The Belorussian Front is an association of Soviet troops, was first created on September 11, 1939, and was intended to protect the territory of Western Belarus.

The meaning of the word "front"

The word "front" in military science has different meanings. In ordinary life, the word "front" means "area of ​​hostilities." That is, this is the place where warring states come into contact with each other.

Military science interprets the word "front" as the largest military formation, which includes various military units. The front includes infantry and tank armies, artillery corps, separate battalions of troops, for example, engineering and repair.

During the Second World War, such formations did not have numbers, but had names, for example, the Belorussian Front,.

The reason for the creation of this front is the attack on Poland by German troops. Therefore, it was decided that it was necessary to begin strengthening the border near Poland, the deployment of field administrations of the districts began, and the reserve began to be mobilized.

Before the outbreak of hostilities, the composition was fully completed, and the strength of the front was 200,000 people. On September 17, 1939, Soviet troops crossed the border and occupied part of the Polish territory.

First Belarusian Front

In 1944, a new formation of troops received the title of the First Belarusian Front. It happened on February 24th. The new front appeared on the basis of the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, it included: 3, 10, 47, 48, 60, 61, 65, 69, 70 combined arms armies; 16 and 6 air armies; 8 guards and others.

In 1944, the military formations of this front conducted military operations in Belarus. Then Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky, a well-known military leader, whose career began during the Civil War, was appointed commander-in-chief of the Belorussian Front. Colonel-General M.S. Malinin became the chief of staff.

Rokossovsky developed a plan for an offensive operation in order to defeat the enemy troops. June 22, 1944 began the victorious march of Soviet troops to the west. This operation dealt a crushing blow to the forces of the German fascists.

Commanders of the 1st Front:

• Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky;
• marshal.

Second Belarusian Front

This front was created on April 24, 1944 on the basis of the order of the Headquarters. It included: 33, 47, 49 combined arms armies; 4, 6 air armies, 1.5 guards tank armies, etc. At the beginning of summer, the troops of this front carried out a major strategic operation in Bobruisk, during which significant parts of the enemy were destroyed.

The spring of 1944 was marked by local battles. Our troops began a major offensive on June 23. At the end of June, Mogilev was liberated, and in July - Minsk. August and November were marked by battles for the liberation of Western Belarus, as well as the fight against the Nazis in Eastern Poland. After that, their task was the liberation of Berlin.

On April 16, the Oder River was taken under control by Soviet troops, and on May 19, the same army liberated the Danish island of Bornholm.

Commanders of the 2nd front:

• Colonel General P.A. Kurochkin;
• Colonel General I.E. Petrov;
• Army General G.F. Zakharov;
• marshal.

Third Belarusian Front

This front was formed on April 24, 1944. It was originally called the Western Front. It consisted of 5, 31, 39 combined arms armies. 1 air, 5 guards tank, etc. Carried out the Vilnius and Kaunas operations of 1944, the Gumbinnen and Koenigsber operations. The task of the 3rd front: in January - April 1945, the implementation of the East Prussian strategic operation, as a result, in April, the fortress and the city of Koenigsberg were occupied. The front was disbanded on August 15, 1945, and the Baranovichi military district was created instead.

Commanders of the 3rd front:

• army General ;
• marshal;
• Army General I.Kh.Bagramyan.

The 3rd Belorussian Front was created on April 24, 1944 according to the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of April 19, 1944 on the basis of the Western Front and the formations of its right wing and center. It included the 5th, 31st, 39th combined arms armies, 1st air army. Subsequently, it included the 2nd, 11th guards, 3rd, 21st, 28th, 33rd, 43rd, 48th, 50th combined arms armies, 5th guards tank army , 3rd Air Army.
Spring - summer 1944 formations of the front participated in offensive operations in Belarus, entered the territory of East Prussia. Vitebsk, Orsha, Borisov, Minsk, Molodechno, Vilnius, Kaunas were liberated.

By early June 1944 troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front took up defensive positions in the strip from the Western Dvina River to Baevo (45 km east of Orsha) with a total length of 130 km. The 39th Army was located in the Vitebsk direction, south of the Western Dvina River; the troops of the 5th Army were grouped in the center, and the 31st Army was located in the Orsha direction. In connection with the preparation of an offensive operation during the first ten days of June, the 11th Guards Army arrived from the 1st Baltic Front, whose formations were concentrated in the forests south of Liozno.
Before the 3rd Belorussian Front units of the 53rd and 6th army corps of the 3rd tank army and the 27th army corps of the 4th German army operated. They were supported by the 6th Air Fleet, consisting of about 330 aircraft. In the first line, the Germans had five infantry, one airfield, one motorized division and several separate security and special units, as well as a brigade of assault guns. The operational reserves, consisting of two infantry and two security divisions, were located in the Lepel, Orsha and Minsk directions. The operational density of the German defense averaged about 14 km per division.
Besides, in the operational depth of the enemy, a large number of separate regiments and battalions operated, scattered by separate garrisons and having the task of protecting communications and fighting partisans.
Undertaking in May 1944 concentric offensive against the main partisan forces from the areas of Budslav, Lepel, Senno, Orsha, Bobr, Ostroshitsky Gorodok, the Germans sought to press them against the impenetrable swamps adjacent to Lake Palik.
In engineering terms, defense The Germans represented a system of developed field fortifications using natural boundaries and advantageous terrain features. The depth and equipment of the defensive zones were different, depending on the importance of the covered areas and the nature of the terrain. The Germans most firmly covered Vitebsk and Orsha. So, in the Orsha direction, the enemy had three equipped lines, echeloned to a depth of 15–20 km. The most important areas were reinforced with armored caps or prefabricated reinforced concrete gun emplacements. Mining was widely used. Less developed was the defense in the Bogushev direction, where the enemy counted on the wooded and marshy nature of the terrain, as well as on lakes and river barriers that hampered the actions of large military formations and equipment.
In the operational depth of the Germans had a number of intermediate lines of the field type of varying degrees of readiness. In the planned large-scale operation of the four fronts to defeat the Germans in Belarus, the 3rd Belorussian Front was assigned a very important role. It was determined by the general concept of the operation outlined above and the place of the 3rd Belorussian Front in it, as well as by the position that the troops of the front occupied in the theater of military operations. Located at the "Smolensk Gate" in the area between the rivers Western Dvina and Dnieper, the troops were in the most important operational direction, leading to the central regions of Belarus and to its capital.
Headquarters Directive of May 31, 1944 The 3rd Belorussian Front was instructed: “To prepare and conduct an operation, in cooperation with the left wing of the 1st Baltic Front and the 2nd Belorussian Front, defeat the enemy’s Vitebsk-Orsha grouping and reach the Berezina River, for which they break through the enemy defenses, inflicting two strike: a) one strike by the forces of the 39th and 5th armies from the area west of Liozno and the general direction of Bogushevsk, Senno; with part of the forces of this grouping, advance in a northwestern direction, bypassing Vitebsk from the southwest, with the aim of defeating the enemy’s Vitebsk grouping and capturing the city of Vitebsk in cooperation with the left wing of the 1st Baltic Front; b) another strike by the forces of the 11th Guards and 31st armies along the Minsk highway in the general direction of Borisov: part of the forces of this grouping would take the city of Orsha with a strike from the north.
The immediate task of the troops of the front, seize the frontier of Senno, Orsha. In the future, to develop the offensive on Borisov with the task, in cooperation with the 2nd Belorussian Front, to defeat the Borisov grouping of the enemy and reach the western bank of the Berezina River in the Borisov region. Mobile troops (cavalry and tanks) should be used to develop success in the general direction of Borisov.
By order of the Headquarters, the 3rd Belorussian Front was transferred: from the 1st Baltic Front, the 11th Guards Army (as part of the 8th, 16th and 36th Guards Rifle Corps), and from the Stavka reserve, the 5th Guards Tank Army, the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps, 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps, 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps and powerful reinforcements.
Based on the task, the front commander decided to create two strike groups: the first, in the area west of Liozno on the adjacent flanks of the 39th and 5th armies (consisting of thirteen rifle divisions, three tank brigades and reinforcements); the second, east of the city of Orsha, in the strip of the Minsk highway on the adjacent flanks of the 11th Guards and 31st Armies (consisting of fourteen rifle divisions, one tank corps, two separate tank brigades and most of the reinforcements).
The task of the first group was to strike most of the forces that were part of the 5th Army in the general direction of Bogushevsk, Senno and (using the success of mobile units) access to the Berezina River on the 10th day of the operation in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bLake Palik and to the north; at the same time, part of the forces that were part of the 39th Army, striking in a north-western direction with the aim of encircling and defeating the Vitebsk group of Germans in cooperation with the 1st Baltic Front.
Second strike force was supposed to strike in the Minsk highway in the general direction to Orsha and to the north, defeat the enemy’s Orsha grouping, and on the tenth day of the operation, with the main forces, reach the Berezina River near the city of Borisov and to the north of it.
After breaking through the tactical defense zone of the enemy in the zone of the 5th Army, a cavalry-mechanized group consisting of the 3rd Guards Mechanized and 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps was to enter the breakthrough with the task of developing success in the direction of Bogushevsk, Chereya and capturing the crossings on the Berezina River on the fifth day of the operation.
In the band of the 11th Guards Army the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps (operating under the operational subordination of the commander of the 11th Guards Army) was introduced into the breakthrough, which was supposed to strike from the area northwest of Orsha, bypassing Orsha from the north, cut the communications of the Orsha group of Germans and by the end of the fourth day of the operation capture the Staroselye area (23 km southwest of Orsha); in the future, providing the left flank of the front, the corps was to advance in the direction of Ukhvala, Chernyavka, and on the sixth day of the operation, capture the crossings across the Berezina River in the Chernyavka area with advanced detachments.
5th Guards Tank Army it was supposed to be used, depending on the situation, on the third day of the operation according to two options. It was supposed to enter the gap either in the Orsha direction in the zone of the 11th Guards Army with the task of developing success along the Minsk highway in the direction of Borisov, or north of Orsha in the zone of the 5th army in the general direction of Bogushevsk, Smolyany with access to the Minsk highway in the Tolochin area, followed by an offensive along it also towards Borisov.
For aviation front the task was to assist combined-arms formations on the battlefield in breaking through enemy defenses, isolating and cutting off enemy reserves, and also ensuring the actions of mobile groups in operational depth. The operation was planned in two stages.
First stage. Breakthrough of the enemy defenses, defeat of his Vitebsk and Bogushevo-Orsha groupings and the exit of the main forces of the front to the Berezina River with the capture of the city of Borisov. Second phase. Forcing the Berezina River and further development of the offensive with the aim of capturing the city of Minsk in cooperation with the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front.
Front headquarters planned in more detail only the first stage lasting 10 days and with a depth of advance of 160 km. The plan determined and indicated the lines that the armies and mobile formations were to reach by the end of each day of the operation. The average rate of advance for combined arms formations was planned to be 12-16 km, for mobile units - 30-35 km per day.
June 20 front commander gave the commanders of the armies private directives. The 39th Army was ordered with the forces of five rifle divisions to strike from the front of Makarovo, Yazykovo (18 and 23 km south of Vitebsk) in the direction of Zamostochye, Plissa, Gnezdilovichi, in cooperation with the troops of the 43rd Army of the 1st Baltic Front, to defeat the Vitebsk enemy grouping and capture the city of Vitebsk. The immediate task of the army was to break through the enemy defenses in the Karpovichi, Kuzmentsy sector (the width of the sector was 6 km) and, by the end of the first day of the operation, reach the line of Perevoz, Borisovka, Zamostochye, Ovchinniki; by the end of the second day - to the line of Rogi, Butezhi, Church, Moshkany; by the end of the third day - to the border of Ostrovno, Lake Sarro, Lake Lipno. In the Ostrovno area, the advancing units of the army were to link up with the troops of the 1st Baltic Front and completely surround the enemy's Vitebsk grouping, while part of the forces continued the offensive in the direction of Beshenkovichi.
The further task of the army, destruction of the encircled enemy and the capture of the city of Vitebsk. To interact with the 5th Army, which was advancing south, the 39th Army, with one division, was to advance in the direction of Simaki, svh. Walkers. The 5th Army was ordered with the forces of eight rifle divisions with all means of reinforcement to strike from the front of Efredyunka, Yulkovo in the direction of Bogushevsk. The immediate task of the army is to break through the German defenses in the Podnivye, Vysochany sector (the width of the sector is 12 km) and, in cooperation with the 11th Guards Army, defeat the enemy's Bogushevo-Orsha grouping. By the end of the second day of the operation, the army was to capture Bogushevsky and go to the front of Moshkany, Chudnya, Lake Devinsky; by the end of the third day - to the line (claim.) Lake Lino, Nov. Obol, Janovo. The next task is to develop a rapid offensive in the direction of Senno, Lukoml, Moiseevshchina and, by the end of the tenth day of the operation, reach the Berezina River near Lake Palik and to the north with the main forces.
With access to the line of the Luchesa River the army was supposed to ensure the entry into the breakthrough of the cavalry-mechanized group (3rd Guards Mechanized Corps and 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps). To curtail the enemy front to the south of the breakthrough, the army commander was ordered, with the start of the offensive, part of the forces to vigorously advance from the front of Yulkovo, Shelmin to the south in the direction of Cape Bobinovichi.
The 11th Guards Army was ordered with the forces of nine rifle divisions with all means of reinforcement, strike in the strip of the Moscow-Minsk highway in the direction of Tolochin, Borisov with the immediate task of breaking through the enemy defenses in the Ostrov, Yuryev, Kirieva sector (section width 8 km) and in cooperation with the troops of the 5th and 31 th armies to defeat the Bogushev-Orsha group of Germans. By the end of the third day of the operation, the army was to reach the line of Janovo, Molotany, Lamachin; further develop a vigorous offensive along the Minsk highway and by the end of the tenth day of the operation, reach the Berezina River in the area of ​​​​the city of Borisov and to the north. Upon reaching the Zabazhnitsa, Shalashino, Bokhatovo line, the army commander was to bring the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps into the gap, and also ensure the readiness of the 5th Guards Tank Army to enter it into the gap from the morning of the third day of the operation.
To assist the 31st Army in capturing the city of Orsha, the commander of the 11th Guards Army was asked to advance around Orsha from the northwest with the forces of one rifle division. The 31st Army was tasked with striking with the forces of five rifle divisions on both banks of the Dnieper in the direction of Dubrovno, Orsha, breaking through the enemy defenses in the Kiriev, Zagvazdino sector (the width of the sector is 7 km) and, together with the 11th Guards Army, defeat the Orsha group of Germans. By the end of the first day of the operation, the army was supposed to capture Dubrovno, by the end of the third day, capture Orsha and reach the Lamachin, Chorven, Chernoye line. The next task is to advance on Vorontsevichi, Vydritsa (south of the Orsha-Borisov railway). Part of the forces (the 113th rifle corps, consisting of two rifle divisions) of the army were to advance in the direction of Kr. Sloboda, Negotina, Borodino with the task of rolling up the enemy front to the south.
At the same time, a directive horse-mechanized group. Its commander (commander of the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps, Lieutenant General Oslikovsky) was ordered on the night of the second day of the operation, after the 5th Army had captured the border of the Luchesa River, to be ready to lead the cavalry-mechanized group into the breakthrough and rapidly develop the offensive in in the direction of Bogushevsk, Senno, Holopenichi, Pleschenitsy. The readiness of the troops of the front for the offensive - by the morning of June 22.
In October 1944 Right-flank formations of the front took part in offensive operations in East Prussia, as a result of which the enemy grouping in Courland was blocked. Stallupenen, Goldap, Suwalki were released. During the winter offensive of 1945, the troops of the front participated in the encirclement and blocking of the enemy grouping in East Prussia, and in March of the same year in its liquidation. On February 24, 1945, the Zemland Group of Forces, formed on the basis of the 1st Baltic Front, entered the front. Later, the formations of the front stormed Koenigsberg, and at the end of April they completed the liquidation of the enemy grouping on the Samland Peninsula and liberated Pillau.
Disbanded 15 August 1945 according to the order of the NPO of the USSR of July 9, 1945. The field administration is aimed at forming the administration of the Baranovichi military district.
Front troops participated in the following operations: Strategic operations: Belarusian strategic offensive operation of 1944; East Prussian strategic offensive operation of 1945; Baltic strategic offensive operation in 1944.
Front and army operations: Brownsburg Offensive of 1945; Vilnius offensive operation in 1944; Vitebsk-Orsha offensive operation of 1944; Gumbinnen offensive operation in 1944; Zemland offensive operation in 1945; Insterburg-Koenigsberg offensive operation of 1945; Kaunas offensive operation in 1944; Koenigsberg offensive operation of 1945; Memel offensive operation in 1944; Minsk offensive operation of 1944; Rastenburg-Heilsberg offensive operation in 1945.

Based on the task set, the front commander decided to create two strike groups: the first, in the area west of Liozno on the adjacent flanks of the 39th and 5th armies (consisting of thirteen rifle divisions, three tank brigades and reinforcements); the second, east of the city of Orsha, in the strip of the Minsk highway on the adjacent flanks of the 11th Guards and 31st Armies (consisting of fourteen rifle divisions, one tank corps, two separate tank brigades and most of the reinforcements).

The task of the first grouping was to strike most of the forces that were part of the 5th Army in the general direction of Bogushevsk, Senno and (using the success of mobile units) access to the Berezina River on the 10th day of the operation in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bLake Palik and to the north; at the same time, part of the forces that were part of the 39th Army, striking in a north-western direction with the aim of encircling and defeating the Vitebsk group of Germans in cooperation with the 1st Baltic Front.

The second strike force was to strike in the Minsk highway in the general direction of Orsha and to the north, defeat the enemy’s Orsha grouping, and on the tenth day of the operation, the main forces would reach the Berezina River near the city of Borisov and north of it.

After breaking through the tactical defense zone of the enemy in the zone of the 5th Army, a cavalry-mechanized group consisting of the 3rd Guards Mechanized and 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps was to enter the breakthrough with the task of developing success in the direction of Bogushevsk, Chereya and capturing the crossings on the Berezina River on the fifth day of the operation.

In the zone of the 11th Guards Army, the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps (operating under the operational subordination of the commander of the 11th Guards Army) was introduced into the breakthrough, which was supposed to strike from the area northwest of Orsha to bypass Orsha from the north, cut off the communications of the Orsha group Germans and by the end of the fourth day of the operation, capture the Staroselye area (23 km southwest of Orsha); in the future, providing the left flank of the front, the corps was to advance in the direction of Ukhvala, Chernyavka, and on the sixth day of the operation, capture the crossings across the Berezina River in the Chernyavka area with advanced detachments.

The 5th Guards Tank Army was supposed to be used, depending on the situation, on the third day of the operation according to two options. It was supposed to enter the gap either in the Orsha direction in the zone of the 11th Guards Army with the task of developing success along the Minsk highway in the direction of Borisov, or north of Orsha in the zone of the 5th army in the general direction of Bogushevsk, Smolyany with access to the Minsk highway in the Tolochin area, followed by an offensive along it also towards Borisov.

The aviation of the front was entrusted with the task of assisting combined-arms formations on the battlefield when breaking through enemy defenses, isolating and cutting off enemy reserves, and also ensuring the actions of mobile groups in operational depth. The operation was planned in two stages.

First stage. Breakthrough of the enemy defenses, defeat of his Vitebsk and Bogushevo-Orsha groupings and the exit of the main forces of the front to the Berezina River with the capture of the city of Borisov.

Second phase. Forcing the Berezina River and further development of the offensive with the aim of capturing the city of Minsk in cooperation with the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front.

The front headquarters planned in more detail only the first stage lasting 10 days and with a depth of advance of 160 km. The plan determined and indicated the lines that the armies and mobile formations were to reach by the end of each day of the operation.

The average rate of advance for combined arms formations was planned to be 12-16 km, for mobile units - 30-35 km per day.

39th Army it was ordered by the forces of five rifle divisions to strike from the front of Makarovo, Yazykovo (18 and 23 km south of Vitebsk) in the direction of Zamostochye, Plissa, Gnezdilovichi, in cooperation with the troops of the 43rd Army of the 1st Baltic Front, to defeat the enemy’s Vitebsk grouping and capture the city of Vitebsk . The immediate task of the army was to break through the enemy defenses in the Karpovichi, Kuzmentsy sector (the width of the sector was 6 km) and, by the end of the first day of the operation, reach the line of Perevoz, Borisovka, Zamostochye, Ovchinniki; by the end of the second day - to the line of Rogi, Butezhi, Church, Moshkany; by the end of the third day - to the border of Ostrovno, Lake Sarro, Lake Lipno. In the Ostrovno area, the advancing units of the army were to link up with the troops of the 1st Baltic Front and completely surround the enemy's Vitebsk grouping, while part of the forces continued the offensive in the direction of Beshenkovichi.

The further task of the army is the destruction of the encircled enemy and the capture of the city of Vitebsk.

To interact with the 5th Army, which was advancing south, the 39th Army, with one division, was to advance in the direction of Simaki, svh. Walkers.

5th Army It was ordered by the forces of eight rifle divisions with all means of reinforcement to strike from the front of Efredyunka, Yulkovo in the direction of Bogushevsk. The immediate task of the army is to break through the German defenses in the Podnivye, Vysochany sector (the width of the sector is 12 km) and, in cooperation with the 11th Guards Army, defeat the enemy's Bogushevo-Orsha grouping. By the end of the second day of the operation, the army was to capture Bogushevsky and go to the front of Moshkany, Chudnya, Lake Devinsky; by the end of the third day - to the line (claim.) Lake Lino, Nov. Obol, Janovo. The next task is to develop a rapid offensive in the direction of Senno, Lukoml, Moiseevshchina and, by the end of the tenth day of the operation, reach the Berezina River near Lake Palik and to the north with the main forces.

With access to the line of the Luchesa River, the army was supposed to ensure the entry into the breakthrough of the cavalry-mechanized group (3rd Guards Mechanized Corps and 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps).

To curtail the enemy front to the south of the breakthrough, the army commander was ordered, with the start of the offensive, part of the forces to vigorously advance from the front of Yulkovo, Shelmin to the south in the direction of Cape Bobinovichi.

Action plan of the 5th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front

11th Guards Army it was ordered by the forces of nine rifle divisions with all means of reinforcement to strike in the strip of the Moscow-Minsk highway in the direction of Tolochin, Borisov with the immediate task of breaking through the enemy defenses in the Ostrov, Yuryev, Kirieva sector (section width 8 km) and in cooperation with the troops of the 5th and the 31st Army to defeat the Bogushev-Orsha group of Germans. By the end of the third day of the operation, the army was to reach the line of Janovo, Molotany, Lamachin; further develop a vigorous offensive along the Minsk highway and by the end of the tenth day of the operation, reach the Berezina River in the area of ​​​​the city of Borisov and to the north. Upon reaching the Zabazhnitsa, Shalashino, Bokhatovo line, the army commander was to bring the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps into the gap, and also ensure the readiness of the 5th Guards Tank Army to enter it into the gap from the morning of the third day of the operation.

To assist the 31st Army in capturing the city of Orsha, the commander of the 11th Guards Army was asked to advance around Orsha from the northwest with the forces of one rifle division.

31st Army the task was set to strike with the forces of five rifle divisions on both banks of the Dnieper in the direction of Dubrovno, Orsha, break through the enemy defenses in the Kiriev, Zagvazdino sector (section width 7 km) and, together with the 11th Guards Army, defeat the Orsha group of Germans. By the end of the first day of the operation, the army was supposed to capture Dubrovno, by the end of the third day, capture Orsha and reach the Lamachin, Chorven, Chernoye line. The next task is to advance on Vorontsevichi, Vydritsa (south of the Orsha-Borisov railway). Part of the forces (the 113th rifle corps, consisting of two rifle divisions) of the army were to advance in the direction of Kr. Sloboda, Negotina, Borodino with the task of rolling up the enemy front to the south.

It was formed in the western direction on April 24, 1944 on the basis of the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of April 19, 1944 as a result of the division of the Western Front into the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian fronts. Initially, it included the 5th, 31st, 39th armies and the 1st air army. Subsequently, it included the 2nd and 11th Guards, 3rd, 21st, 28th, 33rd, 43rd, 48th, 50th Armies, 5th Guards Tank and 3 -I air army.

In May - the first half of June 1944, the troops of the front conducted combat operations of local importance on the territory of Belarus. Participating in the Byelorussian strategic operation (June 23 - August 29, 1944), the front carried out the Vitebsk-Orsha operation on June 23 - 28 (together with the 1st Baltic Front), on June 29 - July 4 - the Minsk operation (together with the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts), July 5 - 20 - the Vilnius operation and July 28 - August 28 - the Kaunas operation. As a result of operations, his troops advanced to a depth of 500 km. They liberated Vitebsk (June 26), Orsha (June 27), Borisov (July 1), Minsk (July 3), Molodechno (July 5), Vilnius (July 13), Kaunas (August 1), other cities and went to the state USSR border with East Prussia.

In October 1944, the front, with the forces of the 39th Army and the 1st Air Army, participated in the Memel operation (October 5 - 22) of the 1st Baltic Front, as a result of which the Courland enemy grouping was isolated and pressed to the Baltic Sea. The troops of the front advanced to a depth of 30 to 60 km into East Prussia and northeast Poland, captured the cities of Shtallupenen (Nesterov) (October 25), Goldap, Suwalki.

In January - April 1945, the troops participated in the East Prussian strategic operation, during which on January 13 - 27 they carried out the Insterburg-Königsberg operation. In cooperation with the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, they broke through the defense in depth, advanced to a depth of 70 - 130 km, reached the approaches to Koenigsberg (Kaliningrad) and blocked the East Prussian grouping of the enemy, and then (March 13 - 29) liquidated it and went to Frisches Huff Bay.

From April 6 to April 9, 1945, the troops of the front carried out the Königsberg operation, as a result of which on April 9 they captured the fortress and the city of Königsberg.

On April 25, having completed the liquidation of the Zemland grouping of the enemy, the troops of the front captured the port and town of Pillau (Baltiysk).

The front was disbanded on August 15, 1945 on the basis of the order of the NPO of the USSR dated July 9, 1945. Its field administration was turned to the formation of the administration of the Baranovichi military district.

The troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front participated in the following operations:

• Strategic operations:
• Belarusian strategic offensive operation of 1944;
• East Prussian strategic offensive operation of 1945;
• Baltic strategic offensive operation in 1944.
• Front and army operations:
• Brownsburg Offensive of 1945;
• Vilnius offensive operation in 1944;
• Vitebsk-Orsha offensive operation of 1944;
• Gumbinnen offensive operation in 1944;
• Zemland offensive operation in 1945;
• Insterburg-Koenigsberg offensive operation of 1945;
• Kaunas offensive operation in 1944;
• Koenigsberg offensive operation of 1945;
• Memel offensive operation in 1944;
• Minsk offensive operation of 1944;
• Rastenburg-Heilsberg offensive operation in 1945.

Zemland group of troops.

• Commander of the BTiMV of the Zemland Group of Forces:
• guards lieutenant general t/v SKORNYAKOV Konstantin Vasilievich [as of April 1945]
• Chief of Staff of the UK BTiMV of the Zemland Group of Forces:
• guards major general RODIONOV Mikhail Iosifovich [as of April 1945]

Current page: 8 (total book has 25 pages) [accessible reading excerpt: 17 pages]

In turn, a blow to the west of the 6th Guards. army could get stuck in a series of inter-lake fashion shows. Therefore, the anxiety of I. Kh. Bagramyan and his chief of staff is at least understandable.

3rd Belorussian Front. In essence, the 3rd Belorussian Front was the heir and, so to speak, the "successor" of the Western Front. Moreover, the new commander of the front, Colonel General Ivan Danilovich Chernyakhovsky, managed to briefly take the post of commander of the Western Front on April 15, 1944, and on April 24, 1944 officially became the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front. I must say that before that, the 38-year-old I. D. Chernyakhovsky had no experience in commanding the front, he started the war only as a colonel and commander of a tank division. Until April 1944, he commanded the 60th Army for a long time. Now he had to lead a large mass of troops against an experienced and strong enemy. However, it should be noted that Chernyakhovsky got a strong and strong headquarters, headed by Lieutenant General A.P. Pokrovsky, which greatly facilitated the young general's debut as a commander. General Pokrovsky, contrary to his own expectations, was not dismissed following the results of the work of the GKO commission and retained his position until the very end of the war. Chernyakhovsky relied on his headquarters and, as A.P. Pokrovsky noted, “was alien to the vicious practice when a displaced leader drags some of his colleagues to a new duty station” 138
The liberation of Belarus ... S.184.

It will be soon. A. M. Vasilevsky and the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front I. D. Chernyakhovsky during the interrogation of the German General Hitter

The directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to the 3rd Belorussian Front was the last in a series of directives that determined the tasks of the fronts in Operation Bagration. The task of the front in it was formulated as follows:

"one. Prepare and conduct an operation with the aim, in cooperation with the left wing of the 1st Baltic Front and the 2nd Belorussian Front, to defeat the Vitebsk-Orsha enemy grouping and reach the river. Berezina, for which purpose to break through the enemy’s defenses, inflicting two blows:

a) one strike by the forces of the 39th and 5th armies from the area west of Liozno in the general direction of Bogushevskoye, Senno; part of the forces of this grouping, advance in a northwestern direction, bypassing Vitebsk from the southwest, with the aim of defeating the enemy's Vitebsk grouping and capturing the city of Vitebsk in cooperation with the left wing of the 1st Baltic Front;

b) another strike by the forces of the 11th Guards. and the 31st Army along the Minsk highway in the general direction to Borisov; part of the forces of this grouping to capture the city of Orsha with a blow from the north.

2. The immediate task of the troops of the front is to capture the Senno-Orsha line.

In the future, develop the offensive on Borisov with the task, in cooperation with the 2nd Belorussian Front, to defeat the Borisov grouping of the enemy and reach the western bank of the river. Berezina near Borisov 139
Russian archive: Great Patriotic. Headquarters of the Supreme High Command: Documents and materials 1944–1945. T. 16 (5–4). M.: Terra, 1999. S. 95.

As we can see, despite the negative experience of offensives along the Minsk highway in the fall of 1943 and early 1944, the Soviet troops were again tasked with advancing on Orsha along the axis of the highway and the railway. This time it was decided to try to break through along the highway with the forces of the elite 11th Guards Army. It was transferred from the 1st Baltic Front as part of the 8th, 16th and 36th Guards Rifle Corps. In addition, the 3rd Belorussian Front received from the Stavka reserve the 5th Guards Tank Army, the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps, and the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps. He returned to the front after the completion of the 2nd Guards. tank corps of A. S. Burdeiny. Since the 3rd Belorussian Front was the heir to the Western Front, it would be more correct to say “returned”, since Burdeiny’s corps already participated in the battles in the Western direction in the winter of 1943/44.

The use of these mobile formations was supposed after breaking through the enemy defenses. They wanted to avoid the nightmare of bringing mechanized formations into battle with an additional breakthrough with large losses in the enemy’s defenses. Accordingly, the horse-mechanized group (KMG) as part of the 3rd Guards. mechanized and 3rd Guards. cavalry corps were planned to be introduced in the general direction of Bogushevskoye, Senno, Lukoml, Moiseevshchina, Pleschenitsy, and the 5th Guards. tank army - in the strip of the Minsk highway to Borisov. The auxiliary task according to the plan was received by the 2nd Guards. tank corps. With the release of the southern grouping of troops of the front (11th Guards A and 31st A) in the Orsha area of ​​the 2nd Guards. the tank corps was supposed to be sent to Staroselye for subsequent actions in the direction of Krutoye, Ukhvala, Chernyavka in order to protect the front troops operating along the Minsk highway from an attack from the south.

The task of the tank army and the cavalry-mechanized group (KMG) was (as formulated in the review of the operation, compiled in the hot pursuit of events), “to crack the enemy’s defenses to their entire operational depth, destroy the oncoming operational reserves and thereby create conditions for the rapid development of the operation, i.e., withdraw the main forces of the front to the river. Berezina north and south of Borisov no later than the tenth day from the start of the offensive " 140
TsAMO RF. F. 241. Op. 2593. D. 504. L. 31.

Both the mobile formations of the KMG and the tank army were ordered to reach the western bank of the river. Berezina. Accordingly, KMG - to the area of ​​Voloka, Pleschenitsy, Zembin, and the 5th Guards. tank army - to the forest area immediately west of Borisov. By the end of the sixth day of the operation, they were supposed to provide bridgeheads for the deployment of the main forces of the front on the western bank of the river. Berezina with the aim of further development of the operation on Minsk. That is, the main task of the KMG and the tank army was a quick breakthrough to the Berezina in order to prevent the formation of a new resistance front by the enemy on its border and seize a bridgehead for a further offensive.

Fulfillment of the assigned task of the 5th Guards. the tank army, depending on the success of breaking through the enemy’s defense, was planned in two ways:

1) in the Orsha direction along the highway Moscow - Minsk to Borisov;

2) in the Bogushevsky direction with access to the highway in the Ozertsy area (5 km east of Tolochin) further along the highway to Borisov.

I draw your attention to the fact that the Orsha direction is listed as the first option. In Soviet historical works, the question of which direction was considered the main one (Orsha or Bogushev) and which was auxiliary, was not exactly hidden, but bypassed. Both directions were positioned as equivalent. Nevertheless, even in the period when the documents were closed, quite authoritative voices were heard, dotting the “e”. So, the former chief of staff of the front, A.P. Pokrovsky, quite definitely spoke about this: “The first option was the main one” 141
Liberation of Belarus. P.190.

The reporting documents of the 1st Air Army of the Front (which was not directly interested in glossing over reality and projecting plans onto the reality of ground battles) explicitly stated:

"Of the two strike directions - Bogushevsky and Orsha - the decisive one, according to the plan of the command, was the Orsha direction, which provided major difficulties in overcoming the enemy's highly developed defensive system, but at the same time made it possible to more widely develop the actions of large formations in the operational rear of the enemy" 142
TsAMO RF. F. 241. Op. 2593. D. 478. L. 38.

It is usually stated that in terms of using the tank army of P. A. Rotmistrov, there were two options for its introduction into the breakthrough, without specifying which of them was the main one. By the way, Rotmistrov himself, in an interview with the Military Historical Journal in 1964, in response to a question about plans to bring his army into battle, absolutely definitely denied this. Pavel Alekseevich then spoke in a very definite way: “By the decision of the commander of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, the 5th Guards Tank Army was to be brought into battle in the 11th Guards zone” 143
VIZH. 1964. No. 6. S. 27.

“Despite the fact that before the start of the front offensive, our army was not focused on entering the battle in the zone of the 5th army, I, on my own initiative, with a small group of officers (after planning was completed and all reconnaissance was carried out to enter the battle in lane of the 11th Guards Army) just in case, made a reconnaissance in its lanes " 144
There.

Moreover, P. A. Rotmistrov took the liberty of asserting that “the front did not envisage the second option for bringing the 5th Guards Tank Army into battle” 145
There.

However, according to the reporting documents of the 5th Guards. tank army and the 3rd Belorussian Front, this version is not traceable. Discussion and assertions about the absence of the second option could arise only in the years when independent researchers did not have access to operational documents of the war. The army of P. A. Rotmistrov was originally supposed to be used to develop the success of the front in the general direction of the city of Borisov according to two options. It is possible to discuss here which of the two was the priority and the main one. In favor of the fact that it was the Orsha direction that was the main one, and not one of two equivalent ones, is also evidenced by the events of the last hours before the start of the operation. Commander of the 5th Guards tank army in a 1970 article described the situation as follows:

“The army received an order on the night of June 22-23 to move forward in the Minsk highway lane for 25 km, meaning to enter it into a breakthrough in the 11th Guards Army lane, that is, as planned according to the first option” 146
Liberation of Belarus ... S. 404.

These words are corroborated by other sources. P. A. Rotmistrov calls the early advance "haste", but there is a simpler explanation - they really wanted to bring his army into a breakthrough on the highway from the very beginning. The second option, although it was worked out, albeit not on an initiative basis, was considered a backup. Considering the failures of the winter offensives, it was necessary to be prepared for any surprises, and a powerful means of combat (which was the 5th Guards Tank Army) was worked out to be used in different ways in order to be less dependent on the successes and failures of a particular direction.

Also, the Orsha direction received priority in the use of aviation in terms of the operation. For the first three days of the offensive, it was planned to carry out 10,785 sorties, of which 8,540 were aimed at the Orsha direction and 2,245 at Vitebsk. 147
Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War 1941–1945. Volume III. Operations of the Soviet armed forces during the period of decisive victories (January - December 1944). M.: Military Publishing House, 1958. S. 310.

Thus, almost 80% of sorties were aimed at the Orsha direction. A hail of air bombs and RSs was supposed to pave the way for the tanks of Rotmistrov's army.

The most eloquent of all about the importance attached to each of the offensive directions of the 3rd Belorussian Front is evidenced by the distribution of forces and means between the armies subordinate to the front of I. D. Chernyakhovsky.

The strength of the armies and units subordinate to the front of the 3rd Belorussian Front on June 20, 1944148
Compiled according to the data of the lists of the Combat and strength of the 3BF. TsAMO RF. F.241. Op. 2628. D. 48. Ll. 266ob, 274ob, l. 288rev, 302rev, 322rev, 329rev, 332rev, 359rev, 375.

I would like to note that the given data on the total number of armies (column "Total") do not take into account civilian personnel and the wounded in hospitals. Discrepancies in the figures cited in different publications are explained by taking into account or, conversely, underestimating different categories of servicemen. The number of wounded in hospitals as of June 20, 1944 was characterized by the following figures 149
TsAMO RF. F. 241. Op. 2628. D. 48. L. 352.

5th Army - 2543 people;

11th Guards. army - 1356 people;

31st Army - 1489 people;

39th Army - 2000 people.

Parts subordinate to the front - 17,959 people.

According to the data presented, it is clearly seen how numerous and well-armed the 11th Guards was by the beginning of the operation. army of Lieutenant General K. N. Galitsky. After these figures, there is no doubt in which direction the main blow of the 3rd Belorussian Front was delivered according to the plan.

In total, as of June 20, 1944, out of 679,614 people in the state, there were 564,097 people on the list as part of the 3rd Belorussian Front, as well as 13,546 civilians 150

The civilians were mainly concentrated in the rear units, there were only a few of them in the combat troops.

The new commander of the 39th Army Ivan Ilyich Lyudnikov

By June 20, 1944, the artillery "fist" of the 3rd Belorussian Front had 135 203-mm howitzers, 6 152-mm cannons, 391 152-mm howitzer cannons, 100 122-mm cannons, 672 122-mm howitzers, 12,107 -mm guns, 1513 76-mm divisional guns, 397 76-mm regimental and mountain guns, 1087 45-mm guns and 55 57-mm guns 151
TsAMO RF. F. 241. Op. 2628. D. 48. L. 376v.

It should be noted a small number of 57-mm anti-tank guns ZIS-2. Guns of these types entered the troops rather slowly, and the basis of anti-tank defense, despite the enemy's "tigers" and "panthers" with thick armor, were 76-mm guns.

Plan of the Vitebsk operation

The tasks for detailing the plan of operation were assigned to the army commanders shortly after receiving the Directive from the Headquarters. As I. I. Lyudnikov, commander of the 39th Army, later recalled:

“On June 1, 1944, the commander of the 39th Army at the headquarters of the 3rd Belorussian Front (commander Colonel General I. D. Chernyakhovsky, member of the Military Council V. E. Makarov, chief of staff Lieutenant General A. P. Pokrovsky) was awarded private directive of the Military Council of the front on the offensive and ordered to begin preparations for the Vitebsk operation " 152
Lyudnikov I. I. Decree. op. S. 13.

Actually, it makes sense to start describing the offensive plan of the 3rd Belorussian Front with Lyudnikov's army. It was one of two armies aimed at the Bogushev direction. As well as on the 1st Baltic Front, the principle of "shoulder to shoulder" strike with multidirectional tasks was used. That is, the armies broke through in adjacent sections of the breakthrough, avoiding the problem of a narrow and isolated section of the breakthrough that could be shot through from the flanks. Accordingly, the 39th and 5th armies had adjacent breakthrough sections with a total width of 16 km 153
Radzievskiy A. I. Development of the theory and practice of a breakthrough (based on the experience of the Great Patriotic War). In 2 volumes. Volume 2. M .: Military Academy. M. V. Frunze, 1977. S. 60.

The 39th Army was instructed to advance in the sector where the last spring (March 21-28, 1944) offensive of the 33rd Army took place. It would have been irresponsible to attack from the top of a ledge driven into the German defenses - the shortest route to the Orsha railway - Vitebsk defended itself the best. A breakthrough from the southern front of the ledge increased the distance to the target, but increased the chances of breaking through the less dense enemy defenses.

The task of the army of I. I. Lyudnikov was set quite ambitious. The main task of the 39th Army, according to the directive of the front, was to encircle and destroy, together with the troops of the 43rd Army, the Vitebsk enemy grouping. The army troops were instructed to: use the forces of the 5th Guards Rifle Corps (three divisions), the 251st and 164th Rifle Divisions to strike from the Makarov, Yazykovo front in the general direction of Pesochna, Plissa, Gnezdilovichi and, uniting with the troops of the 43rd Army 1 th Baltic Front in the area north of Ostrovno, together with them to surround and destroy the enemy in the Vitebsk area and capture the city. Part of the forces of the army was to continue the offensive in the direction of Beshenkovichi.

According to the plan developed by the headquarters of I. I. Lyudnikov, the army went on the offensive in a two-echelon formation. In the first echelon there were five rifle divisions of the 84th and 5th Guards. rifle corps, in the second echelon - two rifle divisions. The main blow was delivered on the left flank of the army by the forces of the 5th Guards. the rifle corps of Major General I. S. Bezugly, who broke through the defenses on a 6 km section with the forces of three rifle divisions. By the beginning of the operation, these three divisions had been brought to a strength of about 7 thousand people, with a staffing strength of 10,670 people (staff 04/500). 17th Guards on June 20, 1944, there were 6761 people, the 19th Guards. SD - 7144 people, 91st Guards. sd - 6760 people. It would be useful to say that I. S. Bezugly was one of the veterans of the airborne troops of the Red Army, who in 1933 became the commander of an airborne brigade regiment. He met the war as the commander of the 5th Airborne Corps, fought in the Baltic.

The tank forces allocated to the 39th Army cannot be said to be impressive (shown as of 24.00 06.22.44) 154

28th Guards tank brigade 32 T-34, 13 T-70, 4 SU-122, 3 SU-76, 2 Pz.VI "Tiger";

735th and 957th SAPs each with 21 SU-76s.

The tank brigade and both self-propelled regiments were supposed to support the offensive of the 5th Guards. rifle corps.

To the south of the army of I. I. Lyudnikov, in the Bogushev direction, the 5th army of N. I. Krylov, who remained the permanent commander of the army since the autumn of 1943, was to attack. on Bogushevskoye. With access to the border of the river. Luchesa, the army was supposed to ensure the entry into the breakthrough of a cavalry-mechanized group aimed at Bogushevsk and Cherey.

To break through the enemy defenses, according to the plan of the commander of the 5th Army, the 72nd and 65th rifle corps were involved with the construction of their battle order in two echelons. Some of the strongest formations stood out in the first echelon:

63rd and 277th rifle divisions of the 72nd rifle corps;

371st and 97th Rifle Divisions of the 65th Rifle Corps.

The 215th and 144th rifle divisions were in the second echelon.

The staffing of the formations of the army of N. I. Krylov was characterized by the following figures 155
TsAMO RF. F. 241. Op. 2628. D. 48. Ll. 259rev, 260rev, 261rev.

45th sc: 159th sd 4663 people, 184th sd 6909 people, 338th sd 6877 people;

65th sc: 97th sd 6651 people, 144th sd 6910 people, 371st sd 6625 people;

72nd sc: 63rd sd 6789 people, 215th sd 6368 people, 277th sd 6821 people.

The formations of the 5th Army were kept according to state No. 04/550 with a staffing strength of 9435 people. It is clearly seen that the strength of the formations, in comparison with the winter battles, when divisions of about 5 thousand people went into battle in the first line, has grown significantly.

As armored vehicles of direct support, the 5th Army received two tank brigades and three self-propelled artillery regiments on the SU-76 (shown as of 24.00 06.22.44) 156
TsAMO RF. F. 241. Op. 2658. D. 45. L. 60.

153rd tank brigade - 2 T-34, 30 MkIII, 3 M3s, 14 M3l;

2nd Guards tank brigade - 34 T-34, 10 T-70, 1 ° SU-85;

953, 954 and 958th SAP - 21 SU-76 each.

Considering the threat of a meeting with the "tigers" (at least, according to the experience of winter battles), the set of Lend-Lease antiques in the 153rd brigade is not at all impressive. At the same time, a large number of SU-76s undoubtedly solved the problem of supporting infantry with fire.

The 11th Guards was to advance in the direction of the main attack of the front. army. She was part of a pair of 11th Guards. and the 31st armies, aimed at the Orsha direction. The principle of adjacent breakthrough sections was also used here, as a result, the two armies had adjacent breakthrough sections with a total width of 16 km 157
Radzievsky A. I. S. 60.

In the final version of the action plan of the 11th Guards. army was formulated in the order of the army headquarters No. 024 / op dated June 22, 1944. The tasks in it were as follows:

"11 Guards. the army, with the forces of nine rifle divisions (1, 11, 31, 5, 26, 83, 16, 18, 84 guards divisions) with all means of reinforcement, strike in the highway strip in the direction of Tolochin, Borisov.

The immediate task is to break through the enemy defenses in the Ostrov Yuryev, Kireeva sector and, in cooperation with the troops of the 5th and 31st armies, defeat the enemy's Orsha-Bogushev grouping.

By the end of the second day, reach the boundary of the lake. Devinsky, Badgers.

By the end of the third day, reach the line of Janovo, Molotany, Lamachin " 158
TsAMO RF. F. 358. Op. 5916. D. 645–649. L. 22.

In the future, it was supposed to develop an offensive along the highway and, by the end of the tenth day, reach the river. Berezina to the area of ​​the city of Borisov and to the north.

The main idea of ​​the offensive plan of the 11th Guards. army was as follows. Increasing the strike along the Smolensk-Minsk highway, it was supposed to defeat the opposing enemy and, using the wooded area north of the highway to quickly advance part of the forces with the aim of subsequently enveloping the enemy defending in the direction of the Minsk highway from the north, by the end of the second day, capture the border of the river. Orshitsa. At the same time, a group of right-flank divisions and the 152nd fortified area were supposed to complete, together with the left-flank units of the 5th Army, the destruction of the enemy by encircling him in the forests in the area of ​​Bogushevsky, Lake Nuts, Babinovichi. The build-up of efforts according to the plan was carried out with the introduction on the first day of the 2nd Guards. tank corps and one rifle division, on the second day - three rifle divisions and on the third day - one rifle division.

In the future, developing success along the highway, it was planned to defeat the enemy reserves approaching the front and, covering their left flank from the direction of Orsha and Shklov, by the end of the fifth day of the offensive, reach the front of Cape Oboltsy, Bol. Mikhenichi, Perevolochnaya, having advanced the 2nd Guards. tank corps in the area of ​​Cape Tolochin or Senno.

Break through the front of the enemy command of the 11th Guards. the army decided on the plot of Yuryev Island, Kireeva, 10.5 km long. Actually, this section covered the entire space from the highway and the railway to the vast swampy tract Vereteysky Mokh. This was the direction of the main attack, here four rifle divisions (31st, 26th, 84th and 16th Guards Rifle Divisions) were involved in the first echelon. Accordingly, an auxiliary strike was supposed to be delivered in a section 3 km wide south of Lake Sitnyanskoye, at the northern tip of the same Vereteysky Mokh. Six battalions of the 152nd fortified area were involved in this direction.

In the second echelon there were five divisions (1st, 5th, 11th, 18th and 83rd guards divisions), including the 83rd guards, which was part of the army reserve. rifle division. Of these, all five divisions could be involved in the direction of the main attack, and three or four divisions in the auxiliary direction.

In accordance with the decision taken, tasks were distributed between the corps.

16th Guards The rifle corps of Major General Ya. S. Vorobyov carried out a breakthrough of the enemy defensive zone in the direction of Yuryev Island, followed by a bypass from the north of the enemy grouping defending the direction of the Minsk highway, using a wooded area in its zone for this. In the first echelon of the corps there was one rifle division (31st Guards), in the second - two (1st and 11th Guards Rifle Division). The corps of Ya. S. Vorobyov was also entrusted with the task of encircling and destroying, together with parts of the 5th Army, the 256th and part of the 78th German infantry divisions in the forests in the Bogushevsky area, Lake. Nuts, Babinovichi.

On the 8th Guards. the rifle corps of Major General M.N. Zavadovsky and the 36th Guards. the rifle corps of Major General P. G. Shafranov was entrusted with the task of breaking through the enemy’s defensive zone. Moreover, the first one participated in the breakthrough by the forces of one rifle division in the first echelon (26th Guards Rifle Division), and the second - two (84th and 16th Guards Rifle Divisions). Further, the corps of M.N. Zavadovsky was to play the main role in pursuing the enemy, and the corps of P.G. Shafranov - part of the forces to pursue the enemy, and partly to provide the left flank of the army. The staffing of the corps was characterized by the following figures 159
TsAMO RF. F. 241. Op. 2628. D. 48. Ll. 280 rpm, 281 rpm

8th Guards sc: 5 guards. sd 7401 people, 26 guards. sd 7406 people, 83 guards. sd 7423 people;

36th Guards sc: 16 guards. sd 7363 people, 18 guards. sd 7428 people, 84 guards. sd 7354 people.

Breakthrough section of the 31st Guards. rifle division (7362 people) was 3 km, and the 26th, 84th and 16th Guards. rifle divisions - 2.5 km. By June 20, 1944, the latter numbered 7406, 7354 and 7363 people, respectively. That is, wider offensive zones compared to winter battles were due to the greater number of personnel of the guards rifle divisions of the Galitsky army. Connections of the 11th Guards. the armies were maintained according to the state 04/500, providing for a total strength of 10,670 people.

Artillery breakthrough group of the 11th Guards. The army was divided into corps breakthrough groups and subgroups of corps divisions.

Tank units of the 11th Guards. armies were distributed among divisions of the first echelon as follows (numbers are given as of 24.00 22.06.44 160
TsAMO RF. F. 241. Op. 2658. D. 45. L. 60.

26 Guards sd - 120 TBr (34 T-34, 20 T-60-70, 3 SU-122) and 1435 SAP (23 SU-85);

84 Guards. sd - 35 CCI and 345 SAP;

16 Guards sd - 63 CCI (14 KV, 13 SU-152) and 348 SAP.

In the zone of the last two divisions, it was also planned to use minesweeper tanks - T-34 with a trawl from the 148th tank engineer regiment. In the second echelon was a regiment of flamethrower tanks. In a word, it was supposed to ram the positional defense using the latest technical means. In general, the equipment of armored vehicles of the 11th Guards. army contrasts markedly with the neighboring 5th Army, primarily in terms of quality - ISs, KVs and heavy self-propelled guns.

Paired with the 11th Guards. one of the “losers” of the winter battles, the 31st Army, was supposed to advance with the army. Like a number of other formations in the Western direction, the 31st Army received a new commander - Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General V.V. Glagolev. In this case, this was not a formal promotion - earlier V.V. Glagolev commanded the 46th Army of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. General Glagolev did not have an academic education, only academic courses, he met the war as the commander of a cavalry division. From 1941 to May 1944 he fought in the southern sector of the front - in the Crimea, in the Caucasus. It was difficult to call him a specialist in positional battles.

However, the 31st Army received in the new operation the task of breaking through a solid positional front. According to the plan, the 31st Army, with the forces of six rifle divisions, attacked both banks of the river. The Dnieper in the direction of Dubrovna, Orsha and further advanced on Vorontsevichi and Vydritsa. The immediate task of the army was to break through the enemy defenses in the Kireev sector (exclusively, the village itself fell into the zone of the 11th Guards Army), Zagvazdino. By the end of the first day it was supposed to capture Dubrovno, by the end of the third day - Orsha.

To the north of the Dnieper, the 71st Rifle Corps was to advance, to the south - the 36th Rifle Corps. The width of the breakthrough front of the 71st Rifle Corps was about 4 km. The combat order of the corps was built in two echelons: in the first - the 88th and 331st rifle divisions, in the second - the 192nd rifle division. The 36th Corps was tasked with the forces of the 220th and 352nd Rifle Divisions (both in the first echelon) to break through the enemy defenses on the front, the left bank of the Dnieper, the village of Zastenok Yuryev; the width of the breakthrough section was 6 km.

The staffing of the formations of the army of V.V. Glagolev was characterized by the following figures (as of June 20, 1944):

36 sk 220 sd - 6881 people, 173 sd - 6055 people, 352 sd - 6921 people;

71 sk 88 sd - 5798 people, 192 sd - 5758 people, 331 sd - 7073 people;

113 sk 62 sd - 4856 people, 174 sd - 4602 people.

It is clearly seen that to break through the defense, the connections of the best completeness were supplied. However, in general, the staffing of the 31st Army is not impressive, especially the 71st Rifle Corps, aimed at positional defense with a rifle division of less than 6 thousand people. Rifle formations of the 31st Army were kept according to the above-mentioned staff No. 04/550.

For direct support of the infantry of the army of V.V. Glagolev, one tank brigade and several self-propelled artillery regiments were attached (shown as of 24.00 22.06.44 161
TsAMO RF. F. 241. Op. 2658. D. 45. L. 60.

213th Tank Brigade (34 T-34s, 12 T-60-70s, 3 SU-122s, 4 SU-76s);

1445th SAP 2 ° SU-152;

926, 927 and 959th SAP for 21 SU-76s.

The tank brigade was supposed to be used in the strip of the 71st Rifle Corps. Also, the 52nd division of armored trains (2 armored trains) was subordinate to the 31st Army.

Concluding the story about the combined arms armies of the 3rd Belorussian Front, it should be noted that the previously mentioned letter of I. A. Tolkonyuk "at the top" was carefully read and reacted to. Thus, the front command requested the GAU to replenish 400 light and 500 heavy machine guns. GAU was issued 1000 light and 700 heavy machine guns, i.e. 250% and 140% of the application 162
TsAMO RF. F. 81. Op. 12079. D. 204. L. 8.

At the same time, for the rest of the armament positions, the application was satisfied by 60-100%.

11th Guards. the army was supposed to pave the way to Borisov for the 5th Guards. tank army of P. A. Rotmistrov. For the first time in many months, almost a year, an association of the tank army class appeared in the Western strategic direction. In the winter campaign, tank armies were involved in Ukraine, where there were appropriate conditions for them, first of all, there was no positional front that was deadly for tanks.

5th Guards the tank army of P. A. Rotmistrov at that time was not the strongest of the tank armies. It consisted of two (the strongest numbered three) corps, and both corps were armored. The strength of the army is shown in the table.

The strength of the armored vehicles of the 5th Guards. tank army on June 22, 1944163
TsAMO RF. F. 241. Op. 2658. D. 25. Ll. 391–392.

The rather motley composition of the army is clearly visible, and at that moment there were no T-34-85 tanks in the army of P. A. Rotmistrov. If necessary, the SU-85, as well as artillery, were supposed to repel the attacks of the "tigers" and "panthers" - the army had 12 85-mm cannons and 36 57-mm ZIS-2 cannons. Speaking of the artillery of the 5th Guards. tank army, it should be noted that it included a howitzer artillery regiment of 24 122-mm howitzers. This, of course, was significantly weaker than the artillery regiment of the average German tank division, but still a noticeable step forward from arming independent mechanized formations with only 76-mm artillery, RA combat vehicles and mortars. Another feature of the combat strength of the 5th Guards. tank army, which I would like to draw attention to, are 29 U-2 aircraft for communications and reconnaissance. They were used to communicate with the headquarters of the front and partly with the corps.

Having mentioned the U-2 biplanes in the tank army of P. A. Rotmistrov, we smoothly moved from the kings of the land front to the rulers of the fifth ocean. The 1st Air Army was inherited by the 3rd Belorussian Front from the Western Front when it was disaggregated in the spring of 1944. At that time, the army was commanded by one of the most famous Soviet pilots, Hero of the Soviet Union M. M. Gromov, who began flying back in the tsarist army, and before the war, he flew across the North Pole on the ANT-25 and set one of the distance records. However, with all the desire, it is difficult to call him an experienced specialist in the combat use of the Air Force. He headed the aviation unit (air division) only from the end of 1941. Prior to that, he had not even commanded an air regiment, being engaged in test and instructor work. Already in July 1944, Gromov left the post of commander of the air army and headed the Main Directorate for Combat Training of Front-line Aviation.

On June 1, 1944, the 1st Air Army consisted of only four air divisions: the 303rd Fighter, 311th Assault, 3rd Guards Bomber and 213th Night Bomber. In total, the army had a little more than 400 aircraft, including 120 fighters, 80 attack aircraft, 80 day and 80 night bombers. This was an impressive number of aircraft for 1942, but it was difficult to conduct a major offensive operation in such a composition in the realities of 1944. Therefore, shortly before the start of the operation, the 1st Air Army was additionally transferred large forces of attack and fighter aircraft. Three fighter air corps were transferred to the army (1st Guards IAK, 2nd 164
Consisting of 51 Yak-1, 81 Yak-9, 120 La-5.

and 3rd 165
It consists of 258 Yak-1 and Yak-9 aircraft.

IAK) and the 240th IAD (109 Yak-9, 3 Yak-7b, 12 Yak-1), one assault air corps (3rd ShAK) and the 1st Guards. ShAD, one bomber air corps (1st Guards BAK, two air divisions, 170 Pe-2 aircraft), two bomber air divisions (6th Guards BAD consisting of 63 Pe-2 and 39 A-20 "Boston", 113- I am DBAD in the composition of 90 IL-4). The latter (113th DBAD) was in its way a unique three-regiment air force armed with Il-4 bombers. Despite the large carrying capacity, these aircraft were a “sitting duck” for German fighters and therefore were more often used in Long-Range Aviation at night. The experience of using them in the summer of 1943 as part of the 113th air division during the counteroffensive near Kursk was not to say very successful. The use of Il-4 and DB-3 in June 1941 in Belarus for strikes against advancing German mechanized units was almost suicidal. However, in the summer of 1944, the situation in the air changed and the conditions for using the Il-4 strike power promised to be much more favorable than in 1941 and 1943.