Campaign of 1918. Italian campaign (1915-1918)

Being one of the two main theaters of military operations of the First World War, the Western Front certainly occupies the first place in terms of its military and political significance. It was here that the German command in August - September 1914 made a decisive bet on victory, and its failure led to the final defeat of Kaiser Germany, unable to withstand a protracted war of attrition against the combined potential of the Entente powers. Being of paramount importance for Germany, on the one hand, and Great Britain and France, on the other, the Western Front lasted until the conclusion of the Compiegne Armistice in November 1918.
After declaring war on Russia on August 1, 1914, Germany presented an ultimatum to France, demanding that it remain neutral, but France declared that it would fulfill its allied obligations to Russia, and on August 3 Germany declared war on it under the pretext of an alleged bombing of German territory by French airplanes. Since the German plan for a lightning war (the Schlieffen plan) assumed the invasion of the main forces of the German army into France through the territory of Belgium, the refusal of the Belgian government to let the German troops through led to the latter's violation of the neutrality of Belgium, which served as the basis for the entry into the war of Great Britain, bound by military-political agreements with France and Russia.

Campaign 1914

During the Battle of the Frontier in August 1914, French troops and the British Expeditionary Force failed to hold back the advance of seven German armies that poured across the borders of Belgium and France. The German plan for waging war on two fronts was to defeat the troops of their opponents in the West with a powerful blow in a short time, capture Paris and force France to surrender, after which they would transfer the main forces of the German troops to the Eastern Front and in cooperation with the Austro-Hungarian army inflict a decisive defeat on Russia. However, this plan was thwarted due to the active actions of the Russian troops in East Prussia. Despite the fact that the Russian 2nd Army of General Samsonov eventually suffered a heavy defeat near Tannenberg, the German command, having very limited forces against the Russians, was forced to prepare reserves for sending to the East - two army corps designed to reinforce the strike force advancing to Paris. This played a decisive role in the defeat of the Germans at the Battle of the Marne.

Battle of the Marne (Marne).

On September 5, 1914, the French 6th Army of General Maunoury, concentrated east of Paris, launched a counterattack on the unprotected right flank of the enemy on the Marne River. The German command did not have free forces to fend off the blow, and the commander of the right-flank German 1st Army, General von Kluck, transferred two corps against the Monuri army, and then two more divisions, exposing the junction with the neighboring 2nd Army. This allowed the French 5th th army and British troops to launch a second counterattack into the gap that had opened. The German 2nd Army faced the threat of encirclement and was forced to retreat north, pulling the neighboring 1st and 3rd armies with it. By September 12, the German troops rolled back 60 km, taking up defense along the lines of the Aisne and Vel rivers. Thus, the German plan to defeat France with one blow failed, which predetermined the unfavorable outcome of the entire war for Germany.
In the second half of September - October, both sides continued maneuvering, trying to outflank the enemy from the open northern flank (the so-called "Run to the Sea"), as a result of which the front line extended to the coast of the North Sea, and the war acquired a positional character.

Campaign 1915

From the end of 1914, the opposing sides dug into the ground, rebuilding dugouts, trenches, machine-gun emplacements, securely covered by barbed wire and minefields. Attempts to break through such defenses each time turned out to be huge losses for the attacking side with insignificant results. In the changed conditions of hostilities, along with the strengthening of the role of artillery, especially heavy artillery, new means of conducting armed struggle began to develop, including chemical weapons, airplanes, tanks, and specially trained assault detachments of infantrymen and combat engineers. At the same time, the significance of the cavalry, which turned out to be extremely vulnerable to fire from automatic weapons, aircraft weapons (bombs, airplane arrows) and poisonous substances, was reduced to nothing. In the spring of 1915, the main efforts of Germany were transferred to the Eastern Front, and the Anglo-French troops tried to take advantage of this situation to go on the offensive. However, the operation undertaken in May-June in Artois was not successful. In two weeks of fighting, the Allies lost 130 thousand people, advancing only 3-4 km on the French sector of the front and 1 km on the British.

Conferences at the Château de Chantilly.

The failures of the Anglo-French troops in operations on the Western Front, the retreat of the Russian armies in Galicia and Poland seriously worried the military-political leadership of the Entente powers.

In the middle of 1915, the French government invited the Allies to carry out a common development of future operations and submitted a project to convene a conference where the French army headquarters was located. In a year and a half, four inter-allied conferences were held. The first conference (July 1915) discussed the Allied plan for the second half of 1915. The second conference (December 1915) discussed the general plan for the 1916 campaign and recommendations to the governments of the Entente countries on economic and political issues. The Third Conference (March 1916) considered and approved the plan for the 1916 campaign. The Fourth Conference (November 1916) decided to prepare coordinated operations for the spring of 1917. The conferences also repeatedly discussed the issue of a centralized body for coordinating the actions of the allied armies, but the military-political contradictions between their participants did not allow it to be created. The Supreme Military Council of the Entente was formed only in November 1917.

Campaign 1916

Despite the major successes won in 1915 on the Eastern Front, the Austro-German troops failed to crush Russia and withdraw it from the war, and the German command decided to try their luck again in the West.

Battle of Verdun (Verdun).

The fortified area of ​​Verdun was chosen as the main point of application of forces, against which the Germans gathered artillery forces unprecedented in history (1225 guns, of which 703 were heavy, 110 guns per 1 km of the front). It was assumed that in the battle for Verdun, which is the key to Paris, the French would be forced to deplete their resources of manpower, weapons and ammunition. However, during the fierce fighting that lasted from February to December 1916, the German army was able to achieve only very limited successes at the cost of huge losses. This was facilitated, in particular, by the fact that during the year the German command had to repeatedly withdraw troops from the front in order to support its ally Austria-Hungary, which found itself in a difficult situation as a result of the offensive of the Russian troops (Brusilovsky breakthrough), undertaken in accordance with the decisions adopted at the meetings of representatives of the General Staffs of the Allied Powers in Chantilly.

Battle of the Somme.

In July-November 1916, the Allied Command undertook an offensive operation on the Somme River, which went down in history as one of the largest battles of the First World War. Despite many days of artillery preparation, the offensive developed slowly and at the cost of heavy losses. The total losses of the parties in killed and wounded amounted to more than 1 million people. For the first time in history, tanks were used to break through the enemy defenses during this battle. As a result of the operation, the Allies broke through the German front by only 10 km in a sector of 35 km. in depth. In order to prevent the development of a breakthrough, the Germans had to urgently create a new line of defense. Losses near Verdun and on the Somme seriously affected the morale and combat effectiveness of the German troops. The strategic initiative passed to the allies for a long time.

Campaign 1917

The 1917 campaign was marked by new Allied attempts to break through the front. This was preceded by the withdrawal of German troops to the rear defensive line (the Hindenburg line), prepared in the winter of 1916-17. By shortening the front line, the German command thus freed part of its forces.

The April offensive of the British and French near Arras, which went down in history as the "Nievel massacre" (after the French commander-in-chief Robert Nivel), did not achieve its goals, and the losses incurred during it caused protest moods and unrest in the French army due to the unwillingness of the soldiers to go to the battle. Equally unsuccessful were the actions of the British troops during several operations undertaken in July - November in Flanders (Battle of Passchendaele). Their results remained far from desirable, but the experience gained made it possible to improve the offensive tactics of the Allies, which were successfully used in the operations of 1918.

Battle of Cambrai.

In late November - early December 1917, British troops undertook a large-scale operation against the new German defense line in the area of ​​​​the city of Cambrai, relying on the massive use of tanks (476 units) and the new assault tactics of infantry units. On the first day of the offensive, they managed to achieve tangible success, breaking through the German front in a section of 12 km to 6-8 km in depth with rather small losses. However, the delay in bringing Canadian cavalry into the breach allowed the Germans to recover from the initial shock and close the gap. Over the next days, the German troops were able to completely stop the advance of the enemy, and then launched a counteroffensive and pushed the British back to their original positions.
During the 1917 campaign, both sides had exhausted their forces almost to the limit. Only the influence of external factors could decide the outcome of the struggle in favor of one of them. For Germany, this was Russia's exit from the war as a result of the Bolshevik revolution and the possibility of using additional forces transferred from the East on the Western Front; for Great Britain and France - the entry into the war of the United States on the side of the Entente and the arrival in Europe of numerous and fresh American troops. In such a situation, Germany could only count on achieving a decisive victory before sufficiently large American contingents appeared on the front.

Campaign 1918

In March 1918, after the conclusion of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk between Germany and Soviet Russia, German troops undertook a series of offensive operations in the West, which went down in history under the general name "Battle of the Kaiser". The Germans managed to significantly push back their opponents and again, as in 1914, reach the approaches to Paris. However, the material resources of Germany and the morale of the army and the population were finally undermined. In July, during the second battle on the Marne, the German offensive was stopped, and in August, having broken through the German front near Amiens, the Anglo-French troops went on the offensive, supported by the American troops who arrived in France. The German command was forced to leave all the territories occupied during the offensive and withdraw troops to the rear positions. Failures at the front and an extremely difficult situation in the rear led to a revolution in Germany in early November, the monarchy fell, and the provisional government that came to power signed an armistice with the Entente powers on November 11 in Compiegne, recognizing defeat in the war and pledging to evacuate all territories, still occupied by German troops at that time.

S.I. Drobyazko,
Candidate of Historical Sciences

So, ended the war, which lasted 4 years and 3 months. The most important mistake of the German high command in 1918 was that it overestimated the strategic and political-economic power of Germany and sought to achieve excessively large and unattainable results for it.

When comparing the composition, size, and then the actions of the armed forces of the Entente and Germany in 1918, Hindenburg was already aware at the beginning of the campaign that the defeat of Germany was inevitable if she could not crush the Entente armies before the arrival of the Americans. But the lack of superiority of forces among the Germans and the need for careful preparation of operations made it possible to undertake them each time only on a relatively small area and at long intervals. These operations were very powerful, aimed at crushing the enemy's manpower. They were always produced in a new operational direction, but with the same methods and with less and less results. The position of the Germans with the lengthening of the front and with the decrease in manpower worsened each time, which is why the result was deplorable. The German high command did not foresee such consequences. But this must be blamed not only on him, but also on the bourgeoisie, which pushed him to such a course of action.

The allied high command, although possessing enormous capabilities compared to the Germans, better took into account the changing situation, the exhaustion and disintegration of the German forces, but, having repelled the German offensive with great difficulty, from July 18 it began only to oust the German army, almost without striving to destroy it. or surrender. Foch's method of action was more certain, less risky, but slow, costly and did not promise decisive results. In general, the German army retreated to Germany quite safely and slowly, at a speed of no more than 2 kilometers per day. If the armistice had not been concluded on November 11, Foch could not have prevented the main German forces from withdrawing to the Rhine, both as a result of the disruption of the Allied military communications, and because of the difference in interests of the Entente states, which would become more and more pronounced.

The effort shown by the United States during the most critical period of the war yielded results that exceeded all expectations. The number of American divisions that actually ended up in France in October 1918 was almost 4 times higher than the number that they themselves had planned. True, the American units, especially at the beginning, were poorly trained, but they replaced the British and French divisions in quiet areas, and this circumstance was of no small importance for the course of operations. In the second half of the campaign, the Americans took the most active part in the battles, although without great success, but with heavy losses.

Despite the efforts of both sides, and especially the Germans, to switch to maneuver warfare and thereby create the possibility of achieving quick and decisive results, this was not possible. The order of battle in 1918 was so dense, and the technical means were so great, that under these conditions it was impossible to maintain the maneuverability of the troops.

The adjoining of the flanks of the positional front to the sea and to the border of a neutral state made it possible to produce only breakthroughs. Enveloping or bypassing the exposed flank could only be the second phase of the operation. But if the breakthrough itself turned out to be more or less successful, then the issues of its development and the supply of the operation in 1918 turned out to be unresolved. The advance of the victorious troops, followed by huge reserves, was always slower than the concentration of fresh operational reserves of the defender, who used rich and intact transport for this. The slowdown in the advance of the attackers, and sometimes its complete cessation, often took place not only as a result of the staunch resistance created in their path, but also due to the fact that huge forces were being deployed in a small area. They required plentiful means of transport for their supply. Both the troops and the transport were forced to advance along the terrain destroyed by the retreating enemy, which required complex and slow restoration work. Under these conditions, the reproduction of "Cannes" was impossible.

While both sides had quite enough firepower and technical means, there were not enough people to replenish the active army. This circumstance to a large extent was the cause of the defeat of Germany. If the Entente has relatively safely survived its army replenishment crisis, it is only thanks to the United States and the extensive use of the population of dominions and colonies. Thus, France received from her colonies during the whole war 766,000 people, and England from her possessions over 2,600,000 people. Germany, on the other hand, having attracted 10,500,000 people for military service, that is, everything that it could, exhausted all its possibilities. Therefore, from June 1918, the German army was forced to eat itself, that is, to disband some parts to replenish others. If during the war in Germany 100 divisions were newly formed, then during the last 5 months of the war the Germans disbanded 29 divisions.

In addition to the desire to have a large army and the need to free workers and employees of the military industry, transport and administration from military service, huge losses had a major impact on the lack of manpower. The Entente lost over 2,000,000 people in the 1918 campaign in France, and Germany over 1,500,000, including prisoners (Germany lost 325,000 prisoners). The smaller losses of the Germans can be explained by the better training of the German troops and their more skillful management.

Of particular importance in 1918 was rail, road and sea transport, both in carrying out a maneuver to repel an enemy offensive and in supplying the armed forces.

If in the end the infantryman decided the victory, then the power of the artillery fire was the main element of success. The number of guns, especially heavy ones, continued to increase in 1918, and the average consumption of shells per gun per day, which exceeded all previously available norms, reached 35.

The Allied tanks and superb aviation were of great benefit to them, especially on July 18 and August 8, but their actions cannot be exemplary at the present time in the presence of more advanced types and tanks and aircraft. Nevertheless, the operations mentioned are instructive as a method of making the best use of the technique at the beginning of the operation.

The World War is over... Its participants were divided into winners and losers. Russia alone resolutely refused to share the fate of one or the other.

The whole world is studying this greatest of wars and is looking for the reasons for victories and defeats.

There are many factors that decided the fate of the World War.

The changed economic situation in Germany, especially in Alsace-Lorraine, did not allow the German command to implement the idea of ​​the Schlieffen plan, which consisted in massing forces in Belgium behind the right flank of the outflanking wing, which led to a reduction in the balance of forces of the shock (in Belgium) and holding down groups (in Alsace - Lorraine) from 7:1 to 3:1. At the same time, the possibilities of using the railway network of France and Russia in operational terms have greatly increased. The French command organized a counter-maneuver against the bypassing right wing of the Germans, deprived of the corps of the subsequent echelons (ersatzreserve and landwehr). The Russian command reduced the time for the deployment of its armies on the German border, which managed to create a threat not only to East Prussia, but also to Silesia, the temporary loss of which the German command, due to political and economic conditions, could not agree to. This circumstance was the reason for the diversion of part of the forces from the French to the Russian front, which further increased the shortage of forces on the French front.

An unreasonable calculation for a short lightning war “until autumn leaf fall” (according to Schlieffen), not taking into account the fact that even then the economic power of the opponents, with the strain of all the forces of the country, provided the means and all the prerequisites for a long war.

A gross political mistake of the German government, which did not prepare a war against its main enemy - England. Hence the underestimation of the military power of England, which, during the protracted war, managed to deploy strong armies that almost doubled the size of the enemy in the French theater of war.

The unfounded calculation of the German military command that with the help of submarine warfare it will be able to block England. Polygugically, this was impossible, since, given the existing international economic relations, Germany, by unrestricted submarine warfare, challenged the neutral countries and called in a new adversary - the United States.

The dispersal of German forces and means among their allies, who, after six months of the war, could only hold on through her help and, for their part, did not provide her with decisive support. This circumstance aggravated the economic and military situation of Germany.

The war of 1914-1918 surpassed all previous wars in its scope. Of the 54 states, 33 states were involved in the war, the population of which was 67 percent of the world's population. Enormous resources of the national economy were thrown into the business of servicing and feeding the armed front. In addition to numerous armies at the front, millions of workers in the rear were involved in the manufacture of weapons, shells, aircraft, poisonous substances and other means of extermination. By the end of the war, 1 million workers were employed directly in the production of military equipment in France, 2 million in England, 1 million in the USA, and up to 2 million in Germany. In connection with this, major shifts took place in the economy of capitalism, and the correlation between the output of various branches of production changed dramatically.

The vastness of the theater of military operations stemmed from the need for vast spaces for the deployment of millions of armies and the supply of the latter with all kinds of provisions and equipment. Thus, one Western European front of the war, stretched by the beginning of the war between Belfort and Mezieres for 300 kilometers, already after the battle on the Marne, when the front stretched from the Swiss border to the North Sea, was equal to 600 kilometers. In order to imagine the space occupied during the World War by troops and convoys, one must take into account that the general reserves, parks, transports, temporary institutions and the main services of the armies were located behind the front to an average depth of about 100 kilometers. Multiplying the number of kilometers of the front by 100, we get 60,000 square kilometers, which was 1/9 of the surface of the whole of France. The East European front, after the speech of Romania in 1916, stretching between the Black and Baltic Seas, was already 1,400 kilometers, and the space necessary for the deployment of troops and convoys, calculating it on the same basis, was 140,000 square kilometers, which was the area of ​​\u200b\u200bmodern Germany. This shows how difficult it is for the population to quarter large mobilized armies.

The duration of the war exceeded all expectations. The German military school, of which Schlieffen was the most prominent representative, believed that, given the existing international economic relations, the wheels of the state mechanism would very soon be broken, and therefore the war should be fleeting. Germany tried to ensure the speed of its operations with appropriate powerful weapons in terms of artillery. However, there was a mistake here, since the powerful economy of the other side made it possible to develop a military industry and stretch the war for four and a half years.

The more or less effective blockade of the Central Powers by the Allies, the attempts made by the Germans to destroy English trade by intensifying submarine warfare, only hastened American intervention in the war on the side of the French and British. But there were other reasons as well - the application of American capital on the Anglo-French side required a more rapid realization of the profits of the American capitalists.

The attraction of new allies by both belligerents and the joint use of sources of industry, agriculture and finance, which could be at the disposal of individual allied states, contributed to the expansion of the theater of operations and an increase in the duration of the struggle.

The destructiveness of the war of 1914-1918 many times exceeded the casualties and losses of a number of previous wars. The direct military expenditures of the 11 major belligerents reached $200 billion, that is, 10 times the cost of all the wars from 1793 to 1907. Losses in killed and dead from wounds amounted to 10 million people, there were 19 million wounded, of which about 3.5 million remained disabled. There was a colossal death rate in the POW camps. So, for example, the number of dead Russian prisoners in Austria and Germany amounted to almost 500,000 people. The population of 10 European states, which by 1914 amounted to 400.8 million people, in the middle of 1919 decreased to 389 million people. In the areas of hostilities, a large number of industrial enterprises, means of transport, and agricultural implements were destroyed. In northern France alone, 23,000 industries were destroyed, including 50 blast furnaces, 4,000 kilometers of railways and 61,000 kilometers of other lines of communication, 9,700 railway bridges, 290,000 houses were destroyed, and 500,000 buildings were destroyed to a greater or lesser extent. Over 16 million tons of merchant fleet worth almost $7 billion were destroyed on the seas.

In the history of each country, there are years that are considered turning points at the change of eras. They are characterized by a rapid change of events at almost all levels of public life, an acute crisis, and often the outbreak of hostilities. This is exactly what happened in 1918 in the history of Russia. We will now talk about the most prominent personalities of this period, the events that then unfolded on the territory of the country, and their significance for future generations.

On the eve of 1918

Before fully plunging into the maelstrom of the ups and downs of 1918, in order to understand their full depth and causes, it is necessary to briefly describe what events preceded it.

First, it must be said that the year 1914-1918 in the history of Russia and the whole world is the period of the First World War. It was this event that served as the initial impetus for all the changes that took place in our country, as well as in most European states of that period. The Russian Empire, which had begun to rot, did not pull, either militarily or economically, for long-term hostilities. Actually, this could have been predicted based on the results of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905.

The Romanov dynasty, ruling for more than 300 years, began to rapidly lose its former authority. The events of the unfinished revolution of 1905 were only harbingers of the coming storm. And she soon exploded.

Of course, the most significant events on the eve of the described period were February and 1917. The first of them put an end to the autocracy of the Romanovs, and the second laid the foundation for a completely new model of statehood based on principles that had not been put into practice by anyone before.

But how viable the new state was to show the turning point in 1918 in the history of Russia.

Immediately after coming to power, the Bolshevik Party began a whole chain of reforms in the country.

On January 26, 1918, a Decree was issued announcing the beginning of the calendar reform. Its essence consisted in the transition from the Julian calendar used by the Orthodox Church, and until then considered official in the Russian Empire, to the Gregorian, put into use in most countries of the world, more accurately responding to the astronomical calendar. The reform was completed on February 14, when Soviet Russia officially switched to the new calendar system.

On January 28, the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars on the formation of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army was issued. This is what marked the beginning of the future greatness of the armed forces of the Soviet Union.

On February 2, a Decree was announced that separated the Orthodox Church from the state. From that moment on, all religious directions in the country had formally equal rights, and religions were declared.

Negotiations with Germany

The primary and vital task for the Soviet government was to get out of the First World War, which by that time for Russia, of course, had already been lost. But, of course, there was no question of any complete surrender. It was necessary to conclude an agreement with the Central Powers, with which at that moment Russia was at war, on the most favorable terms for the latter, possible in the current difficult situation.

The importance of these negotiations for the Soviet government is evidenced by the fact that they started on December 22, 1917. They were quite difficult, since neither side wanted to make significant concessions.

The resumption of hostilities and the very successful advance of German troops on the Russian-German front forced the Soviet delegation to reconsider its positions on many issues. These events prompted the Bolsheviks to make significant concessions.

Treaty of Brest-Litovsk

In 1918, the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty was finally signed. Soviet Russia agreed to significant territorial losses, including giving away Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic States, Finland, and a number of Transcaucasian regions. In addition, she pledged to pay significant sums of money in the form of reparations to the victorious powers, to stop hostilities against them and, in fact, to disband the army.

The Soviet government could not fail to understand that by signing this separate treaty, it would lose even illusory hopes for recognition of its legitimacy by the Entente countries, and would also get involved in direct confrontation with them. But there was no other way, since peace with Germany was a matter of survival.

The beginning of the formation of the White movement

From the very beginning of coming to power, the Bolsheviks had many opponents within Russia itself. The main core of their formation was the so-called White movement. He was joined not only by sincere monarchists, but also by supporters of republican models of statehood, more democratic than those that the Soviet government could offer, as well as other opponents of the Bolsheviks.

However, the leadership of the White movement, unlike the Soviet government, considered itself the legal successor of the Russian Empire and the Provisional Government, dissolved during the October Revolution. The signing of the separate Brest-Litovsk agreements with the delegations of the Central Powers contributed to the de facto recognition of the leaders of the White movement by the Entente countries as the legitimate government of Russia. Although they were in no hurry with the legal registration of this provision.

Volunteer army

The combat wing of the White movement was the Volunteer Army, which began to form at the end of 1917, first under the leadership of General Alekseev M.V., and then - Kornilov L.G. It is the latter that can be considered its real creator. The final formation of the Volunteer Army was completed on January 7, 1918.

But Kornilov was killed on April 13 of the same year during the liberation of Ekaterinodar from the Bolsheviks. The no less active Anton Ivanovich Denikin took over the leadership of the Volunteer Army.

These events show the depth of the political crisis that has covered the country. Awareness of its seriousness brought 1918 in the history of Russia. War was inevitable.

Intervention of the Entente countries

As mentioned above, the conclusion of a separate treaty with Germany and its allies put the Soviet government in direct confrontation with the Entente countries. Moreover, this conflict was not only purely political in nature, but also escalated into armed clashes. 1918 - 1920 in the history of Russia is characterized as the period of the most active phase of foreign military intervention.

The hostile actions of the Entente countries against Soviet Russia were initiated by the French landing in Murmansk in March 1918, as well as by blocking the Arkhangelsk port by the British fleet.

Later, when the Civil War in Russia was in full swing, Vladivostok, Odessa, Kherson, Sevastopol, Batumi and other cities became the object of foreign aggression. The geography of the invasion expanded.

British colonies and dominions, as well as countries outside the Entente (USA, Japan and others) joined the intervention.

Civil War

The year 1918-1922 in the history of Russia is characterized as a period of the Civil War. Although many historians count its beginning from 1917, and consider 1924 as the date of completion. But the most active actions, of course, begin to unfold precisely in the period we are studying.

By the spring of 1918, the Volunteer Army was fully formed as a combat-ready force that could challenge the Bolshevik Red Army.

Since March, active hostilities have begun. The uprising against the power of the Soviets first covers the region of the Don Cossacks, and then the Kuban. In particular, it was during the assault on Yekaterinodar that the first commander of the Volunteer Army, Kornilov Lavr Georgievich, died.

White movement in eastern Russia

In June, the Committee of Members of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly (KOMUCH) was created in Samara, which considered itself the successor to the Provisional Government of Kerensky. The People's Army of KOMUCH was created, which was the eastern front of the White movement. She entered into hostilities with the Red Army of the Bolsheviks, however, with little success.

In September 1918, the Provisional All-Russian Government (Ufa Directory) was created in Ufa on the basis of KOMUCH. In turn, after unsuccessful political and military actions, it was dissolved in November by Admiral Kolchak. Then in Omsk he was appointed the Supreme Ruler of Russia, and from that moment he was recognized in Russia. Immediately he showed himself to be a very active leader and an excellent commander, having won several important victories over the Bolsheviks. However, the peak of his political and military glory came in the next year, 1919.

All new unexpected turns brought 1918 in the history of Russia. Events rushed without slowing down.

Execution of the Romanovs

One of the most controversial events that marked the year 1918 in the history of Russia was the execution by the Bolsheviks on July 17 in Yekaterinburg of the Romanov royal family, headed by the former Emperor Nicholas II. Until now, historians have not agreed on how expedient this act of cruelty was, and whether the members of the dynasty that had lost popularity among the people really posed a real threat to Soviet power.

National separatism

The year 1918 in the history of Russia was also marked by the rise of national separatism in the regions that were part of the Romanov state. Some state formations on the ruins of the empire managed to defend their independence (Poland, Finland, the Baltic countries), others were forced to cede their sovereignty in the course of a difficult struggle (UNR, Georgia), others were generally a fiction that never had real instruments of power (BNR), the fourth, in fact, were satellites of Soviet Russia (the Far Eastern Republic, the Donetsk-Krivoy Rog Republic, LitBel, etc.).

The most tragic year was 1918 in the history of Ukraine. Here a struggle unfolded between the troops of the Ukrainian national state (UNR), the hetmanate of Skoropadsky who replaced him, the Volunteer Army of Denikin, the Red Army of the Bolsheviks and various anarchist, and sometimes simply gangster armed formations.

Notable personalities

All of the above events could not have happened without the actions of specific people. Let's see who most influenced the situation that 1918 formed in the history of Russia, who ruled, led the troops, and shaped the political atmosphere.

Let's start with the representatives of the Soviet government. Undoubtedly, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, who was both the leader of the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet state, had the greatest influence on events from this side. It was he who largely influenced the events that made 1918 a turning point in the history of Russia. Photo of Lenin can be seen below.

In addition, such party functionaries as Leon Trotsky, Lev Kamenev, Felix Dzerzhinsky played a significant role, Joseph Stalin began to gain more and more weight. In addition, such commanders of the Red Army as Mikhail Frunze, Grigory Kotovsky and others became famous during this period.

The most active organizers of the White movement, as mentioned above, were Lavr Kornilov and Anton Denikin, and by the end of 1918, Admiral Alexander Kolchak came forward.

Results

Thus, by the end of 1918, the young Soviet state was in the ring of enemies, which was formed from representatives of the White movement, local national formations and foreign invaders. The struggle was just beginning, but the Soviet government did the main thing - it held on to the first wave of enemy pressure. This fact, as well as the disunity of the opponents of the Bolsheviks, which turned into an open armed struggle between them, led to the fact that the fate of the country for the next 70 years was a foregone conclusion. However, the consequences of that momentous year are felt even now.

The preparation of the parties for hostilities in the campaign of 1918 took place in the conditions of the growth of the revolutionary movement in the countries of Western Europe under the influence of the Great October Socialist Revolution. As early as January 1918, mass strikes of workers broke out in a number of countries, and uprisings took place in the armies and navies. The revolutionary movement grew especially rapidly in Germany and Austria-Hungary.

The growth of the revolutionary movement in the countries of Europe was the main reason why the American imperialists began to transfer their troops to France.

By the beginning of 1918, the Entente (without Russia) had 274 divisions, 51,750 guns, 3,784 aircraft and 890 tanks. The countries of the German coalition had 275 divisions, 15,700 guns and 2,890 aircraft; there were no tanks in their army.

Having lost numerical superiority in forces due to Russia's withdrawal from the war, the Entente command decided to switch to strategic defense in order to accumulate forces in the second half of 1918 to begin active operations.

The German command, planning military operations for 1918, planned to carry out two strikes: in the west - in order to defeat the allies, ahead of the arrival of the main contingent of US troops in France, and in the east - with the aim of unleashing a military intervention against the Soviet Republic.

February 18, 1918 Germany and Austria-Hungary violated the truce with Soviet Russia and their troops invaded the territory of Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states. However, they were rebuffed by the workers of the Soviet Republic and were forced on February 23 to agree to peace negotiations.

The Germans struck their first blow in the West on March 21 on the right flank of the British in Picardy. Superiority in forces and surprise actions ensured their success already in the first days of the offensive. The British troops had to retreat, they suffered significant losses. In this regard, the German command clarified the original plan of the operation, deciding to defeat the French troops south of the Somme. However, during the operation, superiority in forces was lost. Fighting south of the Somme continued until 4 April, when the German advance was completely halted. It was not possible to defeat the main forces of the Anglo-French troops.

Five days later, the Germans launched an offensive against the British in the northern sector of the front in Flanders. As in March, here, because of the suddenness of the offensive and the considerable superiority of their forces, they succeeded at the outset in placing the British in a critical position. But French reserves were put forward to help, and this saved the British troops from defeat. Fighting in this direction continued until May 1. The Germans advanced 16-20 km, captured a number of settlements, but did not achieve their main goal - they failed to defeat the British.

Despite the failure of two operations, the Germans did not give up hope of defeating the Entente and forcing it at least to a compromise peace. To this end, on May 27, a new operation began, now against French troops in the Paris direction. The French front was broken through on the first day of the offensive. To cause panic in Paris, the Germans began shelling it with super-heavy guns, the firing range of which reached 120 km.

By May 30, German troops advancing in the center reached the Marne River, being 70 km away. From Paris. However, on the left wing, their advance was halted. Attempts to expand the breakthrough towards the flanks were not successful. The forces of the Entente were constantly growing. The ratio of enemy forces almost equalized, and by June 7, active hostilities had ceased. The Germans failed to form the Marne. On June 11, the French launched a strong counterattack on the right flank of the German troops. The German offensive was finally halted.

On July 15, the German command launched a new offensive operation on the Marne with the aim of delivering the last crushing blow. The operation was prepared carefully, counting on the surprise of the offensive. However, the French learned about the place and time of the upcoming attack and took a number of preventive measures, in particular, withdrew their main forces to the rear. As a result of this, the Germans' fire strike fell on an empty place.

On the first day of the offensive, German troops crossed the Marne in several places and moved 5-8 km deep into the French positions. Having met the main forces of the French, the Germans could not advance further.

On July 18, French troops launched a counterattack on the right flank of the German troops located on the Marne ledge, and threw them back 20-30 km across the River Aisne, that is, to the line from which they began their offensive in May.

The command of the Entente planned a number of private operations for the second half of 1918 in order to eliminate the ledges formed during the offensive operations of the Germans. It believed that if these operations were successful, then large operations could be carried out in the future.

The offensive of the Anglo-French troops with the aim of eliminating the Amenien ledge began on August 8. The unexpected and strong blow of the Allies led to the breakthrough of the German defenses and the rapid development of the operation. He contributed to the decline in the morale of the German army. Over 10,000 German soldiers and officers surrendered in just one day.

In the second half of August, the Entente command organized a number of new operations, expanding the front of the offensive, and on September 26, the Anglo-French launched a general offensive. The German military catastrophe was fast approaching. This hastened the defeat of the German troops. During October, Anglo-French troops successively overcame several German defensive lines in northern France. On November 5, German troops began to retreat along the entire front, and on November 11, Germany capitulated.

The First World War, which lasted just over four years, is over.

So, ended the war, which lasted 4 years and 3 months. The most important mistake of the German high command in 1918 was that it overestimated Germany's strategic and political and economic power and sought to achieve excessively large and unattainable results for her.

When comparing the composition, size, and then the actions of the armed forces of the Entente and Germany in 1918, Hindenburg was already aware at the beginning of the campaign that the defeat of Germany was inevitable if she could not crush the Entente armies before the arrival of the Americans. But the lack of superiority of forces among the Germans and the need for careful preparation of operations made it possible to undertake them each time only on a relatively small area and at long intervals. These operations were very powerful, aimed at crushing the enemy's manpower. They were always produced in a new operational direction, but with the same methods and with less and less results. The position of the Germans with the lengthening of the front and with the decrease in manpower worsened each time, which is why the result was deplorable. The German high command did not foresee such consequences. But this must be blamed not only on him, but also on the bourgeoisie, which pushed him to such a course of action.

The allied high command, although possessing enormous capabilities compared to the Germans, better took into account the changing situation, the exhaustion and disintegration of the German forces, but, having repelled the German offensive with great difficulty, from July 18 it began only to oust the German army, almost without striving to destroy it. or surrender. Foch's method of action was more certain, less risky, but slow, costly and did not promise decisive results. In general, the German army retreated to Germany quite safely and slowly, at a speed of no more than 2 km per day. If the armistice had not been concluded on November 11, Foch could not have prevented the main German forces from withdrawing to the Rhine, both as a result of the disruption of the Allied military communications, and because of the difference in interests of the Entente states, which would become more and more pronounced.

The effort shown by the United States during the most critical period of the war yielded results that exceeded all expectations. The number of American divisions that actually ended up in France in October 1918 was almost 4 times higher than the number that they themselves had planned. True, the American units, especially at the beginning, were poorly trained, but they replaced the British and French divisions in quiet areas, and this circumstance was of no small importance for the course of operations. In the second half of the campaign, the Americans took the most active part in the battles, although without great success, but with heavy losses.

Despite the efforts of both sides, and especially the Germans, to switch to mobile warfare and thereby create the possibility of achieving quick and decisive results, this was not achieved. The battle order in 1918 was so dense, and the technical means were so great, that under these conditions it was impossible to maintain the maneuverability of the troops.

The adjoining of the flanks of the positional front to the sea and to the border of a neutral state made it possible to produce only breakthroughs. Enveloping or bypassing the exposed flank could only be the second phase of the operation. But if the breakthrough itself turned out to be more or less successful, then the questions of its development and the supply of the operation in 1918 turned out to be unresolved. The advance of the victorious troops, followed by huge reserves, was always slower than the concentration of fresh operational reserves of the defender, who used rich and intact transport for this. The slowdown in the advance of the attackers, and sometimes its complete cessation, often took place not only as a result of the staunch resistance created in their path, but also due to the fact that huge forces were being deployed in a small area. They required plentiful means of transport for their supply. Both the troops and the transport were forced to advance along the terrain destroyed by the retreating enemy, which required complex and slow restoration work. Under these conditions, the reproduction of "Cannes" was impossible.

While both sides had quite enough firepower and technical means, there were not enough people to replenish the active army. This circumstance to a large extent was the cause of the defeat of Germany.

If the Entente has relatively safely survived its army replenishment crisis, it is only thanks to the United States and the extensive use of the population of dominions and colonies. Thus, France received from her colonies during the whole war 766,000 people, and England from her possessions over 2,600,000 people. Germany, which attracted 10,500,000 people for military service, i.e. everything she could, exhausted all her possibilities. Therefore, from June 1918, the German army was forced to eat itself, i.e. disband some parts to replenish others. If during the war in Germany 100 divisions were newly formed, then during the last 5 months of the war the Germans disbanded 29 divisions.

In addition to the desire to have a large army and the need to free workers and employees of the military industry, transport and administration from military service, huge losses had a major impact on the lack of manpower. The Entente lost over 2,000,000 men in the 1918 campaign in France, and over 1,500,000 in Germany, including prisoners (Germany lost 325,000 prisoners). The smaller losses of the Germans can be explained by the better training of the German troops and their more skillful management.

Of particular importance in 1918 was rail, road and sea transport, both in carrying out a maneuver to repel an enemy offensive and in supplying the armed forces.

If in the end the infantryman decided the victory, then the power of the artillery fire was the main element of success. The number of guns, especially heavy guns, continued to increase in 1918, and the average consumption of shells per gun per day, which exceeded all previously available norms, reached 35.

The Allied tanks and superb aviation were of great benefit to them, especially on July 18 and August 8, but their actions cannot be exemplary at the present time in the presence of more advanced types and tanks and aircraft. Nevertheless, the operations mentioned are instructive as a method of making the best use of the technique at the beginning of the operation.