On August 23, 1939, the criminal Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was concluded. This conspiracy of two predators made World War II inevitable. Today, the last of the Soviets are trying to justify this criminal pact, condemned by the European Parliament. Under the cut, some historical details and educational program of historical illiteracy.
Handshake of Molotov and Ribbentrop
rendezvous. British caricature of the partition of Poland. Hitler: "The dregs of society, if I'm not mistaken?" Stalin: "A bloody killer of workers, dare I guess?" ("Evening Standard", 09/20/1939)
"Prussian vassalage to Moscow". Caricature from the Polish newspaper Mukha, September 8, 1939. Caption: “We have signed a pact for you, Ribbentrop. Kiss our hand, take the pact, and what we will do next - we will think about it ”
Usually scoops stupidly repeat memorized mantras.
"There is nothing criminal in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. But the conspiracy of the West with Hitler made World War II inevitable. And the collective support of Hitler by the West with the aim of his attack on our country."
Nonsense. The Peace of Munich in 1938 was, albeit unsuccessful, an attempt to negotiate world.
The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939 was precisely that criminal conspiracy of two predators about war.
Even the pro-Soviet historian A. Isaev admits that:
Yes, it was our Munich. England and France had exactly the same motivation: better prepare for war. The difference between Munich and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact is only in the secret protocols on the delimitation of spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. The fact that the Munich Agreement allegedly aimed to redirect Hitlerite aggression to the East is an invention of Soviet propagandists. In fact, England and France also needed at least some respite to mobilize their resources.
"The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact pushed back the border of the USSR and allowed them to win time."
Nonsense. BEFORE the signing of the criminal pact, the USSR did not have a common border with the Reich. Poland was a buffer between them. Even if Hitler had attacked Poland then, the USSR would have had enough time to bring its troops to the border. Having received the territory of Poland, the USSR also received a common border with the Reich. From the point of view of preparing an attack on Germany, this was beneficial. Only Stalin did not take into account that Hitler would get ahead of him with an attack ... And all the "achievements" of Stalin's diplomacy in 1939 were devalued by the military disaster of 1941. For example, the Germans took Minsk, located not far from the 1939 border, on June 28, 1941. So much for you and "winning in territory and time."
"The Soviet Union received a respite for two years in order to prepare for war. Our military industry has significantly increased, and the size of the Red Army has increased from 1 million 700 thousand people in August 1939 to 5.4 million people in June 1941."(A.Isaev)
Hehe, so of them in 1941 only more than three million were captured. So was it necessary to prepare for war? The reckless and suicidal policy of the West allowed Stalin to turn gigantic financial resources (both forcibly seized from the former owners and newly created by the labor of a multimillion-strong army of collective farm and Gulag slaves) into mountains of weapons and military equipment. Already in 1937, the Soviet Air Force was armed with 8139 combat aircraft - about the same number will be two years later in service with Germany (4093), England (1992) and the USA (2473) combined. By October 1, 1939, the aircraft fleet of the Soviet Air Force had grown one and a half times (up to 12,677 aircraft) and now exceeded the total number of aircraft of all participants in the outbreak of the world war. In terms of the number of tanks (14544 - and this is not counting the obsolete T-27 and light amphibious T-37/38), the Red Army at the beginning of 1939 was exactly twice as large as the armies of Germany (3419), France (3286) and England (547) taken together.
General conscription in Germany was introduced only on March 16, 1935. By the summer of 1939, the Wehrmacht already had 51 divisions (including 5 tank and 4 motorized), and the Red Army had 100 rifle divisions (counting the existing 5 rifle brigades for two "calculated divisions"), 18 cavalry divisions and 36 tank brigades. In the future, both powers rapidly increased the number of their armed forces, and the gap between them was continuously decreasing (Germany was catching up with its future enemy). So it turns out that the Reich benefited from the pact.
"The USSR has returned its own!"
Nonsense. The territories occupied by Stalin were not part of the USSR, and the scoops had no right to belong to the Russian Empire. The Soviet Union is not Russia.
In addition, Lviv was not part of the Russian Empire, it was until 1914 part of Austria-Hungary.
"The Poles themselves also entered into an agreement with Hitler and together they tore apart Czechoslovakia!"
Nonsense. Poland did not conclude secret agreements with the Reich on the subsequent division of a particular country, as the USSR did. The Poles just "returned theirs": the notorious Teshin region was inhabited by a mixture of Poles and Czechs, more than once passed from hand to hand. Czechoslovakia was an artificially created quasi-state, the result of the Treaty of Versailles. When the Germans made completely legitimate territorial claims over the Sudetenland inhabited by the Germans, and the Czechs did not want to fight and cowardly capitulated, then the rest of Czechoslovakia's neighbors quite reasonably wanted to return the territories inhabited by their relatives.
"By September 17, when the USSR invaded Poland, the Polish army was already completely defeated by the Wehrmacht. And by that time the Polish government had been evacuated from the country."
Far from it. Separate battles still continued until October, and in some places until November. And this is after the German and Soviet invaders invaded Poland. The Polish government was forced to evacuate after the Soviet attack, when it became clear that the open struggle was lost.
It should also be noted that in the territories occupied by the Soviets, they received a hostile local population, who in 1941 welcomed the Germans. It would seem, what does this mean against the general background of those events when millions of armies fought? However, there are many memories that during the days of the stampede of the Red Army in 1941, the Red Army often panicked after shelling from the local population (especially in Western Ukraine).
Stalin performed an incredible miracle in the Baltics: with his repressions, he forced the Baltics, who had hated the Germans for centuries, to welcome them as liberators.
Fifty years later, two million people - Latvians, Estonians, Lithuanians - held the "Baltic Way" action: they formed a human chain 600 km long through all the Baltic republics, commemorating the victims of the collusion between Stalin and Hitler.
The criminal pact of Molotov-Ribbentrop was.
Unfortunately, the current authorities of Erefia are trying to whitewash the crimes of the Stalinist regime, including.
Original taken from beam_truth On August 23, 1939, a non-aggression pact was signed between Germany and the USSR. part 2.
The beginning of the occupation
By September 16, German troops occupied the Brest Fortress and reached the line Osovets - Bialystok - Belsk - Kamenetz-Litovsk - Vlodava - Vladimir-Volynsky - Zamosc - Lvov - Sambir, at a distance of 150-200 km from the Soviet border. Warsaw was surrounded, the Polish government and the headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Marshal Edward Rydz-Smigly were transferred to Kolomyia, near the Polish-Romanian border. Polish divisions, located on the border with the USSR, were transferred to the west to reinforce the Polish-German front.
At 2 a.m. from September 16 to 17, Stalin called Schulenburg and told him that "The Red Army will cross the Soviet border at 6 a.m. ... Soviet planes will begin bombing areas east of Lvov today" At 3 a.m., Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.P. Potemkin read a note to the Polish ambassador in Moscow, W. Grzybowski, in which it was stated that the war had revealed Poland's internal failure and that by now the Polish government had fled, the troops were not resisting, which meant the termination of the treaties between Poland and the USSR. Grzybowski refused to accept the note: “None of the arguments used to justify the transformation of the Polish-Soviet treaties into empty pieces of paper stand up to scrutiny. According to my information, the head of state and the government are on Polish territory […]. The sovereignty of the state exists as long as the soldiers of the regular army fight […]. What the note says about the position of minorities is nonsense. All the minorities demonstrate by their action their full solidarity with Poland in the struggle against Germanism. […] Napoleon entered Moscow, but as long as Kutuzov's armies existed, it was believed that Russia also existed.
On September 17, Soviet troops moved towards the German offensive. 21 rifle and 13 cavalry divisions, 16 tank and 2 motorized rifle brigades of the Red Army crossed the border. The offensive involved 700 thousand people, 6000 guns, 4500 tanks, 4000 aircraft. As Molotov stated on the radio the same day, their goal is "to take under their protection the lives and property of the population of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus." On the night of September 18, the Polish government fled the country and ordered the Polish military not to enter into armed conflict with the Red Army. The Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army, Rydz-Smigly, issued the following order:
Soviet and German officers at a meeting after the Soviet invasion of Poland. From the German newsreel. A German officer shows a Soviet leaflet in broken Russian, which he reads aloud:
“The German army welcomes the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army! We soldiers wish to enter into a good soldierly relationship with the soldiers of R.K.K.A.
The Russian soldier has always been deeply respected by us.
Which should remain so in the future!
On September 23, a delegation of four German officers arrived in Lvov, who reported that large Polish forces were gathering west of the city of Grubeshov (up to 3 infantry, 4 cavalry divisions, as well as artillery). It was said that the German command was going to attack the flank with tanks in a northerly direction against the Hrubeshov grouping. “At the same time, they propose,” Commander Ivanov pointed out in a report to the commander of the KOVO, “that we participate in the joint destruction of this grouping. The headquarters of the German troops is located in Grudek-Jagelionski, where we ask you to send our delegation.” After that, the Soviet 8th Rifle Corps was sent to the Grubeshov area, where it entered into battle with the Polish units.
In the city of Bereza-Kartuzskaya, communists, Jews, Poles, Belarusians, as well as captured German soldiers who were kept in a concentration camp, were released. The offensive of the Red Army in the rear of the Polish army thwarted the last attempts of the Polish command to organize defense in the Lvov region. The remnants of the Polish army had only to break through to Romania through the Polish-Romanian border. Vladislav Anders subsequently claimed that the Soviet Union, true to its treaties with Germany, tried to stop all attempts to break through and even leave individual Polish soldiers across the border
On September 28, German troops captured Warsaw, and the completely Polish army ceased resistance on October 5, when the last regular Polish formation, the Separate Task Force "Polesie" of General Kläberg, pursued by both German and Soviet troops, surrendered to the Germans.
At the end of September, Soviet and German troops met near Lvov, Lublin and Bialystok. At Lvov, there was a small clash between them, during which both sides had small losses. According to a number of historians, the Wehrmacht and the Red Army held joint parades. In Grodno, the parade was received by commander V. I. Chuikov and a German general, and in Brest by General Heinz Guderian and brigade commander Semyon Krivoshein. A video of the joint parade was shown in the German newsreel Wochenschau N435. Some Russian researchers deny that Soviet units took part in the parade in Brest. Military parades were held as part of ceremonies marking the withdrawal of German troops and the transfer of cities under the control of the Soviet administration.
(see the chronicle of the Brest parade)
Heinz Guderian in his memoirs describes the withdrawal of German troops from Brest as follows:
Krivoshein writes in his memoirs that he insisted on the following scheme:
On October 31, 1939, summing up the results of the operation, Vyacheslav Molotov stated: “It turned out that a short blow to Poland from first the German army, and then the Red Army, was enough to leave nothing left of this ugly offspring of the Versailles Treaty, which lived due to the oppression of non-Polish nationalities” . He also stated that the terms "aggression" and "aggressor" "acquired a new meaning", so that Nazi Germany is now the peace-loving side, and its opponents are aggressive.
Heinz Guderian (center) and Semyon Krivoshein (right) watching the passage of the Wehrmacht and Red Army troops during the transfer of Brest-Litovsk on September 22, 1939 to the Soviet administration
Fight with Hungarian troops
By September 26, the advance detachment of the 16th Soviet cavalry division arrived at the Beskid station, which, as it turned out, was occupied by Hungarian troops on September 23. An attempt to establish contact with them caused shelling from their side. Soviet troops returned artillery fire from armored vehicles. This led to the cessation of firing from the Hungarian side and the withdrawal of the Hungarian troops into the railway tunnel on the border. According to local residents, the tunnel was mined. The situation on this section of the border was normalized after the Soviet-Hungarian negotiations
"Rendezvous". Caricature by David Lo. Published in the British newspaper Evening Standard September 20, 1939, depicts the meeting between Hitler and Stalin after the partition of Poland.
Hitler: "The scum of humanity, if I'm not mistaken?"
Stalin: "A bloody killer of workers, I presume?"
Results
The Polish state temporarily ceased to exist. Despite the defeat of the army, part of the people of Poland did not stop resistance. A Polish government-in-exile was created in London, servicemen of the Polish army joined the ranks of the armies of a number of states, an extensive network of underground resistance cells of the Home Army was created.
The combat losses of the Red Army during the Polish campaign of 1939, according to Soviet archival data, first published by the historian Meltyukhov, amounted to 1,173 people killed, 2,002 wounded and 302 missing. As a result of hostilities, 17 tanks, 6 aircraft, 6 guns and mortars, 36 vehicles were also lost. According to Polish historians, the Red Army lost about 2.5 thousand soldiers, 150 armored vehicles and 20 aircraft killed.
According to the research of Osmachko S.G. The USSR lost only 882 people and 97 missing
The losses of the Polish side in operations against the Soviet troops amounted to [source not specified 86 days] 3,500 people killed, 20,000 missing and 454,700 prisoners. Of the 900 guns and mortars and 300 aircraft, the vast majority went to the Red Army as trophies.
prisoners
After the entry of Soviet troops into the territory of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus and the division of Poland between Germany and the USSR, tens of thousands of Polish citizens, captured by the Red Army and interned, were found in the territory occupied by Soviet troops - servicemen of the Polish army and officials of local government bodies, "siegemen" (military colonists), policemen.
At the end of 1939, the Directorate for Prisoners of War and Internees was created, headed by Pyotr Soprunenko, which was in charge of prisoners from the camps of Central Russia, prisons in Western Belarus and Western Ukraine.
In total, during the fighting, the Red Army captured up to a quarter of a million soldiers and officers of the Polish army. Ordinary and non-commissioned officers, natives of the territories of Poland that had ceded to the USSR, were sent home, more than 40 thousand inhabitants of western and central Poland were handed over to Germany (at the same time, about 20-25 thousand more people were sent to work in the mines of Krivoy Rog and Donbass).
According to the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of October 3, 1939, 6 thousand policemen and gendarmes were kept in the Ostashkov camp (Kalinin region), 4.5 thousand personnel and officers called up from the reserve - in Kozelsky, and about 4 thousand more - in Starobelsky (near Lugansk).
In April-May 1940, at the suggestion of Lavrenty Beria, about 21,857 Polish officers were shot (see Katyn massacre).
In early November 1940, Beria and Stalin came up with the idea of creating a division of Polish prisoners of war in the Red Army, which could be used in case of war with Germany; however, this idea was abandoned.
On June 30, 1941, in London, between the Polish government in exile and representatives of the USSR, an “Agreement on mutual assistance in the war against Germany and the creation of Polish military formations on the territory of the USSR” was signed. On August 12, an amnesty decree for the Poles followed. A total of 389,000 people were amnestied. A significant part of them joined the Polish army, which was formed on the territory of the USSR by General Vladislav Anders, and left the USSR in 1942 as part of it. Another part in 1943 joined the division. Tadeusz Kosciuszko.
The remains of a Polish officer found in Katyn
There is still a long way to go before a unified view of the Second World War within the European Union.
There is still a long way to go before a unified view of the Second World War within the European Union. This is especially evident in relation to the Hitler-Stalin pact and the partition of Poland. The German historian Stefan Trebs says:
Views and opinions here are very different from each other, but still not so much between East and West, but between the Baltic countries plus Poland on the one hand and Russia on the other. In the countries of Western Europe, the non-aggression pact between dictators is not seriously considered as a factor in unleashing a war. For the Germans, the event of August 23, 1939 was blocked in the minds of the events of September 1, 1939, i.e. attack on Poland. But in Western and Central Europe as a whole, the memory of the Hitler-Stalin pact does not play a big role. Surprising but true. Although this pact untied Hitler's hands not only for attacking Poland, but also for actions in early 1940 against France, and later against England.
It was to be expected that in Western Europe this pact should be considered one of the important reasons for the outbreak of war. But this is not the case; in the public memory of France and Great Britain, the pact practically did not linger at all and does not play any role. He is the subject of controversy and contention only between Moscow and the Baltic countries plus Poland. This is clear. From the Russian point of view, the Baltic countries then voluntarily joined the USSR. And from the point of view of the Baltic countries, it was a seizure that violated the rights of the peoples, which interrupted the short history of their independence, which arose in 1918 and was forcibly interrupted by the "Soviets" that authorized the mass deportations of Estonians, Lithuanians and Latvians to Siberia. The elites of the Baltic countries were thus beheaded and independence was lost until 1991.
In Poland, for example, many TV channels show documentaries that are practically unknown in Germany, depicting a joint parade of German and Soviet troops on March 17, 1940 in Brest on the demarcation line that divided these invading armies. Every Pole knows these shots. Soviet and German officers are together, they are cheerful, they laugh at each other's jokes and smoke cigars. The partition of Poland for the Poles puts the German invasion and the Red Army's takeover of eastern Poland on the same plane. There are even footage that captured the negotiations between the Gestapo and the NKVD in Zakopane, which discussed plans for the arrests of prominent representatives of the Polish elite and plans for their isolation. Not a single Pole can look at these shots without feeling a sense of bitterness.
I believe that it makes sense for Europeans to share their memories of the events of those years. But this process will not lead to the fact that such different traces in the people's memory in different countries of Europe, such as between the Baltic countries and Russia, will ever even out, come to a common denominator. Such a prospect seems impossible to me.
The Sejm of Poland adopted a resolution condemning the Red Army's invasion of Eastern Poland on September 17, 1939. The resolution states that Poland fell victim to "two totalitarian regimes - Nazism and communism." The duration and scale of the events that followed the loss of sovereignty give these crimes "signs of genocide," the resolution says.
The Sejm "takes the position that Polish-Russian reconciliation requires respect for historical truth." The deputies condemn attempts to falsify history and appeal "to all people of good will in the Russian Federation with an appeal for joint, solidarity actions to expose and condemn the crimes of the Stalinist era."
| From the resolution of the Seimas On September 17, 1939, the troops of the USSR, without declaring war, committed aggression against the Commonwealth, violating its sovereignty and violating the norms of international law. The basis for the invasion of the Red Army was given by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, concluded on August 23, 1939 in Moscow between the USSR and Nazi Germany. Thus the fourth partition of Poland was carried out. Poland fell victim to two totalitarian regimes - Nazism and communism. The invasion of the Red Army opened another tragic chapter in the history of Poland and all of Central and Eastern Europe. The Polish fate was shared by many other peoples of Central and Eastern Europe. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia lost their sovereignty, and a threat hung over the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Finland and Romania. The Gulag archipelago swallowed up hundreds of thousands of human lives of all the peoples of this region, including many citizens of the USSR. The organization of the system, the duration and scale of the phenomenon gave these crimes, including the Katyn crime, signs of genocide. The truth cannot be hushed up, it cannot be manipulated. The Seim of the Commonwealth condemns all attempts to falsify history and appeals to all people of good will in the Russian Federation with an appeal for joint, solidarity actions to expose and condemn the crimes of the Stalinist era. |
Poland equated Lenin to Hitler
The Sejm of Poland banned communist symbols. According to the adopted amendments to the Criminal Code, the symbols of communism are equated with Nazi ones. Under the new law, production and possession for the purpose of distributing materials propagating Nazi and communist ideologies carries a prison sentence of up to two years. Thus, one can now go to prison in Poland for wearing T-shirts with the image of Lenin and Che Guevara, for using red flags with a hammer and sickle in mass events, etc.
According to the adopted amendments, communist symbols can be distributed exclusively "for artistic, collection, scientific and educational purposes"
MP Stanislav Penta from the Law and Justice opposition faction, which supported the ruling coalition when voting on changes to the criminal code, said the changes to the Criminal Code were adopted “so that the younger generation knows that communism was as evil as fascism.” “Practically every young person knows what a swastika is and has an unambiguous relation to this symbol, but already a sickle and a hammer, a portrait of Lenin - not everyone knows what it is,” the parliamentarian said.
Recall that in June last year, Lithuania banned Soviet symbols and equated them with Nazi ones. Earlier, the Estonian authorities announced their intention to ban Soviet symbols. According to the amendments to the regulation on punishments, prepared in autumn 2006 by the Ministry of Justice of Estonia, “the demonstration and distribution of the official symbols of the former USSR and the union republics, as well as the symbols of the National Socialist Party of Germany and the Waffen SS, including easily recognizable fragments of this symbols”, will regarded as inciting hatred and subject to criminal penalties. Meanwhile, the document approved by the government was never adopted. According to Estonian lawyers, its provisions do not comply with the principles of the rule of law.
The window of truth opened briefly. This happened in 1989 after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, which led to the “revolution of acts”. The veil of secrets of the empire was lifted, and the unpleasant truth, stored in documents since 1917, gradually came to light. At the same time, the biggest lie of the second half of the 20th century was destroyed, that the USSR, being Hitler's worst enemy, defeated fascism with the support of loyal communists from all European countries. This is only half true.
Now the window of truth must be closed again. Stalin is back in fashion in Russia, the victory in the Great Patriotic War is celebrated in a big way, and the collapse of the USSR is “the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century” not only for Putin. This revision of history is noticeable when interpreting the events of August 23, 1939. On this day, a non-aggression pact was signed between Germany and the USSR. It was signed a day later in Moscow in the presence of Joseph Stalin, who the day before dismissed the people's commissar for foreign affairs, Maxim Litvinov, a Jew by nationality.
The non-aggression pact was concluded for a period of ten years, it secured the neutrality of the USSR during the German attack on Poland and its Western neighbors. The secret additional protocol “in case of territorial and political transformations” allowed the USSR to reattach the territories of tsarist Russia lost during the First World War in Eastern Poland, Finland, Estonia and Latvia, while Western Poland and Lithuania were declared a sphere of German interests. When the Wehrmacht occupied western Poland and the Red Army occupied eastern Poland, there were joint parades in the cities where German and Russian soldiers met. Before 1940, both dictatorships divided Central and Eastern Europe and turned the region into the worst hotbed of hostilities (Timothy Snyder). And the Holocaust became possible only because of the silent position of the Soviet Union.
Germany and the Soviet Union were both losers in World War I and had long sought a revision of the Treaty of Versailles. The division of Poland in 1939, as well as the occupation of the Baltic states, continued the tradition of Prussian-Russian cooperation that had been maintained between Moscow and Berlin since the Treaty of Rapalle concluded in 1922. Stalin initially saw in Hitler not an antipode, but an accomplice. When comparing dictatorships, the reasons are often weighed, analyzed, but the state between cooperation and confrontation that was achieved around 1940 is called a collusion by lawyers - a secret agreement between two parties to the detriment of a third. This fact, difficult to grasp, changes the view of the 20th century.
For sincere anti-fascists, such a misalliance should be a heavy blow. The two powers, which were previously considered politically-ideologically and politically-economically antagonists, carried out common affairs. But already at the end of the 1920s, the communist parties identified the "social fascists", that is, the social democratic and socialist parties, as their main opponent. Documents from earlier times show how often communists and national socialists entered into de facto alliances. And Stalin's plan to eliminate the old Bolshevik elite, among which there were a large number of German communists, was being implemented since 1939 in agreement with the Gestapo. Only a few, such as the Trotskyist Willy Münzenberg, voiced their opinion - "You, Stalin, are a traitor!"
The pernicious treaty did not end with the attack on the USSR in June 1941, to which a discouraged and taken aback Stalin reacted by voluntarily dissolving the Comintern. The “security layer” created in 1939 by force remained until 1991 in the territory from Estonia to Bulgaria. There, May 8, 1945 was not a day of liberation, but an instant transition from one domination to another. In the period from August 23, 1939 to May 8, 1945, the central axis of memory of the peoples living there passes, which neither Russia nor Germany wants to perceive.
There are enough reasons to remember, and August 23, to the surprise of many Europeans, is a semi-official holiday. In 2009, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on European conscience and totalitarianism by a majority vote. The parliamentarians, with the support of their colleagues from the Baltic states, called for considering this day “objectively and with a sense of dignity”, thus making their contribution to the common vision of history. They wanted to emphasize in a special way that this process will not be used for political purposes. To this end, a pan-European documentation center and a memorial must be created, Eastern European archives must be opened, including those of the internal special services, secret police and intelligence.
As of today, the European Day of Remembrance for the Victims of Stalinist and Nazi Crimes, despite the support of the European Commission, the Council of Europe and the OSCE, is celebrated only in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia. In Sweden, Ireland and Malta, he caused a stir, in contrast to the larger EU countries. It is generally rejected in Germany. In Russia, it is generally not subject to consideration. It is those countries that signed the treaty on August 23 that ignore this date and do not officially consider it a date of remembrance.
Both countries following the Hitler and Stalin regimes instead settled on the date of May 8-9, 1945. From this perspective, a picture emerges of the anti-Hitler coalition that won in 1945, the war of extermination launched by the National Socialists in 1941 against the Soviet Union with many millions of victims, the liberation of the extermination camp by the Red Army.
But can Europe face the whole truth? In the Soviet Union, which was on the verge of collapse, the presence of a secret additional protocol was no longer hidden; its consequences were condemned at the Congress of People's Deputies at the end of 1989. On the 70th anniversary of the start of World War II, Putin, then prime minister, said in a 2009 address to Poland that the pact was immoral. And he added that Poland was the first to resist the Germans, while earlier he always claimed that the country wanted to unite with Hitler in the fight against the Soviet Union and annexed Czech territory in 1938. And now it looked like this: "All agreements to pacify the Nazis were morally unacceptable, and politically meaningless, damaging and dangerous."
Stalin made this diabolical pact with Hitler only to prevent a confrontation between Germany and the USSR. But even this partial “self-enlightenment,” which did not reach the broad masses of post-Soviet society, was abandoned by Russian opinion leaders in the course of Russian aggression in Ukraine. The dogma of May 9, as a day of liberation, which is supported by representatives of Russian minorities in the Baltic countries, is consolidated, Stalin's atrocities are justified as measures to protect the Soviet Union. The term "fascist" is experiencing a renaissance and is also used in official documents in relation to America, the West and the EU. At the same time, real fascists appear at all sites in the region. Populists from the National Front to the anti-Semitic Jobbik party in Hungary view Putin favorably as they share his goal of weakening the European Union. It is not about understanding history, but about self-affirmation.
In Germany, memorialists and representatives of the Left are criticizing the pan-European Memorial Day on August 23, dismissing the theory of the equation of "red" and "brown" dictatorships. But this paradigm is no longer hidden in the serious study of history, which compares the experience of dictatorships and occupations. The European culture of memory does not emerge from the shadow of the conflict between East and West. But one cannot say goodbye to the hope expressed ten years ago by Jorge Semprun, who survived Buchenwald and said goodbye to the Spanish Communist Party, that "we will no longer be half paralyzed and that Russia will take a decisive step towards democratization."
The Soviet-German non-aggression pact of 1939 marked a sharp turn in the foreign policy of the USSR from support for "collective security" to cooperation with Germany. The division of "spheres of interest", which the leaders of the USSR and Germany agreed on, made it easier for Hitler to capture Poland and ensured the territorial expansion of the USSR in 1939-1940.
After the conclusion of the Munich Treaty between Germany, Italy, Great Britain and France on September 30, 1938, the policy of "collective security" failed, and the USSR found itself isolated. This created the prerequisites for a revision of the course pursued by the Soviet Union directed against Nazi Germany. Such a revision was also in the interests of the German leadership, which was preparing for a military clash with Poland. After the capture of the Czech Republic by Germany on March 15, 1939, Poland received security guarantees from Great Britain and France, and on June 14 Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations began in Moscow on an alliance against Germany. However, they moved slowly and almost reached a dead end. Germany was also in dire need of raw materials, which, in the context of the conflict with Great Britain and France, could be bought in the USSR. Under these conditions, Soviet-German contacts began, aimed at improving bilateral relations.
On December 16, 1938, K. Shnure, head of the Eastern European referentry of the political and economic department of the German Foreign Ministry, informed the Soviet representatives that Germany was ready to provide a loan in exchange for expanding Soviet exports of raw materials. This proposal became the starting point for the Soviet-German rapprochement - so far unstable and not guaranteed in any way.
The German credit initiative evoked a positive response from the Soviet side. We agreed that on January 30 a delegation led by Schnurre would leave for Moscow.
At the New Year’s reception of the heads of diplomatic missions on January 12, 1939, Hitler suddenly approached the Soviet ambassador A. Merekalov, “asked about living in Berlin, about my family, about a trip to Moscow, stressed that he knew about my visit to Schulenburg in Moscow, wished good luck and said goodbye. This has never happened before. But Hitler considered such a demonstration the maximum public disclosure of his intentions, which he could go without reciprocal expressions of sympathy from the Soviet side. And they were not. Therefore, when reports of Schnurre's trip were leaked to the world press, Ribbentrop forbade the visit, negotiations broke down.
On April 17, the Secretary of State of the German Foreign Ministry (First Deputy Ribbentrop) E. Weizsacker was visited by the Soviet Ambassador A. Merekalov. The reason for the visit was quite decent: after the capture of Czechoslovakia, the unresolved issue of Soviet military orders, which were placed at the Czech Skoda factories, remained. However, the discussion went beyond this process, it was about the "political climate" in relations between the two states.
On May 5, adviser of the Soviet embassy G. Astakhov came to K. Schnurra (again about the Skoda - the Germans declared their readiness to fulfill the Soviet order), and the talk was about changes in the Soviet People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. Schnurre reported: "Astakhov touched on the removal of Litvinov and tried, without asking direct questions, to find out whether this event would lead to a change in our position regarding the Soviet Union."
After M. Litvinov was replaced at the post of People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs by V. Molotov, "Hitler, for the first time in six years of his reign, expressed a desire to listen to his experts on Russia." From their report, Hitler learned that the USSR was now pursuing not the policy of world revolution, but a more pragmatic state course. After watching a documentary about Soviet military parades, the Fuhrer exclaimed: "I didn't know at all that Stalin was such a nice and strong personality." German diplomats were given the command to continue to probe the possibilities of rapprochement with the USSR.
The conversations between Schnurre and Astakhov became more frequent. On May 26, the German ambassador to the USSR, F. von Schulenburg, was instructed to intensify contacts with Molotov. But the matter has not moved forward so far - the Soviet leadership retained hopes for negotiations with Great Britain and France. However, both the political negotiations with Great Britain and France in June-July and the military consultations in August were difficult. On July 18, Molotov gave the command to resume consultations with the Germans on the conclusion of an economic agreement. On July 22, the resumption of Soviet-German economic negotiations was announced. At this stage, favor to the German proposals could be used to put pressure on the intractable Anglo-French partners.
At the end of July, Schnurre received instructions to meet with Soviet representatives and resume consultations on improving Soviet-German relations. He invited Astakhov to dinner (in connection with the departure of Merekalov, he became the USSR chargé d'affaires in Germany) and the deputy Soviet trade representative E. Babarin (the representative was also resting at that time). In the informal setting of the restaurant, Schnurre outlined the stages of a possible rapprochement between the two countries: the resumption of economic cooperation through the conclusion of credit and trade agreements, then the "normalization and improvement of political relations", then the conclusion of an agreement between the two countries or a return to the 1926 neutrality agreement. Schnurre formulated the principle, which his superiors will then repeat: "in the entire region from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea and the Far East, there are, in my opinion, no insoluble foreign policy problems between our countries."
Molotov telegraphed Astakhov: “Between the USSR and Germany, of course, with the improvement of economic relations, political relations may also improve. In this sense, Schnurre, generally speaking, is right ... If now the Germans are sincerely changing milestones and really want to improve political relations with the USSR, then they are obliged to tell us how they specifically imagine this improvement ... The matter here depends entirely on the Germans. We would, of course, welcome any improvement in political relations between the two countries.”
German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop received Astakhov and presented him with an alternative: “If Moscow takes a negative position, we will know what is happening and how we should act. If the opposite happens, then from the Baltic to the Black Sea there will be no problems that we cannot jointly resolve between ourselves.”
On August 11, Stalin, having discussed the current situation at the Politburo, gave the go-ahead to strengthen contacts with Germany. On August 14, Astakhov informed Schnurra that Molotov agreed to discuss both the improvement of relations and even the fate of Poland. On August 15, Ambassador Schulenburg received Ribbentrop's instructions to propose that the Soviet side accept a visit by a major German leader in the near future. But Molotov replied that there was no need to hurry with Ribbentrop's visit, "so that everything is not limited to just conversations held in Moscow, but specific decisions are made." Time worked for the USSR, since Hitler planned an attack on Poland as early as August 26th.
To speed things up, Ribbentrop sent Schulenburg to Molotov already with a draft pact, simple to the point of primitiveness: "The German state and the USSR undertake under no circumstances to resort to war and to refrain from any violence against each other." The second point provided for the immediate entry into force of the pact and its long life - 25 years. The USSR and Germany were not supposed to fight until 1964. In a special protocol, Ribbentrop proposed to "coordinate spheres of interest in the Baltic, the problems of the Baltic states", etc. At the first meeting with the German ambassador on August 19, Molotov replied that if the economic agreements were signed today, then Ribbentrop might arrive in a week - on August 26 or 27. It was too late for the Germans - just these days they planned to attack Poland. In addition, Molotov was surprised by the amateurish draft of the pact. He suggested that the Germans take as a basis one of the already concluded pacts and draw up a draft as it should be, with several articles adopted by diplomatic turns. To Schulenburg's proposal to postpone Ribbetrop's visit, "Molotov objected that so far even the first stage - the completion of economic negotiations - has not been passed."
But on August 19, a fundamental decision was made to receive Ribbentrop in Moscow in the near future. At the second meeting with Molotov that day, Schulenburg received a draft non-aggression pact drawn up in accordance with all the rules of diplomatic science.
On the night of August 20, a trade and credit agreement was signed. The USSR received 200 million marks, with which it could buy German equipment, and pay off debts with the supply of raw materials and food.
On 20 August Hitler, risking his prestige, sent a personal message to Stalin to push his new partner to accept Ribbentrop on 22 or 23 August. In his letter, Hitler accepted the Soviet draft pact.
On 21 August, Stalin thanked Hitler for the letter, expressed his hope that the pact would be "a turning point in the improvement of political relations between our countries", and agreed to the arrival of Ribbentrop on 23 August.
When Hitler learned that Ribbentrop could go to Moscow on August 23, he exclaimed: “This is a 100% victory! And although I never do this, now I will drink a bottle of champagne!”
Arriving in Moscow on August 23, Ribbentrop met with a cool reception, but at a very high level. Stalin personally took part in the negotiations. The Soviet side rejected the preamble proposed by the Germans on friendship between the two peoples, but agreed to the wording of a "friendly" exchange of views to resolve Soviet-German differences.
A secret protocol was attached to the treaty, providing for the division of "spheres of influence" in Eastern Europe. Ribbentrop offered the USSR to control the fate of Finland and Bessarabia. It was decided to divide the Baltic States into spheres of interest: Estonia, which is geographically closest to Leningrad - the Soviet Union, Lithuania - Germany. Controversy erupted over Latvia. Ribbentrop tried to get Libava and Vindava into the German sphere of influence, but the Soviet Union needed these ports, and Stalin knew that the agreement was more expensive for Hitler than two ports and all of Latvia to boot. Hitler did not become stubborn and gave up Latvia, informing Ribbentrop of his decision in Moscow. With regard to the Polish state, Ribbentrop proposed to divide the spheres of interest along the border of ethnic Poland, the "Curzon Line", giving Western Belarus and Ukraine under the control of the USSR. But Stalin considered it possible to draw a dividing line along the Vistula, thus claiming to participate in deciding the fate of the Polish people. In general, the sphere of interests of the USSR was close to the borders of the Russian Empire.
After the signing of the documents, a mountain fell off the shoulders of the negotiators - the failure of the meeting would mean a strategic failure for both sides. The conversation became much friendlier.
The Soviet-German non-aggression pact, known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, was signed on the night of August 24, 1939 (the official date of its signing is the day the negotiations began on August 23).
This treaty marked the beginning of a period of Soviet-German rapprochement, made it easier for Hitler to defeat Poland, which Germany attacked on September 1, 1939. On September 3, Great Britain and France declared war on Germany, marking the beginning of World War II. The USSR used this military conflict, occupying the western parts of Ukraine and Belarus, which were previously part of the Polish state. On September 28, a new Soviet-German treaty "On Friendship and Borders" was concluded, which secured the division of the territory of the destroyed Polish state between the USSR and Germany. By agreeing to the transfer of all ethnic Polish territories to Germany, the USSR also received Lithuania in its sphere of influence, and set about establishing its military-political control over the Baltic states.
NON-AGGRESSION PACT BETWEEN GERMANY AND THE SOVIET UNION
USSR government and
German government
Guided by the desire to strengthen the cause of peace between the USSR and Germany and proceeding from the main provisions of the neutrality treaty concluded between the USSR and Germany in April 1926, they came to the following agreement:
Article I
Both Contracting Parties undertake to refrain from any violence, from any aggressive action and any attack against each other, either separately or jointly with other powers.
Article II
In the event that one of the Contracting Parties becomes the object of hostilities by a third power, the other Contracting Party will not support that power in any form.
Article III.
The Governments of both Contracting Parties shall remain in future contact with each other for consultation, in order to inform each other of matters affecting their common interests.
Article IV
None of the Contracting Parties will participate in any grouping of powers which is directly or indirectly directed against the other side.
Article V
In the event of disputes or conflicts between the Contracting Parties on issues of one kind or another, both parties will resolve these disputes or conflicts exclusively by peaceful means through a friendly exchange of opinions or, if necessary, by creating commissions to resolve the conflict.
Article VI
The present treaty is concluded for a period of ten years, so long as one of the Contracting Parties does not denounce it one year before the expiration of the term, the term of the treaty will be considered automatically extended for another five years.
Article VII.
This treaty is subject to ratification as soon as possible. The exchange of instruments of ratification is to take place in Berlin. The agreement comes into force immediately after its signing.
Secret Additional Protocol
to the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union
At the time of the signing of the non-aggression pact between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the undersigned plenipotentiaries of both parties discussed in strict confidentiality the question of delimiting the spheres of mutual interests in Eastern Europe. This discussion led to the following result:
1. In the event of a territorial and political reorganization of the regions that are part of the Baltic states (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern border of Lithuania is simultaneously the border of the spheres of interests of Germany and the USSR. At the same time, the interests of Lithuania in relation to the Vilna region are recognized by both parties.
2. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement of the regions that are part of the Polish state, the border of the spheres of interests of Germany and the USSR will approximately run along the line of the Nareva, Vistula and Sana rivers.
The question whether the preservation of an independent Polish state is desirable in mutual interests, and what the boundaries of this state will be, can only be definitively clarified in the course of further political development.
In any case, both governments will resolve this issue by way of friendly mutual agreement.
3. Regarding the south-east of Europe, the Soviet side emphasizes the interest of the USSR in Bessarabia. The German side declares its complete political disinterest in these areas.
4. This protocol will be kept strictly secret by both parties.
1939. Pre-war crisis in documents. M., 1992.
Eastern Europe between Hitler and Stalin. 1939-1941 M., 1999.
Documents of foreign policy of the USSR. T.21.
Rozanov G.L. Stalin - Hitler. Documentary essay on Soviet-German diplomatic relations, 1939-1941. M., 1991.
Semiryaga M.I. Secrets of Stalinist diplomacy. 1939-1941. M., 1992.
Fleischhauer I. Pact. Hitler, Stalin and the initiative of German diplomacy 1938-1939. M., 1991.
Shubin A.V. The world is on the edge of the abyss. From global crisis to world war. 1929-1941. M., 2004.
What were the reasons for the Soviet-German rapprochement in 1939?
Why did the German leadership insist on signing a non-aggression pact with Germany in the second half of August 1939?
How did Soviet-German relations in 1939 depend on the course of the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations?
What changes were made to the draft documents during the negotiations on August 23-24, 1939?
Opposition to German revanchism
"Mission Kandelaki" and Stalin's first attempts to improve relations with Hitler
This search for contacts begins in 1934, when (after the "Night of the Long Knives") Stalin begins to realize that Hitler came to power in earnest and for a long time. As a result, at the end of this year, Soviet emissary David Kandelaki is sent to Berlin as a trade representative, with the task of establishing political relations with Berlin. Before Kandelaki's departure, Stalin received him twice (and the second time the conversation took place in private), which testifies to the importance that Stalin attached to this mission. While negotiating in Germany, Kandelaki stubbornly tried to transfer them from the economic to the political level - to the Reich Minister G. Goering and the director of the Imperial Bank J. Schacht. In 1936, the Soviet side offered Berlin the signing of a non-aggression pact (rejected on the grounds that there was no common border between the USSR and Germany). To demonstrate goodwill on the part of Moscow, the head of the Soviet intelligence network, Walter Krivitsky, was ordered to curtail the German residency.
The so-called “Kandelaki mission”, which lasted until 1937, ended in failure: Hitler, for ideological and political reasons, considered it necessary to maintain ties with the USSR at a minimum level. Nevertheless, in the same 1937, channels of communication with the higher spheres of the Reich were established through Yezhov through the NKVD.
Situation after Munich
At the same time (in October 1938), Hitler for the first time puts forward claims to Poland (demanding Danzig, extraterritorial roads and the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact), which subsequently served as a pretext for the German attack on Poland.
"It's About Roasted Chestnuts"
Negotiations with Poland, however, did not lead to the desired result for Hitler; the situation worsened, and the threat of war arose again. Under these conditions, Stalin, speaking on March 10, 1939 at the XVIII Congress of the CPSU (b), in a speech that received the name in the West "speech about roasted chestnuts", accused the Anglo-French of provoking the war and announced his readiness for a "peace policy" in relation to Germany, declaring the main tasks of Soviet policy:
1. Continue to pursue a policy of peace and strengthening business ties with all countries.
2. […] Do not let our country be drawn into conflicts by provocateurs of war, who are accustomed to rake in the heat with the wrong hands.
This hint was immediately perceived in Berlin. Subsequently, after the conclusion of the Pact, Molotov called it "the beginning of a turn" in Soviet-German relations.
Crisis of 1939
Spring-Summer Crisis of 1939
The further development of the situation in Europe looked as follows.
Soviet diplomacy in the conditions of the spring-summer crisis
Negotiations in the summer of 1939
Political negotiations with England and France
Trilateral political negotiations between the USSR, Great Britain and France, which began on April 10, were based on the Soviet draft of June 2, which provided for the entry into force of the union in the following cases:
- In the event of an attack by one of the European powers (i.e. Germany) on the contracting party;
- in the event of German aggression against Belgium, Greece, Turkey, Romania, Poland, Latvia, Estonia or Finland (the contracting parties gave guarantees of protection to all of them),
- in the event that one of the parties will be involved in the war due to the provision of assistance at the request of a third European country.
These conditions were only partially accepted by London and Paris. . The negotiations, which dragged on until the end of July, rested mainly on the unwillingness of Britain and France to accept the Soviet definition of the concept of "indirect aggression", under which allied obligations would come into force. In the Soviet version, it was defined as follows:
The expression "indirect aggression" refers to an act to which any of the above states<страны, пограничные с СССР, а также Бельгия и Греция>agrees under the threat of force from another power or without such threat and which entails the use of the territory and forces of this state for aggression against it or against one of the contracting parties
This was regarded by the Anglo-French as a demand from the USSR to give it the opportunity, at will and under any pretext, to send its troops into neighboring countries. For their part, the "democracies" proposed such a variant of the treaty, in which the existence of "indirect aggression" was established only after tripartite consultations; The USSR, for its part, accused England and France of unwillingness to bind themselves with obligations of military participation in the event of a possible war with Germany. In addition, the Soviet Union demanded that a military convention be concluded simultaneously with a political treaty, while Britain and France insisted that military negotiations follow a political agreement.
According to Churchill,
An obstacle to concluding such an agreement (with the USSR) was the horror that these same border states experienced before Soviet help in the form of Soviet armies that could pass through their territories to protect them from the Germans and, along the way, include them in the Soviet-communist system. After all, they were the most violent opponents of this system. Poland, Romania, Finland and the three Baltic states did not know what they feared more - German aggression or Russian salvation. It was the need to make such a terrible choice that paralyzed the politics of England and France.
Rapprochement between the USSR and Germany
At the end of July 1939, Hitler decides to move closer to the USSR. On July 26, Astakhov, a Soviet charge d'affaires, is invited to a restaurant to "probe" him in an informal setting. On the German side, there was an official from the Foreign Ministry, Schnurre, who had been conducting economic negotiations until now. The results of the conversation were satisfactory to both parties. Astakhov reports in a telegram:
Germany is ready to talk and come to an agreement with us [USSR] on all issues of interest to both sides, giving all the security guarantees that we would like to receive from her. Even with respect to the Baltic States and Poland, it would be as easy to reach an agreement as it would be with respect to Ukraine (which Germany abandoned).
According to these authors, "all of its points were aimed not at how to contribute to the success of the negotiations (their goal was not even indicated), but at how to frustrate them, then placing the responsibility for the failure on the Western delegations that sent them to the governments." This is also confirmed by the fact that on August 11, that is, on the eve of the start of negotiations, the Politburo decided "to enter into an official discussion of the issues raised by the Germans, about which to notify Berlin." . Charge d'Affaires of the USSR in Germany Astakhov wrote to Molotov on August 8, 1939:
... But, in essence, the Germans are interested, of course, not in these questions. Judging by the hints that I hear and the trends that reach me, they would not mind, having tested our discreteness and readiness to negotiate on these issues, to involve us in conversations of a more far-reaching nature, having reviewed all the territorial and political problems that could arise between us and them. In this regard, the phrase about the absence of contradictions “all the way from the Black Sea to the Baltic” can be understood as a desire to agree on all issues related to the countries located in this zone. The Germans want to give us the impression that they would be ready to declare their disinterest (at least political) in the fate of the Baltic states (except Lithuania), Bessarabia, Russian Poland (with changes in favor of the Germans) and to dissociate themselves from aspiration to Ukraine. For this, they would like us to confirm our disinterest in the fate of Danzig, as well as former German Poland (perhaps with an addition to the Warta or even the Vistula line) and (by way of discussion) Galicia. Conversations of this kind in the minds of the Germans are obviously conceivable only on the basis of the absence of an Anglo-French-Soviet military-political agreement.
... The list of objects indicated in your letter dated August 8 is of interest to us. Talking about them requires preparation and some transitional steps from the trade and credit agreement to other issues. We prefer to conduct negotiations on these issues in Moscow. Molotov.
According to other researchers, the text does not give grounds for such interpretations.
Voroshilov posed a number of specific questions to the Anglo-French, to which they could not give clear answers, since they were forbidden to disclose secret military information (due to the fact that, in the absence of a binding political agreement, it could be transferred to Berlin). A deployment plan was also presented to the USSR, according to which up to 136 divisions were to operate, but representatives of England and France did not provide such plans.
A day later, it came to the question of the passage of the Red Army through the territory of Poland, along the Vilna and Galician corridors - without which, in the opinion of the Soviet side, a possible German aggression could not be repelled. . This turned out to be a "dead point" on which the negotiations froze. The Poles flatly refused to let the Red Army through their territory, despite pressure from France. The aphoristic expression said by Beck to the French ambassador is known: "With the Germans we risk losing our freedom, and with the Russians - our soul."
There is no doubt that the USSR wants to conclude a military pact and does not want us to turn this pact into an empty piece of paper with no specific meaning. […] The failure of the negotiations is inevitable if Poland does not change its position.
American journalist William Shearer states:
Despite the opinion widespread at that time not only in Moscow, but also in Western capitals, that England and France did nothing to persuade Poland to allow Soviet troops to pass through its territory to protect against the Germans, it follows from recently published documents , it is not so. England and France have advanced far in this matter, but not far enough. From these documents it is also clear that the Poles showed incomprehensible stupidity.
Simultaneously with the Moscow talks, the British government was negotiating in London with German representatives to conclude an agreement that would recognize special German interests in Eastern and Southeastern Europe; in addition, England was ready to allow Germany to exploit the "colonial-African zone." The negotiations ended in failure due to the actual refusal of Germany to consider the British proposals, due to the depth of mutual contradictions.
According to the official Soviet version, it was after this that the Soviet government ceased to trust its partners in the Moscow negotiations and agreed to consider the German proposal for a German-Soviet non-aggression pact.
Politics of the countries of Eastern Europe
The governments of the Eastern European countries treated the USSR with deep distrust. In March 1939, after the capture of the Klaipeda region of Lithuania by Germany, the USSR took diplomatic steps towards rapprochement with Latvia and Estonia, but they were met coldly. . In May, despite the aggravation of relations with Germany, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Poland did not want to be bound by any agreements with the USSR.
The American historian W. Shearer characterizes Poland's pre-war policy as "suicidal." Shearer notes that Poland has consistently supported Germany since 1934 to the detriment of the Versailles system. At the same time, there was a sharp territorial dispute between Poland and Germany over the Danzig corridor, which divided German territory into two parts. Relations between Poland and Russia have been chilly since the Polish-Soviet War, during which Poland attacked Russia, weakened by civil war, and moved its border east of the Curzon Line at the expense of Soviet territory. (As a result, about 6 million ethnic Belarusians and Ukrainians ended up in Poland). After Piłsudski's death, Poland's policy was determined by veterans of the Polish–Soviet War, such as Beck and Rydz-Smigly, who were determined to confront the USSR. Thus, according to Shearer, Poland had a border "unacceptable" to either Germany or the USSR, while not being strong enough to be able to quarrel with both neighbors at the same time.
The Baltic countries, as noted by the Estonian historian Dr. Magnus Ilmjärv, did not trust the USSR, both for historical reasons and because of the difference in regimes; the Soviet-Anglo-French negotiations that began in the summer of 1939 aroused their fear that, having entered these countries, the Red Army would establish a Bolshevik regime there and eventually refuse to leave. In addition, the Baltic countries, after the experience of Munich, did not believe that Great Britain and France would actually fulfill their obligations to protect them in the event of German aggression.
As a result, the governments of Estonia, Latvia, and Finland declared that any guarantee given without their request would be regarded as an act of aggression, after which they hastened to conclude non-aggression pacts with Germany (June 7). At the same time, Germany not only promised not to attack the Baltic countries, but also guaranteed assistance in the event of Soviet aggression. This gave the Baltic governments a sense of security, which soon turned out to be false. High-ranking German military officers (Halder and Canaris) visited the Baltic countries and negotiated military cooperation there. According to the German envoy in Tallinn, the chief of staff of the Estonian army Reck told him that Estonia could assist Germany in establishing control over the Baltic Sea, including mining the Gulf of Finland against Soviet warships.
non-aggression pact
Signing an agreement
Ribbentrop flew to Moscow at noon on August 23 and immediately reported to the Kremlin. The meeting, which lasted three hours, ended favorably for the Germans. When the discussion of the draft treaty began, Stalin declared: "Additional agreements are needed for this treaty, about which we will not publish anything anywhere." This meant a secret protocol on the division of spheres of mutual interests. According to Ribbentrop, Stalin "made it clear that if he did not get half of Poland and the Baltic countries without Lithuania with the port of Libava, then I could immediately fly back" (As Ribbentrop's telegram to Hitler shows, it was about two Latvian ports - Liepaja and Ventspils). On the same evening both documents were signed. Negotiations continued until the morning. The meeting ended with a banquet that opened with Stalin's toast: “I know how the German people love the Fuhrer. Therefore, I want to drink to his health.
Content and legal characteristics of the contract
Left: division of areas of interest in Eastern Europe under the additional protocol.
Right: Actual territorial changes by 1941.
In orange are the territories that departed and ceded to the USSR, in blue - the territories ceded to the Reich, in purple - the territories occupied by Germany (Warsaw General Government and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia)
Estimates of the legal side of the contract are contradictory. According to some opinions, the Non-Aggression Pact itself (without a protocol) contains nothing unusual and is a typical non-aggression pact, examples of which are frequent in contemporary European history (for example, a similar pact between Germany and Poland). In addition, the delimitation of spheres of interest, in itself, does not imply a mandatory change in the status of states assigned to someone's sphere of interest.
Other authors, analyzing the treaty, point to the following features that make it possible to characterize it as a conscious encouragement of the aggressor:
- There was no clause in the treaty that canceled its effect in the event that one of the parties committed aggression (in international practice, this clause was optional, but in Soviet treaties of this kind until then it was always present).
- Article II of the treaty provided for the observance of neutrality in the event that one of the parties becomes not the object of attack, but “the object of hostilities on the part of a third power” (that is, the USSR guaranteed Germany neutrality both in the case of defensive and aggressive actions).
- Article III declared forms of political interaction in the form of consultations.
- Article IV declared the refusal of both parties to participate in a grouping of powers directly or indirectly directed against the other side. At the same time, it did not contain the usual clause in such cases that this agreement does not cancel the validity of previously concluded agreements. Thus, this agreement canceled all agreements previously concluded by the USSR with Germany's opponents, and concluded a promise not to support them in any form. From this it is concluded that Articles III and IV unilaterally tied the USSR to the German bloc to the detriment of relations with Germany's adversaries (Although from a legal point of view, such a clause is unthinkable, since an agreement concluded between the two parties cannot in any way change or cancel any other an agreement concluded by one of the parties to this agreement with a third party - without such a third party itself becoming a party to the agreement being concluded).
These authors also point out that the Treaty is closely related to the secret protocol and cannot be assessed separately from it, as well as outside the specific pre-war situation of those days. The secret protocol to the treaty referred to the sphere of interests of the USSR in the Baltic States Latvia, Estonia and Finland, Germany - Lithuania; in Poland, the division passed along the Narew-Vistula-San line, Vilnius passed from Poland to Lithuania. At the same time, the very question of whether the preservation of the Polish state was desirable from the point of view of the interests of the contracting parties was left to "the course of further political development", but in any case had to be resolved "by mutual friendly agreement." In addition, the USSR emphasized its interest in Bessarabia, and Germany did not object to the interests of the USSR in Bessarabia. The additional protocol is assessed by these authors as legally unlawful, since it concerned third countries
Japan's reaction to the signing of the treaty
On August 25, 1939, Japanese Foreign Minister Arita protested to the German ambassador in Tokyo, Otto, about the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact. The protest noted that this treaty was in its spirit contrary to the Anti-Comintern Pact. On August 28, 1939, the Japanese government, headed by Kiichiro Hiranuma, who was a supporter of a joint Japanese-German war against the USSR, resigned.
Versions about the reasons for signing the contract
The version about the desire of the USSR to avoid war with Germany
This version is followed by Soviet and modern Russian historiography.
The agreement was signed after the failure of the Moscow negotiations held in the spring and summer of 1939 between representatives of the USSR, England and France in order to conclude a tripartite agreement on mutual assistance (the draft agreement was presented by the Soviet government on June 2) and a military convention providing for specific military measures to ensure collective security in Europe.
During the negotiations, the unwillingness of England and France to give concrete military obligations and develop real military plans to counter possible German aggression was revealed. Moreover, in parallel with the Moscow talks, the British government was holding talks in London with German representatives on the delimitation of spheres of influence. And this further reinforced the fears of the Soviet government that its Western partners were seeking to direct Hitler's aggression to the east, the aggression that had already led to the "Munich Pact" and the division of Czechoslovakia. As a result of the failure of the Moscow talks, the USSR lost hope of creating a military coalition with the Western powers and found itself in a hostile environment, when in the West its potential opponents were both the countries of the “cordon sanitaire” and Germany, and in the East militaristic Japan acted as an aggressor. Under these conditions, the USSR was forced to agree to Germany's proposals to start negotiations on a non-aggression pact.
|
Thus, Soviet historiography considered the signing of a non-aggression pact with Germany the only way to avoid war with Germany and other countries of the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1939, when the USSR, in its opinion, was actually in isolation, having no allies.
The version about the expansionist motives of Stalin
According to a number of researchers, the treaty was a manifestation of the expansionist aspirations of Stalin, who sought to push Germany against the "Western democracies" and take the position of the "third rejoicing", and after their mutual weakening, to Sovietize Western Europe. S. Z. Sluch, who believes that Stalin saw in Germany, first of all, a “natural ally” in the struggle against the capitalist world, characterizes the agreement as follows: “Essentially, even before the start of World War II, continental Europe was divided between two dictators who represented models of largely similar behavior in the international arena - a new type of political gangsterism, differing only in the scale and degree of hypocrisy” .
Version of Stalin's imperial motives
This point of view explains Stalin's actions exclusively by pragmatic-imperial considerations. According to it, Stalin for some time chose between Germany and the "democracies", but, faced with the dishonesty of the latter, he preferred to stay away from the war and take advantage of the "friendship" with Germany, primarily by affirming the political interests of the USSR in Eastern Europe. This opinion was already expressed by Winston Churchill immediately after the signing of the Treaty.
Geoffrey Roberts, professor of history at the University of Ireland, believes that the policy of the USSR was to achieve, on the basis of an agreement with Germany, a limited sphere of influence that would guarantee the country's primary security needs, mainly to keep the country from being drawn into the war and limit Germany's expansion to the east. .
It should also be noted that many historians believe that England and France, contrary to the version of Soviet historiography, did not aim at directing German aggression to the east of Europe.
Version of Stalin's preparation for an attack on Germany
This version is supported by the concentration of Soviet troops near the borders of Germany in 1941 and the training of the Red Army in offensive war tactics.
Possible motives for Stalin's actions
Calculations for the provocation of war
According to a number of researchers, Stalin was never a sincere adherent of the course of collective security officially proclaimed (and sincerely defended) by Litvinov.
It is significant that not a word is mentioned about collective security in the “Short Course on the History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks”, edited and partly written by Stalin himself. Moreover, in this work, written in , it was stated that "the second imperialist war had actually already begun" - thus, the ongoing political events were qualified by Stalin as a war between imperialist states. Deputy People's Commissar of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs V. Potemkin stated in the Bolshevik magazine the official concept of the "second imperialist war" and its prospects:
A. A. Zhdanov, having outlined the theses of the future Stalinist “speech on roasted chestnuts” at the Leningrad Party Conference on March 3, 1939, made the following summary: Moscow’s task is “to accumulate our strength for the time when we will deal with Hitler and Mussolini, and at the same time, of course, , and with Chamberlain"
From this, a number of researchers conclude that Stalin considered undermining the imperialist system in the course of the proposed war as his political goal. According to S. Z. Sluch, Stalin “saw in the acutely confrontational development of the international situation additional opportunities for realizing his own imperial ambitions, identified with the interests of the country’s security, and sought to force the capitalist world“ to make room a little and retreat ”
In 1935, Stalin wrote to Kaganovich in a cipher telegram:
The stronger the fight between them<капиталистическими странами>the better for the USSR. We can sell bread to both so that they can fight.<...>It is beneficial for us that their fight be as long as possible, but without an early victory of one over the other
Almost the same thoughts were expressed by Stalin immediately after the outbreak of World War II to Georgy Dimitrov:
A war is going on between two groups of capitalist countries (the poor and the rich in terms of colonies, raw materials, etc.) for the redistribution of the world, for domination of the world! We don't mind if they fight well and weaken each other. It would not be bad if the position of the richest capitalist countries (especially England) were shaken by the hands of Germany. Hitler himself, without understanding or wanting to do so, shakes and undermines the capitalist system.<...>We can maneuver, push one side against the other, so that we better tear ourselves apart.<...>What would be bad if, as a result of the defeat of Poland, we extended the socialist system to new territories and populations?
In this regard, some historians believe that Stalin was really guided by the "rules of the game" that he formulated in his "speech on roasted chestnuts" in relation to England and France:
Formally, the policy of non-intervention could be described as follows: "Let each country defend itself against aggressors as it wants and as best it can, our business is a side, we will trade with both aggressors and their victims." In reality, however, the policy of non-intervention means condoning aggression, unleashing a war, and consequently turning it into a world war. In the policy of non-intervention, there is a desire, a desire not to interfere with the aggressors from doing their dirty work<...>let all the participants in the war get bogged down deep in the mire of war, encourage them to do so in secret, let them weaken and exhaust each other, and then, when they are sufficiently weakened, come on stage with fresh strength - to speak, of course, "in the interests of peace" and dictate weakened participants in the war their conditions. And cheap and cute!
"State tasks of the USSR" in the understanding of Stalin
A number of researchers believe that Stalin, putting forward his proposals for a joint struggle against Hitler, was not at all as disinterested as official Moscow represented. In this they rely on a number of statements, directly or indirectly going back to Stalin himself. In the city, the Pravda newspaper defined the behavior of the USSR before the signing of the pact as follows: “The USSR sought to carry out its state tasks within the western borders of our country and strengthen peace, while Anglo-French diplomacy - to ignore these tasks of the USSR, to organize war and the involvement of the Soviet Union in it.
They also point to Stalin's words to Georgy Dimitrov (September 7), from which it is clear that Stalin expected to receive a "payment" for an alliance with the democracies:
We preferred an agreement with the so-called democratic countries, and therefore we negotiated. But the English and French wanted to have us as farmhands, and, moreover, to pay nothing! We, of course, would not have gone to work as farm laborers and still less without getting anything.
Opinions of contemporaries
Our enemies also counted on the fact that Russia would become our adversary after the conquest of Poland. Enemies did not take into account my determination. Our enemies are like little worms. I saw them in Munich. I was convinced that Stalin would never accept the proposal of the British. Only reckless optimists could think that Stalin was so stupid that he did not recognize their true goal. Russia is not interested in preserving Poland... Litvinov's resignation was a decisive factor. After that, I instantly realized that in Moscow the attitude towards the Western powers had changed. I have taken steps to change relations with Russia. In connection with the economic agreement, political negotiations began. In the end, a proposal came from the Russians to sign a non-aggression pact. Four days ago, I took a special step that led to Russia yesterday announcing its readiness to sign the pact. Established personal contact with Stalin. The day after tomorrow Ribbentrop will conclude a treaty. Now Poland found herself in the position I wanted to see her in... The destruction of England's hegemony had begun. Now that I have made the necessary diplomatic preparations, the way is open for the soldiers.
It may be asked: how could it happen that the Soviet Government agreed to conclude a non-aggression pact with such treacherous people and monsters as Hitler and Ribbentrop? Has the Soviet Government made a mistake here? Of course not! A non-aggression pact is a peace pact between two states. It was this pact that Germany proposed to us in 1939. Could the Soviet Government refuse such a proposal? I think that not a single peace-loving state can refuse a peace agreement with a neighboring power, if at the head of this power there are even such monsters and cannibals as Hitler and Ribbentrop. And this, of course, on one indispensable condition - if the peace agreement does not affect either directly or indirectly the territorial integrity, independence and honor of a peace-loving state. As you know, the non-aggression pact between Germany and the USSR is just such a pact.
As for the agreement with Russia, I fully approve it.<...>rapprochement between Germany and Russia is necessary to prevent encirclement by democracies
7. William Shearer, American historian, correspondent in Germany
France, together with Germany and England, unanimously excluded Russia from the number of participants in the meeting in Munich. A few months later, Western democracies had to pay the price. On October 3, four days after the Munich meeting, Werner von Tippelskirch, adviser to the German embassy in Moscow, reported to Berlin on the consequences of Munich for the policy of the Soviet Union.<…>
London and Paris bitterly lamented Stalin's double game. For many years, the Soviet despot shouted about "fascist beasts", calling on all peace-loving states to rally to stop Nazi aggression. Now he himself became her accomplice. The Kremlin could object, which, in fact, they did: the Soviet Union did what England and France did a year ago in Munich - at the expense of a small state they bought themselves a peaceful respite, necessary for rearmament in order to resist Germany. If Chamberlain acted honestly and nobly in appeasing Hitler and giving him Czechoslovakia in 1938, then why did Stalin behave dishonestly and ignoblely, appeasing Hitler a year later with Poland, which still refused Soviet assistance?
About the secret cynical deal between Stalin and Hitler<по разделу Восточной Европы>(...) knew only in Berlin and Moscow. True, everyone soon learned about it by the steps that Russia took and which even then amazed the whole world. (…)
In 1948, in response to the publication of the aforementioned collection of the US State Department "Nazi-Soviet relations", the Sovinformburo published the book "Falsifiers of History" in which counter-accusations are made to Western countries and, in turn, contain statements about the financing of Germany by British and American financial circles in the 1930s years . Unlike the publication of the US State Department, which was, in fact, a collection of archival documents, the Soviet edition was an author's text; it did not cite a single document in full and several - in minor excerpts. The existence of a secret protocol was denied by Molotov until his death, which he repeatedly spoke about in conversations with the writer Chuev.
The question of the pact and especially the protocols was raised in the USSR during perestroika, primarily due to pressure from Poland (see the Katyn question). To study the issue, a special commission was created, headed by the secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Alexander Yakovlev. On December 24, 1989, the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, after hearing the conclusions of the commission reported by Yakovlev, adopted a resolution in which it condemned the protocol (noting the absence of originals, but recognizing its authenticity, based on graphological, phototechnical and lexical examination of copies, and the correspondence of subsequent events to them). At the same time, for the first time in the USSR, the text of secret protocols was published (according to the German microfilm - "Questions of History", No. 6, 1989).
The original protocol was actually kept in the Presidential Archive (now the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Special folder, package No. 34), but was hidden by Mikhail Gorbachev (who knew about its existence since 1987), and Gorbachev, according to his manager V. Boldin, hinted to Boldin on the desirability of destroying this document. After declassifying the archive, the document was “found” on October 30, 1992 by the Deputy Head of the Main Political Directorate, Colonel General D.A. Volkogonov and published in newspapers. The scientific publication took place in the journal "New and Contemporary History", No. 1, 1993.
see also
- Soviet-German cooperation in the period before World War II
Notes
- S. Z. Sluch. Stalin and Hitler, 1933-1941. Calculations and miscalculations of the Kremlin, Patriotic History, 2005, No. 1 pp. 100-101.
- TSB "World War II"
- Anthony C. Sutton. Wall Street and the rise of Hitler. New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House, 1975
- S. Z. Sluch. Stalin and Hitler, 1933-1941. Calculations and miscalculations of the Kremlin, Patriotic History, 2005, No. 1 p. 101 ff.
- S. Z. Sluch. Germany and the USSR in 1918-1939: motives and consequences of foreign policy decisions // USSR and Germany during the years of war and peace (1941-1945) M., 1995
- A. M. Nekrich. June 22, 1941
- D. G. Najafov. The Soviet-German pact of 1939 and its historical consequences.// Questions of History, No. 12, 2006, p.7
