And why did you end up losing?
Evert Gottfried (lieutenant, Wehrmacht infantry): Because a flea can bite an elephant, but not kill it.
Anyone attempting to study air warfare in WWII faces a number of obvious contradictions. On the one hand, the absolutely incredible personal accounts of the German aces, on the other hand, the obvious result in the form of the complete defeat of Germany. On the one hand, the well-known bitterness of the war on the Soviet-German front, on the other hand, the Luftwaffe suffered the heaviest losses in the West. Other examples can be found.
To resolve these contradictions, historians and publicists are trying to build various kinds of theories. The theory should be such as to link all the facts into a single whole. For most, this is pretty bad. To link facts, historians need to invent fantastic, improbable arguments. For example, the fact that the Red Army Air Force crushed the enemy by numbers - hence the large numbers of aces. The heavy losses of the Germans in the West are allegedly explained by the fact that the air war on the Eastern Front was too easy: Soviet pilots were primitive and frivolous opponents. And most of the inhabitants believe in these fantasies. Although you don't have to dig through the archives to understand how absurd these theories are. It is enough to have some life experience. If the shortcomings that are attributed to the Red Army Air Force were in reality, then no victory over Nazi Germany would have happened. There are no miracles. Victory is the result of hard and, most importantly, successful work.
The beginning of the war in the East and the personal accounts of the German aces
The pre-war theory of air combat was based on the requirement to achieve a decisive victory in air combat. Each battle was required to end with a victory - the destruction of an enemy aircraft. This seemed to be the main way to gain air supremacy. By shooting down enemy aircraft, it was possible to inflict maximum damage on him, reducing the number of his fleet to a minimum. This theory was described in the writings of many pre-war tacticians both in the USSR and in Germany.
It is impossible to say with certainty, but, apparently, it was in accordance with this theory that the Germans built the tactics of using their fighters. Pre-war views required maximum concentration precisely on victory in air combat. The orientation towards the destruction of the maximum number of enemy aircraft is clearly visible by the criteria that were taken as the main ones, in assessing the effectiveness of hostilities - the personal account of downed enemy aircraft.
The accounts of the German aces themselves are often questioned. It seems incredible that the Germans managed to achieve such a number of victories. Why such a huge gap in the number of victories compared to the allies? Yes, in the initial period of World War II, German pilots were better trained than their American, British or Soviet counterparts. But not many times! Therefore, there is a great temptation to accuse the German pilots of banal falsification of their accounts for the sake of propaganda and their own pride.
However, the author of this article considers the accounts of the German aces to be quite truthful. Truthful - as far as it is generally possible in a military mess. Enemy losses are almost always exaggerated, but this is an objective process: it is difficult to determine exactly in a combat situation whether you shot down an enemy plane or just damaged it. Therefore, if the accounts of the German aces are overstated, then not by 5-10 times, but by 2-2.5 times, no more. It doesn't change the essence. Whether Hartman shot down 352 aircraft, or only 200, he was still too far ahead of the pilots of the anti-Hitler coalition in this matter. Why? Was he some sort of mystical cyborg killer? As will be shown below, he, like all German aces, was not much stronger than his colleagues from the USSR, USA or Great Britain.
Indirectly, the rather high accuracy of the accounts of aces is confirmed by statistics. So, for example, 93 best aces shot down 2,331 Il-2 aircraft. The Soviet command considered 2,557 Il-2 aircraft to have died from fighter attacks. Plus, some of the "unspecified cause" number was probably shot down by German fighters. Or another example - one hundred of the best aces shot down 12,146 aircraft on the eastern front. And the Soviet command considers 12,189 aircraft shot down in the air, plus, as in the case of the Il-2, some of the “unidentified” ones. The figures, as we see, are comparable, although it is obvious that the aces still overestimated their victories.
If we take the victories of all German pilots on the Eastern Front, it turns out that there are more of these victories than the Red Army Air Force lost aircraft. So, of course, there is an overestimation. But the problem is that most researchers pay too much attention to this issue. The essence of the contradictions lies not at all in the accounts of aces and the number of downed aircraft. And it will be shown below.
the day before
Germany attacked the USSR, having a significant qualitative superiority in aviation. First of all, this concerns pilots who had rich combat experience of the war in Europe. Behind German pilots and commanders are full-scale campaigns with the massive use of aviation: France, Poland, Scandinavia, the Balkans. The assets of Soviet pilots are only local conflicts limited in scope and scale - the Soviet-Finnish war and ... and, perhaps, that's all. The remaining pre-war conflicts are too small in scope and mass use of troops to be compared with the war in Europe in 1939-1941.
The military equipment of the Germans was excellent: the most massive Soviet I-16 and I-153 fighters were inferior to the German Bf-109 model E in most characteristics, and the F model absolutely. The author does not consider it correct to compare equipment according to tabular data, but in this particular case there is not even a need to get into the details of air battles in order to understand how far the I-153 is from the Bf-109F.
The USSR approached the beginning of the war in the stage of rearmament and transition to new equipment. The samples that have just begun to arrive have not yet had time to master them to perfection. The role of rearmament is traditionally underestimated in our country. It is believed that if the aircraft left the gates of the plant, it already counts against the total number of aircraft in the Air Force. Although he still needs to arrive at the unit, the flight and ground crew must master it, and the commanders must delve into the details of the combat qualities of the new technology. For all this, a few Soviet pilots had several months. The Red Army Air Forces were distributed over a vast territory from the border to Moscow and could not repel strikes in a coordinated and concentrated manner in the first days of the war.
The table shows that 732 pilots could actually fight on the "new" types of aircraft. But according to the Yak-1 and LaGG-3, there were not enough aircraft for them. So the total number of combat-ready units is 657. And finally, you need to carefully think about the term "retrained pilots." Retrained - this does not mean that they have mastered the new technique to perfection and caught up in the ability to conduct air combat with German opponents. Think for yourself: aircraft of the Yak-1 and LaGG-3 types began to receive troops in 1941, i.e. in the months remaining before the war, the pilots simply physically could not have time to gain sufficient and full-fledged experience in combat on a new aircraft. It is simply unrealistic for 3-4 months. This requires at least a year or two of continuous training. With the MiG-3, the situation is slightly better, but not at times. Only aircraft that entered the troops in 1940 could be more or less mastered by the crews. But in 1940, only 100 MiG-1 and 30 MiG-3 were received from industry. Moreover, it was received in the fall, and in winter, spring and autumn in those years there were known difficulties with full-fledged combat training. There were no concrete runways in the border districts; they had just begun to be built in the spring of 1941. Therefore, one should not overestimate the quality of pilot training on new aircraft in the autumn and winter of 1940-1941. After all, a fighter pilot must not only be able to fly - he must be able to squeeze everything out of his car to the limit and a little more. The Germans were good at it. And ours have just received new aircraft, there can be no question of any equality. On the other hand, those of our pilots who have long and firmly "grown" into the cockpits of their aircraft are the pilots of the obsolete I-153 and I-16. It turns out that where there is pilot experience, there is no modern technology, and where there is modern technology, there is still no experience.
Blitzkrieg in the air
The first battles brought heavy disappointment to the Soviet command. It turned out that it is extremely difficult to destroy enemy aircraft in the air using existing military equipment. The high experience and skill of the German pilots, plus the perfection of technology left little chance. At the same time, it became obvious that the fate of the war was being decided on the ground, by the ground forces.
All this prompted to enter the actions of the Air Force into a single, global plan for the actions of the armed forces as a whole. Aviation could not be a thing in itself, acting in isolation from the situation at the forefront. It was necessary to work precisely in the interests of the ground forces, which decided the fate of the war. In this regard, the role of attack aircraft increased sharply, and the Il-2, in fact, became the main strike force of the Air Force. Now all aviation actions were aimed at helping their infantry. The nature of the outbreak of war quickly took the form of a struggle precisely above the front line and in the near rear of the parties.
The fighters were also reoriented to solve two main tasks. The first is the protection of their attack aircraft. The second is the protection of the orders of their ground forces from retaliatory strikes by enemy aircraft. Under these conditions, the value and meaning of the concepts of "personal victory" and "shooting down" began to fall sharply. The criterion for the effectiveness of fighters was the percentage of losses of protected attack aircraft from enemy fighters. Whether you shoot down a German fighter at the same time, or simply by shooting at the course, you will force him to evade the attack and go to the side, it doesn’t matter. The main thing is to prevent the Germans from aiming at their Il-2s.
Golodnikov Nikolai Gerasimovich (fighter pilot): “We had such a rule that “it’s better not to shoot down anyone and not lose a single bomber than to shoot down three and lose one bomber.”
With enemy attack aircraft, the situation is similar - the main thing is not to let bombs be dropped on your infantrymen. To do this, it is not necessary to shoot down the bomber - you can make him get rid of the bombs before approaching the targets.
From NPO Order No. 0489 dated June 17, 1942 on the actions of fighters to destroy enemy bombers:
“Enemy fighters, covering their bombers, naturally seek to pin down our fighters, prevent them from reaching the bombers, and our fighters fall for this trick of the enemy, get involved in an air duel with enemy fighters and thereby enable enemy bombers to drop bombs on our troops with impunity or to other targets.
Neither pilots, nor regimental commanders, nor division commanders, nor air force commanders of the fronts and air armies understand this and do not understand that the main and main task of our fighters is to destroy enemy bombers in the first place, to prevent them from dropping their own bomb load on our troops, on our protected objects.
These changes in the nature of the combat work of Soviet aviation caused post-war accusations from the losing Germans. Describing a typical Soviet fighter pilot, the Germans wrote about the lack of initiative, passion, and desire to win.
Walter Schwabedissen (General of the Luftwaffe): “We must not forget that the Russian mentality, upbringing, specific character traits and education did not contribute to the development of individual wrestling qualities in a Soviet pilot, which are essential in air combat. The primitive and often stupid adherence to the concept of group combat made him lack initiative in an individual duel and, as a result, less aggressive and persistent than his German opponents.
From this arrogant quote, in which a German officer who lost the war describes the Soviet pilots of the period 1942-1943, it is clearly seen that the halo of the superman does not allow him to descend from the heights of fabulous "individual duels" to the mundane, but very necessary scuffle in the war. We again see a contradiction - how did the stupid collective Russian principle prevail over the individually unsurpassed German knightly principle? The answer here is simple: the Red Army Air Force used tactics that were absolutely correct in that war.
Klimenko Vitaliy Ivanovich (fighter pilot): “If an air battle ensued, then by agreement we had one pair leave the battle and climb up, from where they watched what was happening. As soon as they saw that a German was coming at ours, they immediately fell on top of them. You don’t even have to hit there, just show the track in front of his nose, and he is already out of the attack. If you can shoot down, they shot down, but the main thing is to knock him out of position for the attack.
Apparently, the Germans did not understand that such behavior of Soviet pilots was completely conscious. They did not seek to shoot down, they sought to prevent their own from being shot down. Therefore, having driven the German interceptors away from the IL-2 under their patronage for a certain distance, they left the battle and returned. IL-2s could not be left alone for a long time, because they could be attacked by other groups of enemy fighters from other directions. And for every lost IL-2 upon arrival, they will be asked harshly. For throwing stormtroopers over the front line without cover, one could easily go to the penal battalion. But for an unbeaten messer - no. The main part of the sorties of Soviet fighters fell precisely on the escort of attack aircraft and bombers.
At the same time, nothing changed in the tactics of the Germans. Aces accounts continued to grow. Somewhere they continued to shoot down someone. But who? The famous Hartman shot down 352 aircraft. But only 15 of them are IL-2. Another 10 are bombers. 25 strike aircraft, or 7% of the total number shot down. Obviously, Mr. Hartman really wanted to live, and really did not want to go to the defensive firing installations of bombers and attack aircraft. It's better to spin around with fighters, which may never get into position for an attack during the entire battle, while an IL-2 attack is a guaranteed fan of bullets in the face.
The majority of German experts have a similar picture. Among their victories - no more than 20% of strike aircraft. Only Otto Kittel stands out against this background - he shot down 94 Il-2s, which brought more benefits to his ground troops than, for example, Hartman, Novotny and Barkhorn combined. The truth and fate of Kittel developed accordingly - he died in February 1945. During the Il-2 attack, he was killed in the cockpit of his plane by a gunner of a Soviet attack aircraft.
But the Soviet aces were not afraid to attack the Junkers. Kozhedub shot down 24 strike aircraft - almost as many as Hartman. On average, in the total number of victories among the first ten Soviet aces, strike aircraft account for 38%. Twice as many as the Germans. What did Hartman do in reality, having shot down so many fighters? Reflected their attacks by Soviet fighters on their dive bombers? Doubtful. Apparently, he shot down the guards of attack aircraft, instead of breaking through this guard to the main goal - attack aircraft killing Wehrmacht infantrymen.
Klimenko Vitaliy Ivanovich (fighter pilot): “From the first attack, you need to shoot down the leader - everyone is guided by him, and bombs are often “on him” thrown. And if you want to personally shoot down, then you need to catch the pilots who fly last. They don’t understand a damn thing, there are usually young people there. If he fought back - yeah, this is mine.
The Germans carried out the protection of their bombers in a completely different way than the Soviet Air Force. Their actions were of a preemptive nature - clearing the sky along the path of the strike groups. They did not carry out direct escort, trying not to constrain their maneuver by attachment to slow bombers. The success of such tactics of the Germans depended on the skillful opposition of the Soviet command. If it singled out several groups of interceptor fighters, then the German strike aircraft were intercepted with a high degree of probability. While one group pinned down the German sky-clearing fighters, another group attacked the unprotected bombers. This is where the large number of the Soviet Air Force began to affect, even if not with the most advanced technology.
Golodnikov Nikolai Gerasimovich: “The Germans could get involved in battle when it was not necessary at all. For example, when covering their bombers. We used this throughout the war, we had one group in battle with cover fighters, diverting them “on itself”, and the other attacked the bombers. The Germans are glad, a chance to shoot down appeared. “Bombers” are immediately on their side and do not care that our other group, these bombers, hit as far as they have enough strength. ... Formally, the Germans covered their attack aircraft very strongly, but as soon as they get involved in the battle, and that’s all - side cover, they were quite easily distracted, and throughout the war.
Destruction failed
So, having managed to rebuild tactics and receive new equipment, the Red Army Air Force began to achieve its first successes. The fighters of the "new types" received in a sufficiently large number were no longer inferior to the German aircraft as catastrophically as the I-16 and I-153. On this technique it was already possible to fight. The process of introducing new pilots into battle was established. If in 1941 and early 1942 they were really “green” aviators who had barely mastered takeoff and landing, then already at the beginning of 43 they began to be given the opportunity to carefully and gradually delve into the intricacies of the air war. Beginners were no longer thrown into hell right away. Having mastered the basics of piloting at the school, the pilots ended up in ZAPs, where they underwent combat use, and only then went to combat regiments. And in the regiments, they also stopped thoughtlessly throwing them into battle, allowing them to delve into the situation and gain experience. After Stalingrad, this practice became the norm.
Klimenko Vitaly Ivanovich (fighter pilot): “Let's say a young pilot comes. Finished school. They give him a little flight around the airfield, then - flying around the area, then in the end he can be taken in pairs. Don't let him fight right away. Gradually ... Gradually ... Because I don’t need to carry a target behind the tail. ”
The Red Army Air Force managed to achieve the main goal - to prevent the enemy from gaining air supremacy. Of course, the Germans were still able to achieve dominance at a certain time, over a certain sector of the front. This was done by concentrating efforts and clearing the sky. But, in general, they failed to completely paralyze Soviet aviation. Moreover, the volume of combat work increased. The industry was able to mass-produce, if not the best aircraft in the world, but in large quantities. And inferior in terms of performance characteristics to German very slightly. The first calls for the Luftwaffe sounded - continuing to shoot down as many aircraft as possible and winding up the counters of personal victories, the Germans gradually led themselves to the abyss. They no longer succeeded in destroying more aircraft than the Soviet aviation industry produced. The growth in the number of victories did not lead to real, tangible results in practice - the Soviet Air Force did not stop combat work, and even increased its intensity.
The year 1942 is characterized by a surge in the number of sorties by the Luftwaffe. If in 1941 they made 37,760 sorties, then already in 1942 - 520,082 sorties. It looks like a commotion in the calm and measured mechanism of blitzkrieg, like an attempt to put out a blazing fire. All this combat work fell on the very small German aviation forces - at the beginning of 1942, the Luftwaffe had 5,178 aircraft of all types on all fronts. For comparison, at the same time, the Red Army Air Force already had more than 7,000 Il-2 attack aircraft and more than 15,000 fighters. The volumes are simply incomparable. In 1942, the Red Army Air Force made 852,000 sorties - a clear confirmation that the Germans had no dominance. The survivability of the Il-2 increased from 13 sorties per 1 dead aircraft to 26 sorties.
During the entire war, from the actions of the Luftwaffe IA, the Soviet command reliably confirms the death of approximately 2550 Il-2s. But there is also a column "unidentified causes of loss." If we make a big concession to the German aces and assume that all the “unidentified” aircraft were shot down exclusively by them (but in reality this could not be), then it turns out that in 1942 they intercepted only about 3% of Il-2 combat sorties. And, despite the continued growth of personal accounts, this figure continues to fall rapidly, to 1.2% in 1943 and 0.5% in 1944. What does this mean in practice? That in 1942, IL-2s flew 41,753 times to their targets. And 41,753 times something fell on the heads of German infantrymen. Bombs, NURSs, shells. This, of course, is a rough estimate, since IL-2s were also killed by anti-aircraft artillery, and in reality, not every one of the 41,753 sorties ended with bombs hitting the target. Another thing is important - the German fighters could not prevent this in any way. They hit someone. But on the scale of the huge front, on which thousands of Soviet Il-2s worked, it was a drop in the ocean. There were too few German fighters for the Eastern Front. Even making 5-6 sorties a day, they could not destroy the Soviet Air Force. And nothing, they are doing well, their bills are growing, crosses are awarded with all sorts of leaves and diamonds - everything is fine, life is beautiful. And so it was until May 9, 1945.
Golodnikov Nikolai Gerasimovich: “We cover the attack aircraft. German fighters appear, spin around, but do not attack, they believe that there are few of them. "Ils" are working on the front line - the Germans do not attack, concentrate, pull fighters from other sectors. The “silts” depart from the target, and this is where the attack begins. Well, what is the meaning of this attack? “Ilys” have already “worked out”. Only for personal account. And that was often the case. Yes, it was even more interesting. The Germans could “scroll” around us like this and not attack at all. They are not fools, intelligence worked for them. "Red-nosed" "cobras" - 2nd GIAP of the Navy KSF. Well, they, completely headless, mess with the elite guards regiment? These can knock down. Better to wait for someone "easier".
To be continued…
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MILITARY AVIATION IN FIGURES
Updated - 11/22/2013
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Reformatted the topic into a group of sections for each of the main participating countries and cleaned up duplicates, similar information and information that caused frank doubts.
Air Force of Tsarist Russia:
- during the years of WW1, 120-150 captured German and Austrian aircraft were captured. Most - double reconnaissance, fighters and twin-engine aircraft were rare (Note 28 *)
- at the end of 1917, the Russian army had 91 squadrons of 1109 aircraft, of which:
available at the fronts - 579 (428 serviceable, 137 faulty, 14 obsolete), 237 loaded for the front and 293 in schools. This number did not include up to 35 aircraft of the Squadron of Airships, 150 aircraft of naval aviation, aircraft of rear forces, 400 aircraft of air fleets and in reserve. The total number of aircraft was estimated at 2200-2500 military aircraft (Note 28 *)
USSR Air Force:
- in 1937 there were 18 aviation schools in the Red Army, in 1939 - 32, on 05/01/1941 - already 100
(Note 32*)
- order No. 080 dated 03.1941: the training period for flight personnel is 9 months in peacetime and 6 months in wartime, flying hours for cadets on training and combat aircraft is 20 hours for fighters and 24 hours for bombers (a Japanese suicide bomber in 1944 was supposed to have 30 flight hours) (Note 12*)
- in 1939, the Red Army had 8139 combat aircraft, of which 2225 were fighters (Note 41 *)
- 09/01/1939 the USSR had 12677 combat aircraft at the beginning of WW2 (Note 31 *)
- for the summer of 1940, there were 38 air divisions in the Red Army, and by 01/01/1941 they should have become and became 50
(Note 9*)
- only in the period from 01/01/1939 to 06/22/1941, the Red Army received 17745 combat aircraft, of which 3719 were new types, not inferior in basic parameters to the best Luftwaffe vehicles (Note 43 *). According to other sources, at the beginning of the war there were 2739 aircraft of the latest types Yak-1, MIG-3, LAGG-3, PE-2, of which half were in the western military districts (Note 11 *)
- on 01/01/1940, there were 12,540 combat aircraft in the western military districts, excluding long-range bomber aircraft. By the end of 1940, these figures had almost doubled to 24,000 combat aircraft. The number of only training aircraft was increased to 6800 (Note 12 *)
- on 01/01/1941, the Red Army Air Force had 26,392 aircraft, of which 14,628 combat and 11,438 training aircraft. Moreover, 10565 (8392 combat) were built in 1940 (Note 32 *)
- at the beginning of the Second World War, 79 air divisions and 5 air brigades were formed, of which 32 air divisions, 119 air regiments and 36 corps squadrons were part of the Western Military District. Long-range bomber aviation in the western direction was represented by 4 air corps and 1 separate air division in the amount of 1546 aircraft. The number of air regiments by June 1941 increased by 80% compared to the beginning of 1939 (Note 11 *)
- The Second World War was met by 5 heavy bomber corps, 3 separate air divisions and one separate regiment of Soviet long-range bomber aviation - about 1000 aircraft, of which 2\\3 were lost during the six months of the war. By the summer of 1943, long-range bomber aviation consisted of 8 air corps and numbered more than 1000 aircraft and crews. (Note 2*)
- 1528 DB-3 long-range bombers were built in 1941 (Note 44 *)
- 818 TB-3 heavy bombers were produced at the beginning of the Second World War (Note 41 *)
- by the beginning of the war, there were 2739 aircraft of the latest types Yak-1, MIG-3, LAGG-3, PE-2, of which half were in the western military districts (Note 11 *). On 06/22/41, the Air Force received 917 MiG-3s (486 pilots retrained), 142 Yak-1s (156 pilots retrained), 29 Laggs (90 pilots retrained) (Note 4*)
- in the units of the Air Force of the Red Army of the border military districts at the beginning of the war there were 7139 combat aircraft, 1339 long-range bomber aircraft, 1445 - in the aviation of the Navy, which totaled 9917 aircraft
- on the eve of the war, only in the European part of the USSR there were 20 thousand aircraft, of which 17 thousand combat aircraft (Note 12 *)
- by the spring of 1942, the USSR reached the pre-war level of aircraft production - at least 1000 combat aircraft per month. From June 1941 to December 1944, the USSR produced 97 thousand aircraft
- from the second half of 1942, the Soviet industry reached the production line of 2500 aircraft per month with a total monthly loss of 1000 aircraft (Note 9 *)
- on 06/22/1942, 85% of all Soviet long-range bomber aviation was 1789 DB-3 aircraft (from the DB-3f modification it was called IL-4), the remaining 15% - SB-3. These aircraft did not fall under the first German air strikes, as they were based relatively far from the border (Note 3 *)
- over the years of production (1936-40) 6831 Soviet SB bombers were built (Note 41 *)
- 10292 I-16 biplanes and its modifications were produced from 1934 to 1942
- on 06/22/1941, 412 Yak-1s were produced (Note 39)
- 16 thousand Yak-9s were produced during the war
- IL-2 was the most massive attack aircraft of the Second World War. From 1941 to 1945, 36 thousand of them were produced. (Note 41 * and 37 *) Losses of attack aircraft during the war years amounted to about 23 thousand.
- during the years of the Second World War, 11 thousand Soviet attack pilots died (Note 25 *)
- in 1944, in parts for each Soviet attack pilot, there were two aircraft (Note 17 *)
- the life of an attack aircraft lasted an average of 10-15 sorties, and 25% of the pilots went down on the first flight, while at least 10 sorties were required to destroy one German tank (Note 9 *)
- the USSR received 18.7 thousand aircraft from the USA under Lend-Lease (Note 34 *), of which: 2243 P-40 "Curtiss", 2771 A-20 "Douglas Boston", 842 B-25 "Mitchell" bombers " from the USA, and 1338 "Supermarine Spitfire" and 2932 "Hurricane" - (Note 26 *) from England.
- by the beginning of 1944, the USSR had 11,000 combat aircraft, the Germans - no more than 2,000. During the 4 years of the war, the USSR built 137,271 aircraft and received 18,865 aircraft of all types, of which 638 aircraft were lost during transportation. According to other sources, at the beginning of 1944 there were 6 times more Soviet combat aircraft than all German aircraft (Note 8 *)
- on the "heavenly slug" - U-2vs fought during the Second World War about 50 air regiments (Note 33 *)
- from the monograph "1941 - lessons and conclusions": "... out of 250 thousand sorties carried out
Soviet aviation in the first three months of the war, against the enemy’s tank and motorized columns ... "The record month for the Luftwaffe was June 1942, when (according to the Soviet VNOS posts) 83,949 sorties of combat aircraft of all types were carried out. In other words," defeated and destroyed on the ground "Soviet aviation flew in the summer of 1941 with an intensity that the Germans were able to achieve in only one month during the entire war (Note 13 *)
- The average survivability of Soviet pilots during World War II:
fighter pilot - 64 sorties
attack aircraft pilot - 11 sorties
bomber pilot - 48 sorties
torpedo bomber pilot - 3.8 sorties (Note 45 *)
- the accident rate in the Red Army Air Force on the eve of the Second World War was huge - on average, 2-3 aircraft crashed per day. This situation was largely preserved during the war. It is no coincidence that during the war, non-combat losses of aircraft were over 50% (Note 9 *)
- "unaccounted for loss" - 5240 Soviet aircraft remaining at the airfields after they were captured by the Germans in 1941
- the average monthly losses of the Red Army Air Force from 1942 to May 1945 amounted to 1000 aircraft, of which non-combat ones - over 50%, and in 1941 combat losses amounted to 1700 aircraft, and total - 3500 per month (Note 9 *)
- non-combat losses of Soviet military aviation in the Second World War amounted to 60,300 aircraft (56.7%) (Note 32 *)
- in 1944, the losses of Soviet military aviation amounted to 24,800 vehicles, of which 9,700 were combat losses, and 15,100 were non-combat losses (Note 18 *)
- from 19 to 22 thousand Soviet fighters were lost in the Second World War (Note 23 *)
- in accordance with the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 632-230ss of 03/22/1946 "On the rearmament of the Air Force, air defense fighter aircraft and naval aviation with modern domestic-made aircraft": "... withdraw from service in 1946 and write off: foreign fighter aircraft types, including Airacobra - 2216 aircraft, Thunderbolt - 186 aircraft, Kingcobra - 2344 aircraft, Kittyhawk - 1986 aircraft, Spitfire - 1139 aircraft, Hurricane - 421 aircraft.Total: 7392 aircraft and 11937 obsolete domestic aircraft (Note 1 *)
German Air Force:
- during the German offensive of 1917, up to 500 Russian aircraft became German trophies (Note 28 *)
- according to the Treaty of Versailles, Germany had to scrap 14 thousand of its aircraft after the end of WW1 (Note 32 *)
- serial production of the first combat aircraft in Nazi Germany began only in 1935-1936 (Note 13 *). So in 1934, the German government adopted a plan to build 4,000 aircraft by 09/30/1935. Among them there was nothing but junk (Note 52 *)
- 03/01/1935 - official recognition of the Luftwaffe. There were 2 regiments of Ju-52 and Do-23 (Note 52 *)
- 771 German fighters were produced in 1939 (Note 50 *)
- in 1939, Germany produced 23 combat aircraft daily, in 1940 - 27, and in 1941 - 30 aircraft (Note 32 *) By the spring of 1942, Germany was producing up to 160 aircraft per month
- 09/01/1939 Germany began WW2 with 4093 aircraft (of which 1502 bombers) (Note 31 *)
- on the eve of the Second World War, Germany had 6852 aircraft, of which 3909 aircraft of all types were allocated to attack the USSR. This number included 313 transport workers and 326 communications aircraft. Of the remaining 3270 combat aircraft: 965 fighters (almost equally - Bf-109e and BF-109f), 102 fighter-bombers (Bf-110), 952 bombers, 456 attack aircraft and 786 reconnaissance aircraft (Note 32 *). According to other sources, on June 22, 1941, the Germans concentrated against the USSR; 1037 (including 400 combat-ready) Bf-109 fighters; 179 Bf-110 as reconnaissance and light bombers, 893 bombers (281 He-111, 510 Ju-88, 102 Do-17), attack aircraft - 340 Ju-87, reconnaissance aircraft - 120. Total - 2534 (of which about 2000 combat-ready ). As well as 1000 aircraft of the German allies
- after the transfer in December 1941 of 250-300 aircraft of the 2nd Air Corps from the USSR for operations in the region of Malta and North Africa, the total number of Luftwaffe on the Soviet front was reduced from 2465 aircraft on 12/01/1941 to 1700 aircraft on 12/31/1941. In January 1942, the number of German aircraft was further reduced after the transfer of aircraft of the 5th Air Corps to Belgium (Note 29 *)
- in 1942, Germany produced 8.4 thousand combat aircraft. According to other sources, the Germans produced only up to 160 aircraft per month.
- in 1943, the average monthly Germany produced 849 fighters (Note 49 *)
- 84320 aircraft of all types were produced in Germany in 1941-45. (Note 24 *) - in total, 57 thousand German aircraft of all types were destroyed during the years of WW2
- 1190 seaplanes were produced by the German aviation industry during WW2 (Note 38): 541 of them Arado 196a
- 2500 Storch liaison aircraft were built in total. According to other sources, 2871 Fi-156 "Storch" ("Aist") was produced, and in the summer of 1941 the Germans seized a factory for the production of its Soviet counterfeit copy OKA-38 "Aist" (Note 37 *)
- the German bomber Ju-88 was released with a total of 15100 aircraft (Note 38 *)
- 1433 jet Me-262s were produced in Germany during WW2 (Note 21 *)
- a total of 5709 Ju-87 "Stuka" (Note 40*) and 14676 Ju-88 (Note 40* and 37*) were produced
- for 1939-45, 20087 FW-190 fighters were produced, while production reached its peak at the beginning of 1944, when 22 aircraft of this type were produced daily (Note 37 * and 38 *)
- during the years of WW2, 35 thousand German Bf-109 fighters were produced (Note 14 * and 37 *)
- having released 3225 transport Ju-52s ("aunt Yu") since 1939, the German aircraft industry was forced to stop its production in 1944 (Note 40 *)
- during the war years, 846 "frames" - FВ-189 fire spotters were produced at Czech aviation enterprises for the Luftwaffe. In the USSR, this type of aircraft was not produced at all.
- a total of 780 scouts - spotters Hs-126 ("Crutch") were released (Note 32 *)
- German unsuccessful aircraft adopted by the Wehrmacht: 871 Hs-129 attack aircraft (released in 1940), 6500 Bf-110 (6170 - Note 37 *), 1500 Me-210 and Me-410 (Note 15 *). The Germans retrained the failed Ju-86 fighter into a strategic reconnaissance aircraft (Note 32 *). Do-217 did not become a successful night fighter (364 were produced, 200 of them - in 1943) (Note 46 *). Produced in quantities of more than 1000 units (according to other sources, only 200 aircraft were produced, another 370 were at various stages of readiness, and parts and components were produced for another 800 aircraft - Note 38 *) the German He-177 heavy bomber due to numerous accidents often simply burned up in the air (Note 41 *). The Ne-129 attack aircraft turned out to be extremely unsuccessful due to heavy control, weak engine armor, weak stern weapons (Note 47 *)
- in 1945, the share of fighters from all military aviation produced in Germany was 65.5%, in 1944 - 62.3% (Note 41 *)
- during the years of WW2, the Germans launched 198 not entirely successful, heavy six-engine military transport aircraft Me-323 from converted Gigant gliders, which at one time were intended for landing (could carry 200 paratroopers or a certain number of tanks and 88mm anti-aircraft guns) to the territory England (Notes 41* and 38*)
- in 1941, the loss of transport Ju-52s for the first time exceeded their production - more than 500 aircraft were lost, and only 471 were produced (Note 40 *)
- 273 Ju-87s acted against the USSR, while Poland was attacked by 348 Ju-87s (Note 38 *)
- for 8 months (08/01/40 - 03/31/41) due to accidents and disasters, the Luftwaffe lost 575
aircraft and 1368 people died (Note 32 *)
- the most active Allied pilots made 250-400 sorties in WW2, while similar figures for German pilots fluctuated between 1000 - 2000 sorties
- by the beginning of WW2, 25% of German pilots had mastered the skill of blind piloting (Note 32 *)
- in 1941, a German fighter pilot, leaving flight school, had more than 400 hours of total
flight hours, of which at least 80 hours - on a combat vehicle. After in the reserve air group, a graduate
added another 200 hours (Note 32*)
- during the Second World War there were 36 German pilots, each of whom shot down more than 150 Soviet aircraft and about 10 Soviet pilots, each of whom shot down 50 or more German aircraft (Note 9 *)
- the ammunition of the Bf-109F fighter is enough for 50 seconds of continuous firing from machine guns and 11 seconds from the MG-151 cannon (Note 13*)
- the V-2 rocket consisted of 45 thousand parts, Germany was able to produce up to 400 rockets of this type every month
- out of 4,300 V-2 rockets, more than 2,000 exploded on the ground or in the air during launch or left
building during the flight. Only 50% of the rockets hit a circle with a diameter of 10 km (Note 27*). In total, 2419 V-missile strikes were recorded on London, and 2448 on Antwerp. Of those fired at targets, 25% of the missiles reached their target. In total, 30 thousand V-1 rockets were manufactured. In 1945, the speed of V-1 rockets reached about 800 km\\h. (Note 9*)
- 06/14/1944 the first V-2 fell on London. Of the 10492 V-2s fired at London, 2419 flew to the target. Another 1115 rockets exploded in southern England (Note 35 *)
- from carrier aircraft Non-111 (N-22) by the end of 1944, 8696, 4141 and 151 V-2s were fired in Antwerp, London and Brussels, respectively (Note 35 *)
USAF:
- after WW1, in November 1918, 1172 "flying boats" were in service in the USA (Note 41 *)
- 09/01/1939, the United States had 1576 combat aircraft at the beginning of WW2 (Note 31 *)
- over the years of WW2, the US aviation industry produced over 13 thousand Warhawks, 20 thousand Wildcats and Hellcats, 15 thousand Thunderbolts and 12 thousand Mustangs (Note 42 *)
- 13 thousand American B-17 bombers were produced in WW2 (Note 41 *)
British Air Force:
- the most massive English bomber 2 MV "Wellington" was produced in the amount of 11,461 aircraft (Note 51 *)
- 09/01/1939 England began WW2 with 1992 combat aircraft (Note 31 *)
- already in August 1940, England produced 2 times more fighters daily than
Germany. Their total number subsequently so much exceeded the number of pilots that
soon allowed to transfer part of the aircraft for conservation or transfer to other countries under lend-lease (Note 31 *)
- from 1937 until the end of WW2, more than 20 thousand British Spitfire fighters were produced (Note 41 *)
Air forces of other countries:
- 09/01/1939 France began WW2 with 3335 aircraft (Note 31 *): 1200 fighters, 1300 bombers, 800 reconnaissance, 110,000 personnel
- in 1942, Japan 3.2 thousand combat aircraft
- in total, the Polish Air Force had 1900 aircraft at the beginning of the war (Note 8 *)
- Romanian Air Force on 06/22/1941: 276 combat aircraft, including 121 fighters, 34 medium and 21 light bombers, 18 seaplanes and 82 reconnaissance aircraft. Another 400 aircraft were in flight schools. It makes no sense to specify the types of aircraft due to moral and physical obsolescence. Romanian 250 (205 combat-ready) aircraft allocated against the USSR were opposed by about 1900 Soviet aircraft. On the eve of the war, the Germans retrained 1500 Romanian aviation specialists and agreed to supply modern Bf-109u and He-110e to Romania. On the eve of the war, 3 squadrons were re-equipped with the new Romanian IAR-80 fighter (Note 7 *)
OTHER:
- in the "battle for England" the Germans lost 1733 aircraft (Note 30 *). According to other sources, the losses amounted to 1,792 aircraft, of which 610 were Bf-109s. The losses of the British amounted to 1172 aircraft: 403 Spitfires, 631 Hurricanes, 115 Blenheims and 23 Defiants (Note 37 *)
- more than 200 US P-36 fighters were manufactured for France before WW2 (Note 41*)
- in September 1944, there is a peak in the number of allied bombers in Europe - more than 6 thousand (Note 36 *)
- 250 million aviation cartridges received under Lend-Lease were remelted (Note 9 *)
- during the years of the Second World War, the Finns (VVS-Air Defense) claim 2787, the Romanians - about 1500, the Hungarians - about 1000, the Italians - 150-200, the Slovaks - 10 downed Soviet aircraft. Another 638 downed Soviet aircraft are on the combat accounts of the Slovak, Croatian and Spanish fighter squadrons. According to other sources, together the German allies shot down no more than 2400 Soviet aircraft (Note 23 *)
- about 3240 German fighters were destroyed on the Soviet-German front, of which 40 were accounted for by the allies of the USSR (Air Force-Air Defense of the Poles, Bulgarians and Romanians since 1944, the French from Normandie-Neman) (Note 23 *)
- on 01/01/1943, 395 German day fighters operated against Soviet 12300 aircraft, on 01/01/1944 - 13400 and 473, respectively (Note 23 *)
- after 1943, from 2\\3 to 3\\4 of all German aviation counteracted the aviation of the anti-Hitler coalition in Western Europe (Note 23 *) Formed at the end of 1943, 14 Soviet air armies put an end to the dominance of German aviation in the skies of the USSR (Note 9 * )
- losses of Soviet aviation in the first days of the war: 1142 (800 were destroyed on the ground), of which: Western District - 738, Kyiv - 301, Baltic - 56, Odessa - 47. Losses of the Luftwaffe in 3 days - 244 (of which 51 in first day of the war) (Note 20*)
- on 06/22/1941, the Germans assigned 3 bombers to attack each Soviet military airfield. The blow was delivered by 2-kilogram fragmentation bombs SD-2. The radius of destruction of the bomb is 12 meters with 50-200 fragments. A direct hit from such a bomb was equivalent to a medium-power anti-aircraft projectile (Note 22*) The Stuka attack aircraft carried 360 SD-2 bombs (Note 19*)
- in 1940, 21447 aircraft engines were produced in the USSR, of which less than 20% was the share of domestic developments. In 1940, the average repair life of Soviet aircraft engines was 100-150 hours, in reality - 50-70 hours, while this figure in France and Germany is 200-400 hours, in the USA - up to 600 hours (Note 16 *)
- at the beginning of the war in the European part of the USSR, the Soviet Air Force had 269 reconnaissance aircraft out of a total of 8000 aircraft against German 219 long-range and 562 short-range reconnaissance aircraft out of a total of 3000 aircraft (Note 10 *)
- the allied air force in the Mediterranean theater after the fall of Tunisia, estimated at 5000 aircraft, was opposed by no more than 1250 "axis" aircraft, of which roughly half were German and half were Italian. Of the German aircraft, only 320 were suitable for action, and among them 130 Messerschmitt fighters of all modifications (Note 8 *)
- Aviation of the Northern Fleet of the USSR in 1944: 456 combat-ready aircraft, of which 80 were flying boats. German aviation in Norway consisted of 205 aircraft in 1944 (Note 6 *)
- the German Air Force in France lost 1401 aircraft, the French lost only fighters - 508 (257 fighter pilots died) (Note 5 *)
The Air Force of the USSR in the pre-war years developed as an independent branch of the Armed Forces, and on the eve of the war was organized into several groups. The main tactical unit was the division. Part of the long-range bomber aviation was consolidated into aviation corps. By June 1941, there were 79 air divisions and 5 air brigades. The number of air regiments grew. In comparison with 1939, by June 1941 their number had increased by 80%. But by the beginning of the war, the deployment of aviation and the restructuring of the aviation rear could not be carried out, the flight personnel were undergoing retraining.
There was a lack of maintenance and repair facilities, new equipment. The development of the airfield network lagged behind the pace of aviation development. The Air Force was armed with combat aircraft of various designs, most of them had low speed and weak weapons. The new aircraft (MIG-3, Yak-1, LaGG-3, PE-2, IL-2 and others) were not inferior to the Nazi German ones in terms of combat capabilities, and surpassed them in a number of indicators. However, their entry into the Air Force began not long before the start of the war, and by June 22, 1941, there were only 2,739 of them.
Aviation personnel were trained in three aviation academies, 78 flight and 18 technical schools and colleges.
On the first day of the war, fascist German aviation launched surprise attacks on Soviet airfields, on which 65% of the aviation of the western border military districts was based. The armed forces lost 1,200 aircraft on the ground and in the air, only one Belarusian military district lost 738 aircraft. Enemy aviation seized air supremacy in a number of sectors of the Soviet-German front. This put the Soviet ground forces and aviation in a difficult position and was one of the reasons for the temporary setbacks of Soviet aviation in the first period of the war. Despite the great difficulties, the Soviet pilots showed great courage, bravery and mass heroism. On the first day of the war, they made 6,000 sorties. The Soviet government took measures aimed at strengthening the air force, restructuring the aviation industry and training aviation personnel. In August 1941, the GKO decided to reorganize the air force. The reorganization ended on the whole by 1943 and represented a more complex system than on the eve and at the beginning of the war.
In the course of hostilities, aviation provided great support to ground formations. This type of troops was the key to victory in hundreds of military operations.
By the beginning of the war, the work of the aviation industry, which had become a major branch of the national economy in the mid-1930s, had been substantially restructured. In 1939, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Soviet government took urgent measures to strengthen the aviation industry in order to transfer it to the production of more advanced aviation military equipment. In 1939 - early 1941, new models of combat aircraft were built, tested, put into service and put into mass production: LaGG-3, MIG-3, Yak-1 fighters, PE-2, PE-8, Il-4 bombers, attack aircraft Il-2. The aviation industry has completely switched to the production of aircraft - monoplanes with retractable landing gear, a streamlined fuselage, a closed canopy, etc. The speed of Soviet fighters reached 600 - 650 km / h, the ceiling was 11 - 12 km, the flight range was 3 - 4 thousand km, the bomb load was 3 - 4 tons. The number of plants in the industry increased by 1.7 times compared to 1937; by 1941, production capacity had increased sharply, exceeding the capacity of German aircraft factories. However, the German aviation industry produced only new aircraft designs, while the Soviet one produced both new and old ones. Serial production of combat vehicles of new designs was launched in the USSR in 1940. In total, in 1940 and the first half of 1941, the aviation industry of the USSR produced 249 Il-2 attack aircraft, 322 LaGG-3 fighters, 399 Yak-1, 111 MiG-1, 1289 MiG-3, 459 Pe-2 dive bombers.
In the first days of the war, the aviation industry was tasked with achieving a significant increase in the production of combat vehicles, especially new types. The aviation industry was transferred to many machine-building and machine-tool plants, as well as enterprises that produced electrical equipment. The construction of new aircraft factories has begun.*
In July 1941, more than 1800 combat aircraft were produced (twice the average monthly output in the first half of 1941), in September - 2329. However, since October 1941, there has been a significant decrease in aircraft production, caused by the relocation of most aircraft factories to the eastern regions of the country. But already from the end of 1941, the industry began to continuously increase the production of new aircraft.
In total, during the war, the aviation industry mastered and put into serial production 25 types of new and modified aircraft (fighters - 10 types, bombers - 8, attack aircraft - 2, transport - 4, training - 1) and 23 types of aircraft engines.
The new aircraft were built according to a simple design from non-deficient materials, which greatly facilitated their mass production in wartime conditions. In terms of simplicity and reliability, Soviet aircraft favorably differed from foreign ones.
Aviation in the Battle of Kursk
By the summer of 1943, the center of gravity of the struggle for air supremacy had shifted to the central sector of the Soviet-German front.
To support their ground forces from the air, the fascist German command created two powerful groupings: one south of Orel, the other north of Kharkov. In total, the enemy aviation forces in the Kursk Bulge area consisted of 2050 aircraft (1200 bombers, 600 fighters, 150 reconnaissance aircraft). In the upcoming battle, the Nazis made a big bet on aviation, they concentrated on the Kursk Bulge 65% of all aircraft on the Soviet-German front, including new types of combat aircraft - the Focke-Wulf-190a fighter, the modified Messer- Schmitt-109", attack aircraft "Henschel-129".
The aviation group of Soviet troops consisted of the 16th Air Army (commander General S.I. Rudenko) of the Central Front, the 2nd (commander General S.A. Krasovsky) of the Voronezh Front and the 17th (commander General V.A. Sudets) Southwestern Front, as well as the main forces of long-range aviation. The Steppe Front included the 5th Air Army (commanded by General S.K. Gorchakov). In total, the Soviet aviation formations operating on the Kursk Bulge, there were 1650 aircraft.
Thus, the overall ratio of forces, 1.3:3, was in favor of Germany. By the beginning of the battle, there was a significant renewal of the aircraft fleet of the Soviet Air Force. The organization of interaction between aviation and ground forces was carefully worked out, for which the headquarters of the air armies allocated their representatives to the ground forces. By the beginning of the battle, the headquarters of the air armies were moving closer to the front (40 - 50 km from the front line. Since October 1942, every second fighter aircraft had transceiver radio stations.
The rear bodies of the air armies, with attached engineer battalions, intensively prepared the airfield network, accumulated stocks of combat and materiel. The population was involved in the construction of airfields.
During the day of July 5, Soviet pilots shot down 260 and destroyed 60 enemy aircraft in air battles. Our losses amounted to 176 aircraft. As a result of the opposition of our fighters and the losses incurred, the activity of enemy aviation decreased in the afternoon on the Central Front, and in the Voronezh Front the enemy was not at all able to overcome the resistance of our fighters.
However, not everything went smoothly. Shortcomings were revealed in the actions of our fighters. They were fond of fighting with enemy fighters and, at times, left bombers unattended. The notification of the approach of an air enemy was not clearly organized. Evaluating all this, the Air Force command, the commanders of the air armies the next day (July 6) changed the forms and methods of operation of our aviation and switched to massive strikes against the advancing enemy troops. At the same time, adjustments were made to the organization of combat operations of the fighters. Patrol zones were moved to enemy territory. Fighters began to direct with the help of radio in the first place at the bombers.
As a result of increased losses, German aviation sharply reduced its activity. If on July 5, 4298 sorties were noted on the Central and Voronezh fronts, then on July 6 - only 2100.
Starting from July 7, Soviet fighters firmly seized the initiative in the air. The activity of German aviation decreased every day. By July 10, the offensive capabilities of the Nazi troops in the Oryol direction had dried up.
During the counteroffensive of our troops in the Battle of Kursk, for the first time in the Great Patriotic War, an air offensive was carried out.** During the counteroffensive near Kursk, Soviet aviation made over 90,000 sorties. In 1700 air battles, 2100 enemy aircraft were destroyed, in addition, 145 aircraft were destroyed and damaged at airfields and 780 aircraft were shot down by anti-aircraft artillery.
Mass heroism and high combat skills were shown by the pilots during the battles. The immortal feat was accomplished on July 6, 1943 by pilot A.K. Gorovets. In one air battle, he shot down 9 enemy aircraft. He was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. On July 8, squadron commander M.Malov, covering the 2nd Tatsinsky tank corps, destroyed several enemy tanks. In the last attack, his plane was hit by anti-aircraft guns, and the courageous pilot sent the burning car into a cluster of enemy tanks. Posthumously, M. Malov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Pilots A. Nechaev, M.S. Tokarev died by the death of Heroes. Here the pilot, junior lieutenant I.N. Kozhedub, later three times Hero of the Soviet Union, received his baptism of fire.
In air battles, the aviation power of fascist Germany was melting away. The conquest of air supremacy was ensured by the continuous quantitative and qualitative growth of the Soviet air force, a more resolute massing of aviation in the main directions, an increase in the military skills of the flight personnel, and new methods of using aviation.
The Great Patriotic War began at dawn on June 22, 1941, when Nazi Germany, violating the Soviet-German treaties of 1939, attacked the Soviet Union. On her side were Romania, Italy, and a few days later Slovakia, Finland, Hungary and Norway.
The war lasted almost four years and became the largest armed clash in the history of mankind. On the front stretching from the Barents to the Black Seas, on both sides in different periods fought from 8 million to 12.8 million people, used from 5.7 thousand to 20 thousand tanks and assault guns, from 84 thousand to 163 thousand guns and mortars , from 6.5 thousand to 18.8 thousand aircraft.
LaGG-3 was one of the new generation fighters adopted by the USSR just before the war. Among its main advantages was the minimal use of scarce materials in the construction of the aircraft: LaGG-3 for the most part consisted of pine and delta wood (plywood impregnated with resin).LaGG-3 - a fighter made of pine and plywood
LaGG-3 was one of the new generation fighters adopted by the USSR just before the war. Among its main advantages was the minimal use of scarce materials in the construction of the aircraft: LaGG-3 for the most part consisted of pine and delta wood (plywood impregnated with resin).
Il-2 - Soviet "flying tank"
The Soviet Il-2 attack aircraft became the most massive combat aircraft in history. He took part in the battles in all theaters of military operations of the Great Patriotic War. The designers called the aircraft they developed a "flying tank", and the German pilots called it Betonflugzeug - "concrete aircraft" for its survivability.
Junkers-87 - a symbol of fascist aggression
"Junkers" from the first day of the war took part in the bombing of the USSR, becoming one of the symbols of the blitzkrieg. Despite its low speed, vulnerability and mediocre aerodynamics, the Yu-87 was one of the most effective weapons of the Luftwaffe due to its ability to drop bombs while diving.
I-16 - the basis of the fighter aviation of the USSR
I-16 is the world's first serial high-speed low-wing aircraft with retractable landing gear. By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the aircraft was outdated, but it was he who formed the basis of the fighter aviation of the USSR. Soviet pilots called it "donkey", Spanish - "mosca" (fly), and German - "rata" (rat).
A video announcing a series of infographic works about military aircraft of the 1940s,
By the beginning of the war, there were significantly more MiG-3 fighters in service than other aircraft. However, the "third" MiG was still insufficiently mastered by combatant pilots, the retraining of most of them was not completed.
In a short time, two regiments were formed on the MiG-3 with a large percentage of testers familiar with them. This partly helped in eliminating the shortcomings of piloting. But still, the MiG-3 lost even to the I-6 fighters, common at the beginning of the war. Surpassing in speed at altitudes of more than 5000 m, at low and medium altitudes, it was inferior to other fighters.
This is both a disadvantage and at the same time an advantage of the "third" MiG. MiG-3 is a high-altitude aircraft, all the best qualities of which were manifested at an altitude of over 4500 meters. It found its use as a high-altitude night fighter in the air defense system, where its large ceiling of up to 12,000 meters and speed at altitudes were decisive. So, the MiG-3 was mainly used until the end of the war, in particular, guarding Moscow.
In the very first battle over the capital, on July 22, 1941, Mark Gallay, pilot of the 2nd separate air defense fighter air squadron of Moscow, shot down an enemy plane on a MiG-3. At the beginning of the war, one of the aces-pilots Alexander Pokryshkin flew on the same plane and won his first victory.
Yak-9: the "king" of modifications
Until the end of the 1930s, the design bureau of Alexander Yakovlev produced light, mainly sports aircraft. In 1940, the Yak-1 fighter, which had excellent flight qualities, was put into production. At the beginning of the war, the Yak-1 successfully fought back the German pilots.
Already in 1942, the Yak-9 began to enter service with our Air Force. The new Soviet vehicle was highly maneuverable, allowing it to conduct dynamic combat close to the enemy at low and medium altitudes.
It was the Yak-9 that turned out to be the most massive Soviet fighter of the Great Patriotic War. It was produced from 1942 to 1948, in total almost 17 thousand aircraft were built.
The Yak-9 design used duralumin instead of heavy wood, which made the aircraft lighter and left room for modifications. It was the Yak-9's ability to upgrade that became its main advantage. It had 22 major modifications, of which 15 were mass-produced. This is a front-line fighter, fighter-bomber, interceptor, escort, reconnaissance aircraft, special-purpose passenger aircraft and training aircraft.
The Yak-9U fighter, which appeared in the fall of 1944, is considered the most successful modification. Suffice it to say that his pilots called him "the killer."
La-5: disciplined soldier
At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, German aviation had an advantage in the sky of the USSR. But in 1942, a Soviet fighter appeared that could fight on equal terms with German aircraft - this is the La-5, developed at the Lavochkin Design Bureau.
Despite its simplicity - the La-5 cockpit did not have even the most elementary instruments like the artificial horizon - the pilots immediately liked the plane.
Lavochkin's new plane had a solid construction and did not fall apart even after dozens of direct hits. At the same time, La-5 had impressive maneuverability and speed: turn time was 16.5-19 seconds, speed was over 600 km/h.
Another advantage of the La-5 is that, as a disciplined soldier, he did not perform the “corkscrew” aerobatics without a direct order from the pilot, and if he got into a tailspin, he got out of it on the first command.
La-5 fought in the sky over Stalingrad and the Kursk Bulge, ace pilot Ivan Kozhedub fought on it, it was on him that the famous Alexei Maresyev flew.
Po-2: night bomber
The Po-2 (U-2) aircraft is considered the most massive biplane in the history of world aviation. Creating a training aircraft in the 1920s, Nikolai Polikarpov did not imagine that there would be another, serious application for his unpretentious machine.
During the Great Patriotic War, the U-2 turned into an effective night bomber. Aviation regiments appeared in the Soviet Air Force, armed exclusively with U-2s. It was these biplanes that carried out more than half of all sorties of Soviet bombers during the war years.
"Sewing machines" - that's what the Germans called the U-2, bombing their units at night. One biplane could make several sorties per night, and given the maximum bomb load of 100-350 kg, the aircraft could drop more ammunition than a heavy bomber.
It was on Polikarpov's biplanes that the famous 46th Taman Guards Aviation Regiment fought. Four squadrons of 80 female pilots, 23 of which received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. For courage and aviation skills, the Germans nicknamed the girls Nachthexen - "night witches". During the war years, the women's aviation regiment made 23,672 sorties.
In total, 11 thousand U-2 biplanes were manufactured during the war. They were produced at aircraft factory No. 387 in Kazan. Cabins for aircraft and air skis for them were mass-produced at the plant in Ryazan. Today it is the State Ryazan Instrument Plant (GRPZ), which is part of KRET.
It was not until 1959 that the U-2, renamed Po-2 in 1944 in honor of its creator, completed its thirty years of impeccable service.
IL-2: winged tank
IL-2 is the most massive combat aircraft in history, more than 36 thousand aircraft were produced in total. Il-2 attacks brought huge losses to the enemy, for which the Germans called the attack aircraft the “black death”, and among our pilots as soon as they did not call this bomber - “humped”, “winged tank”, “concrete aircraft”.
The IL-2 went into production just before the war, in December 1940. The first flight on it was made by the famous test pilot Vladimir Kokkinaki. These serial armored attack aircraft entered service at the beginning of the war.
The Il-2 attack aircraft became the main striking force of Soviet aviation. The key to excellent combat performance was a powerful aircraft engine, armored glass necessary to protect the crew, as well as rapid-fire aircraft guns and rockets.
The best enterprises of the country worked on the creation of components for the most massive attack aircraft in history, including those included today in Rostec. The leading enterprise for the production of ammunition for the aircraft was the well-known Tula Instrument Design Bureau. Transparent armored glass for glazing the IL-2 canopy was produced at the Lytkarino Optical Glass Plant. The assembly of engines for attack aircraft was carried out in the workshops of plant No. 24, today known as the Kuznetsov enterprise. Propellers for the attack aircraft were produced in Kuibyshev at the Aviaagregat plant.
Thanks to modern technologies at that time, the IL-2 became a real legend. There was a case when an attack aircraft returned from a departure and more than 600 hits were counted on it. After a quick repair, the "winged tanks" again went into battle.
