Tu 22 Georgia. Aviation losses in the five-day war - war and peace

MOSCOW, September 11 - RIA Novosti. The Russian Air Force lost seven aircraft during the armed conflict with Georgia, says Russian expert Said Aminov.

"According to the latest unofficial information, on the first day of the war on August 8, Georgian air defense systems were able to shoot down four Russian aircraft - three Su-25s and one Tu-22M3," Aminov said in an article that will be published on September 13 in the Moscow Defense Brief magazine.

The loss of these four aircraft was officially confirmed by the Russian General Staff. The author notes that all four Russian planes were shot down by Buk-M1.

"Moreover, the Georgian military were trained in the use of the Buk-M1 in Ukraine, and the Georgians could conduct combat operations under the control of Ukrainian military instructors," the author states.

According to Aminov, both Su-24s were allegedly hit by Georgian Osa-AK/AKM air defense systems or man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), while the Su-25 was reportedly the victim of misguided “friendly fire” by Russian troops .

"At least one more Russian Su-25 was hit by a Georgian MANPADS missile, but was able to safely return to the base. In turn, as reported, the air defense of the Russian troops shot down three Georgian Su-25s," the Russian expert says in the article.

Of the crew members of the downed Russian aircraft, two (pilots of the Su-24MR and Tu-22M3) were captured, from where they were released on an exchange on August 19.

"According to unofficial information, five more Russian pilots (the pilot of the Su-25 shot down by friendly fire, the navigator of the Su-24MR crew and three members of the Tu-22M3 crew) were killed," Aminov said.

He concludes that the collision with such an air defense system was a serious test for the Russian military aviation. “Especially since, apparently, initially there was an underestimation of Georgian air defense capabilities. At the same time, Georgian air defense, as reported, relied mainly on receiving information from Kolchuga-M (electronic intelligence complex), using active radars to a minimum , and the Georgian Buk-M1 and Osa-AK/AKM used ambush tactics, which made it difficult to fight Georgian air defense systems," the Russian expert says in the article.

"Buk-M1-2" (GRAU index - 9K37M1-2) - anti-aircraft missile system. Its development began on February 13, 1972 at the Research Institute of Instrument Engineering. V. V. Tikhomirova. It represents a conceptual development of the Kub air defense system and the modernization of the Buk air defense system. According to NATO classification - SA-17 Grizzly (Grizzly).

Development completed in 1978, first introduced in 1980. Active work is underway to create new military air defense systems, including the promising Buk-M3 air defense system.

The Buk-M1-2 combat complex includes a command post (command post), a target detection radar, up to six self-propelled firing systems (SDA), up to three launchers, and up to 48 anti-aircraft guided missiles.

When deploying the complex from the march, it ensures full readiness for work in five minutes. As a combat unit, the complex is a separate anti-aircraft missile division, consisting of a control battery, a target detection station and three firing batteries. The three-coordinate radar station is designed to detect the nationality of air targets (the "friend or foe" system), the choice of a sign is a single or group target.

The detection range of combat and tactical aircraft is: at an altitude of 100 meters - at least 35 kilometers, at an altitude of 1,000 to 25,000 meters - up to 150 kilometers. At the same time, the command post can process information about 75 targets, while ensuring the selection of the most dangerous 15, and automatically distribute among six fire channels.

Complex "Kolchuga" allows you to detect, identify, determine the coordinates and routes of movement of ground, surface and air targets in a passive mode.

The Ministry of Defense of Russia officially recognized the loss of 4 aircraft, one Tu-22M3 and three Su-25s. The loss of two more Su-24s has not been acknowledged. In addition to the downed and crashed aircraft, it is known that several more aircraft were damaged, but managed to return to their bases. It is reliably known about serious damage to 4 more Russian Su-25s.

1. In the afternoon 08/08/2008, Su-25BM of the 368th assault aviation regiment
Shot down, presumably as a result of "friendly fire". Pilot, lieutenant colonel, military pilot 2nd class Oleg Mikhailovich Terebunsky, ejected and landed on the territory controlled by Russian and South Ossetian units. He was injured on landing. Awarded the Order of Courage.


2. around 09:00 08/09/2008, Tu-22M3 of the 52nd heavy bomber regiment.
The Tu-22M3 long-range bomber was shot down on the morning of August 9 in the Kareli region, presumably by the Osa-AK or Buk-M1 complex. From the crew of a lieutenant colonel Alexandra Koventsova, major Viktor Pryadkin, major Igor Nesterov, major Vyacheslav Malkov, Major Malkov ejected and survived. The catapulted lieutenant colonel Koventsov went missing. The rest of the crew remained on the plane and died. Malkov was injured, was captured and hospitalized in a Georgian hospital, after which on August 19 he was exchanged for Georgian prisoners of war.

The plot of the Russian Tu-22M3 shot down in Georgia. Ren-TV program "Week with Marianna Maksimovskaya" from 21.02.2009


3. 10:20 9.08.2008, Su-24M of the 929th State Flight Test Center
Departure by three Su-24s to suppress Georgian artillery. Shot down after a bombing strike near the village of Shindisi, the plane crashed into the village of Dzeveri. Crew, Colonel Igor Leonidovich Zinov and test navigator 1st class Colonel Igor Viktorovich Rzhavitin ejected. Rzhavitin died, Zinov, seriously injured, was captured by the Georgians and on August 19 was exchanged for Georgian prisoners.
Georgian newspaper "Kviris palette" №38/2008 describes their downing in this way: “The inhabitants of Shindisi could console themselves with the fact that the Russian bomber that destroyed their houses was shot down two minutes after the attack. Two infrared-guided missiles missed the target, but the third hit accurately, and the plane crashed into the village of Dzeveri. One of the two ejected pilots survived, while the other died after burning debris fell on his parachute canopy and set it on fire. The pilot tried to open the reserve parachute, but it was too late and it crashed to the ground. Many people watched it."

4. 10:30 9.08.2008, Su-25SM of the 368th assault aviation regiment
Departure by a pair of Su-25s for an attack Georgian column. Pilot - commander of the 368 cap, colonel Sergey Kobylash. After an attack on a convoy south of Tskhinvali, a MANPADS missile hit the left engine, as a result of which it failed. When the damaged aircraft returned to the airfield, over the southern outskirts of Tskhinvali, a second hit from MANPADS occurred on the right engine, which also failed. Colonel Kobylash ejected and landed in a Georgian enclave north of Tskhinvali, after which he was picked up by a search and rescue team helicopter. The plane crashed in a deserted place near the river in a mountain gorge and exploded.
In less than an hour, the State Committee for Press and Mass Information South Ossetia circulated a statement about the downing of a Georgian Su-25 over Tskhinvali by South Ossetian air defense forces, which suggests that the already damaged Kobylash aircraft flying from Georgia was mistakenly identified as Georgian and shot down as a result of "friendly fire".

Interview with Sergey Kobylash

5. 08/09/2008, Su-25BM of the 368th assault aviation regiment
Departure by a pair of Su-25s to escort a Russian army column advancing from Dzhava to Tskhinval. Shot down in the Dzhava region by friendly fire, presumably from the Shilka ZSU, which covered the Guftinsky bridge. Pilot, Major Vladimir Evgenievich Edamenko died. The wreckage of the plane fell near the village of Itrapis and was destroyed on September 5, 2008 by employees of the Leader Special Risk Operations Center of the Russian Emergencies Ministry. Major Edamenko was awarded the title of Hero of Russia posthumously.

The story of the slave about the death of Edamenko


Photos (c) Sergey Uzakov What are the actual losses suffered by the parties during the war? There are no exact data. Shortly after the end of the war, the numbers continued to grow, however, it is not the Georgian authorities, but the journalists who are responsible for this:

The Georgian authorities announced 21 downed Russian planes and three helicopters, more than 60 knocked out tanks.

However, some time after the end of the conflict, the Georgian leaders somewhat reduced the number of downed Russian aircraft, returning to the figure of 19, announced on August 11, 2008:

15.09.08 13:54 As Zaza Gogava, head of the Joint Headquarters of the Georgian Armed Forces, stated at a meeting of the interim commission of the Georgian parliament, the Georgians shot down 19 Russian aircraft during the hostilities and did not lose a single one.

Kyiv, September 15 (New Region, Mikhail Ryabov) - ...Tbilisi expects to quickly restore military power. This was stated Georgian minister defense David Kezerashvili in an interview with the Ukrainian magazine "Tyzhden". "... Let's put it this way: 14 aircraft were shot down, among them the Tu-22 strategic bomber.

However, the reduction in the number of victories was not officially announced by the Georgian authorities, and in most sources the numbers 19-21 LA appear as victories.

In reports (including "analytical" articles!) about the losses of the Russian Air Force, real chaos reigns:

"... A collision with such an air defense system became a serious test for Russian military aviation, especially since, apparently, there was an initial underestimation of Georgian air defense capabilities. At the same time, Georgian air defense, as reported, relied mainly on obtaining information from radars passive reconnaissance "Kolchuga-M", using minimal active radars, and the Georgian self-propelled air defense systems "Buk-M1" and "Osa-AK / AKM" used ambush tactics. This made it difficult to deal with Georgian air defense systems. According to the latest unofficial information, Georgian On the first day of the war on August 8, Buk-M1 SAM systems were able to shoot down four Russian aircraft - three Su-25 attack aircraft and one Tu-22M3 medium-range bomber.

"... in particular, all the Su-25s lost during the conflict were hit by the Osa-AKM air defense system."

October 17 - RIA Novosti. Three Russian Su-25 attack aircraft were damaged by Georgian ground-based air defense systems during the armed conflict in South Ossetia, but were then able to return to the base, Yakov Kazhdan, general director of the 121st aircraft repair plant (Kubinka), said in an interview with RIA Novosti on Friday. These aircraft are currently being repaired and upgraded at the Kubinka plant and will be returned to combat service in the near future. Kazhdan also said that three Su-25 attack aircraft undergoing repairs at the plant were damaged precisely by ground-based air defense systems, and not by Georgian Air Force aircraft, not small arms and not by artillery fire. "The nature of the damage to the three aircraft allows us to say that they were attacked by ground-based air defense systems - man-portable air defense systems, as well as Buk-M1 systems," Kazhdan said.

The officially recognized losses of the Russian Air Force have not changed since the war and still amount to 4 irretrievably lost aircraft - 1 TU-22M3, 3 Su-25 and 3 damaged Su-25s, and the damaged aircraft will be restored. However, it can be considered proven that this list is not complete and 2 more lost Su-24Ms must be added to it. Information about other vehicles shot down, decommissioned after combat damage or sent for repair is not confirmed. It is possible that 4 more Su-25s and 2 Mi-24s received some damage, however, if this fact took place, most likely the damage was minor.

At the end of the war, Russian troops lost 2 more Mi-8 helicopters destroyed in a crash, 4 more (including at least one Mi-24) were damaged. In addition, the loss of 2-3 UAVs is not ruled out.

Based on the available information, we can conclude that during the war, Georgian air defense managed to shoot down only 2 aircraft - Su-24 and Tu-22 and damage 2 more Su-25s, one of which was subsequently shot down by Ossetian militias.

Thus, the Georgian authorities overestimated the success of their air defense by 10 times!

Interestingly, the propaganda "pressure" of the Georgian authorities varied depending on the current situation. In the first day and a half of the fighting, most of the declared Russian aircraft were indeed shot down (although not always by Georgian troops) or damaged. But as soon as 10.08. a turning point occurred in the hostilities, victorious reports ceased. And in the conditions of chaos and panic retreat on August 11-12, reports of victories fell like a cornucopia, without the slightest reason. This is partly recognized by the Georgians themselves:

"Despite the fact that in the first half of the day part of the troops air defense effectively shot down three Russian fighters, the morale and psychological armed forces of Georgia were not ready for an air attack. And the political leadership did not understand that the enemy's air supremacy could be decisive in the outcome of the war, and personnel military formations was introduced into unequal fight. By that time, the authorities were spreading statements about downed enemy planes through various agencies, pretending to be this, and more often citing exaggerated figures.

All other irretrievable losses - 3 Su-25s and 1 Su-24, as well as 2 damaged Su-25s, arose as a result of "friendly" fire from Russian troops and Ossetian militias. Most likely, 2-3 Russian UAVs were also shot down by the fire of their troops.

Consequently, the information widely disseminated in the media about the strength of the Georgian air defense, effectively counteracting Russian aviation, is not confirmed. What is the reason for this?

The types of SAM and ZA used by the Georgian and Russian air defense in the war have already been presented above, but their number needs to be estimated. First of all, it should be noted that the Georgian air defense was rather small and could not cover the entire territory of the country:

"According to the UN Register, in Ukraine in 2007 Georgia ... acquired 1 Osa-AKM air defense system (according to the website of the RF Ministry of Defense - 10 launchers) and 1 division of the Buk-M1 air defense system. In particular, in the documents of the special commission Verkhovna Rada it is noted that in 2007 Georgia was supplied with 6 Buk-M1 air defense systems, 48 ​​missiles ... Information about deliveries in 2007 of 4 Osa air defense systems, 2 Kub air defense systems and 2 Krug air defense systems is also quite plausible, however so far there is also no confirmation of these deliveries from other sources. ... It should be noted that after the publication in Izvestia, serious confusion arose regarding the supply of the Buk-M1 air defense system. The list of weapons supplied by Ukraine to Georgia in 2007 includes 6 units. SAM "Buk-M1". Later this was interpreted as 6 divisions of the Buk-M1 air defense system. Actually we are talking about six self-propelled firing systems (SOU), which according to the state form the 1st division of the Buk-M1 air defense system. The division consists of 3 batteries, each of which has 2 SOU. In addition, the division includes a command post (CP), a target detection station (SOC) - the 9S18M1 Kupol radar, as well as 8 launchers (PZU) - one for each SOU and two spare ones for the KP. The number of 9M38 missiles that were delivered together with the complex (48 units) confirms that in 2007 one division of the Buk-M1 air defense system was transferred to Georgia. Since 4 missiles are placed on each SOU, Georgia was supplied with a double ammunition load."

"... Georgia's air defense - three Bukov divisions (one did not participate in the war) 5 "Os" (with missiles vyr. resource), s-125 (not working condition at the time of the war), MANPADS thunder arrow ilga - 120 launchers (1000 missiles) - very little for an army of 30,000. Only three MANPADS per battalion. And an air defense system spider 1-2 vehicles. This air defense was designed for a war with the separatists and counteracting the non-massive use of UFOs with the bear label in the den ... ".

Taking into account the fact that delivered from Ukraine in the summer of 2008. 2 additional self-propelled guns of the Buk-M1 air defense system were captured by our troops and did not take part in the hostilities, in the conflict zone the Georgians could have 6 self-propelled guns "Buk-M1", 1-2 "Spider", and 5-14 "Osa-AKM" ". Probably, "Osa-AKM" was exactly 5, because. such a number were captured as trophies. So not a large number of The air defense system could still provide air defense for the Tskhinvali and Znauri regions, as well as the outskirts of Gori, but it could not be enough for more. This is confirmed by the fact that all reliable losses of Russian aviation (Su-24M and Tu-22M3) from the actions of Georgian air defense systems took place over the combat area, in South Ossetia and adjacent areas.

At the same time, Russian aircraft bombed the entire territory of Georgia almost without hindrance.

In this regard, the statement of the author of the article looks very doubtful:

that:

"As if on purpose, after the end of active hostilities to establish peace, on August 14, 2008, the Georgian armed forces decided to demonstrate to Russia the full power of their air defense, which was involved in hostilities. The electronic intelligence of Russian Air Force EW aircraft and helicopters revealed the work of a large the number of RTV radars of the Georgian Armed Forces of various frequency bands - P-18, P-37, 36D6, ASR-12, active use (switching on and long-term operation on the air) of the Buk-M1, Osa-AKM, S-125 air defense systems, MANPADS of the "Strela", "Igla" and "Stinger" types, as well as the work of the Russian Orthodox Church of the S-200 and "Krug" air defense systems was recorded. Thus, it was confirmed that the Georgian air defense grouping is functioning and ready for combat operations.".

The presence of the indicated S-200 and Stinger air defense systems among the Georgians is not confirmed by any other sources and is probably the author's fantasy.

Stationary S-125 complexes located near Poti, according to available information, were also not combat-ready, although Ukrainian specialists repaired in 2007. 6 PU:

The delivery of the Kub and Krug air defense systems has also not been proven, there is no mention of their use in hostilities. On the other hand, the author of the article does not say a word about the Israeli-made "Spider" air defense systems actually used by the Georgians.

It is still unclear whether the Spider was captured by Russian troops or whether they got only parts of the missiles, and the photos of the SAM were taken by Georgian military personnel.

As for the means of controlling the air situation, Georgia really had a lot of radar stations, including those in the conflict zone:

04/30/2007, 11:15. The Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF) in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict again confirmed the illegal presence of the Georgian air defense radar in the conflict zone. and Georgia, the illegal location of the Georgian air defense radar 1.5 km to the south was again confirmed locality Shavshevebi in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict.

One of the two Ukrainian-made radars purchased was located there:

06/13/2006, 13:43:06. Ukraine delivered two 36D6-M radar stations to Georgia. This, according to RBC, was reported by a source in Ukrainian defense circles.

According to him, the Georgian side paid in full for the radar stations received in March this year. It is possible that Tbilisi will initiate an expansion of the order.

The stations purchased by Georgia are designed to ensure control of the airspace over Tbilisi. Stations 36D6-M are designed to detect air targets, including small-sized, slow-flying and hovering helicopters, automatically track targets and issue target designation to an air defense command post. The station can operate as an autonomous control point.

In addition to the indicated radar, there were other radio equipment:

"... In addition, the passive location system was deployed in positions east of Gori. And thus a group was created that did not reveal itself in any way until the moment of the attack, did not turn on, was not designated, and the reconnaissance of radar radiation, which was conducted by us, was not revealed."

The passive location system is obviously the Kolchuga-M electronic intelligence complex, delivered from Ukraine.

The use of this technique gave the Georgians the opportunity to exercise radar control over the entire Tskhinvali region and largely predetermined the first losses of our aviation. Attacks on the deployed air defense system followed already on the first day of fighting:

9.45 am, August 8 A Russian military aircraft dropped shells near the village of Shavshvebi, on the road between Poti and Tbilsi, 300-500 meters from the Georgian military radar.

However, it was only possible to destroy it, as well as other Georgian radar stations, by the end of the second day of fighting:

"Under the circumstances: the radar was destroyed on the night of 9 to 10 as part of the Russian Air Force operation to suppress the Georgian air defense system. There is an entry about the destruction in the press release of the National Security Council of Georgia for August 10-11, where it is called "civilian"

"<10.08.08>00.30 As a result of the bombardment, the civilian radar in the village of Shashvebi, west of Gori, was destroyed. "The same night, the central radar in Leninisi and the ASR-12 radar in the village of Patara Lilo were destroyed with the use of PRR."

In addition to the P36D6-M RSLs already mentioned, our aircraft destroyed all the main radars, in particular at Tbilisi Airport:

In addition, Russian troops destroyed at least one P-18 radar, modernized in Ukraine. In fact, all the real successes of the Georgian air defense systems, confirmed by many sources, refer to the first day of the fighting. It can be assumed that by the evening of 08/09/2008. centralized system Air defense was disabled - both by the destruction of radars and launchers of air defense systems, and by the use of electronic interference.

“With the outbreak of hostilities, in the very first sorties, the Air Force aviation forces detected and suppressed up to 5 Osa-AKM combat vehicles, up to two SOU and one Buk SOC, as well as the S-125 air defense system. All air defense systems were either completely suppressed, or made unsuccessful attempts to target missiles, which was recorded by the operating modes and parameters of the signals of the air defense system of the air defense system.During the conduct of hostilities, the Su-34 airborne electronic defense system showed the greatest efficiency. P-18, 19ZH6, PRV-9, -11, -13, ASR-12 in the areas of GORI, TBILISI and MARNEULI. 5N87, P-18, P-37, located at a distance of 100-120 km from the setting zone by An-12pp aircraft ... jamming by electronic jamming of the RTV and ZRV radars of Georgia from the given boundaries and from the designated jamming zones. When supporting aviation operations in the Abkhazian and South Ossetian directions, interference was placed from the loitering zones by groups of Mi-8ppa and M-8smv-pg helicopters from heights H = 2-3.5 thousand m to suppress the RTV radar and radio electronics of the S-125 air defense system and Buk Georgia. Su-34 attack aircraft interfered from combat formations in order to suppress the RES, which did not allow the Georgian air defense system (and this was recorded) to successfully de-interference, and the most dangerous RES of the Buk and S-125 air defense systems were attacked by air missiles. -Radar".

Moreover, there was information that immediately after the end of the war, the Georgian authorities could not control the airspace over Georgia, and the intervention of French specialists was required to organize civilian flights.

In addition to the air defense systems mentioned above, the Georgian troops also had MANPADS various types.. By the way, it is not clear whether the "long-term operation on the air" of MANPADS indicated in the article is possible. Probably, the interrogators of the "friend or foe" system are meant.

According to available information, for last years about 200-230 MANPADS "Strela-2M", "Igla", "Thunder" and 800-1000 missiles for them were delivered to Georgia:

"According to the UN Register, in Ukraine Georgia ... 200 MANPADS "Strela" and "Igla" ...

Information about deliveries in 2007 of 150-200 MANPADS "Strela" and "Igla" (obviously, this refers to the number of missiles without specifying the number of launchers) ... is also quite plausible, but so far there are also no confirmations of these deliveries from other sources ... The Czech Republic also provided significant assistance in arming the Georgian army. Since 2000, Georgia has been supplied ... 200 Strela-2M MANPADS ... In Bulgaria, Georgia purchased ... 12 23-mm ZU-23-2M anti-aircraft guns, 4 23-mm ZSU-23-4 "Shilka", 500 missiles to MANPADS "Igla" ... in 2007, Poland handed over to Georgia 30 MANPADS "Grom" (a modified version of the licensed MANPADS "Igla-1") and 100 missiles for them.".

Piotr Paszkowski, spokesman for the Polish Foreign Ministry: "We confirm that Poland has sold 100 Thunder-type kits to Georgia."

At first glance, such a number of MANPADS and missiles for them should have been more than enough to counter Russian aviation in the conflict zone. Judging by the numerous videos of the use of our Su-25s, for example, attacks on the first day of the war of the Georgian air base Marneuli, Russian "Rooks" were tempting targets for air defense systems. But apart from the obviously propaganda report about the "exploits" of Sergeant Mukutadze, the only more or less confirmed success of the Georgian MANPADS is damage by a certain anti-aircraft gunner Bukhrikidze Su-25 Kobylash, and he was shot down only by the second missile fired by the Ossetian militias. Perhaps the reason is that the Georgian troops had few MANPADS in the battle zone, because. part of the missiles was never used in the war:

"... in a warehouse in Gori, our soldiers found 48 Igla MANPADS systems and 200 missiles for them ...".

And the remaining few MANPADS were probably distributed throughout the territory of Georgia, as evidenced by the photo of the gallant Georgian anti-aircraft gunner from Poti:

Thus, directly in the combat zone, the number of Georgian MANPADS was small.

In addition, among the weapons seized after the war, there were clearly handicraft MANPADS launchers:

This state of affairs is confirmed by the Georgians themselves:

"... In total, we had 1 modern air defense installation modified by Jews, 3-4 BUKs, arrows and needles in parts, many had nothing at all, there was nothing anti-aircraft in Serge's unit at all. Three times there were cases when they had a wonderful opportunity to shoot down, but due to the fact that they had nothing, they just watched enemy aircraft fly overhead ... "

"... At about 23:00 hours on August 10, during the first flight, an enemy helicopter discovered and blew up a tank and Hilux of the IV brigade delivered without camouflage. Two Strelas, which were in service with the 43rd battalion, did not work (turned out to be unusable ) This was not the first time…"

"... the air defense worked. There were three systems, something from Israel that I don’t know, I didn’t see and maybe there was nothing, beeches and a wasp. They used MANPADS, but for some reason there were very few of them ...".

"... On August 8, in the morning, walking in the direction of Tskhinvali together with TV reporters, near the village of Ergneti, I came under an air raid - a Russian attack aircraft directly in front of us fired 30 mm Land Rovers unguided rockets of the Senaki 2nd Infantry Brigade ... the attack aircraft flew at an altitude of several hundred meters, sometimes dropping very low, up to 50-100 meters. I was biting my lips from impotence. If at that moment I had a “Thunder”, “Arrow”, or at least “Needle”, I would certainly “take it off” and stop the unpunished flight over Georgian villages and military convoys ... .. (at that moment, a Russian two-keel fighter flashed high in the clouds over Tskhinvali) ... ".

Moreover, in addition to modern means Air defense, at least one Russian aircraft - Su-25SM No. 08 of Colonel Oleg Molosov from the 361st OShAP was damaged by fire from ZA, probably S-60.

In general, it can be concluded that all the losses (2 aircraft) were suffered by Russian aviation before the suppression of Georgian air defense, which is due to the lack of time on the first day of the war and the need for immediate assistance to Russian peacekeepers and residents of Tskhinval. The actions of MANPADS and ZA, insensitive to the reconciliation of electronic interference and (with proper camouflage) difficult to defeat, turned out to be ineffective due to their small number and poor technical condition.

As for the losses of Russian aviation from friendly fire, they turned out to be very high. Two Su-25s were shot down and two damaged by MANPADS, one more likely by Osa-AK. In addition, the second lost Su-24M was reportedly also shot down by Ossetian militias from MANPADS. Thus, 4-5 targets (half of those shot down and damaged) were hit at a relatively short distance, with visual contact, allowing you to see the color of the aircraft. Given the uniformity of the aircraft used by the parties, as well as the repeated cases of strikes against their troops, it was not easy to determine the belonging of the attack aircraft to Russian soldiers (and even more so to the militias!) In this regard, it is regrettable that, in addition to the above methods of combating enemy air defense (jamming, destroying radars and air defense systems), our pilots did not use such a simple and at the same time sufficient effective method prevention of "friendly" fire, as elements of rapid identification (EBO). Perhaps the application of EBO to aircraft (by analogy with the actions in Normandy in 1944, in Czechoslovakia in 1968 or in the Arab-Israeli conflicts) would reduce losses.

But if information about Russian losses is contradictory, then information about the use of aviation and the losses of the Georgian side is either completely absent or clearly unreliable. First of all, there is no official, final list of air defense victories Russian army and Ossetian militias. In a few comments officials and "experts" various data are given:

"... In turn, as reported, the air defense of the Russian troops shot down three Georgian Su-25s," the article of the Russian expert says.

"... the head of the military air defense of the Ground Forces, Major General Mikhail KRUSH ... The units of the Osa-AK air defense system, capable of combating small and low-speed air targets at night, were most effectively used ... As a result of anti-aircraft battles, the Su -25KM and three Israeli-made Hermes UAVs.At the same time, short-range mobile air defense systems showed the greatest efficiency, due to their high maneuverability, surprise of action, short reaction time and firing cycle, as well as a high probability of hitting small-sized highly maneuverable targets ... From our side, the most I repeat, the Igla MANPADS and the Strela-10 and Osa air defense systems were effectively used against the enemy.

Information in last post it looks like the truth, only the victory of the Russian Osa-AK air defense systems was described above, and the UAVs fired upon by our soldiers in the conflict zone are not at all like the Hermes.

Another source of information about the victories are reports from news agencies, according to which 6 Georgian Su-25s were declared destroyed during the hostilities (one on 08,09,10 and 3 on 08/11/2008) and one helicopter on 08/11/2008. In fact, on the 08th and 09th, Russian attack aircraft were shot down, and on 11.08.2008. 2 "Rooks" with red stars were damaged. The Su-25, allegedly shot down in an air battle on 10.08.2008, the Su-25 shot down on 11.08.2008, remains on the "share" of the Georgians from the specified list. and a helicopter destroyed on the same day (probably Mi-24). Officially, the Georgian side recognized the loss of 7 aircraft - 3 Mi-24s (number one -05, the rest is unknown) Mi-14 (number 07) and 3 An-2. You can quote the already mentioned article from a Georgian magazine:

"The magazine publishes an article by Irakli Aladashvili (the editor-in-chief of the magazine) under the heading "The enemy could not shoot down a single Georgian aircraft and helicopter."

According to the author, the Georgian attack aircraft made their first sortie at 06:30 on August 8th. Initially, 6 aircraft were prepared for takeoff. One of the attack aircraft had problems with the engine, five aircraft took off. One returned to base due to a malfunction in the weapons control system. As a result, four cars flew on the mission.

Near Dzhava, the pilots found a convoy of Russian equipment of about 40 units. 24 250-kilogram FAB 250 bombs were dropped on the column. The author of the article reports that up to 10 pieces of equipment were destroyed as a result of this raid. All four aircraft returned safely to base at 7:32 a.m. and they immediately began to prepare for the next sortie.

There are many descriptions of the first strike of Georgian attack aircraft:

"... The village of Dzhava was considered calm ... The hostess ran to prepare hot tea for us, and a column of Russian armored vehicles went past ... But what was our joy when the aviation went! Su-25 aircraft with red stars! "So these Georgians, so them," - we shouted in unison with the local residents who had not slept for days in a row. But the joy was short. The planes made an incomprehensible turn and went around the second circle, flying very close over the village. Aviation turned out to be Georgian. I woke up under a door that collapsed on me. Zhorka is nearby ( our operator) was groaning in terrible pain - one of the rocks hit him in the back. On the third circle of the Georgian planes, shells went over Dzhava. The very first one, as it turned out, exploded thirty meters from us. We managed to feel shock wave from a few more breaks before deciding to move on. Our assistant fussed nearby: they say that the second shell does not fall into one funnel ... ".

"Sanakoev Anzor Fomaevich, born in 1948, resident of the village of Dzhava, RSO: I witnessed how a Georgian military aircraft on August 8, 2008, flying over the village of Dzhava, dropped bombs that hit houses civilians.".

There are also two videos of an attack by Georgian aircraft on Russian column on the morning of 08/08/2008, taken from different points:

The statement about the destruction of up to 10 pieces of equipment is an exaggeration, but the bombs really fell very close to the column.

You should pay attention to a bright flash in the sky to the right-in front of the attacking pair.

It looks like a NURS launch - but according to Aladashvili, in this sortie, the Su-25 carried only bombs dropped from one approach, after which one of the attack aircraft made a second approach, firing at the column from a cannon, and in the frame this fire is visible for at least 3 seconds . It is more likely that a burning plane got into the lens. In this case, it is possible that the above reports about the capture of a Georgian pilot by the reconnaissance company of Captain Ukhvatov on August 8 may be justified. Unfortunately, after the explosion of the bomb, the cameraman was not up to shooting, and this object did not get into the frame anymore. However, data on the destruction of the Georgian aircraft in the early morning of 08.08.2008. no.

Aladashvili's further revelations about the actions of the Su-25 have nothing to do with the events that actually took place:

"... However, the flight did not take place, since soon Russian fighters (Su-27 or MiG 29) appeared over Tskhinvali, therefore, instead of taking off, attack aircraft were dispersed in different corners of the airfield and hidden. This airfield (which is not called), on August 8 and later was repeatedly bombed Russian attack aircraft, but Georgian combat aircraft remained intact. Mi-24 attack helicopters also took part in the fighting, which carried out 4 sorties on 8, 9 and 10 August. The author of the article claims that during the hostilities the Georgian Air Force did not lose a single aircraft and helicopter in battles ... August 8 Russian aircraft Su-25 and Su-24 bombed the Georgian air base in Marneuli four times. Three An-2 planes were destroyed at the airfield, three servicemen of the Georgian Air Force were killed. After the Russian troops occupied the Georgian military base in Senaki, they destroyed two Mi-24 helicopters and one Mi-14 helicopter standing at the airfield. According to the author, the Mi-14 has not flown for a long time, and the destroyed Mi-24s have almost exhausted their flight life. In addition, during the hostilities, one attack helicopter (most likely Mi-24) crashed, the crew was not injured. Thus, according to the information of the "Arsenal" magazine, the Georgian aviation did not suffer losses in combat during the hostilities, the losses were only at the airfields. None of the Georgian pilots died."

More detailed and accurate translation said article presented in the journal "Aviation and Time" No. 6/2008:

As already mentioned, information about the number of sorties of Georgian Su-25s is unreliable - several sources noted several sorties, and on 10.08.2008. Georgian attack aircraft tried to bomb Gufta and was intercepted Russian fighters. Accordingly, other information also raises doubts, in particular, about the number of dead - in fact there were 5 of them, about sorties of Georgian helicopters and, of course, about losses. Intelligence It is curious to compare Aladashvili with messages on Internet forums, including from the Georgian side:

"... The Georgian Air Force made approximately 30 sorties during the conflict. 4th (2 times 1 shot down), 2nd (3 times) to Tskhinvali, 2nd to Java (1 time), 4th to the Russian convoy 58 -th army, (1-time, 1 shot down) 1-cm (1 time) on the Roki tunnel (section of the road at the exit of the tunnel, the 2nd MiG-29 was not allowed to Rocky, dropped bombs into the "white light" and left to the base) ... "

It lists 21 used and 2 shot down, including a 4th non-Russian column during a raid.

"... you can believe it or not, the entire Air Force lost 2 An-2s, 2 Mi-24s (both at the airfield in Senaki, 1 of them was out of order) 1 Mi-8 (in Senaki), 1 Su-25UB (in Marneuli).

As for the battles, only 4 sides participated, all Su-25 Scorpion

none of them was shot down, but 3 of them were damaged, one had almost the entire body in holes near the tail. In general, the Air Force operated in stages, on the 8th-9th they flew, on the 10th-11th they did not fly, and on the 12th there were 3 sorties after the artillery crew accidentally covered the Russian mobile radar.

"... all sources from our side unequivocally state that not a single Su-25 was lost. I myself am trying to get to the bottom of the truth. According to a Georgian Air Force employee, 4 helicopters were lost (all on the ground) and during the bombing of Marneuli all sorts of junk, like An-2 and the like. as soon as everything becomes more clear, I will post updated information (if I stay in this forum) ... "

"... In Marneuli, during the raid, 2 Su-25s were destroyed and 1 damaged. It turns out that Georgia lost 2 dryers shot down and 2 destroyed on the ground. The degree of damage to the 5th in Marneuli is unknown, although, as I was told, it may well be that it can also be considered irretrievably lost if the techies do not create a miracle ... ".

As can be seen from various reports, the confusion is in everything - in the type and number of aircraft involved in the battles, in the loss data. Most sources agree that the Georgian Air Force did not suffer irretrievable losses in the air (with the exception of the crashed, possibly with the help of Sergeant Stanislav Svatko, Mi-24) and 1-2 damaged Su-25s, losses on the ground amounted to 1 Su- 25UB up to 3 Su-25s. In other cases, it says 2 shot down in the air. In addition, the reports mention "all sorts of junk" destroyed at the Marneuli airbase. It is unclear whether it includes 9 Georgian L-29s stationed at this airfield and, judging by the photographs, standing in open areas, next to the subsequently destroyed An-2s, in contrast to the 10 more modern L-39s stored in shelters.

Despite the fact that these photographs were taken long before the war, the An-2s were destroyed in the same place, therefore, it can be assumed that the L-29s remained in their parking lots. This version is also supported by the absence of any other photographs of the destroyed Marneuli airfield. The only photo from the site http://www.milkavkaz.net, shown above, was subsequently deleted by the user. Such "conspiracy" leads to suspicion.

The sequence of reports about raids on air bases is also curious:

17:35, August 8 Marneuli military airbase, located 20 km south of Tbilisi and outside the conflict zone, was bombed for the third time. One person died and four were injured. As a result of three bombings, three AN-4 aircraft and military armored vehicles of the air base were destroyed.

16.30, August 8 Russian aviation bombs military air bases in Marneuli and Bolnisi, located 20 km and 35 km south of Tbilisi. Two planes of the Georgian Defense Ministry were destroyed on the ground. Buildings are destroyed, there are casualties.

Indirect evidence that more than 3 An-2s were destroyed at the Marneuli airbase is the above video of the second attack by 2 Su-25s at 17:00. Column of smoke from standing nearby with each other, three An-2s and vehicles appeared only after the attack of one of the attack aircraft with cannon fire. However, the first reports of two aircraft of the Georgian Ministry of Defense aircraft destroyed on the ground appeared half an hour earlier, after the attack of 2 Su-24s:

This means that these 2 aircraft (probably Su-25) were stationed at another site of the air base, far from the three An-2s, and by the time of the attack at 17:00 they had already been destroyed. One of the possible candidates for the "dead" may be the Su-25UB, b / n 21, one of the two "sparks" that the Georgian Air Force had before the war.

Given the small size of the Georgian Air Force, their actual losses in the conflict could easily be determined by knowing the post-war number of aircraft. However, the Georgian side, for some reason, is in no hurry to "open the cards." This is rather strange, because photographs or videos from the Su-25 (by the way, quite often shown to the public before the war, without any regard for secrecy) would be the best proof of the absence of losses. Information about the post-war state of the Su-25 fleet was passed on the Internet:

"... The number of Su-25s of all models that Georgia retained at the end of the war is estimated at 7.".

Later, a story about the first post-war exercises with the participation of the Su-25 was broadcast on Georgian television. 2 Su-25s - b / n 17 and 23 and Su-25UB b / n20 got into the frame.

Perhaps another survivor was the Su-25 w/n 12. Given the many references to the destruction of the Su-25UB on the ground, and the safety of w/n20, the lost aircraft can only be w/n 21.

In addition, it is reliably known about 2 Mi-24s (numbers 07 and 08), 3 L-39s, 2 Mi-8s and 1 Iroquois in post-war Georgia.

What is the effectiveness of the aviation actions of both sides and how serious are the losses incurred during the war? It is quite clear that Russian aviation has contributed greatly huge contribution to a common victory over the enemy. Suffice it to say that only after one of the first attacks by Russian attack aircraft, the results of which became widely known from photographs on the Internet, 22 Georgian soldiers were killed, i.e. more than 10% of officially recognized losses:

On August 8, the commander of the assault aviation regiment, Sergei Kobylash, was the first to fly to the defense of Tskhinvali. “On the 8th, when I made the very first sortie, I passed over their column, they all stood with their heads calmly raised,” says Sergey, “they looked at me, they probably thought that these were their attack aircraft. Well, then, when the second I made a call, there was no one there. That is, and then we began to beat them, beat, beat them. Let them not hope that they will go unpunished. We will get far."

"...Recently, officers convicted of desertion were released from the Tbilisi pre-trial detention center (an act of pardon was issued), they told a lot of interesting things ... And you can also hear accusations against the commander of one of the companies of the 42nd battalion of the 4th PB, who organized the construction in the Oak Grove ", just at that time they were hit from the air. After that, the indicated commander, along with several other PB commanders, took his hands to his feet and fell down, left his people to die. According to them, the plane flew very low over them and they thought it was Georgian, they even saw the pilot and waved their hands at him."

"... Then suddenly two more planes appeared and they also walked around the city. They worked, one plane flew in after them, but when the last one arrived, I suddenly look - two planes are flying from the north, I was delighted and quietly say to other prisoners, these are ours, Russians , they fly, and they answered me, “yes, what kind of Russians, they betrayed us, just like in 1991, when they withdrew Soviet troops.” The Georgians were also surprised, they say, why did ours fly in from the north, and took refuge in an oak grove. above us and flew towards the village of Kekhvi, dropped bombs on the Georgian troops there. The Georgians thought that it was bombs dropped on the city. They climbed back out of the forest and shouted joyfully: "chueni erebus" - "these are ours". Meanwhile, the Russian planes did circle over the city, flew over the Georgian positions and bombed them.One of the Georgians, who lay down next to us, was killed when the Russians dropped bombs, the other 15 that were closest, also fell down, only two or three could escape ... The survivors Georgian co The soldiers fled some on the surviving tanks, some on armored personnel carriers, the rest on foot, part of the side with. Nikozi, the rest aside with. Tbet.".

But this is only one sortie! There were many others, the consequences of which are widely known:

In addition to the direct destruction of enemy manpower and equipment on the battlefield, Russian aircraft attacked almost the entire territory of Georgia, isolating the combat area, destroying military infrastructure and exerting enormous psychological pressure on the armed forces and the population of Georgia.

It is difficult to overestimate the significance of this - after all, signs of panic, loss of will to resist were observed even among the top military-political leadership of Georgia!

At the same time, it is not clear why, despite the attacks on Georgian air bases, it was not possible to completely destroy them, due to which enemy attack aircraft and helicopters attacked our troops until the last day.

Questions arise about the work of our air defense, which shot down its own aircraft much more effectively than enemy aircraft, and of course, the actions of our fighters, which entered into combat only once during the entire conflict, are incomprehensible. air battle with unclear results, despite the fact that Georgian aviation carried out many sorties.

How big is the price paid by our Air Force for the victory?

In the Aviapark magazine No. 4-2008. data are given on the number of sorties of the Russian Air Force - about 600. These figures are difficult to confirm or refute. In particular, by the end of the first day of fighting (when they were still able to maintain control over the situation and track Russian aircraft), the Georgian authorities announced 22 raids:

In total, according to the information of the Ministry of Defense of Georgia, at 22:40 on August 8, Russian aircraft violated Georgian airspace 22 times.

Because Since the majority of air strikes were carried out as part of a flight or a pair of aircraft, it can be assumed that on the first day our Air Force carried out about 80-100 air strikes. In the future, the number of sorties did not decrease, so the figure of 600 b / a for 5 days of fighting can be considered the minimum, without taking into account the actions of fighter and transport aircraft, helicopters. On the Internet, there were claims of 2000 departures. Most likely, reliable numbers are somewhere in the middle. Thus, the set goal - peace enforcement was achieved in almost 4 days in the interaction of the ground forces, air force and navy, with a relatively small number of used ones, incomparable, for example, with the actions of the United States in Yugoslavia. Lost 6 strike aircraft amounted to 0,3-1% on the number of sorties, and most likely even less, which is quite comparable with the losses of aviation in other local conflicts with an enemy with strong air defense. Another thing is that these losses could have been minimized by suppressing the Georgian air defense, eliminating the "friendly" fire factor - but, unfortunately, there was no time for this. If "friendly" fire is not taken into account, then the victories of the Georgian air defense are 0,1-03% on the number of sorties of Russian aircraft.

Studying the actions of the Georgian Air Force (as well as all the armed forces), we can say that their actions were aimed specifically at combating Russian peacekeepers, armed formations and the population of South Ossetia and, but not in any way to counter the Russian army. This is also confirmed by the direction of their strikes:

"From the Georgian side, a group of 8 SU-25s was represented, they were being repaired at a factory in Tbilisi during the Soviet period. They had a helicopter group. Naturally, it did not have a serious strategic level of aviation, like ours. And it did not have serious opposition. In At the initial stage, they were used against peacekeepers, SU-25, by the way, they struck the Georgian Air Force at the peacekeepers' camp at the beginning of the conflict, and disabled the entire mobile unit, i.e. deprived of mobility.".

If the main goal of the Tsminda Veli operation was to counter Russian troops (which at that time of the decision were not yet on the territory of South Ossetia), then it is not clear why on the first morning only one sortie was made against them by forces of 6 attack aircraft, and they reached the target only 4. But several hours have passed since the decision to start the operation was made, but all 8 (according to other sources 10 or even 12) Su-25s were never put into operation. Moreover, no attempt was made to use the existing 10 L-39s and 9 L-29s against Russian troops. But these machines were successfully used as light attack aircraft in the 90s by the Abkhaz and Azerbaijani sides, respectively.

Of course, this was fraught with serious losses, but in order to repel such a global task as repelling "Russian aggression", this could be put up with, and our air defense was not yet fully deployed in the first hours. For example, in the event of a successful strike on a column near Java in the morning of 08/08/2008. not 4 attack aircraft, but the entire Georgian aviation, the consequences could be very sad. Fortunately, this did not happen. Moreover, even Georgian attack aircraft and attack helicopters that took off in the air repeatedly attacked Tskhinval, which could not stop our troops in any way and was completely pointless from the point of view of repelling "Russian aggression". The same sorties, which nevertheless were committed against the Russian troops, were ineffective. So, the Georgian pilots failed to destroy the Guftinsky bridge, they did not even think about raids on the Roki tunnel. The main efforts of the Georgian aviation were aimed at the destruction of the civilian population in Tskhinval. This is confirmed by the fact that in the unofficial list of losses of the Russian army:

among the circumstances of the death of 61 military personnel, there is not a single reference to death as a result of air strikes. But among the 364 dead civilians in South Ossetia, 24 indicated as the cause of death - he died during the bombing:

Of course, the Georgian Air Force, like all the armed forces, had no chance after the decision by the Russian leadership to "not stand aside", but with skillful leadership and high fighting spirit could cause a lot of trouble. It is not clear at all what goals were set for the Georgian Air Force - to inflict maximum damage on the enemy, even at the cost of high losses? Stop his progress? Save your own strength? Most likely, the Air Force command, like the entire leadership of Georgia, did not expect Russian intervention and was preparing for a "small victorious war", and statements about the need to stop Russian aggression made after the war were needed only to justify their aggressive actions. At the same time, we must pay tribute to the command of the enemy Air Force, which managed to ensure the implementation of individual, essentially "partisan" sorties throughout the entire campaign.

If we evaluate the level of relative losses, then even if only one helicopter is lost in the air for 30-40 sorties during the conflict, they will amount to about 3%, those. 3 times higher than Russian ones. The total absolute losses of 7-8 aircraft in the air and on the ground (including 1 attack aircraft and 3 attack helicopters) are very sensitive for the small Georgian Air Force, and in relation to the number of sorties they reach 20% ! If the information on losses in the air and on the ground of several more Su-25s is confirmed, then the statistics will become simply disastrous for the Georgians.

Based on the above information, it can be concluded that the actions of the Georgian air defense and aviation turned out to be ineffective, and the losses incurred were high. The losses of Russian aviation are primarily due to their own mistakes and the lack of time to suppress air defense forces on the first day of the conflict.

This text does not close the topic of aviation losses in the five-day war. Perhaps in the course of time it will be received new information shedding light on the events described above ...

Losses of Russian aircraft in the Five-Day War with Georgia in August 2008

Anton Lavrov

The loss of Russian aviation in the short-term Five-Day War with Georgia in August 2008 was one of the main surprises for observers. The death of several Russian aircraft in such a fleeting conflict with an enemy of a completely different weight category led to the assumption that the Georgian air defense turned out to be extremely effective and became perhaps the most successful branch of the Georgian army in this war. But upon closer examination of the circumstances of the death of Russian aircraft, the picture changes significantly. The official data of the parties on the losses of Russian aviation in the short-term military conflict between Russia and Georgia differ significantly. According to high-ranking officials of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, four aircraft were lost: three Su-25 attack aircraft and one Tu-22M3 long-range bomber (speeches by Deputy Chief General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, Colonel-General Anatoly Nagovitsyn). The Georgian side's version was voiced by Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili in the evening of August 12. According to him, during the period of hostilities, 21 Russian aircraft were shot down. It should be noted that subsequently video materials and photographs with the wreckage of only one Russian aircraft appeared in the Georgian media.

Representatives of the Russian Ministry of Defense did not give any details and circumstances of the loss of the aircraft and their belongings. Moreover, they never officially recognized the losses in combat operations of two Su-24M front-line bombers. But the media materials and information from unofficial sources that have appeared since the war make it possible to partially fill in the gaps in official information.

The first loss of the Russian Air Force in the conflict with Georgia was the Su-25BM attack aircraft of Lieutenant Colonel Oleg Terebunsky from the 368th Assault Aviation Regiment (Budennovsk airfield), shot down over the territory of South Ossetia in the area of ​​the Zarsky Pass, between Dzhava and Tskhinvali. It was hit by a salvo launch of several missiles from MANPADS by South Ossetian militias around 6 p.m. on August 8. The fall of the burning plane and its wreckage were recorded on a video camera by the film crew of the Russian state television channel Vesti and shown on television as the destruction of the Georgian aircraft. The incorrect identification of the aircraft, which caused "friendly fire" and led to the first combat loss, probably occurred due to the fact that this was one of the first sorties of Russian aviation in the conflict and the South Ossetian side was not yet aware of the participation of Russian aviation in it. In addition, just a few hours earlier, four Georgian Su-25s had bombed a nearby area, after which the Ossetians had reason to believe that Georgian air raids would continue. Lieutenant Colonel Terebunsky successfully ejected, was quickly discovered and evacuated by the Russian side.

First and most major success Georgian air defense systems reached more than a day after the start of hostilities, in the early morning of August 9, when they managed to shoot down a Russian Tu-22M3 long-range bomber from the 52nd Guards Heavy Bomber Aviation Regiment (Shaikovka airfield). When several Tu-22M3 regiments performed a night flight to bombard the base of one of the infantry brigades of Georgia, a group of bombers proceeded back along the same route as to the target, while, according to unofficial sources, for some unknown reason, it decreased from a flight altitude of 12,000 m to 4,000 m. According to an anonymous Russian military source, the planes were fired upon by Georgian Osa-AK/AKM air defense systems. Missile hit bomber causes failure key systems aircraft, it was de-energized.

One of the crew members, co-pilot Major Vyacheslav Malkov, ejected and was taken prisoner by the Georgians. Upon landing, he received a compression fracture of three vertebrae and a broken arm, was placed in the village hospital, and subsequently transferred to the Tbilisi hospital. On August 19, Malkov was exchanged for Georgian prisoners of war. The commander of the Tu-22M3, Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Koventsov, ejected after Malkov and went missing. The remains of his ejection seat have been found, but he or his body has not yet been found. Subsequently, the Georgian side handed over DNA samples of an unidentified body, which matched 95% with the DNA of Lieutenant Colonel Koventsov's mother. Additional analyzes should determine if the commander of the Russian bomber has finally been found.

A few weeks after the war, on the territory of South Ossetia, in a remote, sparsely populated area near the border with Georgia, the search group found the wreckage of a crashed aircraft and in them the bodies of the remaining crew members, Majors Viktor Pryadkin (navigator) and Igor Nesterov (weapons systems operator). It should be pointed out that, contrary to early erroneous media reports, the downed Tu-22M3 was not a reconnaissance aircraft.

On the morning of the same day, at 10.20 on August 9, the Georgian air defense managed to shoot down another Russian aircraft, this time a Su-24M front-line bomber from the 929th State Flight Test Center (Akhtubinsk airfield). He made a sortie as part of a group of three bombers with the task of suppressing Georgian artillery in the area of ​​the village of Shindisi (between Gori and Tskhinval). After making the first approach, the plane was shot down in front of numerous Georgian eyewitnesses, the moments of hitting it and the fall of the burning plane were filmed mobile phones and later posted online. , According to an eyewitness, two unsuccessful missile launches from MANPADS were made on the plane, but it was hit by a third missile. According to the Polish media, the Su-24M was allegedly hit by a Polish-made Grom 2 MANPADS.

The hit caused a strong fire, and the crew ejected, but the parachute dome of the navigator Colonel Igor Rzhavitin was damaged by the wreckage of the aircraft, as a result of which he died upon impact with the ground. The commander of the crew, Colonel Igor Zinov, who received extensive burns and a severe bruise of the spine, was taken prisoner, after which he was taken to the Gori military hospital, and from there he was evacuated to a hospital in Tbilisi and placed with Major Malkov. On August 19, both of them were exchanged for Georgian prisoners of war. The downed Su-24M fell into the garden of a private house in the village of Dzeveri without causing casualties or destruction on the ground. Its wreckage was filmed and shown on Georgian TV channels the same day. Photos of the wreckage of this aircraft were later published in the Georgian magazine "Arsenal" and some foreign media.

Almost simultaneously with the Akhtuba Su-24M, at about 10.30 am on August 9, the modernized Su-25SM attack aircraft of the commander of the 368th assault aviation regiment, Colonel Sergei Kobylash, was also shot down. A pair of attack aircraft, in which he was the leader, attacked the Georgian column south of Tskhinval, on the Gori-Tskhinval road. At the exit from the first approach, Kobylash's plane was hit by a MANPADS missile in the left engine, as a result of which it failed. Kobylash was forced to interrupt the attack and return to base with a wingman. Some time later, while flying over the southern outskirts of Tskhinvali at an altitude of 1000 m, the plane was hit by a MANPADS missile already in the right engine, left without thrust. The pilot in planning tried to take the plane as far as possible from the "front line" in order to eject in the location of friendly troops. He ejected north of Tskhinval and successfully landed on the territory of South Ossetia, in one of the villages of the Georgian enclave in the Great Liakhvi Gorge, after which he was quickly picked up by a Russian Mi-8 helicopter of the search and rescue group from the 487th separate helicopter regiment (Budennovsk). During the ejection and landing, Kobylash did not receive any injuries.

Who shot down Colonel Kobylash's Su-25SM remains unclear. In Tskhinval, over which he received a second MANPADS missile hit, there were no Georgian troops at that time, but they were concentrated nearby, in villages near the outskirts of the city. On the other hand, about half an hour after the fall of his plane, the State Committee for Press and Mass Information of South Ossetia issued a statement about the downing of one of the two Georgian attack aircraft over the city that attempted to carry out a raid on Tskhinval. According to the available information from the Georgian side, on August 9, Georgian attack aircraft no longer made sorties, so, apparently, the damaged aircraft of Kobylash and the wingman accompanying him, who entered the airspace over the city from Georgia, were mistaken for Georgian aircraft and fired upon.

August 9 was the most difficult day for Russian aviation, in total four aircraft were lost that day. The fourth was the Su-25BM attack aircraft of Major Vladimir Edamenko from the 368th Assault Aviation Regiment. The circumstances of this flight were told to the Ren-TV channel by its wingman Sergey Sapilin. Their pair of attack aircraft was assigned to air escort a Russian military convoy en route from Dzhava to Tskhinvali. Immediately after crossing the Caucasus Range and entering the airspace of South Ossetia, the crews visually detected the approach of fighters, which they identified as MiG-29s of unknown origin. As a precaution, the attack aircraft began to perform an anti-fighter maneuver. The Russian MiG-29s, having approached and carried out a visual identification, turned away.

Almost immediately after that, in the Dzhava region, over the territory controlled by Russian troops, the wingman of Major Edamenko detected radio exposure of his aircraft from the ground and saw his leader's Su-25BM burning, going in a gentle dive towards the ground. Edamenko did not answer the requests of the radio follower, he did not even attempt to eject, which may indicate that the major was killed or seriously wounded. The plane crashed into the ground and exploded, Major Edamenko died. Subsequently, the head of the military air defense of the Russian Armed Forces, Major General Mikhail Krush, announced the destruction of the "Georgian Su-25KM" by Russian air defense systems. Most likely, this was Yedamenko's attack aircraft.

Between 3 and 4 p.m. on August 9, NTV channel correspondent Alexander Viktorov observed an air target being fired upon by a Russian ZSU-23-4 Shilka self-propelled anti-aircraft gun that was covering the Guftinsky bridge. Subsequently, in the direction of the shelling, on the banks of the Bolshoy Liakhvi River near the village of Itrapis, at a distance of about 1.6 kilometers from the bridge, fragments of the Su-25 attack aircraft were found. They were declared to be the remnants of a downed "Georgian attack aircraft" and on September 5 they were blown up by specialists of the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations, since among them there were a large number of damaged unguided rockets. Russian journalists who subsequently visited this place found Russian identification marks on the wreckage.

Most likely, this was the Edamenko attack aircraft, since by the time the Russian air defense systems were brought into South Ossetia, Georgian planes were no longer flying. Problems with the recognition of the attack aircraft by Russian fighters and the air defense installation may indicate a malfunction of the “friend or foe” identification system on his plane.

The sixth and last shot down aircraft of the Russian Air Force was lost already at the end of the active phase of the conflict, at about 11 am on August 11. It was a Su-24M front-line bomber. According to unofficial information from aviation circles, he was a member of the 968th research and instructor mixed aviation regiment of the 4th Center for combat use and retraining of flight personnel (Lipetsk). A column of Russian troops advancing from the Tskhinval region towards Gori, mistakenly identifying this Su-24M as an enemy, fired several MANPADS missiles at it, as a result of which the aircraft was shot down, a few kilometers west of Tskhinval, over the territory of South Ossetia. The pilots successfully ejected and were evacuated, the wreckage of the Su-24M fell in a hard-to-reach mountainous area.

Already after the end of active hostilities, on the night of August 16-17, a Mi-8MTKO aviation helicopter crashed in South Ossetia Border Guard FSB of Russia (military unit 2464). When landing at night on a temporary helipad near the village of Ugardanta, near the village of Dzhava, it hit a Mi-24 helicopter of the 487th helicopter regiment (Budennovsk), which was on the ground, rolled over and caught fire. As a result of the fire and the subsequent explosion of ammunition, the Mi-24 was also seriously damaged and several other helicopters on the site were lightly damaged. The flight mechanic senior warrant officer Alexander Burlachko died, three other crew members received severe burns.

In total, thus, during the hostilities, four crew members of Russian aircraft were killed:

Major Vladimir Edamenko - 368th cap;

Major Igor Nesterov - 52nd GTBAP;

Major Viktor Pryadkin - 52nd GTBAP;

Colonel Igor Rzhavitin - 929th GLITs.

Already after the end of hostilities, senior warrant officer Alexander Burlachko (military unit 2464) died in a helicopter crash in South Ossetia.

They were shot down, captured by the Georgian side and later exchanged for Georgian prisoners of war:

Colonel Igor Zinov - 929th GLITS;

Major Vyacheslav Malkov - 52nd GTBAP.

Listed as missing:

Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Koventsov - 52nd GTBAP.

The total combat losses of Russian aviation during the Five-Day War amounted to six aircraft:

1 - Su-25SM and 2 - Su-25BM;

2 - Su-24M;

1 - Tu-22M3.

Of these, two aircraft were reliably shot down by enemy fire, three aircraft were probably shot down by “friendly fire”, it seems difficult to determine who shot down another one. The wreckage of five aircraft fell within the borders of South Ossetia and only one - Su-24M from the 929th GLITS - on the territory of Georgia.

In addition to the downed aircraft, four more Su-25 attack aircraft were seriously damaged, although they returned to Russian airfields. Damage was officially confirmed to three upgraded Su-25SMs (statements by Chief Designer of the Sukhoi Design Bureau Vladimir Babak and Director of the 121st Aircraft Repair Plant of the Russian Ministry of Defense Yakov Kazhdan) from the 368th Assault Aviation Regiment. It is known that two of them were piloted by pilots Captain Ivan Nechaev and Lieutenant Colonel Oleg Molostov. In addition, it is known that another Su-25 (tail number "47 red", pilot Major Ivan Konyukhov) from the 461st Assault Aviation Regiment (Krasnodar airfield) was damaged. All of them were hit by MANPADS missiles. Aircraft of other types and helicopters did not receive significant combat damage.

Thus, the most heavy losses in technology suffered the Budyonnovsky 368th assault aviation regiment, in which six Su-25 aircraft were shot down and seriously damaged - that is, at least a quarter of the aircraft from headcount, and mostly only recently modernized Su-25SM, with the most trained pilots, including the regiment commander.

At the same time, initial estimates of the effectiveness of Georgian air defense, made based only on the number lost by Russia aircraft, without taking into account the reasons for their losses, were exaggerated. Georgian air defense, despite the presence in its composition of such fairly effective air defense systems as Buk-M1, Osa-AK / AKM and Spyder-SR, as well as a significant number of MANPADS, failed to reliably cover its troops and the country's territory. During the entire first day of the war, on August 8, the Georgian air defense system failed to shoot down a single Russian aircraft, despite the fact that on that day they operated in conditions of unsuppressed enemy air defense and the presence of a single radar field over Georgia itself, its separatist regions and nearby border areas.

During the first day of hostilities, Russian military aviation made several dozen sorties, and struck not only directly in the zone of armed confrontation, but throughout the entire depth of the territory of Georgia, using almost exclusively unguided weapons. For example, the main base of the Georgian Air Force Marneuli, located more than a hundred kilometers from the conflict zone and the border with Russia, not far from Tbilisi and the border of Georgia and Armenia, was bombarded three times on the afternoon of August 8 by small groups of Su-25 and Su-24M aircraft. Both (or best case three) aircraft, which can be attributed to Georgian air defense systems, were shot down on August 9, in the first half of the day. From noon on August 9 until the end of the conflict, the Georgian armed forces failed to shoot down a single Russian aircraft.

In total, over the entire period of hostilities, Georgian air defense systems managed to achieve only one hit on Russian aircraft from mobile air defense systems. The actions of man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems turned out to be more successful. Georgian forces managed to score at least three, but no more than six, MANPADS hits on Russian aircraft, including one close miss that did not cause serious damage.

The loss of at least half of Russian aircraft from "friendly fire" was an unpleasant surprise. This demonstrated the most serious problems of the Russian armed forces with the coordination and command and control of troops in the combat zone. Practical absence interaction between the ground forces and the Russian Air Force led to the fact that they were actually conducting two individual wars. The pilots were not fully informed about the situation on the ground, they received inaccurate and delayed intelligence data, by the beginning of the war, according to the commander of the 368th assault aviation regiment, Colonel Kobylash, they had no accurate information on the structure and air defense forces of Georgia.

The Russian ground forces also had no knowledge of the situation in the air and, until the end of hostilities, were not even sure of Russian air supremacy. Despite the fact that the Georgian Su-25 attack aircraft made only one sortie in the early morning of August 8 and did not take off again, Russian aircraft were often mistaken for Georgian ones by Russian and Ossetian forces and were fired upon without their identification and in the absence of aggressive actions on their part. (although there is some evidence of cases of “friendly fire” from aviation.) As a result, Russian troops and the Ossetian militia fired at least ten MANPADS missiles at their aircraft, fire was also opened on them from BMP cannons, anti-aircraft machine guns of tanks and light automatic weapons. There is also information about problems in the operation of the "friend or foe" identification system and its only occasional use when using MANPADS. All this led to such large losses of Russian aircraft from "friendly fire".

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In the early morning of August 9, 2008, near the village of Karbauli, Sachkhere region of Georgia (about 50 km north-west of Gori), a Russian long-range Tu-22M3 bomber from the 52nd Guards Heavy Bomber Aviation Regiment (Shaikovka airfield) was shot down.

One of the crew members, co-pilot Major Vyacheslav Malkov, ejected and was taken prisoner by the Georgians. The commander of the Tu-22M3, Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Koventsov, left the plane after Malkov and went missing. The remains of his ejection seat have been found, but he or his body has not yet been found.

A few weeks after the war, in the territory of South Ossetia, in a remote, sparsely populated area near the border with Georgia, the search group found the wreckage of a crashed aircraft and in them the bodies of the remaining crew members - Majors Viktor Pryadkin (navigator) and Igor Nesterov (weapons systems operator). For some reason, they did not have time to eject. After this loss, the Russian Air Force stopped using long-range aviation until the very end of the conflict.

What happened, why and, most importantly, who shot down the unique Russian Tu-22M3 long-range bomber?

Required Foreword


Tu-22M3

Tu-22M ("product 45"), according to the NATO codification Backfire, is a Soviet long-range supersonic bomber-missile carrier with a variable-swept wing.

The Tu-22MZ aircraft is designed to conduct combat operations in the operational zones of land and sea theaters of military operations in order to destroy mobile and stationary, radar-contrast and area, visible and invisible targets (objects) with missiles and bombs day and night in simple and difficult meteorological conditions .

The first experimental Tu-22M3 flew on June 20, 1977. After completing the program of flight-development tests, the Tu-22M3 has been put into serial production since 1978. In its final form, it was put into service in March 1989.

The last Tu-22M3 was built in 1993 (due to non-payment by the customer, the aircraft was installed as a monument near the Kazan Aviation Plant). A total of 268 Tu-22M3s were built at the Kazan Aviation Production Association.

five day war


Tu-22M3

Any war for a non-aggressor always starts suddenly. The consequence of surprise is often a panic in the troops of the country that was attacked. South Ossetia is no exception.

In the ranks of its defenders there arose exactly the same panic mood that was in Soviet troops in 1941 during the Great Patriotic War.

The fact that both sides fought with Soviet-made weapons contributed to the panic. This was especially true for aircraft. For example, the well-known Su-25 attack aircraft were built at the Tbilisi Aviation Plant and were in service with both the Russian and Georgian armies. Therefore, the Ossetian militias were forced to shoot at everything that flew.

Independent military experts claim that the total combat losses of Russian aviation during the five-day war amounted to six aircraft: one Su-25SM, two Su-25BM, two Su-24M, one Tu-22M3.

Of these, two planes (!) were reliably shot down by Georgian fire, and three - by the so-called friendly fire of Ossetians. The wreckage of five planes fell within the borders of South Ossetia, and only one Su-24M - on the territory of Georgia.

In addition to the downed aircraft, four more Su-25 attack aircraft were seriously damaged, although they returned to Russian airfields.

Most likely, the reason for these losses was the ineffective interaction between the branches of the military, as well as the fact that the recognition systems "friend or foe" simply did not work, and the satellite targeting and orientation grouping was too weak and ineffective.

How and why was he shot down?


Tu-22M3

During the war in South Ossetia in August 2008, the Tu-22M3 group delivered targeted air strikes on the Georgian army's ammunition depots, bombed airfields and troop concentrations in the Kodori Gorge.

Who made such a short-sighted decision is still unclear. None of the Russian military knew what air defense systems the Georgian army had, how many of them were involved in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict.

Who shot down the Tu-22M3 is also unclear. It could be either the Georgian Buk-M1 air defense system or the Georgian Osa air defense system. According to independent experts, most likely it was a modernized Georgian air defense system Osa-AK/AKM. True, the Russian Ministry of Defense did not confirm this.

However, certain questions arise. First: how and why was it shot down? Didn't such a powerful aircraft have defense systems against missile attacks?

This question was answered by co-pilot Major Vyacheslav Malkov. Here is what he said in Russian newspaper about this state of emergency: “We dodged the first missile. And the second hit right in the air intake. The impact of the rocket was like a sledgehammer. The aircraft was immediately de-energized. Then it disintegrated in the air. The commander managed to shout: “Jump!”


A pair of Tu-22M3 on a combat mission

And Malkov ejected. Just before the ground, the parachute dome collapsed, and the major hit the ground like a stone. Blood gushed from a broken arm. There were some people in camouflage. He reached for the gun and lost consciousness.

Then he was captured, exchanged for 18 Georgian soldiers, a hospital, where Vladimir Putin came to see him. Then he served as chairman of the government of the Russian Federation.

The prime minister sat on the edge of the bed and asked why they had been knocked down. Malkov squinted at the Minister of Defense (at that time he was the same Anatoly Serdyukov), who was also present there, then waved his hand and told the truth.

“There were no electronic warfare units (electronic warfare system) in the combat vehicle. The old ones burned out, but there were no new ones in the warehouse. Like this.

It seemed that the terrible was left behind for him. But Malkov's driver's license expired. He went to change, and there they told him: you are on the international wanted list, which was announced by the government of Georgia. And they called for an outfit. So the war once again reminded of itself.

But, as they say, this is a second matter.

Why didn't they eject?

The second question is why the entire crew of the Russian Tu-22M3 failed to successfully eject, because the flight altitude allowed it to be done.


SAM "Osa"

What does the ejection manual say?

In accordance with it, each member of the aircraft crew is equipped with a KT-1M ejection seat developed by the Tupolev Design Bureau with a PS-T three-stage parachute system mounted in the seat. Ejection, I emphasize, under normal conditions is carried out in the following sequence: operator, navigator, right pilot, ship commander (remember!). Both individual and forced ejection are provided.

Forced ejection of the crew is performed by the commander, for which it is enough to lift the cap and turn on the “Forced ejection” toggle switch.

The commander is the last to eject, manually operating the ejection drives on the seat. Forced ejection is the main one, and the individual evacuation of the aircraft is the backup.

In the event of leaving, I emphasize once again, a de-energized aircraft, only an individual ejection is possible with a preliminary manual reset of the access hatch covers (until the hatch “leaves”, the firing mechanism of the seat remains blocked).

So, as a result of a Tu-22M3 missile hit, the power was de-energized. The co-pilot, Major Vyacheslav Malkov, was the first to eject.

The commander of the Tu-22M3, lieutenant colonel Alexander Koventsov, ejected after Malkov and went missing. The remains of his ejection seat have been found, but he or his body has not yet been found.


SAM "Buk-M1"

It was not said to reproach him, but he should have been the last to eject. Why Koventsov ejected second is unclear.

But these are just our speculations. The question is why the rest of the crew died. As mentioned above, an individual ejection on this aircraft occurs with a preliminary manual reset of the access hatch covers (until the hatch “leaves”, the firing mechanism of the seat remains blocked).

Most likely, the hatches were not dropped and the crew remained in ejection seats to the very ground. Or the plane fell apart in the air so quickly that they didn't have time to do anything.

Necessary Afterword


Ejection seat KT-1M

What did the Georgian-Ossetian conflict show?

First of all, the extremely inefficient work of Russian aviation, as well as its poor interaction with ground forces.

Perhaps, after everything that happened, the generals drew some conclusions. Of course, if they had time, almost all the top leadership of almost all branches of the military involved in the five-day war were fired.

The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation stated that "perestroika in the Russian army began with this conflict." It was a very interesting statement, given the fact that Anatoly Eduardovich Serdyukov was its head at that time.