In the first hours of the war, the General Staff and the People's Commissariat of Defense had absolutely no idea of ​​the real situation at the front. Directive No. 2 testifies to this. The Red Army was rapidly retreating from the border, the officers searched in vain for their units, and in Moscow they were still afraid of "provocations". On the evening of the same day, at 21.15, the People's Commissar of Defense issued another unrealistic directive, demanding that they switch to offensive operations in the main directions, defeat the enemy's strike groups and transfer military operations to its territory. By the end of June 24, the troops were ordered to capture the areas of Suwalki and Lyubin. Indiscriminate attempts to go on the counteroffensive, undertaken in accordance with the directive instead of organizing a planned withdrawal of troops, only led to additional casualties and even more confusion at the front.

For Stalin, the sudden attack of Germany was a terrible shock. Admiral I.S. Isakov testifies that in the first days of the war the leader "was in a state of prostration." According to N.S. Khrushchev, Stalin "was completely paralyzed in his actions, unable to collect his thoughts." He went to his "near dacha" in Kuntsevo and, despite the persuasion of members of the Politburo, stubbornly refused to speak on the radio with an appeal to the population. Even on June 30, when the Politburo group again came to Stalin. He met them with the question: "Why did you come?"

A.I. Mikoyan recalled that Stalin considered everything "irretrievably lost." The depressed state also explains the fact that not he, but Molotov, spoke at 12 noon on June 22 with an appeal to the citizens of the USSR. It was from Molotov's radio address that the inhabitants of most of the country learned that the war had begun. Molotov ended his speech with the words: “All our people must now be united and united as never before. Each of us must demand from ourselves and others discipline, organization, selflessness, worthy of a real Soviet patriot, in order to ensure victory over the enemy. Our cause is just. The enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours."

Stalin gathered his courage and spoke on the radio only on July 3. Neither earlier nor later did he say this: "Comrades! Citizens! Brothers and sisters! Soldiers of our army and navy! I am addressing you, my friends!"

On the second day of the war, June 23, the Headquarters of the High Command was created. It was headed by Tymoshenko. However, his powers were extremely limited. G.K. Zhukov recalled: “Without the approval of Stalin, Timoshenko was not able to give the troops any fundamental orders. Stalin intervened hourly in the course of events, several times a day called the commander-in-chief Timoshenko and me to the Kremlin, got nervous, scolded, and with all this only disorganized the work of the High Command in the current situation. On July 9, I reported to some members of the Politburo about the need to make Stalin the legal Supreme Commander."

On July 10, the Headquarters of the Civil Code was transformed into the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Stalin became the Chairman of the Headquarters (from July 19 - People's Commissar of Defense, from August 8 - Supreme Commander). At the same time, three main commands were created, each of which was subordinated to several fronts. The northwestern main command was headed by Voroshilov, the western command was headed by Timoshenko, the southwestern command was headed by Budyonny. The headquarters was to become a collective body of the Supreme High Command. However, it did not fulfill this function: Stalin almost never assembled the Stavka in its entirety, but called in those members with whom he considered it necessary to consult.

In this most difficult time, it was necessary to rouse the people to fight against the Nazi invaders. The most important tasks of mobilizing all the forces and means of the country to fight the enemy were set out in the directive of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to party and Soviet organizations in the front-line regions dated June 29, 1941. The directive emphasized the goal of Nazi Germany's treacherous attack on the Soviet Union, explained the nature of the war, revealed the conditions for achieving victory, pointed out the tasks of the Party and the people in the war. of the Soviet state, about whether the peoples of the Soviet Union should be free or fall into enslavement.

On June 30, the State Defense Committee (GKO) was created, concentrating all power in the country. Stalin became the chairman of the GKO, and Molotov, Voroshilov, Beria and Malenkov became members. Subsequently, G.K. Zhukov explained: “The non-simultaneous formation of all the highest state bodies for the leadership of the war and the life of the country during the war happened because in the pre-war period these issues were not resolved by the government and the Politburo. Before the war, the People’s Commissar of Defense and the General Staff repeatedly asked Stalin, Molotov and Voroshilov to consider projects documents on the organization of the Supreme Command and the organization of the management of the front and districts, but each time we were told: "Wait", and Voroshilov was generally opposed to any plans for the war, fearing that they might become known to enemy intelligence.

(1941–1945)

Restructuring of the Soviet state

Apparatus in a military way

Period 1941-1945 - this is at the same time one of the most tragic and most heroic pages in the history of our Motherland. For four long years the Soviet people waged a mortal struggle against Hitler's fascism. It was in the full sense of the word the Patriotic War, since it was about the life and death of our people, the Soviet state. Hitler's Germany pursued the goal not only of capturing "living space" - new territories rich in natural resources and fertile land, but also of destroying the existing social and state structure of the USSR, exterminating a significant part of the population. Hitler himself repeatedly stated that the destruction of the USSR as a socialist state is the meaning of his whole life, the goal for which the National Socialist movement exists.

The Great Patriotic War still continues to be at the forefront of ideological and political battles, causing a violent clash of different points of view. Attempts to rewrite its history, and even to some extent to rehabilitate the aggressor, to present his perfidious actions as a "preventive war" against "Soviet expansionism" do not stop. These attempts are complemented by a desire to distort the question of "the main architect of victory", to cast doubt on the USSR's decisive contribution to the defeat of fascism. But be that as it may, it was the Soviet people who became the true winner in the war.

The Soviet people and its Armed Forces bore the brunt of the Second World War on their shoulders and achieved a world-historic victory. It was the Soviet Union that played a decisive role in defeating the main force of the fascist coalition - Nazi Germany. English Prime Minister W. Churchill, traditionally hostile to the Soviet Union, expressed himself very figuratively on this occasion: "It was the Russian army that let the guts out of the German military machine ...".

The main source of victory was the patriotism of the Soviet people, their love for the motherland. The Soviet people fought for their freedom and independence, for their Soviet power. From the first day of the war - June 22, 1941, the multinational Soviet people rose to fight the fascist aggressor. The slogan “Everything for the front! Everything for the Victory! all the peoples of our Fatherland have subordinated their activity.

On the fronts of the war, Soviet soldiers showed miracles of mass heroism, fighting sometimes with superior enemy forces in the most unfavorable conditions. Partisan detachments were organized on the territory occupied by the enemy. The country has turned into a single military camp.

But not only the courage and selflessness of the Soviet people on the fronts and in the rear decided the outcome of the war. The Soviet state apparatus, which was substantially reorganized in the first period of the Great Patriotic War and adapted to the conditions and needs of wartime, also played a major role in the success.

The role of the Soviet state apparatus in organizing the defense of the country and achieving victory in the Great Patriotic War was exceptionally great. However, in the historical-legal and general historical literature it is not sufficiently covered, which in particular refers to the activities (its forms and methods) of the highest levels of the state apparatus during the war years.

The program for restructuring the entire life of the country on a military footing was outlined in the directive of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of June 29, 1941 and specified in a radio speech on July 3, 1941 by I.V. Stalin.

In wartime conditions, the Soviet state apparatus, first of all, had to ensure the deployment on an ever-increasing scale of military production and the supply to the front of the necessary weapons, military equipment and other property. For this it was necessary:

· concentrate all resources to meet the needs of the war;

· to change economic proportions in the interests of increasing military production;

increase the capacity of railways;

· to direct the activities of scientific and experimental design institutions towards achieving military-technical superiority over the enemy and meeting the needs of the Armed Forces;

· to mobilize the material and labor resources of agriculture for the uninterrupted supply of the Armed Forces, the population of cities - with food, and industry - with raw materials;

· reallocate human resources to ensure mobilization into the Armed Forces and the needs of the military economy;

· to mobilize financial resources for the needs of the war.

The implementation of all these measures was seriously complicated by the occupation by the enemy of Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, the Baltic states, part of the territory of the RSFSR and the mass evacuation to the east of a large number of industrial enterprises, collective farm property, and the population.

In the new, military situation, it was necessary to carry out a significant reorganization of the state apparatus. Three interconnected trends were observed in this process: firstly, temporary emergency authorities and administrations were created, endowed with special powers; secondly, the role of central government bodies has increased; and, thirdly, a certain decentralization has been carried out, caused by the need to quickly resolve specific management issues. The superfluous links of the administrative apparatus were cut off, many subdivisions of parallel action were merged, and the staff was significantly reduced.

The State Defense Committee (GKO) of the USSR became the supreme body of strategic leadership of the armed struggle of the Soviet people, which combined the management and actions of the Armed Forces at the front and the military economy in the rear. It was formed on June 30, 1941 by a joint resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. The State Defense Committee concentrated "all the power in the state." Never before in the history of the country has there been an emergency body with such unlimited powers, even during the years of the civil war, when the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense under the chairmanship of V.I. Lenin. The decisions of the State Defense Committee had the force of wartime laws: party, Soviet, economic, military bodies and public organizations, all citizens of the USSR were obliged to strictly comply with the decisions and orders of the committee.

The creation of the GKO was not provided for by the Constitution of the USSR, so some scientists express doubts about the legitimacy of this body. However, be that as it may, it was the State Defense Committee of the USSR that directed and organized the struggle of the Soviet people against the enemy throughout all four war years.

The main direction in the activities of the State Defense Committee was the work on the deployment of the Armed Forces, the preparation of reserves, their provision with weapons, equipment, and food. The State Defense Committee also led the mobilization of the economy, the organization of the military economy, and took measures to increase the production of weapons, ammunition, metal, fuel, food, and so on. Finally, the GKO directly supervised the defense of Moscow and Leningrad.

The GKO worked in close contact with the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. The unity of their activities was ensured by the combination of posts. Members of the State Defense Committee were members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and (or) held the positions of Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and secretaries of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and the Chairman of the State Defense Committee - I.V. Stalin was both the Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. Members of the GKO were personally responsible for various areas of work.

The GKO did not have its own special apparatus, but used the apparatus of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissariats, especially the People's Commissariat of Defense. To study and solve some of the most complex problems, the State Defense Committee created special committees, councils and commissions that prepared draft resolutions, but also often directly resolved specific issues. So, on June 24, 1941, the Evacuation Council was created, with N.M. Shvernik. To restore order in the movement of trains, on December 25, 1941, the State Defense Committee formed the Committee for the unloading of transit and other goods stuck on the railways, chaired by A.I. Mikoyan, and somewhat later, in February 1942, the Transport Committee was formed under the GKO under the leadership of I.V. Stalin.

In order to implement the decisions of the State Defense Committee, positions of authorized representatives of the State Defense Committee were established on the ground. In most cases, they were the secretaries of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics, regional and regional party committees, people's commissars and their deputies. So, to resolve on the spot issues related to the placement of evacuated enterprises, an authorized GKO, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR V.A. Malyshev.

The vesting of the State Defense Committee with the broadest powers, the simplified procedure for its work, made it possible to make decisions quickly and efficiently, and effectively lead the country in the most difficult war conditions. “At the meetings of the GKO, which took place at any time of the day ...,” wrote G.K. Zhukov, - the most important issues were discussed and resolved. Plans for military action were considered by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Party and the State Defense Committee. People's commissars were invited to the meetings, who were to take part in ensuring the operation. This made it possible, when the opportunity arose, to concentrate huge material forces in the most important areas, to pursue a single line in the field of strategic leadership and, backing it up with an organized rear, to link the combat activities of the troops with the efforts of the whole country.

During the war years, the State Defense Committee issued over 10,000 resolutions. These decisions, according to G.K. Zhukov, “they were strictly and energetically executed, work began to boil around them, which ensured the implementation of a single party line in the leadership of the country at that difficult and difficult time.”

For direct leadership of the Armed Forces on June 23, 1941, by decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Party, the Headquarters of the High Command was formed - the highest body of strategic leadership of the armed struggle, headed by People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko. It included members of the Politburo of the Party Central Committee and leaders of the People's Commissariat of Defense. On July 10, it was renamed the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, and I.V. Stalin.

The General Staff, the departments of the People's Commissariats of Defense and the Navy served as the working apparatus of the Headquarters. The decisions taken by the Headquarters were communicated to the command of the fronts and fleets in the form of directives from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Communication with the troops was carried out through the military councils of the fronts and representatives of the Headquarters, whose tasks included: coordinating the actions of the fronts, monitoring the implementation of the directives of the Supreme Command, helping the fronts in planning, preparing and carrying out operations.

The coordination of the actions of the State Defense Committee and the Headquarters was largely ensured by the fact that they were headed by one person: I.V. Stalin held the posts of both the Chairman of the State Defense Committee and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (since August 8, 1941). This organization of strategic leadership in the conduct of the war proved to be effective and was maintained throughout its entire duration. At the same time, despite the fact that the State Defense Committee and the Headquarters were headed by one person, their functions differed significantly. The State Defense Committee was the highest authority that carried out the general management of the armed struggle of the Soviet state, and the Headquarters was the executive military body, guided by the instructions of the State Defense Committee.

By the way, later evaluating the procedure for the formation of higher bodies of strategic leadership in the conduct of war, N.G. Kuznetsov, a former People's Commissar of the Navy and a member of the Headquarters, emphasized that if the Headquarters had been created even before the outbreak of hostilities, "then the first hostilities, I think, would have been more favorable for our Armed Forces."

Along with the State Defense Committee and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command as emergency bodies of the highest leadership of the armed struggle, temporary emergency bodies were also created during the war years in cities located in close proximity to the front (primarily in those besieged by the enemy). For the first time such bodies began to be created in Kyiv, Tallinn and a number of other cities as early as July-August 1941 on the initiative of local workers and military command. Initially, they were called differently (city defense headquarters, defense commission, etc.), but an analysis of their composition and functions shows that it was in the summer and autumn of 1941 that such a type of emergency bodies as city defense committees was developed. Subsequently, the experience of their activities was summarized and enshrined in the GKO resolutions.

On October 22 and 23, 1941, the GKO decided to form defense committees in the cities of the Moscow region - Serpukhov, Kolomna, etc. At the same time, defense committees were created in Stalingrad, Astrakhan and Kamyshin; a little later - in Tula, Rostov-on-Don, Murmansk, Sevastopol and a number of other cities. In total, there were defense committees in more than 60 cities. According to GKO resolutions, city committees were created in the interests of concentrating all civil and military power in them, establishing the strictest order in cities and adjacent areas, consisting of the first secretary of the regional committee or the city party committee, the chairmen of the regional executive committee and the city executive committee, the military commandant of the city and the head of the NKVD department. In some cases, commanders of troops were also introduced into their composition.

The city defense committees had the right to declare a state of siege, relocate residents, impose a curfew, and give industrial enterprises military assignments. They were in charge of the construction of defensive lines, formed parts of the people's militia and extermination battalions, and sometimes even led their combat operations (for example, in Stalingrad). Some committees continued to operate even after the end of hostilities in the city area, because. in conditions of unheard-of destruction and disasters, it was the emergency authorities that could most effectively carry out the clearing of the territory of cities from mines, unexploded bombs, the restoration of housing, utilities, and industry. Many city defense committees existed almost until the end of the war.

Along with the temporary emergency bodies for the leadership of the armed struggle during the Great Patriotic War, the permanent (constitutional) highest bodies of state power and administration continued to operate: the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, its Presidium, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR each worked in its own sphere of competence, although it, of course, has undergone certain changes.

The conditions of the war made it impossible to hold sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR 2 times a year, as provided for by the Constitution of 1936. However, during the war years, 3 sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR were held (June 1942, February 1944 and April 1945. ). Thus, in 1942, the Supreme Soviet discussed and ratified the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance in the War against Nazi Germany and Cooperation and Mutual Assistance after the war, signed in May of the same year. By the law of February 1, 1944, the session of the Supreme Soviet amended the Constitution of the USSR, according to which the union republics received the right to organize republican military formations and enter into direct relations with foreign states and conclude agreements with them.

In carrying out its constitutional functions, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR carried out a great deal of work. In particular, he issued (issued) decrees: on martial law; on the mobilization of persons liable for military service of the corresponding ages; on the establishment of new orders and medals; on the reorganization of departments; appointment and dismissal of people's commissars and their deputies; on conferring higher military ranks; on supplementing criminal, civil, family, procedural legislation, etc.

Military conditions required certain adjustments to be made to the activities of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, which, even during the war, was the highest executive and administrative body of state power in the USSR. The Council of People's Commissars led the people's commissariats, including those in charge of the production of non-military products, and resolved issues of civil and housing construction, agriculture, social and cultural construction, etc. He was in charge of relations with foreign states, foreign and domestic trade, directed and coordinated the activities of state administration bodies of the Union republics and local Soviets in the rear areas of the country, ensured public order and protection of the rights of citizens. The Council of People's Commissars resolved many issues of managing the national economy as a whole, the production of weapons, equipment, supplying the army, etc., although the State Defense Committee also dealt with these issues. The powers of the State Defense Committee of the USSR and the Council of People's Commissars were not delineated in detail, but an analysis of the practical work of these bodies and their resolutions allowed experts to conclude that in most cases the State Defense Committee made the most important, fundamental decisions, and the Council of People's Commissars then developed resolutions that ensured the implementation of the decisions of the State Defense Committee.

The organization of the work of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR adapted to the military situation in such a way as to ensure the continuous and effective administration of the country. In the autumn of 1941, when a direct threat to the capital was created, a decision was made to evacuate a number of government offices to Kuibyshev. The apparatuses of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and most people's commissariats, as well as the diplomatic corps, were transferred there. The State Defense Committee, part of the apparatus of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, as well as operational groups of the most important people's commissariats directly connected with the State Defense Committee, headed by people's commissars or their first deputies, remained in Moscow.

October 25, 1941 Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars N.A. Voznesensky was instructed to represent the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, to supervise the work of the people's commissariats evacuated to the East and to ensure that the factories evacuated to the Volga, the Urals and Siberia were put into operation as soon as possible. At the same time, the secretary of the Central Committee of the party, A.A. Andreev was authorized to give instructions and orders on behalf of the Central Committee to the regional party committees of the Volga, Siberia, Urals and the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Central Asian republics on the organization of industry in connection with the evacuation of enterprises in this area, as well as on agricultural procurement.

In order to be more efficient and quick in resolving urgent issues of assistance to the front, to increase the initiative in the search for internal reserves, the rights of people's commissars were expanded. In accordance with the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of July 1, 1941 "On the expansion of the rights of people's commissars of the USSR in wartime conditions," they could distribute and redistribute material resources between enterprises and construction sites subordinate to their people's commissariats. People's Commissariats also received the right to transfer specialists, workers and employees from one enterprise to another.

Consistency in the activities of military and civilian bodies was sometimes achieved by uniting a number of civilian people's commissariats and departments under the same leadership of the military bodies. For example, in February 1942, the head of the rear of the Soviet Army at the same time became the people's commissar of communications, the head of the main military sanitary department - the people's commissar of health of the USSR.

In many people's commissariats, special main departments were created to serve military needs. In particular, such paramilitary main directorates were created in the allied people's commissariats of communications, communications, construction, trade, health care, etc., as well as in some republican people's commissariats. For example, in the people's commissariats of social security of the republics, departments were established to serve the disabled of the Great Patriotic War, the families of military personnel and those who died on the fronts. In the regions with the highest concentration of defense industry enterprises, there were territorial departments of the relevant people's commissariats.

Military needs required the formation of a number of new people's commissariats. In September 1941, the People's Commissariat of the Tank Industry was created; in November 1941, the People's Commissariat for General Engineering was transformed into the People's Commissariat for Mortar Weapons.

A number of committees, main departments, bureaus and other departments under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR were also formed (Committee for the Accounting and Distribution of Labor, the Department for the Evacuation of the Population, the Soviet Information Bureau, the Central Directorate for Repatriation Affairs, Glavsnabless, Glavsnabugol, etc.). In 1943, by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR for the restoration of the economy in areas liberated from German occupation was created.

In addition, in accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on November 2, 1942, an Extraordinary State Commission was formed to establish and investigate the atrocities of the Nazi invaders and their accomplices. Similar commissions were formed in the republics, regions (territories) and cities.

The conditions of the war required a significant restructuring of the local state apparatus, a revision of the system, internal structure, rights and obligations of many of its links, forms and methods of their activity. To the greatest extent, this applied to the local Soviets of areas close to the front and declared under martial law. In these areas, all the functions of power in matters of defense, ensuring order and state security were transferred to the military authorities (military councils of fronts, armies, military districts, and where there were none, to the high command of military formations).

With the outbreak of the war, naturally, the directions of the activities of the local Soviets changed, both in the front line and in the rear areas. They played a particularly large role in the development of military production. The local Soviets play a great role in organizing the evacuation of industry, as well as in the location and speedy commissioning of industrial enterprises in new places. To manage this work in the areas where a large number of evacuated enterprises were relocated, special departments were created under the regional executive committees, which were in charge of the fulfillment of military orders and the installation of evacuated equipment. The hard work of evacuating the population, placing it and settling it in the eastern regions of the country also fell on the local Soviets. Under the executive committees of the regional, city and district councils, special evacuation departments were created. Many Soviets have reduced housing and sanitary standards, bringing them to 3-5 sq.m. per person, and redistributed living space in order to provide it to the evacuees. Another direction in the work of local Soviets, caused by military conditions, was the provision and household arrangements for families of front-line soldiers, invalids of the Great Patriotic War and families of people who died at the front.

The Soviets controlled the conduct of agricultural work, helped state farms, collective farms, MTS. Already in the first period of the war, 60-70% of the chairmen of collective farms and foremen went to the front, therefore, together with the political departments of the MTS, training of new cadres of executives and machine operators was organized with the wide involvement of women. In view of the shortage of workers, local Soviets carried out a centralized redistribution of labor resources between districts and collective farms.

All this required the expansion of the rights of local Soviets and their executive and administrative bodies. By a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of July 23, 1941, the Councils of People's Commissars of the republics and regional (regional) executive committees were allowed to transfer workers and employees to another job. The Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of April 13, 1942 allowed local Soviets in the front line to organize the harvesting of neglected crops, mobilizing workers, employees and members of their families for this.

As can be seen, the volume of activity of local Soviets has increased significantly, their tasks have become more complex, while the number of deputies has sharply decreased. By December 1942, no more than 44% of the deputies of rural Soviets remained in the rear areas, and in the front-line and liberated from the enemy areas (especially in Ukraine and Belarus), there were 1-2 deputies in the village councils. As of January 1, 1945, more than 59% of all deputies elected before the war left the local Soviets.

Difficulties in convening sessions of local Soviets required a serious expansion of the rights of their executive committees. A number of issues that were considered at the sessions in peacetime were now decided by the executive committees. In order to comply with the principle of collegiality in work, it was widely practiced to hold extended meetings of executive committees with active members instead of sessions. However, as noted in February 1942 by the Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR A.F. Gorkin, - "The meeting of the executive committee with the activists cannot replace the session of the Council."

Local sessions of Soviets began to be convened more or less regularly from 1942-1943. Sessions were recognized as plenipotentiaries, which were attended by 2/3 of the actual composition of deputies, while according to the Constitution in peacetime, this required the presence of 2/3 of the elected deputies. Deputies who were at the front or engaged in special assignments were excluded from this calculation of the quorum. For village councils, a rule was established that there should be at least 3-5 deputies at the session. Visiting sessions of Soviets at enterprises and collective farms, inviting activists to sessions with an advisory vote, general meetings of citizens, rural gatherings, etc., began to be widely practiced. In localities where the convocation of sessions of the Soviets was impossible due to the absence of deputies, the executive committees held meetings of citizens.

During the war, the question of the formation of Soviets and their executive committees was extremely difficult. It was impossible to organize elections for local Soviets, so the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Presidiums of the Supreme Soviets of the Union republics were forced during 1941-1945. repeatedly postpone the holding of regular elections and extend the powers of the respective Councils, i.e. the deputies elected in the pre-war period continued to fulfill their duties.

Councils, where there were a sufficient number of deputies, formed their executive committees at sessions, as provided for by the Constitution. But where there was no quorum or there were no deputies left at all, other methods were used. In a number of localities, chairmen of village councils, executive committees of city councils, etc. were appointed by higher executive committees and entered the liberated city or region along with the troops. They immediately set about restoring the local apparatus of Soviet power and establishing law and order. Then the chairmen selected from the partisans and citizens who had shown themselves in the fight against fascism, the workers of the executive committees. This composition of the executive committee was submitted for approval to the higher executive committee. In other cases (especially in Belarus), the rural population elected delegates-electors, and they elected the chairman of the village council, who was approved by the district executive committee. In those places where Soviet power was restored by partisans, they also formed executive committees.

In many territories occupied by the Nazis, the invaders failed to completely liquidate the Soviet state organs. In the areas, regions and republics occupied by the enemy, party and Soviet bodies were maintained or created, based on the partisan and underground movement. In the summer of 1943, over 200 thousand square meters. km of Soviet land behind enemy lines was under the complete control of the partisans. At different times, 35 regional party committees, 2 regional party centers and many other party bodies of various levels operated in the rear of the fascist troops. In the Leningrad and Oryol regions, in the Ukraine and in Belarus, underground sessions of village councils and district councils were convened. Sometimes the role of Soviet bodies was played by the command of partisan formations. The republican bodies of those union republics whose territories were completely occupied were evacuated to the rear and here they continued their work in organizing the underground struggle and preparing for the coming restoration of Soviet power.

Thus, the Soviet state apparatus fulfilled its tasks with honor during the war period, being able to concentrate material and human resources on the areas most important for the armed struggle against the aggressor.

Directly on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War, the fight against the German army and its allies (Romania, Italy, Finland, Hungary, etc.) was carried out by the Soviet Armed Forces, in the composition, structure and command and control system of which the war made significant adjustments.

The attack of the fascist troops required immediate mobilization. In accordance with the mobilization plan, already on June 22, 1941, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, guided by the Constitution of the USSR, announced the mobilization of 14 ages liable for military service in 14 military districts of the country. In the first days of the war, 5 million people were drafted into the army. Later, mobilization was carried out in other districts, and men aged 18 to 55 were subject to conscription. By the end of the war, the number of Soviet armed forces reached 11,365 thousand people. In total, during the war, about 31 million people who were born before 1927, inclusive, served in the Red Army.

One of the most important tasks of military construction was the mass training of the defenders of the Motherland to replenish the army in the field. In accordance with the GKO resolutions of July 16, 1941 "On the training of reserves in the system of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's Commissariat of the Navy" and of September 18, 1941 "On the universal compulsory military training of citizens of the USSR", all men aged from 16 to 50 years old. In total, about 18 million people went through the system of military preliminary general education during the war years.

In addition to those mobilized, hundreds of thousands of volunteers joined the army. Parts and formations of the people's militia, destruction battalions, volunteer women's units and subunits began to form. In early July 1941, the creation of divisions of the people's militia was authorized by the GKO. They were formed on a voluntary basis in areas that were directly threatened by the fascist troops, from citizens who were not subject to mandatory mobilization. On the territory temporarily captured by the Nazis, the number of partisan formations grew. According to official data, there were more than 1 million fighters in partisan detachments and formations.

In January-February 1943, new insignia were introduced for the personnel of the Red Army and the Navy, shoulder straps were restored. In the most difficult, initial period of the war, the Soviet guard was born in battles, while distinguished units, ships, formations and formations (armies) were assigned the names of guards with the award of guards Red Banners to them, and special distinctions were established for personnel in the form of guards ranks of military and badge. To encourage soldiers and officers who especially distinguished themselves in battle during the war years, nine new military orders were established, including the orders of Suvorov, Kutuzov, Alexander Nevsky, the Order of the Patriotic War, Glory, and many medals.

The strategic leadership of the Armed Forces was carried out by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. From July 1941, the highest formations of troops were the strategic directions (North-Western, Western and South-Western), and after the reform of the directions from July 1942, fronts headed by commanders and military councils became the highest military formations. The military councils of the fronts and armies directed military operations and bore full responsibility before the State Defense Committee and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief for military operations, military training, the political and moral state and material and technical support of the troops.

The formations during the war included corps, divisions, brigades. The units in the Red Army were regiments, as well as a special category of units that received the name "separate" (separate battalion, division), the command of which enjoyed the rights to a step higher.

Since July 1941, the institution of military commissars was introduced in units and formations, who, while directing party political work, on an equal basis with commanders, were fully responsible for the combat training and combat capability of the troops, but, unlike during the civil war, the commissars did not have the functions of controlling the command staff. possessed. In the divisions, the positions of political instructors were introduced. Since October 1942, it became possible to strengthen unity of command in command and control of troops, the institute of military commissars in the army and navy was abolished. The positions of deputy commanders for political affairs were introduced, but military commissars were retained in partisan detachments.

To guide the partisan struggle in May 1942, the GKO formed the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement at the Headquarters, as well as headquarters at the military councils of the fronts, in September 1942 the Main Command of the partisan movement was created.

During the war years, the combat experience of all branches of the armed forces was regularly summarized. This experience was reflected in new charters and manuals, including the Combat Manual of the Infantry in 1942, the Manual on the Field Service of Headquarters in 1942, and the Manual on Military Intelligence.

The judicial system during the war years did not undergo fundamental changes. However, the role of military tribunals has increased. They, as before, considered cases of military crimes and all other crimes committed by military personnel. However, in areas declared under martial law, in accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of June 22, 1941, many cases that were within the competence of general courts were transferred to the tribunals: theft of socialist property, robberies, robberies, banditry, deliberate murders and some other. Military tribunals were created at military districts, fronts, fleets and armies, at corps and other formations, as well as on railways, in sea and river basins. The entire system of military tribunals was headed by the Supreme Court of the USSR, which included the Military, Military Railway and Military Water Transport Boards.

During the initial period of the war, in areas declared under martial law and in combat areas, military tribunals heard cases composed of three permanent judges. However, since June 1942, the army public began to be involved in the consideration of cases - assessors appointed by the command and political agencies.

General courts considered cases of certain crimes within the jurisdiction of military tribunals (theft, robbery, robbery, murder), but committed in areas not declared under martial law, as well as all other cases not related to the jurisdiction of military tribunals. The central place in their work was occupied by the consideration of cases related to violations of labor and state discipline in wartime. During the war years, the consideration of people's courts and civil cases did not stop. So, in Moscow, even after the announcement of the state of siege, the transformation of the city court into a military tribunal, in each district of the city, a people's court was retained to consider civil cases. But in general, the number of civil cases in the courts during this period declined sharply. However, it grew again after the liberation of the country's territory from the invaders.

In wartime, the oversight of legality, along with the territorial prosecutorial bodies, is entrusted to the military prosecutor's office. The Military Prosecutor's Office, headed by the Chief Military Prosecutor, exercised supreme supervision over the exact implementation of laws in the Armed Forces. The Chief Military Prosecutor's Office united and directed the activities of the prosecutor's offices of brigades, divisions, corps, armies, fronts, certain types of armed forces and military districts. The Chief Military Prosecutor was directly subordinate to the USSR Prosecutor.

Law in times of war.

During the Great Patriotic War, Soviet law ensured, first of all, the fulfillment of military tasks and the functions of the state. Without changing the basic principles and institutions of law, the military situation at the same time forced a number of significant amendments to be made to it in the interests of successfully solving defense problems.

Administrative and military law. On June 22, 1941, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted the Decree "On Martial Law". In accordance with this decree, martial law could be declared in certain areas or throughout the USSR.

As noted above, in areas declared under martial law, all functions of state authorities in the field of defense, ensuring public order and state security belonged to the military councils of the fronts, armies, military districts, and where there were no military councils, to the high command of the military connections. In this regard, the military authorities were given the right to:

a) involve citizens in labor service for the performance of defense work, the protection of communications, facilities, communications, power plants, power grids and other critical facilities, to participate in the fight against fires, epidemics and natural disasters;

b) establish a military housing obligation for the quartering of military units and institutions;

c) declare labor and auto-horse duty for military needs;

d) to seize vehicles and other property necessary for the needs of defense both from state, public and cooperative enterprises, and from individual citizens;

e) regulate the working hours of institutions and enterprises, including theaters, cinemas, etc.; organization of all kinds of meetings, processions, etc.; prohibit appearance on the street after a certain time, restrict traffic, and also, if necessary, search and detain suspicious persons;

f) to regulate trade and the work of trading organizations, communal enterprises, as well as to arrange the norms for the distribution of food and industrial goods to the population;

g) prohibit entry and exit in areas declared under martial law, persons recognized as socially dangerous both for their criminal activities and for their connections with the criminal environment.

On all these matters, the military authorities could:

issue decrees binding on the entire population, imposing administrative penalties for non-compliance with these decrees in the form of imprisonment for up to 6 months or a fine of up to 3,000 rubles;

give orders to local authorities, state and public institutions and organizations and demand from them unconditional and immediate execution.

All local government bodies, state, public institutions, organizations and enterprises were obliged to provide full assistance to the military command in the use of the forces and means of the given area for the needs of the country's defense and ensuring public order and security. For disobedience to the orders of the military authorities, as well as for crimes committed in these areas, the perpetrators were liable under the laws of war.

On June 22, 1941, martial law was declared in the Baltic States, Ukraine, Belarus, gg. Moscow and Leningrad and a number of regions of the RSFSR. By additional decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and decisions of the State Defense Committee, martial law was introduced on the territory of the Far East region, in most of the union republics, the ASSR and regions of the European part of the USSR, in the Georgian SSR and a number of cities in Transcaucasia, on the coasts of the Black and Caspian Seas. In full, the regime of martial law was established mainly in the front-line and close to them areas. In 1943, martial law was also introduced on all railways, sea, river and air transport.

After the end of the war, martial law was abolished in most regions of the country by a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of September 25, 1945.

During the Great Patriotic War, the practice of declaring a state of siege was resumed during the Civil War. This legal regime was considered as the most pronounced form of martial law and was declared in areas where martial law already existed, in case of extreme danger, as, for example, when approaching and attempting to capture an area (city) by Nazi troops. Thus, by a decree of the State Defense Committee of October 19, 1941, a state of siege was introduced in Moscow. Taking into account the need to take emergency measures for defense, the state of siege was introduced not by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, but by the State Defense Committee and other authorities, including local ones, as well as by the military command. In particular, the state of siege in the Crimea was introduced by the Military Council of the Crimean Troops, in Stalingrad - by the Military Council of the Front and the City Defense Committee.

Civil law. The forms and methods of civil law regulation in the economic sphere and in relations between citizens that had developed before the war turned out to be basically quite stable, and during the war period they did not need to be seriously reorganized. Soviet civil law, with its emphasis on the priority of the right of socialist property, on the protection of the state's property interests, turned out to be, to a large extent, quite adapted to solving the special tasks of wartime. Moreover, certain principles of civil and economic law, precisely in the conditions of war, helped to ensure the establishment of a war economy, the mobilization of all means to defeat the enemy. A very important role here was played by such a principle of Soviet law as the principle of the unity of state property - the leading form of property in the USSR.

The state could always use property owned by it, regardless of whose jurisdiction it was, for its needs, resorting in some cases to an administrative act, the role of which in the war economy has increased, and in others to a civil law transaction, to the contract. The rights of people's commissariats and enterprises were expanded. People's Commissariats were given the right to independently distribute and redistribute material resources: surplus materials and equipment, write off losses of subordinate organizations. The rights of heads of enterprises and construction sites were also expanded, in particular, they received the right to provide other organizations with their materials to fulfill plans and orders under contracts.

In general, during the war years, the application of treaties narrowed, and administrative acts began to be applied more widely. For example, the supply of such important types of products as metal, coal, oil was formalized not by contracts, but by planned targets. The order of contract capital construction was simplified, the volume of project documents was reduced.

Under the conditions of war, the evacuation of state property and citizens to the East, the departure of millions of men to the army, the return to territories liberated from the enemy, the seizure of trophies created complex relations over property. Its owners and owners often changed. Therefore, the state paid special attention to the regulation of property relations. So, in April 1943, the Regulations on the procedure for accounting and using various types of property, including trophy property, the owner or owner of which could not be established, were adopted. Such property became the property of the state.

Serious changes at the end of the war took place in inheritance law. The mass death of people required the expansion of the circle of heirs by law and the establishment of the order in which heirs were called. By a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of March 14, 1945, all heirs were legally divided into three groups (queues), called for inheritance in order of priority in the absence of persons from the previous group. The first group included children, including adopted children, a spouse, disabled parents and other disabled persons who were dependent on the deceased. The second group included able-bodied parents; to the third - the brothers and sisters of the testator. The inheritance was to be divided among the heirs of the respective order into equal shares. Everyone could bequeath property to one or more legal heirs (in their absence - to any person), state and public bodies, while depriving minor children and disabled dependents of the share due to them, the testator did not have the right.

Family law. Changes in the regulation of family and marriage relations during the Great Patriotic War occurred mainly on the basis of Decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, issued in 1943-1944.

Thus, the Decree of September 8, 1943 “On Adoption” allowed, at the request of the adopter, to assign his last name and patronymic to the adopted child and to record the adoptive parent as the parent of the adopted child in the birth certificates.

The most significant act in the field of family law issued during the war years was the Decree of July 8, 1944 “On increasing state assistance to pregnant women, mothers of many children and single mothers, strengthening the protection of motherhood and childhood, on establishing the honorary title “Mother Heroine” and medal "Medal of Motherhood"

According to this decree, only a registered marriage gave rise to the rights and obligations of the spouses. However, in the by-laws developing the Decree, it was stipulated that claims for the recovery of alimony for the maintenance of a child born before July 8, 1944, from a person with whom the mother was not in a registered marriage, provided that the defendant was recorded as the father of the child, are subject to consideration in court. In addition, children born before the issuance of the Decree, from parents who are not in a registered marriage, had the right to inherit in the event of the death of their father on an equal footing with children born in a registered marriage. Recognition as legal only of a registered marriage created a new legal institution - the so-called single mothers, i.e. women who gave birth out of wedlock.

The decree of July 8, 1944 also introduced a rather complicated procedure for the dissolution of marriages. The dissolution of a marriage was carried out in a court of second instance with a preliminary consideration of the case in the first instance (people's court) in order to reconcile the spouses.

Labor law. During the war years, the most able-bodied and skilled labor force was drafted into the army, so the number of workers and employees in enterprises, institutions and organizations was significantly reduced. Industrial facilities in a place with people working on them moved from one region to another. For carrying out defensive work, a mass attraction of labor was required. These and other reasons served as the basis for the revision of labor law norms.

The Soviet state was forced to turn to such legal forms of providing the national economy with personnel as labor service and labor mobilization. The Decree of June 22, 1941 "On martial law" provided for the introduction of labor service in areas declared under martial law.

The general procedure for organizing labor service was established by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of August 10, 1942. It could be declared both in the event of natural disasters and for carrying out defensive work, procuring fuel, and restoring transport. In these cases, able-bodied citizens were involved in labor service for a period not exceeding two months, and their working day should not exceed 11 hours.

The Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of February 13, 1942 “On the mobilization of the able-bodied urban population for wartime to work in production and construction” applied to all able-bodied (from 16 to 50-55 years old) non-working urban population, except for pregnant women or those with young children, women, students, etc. Evasion of mobilization entailed criminal punishment. In 1942 alone, more than 700 thousand people were mobilized for industry, construction and transport, of which almost 200 thousand were for military production, evasion of mobilization entailed criminal punishment. Based on the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of April 13, 1942, it was also allowed during busy periods of agricultural work to mobilize the able-bodied population of urban and rural areas for work on collective farms, state farms and MTS.

In order to improve labor discipline, on December 26, 1941, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued a Decree “On the responsibility of workers and employees of military industry enterprises for unauthorized leaving enterprises”, which declared workers and employees mobilized for military enterprises and established criminal liability for unauthorized leaving, as for desertion. In 1942-1943. in connection with the declaration of transport under martial law, all employees of railway, water and air transport were mobilized and equated to military personnel.

The Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of June 26, 1941 "On the regime of working hours of workers and employees in wartime" granted the right to heads of enterprises and organizations with the permission of the Council of People's Commissars to introduce overtime work mandatory for workers and employees (from 1 to 3 hours a day) from paying them in one and a half size. The same Decree abolished the provision of regular vacations, which were replaced by monetary compensations, which from April 1942 were transferred to deposits frozen until the end of the war in savings banks.

Collective farm and land law. For the agriculture of the USSR, the period of the Great Patriotic War was especially difficult. In the first two years of the war, agriculture produced only about half of the pre-war grain output. At the same time, the war made few changes to the legal forms of organizing collective farm production.

By the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of April 13, 1942 "On increasing the mandatory minimum of workdays for all collective farmers" for the timely implementation of all agricultural work on collective farms, a new increased minimum of workdays was established for the war period: depending on the region - 100, 120 or 150. At the same time, the number of workdays that the collective farmers had to work out in each agricultural period was precisely determined. For adolescents aged 12 to 16, a mandatory minimum was also set - 50 workdays per year, but without breakdown into periods. Able-bodied collective farmers who, without good reason, did not work out at least for periods of agricultural work, were put on trial. It was allowed to exclude such persons from the collective farm with the deprivation of their personal plots. In addition, the obligatory participation of collective farmers and members of their families (aged 14 years and older) in the harvest was established, regardless of the minimum workdays they worked out.

During the war years, some changes were made to wages on collective farms. The most important change was the additional pay for the labor of machine operators - tractor drivers, combine operators and other workers - for increasing productivity. Additional payment was made in kind. Payment in kind for the labor of collective farmers was also practiced (for example, a bag of potatoes out of 10 harvested, a fifth of the exported straw, etc.). This reduced the role of the workday, but its actual value during the war years was low, and payment in kind was an additional incentive to work.

There were some temporary changes in the collective farms, caused by the military situation, in the order of land use. During the war years, collective farms were allowed to sow and use pastures on the empty lands of other collective farms with their consent.

Criminal law. During the Great Patriotic War, the basic principles of Soviet criminal law were preserved in the USSR. However, the war sharply increased the social danger of all crimes and, of course, demanded greater responsibility for their commission. There were also new structures of crimes specific to wartime.

By the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of July 6, 1941 “On responsibility for the dissemination of false rumors in wartime that arouse alarm among the population”, criminal liability was established for such a crime in the form of imprisonment from 2 to 5 years, if these actions did not entail nature of a more severe punishment.

Even before the war, responsibility for divulging state secrets increased. By the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of November 15, 1943 “On liability for the disclosure of state secrets and for the loss of documents containing state secrets”, it was even more toughened: officials for this crime were imprisoned for a term of up to 10 years, private individuals - up to 3 years.

Increased criminal liability for violations of discipline in transport (in connection with its transfer to martial law). Persons who evaded military registration and mobilization, as well as labor and other duties, were subjected to severe liability. Unauthorized departure from military production and from enterprises in areas close to the front was punishable by imprisonment from 5 to 8 years (according to the sentences of the military tribunal). For evading mobilization in industry and construction, liability was provided in the form of corrective labor for up to 1 year. Collective farmers were punished by corrective labor for up to 6 months with deduction of up to 25% of the payment of workdays in favor of the collective farm for not working out the minimum workdays.

The fight against theft of state and public property, as well as personal property, was tightened. In this regard, the well-known Law of August 7, 1932 was applied even for relatively small thefts of socialist property. The same law was applied for waste of grain, for illegal receipt of products, etc. On June 25, 1943, a Decree was issued on liability for theft of fuel (imprisonment for a term of 2 to 5 years). By a resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the USSR of January 8, 1942, the courts were asked to qualify the theft of personal property of citizens under aggravating circumstances, by analogy, as banditry.

The liability for speculation was also strengthened. The Plenum of the Supreme Court, in a decision of December 24, 1942, expanded the scope of this crime. The sale of moonshine was qualified as speculation, as well as the sale of shag in significant quantities before the fulfillment of the procurement plan for the area.

The question of the criminal responsibility of the fascist invaders for the atrocities they committed against prisoners of war and the civilian population was extremely important and topical. Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of April 19, 1943 for fascist criminals and their accomplices - traitors to the Soviet Motherland - the death penalty was introduced by hanging.

Thus, the changes in criminal law caused by wartime are characterized, firstly, by increased penalties for the most dangerous crimes in a military situation; secondly, the introduction of criminal liability for certain actions that before the war were recognized as administrative and other offenses (for example, for certain violations of labor discipline in collective farms, etc.); thirdly, the application of a number of severe laws in force to a wider range of crimes than these laws previously provided for or sometimes did not provide for them at all.

Criminal procedure law. The main changes in the criminal procedure legislation were introduced by the Regulations on military tribunals in areas declared under martial law and in areas of military operations, approved by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of June 22, 1941. Military tribunals could consider cases after 24 hours after delivery copies of the indictment to the accused. The verdicts of the tribunals were not subject to cassation appeal and could be canceled or changed only in the order of supervision. At the same time, increased attention was paid to the verification of cases in relation to those sentenced to capital punishment: the military tribunal had to immediately report each sentence to such a measure of punishment by telegraph to the chairman of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, the Chief Military Prosecutor or the Chief Prosecutor of the Navy. The death sentence was carried out if the chairman of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court or the relevant prosecutor did not receive a telegraph notification of the suspension of the execution of the sentence within 72 hours. In addition, the right to suspend sentences of capital punishment by military tribunals was granted to military councils and commanders of districts, fronts, armies, fleets and flotillas. These features of legal proceedings extended to the military tribunals of railway and water transport.

There were some other features of legal proceedings in criminal cases during the war years. So, in certain categories of cases related to violation of the legislation on labor mobilization, on unauthorized departure from enterprises, on the failure of collective farmers to work out the mandatory minimum of workdays, and in a number of other categories, no preliminary investigation was carried out. The terms of the investigation into the facts of draft evasion, speculation, measuring and weighing buyers, and abuse of food and manufactured goods cards were reduced.

The peoples of the Soviet Union paid a huge price for the victory in the Great Patriotic War. In total, more than 50 million people died in World War II. At the same time, the greatest losses fell on the share of the USSR - about 27 million people. The main result of the hostilities was the defeat of the bloc of fascist states, which saved the world from the threat of enslavement. The Soviet Union proved its right to independently choose the path of development and significantly strengthened its international prestige. Many peoples of Europe and Asia were liberated from enemy occupation.

The social and state system of the USSR withstood a cruel test of strength, and the Soviet state apparatus showed the ability to work smoothly even in difficult war conditions, although it was not possible to avoid the creation of emergency bodies of power and administration.

Soviet law has not undergone fundamental changes. Most of the legal novels were caused by the military situation, but soon after the war they gradually began to die off.

CHAPTER XV

SOVIET STATE

Similar information.

In June 1941 Nazi Germany attacked the USSR. The Great Patriotic War began. It has become the most difficult test for the peoples of our country. The USSR, despite the efforts made during the years of the third five-year plan, did not complete preparations for war. The rearmament of the Red Army was not completed. The political leadership of the country, primarily I. V. Stalin, made a miscalculation in determining the possible timing of the start of the war. The mass repressions of 1937-1938, which affected the command staff of the army, had a negative impact on its ability to repel aggression. In the first days, weeks and months of the war, an extremely unfavorable situation developed on the fronts. Significant territories were captured by the enemy. The question arose about the very existence of the Soviet state.

The extraordinary military circumstances caused significant changes in the state apparatus. By the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of June 22, 1941 "On martial law", all functions of state power in organizing defense, ensuring public order and state security in areas declared under martial law were transferred to military councils and the military command of military formations. On June 23, 1941, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR decided to create a collective body for the leadership of the country's armed forces - the Headquarters of the High Command. On June 24, 1941, an Evacuation Council was established under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, endowed with emergency powers to relocate production facilities and human resources. Bureaus and committees for evacuation were created under the people's commissariats and locally. The rights of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Councils of People's Commissars of the Union republics to mobilize forces and means to organize a rebuff to aggression were expanded.

State Defense Committee. On June 30, 1941, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR adopted a joint resolution, which recognized the need to form the State Defense Committee (GKO) and concentrate in its hands all the civil and military power in the country. Initially, the GKO included five people (I. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, K. E. Voroshilov, G. M. Malenkov and L. P. Beria), in February 1942 - three more (A. I. Mikoyan, N.A. Voznesensky, L.M. Kaganovich), in 1944 - one (N.A. Bulganin). Each of them was responsible for a certain area of ​​work: Molotov - for the production of tanks, Mikoyan - for the supply of the front, Voznesensky - for the launch of evacuated enterprises. I. V. Stalin was the chairman of the State Defense Committee.

The GKO carried out state, military and economic administration in the country and was endowed with emergency powers. He appointed and dismissed the highest military command, prepared reserves for the army in the field, resolved military-strategic issues, established the work of industry, transport, agriculture, supplying the population and the army, prepared labor reserves and distributed labor among production facilities.

All resolutions and orders of the GKO were subject to immediate and mandatory execution by all institutions and citizens. The State Defense Committee did not create its own special apparatus and carried out decisions through state and party bodies. In the Union republics, territories, regions and cities, the State Defense Committee had authorized representatives. In the front-line cities, city defense committees were created, which were usually headed by the first secretaries of the regional and city committees of the party and included the chairmen of the regional executive committee or city executive committee, representatives of the military command and local administration of the NKVD. City defense committees had the right to declare a city under a state of siege, carry out the evacuation of the population, give enterprises special tasks, form people's militias, etc. Their decisions could be canceled only by the State Defense Committee, and if they concerned military defense issues - by the military councils of the fronts. During the war, 60 city defense committees were formed.

To address specific issues, the State Defense Committee created various committees, councils and commissions. Some of them acquired a permanent character and were endowed with great powers. In July 1941, the GKO was reassigned to the Evacuation Council. In February 1942, a Transport Committee was established under the GKO, which coordinated the work of all types of transport and exercised control over the transportation of military and national economic goods. In December 1942, the GKO Operational Bureau was created, which controlled the fulfillment of military orders and the current work of the people's commissariats. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was directly subordinate to the GKO.

The State Defense Committee was an emergency body of state power during the war. He issued over 10 thousand resolutions. With the end of the war, the need for it disappeared, and on September 4, 1945, the State Defense Committee was abolished.

The war pushed into the background the highest constitutional body of state power - the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which during all this time held only three sessions: in July 1942 (ratified the Soviet-British treaty on alliance in the war and on cooperation and mutual assistance after the war from 26 May 1942), in February 1944 (adopted a law on the expansion of the rights of the union republics in the field of defense and external relations) and in April 1945 (considered the law on the budget for 1945).

Restructuring of the military command and control system. Before the war, direct control of the country's defense was carried out by two departments - the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR (existed from 1923, until 1934 it was called the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs) and the People's Commissariat of the Navy (separated from the People's Commissariat of Defense in 1937). The territory of the country in military-administrative terms was divided into military districts. On the eve of the war, there were 16 of them. The military council was the highest body of military power in the district, which included the commander of the district troops and two members of the council. The Military Council directed all military units and military institutions located on the territory of the district, and was fully responsible for their combat and mobilization readiness and moral and political state. The military councils of the districts were directly subordinate to the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. In the territories, regions, districts and cities, military commissariats functioned, which were in charge of organizing the registration of those liable for military service and their conscription into the army.

After the outbreak of hostilities with Germany and its allies, the military command system was restructured. The Headquarters of the High Command, formed on June 23, 1941, became the highest military body. It included members of the country's top political and military leadership: I. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, K. E. Voroshilov, S. M. Budyonny , S.K. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, N.G. Kuznetsov. At the same time, the military districts of the western regions were transformed into fronts. They were led by Headquarters. With the formation of the State Defense Committee (June 30, 1941), the Stavka was directly subordinate to it.

In the first weeks of the war, the Headquarters could not cope with the organization of command and control of the army in the field. On July 10, 1941, by a decree of the State Defense Committee, it was decided to create an intermediate link in the strategic leadership of troops - three main commands in the directions: northwestern (commander-in-chief K.E. Voroshilov), western (commander-in-chief S.K. Timoshenko) and southwestern (commander-in-chief S .M. Budyonny). In this regard, the Headquarters of the High Command was renamed the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, and on August 8, 1941, after the appointment of I.V. Stalin as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, it became known as the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. On August 10, 1941, the General Staff, which had previously been a collegial body of the People's Commissariat of Defense, was reassigned to the Headquarters, becoming its working body. Since that time, the People's Commissariat of Defense began to focus on the preparation of reserves for the Red Army, logistics, management of internal military districts, political work in the troops, etc. In August-September 1941, as the situation on the fronts stabilized and reliable communications between the Headquarters and the fronts were established, the main commands were abolished. The headquarters, being the highest body of military command, was engaged in the approval of plans for military campaigns and operations, the appointment of senior command personnel, the formation of new formations, and the distribution of human and material reserves. Strategic issues were decided collectively at the Headquarters, on other issues Stalin made individual decisions.

In the first months of the war, a complete centralization of military control was carried out. All control structures ultimately closed on Stalin, who was the chairman of the State Defense Committee, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the Chairman of the Headquarters, the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and the People's Commissar of Defense. Such centralization was dictated by the need to concentrate all forces and resources and the levers of their control in one center and was generally justified by the emergency circumstances of wartime. At the same time, it fettered the initiative of front commanders and leaders of other levels of government, and deprived this system of flexibility.

A mass partisan movement was launched on the territory occupied by the enemy. However, a single body for the leadership of the partisan struggle was created only on May 30, 1942. The first secretary of the Central Committee of the CP (b) of Belarus, P.K. TsSHPD directly or through the republican headquarters established contacts with partisan formations, directed and coordinated their activities, supplied weapons, ammunition, medicines, and organized interaction with regular units of the Red Army. In March 1943, the TsSHPD was abolished as having fulfilled its tasks. But soon this decision was recognized as erroneous, and in April 1943 the TsSHPD was restored. The final liquidation of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement took place by order of the State Defense Committee in January 1944 (Fig. 19).

Economic management. From the first days of the war, the transition of the economy to a military footing began. Measures were taken to strengthen labor discipline. The administration of enterprises, institutions and organizations received the right to involve employees in compulsory overtime work, vacations were canceled, and the responsibility of workers and employees for violating labor discipline was increased.

Rice. 19. The system of military control during the Great Patriotic War

The threat of occupation by the enemy of large industrial centers caused an unprecedented shift of production capacities to the eastern regions of the country. To manage this activity, on June 24, 1941, an Evacuation Council was created under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. First, it was headed by L.M. Kaganovich, then by N.M. Shvernik. Since in July 1941 the Council for the Evacuation was transferred to the jurisdiction of the GKO, in October 1941 the Committee for the Evacuation of Food Stocks, Industrial Goods and Industrial Enterprises was formed under the Council of People's Commissars. The autumn of 1941 turned out to be the most difficult period in the activities of the Soviet, since a significant part of industry, primarily military, was "on wheels". By the end of December 1941, when the bulk of the enterprises intended for evacuation were moved to the east and resumed their work, the Council was liquidated, and its apparatus merged into a new body, also formed under the Council of People's Commissars, the Evacuation Administration. In total in 1941-1942. about 2 thousand enterprises and 11 million people were evacuated to the Urals, Siberia, Central Asia.

In the autumn of 1941, two defense people's commissariats were created: in September - the People's Commissariat of Tank Industry (led the evacuated tank factories and the machine-building enterprises of the eastern regions combined with them), in November - the People's Commissariat of Mortar Weapons (it arose on the basis of the reorganized People's Commissariat of General Engineering).

In order to provide labor for the most important enterprises and construction projects that worked for military needs, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in February 1942 legalized the mobilization of the able-bodied urban population for work in production and construction.

In August 1943, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution "On urgent measures to restore the economy in areas liberated from German occupation." On its basis, already during the war years, the restoration of industry, transport and agriculture, destroyed by the occupiers, began.

An integral part of the war economy was the entire system of the Main Directorate of Corrective Labor Camps and Colonies of the NKVD (GULAG). His activities were aimed at the full employment of prisoners, increasing the production of the defense industry, providing labor for the most important facilities built with the participation of the NKVD.

In the management of the economy during the war, command methods prevailed. The administrative-command system, having made it possible to mobilize all the forces and means to organize a rebuff to the enemy, on the whole coped with the tasks that the country faced at that time. Already in 1943, the USSR managed to achieve superiority over Germany in the production of military products.

Organs of the NKVD-NKGB during the war. In the second half of the 1930s. the role of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) in the state system of the USSR increased significantly. The NKVD was one of the most important tools in the implementation of the Stalinist policy of repression. His forces completely eliminated all manifestations of opposition in the party, carried out a "cleansing" in the armed forces.

In order to maintain control over the "organs", acting on the principle of "divide and rule", Stalin in February 1941 decided to break up the NKVD. From its composition, the People's Commissariat of State Security (NKGB) stood out as an independent department. The need to centralize the punitive functions of the state, as well as considerations of economy, forced, after the outbreak of war, to unite the NKVD and the NKGB into one department. After the change in the military situation, the NKVD was again divided into two people's commissariats. This happened in April 1943.

During the war, the organs of the NKVD-NKGB performed a wide variety of functions. They maintained public order, guarded especially important facilities, ensured compliance with the martial law regime, identified provocateurs, saboteurs, enemy agents, carried out intelligence and counterintelligence activities, built defense enterprises, organized prisoner of war camps, carried out instructions from the State Defense Committee and other higher authorities.

On July 28, 1942, Stalin, as People's Commissar for Defense, signed Order No. 227, better known as "Not a step back!" This order ordered to form penal battalions (from 1 to 3) within the front and send them to the most difficult sectors of the front, and within the army - barrage detachments (from 3 to 5), which were to be located in the immediate rear of the units and in case of retreat penal battalions to open fire on them. The formation of barrage detachments was entrusted to the military councils of the armies and the organs of the NKVD.

The People's Commissar of Internal Affairs during the war years was L.P. Beria, the People's Commissar of State Security - V.N. Merkulov.

military tribunals. Military tribunals appeared in the judicial system of the Soviet state during the years of the civil war and were legalized by the judicial reform of 1922. After the start of the Great Patriotic War, their jurisdiction was significantly expanded. At the same time, the procedural procedure for considering cases was simplified. Military tribunals considered all crimes committed by military personnel, as well as cases of crimes against defense, public order and state security, theft of socialist property, robberies, murders, and evasion of compulsory military service. The verdicts entered into force from the moment they were issued; complaints and protests against them were not accepted. The Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR was informed about sentences to capital punishment, and if it did not claim the case before the expiration of a certain time, the sentence was carried out. In 1943, martial law was declared on transport, military discipline was introduced for its workers, they were declared mobilized and assigned to work on it until the end of the war. Cases of crimes in transport were also considered in military tribunals and under the laws of war.

Victory in the Great Patriotic War was undoubtedly achieved by the selfless efforts of all our people and its Armed Forces in cooperation with Britain, the USA, France, China and other countries of the anti-Hitler coalition.

Speaking at the Victory Parade in 1945, Marshal Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov said: “On the Soviet-German front, the authority of German weapons was trampled on and the victorious outcome of the war in Europe was a foregone conclusion. The war showed not only the heroic strength and unparalleled heroism of our army, but also the complete superiority our strategy and tactics over the strategy and tactics of the enemy ... "To win, skillful strategic leadership was also required, which was carried out by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, headed by I.V. Stalin.

The Soviet Armed Forces defeated 507 Nazi divisions and 100 divisions of its allies - almost 3.5 times more than on all other fronts of World War II.

On the Soviet-German front, the German Armed Forces lost more than 73% of the total losses in the war, killed, wounded and captured. The main part of the Wehrmacht military equipment was also destroyed here: over 70 thousand (more than 75%) aircraft, about 50 thousand (up to 75%) tanks and assault guns, 167 thousand (74%) artillery pieces, more than 2.5 thousand warships, transports and auxiliary vessels.

Unprecedented in history was the spatial scope of the armed struggle on the Soviet-German front. From the very first days, it deployed here on lines stretching over 4,000 km. By the autumn of 1942, the front had exceeded 6,000 km. In general, the length of the Soviet-German front was four times the North African, Italian and Western European combined. The depth of the territory in which the military confrontation between the Soviet Army and the armies of the fascist bloc took place can be judged by the fact that Soviet troops marched from Stalingrad to Berlin, Prague and Vienna more than 2.5 thousand km. Not only 1.9 million square meters were liberated from the Nazi invaders. km of Soviet land, but also 1 million square meters. km of the territory of the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe.

Even the opening of a second front did not change the significance of the Soviet-German front as the main one in the war. Thus, in June 1944, 181 German and 58 satellite divisions of Germany acted against the Soviet Army. The American and British troops were opposed by 81 German divisions. Before the final campaign of 1945, the Soviet troops had 179 German and 16 divisions of their allies against them, and the American-British troops had 10 German divisions. Not to mention the fact that in the first, most difficult years of the war, the USSR stood alone against the fascist aggressor. Of course there were different days. There were major setbacks and defeats in 1941-1942, but also victories near Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk and in other battles.

And in the operations of 1944-1945. The Soviet Armed Forces were so superior to the enemy armies in all respects (in armament, equipment, ability to fight, high morale) that they broke through his defensive lines in a short time, immediately crossed water barriers, surrounded and destroyed large enemy groupings, showing the highest examples of military art , although success in these operations was also achieved through a huge effort of the forces of the army, navy and home front workers. It was these brilliant offensive operations, about which it is now customary to "modestly" keep silent, that ultimately led us to the desired victory.

In strategic leadership, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command relied on the General Staff, which really was the "brain of the army" and the main body of strategic management of the Armed Forces.

As Sergei Matveyevich Shtemenko recalled: “The activities of the Headquarters, and therefore the General Staff, were very tense and did not close within four walls, here the pulse of the army in the field was always felt. We were connected with it not only by a thin thread of telegraph or telephone wire. live communications, personal communication with the troops, their headquarters, and the command of the fronts were not interrupted.

So, Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky of the 34 months during which he was chief of the General Staff, only 12 months stayed in Moscow (General Staff), the remaining 22 months he was at the fronts. Later, historians reproached him for this, but in the second half of the war, when strategic operations were carried out sequentially, it was possible and necessary, after planning the operation, to switch the main efforts to organizational work in the troops. From historical experience it is possible to draw proper lessons and conclusions for modern conditions only if it is critically and objectively assessed.

FIRST LESSON

It is related to the coherence of military-political and military-strategic activities.

Why in 1941 did the political and military leadership fail to adequately assess the looming threat and prepare the Armed Forces to repel aggression? The main reason is that Stalin, wanting to delay the start of the war at any cost and, proceeding from purely political considerations, rejected all the proposals of the People's Commissar for Defense, the Chief of the General Staff, did not allow the troops to be put on alert and prepare to repel aggression. It was almost impossible to resist this in those days.

Strategic management begins with the definition of goals and objectives. It is important that the country's leadership sets clear and specific tasks for the troops sent to war.

Recall that on June 22, 1941, Stalin added the words to the directive of the General Staff on bringing the troops to combat readiness: "... but not to take any actions that could cause political complications." This disorientated the troops. Indeed, if the Supreme Commander himself does not know whether the country has entered the war or not, then how can the commander of the regiment fight, thinking about the political consequences he does not understand.

Before the war, a serious problem arose in connection with the movement of Soviet troops into Western Belarus and Ukraine. At the beginning of 1940, Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko, together with Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov, tried to convince Stalin of the inexpediency of the immediate redeployment of the main part of the troops of the western military districts to new areas reunited with the Soviet Union, since they were not prepared for defense and deployment of troops.

In this regard, it was proposed to deploy only part of the Red Army troops in the new western territories as a cover echelon, and to have its main forces in the former areas in order to fight the aggressor on pre-prepared defensive lines along the old state border.

However, Stalin regarded this proposal as "political thoughtlessness of the military", explaining that if we deploy only part of the forces in the new territories, then the population will consider the Soviet power temporary, and it is criminal to knowingly give such vast territories to the aggressor. Then they had to give back to the enemy even more, including in the eastern regions, which only once again testifies to the dire consequences of playing abstract politics and an overly ideological approach to military-strategic issues.

Therefore, the most important conclusion is that politics in its pure form does not exist. It is vital only when, in organic unity, it takes into account the whole complex of factors that ensure the country's security, political, diplomatic, economic, ideological, informational, and last but not least, defense. The last word belongs to the political leadership. But the military department and the General Staff are obliged to actively participate in the development of proposals on the military-strategic aspects of the policy.

SECOND LESSON

It concerns, first of all, the activities of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff, and is associated with the ability to foresee the maturing nature of armed struggle. On the eve of the war, there were mostly justified views about the military-political nature, scale, possible duration of the war, the need for a balanced combination of various types of weapons and combat arms. But the initial period of the war was incorrectly assessed, and strategic defense was underestimated.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov noted: “When revising operational plans in the spring of 1941, the features of conducting a modern war in its initial period were practically not fully taken into account. The People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff believed that a war between such major powers as Germany and the Soviet Union should begin according to the previously existing scheme: the main forces enter the battle a few days after the border battles. Nazi Germany was placed on the same terms with us in terms of the terms of concentration and deployment. In fact, both the forces and the conditions were far from being equal. "

Formally, the possibility of defensive actions was not denied. But the essence of the matter was not in the recognition or non-recognition of defense, but above all in the practical conclusions and measures that follow from this.

First, as experience has shown, one should take into account the possibility of a surprise attack by an enemy mobilized in advance and prepared for aggression. And this required an appropriate system of combat and mobilization readiness of the Armed Forces, ensuring their constant high readiness to repel such an attack, and a more decisive covert increase in the combat readiness of troops.

In fact, on the eve of the war in 1941, the readiness of the country as a whole for defense and the combat effectiveness of the Armed Forces were significantly higher than their combat readiness. Therefore, the full power of the state and the army could not be fully realized. Lessons must be drawn from this for today as well.

In our time, with the defensive nature of military doctrine, the importance of timely bringing the army and navy to combat readiness increases many times over. For the aggressor chooses the time of attack and prepares in advance for a strike, while the defenders still need time to bring the armed forces to readiness to repel aggression.

Secondly, the recognition of the possibility of a sudden attack by the enemy meant that the border military districts had to have carefully developed plans for defensive operations, since it was impossible to repulse the offensive of superior enemy forces in passing, just as an intermediate task. This requires the conduct of a whole series of long-term fierce defensive battles and operations. If these issues were theoretically and practically developed, interconnected, and such plans existed, then in accordance with them in a different way, namely, taking into account defensive tasks, the groupings of forces and means of these districts would be located, management would be built differently and carried out separation of material reserves and other mobilization resources.

Readiness to repel aggression also required that not only plans for defensive operations be developed, but that the operations themselves be fully prepared, including in logistical and engineering terms, so that they were mastered by commanders and headquarters. It is quite obvious that in the event of a surprise attack by the enemy, there is no time left to prepare such operations. But this was not done in the border military districts. In the theory and practice of operational training at headquarters and academies, defense was worked out far from the way it had to be conducted in 1941-1942, but as a type of combat action that was resorted to for a short time and in secondary directions in order to repel an enemy attack in a short time and go on the offensive ourselves. These erroneous positions were also taken into account when setting missions for the troops on the eve and at the beginning of the war.

The idea of ​​indispensably transferring the war at its very beginning to the territory of the enemy (moreover, the idea, unfounded neither scientifically, nor by analysis of the specific situation, nor by operational calculations) so captivated some leading military workers that the possibility of conducting hostilities on their territory was practically excluded. All this had a negative impact on the preparation not only of defense, but also of theaters of military operations in the depths of their territory in general.

Hence a very important conclusion for our time, which boils down to the fact that when assessing the nature of a new war, one cannot proceed from fashionable ideological attitudes, established stereotypes and abstract principles, one must be able to discern the new that it brings.

THIRD LESSON

It consists in organizing the strategic command and control of the armed forces. Historical experience shows that certain decisions must be made in peacetime on how military-political and strategic leadership will be carried out. At exercises and trainings, questions of management at the highest level should be systematically and practically practiced. But these issues were not resolved by the beginning of the war.

Even the question of who would be the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces during the war was not thought out? Initially, it was assumed that they should be the People's Commissar of Defense. But from the very beginning of the war, these functions were assumed by Stalin. It is still difficult to understand why protected command posts for the High Command, the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff were not prepared in advance. It was necessary to reorganize the organization of strategic leadership on the go and impromptu in relation to wartime. All this could not but have a negative impact on the management of the army in the field.

The disunity of the people's commissariats of defense and the Navy had a negative effect. The attitude towards the General Staff as the main body of strategic command and control of the Armed Forces was wrong. Often the words "General Staff" aroused distrust, were used in a disparaging sense; At one time, the need for such a body was generally questioned. And those who admitted the possibility of the existence of the General Staff, imagined it not as a creative ("brain of the army") and organizing body, but as a technical executive body or in the form of a "field office of the high command", which should not have directive rights. It was said that directive functions were peculiar only to the bourgeois General Staff. In a number of cases, approximately the same attitude was generally towards headquarters. Unfortunately, recurrences of such sentiments have not been eliminated so far.

Even after the transformation of the headquarters of the Red Army into the General Staff in 1935, questions of the formation of military-technical policy, organizational structure and staffing of the Armed Forces were withdrawn from its jurisdiction. In particular, organizational and mobilization issues were in charge of the department subordinated to Deputy People's Commissar Efim Afanasyevich Shchadenko, which led to insufficient coordination of measures for these types of activities and their solution by other departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense in isolation from operational-strategic tasks.

The Main Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army was not subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff (the Chief of the GRU was Deputy People's Commissar of Defense), but in fact it was subordinate to Stalin himself. Obviously, the General Staff could not fully resolve the issue of the strategic use of the Armed Forces without its own intelligence agency.

In the People's Commissariat of Defense there was not a single rear management body, the supply services were subordinate to the People's Commissar and his various deputies. The pernicious role was played by repressions against military personnel.

The entire command and control system of the Armed Forces was in a fever of leapfrog with continuous reshuffling of the leadership in the Central Office and military districts. So, in the five pre-war years, four chiefs of the General Staff were replaced. A year and a half before the war, in 1940-1941, five times (on average every 3-4 months) the heads of the air defense department were replaced, from 1936 to 1940 five heads of the intelligence department were replaced, etc. Therefore, most officials did not have time to master their duties related to the implementation of a large range of complex tasks.

The weakness of the strategic leadership of the fronts at the beginning of the war was tried to be compensated by the creation in July 1941 of the headquarters of the northwestern, western and southwestern directions, but this made command and control even more difficult, and they soon had to be abandoned.

Communication was poorly organized in all links, especially radio. Subsequently, this led to the fact that wire communications in fronts, armies, and divisions were disrupted by the enemy in the very first hours of the war, which in a number of cases led to a loss of command and control.

It would seem that the higher the governing body is, the more difficult its duties. And the higher authorities must master the art of command and control of troops no less than the lower ones. But, unfortunately, everything happened the other way around.

Looking back, it is surprising to note that in all the pre-war years not a single exercise or military game was held where the strategic leadership bodies would act as trainees and trained in the performance of their duties during the war. Full-fledged command and staff exercises with the involvement of troops were also not carried out with the departments of the fronts and armies. At district maneuvers, the troops of both sides were led by the district commanders themselves, where neither they nor their headquarters could gain practice in command and control of troops in relation to front-line conditions. At one of the meetings of the Revolutionary Military Council in the mid-30s. Iona Emmanuilovich Yakir requested to conduct several exercises under the leadership of Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevsky or other deputies of the people's commissar of defense, involving the commanders of the troops of the districts and their headquarters as trained front departments. "I would like, - he said, - to check how we will manage the armies in the first days of the war." But this proposal, like many others, was rejected by the People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov. As a result, the General Staff, front-line and army departments went to war insufficiently prepared.

Significant shortcomings were made in strategic planning and in the creation of groupings of troops in the most important areas.

Due to the fact that the state borders were moved forward up to 300 km, the existing strategic and mobilization plans became outdated and did not correspond to the changed conditions of the situation. In 1941 new plans were prepared.

According to the plans, the general scheme of actions of the Soviet troops was as follows: the armies of the first echelon were to repel the enemy's offensive. In the event of a breakthrough, the mechanized corps had the task of liquidating the groupings that had broken through. With the end of mobilization and the approach of the second strategic echelon, it was planned to go over to a general offensive with decisive goals. By May 15, 1941, the General Staff developed proposals for preempting the enemy in going over to the offensive when the situation conditions permit, but these considerations were not accepted. At that time it was not possible.

In planning the strategic deployment, an important place was occupied by the organization of the cover of the state border. For its implementation, the General Staff and the headquarters of the military districts developed "Plans for the defense of the state border." An updated directive on this issue was given to the districts in early May. District plans were submitted to the General Staff on June 10-20, 1941. The final development of the mobilization plan (MP-41) was scheduled to be completed before July 20, 1941.

An analysis of the documents available at the General Staff shows that all border military districts received tasks to cover the state border and defend. No proactive action directives were developed or communicated to the districts.

The General Staff did not develop a clear system for bringing troops to the highest levels of combat readiness. Operational and mobilization plans were not flexible enough. They did not provide for intermediate levels of building up the combat and mobilization readiness of troops, as well as for bringing them to combat readiness one by one. The troops were to remain at their permanent deployment points or immediately fully deploy. More perfect was the system of operational readiness established in the Navy. But the General Staff did not pay attention to this.

FOURTH LESSON

It belongs entirely to the field of military development and shows that its needs cannot be considered from the inside, they must be correlated with a real assessment of existing military threats. The answer to the questions depends on this: what kind of war should the Armed Forces prepare for and what defense tasks will they have to solve?

In the 30s. the most likely opponents are Germany and Japan. After World War II, in the context of global confrontation, there was no other alternative than to prepare for a world war using all available forces and means. Now, with the end of the Cold War, the top priority is to prepare for local wars and armed conflicts.

But the possibility of a large-scale regional war cannot be dismissed either. Even if there is no immediate threat today, it cannot be ruled out in the future and, therefore, it is necessary to prepare in advance. Without working out the issues of preparing and planning full-scale military operations, the governing bodies and officer cadres are degrading.

War can arise from the proliferation of smaller conflicts. In addition, the limitations of local wars are relative. For example, 12,000 artillery pieces and 10,000 tanks took part in the war in the Persian Gulf zone - 1.5 times more than in the Berlin operation.

In view of all this, the most urgent task is to ensure the economy and efficiency of military organizational development. As is known, in the field of construction of the Armed Forces in the 30s. great work has been done. But its effectiveness turned out to be much lower due to the irrational use of available resources. There was an overproduction of old equipment and a delay in the deployment of the production of new tanks, aircraft, etc. The organizational structure of the troops changed too often. Tanks and planes were dispersed over many new formations, and as a result, most of the formations turned out to be understaffed and combat-ready.

By the beginning of the war, the basing of aviation and the location of warehouses with material reserves did not meet the interests of conducting defensive operations. Airfields were built in the immediate vicinity of the border, the basing of aircraft on them was extremely crowded. In practice, the development of operational and mobilization plans in the armies and divisions was not completed.

In addition, the plans were designed for the fulfillment of tasks by fully equipped formations and formations, and the actual complete mobilization and deployment of troops before the start of the war was not carried out.

The General Staff at the present stage seeks to take into account these lessons and draw the necessary conclusions for itself in the construction and training of the Armed Forces, in accordance with the approved by the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin elected Concepts of National Security and New Military Doctrine.

After the war, we formed five branches of the Armed Forces. New tasks arose, and for their urgent solution at first it was considered easier to create new types of aircraft and control bodies than to transform the old ones. But in the light of modern conditions, Zhukov himself would look at all this with different eyes. Everyone agrees that a 5-million-strong army and a million-strong army cannot be in the same organizational structure, have the same governing bodies, the same number of universities, research institutes, etc. But almost everyone thinks: everything needs to be changed, but not touch his department or academy.

If approached this way, then the military reform that everyone is demanding will stall. Although a lot has been done in recent years. The Strategic Missile Forces were transformed, the Air Force and Air Defense Forces were united. A number of formations of constant combat readiness have been created in the Ground Forces, which, on the whole, are successfully fulfilling their assigned tasks in Chechnya. But this work must be continued. First of all, it is necessary to specifically address the question of how, with a reduction in the number of the Armed Forces, the collapse of the defense industry, the negative attitude of society towards military service, and the lack of funds for combat training, acquire a new quality in the combat capability of the army and navy? At the same time, it is necessary to take into account the real financial and economic possibilities of the country, but not to adapt only to them. Reform on a national scale should also provide for the creation of an economic basis necessary for defense. For if the question of the life and death of the state arises, then for the defense of the country it will be necessary to use as many means as necessary.

At the same time, first of all, it is necessary to take into account operational-strategic considerations that determine the mission, organizational structure and methods of control, and not be considered only from the point of view of the internal needs of one or another branch of the Armed Forces. For example, the need to reorganize the air defense structure is determined not by the underestimation of this type of aircraft, but by the increased importance of fighting an air enemy.

FIFTH LESSON

Associated with the unity of control of all forces and means.

During the war, especially in the defense of large cities, the question arose of the need for the coordinated use of all types of troops (Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy) and military formations of various departments (border, NKVD, etc.) and their unified control in solving common defense tasks . The unwillingness to submit to these interests, the desire to act in isolation led to dire consequences. To overcome this disunity, Zhukov and other military leaders had to resort to harsh measures. In order not to resort to such extreme measures during the war, by decisions of the President of the Russian Federation, even in peacetime, the General Staff, together with the heads of the relevant departments, was ordered to plan and coordinate their coordinated actions, as well as the subordination of all forces and means to the commanders of the troops of the districts in the performance of joint tasks. We are not talking, as they sometimes try to portray, about removing them from the subordination of the relevant departments. Their administrative subordination in solving everyday functions remains unshakable. The point is only that in the interests of greater organization and effective use of all forces and means to carry out defense tasks, their actions must be coordinated and coordinated by the combined arms commands in the theater of operations responsible for organizing defense as a whole.

SIXTH LESSON

The importance of intelligence is also enormous. After the war, much was written and said that the scouts reported in a timely manner on the main measures for the concentration of German troops near the Soviet borders and their preparation for the offensive. True. But at the same time, the situation of that time is unnecessarily simplified and it is not taken into account that not only reports were received confirming the preparation for an attack on the USSR, but also data that refuted such reports. As always, it was not without servility when responsible officials tried to report only that information that "suited" the leadership. On the one hand, the head of intelligence of the Red Army, Golikov, reported on the new concentrations of the German army, and on the other hand, he concluded that these data were misleading. Beria, casting doubt on the reports of the Soviet ambassador and military attache from Berlin on the concentration of 170 divisions near the Soviet borders, assured: "I and my people, Joseph Vissarionovich, firmly remember your wise plan: in 1941 Hitler will not attack us."

The situation was extremely confusing and ambiguous, also due to the fact that not only the fascist command, but also the Western countries really carried out large-scale disinformation. Anglo-French and German intelligence supplied the Soviet leadership with information about preparations for an attack by Germany, and the latter - about Soviet military preparations. The leadership of the country, without any reason, perceived all this as a desire to provoke a German-Soviet clash.

All of the above indicates how important it is for intelligence not only to obtain various data about the enemy in a timely manner, especially on the eve of the war, but also to skillfully generalize and process them, sifting out real information from imaginary ones, to report objectively, no matter how unpleasant they may be, but from the outside guides - to evaluate them correctly. In the past, it turned out more than once that for an objective assessment and report of some intelligence data, sometimes it takes no less courage and courage than a scout operating in the enemy's position.

The best intelligence without the art of in-depth analysis of the situation and the skillful use of its conclusions cannot ensure the effectiveness of the decisions and actions taken. “There is nothing easier,” Zhukov wrote, “than, when all the consequences are already known, to return to the beginning of events and give various kinds of assessments. And there is nothing more difficult than to understand the entire set of questions, information and facts directly at this historical moment.” And we must always remember this.

SEVENTH LESSON

These are conclusions related to military losses. The victory achieved in the Great Patriotic War is being questioned in some media because of our really heavy losses. However, they are not what they are portrayed. Military losses during the war amount to 8.6 million people, and the fascist army and its allies - 7.2 million people. The difference of about 1.5 million was formed due to the extermination of Soviet prisoners of war (about 4.5 million people were captured by the Nazis, and only about 2 million returned after the war). The circumstance that at the end of the war the entire German and Japanese Kwantung armies capitulated to our Armed Forces is also discounted.

The issue of military losses is still acute today in connection with the events in the North Caucasus. Drawing lessons from the past, it is worth recalling that in the Soviet Army, even before the war, everything was saturated with the idea of ​​"fighting with little bloodshed and only on foreign territory." But in reality, especially at the highest military-political level, not everything was done for this. On the other hand, in the ultra-modern calls to fight almost without loss, there are more elements of demagoguery and speculation than genuine concern for people. For, as historical experience has shown, any military operation based not on real calculations, but on ideologized slogans, actually turns into even greater victims and losses.

From all this, the following conclusions can be drawn for modern Russian officers.

First, we, as victors in the last war, need to more critically evaluate our own past experience. And indeed, to admit that in the old Russian and in the Soviet Army it was not always customary to strictly ask for losses. Demanding in this regard to yourself and your subordinates must be cultivated and educated in every possible way.

Secondly, to understand that the saving of people in a combat situation and the reduction of losses inevitable in war is not achieved by abstract wishes and appeals. The most important thing in this matter is a responsible approach to the organization and conduct of operations, careful preparation of each battle. Of course, the training of the Armed Forces should be focused on the nature of the armed struggle of the future. But the methods of manifestation of creativity in the performance of combat missions can never become obsolete.

In conclusion, it should be emphasized that the Great Patriotic War was a severe test both for the Armed Forces and for the system of their strategic leadership. In general, they passed this test. But we must not forget how hard we went to all this and to our Victory. The new generation of military leaders needs to critically reflect on past experience and use it creatively. But we must at least solve the modern problems of the defense of the country no worse than our older generation did.

Strengthening the country's defense capability on the eve of the war
The Second World War, which began on September 1, 1939, forced the Soviet government to pay serious attention to strengthening the country's defense capability. The Soviet Union had every opportunity to solve this problem. Bolshevik modernization, carried out under the leadership of I.V. Stalin, turned the USSR into a powerful industrial power. By the end of the 30s. The Soviet Union came second in the world and first in Europe in terms of total industrial production. As a result of the industrial market, in a short historical period (13 years), such modern sectors of the economy as aviation, automotive, chemical, electrical, tractor building, etc. were created in the country, which became the basis of the military-industrial complex.

Strengthening the defense capability was carried out in two directions. The first is the build-up of the military-industrial complex. From 1939 to June 1941, the share of military spending in the Soviet budget increased from 26% to 43%. The output of military products at that time was more than three times ahead of the general rate of industrial growth. In the east of the country, defense plants and backup enterprises were built at an accelerated pace. By the summer of 1941, almost 20% of all military factories were already located there. The production of new types of military equipment was mastered, some samples of which (T-34 tanks, BM-13 rocket launchers, Il-2 attack aircraft, etc.) were qualitatively superior to all foreign counterparts. In June 1941, the army had 1225 T-34 tanks (design bureau M.I. Koshkin) and 638 heavy tanks KV (design bureau Zh.Ya. Kotin). However, it took at least 2 years to completely re-equip the tank fleet.

On the eve of the war, Soviet aviation was also in the stage of rearmament. By this time, most of the aircraft that brought world fame to the country and set 62 world records had already lost their superiority over foreign technology. It was necessary to update the aircraft fleet, to create a new generation of combat vehicles. Stalin constantly followed the development of aviation, met with pilots and designers.

The slightest changes in the design of mass-produced machines were made only with the permission of Stalin and were formalized by resolutions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. Since the beginning of 1941, the aviation industry has completely switched to the production of only new aircraft. By the beginning of the war, the army received 2.7 thousand of the latest aircraft: Il-2 attack aircraft (Design Bureau S.V. Ilyushin), Pe-2 bombers (Design Bureau V.M. Petlyakov), LaGG-3 and Yak-1 fighters (Design Bureau S A. Lavochkin, A. I. Mikoyan and A. S. Yakovlev Design Bureau). However, new types of aircraft accounted for only 17.3% of the aircraft fleet of the USSR Air Force. Only 10% of combatant pilots managed to master the new machines. Thus, the process of re-equipping the Air Force was in full swing and it took at least 1.5 years to complete it.

The second direction of strengthening the country's defense capability was the reorganization of the Red Army, increasing its combat capability. The army moved from a mixed to a territorial-personnel system of organizations, which was introduced in the 1920s in order to save money. in the personnel system. On September 1, 1939, a law on universal conscription was introduced. The number of armed forces from August 1939 to June 1941 increased from 2 to 5.4 million people. The growing army needed a large number of qualified military specialists. At the beginning of 1937, there were 206,000 officers in the army. Over 90% of the command, military medical and military technical staff had higher education. Among political workers and business executives, from 43 to 50 percent received military or special education. At that time it was a good level.

Tens of thousands of officers received new assignments every year. Personnel leapfrog had a negative impact on the level of discipline and combat training of the troops. A huge shortage of commanders formed, which increased from year to year. In 1941, only in the ground forces there were not enough 66,900 commanders at the headquarters, and in the Air Force, the shortage of flight personnel reached 32.3%.

The Soviet-Finnish War (November 30, 1939 – March 12, 1940) exposed shortcomings in the Red Army's tactical training. Stalin removes Voroshilov from the post of People's Commissar for Defense. Analyzing the results of the war, the new People's Commissar of Defense S. Timoshenko, in particular, noted that “our commanders and headquarters, having no practical experience, did not know how to really organize the efforts of the military branches and close interaction, and most importantly, they did not know how to really command ".

The results of the Finnish war forced Stalin to take a whole range of measures aimed at strengthening the command staff of the Red Army. So, on May 7, 1940, new military ranks were introduced in the Soviet Union, and a month later over 1,000 people became generals and admirals. Stalin made a bet on younger military leaders. People's Commissar of Defense Tymoshenko was 45 years old, and Chief of the General Staff K.A. Meretskov - 43. The Navy was headed by 34-year-old Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov, and the air force - 29-year-old General P.V. Levers. The average age of regimental commanders at that time was 29-33 years old, divisional commanders 35-37 years old, and corps and army commanders 40-43 years old. The new nominees were inferior to their predecessors in terms of education and experience. Despite their great energy and desire, they did not have time to master their duties of leading troops in difficult conditions.

L. Trotsky, being in exile and waging an active struggle against Stalin, repeatedly publicly stated: “In the Red Army, not everyone is devoted to Stalin. They still remember me there." Realizing this, Stalin began a thorough cleaning of his main support - the army and the NKVD - from all "unreliable elements." Faithful ally of Stalin V.M. Molotov told the poet F. Chuev: “1937 was necessary. Considering that after the revolution we cut right and left, we won, but the remnants of enemies from different directions existed and in the face of the imminent danger of fascist aggression, they could unite. We owe to 1937 that we did not have a "fifth column" during the war.

On the very eve of the Great Patriotic War, as a result of the implementation of the non-aggression pact with Germany, the Soviet Union pushed its borders to the west by 400-500 km. The USSR included Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, as well as Bessarabia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The population of the Soviet Union increased by 23 million people. As Tippelskirch noted, many leading German generals regarded this as Hitler's blunder. In the spring of 1941, the General Staff of the Red Army, together with the headquarters of the districts and fleets, developed the "Plan for the Defense of the State Border of 1941", according to which the troops of the border districts were supposed to prevent the enemy from invading the territory of the USSR, firmly cover the mobilization, concentration and deployment with stubborn defense in fortified areas the main forces of the Red Army; active air operations to delay the concentration and disrupt the deployment of enemy troops, thereby creating the conditions for a decisive offensive. Covering the western border of the USSR with a length of 4.5 thousand km was assigned to the troops of 5 military districts. It was planned to include about 60 divisions in the first echelons of the covering armies, which, as the first strategic echelon, were supposed to cover the mobilization and entry into battle of the troops of the second strategic echelon. Despite the TASS statement of June 14, 1941, which refuted rumors of an impending war, starting from April 1941, urgent measures were taken to increase the combat readiness of the army. A number of these measures were built taking into account the proposals of the General Staff of May 15, 1941, according to which it was planned to defeat the main forces of the Nazi troops concentrated to attack the USSR (some historians, without sufficient grounds, believe that this document was "practical preparation on the instructions of Stalin preemptive strike against Germany).

In April-May, 800 thousand reservists were called up (under the guise of training camps) to replenish the troops of the western districts. In mid-May, a covert redeployment of 7 armies (66 divisions) of second-echelon troops from the inner districts to the western ones began, bringing them to full combat readiness. On June 12, 63 divisions of the reserves of the western districts moved secretly, by night marches, into the composition of the covering armies to the border. On June 16, from the places of permanent deployment of the second echelon of the covering armies, the transfer (under the guise of exercises) to the places of concentration of 52 divisions began to be carried out. Although the Soviet troops were pulled up to the border, their strategic deployment was carried out without bringing the covering troops to repulse the aggressor's preemptive strike. The mistake of the military-political leadership at the moment consisted in an inadequate assessment of the state of the Armed Forces: the Red Army was not capable of launching a counterattack and did not have real capabilities for defense. The plan for covering the border, developed by the General Staff in May 1941, did not provide for the equipping of defensive lines by troops of the second and third operational echelons.

Preparing for a war against the USSR, the German leadership tried to hide its intentions. It saw the suddenness of the attack as one of the decisive factors in the success of the war, and from the very beginning of the development of its plans and preparations, it did everything possible to disorient the Soviet government and command. The leadership of the Wehrmacht sought to hide from the personnel of its troops for as long as possible all the data on Operation Barbarossa. In accordance with the instructions of the OKW headquarters of May 8, 1941, the commanders of formations and units had to inform the officers about the upcoming war against the USSR about 8 days before the start of the operation, the privates and non-commissioned officers - only in the very last days. The order required to create among the German troops and the population the impression that the landing on the British Isles was the main task of the summer campaign of the Wehrmacht in 1941, and the activities in the East "are of a defensive nature and are aimed at preventing the threat from the Russians." From the autumn of 1940 to June 22, 1941, the Germans managed to carry out a whole range of measures aimed at large-scale disinformation against England and the USSR. Hitler managed to drive a wedge of mistrust between Stalin and Churchill. The warnings of Soviet intelligence officers were contradictory and the country's leadership justifiably refused to listen to them. In addition, there was a belief that Hitler would not risk a war on two fronts, and England and the United States were provoking a premature clash between Germany and the USSR. According to Stalin's calculations, Germany could defeat England only not earlier than the spring of 1942.

However, the iron logic of Stalin did not take into account the adventurous spirit of Hitler. The well-known West German historian of the Second World War G.-A. Jacobsen writes that for Hitler the following considerations had much more weight in deciding to attack the USSR. “If the Soviet Union - England's last continental sword - is defeated, there is hardly any hope left for Great Britain for future resistance. She would have to stop fighting, especially if she could get Japan to act against England and East Asia before the US entered the war. If, in spite of all this, she continues to fight, Hitler decided, by capturing European Russia, to carry out the conquest of new huge economically important areas, using the reservoir of which, if necessary, he can withstand a longer war. Thus, his great dream was finally realized: Germany acquired in the East the living space that she claimed for her population. At the same time, no state in Europe could no longer challenge Germany's dominant position ... Not the least role was played by the fact that the "final clash" of both systems - National Socialism and Bolshevism - one day would still become inevitable; this moment seemed to Hitler the most favorable for this, for Germany had a strong, battle-tested armed force and, moreover, was a country highly equipped for war.

At a meeting at the Berghof on July 31, 1940, Hitler stated the following: “If Russia is defeated, England's last hope will fade. Germany will then become the ruler of Europe and the Balkans... In the course of this clash with Russia, it must be finished. In the spring of 1941... The sooner Russia is defeated, the better. The operation makes sense only if we defeat this state with one blow. Another major historian, the Englishman A. Taylor, notes that “the invasion of Russia can be presented (it will be presented by Hitler as such) as a logical consequence of the doctrines that he proclaimed for about 20 years. He began his political career as an anti-Bolshevik, set himself the task of destroying Soviet communism ... He saved Germany from communism, as he himself claimed; now he will save the world. "Lebensraum" (living space) was Hitler's doctrine, which he borrowed from geopolitics in Munich shortly after the First World War. Germany must have living space if she wants to become a world power, and it can only be mastered by conquering Russia.

Traditionally, in the history of the Great Patriotic War, there are three main stages:
. the initial period of the war - from June 22, 1941 to November 19, 1942,
. the period of a radical turning point in the course of the war - from November 19, 1942 to the end of 1943,
. the period of the victorious end of the war - from the beginning of 1944 to May 9, 1945

On the night of June 22, 1941, the German invasion of the USSR began without a declaration of war. Hitler's allies were Finland, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, Italy, who also sent their troops. Actual support for Germany was provided by Bulgaria, Turkey, Japan, formally remaining neutral. The factor of surprise played a decisive role in many respects in the temporary failures of the Red Army. In the very first hours and days, the Soviet troops suffered huge losses. On June 22, 1,200 aircraft were destroyed (800 of them at airfields). By July 11, about 600 thousand Soviet soldiers and officers were captured. Within a month, German troops advanced 350-500 km, reaching the old border. Another important factor in the failure of the Red Army was the lack of experience in modern warfare. German troops, who captured almost all of Europe, tested the latest schemes of battle tactics. In addition, as a result of the robbery of the occupied countries, the Nazis got various materials and property worth 9 billion pounds sterling, which was twice the pre-war national income of Germany. At the disposal of the Nazis were weapons, ammunition, equipment, transport, captured from 12 British, 22 Belgian, 18 Dutch, 6 Norwegian, 92 French and 30 Czechoslovak divisions, as well as weapons accumulated in the occupied countries, and the current production of their defense enterprises. As a result, the German military-industrial potential by June 1941 was 2.5 times higher than the Soviet one. It should also be taken into account that the main blow of the German troops was expected in a southwestern direction, towards Kyiv. In fact, the main blow of the German troops was inflicted by the Army Group "Center" in a westerly direction towards Moscow.

According to the Barbarossa plan, it was supposed to destroy the main forces of the Red Army in 10 weeks. The result of the plan was to expand the eastern border of the Reich to the line Arkhangelsk - Astrakhan. On June 30, 1941, the State Defense Committee (GKO) was created to lead the country's defense, headed by I.V. Stalin. On June 23, 1941, the Headquarters of the High Command of the Armed Forces was formed (from July 10 - the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command). It included A.N. Antonov, N.A. Bulganin, A.M. Vasilevsky (Chief of the General Staff from June 1942), N.G. Kuznetsov (Commissar of the Navy), V.M. Molotov, S.K. Timoshenko, B.M. Shaposhnikov (Chief of the General Staff in July 1941 - May 1942). On July 19, Stalin became People's Commissar for Defense, and on August 8, 1941 - Supreme Commander. As early as May 6, 1941, Stalin became chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. Thus, in the hands of Stalin, formally, all party, state and military power was now united. Other emergency bodies were also created: the Evacuation Council, the Committee for the Accounting and Distribution of Labor, etc.

The outbreak of the war was an unusual war. A war began, in which it was not only about maintaining the social order or even statehood, but about the physical existence of the peoples inhabiting the USSR. Hitler emphasized that "we must wipe this country off the face of the earth and destroy its people."

According to the Ost plan, after the victory, the dismemberment of the USSR, the forced deportation of 50 million people beyond the Urals, genocide, the destruction of leading cultural centers, and the transformation of the European part of the country into a living space for German colonists were envisaged. “The Slavs must,” wrote Nazi Party Secretary M. Bormann, “work for us. If we don't need them, they may die. The health care system is not needed. Births among the Slavs are undesirable. They must use contraception and practice abortion, and the more the better. Education is dangerous. As for food, they should not receive more than necessary. During the war years, 5 million people were driven to Germany, of which 750 thousand died as a result of ill-treatment.

The inhuman plans of the Nazis, their brutal methods of warfare intensified the desire of the Soviet people to save the Motherland and themselves from complete extermination and enslavement. The war acquired a national liberation character and rightly went down in history as the Great Patriotic War. Already in the first days of the war, units of the Red Army showed courage and steadfastness. From June 22 to July 20, 1941, the garrison of the Brest Fortress fought. Heroic defense of Liepaja (June 23-29, 1941), Kyiv (July 7 - September 24, 1941), Odessa (August 5 - October 16, 1941), Tallinn (August 5-28, 1941), Moonsund Islands (September 6 - October 22, 1941), Sevastopol (October 30, 1941 - July 4, 1942), as well as the Battle of Smolensk (July 10 - September 10, 1941) made it possible to disrupt the "blitzkrieg" plan - a lightning war . Nevertheless, in 4 months the Germans reached Moscow and Leningrad, captured 1.5 million square kilometers with a population of 74.5 million people. By December 1, 1941, the USSR lost more than 3 million people killed, missing and captured.

The GKO in the summer and autumn of 1941 took a number of emergency measures. The mobilization was successfully carried out. Over 20 million people applied for enrollment in the Red Army as volunteers. At the critical moment of the struggle - in August - October 1941 - a huge role in the defense of Moscow and Leningrad and other cities was played by the people's militia, numbering about 2 million people. In the vanguard of the fighting people was the Communist Party; by the end of the war, up to 80% of the members of the CPSU (b) were in the army. During the war, almost 3.5 million were accepted into the party. In the battles for the freedom of the motherland, 3 million communists died, which amounted to 3/5 of the pre-war membership of the party. Nevertheless, the size of the party grew from 3.8 to 5.9 million. The lower levels of the party played a big role in the first period of the war, when, by decision of the GKO, city defense committees were established in more than 60 cities, headed by the first secretaries of the regional committees and city committees of the CPSU (b). In 1941, an armed struggle began behind enemy lines. On July 18, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution “On the Organization of the Fight in the Rear of the German Troops”, which obliged the party committees to deploy underground party and Komsomol committees behind enemy lines, organize and lead the partisan movement.

On September 30, 1941, the battle for Moscow began. In accordance with the Typhoon plan, German troops surrounded five Soviet armies in the Vyazma region. But the encircled troops fought courageously, pinning down the significant forces of Army Group Center, and by the end of October helped stop the enemy at the Mozhaisk line. From mid-November, the Germans launched a new offensive against Moscow. However, by the beginning of December, the forces of the German group were completely exhausted. On December 5-6, Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive. By mid-January 1942, the enemy was pushed back 120-400 km. This victory of the Red Army was of great military and political significance. It was the first major German defeat since the start of World War II. The myth of the invincibility of the Nazi army was dispelled. The lightning war plan was finally thwarted. The victory near Moscow significantly strengthened the international prestige of our country and contributed to the completion of the creation of the anti-Hitler coalition.

Under the cover of the Red Army retreating in bloody battles, the most difficult work to mobilize the national economy was unfolding in the country. New people's commissariats were created for the operational management of key industries. Under the leadership of the Evacuation Council (Chairman N.M. Shvernik, Deputy N.A. Kosygin), an unprecedented transfer of industrial and other facilities to the East of the country took place. 10 million people, 1523 large enterprises, huge material and cultural values ​​were taken there in a short time. Thanks to the measures taken, by December 1941 the decline in military production was stopped, and from March 1942 its growth began. State ownership of the means of production and the strictly centralized system of economic management based on it allowed the USSR to quickly concentrate all resources on military production. Therefore, yielding to the aggressors in terms of the size of the industrial base, the USSR was soon far ahead of them in the production of military equipment. Thus, based on one metal-cutting machine in the USSR, 8 times more aircraft were produced, for each smelted ton of steel - 5 times more tanks.

A radical change in the work of the Soviet rear predetermined a radical change in combat operations. From November 19, 1942 to February 2, 1943, Soviet troops of three fronts: Stalingrad (commander A.I. Eremenko), Don (K.K. Rokossovsky) and South-Western (N.F. Vatutin) - surrounded and destroyed Nazi troops near Stalingrad. The Stalingrad victory became a radical turning point in the course of the war. It showed the whole world the strength of the Red Army, the increased skill of Soviet military leaders, the strength of the rear, which provided the front with a sufficient amount of weapons, military equipment and equipment. The international prestige of the Soviet Union grew immeasurably, and the positions of fascist Germany were seriously shaken. From July 5 to August 23, 1943, the Battle of Kursk took place, which completed a radical change. From the moment of the Battle of Kursk, Soviet troops held the strategic initiative until the end of the war. During the period from November 1942 to December 1943, 50% of the occupied territory was liberated. G.K. Zhukova, A.M. Vasilevsky, K.K. Rokossovsky.

The partisan movement provided significant assistance to the Red Army. In May 1942, the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement was created, and the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks P. Ponomarenko was appointed chairman. In Moscow in 1942, a meeting of the commanders of the largest partisan formations was held (S.A. Kovpak, M.A. Naumov, A.N. Saburov, A.F. Fedorov and others). The partisan struggle gained its greatest scope in the North-West, in Belarus, a number of regions of Ukraine, and in the Bryansk region. At the same time, numerous underground organizations were engaged in reconnaissance, sabotage, and information of the population about the situation on the fronts.

At the final stage of the war, the Red Army had to complete the liberation of the territory of the USSR and liberate the countries of Europe. In January - February 1944, the Leningrad-Novgorod operation was carried out. On January 27, the blockade of the heroic Leningrad was liquidated, which lasted 900 days. In April - May, Odessa and Crimea were liberated. In the context of the opening of the second front (June 6, 1944), Soviet troops launched strikes in different directions. From June 10 to August 9, the Vyborg-Petrozavodsk operation took place, as a result of which Finland withdrew from the war. From June 23 to August 29, the largest summer offensive operation of the Soviet troops in the war took place - Operation Bagration to liberate Belarus, during which Belarus was liberated, and Soviet troops entered Poland. The Iasi-Kishinev operation on August 20-29 led to the defeat of German troops in Romania. In the autumn of 1944, Soviet troops liberated Bulgaria and Yugoslavia from the Nazis.

At the beginning of 1945, ahead of schedule, at the request of the Allies, who experienced difficulties due to the German offensive in the Ardennes, Soviet troops launched the Vistula-Oder operation (January 12 - February 3, 1945), as a result of which Poland was liberated . In February - March 1945, Hungary was liberated, and in April, Soviet troops entered Vienna, the capital of Austria. On April 16, the Berlin operation began. The troops of three fronts: the 1st and 2nd Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian (commanders - marshals G.K. Zhukov, K.K. Rokossovsky and I.S. Konev) - within two weeks defeated the 1 millionth enemy group and on May 2 captured the capital of Nazi Germany. On the night of May 8-9, the surrender of Germany was signed. From May 6 to May 11, 1945, Soviet troops carried out the Prague operation, coming to the aid of the insurgent Prague and defeating German troops in Czechoslovakia.

The Soviet Union made a huge contribution to the victory over Japan. Within three weeks, from August 9 to September 2, the Soviet Army defeated the most combat-ready and powerful 1 million Kwantung Army, liberating Manchuria, as well as South Sakhalin, the Kuril Islands and North Korea. September 2, 1945 Japan capitulated. The Second World War ended with the victory of the peace-loving, democratic, anti-militarist forces over the forces of reaction and militarism. The decisive contribution to the defeat of fascism was made by the Soviet people. Heroism and self-sacrifice became a mass phenomenon. The exploits of I. Ivanov, N. Gastello, A. Matrosov, A. Maresyev were repeated by many Soviet soldiers. During the war, the advantage of the Soviet military doctrine was revealed. Such generals as G.K. Zhukov, K.K. Rokossovsky, I.S. Konev, A.M. Vasilevsky, R.Ya. Malinovsky, N.F. Vatutin, K.A. Meretskov, F.I. Tolbukhin, L.A. Govorov, I.D. Chernyakhovsky, I.Kh. Bagramyan.

The unity of the peoples of the USSR has stood the test. It is significant that representatives of 100 nations and nationalities of the country became Heroes of the Soviet Union. The patriotic spirit of the Russian people played a particularly important role in the victory in the war. In his famous speech on May 24, 1945: “I raise a toast to the health of the Russian people first of all,” Stalin acknowledged the special contribution of the Russian people. Created in the late 30s. the administrative-command system made it possible to concentrate human and material resources in the most important directions for defeating the enemy.

The historical significance of the victory of the USSR in the war lies in the fact that the totalitarian, terrorist model of capitalism, which threatened world civilization, was defeated. The possibility of a democratic renewal of the world and the liberation of the colonies opened up. The Soviet Union emerged from the war as a great power.

Causes, nature, main stages of the Great Patriotic War
September 1, 1939 Germany attacked Poland. Thus began the Second World War. England and France, bound with Poland by a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance, declared war on Germany. During September, Poland was defeated. What the Anglo-French guarantees cost Poland was shown by the first month of the bloody war. Instead of 40 divisions, which the French headquarters promised the Polish command to throw against Germany on the third day of the war, only from September 9, individual units of 9 divisions carried out an unsuccessful operation in the Saar. Meanwhile, according to Jodl, Chief of the Wehrmacht General Staff, the Allies had 110 divisions on the Western Front against 22 German ones, as well as an overwhelming advantage in aviation. However, England and France, having the opportunity to conduct a major battle against the Germans, did not do this. On the contrary, Allied planes dropped leaflets over the trenches of the German troops with calls to turn their weapons against the Soviets. The so-called "strange war" began, when there was practically no fighting on the Western Front until April 1940.

On September 17, 1939, when German troops reached Warsaw and crossed the line specified in the secret protocol, by decision of the Soviet government, the Red Army troops were ordered to "cross the border and take under their protection the life and property of the population of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus." The reunification of the peoples of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus with Russia into a single statehood was the end of their centuries-old struggle to restore historical justice, since the entire territory from Grodno, Brest, Lvov and the Carpathians is primordially Russian lands. For the majority of Ukrainians and Belarusians, the arrival of the Red Army in 1939 meant a truly historic deliverance from cruel national, social and spiritual oppression.

On September 28, 1939, an agreement "On Friendship and Borders" was signed between Germany and the USSR. According to the treaty, the western border of the USSR now ran along the so-called Curzon Line, recognized at one time by England, France, the USA and Poland. One of the secret protocols of the treaty stipulated that a small part of southwestern Lithuania would remain with Germany. Later, according to a secret protocol dated January 10, 1941, this territory was acquired by the USSR for 31.5 million Reichsmarks (7.5 million dollars). At the same time, the USSR managed to solve a number of important foreign policy tasks.

In the autumn of 1939, the USSR concluded treaties of friendship and mutual assistance with the Baltic states. On their basis, garrisons of Soviet troops were placed on the territory of these states. The purpose of this Soviet foreign policy action was to ensure the security of the Baltic states, as well as to prevent attempts to draw them into the war. Under an agreement dated October 10, 1939, the USSR transferred to Lithuania the city of Vilna and the Vilna region, which belonged to Belarus.

In the conditions of the aggravated military-political situation in Europe, the urgent task for the USSR was to ensure the security of the northwestern approaches to Leningrad, the largest industrial center of the country. Finland, which occupied pro-German positions, refused Soviet proposals to lease the port of Hanko to the USSR for 30 years to set up a military base, transfer part of the Karelian Isthmus, part of the Rybachy Peninsula and several islands in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland - a total of 2761 km2 in exchange for 5529 km2 of the Soviet territories in East Karelia. In response to Finland's refusal, the USSR declared war on November 30, 1939, which lasted until March 12, 1940. Britain, France, the USA, Sweden, Norway, and Italy provided military assistance to Finland. On December 14, 1939, the Council of the League of Nations adopted a resolution excluding the USSR from its ranks. Under the peace treaty of March 12, 1940, Finland agreed to move its border with the USSR. The USSR undertook to withdraw its troops from the Petsamo region, which Finland voluntarily ceded to them under the 1920 treaty. The new border was extremely beneficial for the USSR not only from a political (security of Leningrad), but also from an economic point of view: 8 large pulp and paper enterprises ended up on Soviet territory , HPP Rauhala, railway along Ladoga.

The provision of a German loan to the USSR in the amount of 200 million marks (at 4.5% per annum) allowed the USSR to strengthen the country's defense capability, because what was supplied was either just weapons (ship weapons, samples of heavy artillery, tanks, aircraft, as well as important licenses ), or what weapons are made on (lathes, large hydraulic presses, etc., machinery, installations for producing liquid fuel from coal, equipment for other types of industry, etc.).

By April 1940, the so-called "strange war" was over. The German army, having accumulated significant human and military-technical forces, switched to an all-out offensive in Western Europe. On April 5, Germany invaded Denmark; a few hours later, the Danish government capitulated. On April 9, they captured Oslo, but Norway resisted for about 2 months. By May 10, 1940, Germany had already captured Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg. France was next. As a result of Operation Gelb, France was defeated, resisted for only 44 days. On June 22, the Petain government signed a surrender, according to which most of the territory of France was occupied.

The quick victory of Germany over France significantly changed the balance of power in Europe, which required the Soviet leadership to adjust its foreign policy. Calculations for the mutual attrition of opponents on the Western Front did not materialize. In connection with the expansion of German influence in Europe, there was a real danger of blocking certain circles of the Baltic countries with Germany. In June 1940, the USSR accused Lithuania of anti-Soviet actions, demanding a change of government and agreeing to the deployment of additional military units in Lithuania. On June 14 such consent was received from Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The measures taken by Moscow decisively influenced the further course of events in this regard: the People's Seimas of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia (State Duma) on July 21-24, 1940 adopted a declaration on the proclamation of Soviet power in their countries, entry into the USSR. In August 1940, the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, by its decision, accepted Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia into the USSR.

In the summer of 1920, at the request of the USSR, Romania transferred Bessarabia to it, which was annexed to Moldova by the ASSRS (1929 - 1940 Tiraspol). Thus, the USSR found itself in close proximity to the oil regions of Romania, the exploitation of which served the Reich as "an indispensable prerequisite for the successful conduct of the war." Hitler retaliated by making an agreement with the Fascist government of General Antonescu to transfer German troops to Romania. The tension between the USSR and Germany escalated even more with the signing on September 27, 1940 in Berlin of a pact between Germany, Italy and Japan on the actual division of the world. The trip of V.M. Molotov to Berlin on November 12-13, 1940 and his negotiations with Hitler and Ribbentrop did not lead to an improvement in the situation. An important achievement of the foreign policy of the USSR was the conclusion of the Neutrality Treaty with Turkey (March 1941) and Japan (April 1941).

At the same time, until the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, economic and trade relations were intensively developing between the two countries. According to Goebbels, Hitler assessed these agreements as a specifically Stalinist policy, calculated on the economic dependence of the Reich on the supply of industrial raw materials, which Germany could be deprived of at the right time. These are agricultural goods, oil products, manganese and chromium ores, rare metals, etc. The USSR received from German firms industrial products and armaments worth 462.3 million marks. These are machine tools, high-strength steel, technical equipment, military equipment. At the same time, extremely scarce raw materials were flowing into Germany from the United States or through branches of American corporations in third countries. Moreover, deliveries of American oil and petroleum products were carried out until 1944. 249 US monopolies traded with Germany throughout the war.

The foreign policy of the USSR during the Second World War
The foreign policy of the Soviet Union was one of the factors of victory in the Great Patriotic War. Its main task was to create the best conditions in the international arena for defeating the enemy. The main goal also identified specific tasks:

1. Strive for the "bourgeois" states that were at war with Germany and Italy to become allies of the USSR.

2. To prevent the threat of an attack by Japan and drawing neutral states into the war on the side of the fascist aggressors.

3. To promote the liberation from the fascist yoke, the restoration of sovereignty, the democratic development of the countries occupied by the aggressors.

4. Strive for the complete elimination of fascist regimes and the conclusion of a peace that excludes the possibility of a repetition of aggression.

The threat of enslavement imperiously demanded the unification of the efforts of all countries that fought against fascism. This determined the emergence of an anti-Hitler coalition of three great powers - the USSR, the USA and England. About 50 countries joined them during the course of the war, including some of Germany's former allies. The international legal registration of the coalition took place in several stages. The steps of its creation were the signing in Moscow on July 12, 1941 of the “Agreement between the governments of the USSR and Great Britain on joint actions in the war against Germany”, the conclusion of similar agreements between the USSR and the emigrant governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland, the exchange of notes on August 2 between the USSR and the USA on the extension of year of the Soviet-American trade agreement and economic assistance from the United States to the Soviet Union.

An important stage in the formation and strengthening of the anti-Hitler coalition was the Moscow Conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the three powers (September 29 - October 1, 1941), at which the United States and Britain pledged from October 1, 1941 to June 30, 1942 to supply us with 400 aircraft, 500 tanks, 200 anti-tank rifles, etc. The USSR was granted an interest-free loan in the amount of 1 billion dollars. However, lend-lease deliveries were carried out during this period slowly and in small quantities. To strengthen the alliance with Britain and the USA, on September 24, the USSR joined the "Atlantic Charter", signed on August 14, 1941 at a meeting between W. Churchill and F. Roosevelt. For the USSR, this was not an easy decision. In this document, the United States and Britain declared that they did not seek territorial acquisitions in this war and would respect the right of peoples to choose their own form of government. The legitimacy of the borders that existed before the outbreak of World War II was emphasized. The Allies did not consider the USSR as a real force on the world stage, and therefore there was not a word about it or the Soviet-German front in the text of the document. In essence, their charter was of a separate nature, expressing the claims of the two powers to maintain world domination. The USSR expressed in a special declaration its agreement with the basic principles of the charter, emphasizing that their practical implementation should be consistent with the circumstances ...

On December 7, 1941, Japan attacked the US naval base at Pearl Harbor, located in the Hawaiian Islands, without declaring war. On December 8, the United States declared war on Japan. England did the same. On December 11, Germany and Italy declared war on the United States. The World War II zone expanded significantly. On January 1, 1942, in Washington, 26 states of the anti-fascist coalition, including the USSR, the USA, Britain and China, signed a declaration under which they pledged to use all their military and economic resources to fight against the fascist bloc. These countries became known as the "United Nations".

On May 26, 1942, an agreement was signed between England and the USSR on an alliance in war and post-war cooperation. In June 1942, the US and the USSR signed an agreement "On the principles applicable to mutual assistance and the conduct of war against aggression." However, our allies were in no hurry to open a second front. During the London talks in May 1942, Churchill handed Molotov a note to Stalin stating: "We do not bind ourselves to act and cannot make any promise." Churchill motivated his refusal by the lack of sufficient funds and forces. But in reality, political considerations played a major role. The British Minister of Aviation Industry M. Brabazon bluntly stated that "the best outcome of the struggle on the Eastern Front would be the mutual exhaustion of Germany and the USSR, as a result of which England could take a dominant position in Europe." The infamous statement of the future US President G. Truman echoed this thesis: “If we see that Germany is winning, then we should help Russia, and if Russia wins, we should help Germany, and thus let them kill like as much as possible." Thus, the calculations for the future leadership in the world of maritime powers were already based on the fight against fascism in World War II.

On June 12, 1942, Anglo-Soviet and Soviet-American communiqués were published stating that "full agreement was reached on the urgent tasks of creating a second front in Europe in 1942." However, not only 1942, but also 1943 passed, and the second front in Western Europe was never opened. In the meantime, Allied forces launched major amphibious operations in North Africa and later in Sicily and Italy. Churchill even suggested replacing the second front with a strike "in the soft underbelly of Europe" - a landing in the Balkans in order to bring Anglo-American troops into the countries of South-Eastern Europe before the Red Army, advancing from the east, approached, and thereby establish the dominance of the maritime powers in this region, which played an important geopolitical significance.

The victories of the Red Army near Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk were of great international significance. They demonstrated to the whole world the increased power of the Soviet state. The heavy losses of Nazi Germany on the Soviet-German front sharply weakened both its armed forces and the German rear. The resistance movement intensified - Stalingrad became the beginning of a new stage of this movement in France, Belgium, Norway and other occupied countries. Anti-fascist forces also grew in Germany itself, disbelief in the possibility of victory more and more seized its population. Under the influence of the defeat of the Italian army on the Soviet front and the operations of the allies in the Mediterranean basin, Italy capitulated on September 3, 1943 and broke with Nazi Germany. Mussolini was overthrown. Soon allied troops landed in Italy. The Germans responded by occupying the northern and central parts of the country. The new Italian government declared war on Germany.

In connection with the decisive successes of the Red Army by the end of 1943, the essence of the problem of the second front also changed. Victory over Germany was already a foregone conclusion; it could be achieved by the forces of the USSR alone. The Anglo-American side was now directly interested in opening a second front in Western Europe. From October 19 to October 30, 1943, a conference of foreign ministers of the three states was held in Moscow. The conference adopted a "Declaration on the responsibility of the Nazis for the committed atrocities", and also prepared the conditions for a meeting of the heads of government of the USSR, the USA and England. This was also facilitated by the dissolution of the Communist International in May 1943. In an interview with a Reuters correspondent, I.V. Stalin pointed out that the dissolution of the Comintern exposed the lies about Moscow's intention to Bolshevize other states, that the Communist Parties were not acting in the interests of their own peoples, but on orders from outside. The dissolution of the Comintern was positively received by the leaders of the allies, primarily the United States. Relations between Moscow and other communist parties have changed; more emphasis was placed on bilateral contacts between the leadership of the CPSU (b), primarily I.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov, with leaders of foreign communist parties.

On the eve of the Tehran meeting of allied leaders, US President F. Roosevelt said that "the United States must occupy Northwest Germany ... We must reach Berlin." From the point of view of the Americans, Churchill's Mediterranean strategy, which was supported by the US government until mid-1943, had exhausted itself. The second front in the West gave America the opportunity to "keep the Red Army out of the vital areas of the Ruhr and the Rhine, which an offensive from the Mediterranean would never achieve." The growing superiority of the Americans in manpower and technology forced Churchill to accept their plan.

The Tehran Conference, at which I. Stalin, F. Roosevelt and W. Churchill first met, was held from November 28 to December 1, 1943. The main issue of the conference was the question of opening a second front. Despite Churchill's attempts to put forward his "Balkan" option for discussion, the Anglo-American side was forced to set a deadline for the start of the Overlord plan - May 1944 (in fact, the landing began on June 6). At the conference, the Allies put forward projects for the dismemberment of Germany. At the insistence of the USSR, the question of the Anglo-American plans for the dismemberment of Germany was submitted for further study. The conference participants exchanged views on the issue of the borders of Poland, and the Soviet delegation proposed to accept the "Curzon line" as the eastern border, and the "line of the river" as the western border. Oder". Churchill agreed in principle with this proposal, hoping that he would be able to return the émigré "London government" to power in Poland. The conference adopted the "Three Powers Declaration on Iran". Soviet and British troops were brought into Iran in 1941 in order to prevent the Germans from violating the sovereignty of this neutral country. The declaration provided for the withdrawal of allied troops and the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of Iran after the war. The question of war with Japan was also discussed. The USSR agreed to enter the war against Japan. However, no specific agreement has been reached. The first meeting of the Big Three was a success. Despite the presence of sharp disagreements on certain issues, the leaders of the three great powers were able to work out agreed solutions. The results of the Tehran Conference were a great success for Soviet foreign policy.

The help of the allies was of great importance for the USSR at the final stage of the war. It was a well-thought-out foreign policy strategy of Western countries from beginning to end, or, in the words of Western historians, "an act of calculated self-interest." Until 1943, inclusive, the assistance to the USSR was provided by the Americans in such a way as to prevent it from gaining a decisive advantage over Germany. The overall Lend-Lease supply plan was estimated at $11.3 billion. Although the total volume of industrial supplies amounted to 4% of the gross industrial production in the USSR during the war years, the volume of deliveries for individual types of weapons was significant. So, cars - about 70%. 14,450 aircraft were delivered (since 1942, the USSR produced 40,000 aircraft annually), 7,000 tanks (with 30,000 tanks produced annually), machine guns - 1.7% (of the production level of the USSR), shells - 0.6 %, pistols - 0.8%, mines - 0.1%. After the death of F. Roosevelt, the new US President G. Truman on May 11, 1945 issued a directive to stop supplies to the USSR for military operations in Europe, and in August an order to stop all supplies to the USSR from the moment the act of surrender of Japan was signed. The refusal of unconditional assistance to the USSR testified to a fundamental change in the position of the United States, while it should be noted that the USSR, returning debts under Lend-Lease, was obliged to pay 1.3 billion dollars (for 10 billion loans), while England paid only 472 million dollars for a loan of 30 billion dollars.

From February 4 to February 11, 1945, the Crimean Conference of the leaders of the three great powers was held in Yalta. At the conference, its participants solemnly proclaimed that the goal of the occupation and allied control of Germany was "the destruction of German militarism and Nazism and the creation of a guarantee that Germany will never again be in a position to disturb the peace." The agreements "On the zones of occupation of Germany and on the management of greater Berlin" and "On the control mechanism in Germany" were adopted. At the insistence of the USSR, the three occupation zones - Soviet, American and British - were joined by an occupation zone for French troops. Also, at the insistence of the Soviet side, the issue of German reparations was considered. Their total amount was about 20 billion dollars, of which the USSR claimed half. Roosevelt supported the Soviet position on this issue. The Polish question was acute at the conference. England and the USA linked their hopes of influencing Poland with the return of the exile government there. Stalin did not want this. Post-war relations with the USSR depended on the composition of the government in Poland. In response to W. Churchill's remark that Poland is "a matter of honor" for England, Stalin remarked that "for Russia this is a matter of both honor and security." The USSR managed to achieve the legal termination of the Polish government in exile. The conference determined the conditions for the USSR to enter the war against Japan two or three months after the end of the war in Europe. It was decided to convene a United Nations conference on 25 April 1945 in San Francisco to adopt the text of the UN Charter. The Crimean Conference adopted the "Declaration on a Liberated Europe" and the final document "Unity in the organization of peace, as well as in the conduct of war." Both documents outlined specific joint actions to destroy fascism and reorganize Europe on a democratic basis.

The Potsdam Conference (July 17 - August 2, 1945) summed up the joint actions of the USSR, the USA and England in World War II. The USSR delegation was headed by I.V. Stalin, USA - President G. Truman, Great Britain - first W. Churchill, and from July 29 the new Prime Minister C. Attlee. The main issue of the conference is the question of the future of Germany. In relation to it, the so-called "plan of 3 D" was adopted; demilitarization, denazification (liquidation of the Nazi party) and democratization of Germany. The issue of German reparations was settled. At the conference, the allies confirmed their consent to the transfer of the city of Konigsberg to the USSR with the surrounding areas and came to an agreement on the western border of Poland. The Soviet delegation confirmed in Potsdam the agreement concluded at Yalta on the entry of the USSR into the war against Japan within the agreed timeframe. The Council of Foreign Ministers (CMFA) was also established, to which the Allies entrusted the preparation of a peace settlement, primarily the drafting of peace treaties with Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. The Confederation confirmed the intention of the Allied Powers to bring Nazi criminals to justice.

Despite the agreed decisions, the Potsdam Conference showed that the maritime powers have their own program of action in Germany, different from both the Soviet proposals and the obligations they assumed. During the days of the conference, the first experimental explosion of the atomic bomb was carried out in the United States, which the Americans soon used in Japan, barbarously destroying hundreds of thousands of people in the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki without any military necessity. This was an attempt at threatening political influence on the USSR, heralding the approach of the Cold War era.

The history of homeland. Edited by M.V. Zotova. - 2nd ed., corrected. and additional
M.: Publishing House of MGUP, 2001. 208 p. 1000 copies