The Battle of Kursk - military operations during the Great Patriotic War in the area of ​​the Kursk ledge in the summer of 1943. It was a key element of the summer 1943 campaign of the Red Army, during which a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War ended, which began with the victory at Stalingrad.

Chronological framework

In Russian historiography, the point of view was established that the Battle of Kursk took place from July 5 to August 23, 1943. Two periods are distinguished in it: the defensive stage and the counteroffensive of the Red Army.

At the first stage, the Kursk strategic defensive operation was carried out by the forces of two fronts of the Central (July 5-12, 1943) and Voronezh (July 5-23, 1943) with the involvement of the strategic reserves of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (Steppe Front), the purpose of which was to disrupt the Citadel plan ".

Background and plans of the parties

After the defeat at Stalingrad, the leadership of Germany faced two key problems: how to hold the eastern front under the increasing blows of the growing power of the Red Army, and how to keep the allies in their orbit, who had already begun to look for ways out of the war. Hitler believed that an offensive without such a deep breakthrough, as it was in 1942, should not only help solve these problems, but also raise the morale of the troops.

In April, a plan for Operation Citadel was developed, according to which two groups would strike in converging directions and encircle the Central and Voronezh fronts in the Kursk salient. According to Berlin's calculations, their defeat made it possible to inflict huge losses on the Soviet side, and to reduce the front line to 245 km, and to form reserves from the released forces. Two armies and one army group were allocated for the operation. South of Orel, Army Group (GA) "Center" deployed the 9th Army (A) of Colonel General V. Model. After several revisions of the plan, she received the task of breaking through the defenses of the Central Front and, having traveled about 75 km, to unite in the Kursk region with the troops of the GA "Yu" - the 4th Panzer Army (TA) Colonel General G. Goth. The latter was concentrated north of Belgorod and was considered the main force of the offensive. After breaking through the line of the Voronezh Front, she had to go to the meeting point for more than 140 km. The outer front of the encirclement was to be created by 23 ak 9A and the army group (AG) "Kempf" from the GA "South". It was planned to deploy active hostilities in a section of about 150 km.

For the "Citadel" GA "Center" allocated V. Model, whom Berlin appointed in charge of the operation, 3 tank (41.46 and 47) and one army (23) corps, a total of 14 divisions, of which 6 tank, and GA "South" - 4 TA and AG "Kempf" 5 corps - three tank (3, 48 and 2 shopping malls SS) and two army (52 ak and ak "Raus"), consisting of 17 divisions, including 9 tank and motorized.

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command (VGK) received the first information about Berlin's planning for a major offensive operation near Kursk in mid-March 1943. And on April 12, 1943, at a meeting with I.V. Stalin, a preliminary decision was already made on the transition to strategic defense. The Central Front of Army General K.K. Rokossovsky received the task of defending the northern part of the Kursk salient, repelling a possible strike, and then, together with the Western and Bryansk fronts, going on the counteroffensive and defeating the German group in the Orel region.

The Voronezh Front of Army General N.F. Vatutin was supposed to defend the southern part of the Kursk salient, bleed the enemy in the upcoming defensive battles, then go on the counteroffensive and, in cooperation with the Southwestern Front and the Steppe Fronts, complete its defeat in the Bel -city and Kharkov.

The Kursk defensive operation was considered as the most important element of the entire summer campaign of 1943. It was planned that after the expected enemy offensive in the zone of the Central and Voronezh fronts was stopped, conditions would arise for completing its defeat and switching to a general offensive from Smolensk to Taganrog. The Bryansk and Western fronts will immediately begin the Oryol offensive operation, which will help the Central Front finally thwart the plans of the enemy. In parallel with it, the Steppe Front should approach the south of the Kursk ledge, and after its concentration it was planned to launch the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation, which was to be carried out in parallel with the Donbass offensive operation of the Southern Fronts and the South-Western Front.

On July 1, 1943, the Central Front had 711,575 people, including 467,179 combat personnel, 10,725 guns and mortars, 1,607 tanks and self-propelled guns, and the Voronezh Front had 625,590 military personnel, of which 417,451 combat personnel, 8,583 guns and mortars, 1,700 units armored vehicles.

Kursk defensive operation. Combat operations in the north of the Kursk Bulge, July 5-12, 1943

During April - June, the start of the "Citadel" was postponed several times. The last date was the dawn of July 5, 1943. On the Central Front, fierce battles unfolded over a 40 km section. 9 And with a small interval attacked in three directions. The main blow was inflicted on 13A by Lieutenant General N.P. Pukhov with the forces of 47 tk - on Olkhovatka, the second, auxiliary, 41 tk and 23 ak - on Malo-Arkhangelsk, on the right wing 13 A and the left 48A of Lieutenant General P.L .Romanenko and the third - 46 shopping mall - to Gnilets on the right flank 70A of Lieutenant General I.V. Galanin. Heavy and bloody battles ensued.

On the Olkhovatsko-Ponyrovsky direction, Model threw more than 500 armored units into the attack at once, and groups of bombers marched in the air in waves, but a powerful defense system did not allow the enemy to break the lines of the Soviet troops on the move.

In the second half of July 5, N.P. Pukhov moved part of the mobile reserves to the main strip, and K.K. Rokossovsky sent a howitzer and mortar brigades to the Olkhovatka area. Counterattacks by tanks and infantry, supported by artillery, halted the enemy advance. By the end of the day, a small “dent” had formed in the center of 13A, but the defense had not been broken through anywhere. The troops of 48A and the left flank of 13A completely held their positions. At the cost of heavy losses, 47th and 46th TCs managed to advance 6-8 km in the Olkhovat direction, while 70A troops retreated only 5 km.

To restore the lost position at the junction of 13 and 70A, K.K. Rokossovsky in the second half of July 5 decided to conduct a counterattack on the morning of July 6 by 2 TA Lieutenant General A.G. Rodin and 19 TC in cooperation with the second echelon 13 A - 17 Guards . rifle corps (sk). He was unable to complete the task. After two days of fruitless attempts to implement the Citadel plan, 9A got bogged down in the defense of the Central Front. From July 7 to 11, the Ponyri station and the area of ​​​​the villages of Olkhovatka - Samodurovka - Gnilets, where two powerful centers of resistance were created, blocking the path to Kursk, became the epicenter of the battles in the strip 13 and 70A. By the end of July 9, the offensive of the main forces of 9A was stopped, and on July 11, she made the last unsuccessful attempt to break through the defenses of the Central Front.

On July 12, 1943, a turning point occurred in the fighting in this area. The Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive in the Oryol direction. V. Model, who was appointed responsible for the defense of the entire Oryol arc, began hastily transferring troops to Kursk near Orel. And on July 13, Hitler officially ended the Citadel. The depth of advance of 9A was 12-15 km at the front up to 40 km. No operational, let alone strategic, results have been achieved. Moreover, she did not hold on to the already occupied positions. On July 15, the Central Front went over to the counteroffensive and two days later basically restored its position until July 5, 1943.

At dawn on July 5, 1943, the troops of the GA "South" went on the offensive. The main blow was inflicted in the zone of the 6th Guards. And Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov in the direction of Oboyan by forces of 4TA. More than 1168 armored units were involved here by the German side. In the auxiliary, Korochansky direction (east and northeast of Belgorod), the positions of the 7th Guards. And Lieutenant General M.S. Shumilov was attacked by 3 TK and "Raus" AG "Kempf", which had 419 tanks and assault guns. However, thanks to the resilience of the fighters and commanders of the 6th Guards. And, already in the first two days, the offensive schedule of the GA "South" was disrupted, and its divisions suffered great damage. And most importantly, the shock group GA "South" was split. 4TA and AG "Kempf" failed to create a continuous breakthrough front, because. AG "Kempf" was unable to cover the right wing of the 4TA and their troops began to move in divergent directions. Therefore, 4TA was forced to weaken the shock wedge and direct large forces to strengthen the right wing. However, a wider offensive front (up to 130 km) than in the north of the Kursk Bulge and more significant forces allowed the enemy to break through the line of the Voronezh Front in a zone up to 100 km by the end of the fifth day and enter the defense in the main direction up to 28 km, while in its hulls, 66% of armored vehicles failed.

On July 10, the second stage of the Kursk defensive operation of the Voronezh Front began, the epicenter of the fighting shifted to Prokhorovka station. The battle for this center of resistance lasted from July 10 to July 16, 1943. On July 12, a frontal counterattack was carried out. For 10-12 hours, about 1,100 armored units of the opposing sides acted at different times in the station area on a 40 km section. However, it did not bring the expected results. Although the troops of the GA "South" managed to be kept in the army defense system, all formations of the 4th TA and AG "Kempf" retain their combat capability. In the next four days, the most intense fighting took place south of the station in the interfluve of the Seversky and Lipovoy Donets, which was convenient for striking both the deep right flank of the 4TA and the left wing of the Kempf AG. However, the area was not protected. On the night of July 15, 1943, 2nd SS TC and 3rd TC surrounded four 69A divisions south of the station, but they managed to break out of the "ring", albeit with heavy losses

On the night of July 16-17, the troops of the GA "South" began to withdraw in the direction of Belgorod, and by the end of July 23, 1943, the Voronezh Front pushed the GA "South" back approximately to the positions from which it launched the offensive. The goal set for the Soviet troops during the Kursk defensive operation was fully achieved.

Oryol offensive operation

After two weeks of bloody battles, the last strategic offensive of the Wehrmacht was stopped, but this was only part of the plan of the Soviet command for the summer campaign of 1943. Now, it was important to finally take the initiative into our own hands and turn the tide of the war.

The plan for the destruction of German troops in the Orel region, which received the code name Operation Kutuzov, was developed even before the Battle of Kursk. The troops of the Western, Bryansk and Central fronts, bordering the Oryol arc, were supposed to strike in the general direction on Orel, cut 2 TA and 9A GA "Center" into three separate groups, surround them in the areas of Bolkhov, Mtsensk, Orel and destroy.

Part of the forces of the Western (commanded by Colonel General V.D. Sokolovsky), the entire Bryansk (Colonel General M.M. Popov) and the Central Fronts were involved in the operation. A breakthrough of the enemy defense was envisaged in five sectors. The Western Front was to strike the main blow with the troops of the left wing - 11 Guards A, Lieutenant General I.Kh. Bagramyan - on Khotynets and auxiliary - on Zhizdra, and the Bryansk Front - on Oryol (main attack) and Bolkhov (auxiliary). The Central Front, after completely stopping the 9A offensive, was to concentrate the main efforts of 70,13, 48A and 2 TA on the Kromsky direction. The start of the offensive was tightly linked to the moment when it became clear that the 9A strike force was exhausted and tied up in battles on the lines of the Central Front. According to the Headquarters, such a moment came on July 12, 1943.

A day before the offensive, Lieutenant General I.Kh. Bagramyan conducted reconnaissance in combat on the left flank of 2 TA. As a result, not only was the outline of the front edge of the enemy and his system of fire clarified, but in some areas the German infantry was knocked out of the first trench. THEM. Baghramyan gave the order for the immediate start of a general offensive. Introduced on July 13, 1 mk completed the breakthrough of the second band. After that, the 5th shopping mall began to develop an offensive around Bolkhov, and the 1st shopping mall began to attack Khotynets.

The first day of the offensive on the Bryansk Front did not bring tangible results. Operating in the main, Oryol direction, 3A Lieutenant General A.V. Gorbatov and 63A Lieutenant General V.Ya. Kolpakchi by the end of July 13 broke through 14 km, and 61A of Lieutenant General P.A. Belova in the Bolkhov direction wedged into the enemy defenses only 7 km. The offensive of the Central Front, which began on July 15, did not change the situation either. His troops, by the end of July 17, threw back 9A only to the positions that she occupied by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk.

Nevertheless, already on July 19, the threat of encirclement loomed over the Bolkhov group, because. 11 Guards A broke through to the south for 70 km, stubbornly moved towards Bolkhov and 61A. This city was the "key" to Orel, so the warring parties began to build up their forces here. On the direction of the main attack of the Bryansk Front on July 19, the 3rd Guards TA, Lieutenant General P.S. Rybalko, is advanced. Having repulsed the enemy counterattacks, by the end of the day she broke through the second line of defense on the Oleshnya River. The grouping of the Western Front also hastily increased. A significant preponderance of forces, although not quickly, but gave its fruits. On August 5, 1943, one of the largest regional centers of the European part of the USSR, the city of Orel was liberated by the troops of the Bryansk Front.

After the destruction of the grouping in the area of ​​​​Bolkhov and Orel, the most intense hostilities unfolded on the Hotynets-Kromy front, and at the final stage of the Kutuzov operation, the most difficult battles flared up for the city of Karachev, which covered the approaches to Bryansk, which was liberated on August 15, 1943.

On August 18, 1943, Soviet troops reached the German defensive line "Hagen", east of Bryansk. This operation "Kutuzov" ended. In 37 days, the Red Army advanced 150 km, a fortified bridgehead and a large enemy grouping were eliminated in a strategically important direction, favorable conditions were created for an attack on Bryansk and further to Belarus.

Belgorod - Kharkov offensive operation

It received the code name "Commander Rumyantsev", was carried out from August 3 to August 23, 1943 by the Voronezh (Army General N.F. Vatutin) and Steppe (Colonel General I.S. Konev) fronts and was the final stage of the Battle of Kursk. The operation was supposed to be carried out in two stages: at the first, to defeat the troops of the left wing of the GA "South" in the area of ​​Belgorod and Tomarovka, and then to liberate Kharkov. The steppe front was supposed to liberate Belgorod and Kharkov, and the Voronezh front was to bypass them from the north-west, to develop success on Poltava. It was planned to deliver the main blow by the armies of the adjacent flanks of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts from the area northwest of Belgorod in the direction of Bogodukhov and Valki, at the junction of 4 TA and AG Kempf, crush them and cut off their path to retreat to the west and southwest. Apply an auxiliary blow to Akhtyrka, with forces 27 and 40A, in order to block the pulling up of reserves to Kharkov. At the same time, the city was to be bypassed from the south by 57A of the South-Western Front. The operation was planned on a front of 200 km and a depth of up to 120 km.

On August 3, 1943, after a powerful artillery preparation, the first echelon of the Voronezh Front - 6 Guards A, Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov and 5 Guards A, Lieutenant General A.S. Zhadov crossed the Vorskla River, punched a 5 km gap on the front between Belgorod and Tomarovka, through which the main forces entered - 1TA Lieutenant General M.E. Katukov and 5th Guards TA Lieutenant General P.A. Rotmistrov. Having passed the "corridor" of the breakthrough and deployed in battle formation, their troops dealt a strong blow to Zolochev. By the end of the day, the 5th Guards TA, having penetrated 26 km into the enemy’s defenses, cut off the Belgorod grouping from the Tomarovsky one, and reached the line with. Good Will, and in the morning of the next day broke through to Bessonovka and Orlovka. And the 6th Guards. On the evening of August 3, they broke through to Tomarovka. 4TA put up stubborn resistance. From August 4, 5 Guards. TA for two days was pinned down by enemy counterattacks, although according to the calculations of the Soviet side, already on August 5, its brigades were supposed to go west of Kharkov and capture the city of Lyubotin. This delay changed the plan of the entire operation to quickly split the enemy grouping.

After two days of heavy fighting on the outskirts of Belgorod, on August 5, 1943, the 69th and 7th Guards A of the Steppe Front pushed the troops of the Kempf AG to the outskirts and began its assault, which ended in the evening with the clearing of its main part from the invaders. On the evening of August 5, 1943, in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod, for the first time during the war years, a salute was given in Moscow.

On this day, a turning point occurred and in the strip of the Voronezh Front, in the auxiliary direction, the 40A of Lieutenant General K.S. went on the offensive. Moskalenko, in the direction of Boroml and 27A Lieutenant General S.G. Trofimenko, who by the end of August 7 released Grayvoron and advanced to Akhtyrka.

After the liberation of Belgorod, the onslaught of the Steppe Front also intensified. On August 8, 57A of Lieutenant General N.A. was transferred to him. Hagen. Trying to prevent the encirclement of his troops, on August 11, E. von Manstein launched counterattacks on 1TA and 6 Guards A south of Bogodukhov with the forces of 3 TC Kempf AG, which slowed down the pace of the offensive not only of the Voronezh, but also of the Steppe Front. Despite the stubborn resistance of the Kempf AG, Konev's troops continued to persistently move towards Kharkov. On August 17, they started fighting on its outskirts.

On August 18, GA "South" made a second attempt to stop the advance of two fronts with a counterattack, now on the stretched right flank of 27A. To repel it, N.F. Vatutin brought into battle the 4th Guards A, Lieutenant General G.I. Kulik. But the situation was not quickly reversed. The destruction of the Akhtyrskaya group dragged on until August 25th.

On August 18, the 57A offensive resumed, which, bypassing Kharkov from the southeast, was moving towards Merefa. In this situation, the capture on August 20 by units of 53A of Lieutenant General I.M. Managarov of a resistance center in the forest northeast of Kharkov was of great importance. Using this success, Lieutenant-General VD Kryuchenkona's 69th Army began to bypass the city from the northwest and west. During August 21, the corps of the 5th Guards TA concentrated in the strip 53A, which significantly strengthened the right wing of the Steppe Front. A day later, the Kharkov-Zolochev, Kharkov-Lyubotin-Poltava and Kharkov-Lyubotin highways were cut, and on August 22, 57A went south of Kharkov to the area of ​​​​the villages of Bezlyudovka and Konstantinovka. Thus, most of the enemy's retreat routes were cut off, so the German command was forced to begin a hasty withdrawal of all troops from the city.

On August 23, 1943, Moscow saluted the liberators of Kharkov. This event marked the victorious completion of the Battle of Kursk by the Red Army.

Results, meaning

About 4,000,000 people, over 69,000 guns and mortars, more than 13,000 tanks and self-propelled (assault) guns, up to 12,000 aircraft took part in the Battle of Kursk, which lasted 49 days. It became one of the most large-scale events of the Great Patriotic War, its significance goes far beyond the Soviet-German front. “A major defeat on the Kursk Bulge was the beginning of a deadly crisis for the German army,” wrote the outstanding commander Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky. - Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk became three important stages in the fight against the enemy, three historical milestones on the way to victory over Nazi Germany. The initiative for action on the Soviet-German front - the main and decisive front of the entire Second World War - was firmly entrenched in the hands of the Red Army.

The Battle of Kursk, according to historians, was a turning point in. More than six thousand tanks took part in the battles on the Kursk Bulge. There has never been such a thing in world history, and probably never will be again.

The actions of the Soviet fronts on the Kursk Bulge were led by Marshals Georgy and. The number of the Soviet army amounted to more than 1 million people. The soldiers were supported by more than 19,000 guns and mortars, and 2,000 aircraft provided air support to Soviet infantrymen. The Germans countered the USSR on the Kursk Bulge with 900,000 soldiers, 10,000 guns and more than 2,000 aircraft.

The German plan was as follows. They were going to capture the Kursk ledge with a lightning strike and launch a full-scale offensive. Soviet intelligence did not eat its bread in vain, and reported the German plans to the Soviet command. Having learned the exact time of the offensive and the purpose of the main attack, our leaders ordered to strengthen the defenses in these places.

The Germans launched an offensive on the Kursk Bulge. On the Germans gathered in front of the front line, a heavy fire of Soviet artillery fell, causing them great damage. The offensive of the enemy stalled, and went with a delay of a couple of hours. During the day of fighting, the enemy advanced only 5 kilometers, and in 6 days of the offensive on the Kursk Bulge, 12 km. This state of affairs hardly suited the German command.

During the battles on the Kursk Bulge, the largest tank battle in history took place near the village of Prokhorovka. 800 tanks from each side met in battle. It was an impressive and terrible sight. On the battlefield were the best tank models of the Second World War. Soviet T-34 clashed with the German Tiger. St. John's wort was also tested in that battle. 57 mm cannon that pierced the armor of the "Tiger".

Another innovation was the use of anti-tank bombs, the weight of which was small, and the damage caused took the tank out of combat. The German offensive bogged down, the tired enemy began to retreat to their previous positions.

Soon our counteroffensive began. Soviet soldiers took the fortifications and, with the support of aviation, made a breakthrough in the German defenses. The battle on the Kursk Bulge lasted about 50 days. During this time, the Russian army destroyed 30 German divisions, including 7 tank divisions, 1.5 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns, 15 thousand tanks. The casualties of the Wehrmacht on the Kursk Bulge amounted to 500 thousand people.

The victory in the Battle of Kursk showed Germany the strength of the Red Army. The specter of defeat in the war hung over the Wehrmacht. More than 100 thousand participants in the battles on the Kursk Bulge were awarded orders and medals. The chronology of the Battle of Kursk is measured by the following time frames: July 5 - August 23, 1943.

Batov Pavel Ivanovich

Army General, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk, he served as commander of the 65th Army.

In the Red Army since 1918

He graduated from the Higher Officer Courses "Shot" in 1927, the Higher Academic Courses at the Military Academy of the General Staff in 1950.

Member of the First World War since 1916. Awarded for distinction in battles

2 George crosses and 2 medals.

In 1918 he voluntarily joined the Red Army. From 1920 to 1936 he consistently commanded a company, a battalion, and a rifle regiment. In 1936-1937 he fought on the side of the Republican troops in Spain. Upon his return, the commander of the rifle corps (1937). In 1939-1940 he participated in the Soviet-Finnish war. Since 1940, Deputy Commander of the Transcaucasian Military District.

With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the commander of a special rifle corps in the Crimea, deputy commander of the 51st Army of the Southern Front (since August 1941), commander of the 3rd Army (January-February 1942), assistant commander of the Bryansk Front (February -October 1942). From October 1942 until the end of the war, commander of the 65th Army, participating in hostilities as part of the Don, Stalingrad, Central, Belorussian, 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts. The troops under the command of P. I. Batov distinguished themselves in the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, in the battle for the Dnieper, during the liberation of Belarus, in the Vistula-Oder and Berlin operations. The combat successes of the 65th Army were noted about 30 times in the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

For personal courage and courage, for organizing a clear interaction of subordinate troops during the crossing of the Dnieper, P.I. Batov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and for crossing the river. Oder and the capture of the city of Stettin (the German name for the Polish city of Szczecin) was awarded the second "Gold Star".

After the war - commander of the mechanized and combined arms armies, first deputy commander in chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, commander of the Carpathian and Baltic military districts, commander of the Southern Group of Forces.

In 1962-1965 he was chief of staff of the United Armed Forces of the states - participants of the Warsaw Pact. Since 1965, a military inspector - adviser to the Group of General Inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Since 1970, Chairman of the Soviet Committee of War Veterans.

Awarded 6 Orders of Lenin, Order of the October Revolution, 3 Orders of the Red Banner, 3 Orders of Suvorov 1st Class, Orders of Kutuzov 1st Class, Bogdan Khmelnitsky 1st Class, "For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR" 3rd Class, "Badge of Honor", Honorary weapons, foreign orders, medals.

Vatutin Nikolai Fyodorovich

Army General, Hero of the Soviet Union (posthumously). In the Battle of Kursk he took part as commander of the Voronezh Front.

In the Red Army since 1920

He graduated from the Poltava Infantry School in 1922, the Kyiv Higher United Military School in 1924, the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze in 1929, the operational department of the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze in 1934, the Military Academy of the General Staff in 1937

Member of the Civil War. After the war, he commanded a platoon, a company, worked at the headquarters of the 7th Infantry Division. In 1931-1941. He was chief of staff of the division, chief of the 1st department of the headquarters of the Siberian Military District, deputy chief of staff and chief of staff of the Kyiv Special Military District, chief of the Operations Directorate and deputy chief of the General Staff.

From June 30, 1941 Chief of Staff of the North-Western Front. In May - July 1942 - Deputy Chief of the General Staff. In July 1942 he was appointed commander of the Voronezh Front. During the Battle of Stalingrad, he commanded the troops of the Southwestern Front. In March 1943 he was again appointed commander of the Voronezh Front (since October 1943 - the 1st Ukrainian Front). On February 29, 1944, while leaving for the troops, he was seriously wounded and died on April 15. Buried in Kyiv.

He was awarded the Order of Lenin, the Order of the Red Banner, the Order of Suvorov 1st Class, the Order of Kutuzov 1st Class, and the Order of Czechoslovakia.

ZhADOV Alexey Semenovich

Army General, Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk, he served as commander of the 5th Guards Army.

In the Red Army since 1919

He graduated from cavalry courses in 1920, military-political courses in 1928, the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze in 1934, Higher academic courses at the Military Academy of the General Staff in 1950

Member of the Civil War. In November 1919, as part of a separate detachment of the 46th Infantry Division, he fought against Denikin. Since October 1920, as a platoon commander of a cavalry regiment of the 11th Cavalry Division of the 1st Cavalry Army, he participated in battles with Wrangel's troops, as well as with gangs operating in Ukraine and Belarus. In 1922-1924. fought with the Basmachi in Central Asia, was seriously wounded. Since 1925 he was the commander of a training platoon, then the commander and political instructor of the squadron, chief of staff of the regiment, chief of the operational part of the division headquarters, chief of staff of the corps, assistant inspector of cavalry in the Red Army. Since 1940, the commander of the mountain cavalry division.

During the Great Patriotic War, commander of the 4th Airborne Corps (since June 1941). As chief of staff of the 3rd Army of the Central, then the Bryansk Fronts, he took part in the Battle of Moscow, in the summer of 1942 he commanded the 8th Cavalry Corps on the Bryansk Front.

From October 1942 he was commander of the 66th Army of the Don Front, operating north of Stalingrad. From April 1943, the 66th Army was transformed into the 5th Guards Army.

Under the leadership of A. S. Zhadov, the army as part of the Voronezh Front participated in the defeat of the enemy near Prokhorovka, and then in the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation. Subsequently, the 5th Guards Army participated in the liberation of Ukraine, in the Lvov-Sandomierz, Vistula-Oder, Berlin, and Prague operations.

The troops of the army for successful military operations were noted 21 times in the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. For the skillful management of troops in the fight against the Nazi invaders and the courage and courage shown at the same time, A.S. Zhadov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

In the post-war period - Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces for combat training (1946-1949), head of the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze (1950-1954), Commander-in-Chief of the Central Group of Forces (1954-1955), Deputy and First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces (1956-1964). From September 1964 - First Deputy Chief Inspector of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Since October 1969, a military inspector - adviser to the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Awarded 3 Orders of Lenin, the Order of the October Revolution, 5 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov, 1st Class, Orders of Kutuzov, 1st Class, Red Star, "For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR," 3rd Class, medals, as well as foreign orders.

Died in 1977

KATUKOV Mikhail Efimovich

Marshal of armored forces, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk, he served as commander of the 1st Tank Army.

In the Red Army since 1919

He graduated from the Mogilev infantry courses in 1922, the Higher officer courses "Shot" in 1927, the academic courses for the improvement of command personnel at the Military Academy of Motorization and Mechanization of the Red Army in 1935, the Higher Academic Courses at the Military Academy of the General Staff in 1951.

Member of the October armed uprising in Petrograd.

During the Civil War, he fought as a private on the Southern Front.

From 1922 to 1940 he successively commanded a platoon, a company, was head of a regimental school, commander of a training battalion, chief of staff of a brigade, and commander of a tank brigade. From November 1940 commander of the 20th Panzer Division.

At the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War, he participated in defensive operations in the area of ​​the cities. Lutsk, Dubno, Korosten.

On November 11, 1941, for courageous and skillful fighting, the brigade of M.E. Katukov was the first in the tank troops to receive the title of guards.

In 1942, M. E. Katukov commanded the 1st Tank Corps, which repelled the onslaught of enemy troops in the Kursk-Voronezh direction, and then the 3rd Mechanized Corps.

In January 1943, he was appointed to the post of commander of the 1st Tank Army, which, as part of the Voronezh, and later the 1st Ukrainian Front, distinguished itself in the Battle of Kursk and during the liberation of Ukraine.

In June 1944, the army was transformed into a guards. She participated in the Lvov-Sandomierz, Vistula-Oder, East Pomeranian and Berlin operations.

In the postwar years, M. E. Katukov commanded the army, armored and mechanized troops of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

Since 1955 - Inspector General of the Main Inspectorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Since 1963 - military inspector-advisor of the Group of General Inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Awarded 4 Orders of Lenin, 3 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st Class, Orders of Kutuzov 1st Class, Bogdan Khmelnitsky 1st Class, Kutuzov 2nd Class, Order of the Red Star, "For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR » 3rd degree, medals, as well as foreign orders.

Konev Ivan Stepanovich

Marshal of the Soviet Union, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk, he participated as commander of the Steppe Front.

In the Red Army since 1918

He graduated from advanced training courses for senior officers at the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze in 1926, the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze in 1934

During the First World War he was drafted into the army and sent to the South-Western Front. Demobilized from the army in 1918, he took part in the establishment of Soviet power in the city of Nikolsk (Vologda region), where he was elected a member of the Nikolsky district executive committee and appointed district military commissar.

During the Civil War, he was the commissar of an armored train, then a rifle brigade, division, headquarters of the People's Revolutionary Army of the Far Eastern Republic. Fought on the Eastern Front.

After the Civil War - military commissar of the 17th Primorsky Rifle Corps, 17th Rifle Division. After completing advanced training courses for senior officers, he was appointed commander of the regiment. Later he was assistant division commander in 1931-1932. and 1935-1937, commanded a rifle division, a corps and the 2nd Separate Red Banner Far Eastern Army.

In 1940-1941. - commanded the troops of the Trans-Baikal and North Caucasian military districts.

At the beginning of World War II, he was commander of the 19th Army of the Western Front. Then he successively commanded the Western, Kalinin, Northwestern, Steppe and 1st Ukrainian fronts.

In the Battle of Kursk, troops under the command of I. S. Konev successfully operated during the counteroffensive in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction.

After the war, he served as Commander-in-Chief of the Central Group of Forces, Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces - Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, Chief Inspector of the Soviet Army - Deputy Minister of War of the USSR, Commander of the Carpathian Military District, First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR - Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Commander-in-Chief of the United Armed Forces of the participating States Warsaw Pact, Inspector General of the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

Hero of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (1970), Hero of the Mongolian People's Republic (1971).

Awarded 7 Orders of Lenin, Order of the October Revolution, 3 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st Class, 2 Orders of Kutuzov 1st Class, Order of the Red Star, medals and foreign orders.

He was awarded the highest military order "Victory", the Honorary weapon.

MALINOVSKY Rodion Yakovlevich

Marshal of the Soviet Union, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk, he served as commander of the Southwestern Front.

In the Red Army since 1919

Graduated from the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze.

Since 1914, he participated as a private in the First World War. He was awarded the St. George Cross of the 4th degree.

In February 1916 he was sent to France as part of the Russian Expeditionary Force. Upon his return to Russia, he voluntarily joined the Red Army in 1919.

During the Civil War, he participated in battles as part of the 27th Infantry Division of the Eastern Front.

In December 1920, commander of a machine gun platoon, then head of a machine gun team, assistant commander, battalion commander.

Since 1930, the chief of staff of the cavalry regiment of the 10th cavalry division, then served in the headquarters of the North Caucasus and Belarusian military districts, was the chief of staff of the 3rd cavalry corps.

In 1937-1938. participated as a volunteer in the Spanish Civil War, was awarded the Orders of Lenin and the Order of the Red Banner for military distinctions.

Since 1939, a teacher at the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze. From March 1941, commander of the 48th Rifle Corps.

During the Great Patriotic War, he commanded the 6th, 66th, 2nd Guards, 5th shock and 51st armies, the Southern, Southwestern, 3rd Ukrainian, 2nd Ukrainian fronts. He took part in the Battles of Stalingrad, Kursk, Zaporozhye, Nikopol-Krivoy Rog, Bereznegovat-Snigirevskaya, Odessa, Iasi-Kishinev, Debrecen, Budapest, Vienna operations.

Since July 1945, the commander of the Trans-Baikal Front, which dealt the main blow in the Manchurian strategic operation. For high military leadership, courage and courage he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

After the war, he commanded the troops of the Trans-Baikal-Amur Military District, was the commander-in-chief of the troops of the Far East, and the commander of the Far Eastern Military District.

Since March 1956, the First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR - Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces.

Since October 1957 Minister of Defense of the USSR. He remained in this post until the end of his life.

Awarded 5 Orders of Lenin, 3 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st Class, Order of Kutuzov 1st Class, medals, and foreign orders.

He was awarded the highest military order "Victory".

POPOV Markian Mikhailovich

Army General, Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk, he served as commander of the Bryansk Front.

Born on November 15, 1902 in the village of Ust-Medveditskaya (now Serafimovich, Volgograd Region).

In the Red Army since 1920

He graduated from the infantry command courses in 1922, the Higher officer courses "Shot" in 1925, the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze.

He fought in the Civil War on the Western Front as a private.

Since 1922, platoon commander, assistant company commander, assistant chief and head of the regimental school, battalion commander, inspector of military educational institutions of the Moscow Military District. From May 1936 he was chief of staff of a mechanized brigade, then of the 5th mechanized corps. From June 1938 he was deputy commander, from September chief of staff, from July 1939 commander of the 1st Separate Red Banner Army in the Far East, and from January 1941 commander of the Leningrad Military District.

During the Great Patriotic War, commander of the Northern and Leningrad fronts (June - September 1941), 61st and 40th armies (November 1941 - October 1942). He was deputy commander of the Stalingrad and Southwestern fronts. He successfully commanded the 5th Shock Army (October 1942 - April 1943), the Reserve Front and the troops of the Steppe Military District (April - May 1943), Bryansk (June-October 1943), Baltic and 2nd Baltic (October 1943 - April 1944) fronts. From April 1944 until the end of the war he was chief of staff of the Leningrad, 2nd Baltic, then again Leningrad fronts.

Participated in the planning of operations and successfully led the troops in the battles near Leningrad and Moscow, in the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, during the liberation of Karelia and the Baltic states.

In the post-war period, the commander of the Lvov (1945-1946), Tauride (1946-1954) military districts. From January 1955 he was deputy chief and then chief of the Main Directorate of Combat Training, from August 1956 chief of the General Staff - First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces. Since 1962, a military inspector - adviser to the Group of General Inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Awarded 5 Orders of Lenin, 3 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st Class, 2 Orders of Kutuzov 1st Class, Order of the Red Star, medals, and foreign orders.

ROKOSSOVSKY Konstantin Konstantinovich

Marshal of the Soviet Union, Marshal of Poland, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk, he participated as commander of the Central Front.

In the Red Army since 1918

He graduated from the cavalry advanced training courses for command personnel in 1925, advanced training courses for senior command personnel at the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze in 1929

In the army since 1914. Member of the First World War. He fought as part of the 5th Kargopol Dragoon Regiment, as an ordinary and junior non-commissioned officer.

After the October Revolution of 1917 he fought in the ranks of the Red Army. During the Civil War, he commanded a squadron, a separate division and a cavalry regiment. For personal bravery and courage he was awarded 2 Orders of the Red Banner.

After the war, he successively commanded the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, a cavalry regiment, and the 5th Separate Cavalry Brigade. He was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for military distinctions at the CER.

From 1930 he commanded the 7th, then the 15th cavalry divisions, from 1936 - the 5th cavalry, from November 1940 - the 9th mechanized corps.

From July 1941 he commanded the 16th Army of the Western Front. From July 1942 he commanded the Bryansk, from September the Don, from February 1943 the Central, from October 1943 the Belorussian, from February 1944 the 1st Belorussian and from November 1944 until the end of the war the 2nd Belorussian fronts.

Troops under the command of K. K. Rokossovsky participated in the Battle of Smolensk (1941), the Battle of Moscow, in the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, in the Belorussian, East Prussian, East Pomeranian, and Berlin operations.

After the war, commander-in-chief of the Northern Group of Forces (1945-1949). In October 1949, at the request of the government of the Polish People's Republic, with the permission of the Soviet government, he left for the PPR, where he was appointed Minister of National Defense and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the PPR. He was awarded the title of Marshal of Poland.

Upon returning to the USSR in 1956, he was appointed Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR. Since July 1957, the chief inspector - Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR. Since October 1957, commander of the Transcaucasian Military District. In 1958-1962. Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR and Chief Inspector of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Since April 1962 he was the chief inspector of the Group of Inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

He was awarded 7 Orders of Lenin, the Order of the October Revolution, 6 Orders of the Red Banner, Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov 1st degree, medals, as well as foreign orders and medals.

He was awarded the highest military order "Victory". Awarded with Honorary Arms.

ROMANENKO Prokofy Logvinovich

Colonel General. In the Battle of Kursk, he served as commander of the 2nd Tank Army.

In the Red Army since 1918

He graduated from advanced training courses for command personnel in 1925, advanced training courses for senior command personnel in 1930, the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze in 1933, the Military Academy of the General Staff in 1948

In military service since 1914. Member of the First World War, ensign. Awarded 4 St. George's crosses.

After the October Revolution of 1917, he was a volost military commissar in the Stavropol province, then during the Civil War he commanded a partisan detachment, fought on the Southern and Western fronts as a squadron commander, regiment and assistant commander of a cavalry brigade.

After the war he commanded a cavalry regiment, since 1937 a mechanized brigade. Participated in the national liberation struggle of the Spanish people in 1936-1939. For heroism and courage he was awarded the Order of Lenin.

Since 1938, commander of the 7th mechanized corps, participant in the Soviet-Finnish war (1939-1940). Since May 1940, the commander of the 34th rifle, then the 1st mechanized corps.

During the Great Patriotic War, the commander of the 17th Army of the Trans-Baikal Front. From May 1942 commander of the 3rd tank army, then deputy commander of the Bryansk Front (September-November 1942), from November 1942 to December 1944 commander of the 5th, 2nd tank armies, 48th army. The troops of these armies took part in the Rzhev-Sychevsk operation, in the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, in the Belorussian operation.

In 1945-1947. Commander of the East Siberian Military District.

He was awarded 2 Orders of Lenin, 4 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st Class, 2 Orders of Kutuzov 1st Class, medals, a foreign order.

ROTMISTROV Pavel Alekseevich

Chief Marshal of the Armored Forces, Hero of the Soviet Union, Doctor of Military Sciences, Professor. In the Battle of Kursk, he served as commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army.

In the Red Army since 1919

He graduated from the Military Joint School. All-Russian Central Executive Committee, Military Academy. M. V. Frunze, Military Academy of the General Staff.

During the Civil War, he commanded a platoon, company, battery, and was deputy battalion commander.

From 1931 to 1937 he worked at the headquarters of the division and the army, commanded a rifle regiment.

Since 1938, he has been a lecturer in the Tactics Department of the Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army.

During the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. commander of a tank battalion and chief of staff of the 35th tank brigade.

From December 1940 he was deputy commander of the 5th Panzer Division, and from May 1941 he was chief of staff of the mechanized corps.

During the Great Patriotic War he fought on the Western, Northwestern, Kalinin, Stalingrad, Voronezh, Steppe, Southwestern, 2nd Ukrainian and 3rd Belorussian fronts.

Participated in the Battle of Moscow, the Battle of Stalingrad, the Battle of Kursk, as well as the Belgorod-Kharkov, Uman-Botoshansk, Korsun-Shevchenko, Belorussian operations.

After the war, commander of the armored and mechanized troops of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, then the Far East. Deputy Chief, then Head of the Department of the Military Academy of the General Staff, Head of the Military Academy of Armored Forces, Assistant to the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Chief Inspector of the Group of General Inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Awarded 5 Orders of Lenin, Order of the October Revolution, 4 Orders of the Red Banner, Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov 1st Class, Suvorov 2nd Class, Red Star, "For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR" 3rd Class, medals, as well as foreign orders.

RYBALKO Pavel Semyonovich

Marshal of armored forces, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk, he served as commander of the 3rd Guards Tank Army.

Born on November 4, 1894 in the village of Maly Istorop (Lebedinsky district of the Sumy region, Republic of Ukraine).

In the Red Army since 1919

He graduated from advanced training courses for senior officers in 1926 and 1930, the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze in 1934

Member of the First World War, private.

During the Civil War, the commissar of the regiment and brigade, squadron commander, commander of the cavalry regiment and brigade.

After graduating from the academy, he was sent as an assistant commander of a mountain cavalry division, then as a military attache to Poland, China.

During the Great Patriotic War, Deputy Commander of the 5th Tank Army, later commanded the 5th, 3rd, 3rd Guards Tank Armies in the Bryansk, South-Western, Central, Voronezh, 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts.

He participated in the Battle of Kursk, in the Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh, Kharkov, Kyiv, Zhytomyr-Berdichev, Proskurov-Chernivtsi, Lvov-Sandomierz, Lower Silesian, Upper Silesian, Berlin and Prague operations.

For successful military operations, the troops commanded by P. S. Rybalko

22 times noted in the orders of the Supreme Commander.

After the war, first deputy commander, and then commander of the armored and mechanized troops of the Soviet army.

Awarded 2 Orders of Lenin, 3 Orders of the Red Banner, 3 Orders of Suvorov 1st Class, Order of Kutuzov 1st Class, Order of Bogdan Khmelnitsky 1st Class, medals, and foreign orders.

SOKOLOVSKY Vasily Danilovich

Marshal of the Soviet Union, Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk, he served as commander of the Western Front.

Born on July 21, 1897 in the village of Kozliki, Belostok district (Grodno region, Republic of Belarus).

In the Red Army since 1918

He graduated from the Military Academy of the Red Army in 1921, the Higher Academic Courses in 1928.

During the Civil War he fought on the Eastern, Southern and Caucasian fronts. He held the positions of company commander, regiment adjutant, assistant regiment commander, regiment commander, senior assistant chief of staff of the 39th Infantry Division, brigade commander, chief of staff of the 32nd Infantry Division.

In 1921, assistant chief of the operational department of the Turkestan Front, then division chief of staff, division commander. He commanded the Group of Forces of the Fergana and Samarkand regions.

In 1922 - 1930. chief of staff of a rifle division, rifle corps.

In 1930 - 1935. commander of a rifle division, then chief of staff of the Volga Military District.

From May 1935 he was chief of staff of the Ural, from April 1938 of the Moscow military districts. Since February 1941, Deputy Chief of the General Staff.

During the Great Patriotic War, he served as Chief of Staff of the Western Front, Chief of Staff of the Western Direction, Commander of the Western Front, Chief of Staff of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Deputy Commander of the 1st Belorussian Front.

For the skillful leadership of the military operations of the troops in the Berlin operation, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

After the war, he served as Deputy Commander-in-Chief, then Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, Chief of the General Staff - First Deputy Minister of War.

Awarded 8 Orders of Lenin, Order of the October Revolution, 3 Orders of the Red Banner, 3 Orders of Suvorov 1st Class, 3 Orders of Kutuzov 1st Class, medals, as well as foreign orders and medals, Honorary Weapons.

CHERNYAKHOVSKY Ivan Danilovich

Army General, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk he took part in the post of commander of the 60th Army.

In the Red Army since 1924

He graduated from the Kyiv Artillery School in 1928, the Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army in 1936.

From 1928 to 1931, he served as a platoon commander, head of the topographic detachment of the regiment, assistant battery commander for political affairs, commander of a reconnaissance training battery.

Upon graduation from the academy, he was appointed chief of staff of a battalion, then commander of a tank battalion, tank regiment, deputy division commander, commander of a tank division.

During the Great Patriotic War, he commanded a tank corps, the 60th Army on the Voronezh, Central and 1st Ukrainian fronts.

The troops under the command of I. D. Chernyakhovsky distinguished themselves in the Voronezh-Kastornensky operation, the Battle of Kursk, while crossing the river. Desna and Dnieper. Later they participated in the Kyiv, Zhytomyr-Berdichev, Rivne-Lutsk, Proskurov-Chernivtsi, Vilnius, Kaunas, Memel, East Prussian operations.

For successful military operations during the Great Patriotic War, the troops commanded by I. D. Chernyakhovsky were noted 34 times in the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

In the area of ​​the town of Melzak, he was mortally wounded and died on February 18, 1945. Buried in Vilnius.

Awarded with the Order of Lenin, 4 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st Class, Order of Kutuzov 1st Class, Order of Bohdan Khmelnitsky 1st Class and medals.

CHIBISOV Nikandr Evlampievich

Colonel General, Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk, he participated as commander of the 38th Army.

In the Red Army since 1918

Graduated from the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze in 1935

During the First World War he fought on the Western and Southwestern fronts. Commanded a company.

During the Civil War, he took part in the battles on the Karelian Isthmus, near Narva, Pskov, in Belarus.

He was the commander of a platoon, company, battalion, regiment, assistant chief of staff and chief of staff of a rifle brigade. From 1922 to 1937 in staff and command positions. Since 1937, the commander of a rifle division, since 1938 - a rifle corps, in 1938-1940. Chief of Staff of the Leningrad Military District.

During the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. Chief of Staff of the 7th Army.

From July 1940 he was deputy commander of the troops of the Leningrad Military District, and from January 1941 he was deputy commander of the troops of the Odessa military district.

Troops under the command of N. E. Chibisov took part in the Voronezh-Kastornoye, Kharkov, Belgorod-Kharkov, Kyiv, Leningrad-Novgorod operations.

For the skillful leadership of the army troops during the crossing of the Dnieper, courage and heroism was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

From June 1944, he served as head of the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze, from March 1949 - Deputy Chairman of the Central Committee of DOSAAF, and from October 1949 - Assistant Commander of the Belarusian Military District.

He was awarded 3 orders of Lenin, 3 orders of the Red Banner, the Order of Suvorov 1st degree and medals.

SHLEMIN Ivan Timofeevich

Lieutenant General, Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk, he served as commander of the 6th Guards Army.

In the Red Army since 1918

He graduated from the first Petrograd infantry courses in 1920, the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze in 1925, the operational department of the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze in 1932

Member of the First World War. During the Civil War, as a platoon commander, he took part in battles in Estonia and near Petrograd. Since 1925 he was the chief of staff of a rifle regiment, then the chief of the operational unit and the chief of staff of the division, since 1932 he worked at the headquarters of the Red Army (since 1935 the General Staff).

Since 1936 he was the commander of a rifle regiment, since 1937 he was the head of the Military Academy of the General Staff, since 1940 he was the chief of staff of the 11th Army, in this position he entered the Great Patriotic War.

Since May 1942, Chief of Staff of the North-Western Front, then the 1st Guards Army. Since January 1943, he successively commanded the 5th tank, 12th, 6th, 46th armies on the Southwestern, 3rd and 2nd Ukrainian fronts.

Troops under the command of I. T. Shlemin took part in the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, Donbass, Nikopol-Krivoy Rog, Bereznegovato-Snigirevskaya, Odessa, Iasi-Kishinev, Debrecen and Budapest operations. For successful actions, 15 times were noted in the orders of the Supreme Commander.

For the skillful command and control of the troops and the heroism and courage shown at the same time, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

After the Great Patriotic War, Chief of Staff of the Southern Group of Forces, and from April 1948 Deputy Chief of the Main Staff of the Ground Forces - Chief of Operations, from June 1949 Chief of Staff of the Central Group of Forces. In 1954-1962. senior lecturer and deputy head of the department at the Military Academy of the General Staff. Reserved since 1962.

Awarded 3 Orders of Lenin, 4 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st Class, Orders of Kutuzov 1st Class, Bogdan Khmelnitsky 1st Class, medals.

SHUMILOV Mikhail Stepanovich

Colonel General, Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk, he served as commander of the 7th Guards Army.

In the Red Army since 1918

He graduated from the courses of command and political staff in 1924, the Higher Officer Courses "Shot" in 1929, the Higher Academic Courses at the Military Academy of the General Staff in 1948, and before the Great October Revolution, the Chuguev Military School in 1916.

Member of the First World War, ensign. During the Civil War he fought on the Eastern and Southern fronts, commanded a platoon, company, regiment. After the war, the commander of the regiment, then the division and corps, participated in the campaign in Western Belarus in 1939, the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940.

During the Great Patriotic War, commander of a rifle corps, deputy commander of the 55th and 21st armies on the Leningrad and Southwestern fronts (1941-1942). From August 1942 until the end of the war, commander of the 64th Army (reorganized in March 1943 into the 7th Guards), operating as part of the Stalingrad, Don, Voronezh, Steppe, 2nd Ukrainian fronts.

The troops under the command of M. S. Shumilov participated in the defense of Leningrad, in the battles in the Kharkov region, fought heroically near Stalingrad and, together with the 62nd Army in the city itself, defended it from the enemy, participated in the battles near Kursk and for the Dnieper, in Kirovogradskaya , Uman-Botoshansky, Iasi-Chisinau, Budapest, Bratislava-Brnovskaya operations.

For excellent military operations, the troops of the army were noted 16 times in the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

After the war, he commanded the troops of the White Sea (1948-1949) and Voronezh (1949-1955) military districts.

In 1956-1958. retired. Since 1958, military consultant of the Group of General Inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Awarded 3 Orders of Lenin, 4 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st Class, Orders of Kutuzov 1st Class, Orders of the Red Star, "For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR" 3rd Class, medals, as well as foreign orders and medals .

Dates and events of the Great Patriotic War

The Great Patriotic War began on June 22, 1941, on the day of All Saints who shone in the Russian land. The Barbarossa plan - a plan for a lightning war with the USSR - was signed by Hitler on December 18, 1940. Now it has been put into action. German troops - the strongest army in the world - advanced in three groups ("North", "Center", "South"), aimed at the rapid capture of the Baltic states and then Leningrad, Moscow, and in the south - Kyiv.

Kursk Bulge

In 1943, the Nazi command decided to conduct its general offensive in the Kursk region. The fact is that the operational position of the Soviet troops on the Kursk ledge, concave towards the enemy, promised great prospects for the Germans. Two large fronts could be surrounded here at once, as a result of which a large gap would have formed, allowing the enemy to carry out major operations in the south and northeast directions.

The Soviet command was preparing for this offensive. From mid-April, the General Staff began to develop a plan for both a defensive operation near Kursk and a counteroffensive. And by the beginning of July 1943, the Soviet command had completed preparations for the Battle of Kursk.

July 5, 1943 German troops began the offensive. The first attack was repulsed. However, then the Soviet troops had to withdraw. The fighting was very intense and the Germans failed to achieve significant success. The enemy did not solve any of the assigned tasks and was eventually forced to stop the offensive and go on the defensive.

The struggle on the southern face of the Kursk ledge, in the zone of the Voronezh Front, was also exceptionally tense.

On July 12, 1943 (on the day of the holy supreme apostles Peter and Paul), the largest tank battle in military history near Prokhorovka took place. The battle unfolded on both sides of the Belgorod-Kursk railway, and the main events took place southwest of Prokhorovka. As Chief Marshal of the Armored Forces P. A. Rotmistrov, the former commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, recalled, the struggle was extremely fierce, “tanks jumped on each other, grappled, could no longer disperse, fought to the death until one of them flared up torch or did not stop with broken tracks. But the wrecked tanks, if their weapons did not fail, continued to fire. The battlefield was littered with burning German and our tanks for an hour. As a result of the battle near Prokhorovka, none of the parties was able to solve the tasks facing it: the enemy - to break through to Kursk; 5th Guards Tank Army - go to the Yakovlevo area, defeating the opposing enemy. But the way to the enemy to Kursk was closed and the day of July 12, 1943 became the day of the collapse of the German offensive near Kursk.

On July 12, the troops of the Bryansk and Western fronts went on the offensive in the Oryol direction, and on July 15, the troops of the Central.

On August 5, 1943 (the day of the celebration of the Pochaev Icon of the Mother of God, as well as the icon of "Joy of All Who Sorrow"), Orel was released. On the same day Belgorod was liberated by the troops of the Steppe Front. The Oryol offensive operation lasted 38 days and ended on August 18 with the defeat of a powerful group of Nazi troops aimed at Kursk from the north.

The events on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front had a significant impact on the further course of events in the Belgorod-Kursk direction. On July 17, the troops of the Southern and Southwestern Fronts went on the offensive. On the night of July 19, the general withdrawal of the Nazi troops began on the southern face of the Kursk salient.

On August 23, 1943, the strongest battle of the Great Patriotic War ended with the liberation of Kharkov - the Battle of Kursk (it lasted 50 days). It ended with the defeat of the main grouping of German troops.

Liberation of Smolensk (1943)

Smolensk offensive operation August 7 - October 2, 1943. In the course of hostilities and the nature of the tasks performed, the Smolensk strategic offensive operation is divided into three stages. The first stage covers the period of hostilities from 7 to 20 August. During this stage, the troops of the Western Front carried out the Spas-Demenskaya operation. The troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front began the Dukhovshchinskaya offensive operation. At the second stage (August 21 - September 6), the troops of the Western Front carried out the Yelnensko-Dorogobuzh operation, and the troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front continued to conduct the Dukhovshchinskaya offensive operation. At the third stage (September 7 - October 2), the troops of the Western Front, in cooperation with the troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front, carried out the Smolensk-Roslavl operation, and the main forces of the Kalinin Front carried out the Dukhovshchinsky-Demidov operation.

On September 25, 1943, the troops of the Western Front liberated Smolensk, the most important strategic center of defense of the Nazi troops in the western direction.

As a result of the successful implementation of the Smolensk offensive operation, our troops broke into the enemy's heavily fortified multi-lane and deeply echeloned defenses and advanced 200-225 km to the West.

70 years ago the Great Battle of Kursk began. The Battle of Kursk is one of the most important battles of the Second World War in terms of its scope, forces and means involved, tension, results and military-strategic consequences. The Great Battle of Kursk lasted 50 incredibly difficult days and nights (July 5 - August 23, 1943). In Soviet and Russian historiography, it is customary to divide this battle into two stages and three operations: the defensive stage - the Kursk defensive operation (July 5 - 12); offensive - Orel (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3 - 23) offensive operations. The Germans called the offensive part of their operation "Citadel". About 2.2 million people, about 7.7 thousand tanks, self-propelled guns and assault guns, over 29 thousand guns and mortars (with a reserve of more than 35 thousand), more than 4 thousand combat aircraft.

During the winter 1942-1943. offensive of the Red Army and the forced withdrawal of Soviet troops during the Kharkov defensive operation of 1943, the so-called. Kursk ledge. The "Kursk Bulge", a ledge facing west, was up to 200 km wide and up to 150 km deep. During April - June 1943, there was an operational pause on the Eastern Front, during which the Soviet and German armed forces were intensely preparing for the summer campaign, which was to be decisive in this war.

The forces of the Central and Voronezh fronts were located on the Kursk ledge, threatening the flanks and rear of the German army groups Center and South. In turn, the German command, having created powerful strike groups on the Orel and Belgorod-Kharkov bridgeheads, could deliver strong flank attacks on the Soviet troops defending in the Kursk region, surround them and destroy them.

Plans and forces of the parties

Germany. In the spring of 1943, when the enemy forces were exhausted and the mudslide set in, negating the possibility of a quick offensive, it was time to prepare plans for the summer campaign. Despite the defeat in the Battle of Stalingrad and the Battle of the Caucasus, the Wehrmacht retained its offensive power and was a very dangerous adversary who craved revenge. Moreover, the German command carried out a number of mobilization measures and by the beginning of the summer campaign of 1943, compared with the number of troops at the beginning of the summer campaign of 1942, the number of Wehrmacht had increased. On the Eastern Front, excluding the SS troops and the Air Force, there were 3.1 million people, almost the same as there were in the Wehrmacht by the beginning of the campaign to the East on June 22, 1941 - 3.2 million people. In terms of the number of formations, the Wehrmacht of the 1943 model surpassed the German armed forces of the 1941 period.

For the German command, unlike the Soviet, a wait-and-see strategy, pure defense, was unacceptable. Moscow could afford to wait with serious offensive operations, time played on it - the power of the armed forces grew, enterprises evacuated to the east began to work at full capacity (they even increased production compared to the pre-war level), partisan struggle in the German rear expanded. The probability of the landing of the Allied armies in Western Europe, the opening of a second front, grew. In addition, it was not possible to create a solid defense on the Eastern Front, which stretched from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea. In particular, the Army Group "South" was forced to defend with 32 divisions a front with a length of up to 760 km - from Taganrog on the Black Sea to the Sumy region. The balance of forces allowed the Soviet troops, if the enemy was limited only to defense, to carry out offensive operations in various sectors of the Eastern Front, concentrating the maximum number of forces and means, pulling up reserves. The German army could not stick only to defense, it was the path to defeat. Only a maneuver war, with breakthroughs in the front line, with access to the flanks and rear of the Soviet armies, allowed us to hope for a strategic turning point in the war. A major success on the Eastern Front made it possible to hope, if not for victory in the war, then for a satisfactory political solution.

On March 13, 1943, Adolf Hitler signed Operational Order No. 5, where he set the task of preempting the offensive of the Soviet army and "imposing his will on at least one of the sectors of the front." In other sectors of the front, the task of the troops is reduced to bleeding the advancing enemy forces on defensive lines created in advance. Thus, the strategy of the Wehrmacht was chosen as early as March 1943. It remained to determine where to strike. The Kursk ledge arose at the same time, in March 1943, during the German counteroffensive. Therefore, Hitler, in Order No. 5, demanded converging strikes on the Kursk salient, wanting to destroy the Soviet troops stationed on it. However, in March 1943, the German troops in this direction were significantly weakened by previous battles, and the plan to attack the Kursk salient had to be postponed indefinitely.

On April 15, Hitler signed Operational Order No. 6. Operation Citadel was scheduled to begin as soon as weather conditions allowed. The Army Group "South" was supposed to strike from the Tomarovka-Belgorod line, break through the Soviet front at the Prilepa-Oboyan line, connect at Kursk and east of it with the formations of the Amii "Center" group. Army Group "Center" struck from the line of Trosna - an area south of Maloarkhangelsk. Its troops were to break through the front in the Fatezh-Veretenovo section, concentrating the main efforts on the eastern flank. And connect with the Army Group "South" in the Kursk region and east of it. The troops between the strike groups, on the western face of the Kursk ledge - the forces of the 2nd Army, were to organize local attacks and, when the Soviet troops retreated, immediately go on the offensive with all their might. The plan was pretty simple and obvious. They wanted to cut off the Kursk ledge with converging blows from the north and south - on the 4th day it was supposed to surround and then destroy the Soviet troops located on it (Voronezh and Central Fronts). This made it possible to create a vast gap in the Soviet front and seize the strategic initiative. In the Orel region, the 9th Army represented the main strike force, in the Belgorod region - the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf task force. Operation Citadel was to be followed by Operation Panther - a strike to the rear of the Southwestern Front, an offensive in a northeast direction in order to reach the deep rear of the central group of the Red Army and create a threat to Moscow.

The start of the operation was scheduled for mid-May 1943. The commander of Army Group South, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, believed that it was necessary to strike as early as possible, preempting the Soviet offensive in the Donbass. He was supported by the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal Gunther Hans von Kluge. But not all German commanders shared his point of view. Walter Model, commander of the 9th Army, had great authority in the eyes of the Fuhrer and on May 3 prepared a report in which he expressed doubts about the possibility of the successful implementation of Operation Citadel if it began in mid-May. The basis of his skepticism was intelligence data on the defensive potential of the opposing 9th Army of the Central Front. The Soviet command prepared a deeply echeloned and well-organized line of defense, strengthened the artillery and anti-tank potential. And the mechanized units were taken away from the forward positions, removing the enemy from a possible strike.

On May 3-4, a discussion of this report was held in Munich. According to the Model, the Central Front under the command of Konstantin Rokossovsky had an almost double superiority in the number of combat units and equipment over the 9th German Army. 15 infantry divisions of the Model had the number of infantry half as much as regular, in some divisions 3 out of 9 regular infantry battalions were disbanded. Artillery batteries had three guns instead of four, and in some batteries 1-2 guns. By May 16, the divisions of the 9th Army had an average "combat strength" (the number of soldiers directly involved in the battle) of 3.3 thousand people. For comparison, 8 infantry divisions of the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf group had a “combat strength” of 6.3 thousand people. And the infantry was needed to break into the defensive lines of the Soviet troops. In addition, the 9th Army experienced serious problems with transport. Army Group "South", after the Stalingrad disaster, received formations, which in 1942 were reorganized in the rear. Model, on the other hand, had mainly infantry divisions that had been at the front since 1941 and were in urgent need of replenishment.

Model's report made a strong impression on A. Hitler. Other commanders were unable to put forward serious arguments against the calculations of the commander of the 9th Army. As a result, we decided to postpone the start of the operation for a month. This decision of Hitler would then become one of the most criticized by the German generals, who pushed their mistakes onto the Supreme Commander.

Otto Moritz Walter Model (1891 - 1945).

I must say that although this delay led to an increase in the striking power of the German troops, the Soviet armies were also seriously strengthened. The balance of power between Model's army and Rokossovsky's front from May to early July did not improve, and even worsened for the Germans. In April 1943 the Central Front had 538,400 men, 920 tanks, 7,800 guns, and 660 aircraft; in early July - 711.5 thousand people, 1785 tanks and self-propelled guns, 12.4 thousand guns and 1050 aircraft. The 9th Model Army in mid-May had 324,900 men, about 800 tanks and assault guns, and 3,000 guns. In early July, the 9th Army reached 335 thousand people, 1014 tanks, 3368 guns. In addition, it was in May that the Voronezh Front began to receive anti-tank mines, which would become a real scourge of German armored vehicles in the Battle of Kursk. The Soviet economy worked more efficiently, replenishing troops with equipment faster than German industry.

The plan for the advance of the troops of the 9th Army from the Oryol direction was somewhat different from the typical reception for the German school - Model was going to break into the enemy defenses with infantry, and then bring tank units into battle. The infantry was to attack with the support of heavy tanks, assault guns, aircraft and artillery. Of the 8 mobile formations that the 9th Army had, only one was immediately introduced into battle - the 20th Panzer Division. In the zone of the main attack of the 9th Army, the 47th Panzer Corps under the command of Joachim Lemelsen was to advance. The zone of his offensive lay between the villages of Gnilets and Butyrki. Here, according to German intelligence, there was a junction of two Soviet armies - the 13th and 70th. In the first echelon of the 47th Corps, the 6th Infantry and 20th Panzer Divisions advanced, they struck on the first day. The second echelon housed the more powerful 2nd and 9th Panzer Divisions. They should have been introduced already into the breakthrough, after breaking the Soviet defense line. In the direction of Ponyri, on the left flank of the 47th Corps, the 41st Tank Corps advanced under the command of General Josef Harpe. The 86th and 292nd Infantry Divisions were in the first echelon, and the 18th Panzer Division was in reserve. To the left of the 41st Tank Corps was the 23rd Army Corps under General Frisner. He was supposed to inflict a diversionary strike with the forces of the 78th assault and 216th infantry divisions on Maloarkhangelsk. On the right flank of the 47th Corps, the 46th Panzer Corps of General Hans Zorn advanced. In his first strike echelon there were only infantry formations - the 7th, 31st, 102nd and 258th infantry divisions. Three more mobile formations - the 10th motorized (tank-grenadier), 4th and 12th tank divisions were in the reserve of the army group. Their von Kluge was supposed to hand over to Model after the breakthrough of the shock forces into the operational space behind the defensive lines of the Central Front. There is an opinion that Model initially did not want to attack, but was waiting for the Red Army to attack, even prepared additional defensive lines in the rear. And he tried to keep the most valuable mobile formations in the second echelon, so that, if necessary, they could be transferred to a sector that would collapse under the blows of Soviet troops.

The command of the Army Group "South" was not limited to the attack on Kursk by the forces of the 4th Panzer Army, Colonel-General Hermann Hoth (52nd Army Corps, 48th Panzer Corps and 2nd SS Panzer Corps). In the northeast direction, the Kempf task force under the command of Werner Kempf was to advance. The group was facing east along the Seversky Donets River. Manstein believed that as soon as the battle began, the Soviet command would throw into battle strong reserves located east and northeast of Kharkov. Therefore, the strike of the 4th Panzer Army on Kursk had to be secured from the east from suitable Soviet tank and mechanized formations. Army Group "Kempf" was supposed to be one of the 42nd Army Corps (39th, 161st and 282nd Infantry Divisions) of General Franz Mattenclot to hold the line of defense on the Donets. Its 3rd Panzer Corps under the command of General of Panzer Troops Herman Bright (6th, 7th, 19th Panzer and 168th Infantry Divisions) and the 11th Army Corps of General of Panzer Troops Erhard Raus, before the start of the operation and Until July 20, it was called the Reserve of the Raus High Command for Special Purposes (106th, 198th and 320th Infantry Divisions), they were supposed to actively ensure the offensive of the 4th Panzer Army. It was planned to subordinate to the Kempf group another tank corps, which was in the reserve of the army group, after it had captured a sufficient area and secured freedom of action in the northeast direction.

Erich von Manstein (1887 - 1973).

The command of Army Group South was not limited to this innovation. According to the memoirs of the chief of staff of the 4th Panzer Army, General Friedrich Fangor, at a meeting with Manstein on May 10-11, the offensive plan was adjusted at the suggestion of General Hoth. According to intelligence data, a change in the location of Soviet tank and mechanized troops was observed. The Soviet tank reserve could quickly join the battle, passing into the corridor between the Donets and Psyol rivers in the Prokhorovka area. There was a danger of a strong blow to the right flank of the 4th Panzer Army. This situation could lead to disaster. Goth believed that it was necessary to bring into the oncoming battle with the Russian tank forces the most powerful formation that he had. Therefore, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps of Paul Hausser as part of the 1st SS Panzergrenadier Division "Leibstantart Adolf Hitler", the 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Division "Reich" and the 3rd SS Panzergrenadier Division "Totenkopf" (" Dead Head") should not now move directly north along the Psyol River, he should have turned northeast to the Prokhorovka area to destroy Soviet tank reserves.

The experience of the war with the Red Army convinced the German command that there would definitely be strong counterattacks. Therefore, the command of the Army Group "South" tried to minimize their consequences. Both decisions - the strike of the Kempf group and the turn of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps to Prokhorovka had a significant impact on the development of the Battle of Kursk and the actions of the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army. At the same time, the division of the forces of Army Group South into the main and auxiliary attacks in the northeast direction deprived Manstein of serious reserves. Theoretically, Manstein had a reserve - the 24th tank corps of Walter Nering. But he was a reserve of the army group in case of an offensive by Soviet troops in the Donbass and was located quite far from the impact site on the southern face of the Kursk salient. As a result, it was used for the defense of Donbass. He did not have serious reserves that Manstein could immediately bring into battle.

The best generals and the most combat-ready units of the Wehrmacht were involved in the offensive operation, a total of 50 divisions (including 16 tank and motorized) and a significant number of individual formations. In particular, shortly before the operation, the 39th Tank Regiment (200 Panthers) and the 503rd Heavy Tank Battalion (45 Tigers) arrived in Army Group South. From the air, the strike groups supported the 4th Air Fleet of Field Marshal Wolfram von Richthofen and the 6th Air Fleet under the command of Colonel General Robert Ritter von Greim. In total, over 900 thousand soldiers and officers, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, more than 2700 tanks and assault guns (including 148 new heavy tanks T-VI "Tiger", 200 tanks T-V "Panther" and 90 Ferdinand assault guns), about 2050 aircraft.

The German command pinned great hopes on the use of new models of military equipment. Waiting for the arrival of new equipment was one of the reasons why the offensive was postponed to a later time. It was assumed that heavily armored tanks (Soviet researchers "Panther", which the Germans considered a medium tank, were classified as heavy) and self-propelled guns would become a ram for Soviet defense. The medium and heavy tanks T-IV, T-V, T-VI, the Ferdinand assault guns, which entered service with the Wehrmacht, combined good armor protection and strong artillery weapons. Their 75-mm and 88-mm guns with a direct range of 1.5-2.5 km were about 2.5 times the range of the 76.2-mm gun of the main Soviet medium tank T-34. At the same time, due to the high initial speed of the shells, German designers achieved high armor penetration. To combat Soviet tanks, armored self-propelled howitzers, which were part of the artillery regiments of tank divisions, were also used - 105-mm Vespe (German Wespe - “wasp”) and 150-mm Hummel (German “bumblebee”). German combat vehicles had excellent Zeiss optics. The German Air Force received new Focke-Wulf-190 fighters and Henkel-129 attack aircraft. They were supposed to gain air supremacy and carry out assault support for the advancing troops.

Self-propelled howitzers "Wespe" ("Wespe") of the 2nd battalion of the artillery regiment "Grossdeutschland" on the march.

Attack aircraft Henschel Hs 129.

The German command tried to keep the operation secret, to achieve the surprise of the strike. To do this, they tried to misinform the Soviet leadership. They carried out intensive preparations for Operation Panther in the zone of Army Group South. They carried out demonstrative reconnaissance, transferred tanks, concentrated crossing facilities, conducted active radio communications, activated their agents, spread rumors, etc. In the offensive zone of Army Group Center, on the contrary, they tried to disguise all actions as much as possible, hide from the enemy. The measures were carried out with German thoroughness and methodicalness, but they did not give the desired results. The Soviet command was well informed about the upcoming enemy offensive.

German shielded tanks Pz.Kpfw. III in a Soviet village before the start of Operation Citadel.

In order to protect their rear from the strike of partisan formations, in May-June 1943, the German command organized and carried out several major punitive operations against Soviet partisans. In particular, 10 divisions were used against approximately 20 thousand Bryansk partisans, and 40 thousand were sent against the partisans in the Zhytomyr region. grouping. However, it was not possible to fully realize the plan, the partisans retained the ability to inflict strong blows on the invaders.

To be continued…