MILITARY THOUGHT No. 2/1994, pp. 59-66
To the question of the creation and use of reserves of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command during the Great Patriotic War
Colonel G.A.MOKHOROV,
Candidate of Historical Sciences, Associate Professor
In the fierce battles with the Nazi invaders during the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet military strategy withstood severe tests, the most important problem of which was the preparation and use of the strategic reserves of the Supreme High Command. In order to provide the active army with the necessary number of trained strategic reserves, a well-functioning system of organs, structures, and training centers was required, subordinated to the solution of this problem.
On the eve of the war, the country's leadership paid sufficient attention to the preparation of reserves for the Soviet Armed Forces. An important document determining the procedure for accumulating a reserve of those liable for military service was the Law on Universal Military Duty adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on September 1, 1939, which fixed the personnel principle of building, recruiting and training the Armed Forces.
Taking into account the growing threat of war from Nazi Germany, the top state and military leadership took a number of covert measures to increase the combat capability of the Armed Forces. By the middle of 1941, out of 320 divisions envisaged for deployment according to the mobplan, 303 were part of the ground forces, but 81 of them were in the process of formation. In addition, not a single formation in the internal and border military districts was completed according to the prescribed states. The mistake was that in the western direction there were no trained reserves of the troops of the High Command. Four armies and one corps were secretly relocated here from a number of military districts: the 22nd Army; from the Ural Military District to the Velikiye Luki region, the 21st Army from the PriVO to the Gomel region, the 19th Army from the North Caucasus Military District to the Belaya Tserkov region, the 16th Army from the ZabVO to the Shepetovka region and the 25th Rifle Corps from the Kharkov Military District to the line of the Western Dvina. These troops were to deploy before July 3, 1941 and form the reserve of the High Command.
The notion that the most dangerous strategic direction was not the western one - Belarus, but the southwestern one - Ukraine, was erroneous, which resulted in the wrong decision to concentrate reserve troops. In the very first days of the war, the 19th and 16th armies were transferred by forced march to the Smolensk-Moscow direction.
The biggest mistake turned out to be miscalculations in the timing, scale and nature of the first, main blow by the aggressor. This led to the fact that all plans for organizing a more effective repulse of the perfidious invasion of the Nazi army were thwarted.
The first task was to deploy and strengthening Armed Force, creation a sufficient number of heterogeneous reserves of troops for the successful conduct of defensive and offensive operations, formation parts and institutions rear for their comprehensive support during the war. On the second day of the war in fourteen military districts, intense and unprecedented in scale work of military councils, local Soviet and party bodies, and military commissariats began to implement military mobilization plans. In an atmosphere of general patriotic upsurge, 5.3 million people were drafted into the ranks of the Armed Forces in the first eight days of the war. Their numbers have thus doubled. History has not known such a volume of military mobilization in a short time.
Having completed the first stage of mobilization, the State Defense Committee (GKO) began to form a large number of rifle, cavalry, tank, aviation and artillery units and formations. So, in the first days of July, the State Defense Committee adopted two resolutions on the additional formation of 75 rifle, 10 cavalry and 25 divisions of the people's militia, and later another 85 rifle divisions and 50 separate rifle brigades.
By the decision of the State Defense Committee of July 16, 1941 "On the training of reserves in the system of NCOs and the Navy", the direct management of their preparation was entrusted to a special group created under the NCOs of the USSR. In August 1941, to solve this problem, the Main Directorate for the Formation and Staffing of the Red Army was formed.
Particular attention was paid to the training of personnel for aviation, navy, armored, engineering troops, and signal troops. The initial training of the reserves was carried out in the system of general education and Osoaviakhim, and the final training in specialties, especially technical branches of the military, in the system of spare and training units created with the outbreak of war. Their capacity has been constantly increasing. For example, if as of August 12, 1941, crews for tanks and armored vehicles were trained in 18 reserve regiments, then in May 1945 there were 8 training brigades, 7 training tank regiments, 2 reserve tank regiments, 3 training regiments (for tanks of foreign brands ), 2 training repair and restoration battalions, about 10 training tank regiments of the fronts.
The educational and material base and the quality of the educational process were continuously improved. The duration of training varied depending on the complexity of the specialty from 1.5 to 6 months. The main principle, which was implemented in the activities of training and spare parts of all branches of the armed forces, was to teach what is necessary in the war.
An important problem in the preparation of reserve formations was the staffing of their command personnel. With the outbreak of war, the duration of training in all military educational institutions was reduced, their capacity increased, and the network of military educational institutions was expanded. Thus, only the number of military schools of the Ground Forces has increased from 138 to 164, and the number of cadets has increased by 67%. As a result of these and a number of other measures, the officer training system generally met the requirements of the front.
The first strategic success of the Soviet troops during the Battle of Smolensk was used to the maximum by the Soviet government to solve the complex tasks of restructuring the national economy on a war footing, establishing mass production of weapons and military equipment. On this basis, there was an accelerated creation and replenishment of the troops of the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. After the second mass mobilization in August 1941, the conscription of those liable for military service in the army continued uninterrupted. By the end of 1941, more than 400 new divisions had been formed. At that time, the Stavka had 11 armies in its reserve. The number of reserve troops was 700 thousand people.
In total, during the first six months of the war, 221 newly formed and 8 restored divisions, 110 rifle and tank brigades, as well as a large number of artillery, aviation and engineering units, and air defense units were transferred to the fronts. 97 pre-war divisions were also sent from the Stavka reserve to the active army.
An analysis of archival documents shows that during the first year of the war, the fronts were strengthened by units and formations mainly due to new formations, which during this period were the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Divisions that suffered significant losses in battle were not restored, but were sent to replenish other formations and units.
From July 1942, the Stavka changed the procedure for creating its reserves. The main ways of replenishing them were: the formation of new formations of military branches and services of the Armed Forces and the withdrawal of formations and units from the fronts to the reserve for resupplying. The redeployment of rifle divisions under their command to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command for the period of replenishment and subsequent use was carried out according to plans developed by the General Staff and approved by the Headquarters. They envisaged, as a rule, the simultaneous replenishment of 40-50 divisions, the average number of which was 3000-3500 people, up to 600 horses and up to 75 vehicles. 3500-4000 people, 250-300 horses, 70-75 vehicles were required to complete each division to the established state. Combat and political training of personnel in the formations of the reserve was carried out according to special programs. The duration of training varied. Thus, the duration of stay in the reserve of 76% of divisions was less than 2 months.
In the third period, the reserves of the Headquarters were created mainly by resupplying the withdrawn formations and formations from the active fronts. The exception was the newly formed in January 1944, the 6th Panzer Army. Many divisions, corps and armies were withdrawn several times to the Stavka reserve. Four times, for example, the 21st, 28th and 61st combined-arms armies were in reserve; five times each - the 3rd and 5th Guards Tank Armies. The advantages of this method: the organizational and staffing foundations, traditions and continuity of the military glory of the unit, formation, the backbone of the personnel hardened in battles and front-line everyday life were preserved.
All during the war years, 527 divisions and 58 brigades were withdrawn from the fronts and understaffed.
The reserve of the Headquarters was also volunteer formations, which were created with the permission of the State Defense Committee on the initiative of local authorities. In the summer and autumn of 1941, when a critical situation developed in a number of areas, 60 divisions and 200 regiments of the people's militia were formed in large front-line cities. As independent formations, more than 40 volunteer divisions fought courageously near the walls of Moscow and Leningrad.
Highly combat-ready volunteer cadre divisions were also created in Ivanovo, Yaroslavl, Bryansk, Omsk, Novosibirsk and other cities of the RSFSR. And in Sverdlovsk, Chelyabinsk and Perm, the Ural Volunteer Tank Corps was formed and provided with everything necessary from local resources, the combat path of which ended in Berlin and Prague. During the war years, the peoples of Russia gave the front over the GKO plan 55 rifle and cavalry divisions, 14 rifle brigades, 4 tank and 3 motorized rifle brigades.
In order to increase the strike force, improve command and control and use the troops of the reserve of the High Command in combat operations, their organizational structures were continuously improved. Thus, anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery regiments, brigades and even divisions were formed to fight enemy tanks and aircraft. Guards mortar formations were especially actively created: at the beginning, divisions, then regiments and divisions. In the course of the rearmament of the Soviet troops that unfolded in the spring of 1942, the creation of tank and mechanized corps and tank armies, as well as reserve air armies, and then aviation corps, began.
In the summer and autumn of 1943, the preparation and use of strategic reserves reached perfection. The proportion of tank, aviation, artillery, mortar, and engineering troops has increased significantly in their composition. By this time, the transition of rifle troops to the corps system had basically been completed, qualitatively new formations had arisen - assault engineer-sapper brigades of the RGK. Of particular importance in solving strategic problems was the creation of five tank armies. The airborne troops, and especially the air defense troops of the country, received further development.
The results of the military mobilization activities of the central and local bodies of power and administration, the efforts of the entire Soviet people in strengthening their Armed Forces are truly enormous in terms of scale and effectiveness. During the war years, 80 combined arms armies, 6 tank, 17 air and 6 air defense armies were formed, and 40-50 of them, including 11 guards and 5 shock, were at the front.
Guards and shock armies, formed from the most combat-ready divisions, fought in the decisive areas of strategic operations.
One of the difficult moments in the activity of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was the question of the distribution and direction of ready reserves to the fronts. The correct solution of this problem depended on the skillful determination of the main link in the existing strategic situation. The most important principle of the Supreme High Command in the distribution of fresh forces was, first of all, to send them to those areas where decisive battles were to unfold.
Anticipating the most acute events, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief personally asked the commanders of the troops of the fronts and the representatives of the Headquarters attached to them - whether they had enough strength to completely defeat the enemy grouping. If necessary, the fronts always received additional reserves and marching reinforcements.
According to the data of the daily accounting of the number and readiness of reserves and marching replenishment conducted in the General Staff, the Supreme Commander had his own table of the availability of forces and means in the rear. By order of the Headquarters, they were sent to where they were in special need. Difficult situations also arose when the Headquarters could not satisfy the requests of the front commanders for the allocation of reserves. Such an example is typical. In June 1942, the Supreme Commander, in response to a similar request from the commander of the Southwestern Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko, replied: “... the Headquarters does not have new divisions ready for battle ... besides your front, we also have other fronts ... We must fight not by numbers, but by skill. On another occasion, I.V. Stalin "explained" S.K. Timoshenko: "If divisions were sold on the market, I would buy 5-6 divisions for you, but, unfortunately, they are not being sold."
Comprehensively thought-out solutions were also required for issues related to the most rational concentration and efficient use of reserves. Rates. The success of not only individual strategic operations and campaigns, but the entire war as a whole depended on this. As experience has shown, these problems of military art were solved highly professionally and at the proper level.
At the time of the perfidious invasion of the USSR, the fascist German army, developing the offensive in three main directions, dealt the main blow in the central, Smolensk-Moscow. Correctly assessing the current situation, the High Command threw all the forces available in the reserve there in order to organize a strategic defense, the main task of which was to stop the enemy at all costs, to buy time to build up forces to go on the counteroffensive.
On the fourth day of the war, to restore the strategic defense front, the Stavka decided to use the 19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd (commanded by Generals I.S. Konev, P.A. Kurochkin, V.F. Gerasimenko and F.A. Ershakov) armies , put forward from the depths, in order to create a defense at the turn of the Western Dvina - the Dnieper. The command of the army group was entrusted to Marshal of the Soviet Union S.M. Budyonny. At the same time, the forces of the 24th and 28th armies (commanded by Generals S.A. Kalinin and D.I. Ryabyshev) launched defense preparations along the Selizharovo-Smolensk-Roslavl-Gomel line. The 16th Army under the command of General M.F. Lukin was concentrated in the Smolensk region.
During the battle of Smolensk, the Headquarters deployed in the rear of the Western Front (commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko) a new echelon of reserve armies (29.30, 24.28, 31 and 32) led by General I.A. Bogdanov . Of the 20 rifle divisions of this echelon, five army groups were created (commander generals K.K. Rokossovsky, V.A. Khomenko, S.A. Kalinin, V.Ya. counterattacks against the fascist troops and unite with the troops of the Western Front, who fought in the encirclement in the Smolensk region.
In order to more reliably cover Moscow, on July 30, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command formed the Reserve Front (commander Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov). He united the 34th, 31st, 24th, 43rd, 32nd and 33rd armies, which included 12 divisions of the capital's people's militia. The troops of the front occupied the Rzhev-Vyazma line of defense.
The strategic calculation of the Nazi command for a non-stop advance towards Moscow was thwarted. In October 1942, when the operational-strategic situation became even more aggravated, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command sent 18 personnel divisions from Central Asia, Siberia, Transbaikalia and the Far East to the Moscow direction, having information that "the Japanese government decided not to oppose the USSR" .
By the decision of the State Defense Committee on the outskirts of the capital, the Moscow Defense Zone was created under the leadership of the commander of the Moscow Military District, General P.A. Artemyev. It included parts of the capital's garrison, formations of the people's militia and divisions that arrived from other military districts. A significant contribution to strengthening the defense of Moscow and Leningrad was made by 12 divisions formed in the autumn 1941 years in the Siberian military district.
At the same time, five reserve armies were concentrated in the area of Dmitrov, Lobnya, south of Orekho-Zuev, in Ryazan and Ryazhsk.
The State Defense Committee, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Soviet government did everything possible to stop the fascist hordes at the walls of Moscow. Most of the reserves of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command - 150 rifle divisions (52%) and 44 rifle brigades (47%) - were given to the troops of the Moscow direction. And although numerical superiority over the enemy was not achieved, the Soviet troops in fierce defensive battles provided the conditions for going on a counteroffensive with decisive goals.
The defeat of the Nazi troops in the Battle of Moscow radically changed the course of the war in favor of the Soviet Union. However, the situation remained tense. The front needed a huge amount of fresh forces and new reserves. In November-December 1941, they were preparing at an accelerated pace in the front line. In the areas of Krechetovo, Vologda, Gryazovets, Yaroslavl, Gorky, Alatyr, Saratov and Stalingrad, the training of 8 combined arms armies consisting of 52 rifle and 15 cavalry divisions was completed. However, during the general offensive of the Soviet troops in the winter 1941/42 year as a result of the "dispersal" of strategic reserves, no positive results were achieved. Due to the major mistakes of the Supreme High Command, all of them were completely used up. By June 1942 In the 1990s, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command did not actually have ready-made reserve formations.
At this time, their bulk (69 rifle divisions, 5 rifle brigades and 1 tank army) were intensively preparing and concentrated along two lines: the first - Vyshny Volochek, Moscow, Ryazan, Tambov, Borisoglebsk, Stalingrad; the second - Vologda, Yaroslavl, Gorky, Saratov, Kamyshin.
Serious miscalculations by the Headquarters in determining the direction of the main attack of the fascist German army in the summer of 1942 also led to an incorrect distribution of reserves. The bug has been fixed.
In the summer-autumn campaign of 1942, the principle of concentrating large reserves in the most important areas was maintained. Stalingrad turned out to be the main sector of the Soviet-German front. The Stavka transferred two-thirds of its reserves to the South-Western strategic direction. The 60th and 6th (commanded by Generals I.D. Chernyakhovsky and F.M. Kharitonov) armies were advanced to the Voronezh sector from the reserve. In order to block the path to the Volga for the fascist troops, on July 12, 1942, the Headquarters created a new, Stalingrad Front, the core of which was three reserve armies: 64.63 and 62 (commanded by Generals M.S. Shumilov, V.Ya. Kolpakchi, V. I. Kuznetsov, later A. Ilopatin and V. I. Chuikov). Troops of the 1st, 4th and 5th tank armies were concentrated in the area of Kalach, Ilovlinskaya and Serafimovich (commanded by generals M.E. Katukov, V.D. Kryuchenkon, PL. Romanenko). At the end of August, the Stavka transferred the 24th, 1st Guards and 66th armies to the Stalingrad Front (commanded by Generals D.T. Kozlov, K.S. Moskalenko, R.Ya. Malinovsky).
The Headquarters and the General Staff paid special attention to the recruitment and cohesion of the newly created South-Western, as well as to strengthening the Don Front. In October, more than six divisions, understaffed across the Volga, were sent to Stalingrad to help the troops of the 62nd Army, by decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.
Before the counteroffensive near Stalingrad, in order to create a decisive superiority in the forces, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command from its reserve transferred to the fronts only from November 20 to December 31, 1942 20 rifle divisions, 6 tank, 4 mechanized corps, 7 separate tank brigades, 25 artillery regiments and 2 aviation corps . The troops received the latest military equipment and weapons. Mechanized and tank formations had world-famous T-34 tanks, which allowed the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to set more complex tasks for the troops. To build up the strength of the advancing troops, she created the 3rd Guards and 5th shock (commanded by Generals D.D. Lelyushenko, N.E. Berzarin) armies, which have high mobility and huge striking power.
The victory on the Volga further convinced that the final turning point in the war could not be achieved without strong and varied reserves. Therefore, when developing the plan for the summer campaign of 1943, the State Defense Committee and the Headquarters of the Supreme Command assigned a special place to the deployment of powerful strategic reserves, taking into account the military-political tasks of the upcoming campaign, the availability of human, military-technical resources and vehicles. In a short time, huge forces of various types of troops and branches of the Armed Forces were accumulated on the territory of the Moscow and Volga military districts. They concentrated on the Smolensk direction, in the region of Kaluga, Voronezh and Voroshilovgrad. They consisted of 15 armies (including 2 tank armies), uniting 94 rifle divisions, 13 tank, 3 mechanized and 5 cavalry corps. The total number of personnel of the Stavka reserves exceeded 1 million people.
The highest degree of concentration of reserve formations of the Headquarters of the High Command was in the Voronezh direction. In the rear of the Central and Voronezh fronts at the Livny-Stary Oskol line, a reserve front was formed - the Steppe Military District (since July 9, the Steppe Front under the command of Marshal I.S. Konev). It included the 2nd reserve, 27th, 53rd, 4th and 5th guards, 47th combined arms (commanded by generals V.I. Morozov, S.T. Trofimenko, I.M. Managarov, G.I. Kulik, A.S. Zhadov, A.I. Ryzhov) and the 5th tank (under the command of General P.A. Rotmistrov) armies. In July, the front received two more armies. Thus, 50% of all reserve troops of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command were united as part of the Steppe Front. It was the most powerful front-line grouping, most of whose divisions underwent combat training, having received high field training.
The Steppe Front was faced with the task of preventing a deep breakthrough of the advancing enemy, and when our troops went on the counteroffensive, to increase the power of their strike from the depths on the Kursk ledge. The goal of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in the formation of such an organizationally completed strategic link, capable of entering the battle in any direction, was achieved.
The heavy defeat of the fascist army in the Battle of Kursk allowed the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to further change the balance of forces on the Soviet-German front in favor of the Red Army. The continuous increase in the combat power of the army in the field created the conditions for reducing the number of trained reserves. Therefore, in the summer of 1944, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command had at its disposal only six armies (of which 2 were tank armies), consisting of 36 rifle divisions and 4 tank corps.
At the final stage of the war, the Headquarters reserve (on January 1, 1945) included the Field Directorate of the former 3rd Baltic Front, the Karelian Front, consisting of three armies, as well as the 5th Guards Tank and 9th Guards Armies; On May 1, 1945, the Headquarters had at its disposal the Reserve Front Directorate, the Zemland Group of Forces, consisting of four armies (the former 1st Baltic Front). In preparing the final operations of the Great Patriotic War - the Vistula-Oder, East Prussian and especially Berlin - the Headquarters accumulated such forces as to create a double, triple and greater superiority over the fascist troops in the direction of the main attacks. Owing to the increased level of military art of the commanders and the fighting skill of the soldiers, these operations were distinguished by their special scope, decisiveness and high efficiency in the destruction of large strategic enemy groupings.
The undoubted merit of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff is the skillful and creative combat use of strategic reserves. In the first period of the war, they were and acted on the defensive and solved various, but equally complex tasks: the restoration of the repeatedly broken through Soviet strategic defense front, including twice in the main, central direction; creation of the greatest depth of defense in the direction of the main attacks of the enemy; reinforcement of active fronts by forming large strike groupings in order to deliver powerful counterattacks and go on the offensive with the main forces of the fronts in a given direction, etc.
In the second and third periods of the war, the most characteristic feature of the use of strategic reserves was sudden, massive actions with decisive goals up to the complete defeat of enemy troops in offensive operations; achieving superiority over the fascist troops in forces and means and building up strikes by the main groupings of the advancing troops. The actions of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff in the use of the strategic reserve troops were distinguished by: the absence of a template, taking into account the accumulated experience, recognition of the mistakes and miscalculations made, understanding them and preventing them in the future, genuine collective creativity in resolving issues of concentration and timely massive use of forces.
The basis for success in solving the complex complex problem of troop reserves during the war years was the competent, highly qualified leadership of this most important area of military organizational activity of the central bodies of the Soviet state and the Armed Forces to achieve victory over fascist Germany. It was carried out by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff on the basis of the relevant resolutions of the State Defense Committee. All fundamental issues related to the order of formation and combat training, concentration, determination of specific goals and tasks for their use, redeployment, transfer to the active fronts and withdrawal at the disposal of the Headquarters, were resolved at the highest level.
Direct operational work was entrusted to the Department of Reserves, created in August 1941 in the Operational Directorate of the General Staff. After its disbandment (April 1942), planning, development of directives for the withdrawal of formations and units from the fronts to the reserve of the Headquarters, daily accounting, deployment and control over the progress of the staffing of strategic reserves became the responsibility of the Department in the structure of the General Staff Organizational Directorate. In April 1943, it was reorganized and strengthened.
The issue of the state of the reserves (among other paramount ones) was reported daily by the Chief of the General Staff to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The corresponding directives were also approved here. All the changes that had taken place were put on the map of the location of the reserves of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, which was also available to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Thus, the strictest daily operational control was achieved over the course of the formation and resupply, as well as the redeployment of divisions and armies that were at the disposal of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.
The facts summarized above allow us to conclude that the reserves of the Supreme High Command of the Red Army were the main means of restoring and building up the combat potential of the Armed Forces, strengthening the existing fronts in the main directions and the most dangerous sectors of the decisive battles of the Great Patriotic War. They were the most important condition for the victory of the Armed Forces of the USSR over the army of Nazi Germany.
The creative, skillful, comprehensively thought-out approach of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff to the creation and use of strategic reserves clearly showed the superiority of the Soviet military strategy over the strategy of the fascist leadership.
The war of the Soviet Union with Germany and its satellites convincingly proved that it is impossible to fight without reserves. Therefore, the lessons and experience of solving this problem cannot be forgotten. Its relevance is determined not only by external, but also by internal factors. In conditions when there is no Warsaw Pact, NATO's power is maintained and strategy is being improved, new types of weapons and military equipment appear, close attention is required to assessing the balance of power between the forces of peace and war.
50 years of the Armed Forces of the USSR. - M.: Military Publishing, 1968. - S.235.
F at to about in G.K. Memories and reflections. - M.: APN Publishing House, 1971. - S.218.
50 years of the Armed Forces of the USSR. - P.257.
Military history magazine. - 1972. -№12. - P.46.
TsAMORF, f.15, op.2245, d.85, ll.123, 146.
Ibid., op.113, d.1, sheet 160.
Shtemenko S.M. General Staff during the war. Book one. -M.: Military Publishing House, 1985.- P.65.
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RESERVES(from lat. reservo - save, store),
1) the formation of various types of the Armed Forces, human resources, weapons, military equipment and other materiel, retained for a certain time and intended to strengthen active army and navy. During the Great Patriotic War, according to their purpose and scale of use, the reserves were divided into strategic, operational and tactical.
Strategic reserves included: troops directly subordinated to the High Command [since 8/8/1941 - the Supreme High Command (VGK)] (reserves of the VGK); stocks of weapons and military equipment stored in arsenals, warehouses, bases and factories of the military industry; material reserves accumulated by the state.
The troops of the High Command Reserve were created to deploy the Armed Forces in the event of a war and to strengthen them during operations. In accordance with pre-war mobilization plans, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24 and 28 armies were formed on the basis of the troops of the internal districts, in total - 77 divisions (rifle - 58, tank - 13, mechanized - 6). Before the start of the war, some of them managed to be sent to reinforce the border districts, the rest were soon also introduced into the troops of the fronts in threatened directions.
In addition, the reserves of the Supreme High Command included special units (artillery, tank, chemical, engineering, etc.), which were not organizationally part of the combined arms formations and were intended to strengthen the latter, depending on the operational and tactical tasks performed by these formations.
With the outbreak of war, a mass formation of formations and units unfolded. To streamline and centralize the work on creating reserves, by the decision of the State Defense Committee of July 16, 1941 “On the training of reserves in the system of NPOs and the Navy”, direct management of their preparation was entrusted to a special group created under the NPO of the USSR.
From Aug. In 1941, the task of forming, manning and combat training of new units and formations was assigned to the Main Directorate of Formation and Staffing of the Red Army. As a result of his active work, only for the period from 22.6. by 1.12. In 1941, 159 rifle, cavalry and tank divisions, 35 people's militia divisions, 94 rifle, tank and motorized brigades were formed and sent to the active army, which played an important role in stabilizing the front and frustrating the enemy's offensive plans in the summer-autumn of 1941.
The introduction of fresh strategic reserves, massing them in the most important areas ensured the success of the transition to the counteroffensive under Moscow and its subsequent development into a general offensive in the winter of 1941/42.
Along with the troops of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command (RVGK), units and formations of artillery and aviation of the RVGK were used to strengthen the firepower of the fronts. All reserves of the Supreme High Command were at the direct disposal of VGK rates.
In the interior districts, the formation of reserve armies continued. Of great importance in the preparation of strategic reserves was the GKO decree of March 16, 1942, according to which the training of reserves began to be carried out mainly through the completion and training of formations and formations withdrawn from the fronts to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Subsequently, they were used mainly to create strike groups, build up efforts during offensive operations and ensure their successful development and completion.
During the Great Patriotic War, in the reserve of the Supreme High Command at different times, depending on the situation, there were from 2 to 9 combined arms, 3-14 tank (mechanized), 4-10 artillery corps; 16-60 rifle, airborne and 3-24 air divisions, as well as a significant number of regiments and brigades.
What was new in domestic and world practice was that at certain stages of the war, not only armies, but also entire fronts were in the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. For example, the Reserve Front - in the Moscow direction in 1941, the Steppe Front - near Kursk in 1943. The presence of trained strategic reserves allowed the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to plan and carry out strategic operations that were sequentially deployed along the front and in depth, and at the end of the war to conduct an offensive simultaneously on everything Soviet-German front.
Operational reserves, according to the military-theoretical views of the pre-war period, were "military units and formations at the disposal of the army (front), which, when planning and preparing the operation, did not receive a specific task for one or another of its stages." According to the definition of the Operational Dictionary of 1940, they were to be used by the command "as a factor capable of changing the operational situation in a favorable direction at the decisive moment of the operation, as well as to counteract unfavorable accidents in the course of the development of the operation or to strengthen formations performing an important operational task."
tactical reserves were created from a company to a corps and consisted of rifle subunits (units), subunits (units) of military branches and special troops. They were intended to reinforce active troops, to replace units and units that had lost their combat capability, to perform tasks that suddenly appeared during the battle.
Troop reserves armaments, military equipment, and other materiel were also subdivided into tactical (stored in subdivisions, units, formations) and operational (available in associations).
2) An element of operational formation (battle order), designed to solve problems that suddenly arise in the course of an operation (battle). In combined-arms formations, formations and units during the Great Patriotic War, reserves were usually created: general, tank, anti-tank and a reserve of special troops, which were included in their operational formation (battle order).
During the preparation and conduct of offensive operations (battles) in the first period of the war, when the enemy's defense was shallow and intermittent, and subunits, units and formations had a two-echelon formation of battle formations, a general reserve was not created.
Based on the experience gained, on October 8, 1942, the People's Commissar of Defense issued an order No. 306 on the transition to a one-echelon formation of battle formations from a company to a division with the allocation of a reserve consisting of 1/9 forces and means. This contributed to the maximum involvement of firepower in defeating the enemy and participation in the attack of the main infantry forces.
In an offensive, combined-arms reserves were assigned the following tasks: to repulse sudden enemy attacks, especially on the flanks and junctions; support for leading combat units and units; development and consolidation of the achieved success.
Usually, reserves were allocated: in a battalion - a rifle platoon, several anti-tank rifles (PTR) and heavy machine guns; in the regiment - a company of shooters or machine gunners, a platoon of anti-tank rifles, heavy machine guns, 45-mm guns; in the division - a reinforced rifle battalion.
In the second period of the war, in connection with the transition of German-fascist. troops to deep positional defense operational formation (battle order) of the advancing owls. troops again became two-echelon with the allocation of a reserve.
In the third period, more forces and means appeared at the disposal of the command to create a reserve, which contributed to their quantitative increase and qualitative improvement. For example, the operational formation of the 3rd Guards. tank army in the Vistula-Oder operation of 1945 consisted of two echelons, a general reserve, a reserve of military branches and special troops. The composition of the general reserve is the 16th self-propelled artillery brigade, 57th guards. heavy tank and 50th division. motorcycle shelves.
In defensive operations and battles at the beginning of the war, due to a lack of forces and means, the operational formation of formations, as well as the battle formations of subunits, units and formations, were built in one echelon with the allocation of a reserve. In the future, as armaments and military equipment increase in the troops with one or two echelon formation of fronts and armies, as well as the presence of two echelons in battle formations from company to corps, strong reserves are created: general, tank, art.-anti-tank, special.
The reserves of special troops were units and subunits engineering, chemical troops, connections and other special troops left by the commander (commander) in his direct subordination to solve problems that suddenly arise during the operation (battle).
The composition, location, direction of movement and possible tasks of the reserve were determined by him in the decision for the operation (battle). The reserves received specific combat missions directly in the course of hostilities in accordance with the evolving situation. After the completion of the operation (battle), the reserves were immediately restored.
In general, the early creation and skillful use of the reserves of owls. troops during the Great Patriotic War were one of the most important conditions for achieving victory over the enemy.
The main reserves of the fascist German army were represented by formations and units of the reserve of the main command, which were part of the army in the field, and the army of the reserve, which included headquarters and training military units located on German territory. Replenishment Wehrmacht in 1939–42, it was carried out by resupplying the existing formations, when the personnel came from the reserve army after appropriate training. In 1943–45, the active army was replenished mainly due to the formation of new divisions, which were recruited from the civilian population subject to conscription, as well as from military personnel recovering from wounds.
Based on the theory of "blitzkrieg", the German command sought to invest the entire offensive power of the Wehrmacht in the first strike against the enemy, without leaving any significant reserves in depth. The armed forces of Germany were deployed in one strategic echelon with the allocation of 10-20% of the forces participating in the strategic offensive to the reserve of the high command. So, in June 1941, 24 divisions were in the reserve of the High Command of the Ground Forces (OKH), which accounted for 15.7% of all German troops intended for the war with the USSR. divisions.
A distinctive feature of the strategy of fascist Germany was the desire to use the overwhelming majority of forces and reserves at the very beginning of the offensive in the main direction. At the same time, in the course of the offensive itself, the strengthening of strike groups was carried out not by sending available reserves to them, but mainly by maneuvering troops from other directions.
In the first months of the war, almost all the trained divisions in the OKH reserve were put into action. By the autumn of 1941, a very limited number of forces remained in the reserve - from 3 to 15 calculated divisions, most of which were in the process of formation or restoration. At the height of the battle near Moscow, all the available reserves of the ground forces were completely used up. The divisions transferred from the west also turned out to be spent. In May 1942, 4.5 combat-ready divisions remained in the OKH reserve, and before the start Battle of Kursk- only 3 combat-ready divisions, and 5 divisions were under restoration.
In the offensive, army groups delivered powerful blows in a one-echelon formation, having 1-3 divisions in reserve. The combat formations of army corps and infantry divisions consisted of two echelons and a reserve. Infantry regiments and battalions also had a two-echelon formation of battle formations without a reserve.
When conducting defensive operations, it. the command used a one-echelon formation of its strategic and operational groupings with the allocation of reserves. Since 1943, a corps and an infantry division had a combat order in one echelon with a reserve allocated: in the corps - with a force of 1-2 infantry battalions to a regiment; in a division - up to an infantry battalion with reinforcements.
In addition, strengthening it. corps and infantry divisions in the defense was carried out at the expense of artillery, mortar and tank units of the reserve of the main command. Each army corps was reinforced by 1-2 tank battalions of the RGK. The artillery and mortar units of the RGK received for reinforcement were assigned by divisions to infantry divisions, which usually used them centrally. Infantry regiments, battalions and companies also, as a rule, built their battle formations in one echelon.
At the same time, the following were allocated to the reserve: in the regiment - an infantry company; in an infantry battalion, a reinforced platoon; in an infantry company - a reinforced section. All reserves were located in the most threatened areas in the depths of the defense. sections of their units and divisions. Their skillful use of it. command, especially in the struggle for the tactical zone, strengthened the defense. At the same time, the general lack of strong reserves in tactical and operational depth, as well as the slow recovery of their combat effectiveness after counterattacks and counterattacks, adversely affected the stability of the German defense. troops.
In general, the lack of reserves became one of the important factors that led to the defeat of the Wehrmacht in the war.
Research Institute (Military History) VAGSh RF Armed Forces
So I decided to publish this article again from the website of the Union of Paratroopers of Russia, because the PR about the singing "paratroopers" again went on ... It turned out that these are ordinary mummers who are beaten in the face in Gorky Park on August 2 ...
1. Psychological digression into history. In the 1990s, the Russian method of rapidly forming a class of "effective owners," an invention of which Mr. Chubais is so proud, backfired.
The owners did not become "effective" because they did not feel, and could not feel like the legal owners of the property, who knows how they got it. Therefore: sell quickly, go bankrupt, hide money offshore, exchange for gold, expensive houses and cars, turn into pleasures were the first movements of most of the "new owners" of factories, hotels and steamships. Part of society tried to participate in the great redistribution, the other part - in the great lawlessness, part tried honestly, but most often unsuccessfully, to live according to the quickly concocted and crude laws of capitalist existence. Persons in state, municipal and economic positions were given the opportunity to participate in the division of property, the distribution of social benefits and benefits, and unanimously followed the call to “Get rich!”. The semi-legal and illegal division of property could not but affect the law enforcement system, whose employees had to regulate the process of division in the absence of normal and understandable laws.
As a result: the most dangerous thing happened not even in the economy, but in social psychology! The unpunished, corrupt method of enrichment, the consciousness of inferiority and precariousness of property rights has deeply penetrated and taken root in the psychology of the bureaucratic, economic and law enforcement classes of Russian society. Today, the interests of Russia as a state, the interests of the state power itself, the interests of its small homeland, the interests of its population, the preservation of its own habitat are not among the priorities of state and municipal officials, in the priorities of the business elite. Mr. Z. Brzezinski argues that the elite that invests its money in American banks is the American elite, not the Russian one. And he is right: Russia has lost its nationally oriented ruling class. The social system in Russia has acquired pronounced features of state-bureaucratic capitalism with an exorbitant number of officials who are indifferent to the problems of the state and the population, with an exorbitant level of corruption that threatens the foundations of the state, when its institutions cease to function effectively, and the execution of laws and state orders depends on the size " kickbacks."
The algorithm of the "development" of the system, laid down by its founding fathers: E. Gaidar and A. Chubais, also began to work in politics. Following this algorithm, in Russia, one after another, political parties appeared on the political Olympus, swelled, burst and bled liquid mud from the Olympus, imagining themselves to be eternally ruling. 20 years is a very short period of time by historical standards: the names had time to change - "Democratic Choice of Russia", "Our Home is Russia", "Unity" - but the main composition of the party, economic, financial, administrative elite at the regional, city, district level did not change . In fact, this is one and the same party of officials who, when changing the sign, unanimously changed party symbols, sometimes changed offices or chairs. Together with them or after them, new symbols were hung out and, without changing cabinets and chairs, only changing the portraits above them, the lists of the "new party" turned out to be servants of a lower rank. A stable “trade union of bureaucrats” was formed, soldered by economic interests, family ties, and friendly ties. Official servants always and everywhere, “From the Kremlin to the outskirts”, turned out to be the backbone of the “new party”, not allowing outsiders to manage the region, city, district, their finances, education, land, energy, utilities, etc. Power became their psychology, their patrimony, their image and meaning of life, the source of existence for themselves and their numerous relatives. The sale of "profitable" positions, bribes, "kickbacks", their intermediaries and offshore companies have become the norm.
Our July analysis and forecast for the elections held in December, unfortunately, turned out to be not far from the truth: “The country's leadership turned out to be a hostage to the power vertical of the “trade union of bureaucrats”. It seems that the federal government, even if it so desires, will not be able to completely eliminate the "violence" against voters, which has become a byword, in the upcoming December elections to the Duma. Regional and local officials, having mastered “election technologies” in recent years, do not intend to give up their “feeding troughs” (this happened, but in the end, the federal adding machine, V. Churov, was to blame). There is a danger that once again “raped” “citizens voters”, whose patience by all indications is running out, in March may break both “election technologies” and the “technologists” themselves. (“You can’t live like that!”, “Paratroopers of Russia”, August 2011)
V. V. Putin, belatedly, but saw this danger, as evidenced by his initiative to bring the ONF to the fore. However, the ruling class, which does not feel the country behind it and does not live by its interests, did not see the new, independent class that appeared over the years in Russian society. During the elections and after the elections, the same middle class, which has been talked about for 20 years, declared itself. Objectively, he could not help appearing: from the same energetic people who provided income to the elite living abroad; from educated young people who started their business with the assembly and repair of household appliances; from hundreds of thousands of discharged officers, patriotic and found themselves in civilian life; from the very course of time. This is a new class, with a different social psychology - different from the "elite". He is not burdened with thoughts about the inferiority of his social and property position, because he achieved it with his own work. He is not afraid of the investigator, the prosecutor and the court, because he achieved his position legally. He saw and appreciated the world, he wants and knows how to make his country, his small homeland and his environment "no worse than theirs." He is free, young, educated and ambitious, therefore relaxed and capable of more. He sees obstacles to his plans in the existing order and with objective inevitability will eliminate these obstacles, if not today, then tomorrow, since he is closely connected with the people. This process is objective, it cannot be stopped. We can and should only talk about legitimate and effective ways and means of its implementation.
Thoughtful reforms are needed, based on this young active middle class, which will enable its best representatives to be present in government, business, science, and the army. It is this class that is able to objectively formulate the national idea and become its bearer. It must be admitted that V. Putin, with his articles “Russia is concentrating…” and “Russia is a national question”, made it clear that he understands this and intends to rely on this class. If you do not give him these opportunities, tomorrow Russia may not be able to withstand another revolution and risk repeating the fate of the USSR.
Today we are witnessing an attempt by the same liberals from the 90s (Nemtsov, Kasyanov, Shenderovich, Ryzhkov, etc.) to "saddle" the discontent of the population, outraged not so much by the results as by the methods of the past elections, to declare themselves the spokesmen for the aspirations of the middle class and from its name to arrange a "color revolution". The real representatives of the middle class are pushed aside and used as a backdrop for the "petrels of the revolution" in Russia.
2. And here comes the first moment of truth. Today, the number and frequency of local and rebellious armed conflicts, which do not carry the threat of a “big” war, have increased so much in the world that we can talk about them as a way to achieve national interests - safe for its initiators. The experience of initiating and supporting local, rebellious conflicts, guerrilla wars, color revolutions has been successfully adopted by our partners. The problem of energy resources is solved by Western countries with the help of "color" revolutions and rebellious conflicts, followed by the use of military force. Modern armies are also adapting to this method of war. As early as 2009, the areas of possible conflicts were predicted by the National Security Concept of the Russian Federation: “The attention of international (read American) politics ... will be focused on the possession of sources of energy resources in the Middle East, ... in Central Asia, in a number of countries in South Asia and Africa ... , on the shelf of the Barents Sea and in other regions of the Arctic, in the Caspian Sea basin ... . The situation in Iraq and Afghanistan will have a negative impact on the international situation….
Any sovereign state has the right to uphold and defend its ideology, its laws, traditions and its independence, its faith and idols, its well-being. The desire of the West to impose its laws and its rules on democracy is wrong and, moreover, unsuccessful. In Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, after a revolutionary uprising, radical Islamists come to power, with concepts very far from democracy, but with obligations to provide their resources to transnational companies. That's the whole democratic interest and altruism of the West.
Globalization, openness of borders, freedom of movement of finances, modern information and propaganda technologies facilitate the initiation of "color revolutions", stimulation of local and internal, rebellious conflicts. Borders, customs, laws of sovereign states are the main obstacles to the extraction of super profits by transnational companies. Next in line are Syria and Iran. Who can guarantee that the West's long-term plans have no intentions towards Russia with its dependent and discredited "elites", with its world resources, with its militarily uncovered expanses?
The US administration intends to conduct "expeditionary combat operations" (the Pentagon's term) in any part of the world. To do this, the United States has 20 airborne and air assault battalions (82 airborne and 101 airborne) and a 175,000-strong "expeditionary" marine corps. They are being transferred to lighter and more mobile multi-purpose equipment, and the autonomy of providing these troops is expanding. The capabilities of the US Army in conducting psychological and information warfare are being improved.
European NATO countries have formed a 25,000-strong mobile force for use outside NATO's area of responsibility. Germany is significantly increasing the share of units adapted for crisis response. France reduces the number of tank units for the "big" war by 50%, replacing them with lighter and more mobile ones.
The American missile defense system is deployed in a number of European countries, near the borders of the Russian Federation. And Novaya Gazeta and Ekho Moskvy, through the mouth of Pavel Filgenhauer, tell tales that missile defense is not directed against Russia, and naive Americans even pay the same naive Poles and Romanians for allegedly protecting them from Iranian missiles. However, as a result of the deployment of missile defense, military experts predict the potential for the devaluation of the Russian strategic nuclear deterrence forces, given the overwhelming superiority of the United States in conventional weapons.
Three-kilometer concrete runways have been built at the Afghan airfields in Bagram, Kandahar and Kabul, which have been turned into modern American air bases. In their zone of reach is the whole of Central Asia - the states with which Russia has a collective security agreement (CSTO).
The Arctic areas, where the main sources of hydrocarbons and income for our oligarchs and the state are located, are not covered by anything either from the air or from the Arctic Ocean, which is gradually becoming navigable, including for aircraft carrier strike formations.
The psychology of military superiority can play a cruel joke on the United States.
In Russia, the military reform, despite numerous, sharp criticisms of the Ministry of Defense, has led to a significant increase in the mobility, combat readiness and combat capability of the general forces of the Russian Army. By implementing the defensive doctrine, the strategic commands and groupings of troops of the military districts are gradually brought to a combat-ready state. Mistakes made by the General Staff during the unprepared transfer of the army (again under severe pressure from the liberal public) to a one-year conscription service are being corrected. Along with the social security of servicemen, the prestige of military service is also rising. The implementation of the state armaments program until 2020 (SAP-2020) will significantly raise the level of the defense capability of the Russian Federation.
Responsibility for ensuring the country's defense capacity lies with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, who, according to the Constitution, is the President of the Russian Federation.
3. And here comes the second moment of truth! Which of the five contenders for the presidency: V. Putin, G. Zyuganov, S. Mironov, V. Zhirinovsky or M. Prokhorov are able to: 1. Assess the degree of threats and neutralize potential threats by all possible means - from diplomatic to military? 2. Who will be able to ensure the implementation of the State Armaments Program (GPV-2020)? 3. Who will bring the post-reform army into combat readiness? 4. Who will be able to manage the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in a threatened or, God forbid, in a war period? 5. Who will be able to bring the "American-Russian elite" to life, replace it with a nationally oriented one, curb corruption in the country? is one of the most important national security issues.
For paratroopers, these questions are not idle. We had to, losing fighting friends, keep Russia from disintegration in the North Caucasus in 1994-2004; protect the honor of the army and ensure the national interests of Russia in the Balkans in 1992-2002; to protect Russia from humiliation in the Transcaucasus in August 2008. At the same time, the Supreme Commanders of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (V. Putin, D. Medvedev) did not betray and did not frame the paratroopers, as another Supreme Commander (M. Gorbachev) did this more than once during the half-life of the USSR , after landing operations in Tbilisi, in Vilnius, in Baku.
However, military reform measures that increase the combat potential of general-purpose forces, applied without correction to the Airborne Forces, have made them less versatile, less mobile and less autonomous. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief represented by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation today does not have a reserve, because the Airborne Forces, having survived as a branch of the military, have lost the status of an operational group of troops - a reserve of the Supreme High Command. Reduced together with the main commands and central directorates of the RF Ministry of Defense, the Command of the Airborne Forces is losing operational independence. As the experience of the exercises "Center 2011" showed, the Airborne Forces have lost the ability to deploy a command post and organize rear, technical, reconnaissance support for an operational group of troops. These costs of the military reform are fixable and, as the results of the meeting on January 17 this year of the leadership of the Ministry of Defense with the leadership of the Union of Russian Paratroopers and the Command of the Airborne Forces showed, our opinion was heard and accepted with understanding by the military-political leadership of the country.
In addition to the Airborne Forces, in Russia today there are no more effective military tools to quickly respond to suddenly emerging military threats (local, border, rebellious armed conflicts). The Airborne Forces have strategic mobility (transfers between theaters) and tactical mobility (movement in combat space). In this, the paratroopers are an order of magnitude more mobile than other general-purpose forces. In terms of the degree of strategic and tactical mobility and combat effectiveness, mobile, landing and expeditionary formations and parts of other countries cannot be compared with the Airborne Forces. The Airborne Forces is a unique and most modern branch of the military, a decade ahead of its foreign counterparts. Similar forces in the United States are planned to be created in 2015. As a reserve of the Supreme Commander, the Airborne Forces must be kept in constant readiness for deployment and independent action as an operational group.
We carefully analyze the party programs, the speeches of their leaders - candidates for the President of the Russian Federation.
G. A. Zyuganov, without further ado and without specifying, stated: “Special attention of the state will be paid to strengthening the country's defense capability, increasing the combat readiness of the Armed Forces. The authorities must guarantee decent social security for servicemen, veterans, citizens discharged from military service, and members of their families.” Undoubtedly, but also unplanned.
Gennady Andreevich, in our opinion, is able to defeat and defeat corruption, but only together with the economy and the country. The two-year presidential period announced by him with the appointment of new elections under the new rules will inevitably lead to chaos, to a war of all against all, for at least 5-7 years. Russia quite recently, in the 1990s, hardly survived this scenario. There is no need to repeat the mistakes of the CPSU, which voluntarily gave power to the “democrats”. In Russia, one must go to power without fear of either the authorities or Russia, with serious and resolute intentions, with long-term clear and understandable programs.
S. M. Mironov made public his program of a presidential candidate. His Presidential and party programs of military development correspond to the spirit of the times. We know Sergei Mikhailovich as a principled and trained member of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, as a courageous and honest person, as his comrade-in-arms, a patriot of Russia. There is a decision of the 8th Conference of the Union of Russian Paratroopers - to support their comrades in the elections, regardless of their party affiliation. The paratroopers have always supported and continue to support the senior sergeant of the Airborne Forces S. M. Mironov.
However, there was not a single paratrooper in his “royal”, that is, deputy, retinue. At the plenary meeting of the Duma on October 19, 2011, a member of the Just Russia faction, V. Lokareva, reproached B. Gryzlov: “Boris Vyacheslavovich, you declared the Airborne Troops to be the elite. "Fair Russia" notes that the entire Russian army and all power structures should become the elite. This statement can be put on a par with L. I. Brezhnev’s ever-memorable saying: “The economy must be economical!”
The most original way in the field of national security was marked by a young representative of the "old elite" - M. D. Prokhorov, who proposed to unite the finances of Europe and Russia. In this regard, I'll just quote old Rockefeller: "I don't care who runs the country. Give me control of the financial system, and I'll rule!" So will we be ruled, God forbid, by "enlightened Europeans" as a result of the most "effective management" in Russia?
V.F. Zhirinovsky has not yet announced the Presidential program, but he sets tasks in the party program. “Firstly, Russian foreign policy should prevent the unification of anti-Russian forces in the South and prevent the emergence of a conflict between the Orthodox and Muslim worlds. Secondly, the Russian military doctrine should ensure the deterrence of a potential aggressor and the lightning defeat of the enemy in local conflicts, including those involving the use of nuclear weapons. Thirdly, in order to effectively combat crime and terror, law enforcement agencies must be sharply strengthened and a powerful state security body with broad powers should be created.” There are no specific areas of military construction in this program either, but the “geopolitical ringing” for the whole world in the usual manner of Vladimir Volfovich.
Is he capable of defeating corruption??? - Question and big!
V. V. Putin: “From January 1, 2012, the monetary allowance of military personnel, the pensions of all military pensioners, will be increased, by the end of 2012 all work related to the provision of service housing to the military will be completed.” The declared and implemented state armaments program (GPV-2020) provides for financing of the state defense order in the amount of 20 trillion rubles, if they are not stolen by customers in uniform and contractors without shoulder straps. In 1999-2004, V. Putin proved his ability to effectively perform the military duties of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. However, will he be able to do the main thing: bring the "American-Russian elite" to life, replace it with a nationally oriented one, curb corruption in the country? Anyone who answered this question positively can cast their vote for the candidate for the President of the Russian Federation - Putin V.V.
P.S. The Union of Russian Paratroopers refused to participate in political parties. But each of us is free to determine his political preferences and membership in any party - this is not an obstacle to membership in the Union of Russian Paratroopers. We live here and now, but we think about the future of our children, about the future of our Motherland.
At one time, we defended the country from disintegration and humiliation. But today, from the same vile and past time, Russia has been hobbled by an old misfortune: not so much "fools and roads" as the threat of the decomposition of society as a result of corruption. It's time to protect the country from decay, friends! At the same time, to prevent a new disaster - uncontrolled revolutionary chaos that could destroy the country. The “trade union of bureaucrats” turns out to be able only to record the negative development of events, taking them like a boa rabbit. The “petrels of the revolution” are waiting for the “first blood” to unleash a new round of tension so that the centrifugal processes become irreversible. Times are tough. Let's expand, strengthen and consolidate our Union, while seriously thinking for whom and for what purposes our practical works, gatherings, slogans, songs, etc. work.
NOBODY EXCEPT US!
Pavel Popovskikh,
Chairman of the Central Council of the Union of Paratroopers of Russia,
Head of Intelligence of the Airborne Forces (1990 - 1997)
According to the Soviet military science of the pre-war years, fire defeat of the enemy was to be carried out by delivering a simultaneous strike by the forces of all branches of the armed forces to the entire depth of the enemy defense. At the same time, the main role was assigned to artillery, which was organizationally divided into military artillery, which was part of subdivisions (starting from the battalion), units and formations, and artillery of the High Command Reserve (RGK). As part of the artillery of the RGC, it was supposed to have ground and anti-aircraft artillery units, which were intended for the qualitative, quantitative and special strengthening of the artillery of corps and divisions. Artillery units of the RGK were, as a rule, part of long-range corps and divisional artillery groups (DD), whose main task was to fight enemy artillery, or they were included in destruction artillery groups (AR), created if necessary to destroy heavily fortified enemy defensive lines . The creation of anti-tank units of the RGK was not envisaged. The outbreak of World War II refuted this point of view, since large masses of tanks were used in the course of its operations and only effective anti-tank weapons could be opposed to them. However, the decision to form 10 anti-tank artillery brigades of the RGK was made only at the end of April 1941.
Anti-tank artillery brigades, consisting of two regiments of six divisions, were powerful artillery formations. According to the state, the brigade had 120 anti-tank guns, 16 MZA anti-aircraft guns and 12 large-caliber anti-aircraft machine guns.
The formation of brigades began in mid-May 1941 directly in the frontier military districts. The deadline for final readiness for most of them was set on July 1, 1941. Such a short period of time was clearly not enough to properly equip, train and put together brigades as combat units. Due to the shortage of anti-tank guns, the Main Artillery Directorate began supplying 76-mm and 85-mm anti-aircraft guns to the armament of the formations being formed. The situation with the provision of brigades with traction and vehicles was much worse. As of June 12, 1941, they had almost no tractors and received only 20% of the vehicles required by the state.
There were actually no funds for creating anti-aircraft artillery units of the RGC before the war. What was available was spent on staffing anti-aircraft air defense units designed to cover the objects of the country's territory. In the troops, not even all corps and divisions had the separate anti-aircraft artillery divisions of the SZA and MZA assigned to them according to the state (As of June 1, 1941, there were 1382 guns in the military anti-aircraft artillery, and 4900 were required in the states). Part of the GAU anti-aircraft guns was transferred to the formation of anti-tank artillery brigades.
In total, according to the wartime states in the Red Army, it was supposed to have 67335 guns and mortars, of which 4854 were in parts of the RGK. Before the war, the RGK artillery had 60 howitzer and 14 cannon artillery regiments, 10 anti-tank artillery brigades and several separate divisions (battalions) and batteries, which accounted for 8% of all artillery. They were armed mainly with large-caliber guns: 122-210-mm cannons, 152-305-mm howitzers, 280-mm mortars (60%). Anti-tank guns and mortars were respectively 28 and 12%.
The distribution of artillery units of the RGK between the districts on the eve of the war was uneven. As can be seen from the table, the largest number of them were stationed in the southwestern strategic direction, where the High Command expected the enemy to deliver the main blow.
| Data on | Types of artillery | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| anti-tank | cannon | howitzer | mortars | reactive | anti-aircraft | ||||||||||||||||||||
| ptabr | ptap | paws | Total | HC* | dad, tpap | one OM, BM | Total | HC | gap, gap BM | one BM | Total | HC | minp | mind, minb | Total | HC | shelves | Drs. | Total | HC | shelves | Drs. | Total | HC | |
| 22.06.1941 | 10 | - | - | 20 | 18 | 14 | 2 | 15 | 14 | 60 | 13 | 64 | 58 | - | 11 | 11 | 10 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 01.12.1941 | 1 | 56 | - | 58 | 23 | 101 | 1 | 101 | 40 | 53 | 15 | 68 | 23 | - | 14 | 14 | 5 | 7 | 52 | 24 | 9 | - | - | - | - |
| 01.05.1942 | 1 | 120 | - | 122 | 21 | 176 | 4 | 177 | 30 | 145 | 13 | 149 | 26 | 63 | - | 63 | 11 | 56 | 47 | 72 | 12 | - | - | - | - |
| 20.11.1942 | - | 161 | 79 | 240 | 22 | 198 | 4 | 199 | 18 | 192 | 13 | 196 | 17 | 73 | 10 | 83 | 7 | 98 | 119 | 138 | 12 | 159 | 94 | 253 | 24 |
Compiled according to: History of the Second World War 1939-1945. T-34; Artillery in defensive operations of the Great Patriotic War. - Prince. I; Artillery in offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War. - Prince. I; Fighter-anti-tank artillery in the Great Patriotic War.
* HC - specific gravity in percent.When counting the number of regiments, it is conditionally considered that three separate cannon (howitzer) divisions and three rocket artillery divisions are equivalent in terms of firepower to a regiment. One mortar battalion (battalion) is equated to a mortar regiment
Thus, by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the RGK artillery consisted mainly of heavy cannon and howitzer artillery units, intended for the qualitative reinforcement of military artillery, anti-tank artillery formations, as well as individual mortar battalions. There were no anti-aircraft units.
The perfidious attack of fascist Germany put our troops in a difficult position. The rapid advance of the enemy inland led to the fact that the plans for rearmament and the formation of many artillery units and formations were actually thwarted. For the same reasons, the covering troops did not receive the personnel, means of transport and traction attached to them according to the mobilization plan. This had an extremely negative impact on the combat readiness of the artillery and its rear services.
The fight against enemy tanks throughout the Great Patriotic War was one of the most important tasks of Soviet artillery, both military and RGC. Therefore, already in the first months of the battles with the fascist hordes, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command paid great attention to the formation of new artillery units of the RVGK, especially anti-tank ones. In July-August alone, 45 artillery regiments were formed, of which 42 (more than 90%) were anti-tank defense regiments (PTO).
During the border battles and subsequent fierce battles, the RVGK artillery suffered significant damage. There was a real threat of losing units of large and special power, which, as a rule, did not take part in battles, since they were not adapted to conduct highly maneuverable combat operations, but were in the reserve of fronts (armies). In this regard, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief allowed the redeployment of some artillery units of the RGK, armed mainly with 305-mm howitzers and 280-mm mortars, from the fronts (except for the Leningrad front) to the internal military districts.
In an environment of declining resources of artillery weapons, the Headquarters of the RVGK took all measures to keep the artillery of the RVGK at the highest possible level and constantly strengthened it through the formation of new cannon, howitzer, mortar and anti-tank regiments, and also included in September 1941 in its composition all artillery regiments and anti-aircraft artillery battalions of rifle and mechanized corps in connection with the liquidation of the corps link. When forming new artillery regiments, emphasis was placed on increasing the number of highly maneuverable units, designed primarily to fight enemy tanks. For example, the formation of light artillery regiments (paws), anti-tank defense regiments, as well as rocket artillery - this new and effective means of defeating enemy manpower - proceeded at an accelerated pace. Of the 4,252 guns and mortars used in 1941 for the formation of artillery units of the RVGK (without anti-aircraft and rocket artillery), 2,903 guns (69%) were for anti-tank artillery.
As the experience of the first months of the war showed, the anti-tank brigades of the RVGK and their regiments in the conditions of the transition of the Red Army to strategic defense turned out to be very cumbersome and difficult to control. In the course of fast-moving, maneuverable battles and battles, it became necessary to reinforce not only armies, but also rifle divisions and even regiments with artillery anti-tank weapons. To do this, at this stage of the war, it was more expedient to have in the artillery of the RVGK not large artillery formations, but a large number of small maneuverable anti-tank units. With this in mind, in the fall of 1941, all the anti-tank brigades of the RVGK, except for the 14th anti-tank artillery brigade formed during the war on the Leningrad Front, were disbanded. Due to the material part of these formations and the newly allocated weapons in the second half of 1941, 72 artillery regiments of anti-tank weapons of the RVGK of various organizations were formed. Basically, these were light, maneuverable units, which included 4, 5 or 6 batteries of a four-gun composition.
Due to the lack of anti-tank guns, 37-, 76- and 85-mm anti-aircraft guns were used to form anti-tank regiments.
So, in July-October 1941, 49 divisions of medium-caliber and 49 batteries of small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery were involved in staffing anti-tank defense regiments - a total of 770 guns.
Since March 1942, more and more new 76-mm guns of the 1942 model (ZIS-3) began to enter the army. They began to arm new anti-tank regiments, as well as to replace anti-aircraft guns in already formed units. With the release of anti-aircraft guns, the formation of anti-aircraft artillery regiments of the RVGK began. In addition, in early June 1942, 140 separate anti-aircraft artillery battalions, 8 separate anti-aircraft batteries, 5 anti-aircraft armored trains and other units were transferred to the subordination of the chief of artillery of the Red Army from the air defense of the country, which formed the backbone of the formed anti-aircraft artillery units of the RVGK.
Most of the organizational changes carried out in 1941 in the RVGK artillery were dictated by the difficult situation at the front and the lack of weapons. In particular, it was necessary to go to extreme measures related to the weakening of the firepower of artillery units in order to increase their number. So, in early September 1941, the cannon and howitzer regiments of the RVGK were disaggregated. Their batteries were transferred in the active army to a two-gun composition. Due to the released material part, new regiments were formed. 122-mm and 152-mm howitzer artillery units were transferred to the artillery of the RVGK, expelled from the states of rifle and tank divisions and reorganized into howitzer artillery regiments of the RVGK.
Separate mortar battalions of the RVGK turned out to be very bulky (48 107- and 120-mm mortars). Therefore, by order of the NPO in January 1942, they were disbanded, on their basis the creation of lighter mortar units, mainly five-battery mortar regiments (20 mortars each), began. By April 1942, there were 49, and by October, 70 RVGK mortar regiments in the active army.
With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, units of field rocket artillery were rapidly formed. The first combat vehicles of a new type of weapon were developed in our country immediately on the eve of the war. The simplicity of their manufacture by industry, the high efficiency of fire, especially when firing at manpower, the enormous moral impact on the enemy - all this predetermined the rapid growth of rocket artillery.
In July 1941, the formation of the first separate batteries, and then rocket artillery divisions, was completed. Highly appreciating the combat capabilities of the new type of artillery, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command takes decisive measures to develop it. On August 8, the formation of eight regiments of rocket artillery began, and then six more. Fighting vehicles (installations) of rocket artillery BM-8 and BM-13 were first mounted on the chassis of the ZIS-6 vehicle, later on the chassis of the T-40, T-60 tanks and STZ-5 tractors. In January 1942, in accordance with the GKO decree, they began to form rocket artillery regiments of the new organization. The divisions of these units, having received their own material support bodies, were able to act independently.
For the period of operations, the headquarters of the Supreme High Command reinforced the fronts with units of rocket artillery, which received the name of the guards mortar (GMCH). They reported directly to the commanders of the fronts. For the direct management of combat activities and the supply of parts of the GMCh at the fronts, special control bodies were created - front-line operational groups of the GMCh.
Since the spring of 1942, the rear of the country began to supply the Armed Forces with more and more tanks, aircraft, guns, mortars, and rocket artillery combat vehicles. Most of the incoming artillery weapons went to the formation of parts of the RVGK. The number of guns and mortars in the RVGK artillery grew steadily. If at the beginning of the war there were 4854 of them, then by December 1, 1941 - 5704, by May 1, 1942 - 10080, and by the end of the first period of the war - already 18133. The change in the number of artillery units of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command in the first period of the war is shown in the table.
In connection with the continuous growth in the number of artillery units of the RVGK, the armies began to receive 10 or more regiments for reinforcement both in defense and in the offensive. It became more and more difficult for the small artillery headquarters of the formations to manage such a large number of units, so the chiefs of artillery of the armies, as a rule, transferred units of the RVGK to reinforce divisions. However, this practice was contrary to the principle of massing artillery and its fire. In this regard, it became necessary to create large artillery formations of the RVGK. At the end of October 1942, the State Defense Committee adopted a resolution on the organization of RVGK artillery formations in ground and anti-aircraft artillery. On October 31, the People's Commissar of Defense issued an order to create artillery and anti-aircraft artillery divisions of the RVGK (ad and zenad of the RVGK).
The first artillery divisions of the RVGK were formed by including eight artillery regiments of the RVGK (three gaps, two pap and three iptap) and a separate reconnaissance battalion. Part of the army air defense regiments and the already formed anti-aircraft artillery regiments of the RVGK were turned to the formation of anti-aircraft artillery divisions. There were four regiments of MZA (37-mm guns - 48 and 12.7-mm anti-aircraft machine guns - 80) in the zenad in the state of October 22, 1942. By the end of the first period of the war, there were already 11 hells and 8 zenads of the RVGK in the active army.
Reinforcing the fronts, the Headquarters of the All-Russian High Command in the course of operations resolutely concentrated the artillery of the Russian High Command on the most important sectors of the Soviet-German front. So, in the summer and autumn of 1941, the main attention was paid to the Moscow strategic direction. By the end of the Smolensk battle, 50% of all artillery units of the RVGK were concentrated on the Western, Reserve and Bryansk fronts. Of the 49 anti-tank artillery regiments of the RVGK, 22 were transferred to these three fronts. Most of the armies of the Western Front received 4-5 artillery regiments of the RVGK for reinforcement.
In October, during the period of the autumn thaw, the main efforts of artillery were concentrated in the army zones covering the main highways along which enemy tank columns rushed towards Moscow. Thus, the 16th Army, blocking the Volokolamsk Highway, received six regiments for reinforcement, the 5th Army, which was defending in the Mozhaisk direction, eleven, and the 43rd Army, which held the defense in the Maloyaroslavets direction, eight regiments and a separate division of anti-tank artillery. The density of anti-tank artillery (PTA) in these areas was increased to 6-10 guns per 1 km of front. The remaining armies of the Western Front were reinforced by 1-2 regiments. Accordingly, the density of anti-tank guns in their lanes was low - 1-2 guns per 1 km of front.
The cannon, howitzer and mortar units of the army received from the front were transferred for reinforcement to the rifle divisions defending in the main directions. In divisions, they were usually included in the infantry support groups (PP), less often - long-range (DD). The firepower of the artillery of the ace divisions more often began to increase at the expense of rocket artillery, whose volley fire had a high effect, especially when firing at enemy manpower.
In the summer of 1942, the Supreme Command Headquarters focused on the southwestern, and then Stalingrad directions. The bulk of the reserves, including artillery, went here. The number of artillery of the RVGK, which took part in the defensive battles near Stalingrad, was continuously increased due to the reinforcement of the fronts by the reserves of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. So, if on July 12, 1942, the artillery units of the RVGK had 4282 here, then on November 18 - 12078 guns and mortars, i.e. their number has tripled. During July - the first half of October 1942, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command sent 105 artillery regiments and 16 divisions from its reserve (40 iptap, 16 dads, 14 zenap, 3 minp, 32 regiments and 16 divisions of rocket artillery) to the fronts operating in the Stalingrad direction.
The commanders of the fronts, as a rule, reassigned almost all artillery units of the RVGK to the armies of the first echelon, which is explained by their acute shortage of their own artillery. The armies operating in the main directions received 10 or more artillery regiments of the RVGK for reinforcement. The 62nd Army (South-Eastern Front, on September 1) had, for example, 16 artillery units of the RVGK.
Due to the large saturation of the troops with artillery of the RVGK in the battles near Stalingrad, artillery anti-tank reserves (APTR) began to be systematically allocated at all levels from the rifle division to the front: 1-2 iptap in the armies and from 1 to 5 iptap in the fronts. Cannon regiments were included in the army artillery groups DD.
When conducting defensive battles directly in the city, by the decision of the military council of the South-Eastern Front on September 14, a front-line artillery group (FAG) was created at the expense of the RVGK regiments previously attached to the 62nd and 64th armies. It also included parts of the anti-aircraft artillery of the RVGK and artillery of the Volga military flotilla. The group was headed by the deputy chief of artillery of the front, Major General of Artillery V.P. Dmitriev. The FAG included up to 250 guns and mortars. Due to the wide maneuvering of the trajectories and the massing of fire of the artillery of the army and the front-line artillery group, at certain moments of the most intense fighting in Stalingrad, in the defense sectors of the 62nd Army, it was possible to create an artillery density of up to 110 guns and mortars per 1 km of the front. A wide maneuver with the fire of large masses of artillery ensured the stubbornness and stamina of the troops in defensive battles both near Stalingrad and in the city itself.
During the operations of the first period of the Great Patriotic War, the RVGK artillery underwent both quantitative and qualitative changes. It included parts of rocket and anti-aircraft artillery. The organizational structure and armament of the units have changed significantly.
The quantitative growth of the artillery of the RVGK (from 4854 to 18133 guns and mortars), the inclusion in its composition of units armed with various types of guns, mortars and rocket artillery installations, also changed its structure. Due to the artillery of the RVGK, military artillery is strengthened not only in quality, but also in quantity. The proportion of RVGK artillery in terms of staff strength increased in the artillery of the Soviet Army from 8 to 20%.
With the reorganization of the national economy on a war footing and the strengthening of the power of the artillery industry, the artillery of the RVGK began to grow rapidly. Anti-tank and rocket artillery units were formed especially intensively, and since the summer of 1942, anti-aircraft artillery units.
Another was the ratio of different types of artillery. If in the pre-war period more than half of all regiments (see table) accounted for howitzer artillery, then by the end of the first period of the war, anti-aircraft (24%) and anti-tank (22%) artillery were superior. The share of howitzer artillery decreased to 17%.
Rocket artillery, which only appeared at the beginning of the war, began to account for 12% of the total number of RVGK artillery.
The fronts defending in the most important operational areas were assigned 30-40 artillery regiments of the RVGK, the army - 8-10 or more. The need to centralize the management of a large number of separate artillery units of the RVGK raised the question of creating artillery divisions (artillery and anti-aircraft artillery divisions of the RVGK). The tendency to form large artillery formations of the RVGK was further developed in the second period of the Great Patriotic War.
The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the command of the fronts, widely maneuvering the artillery formations of the RVGK, at the right time reinforced the fronts (armies) with artillery, due to which they achieved a significant increase in the density of artillery in defensive and offensive operations.
Supreme High Command. Short name (abbreviation) - RVGK and RGK.
In the literature there is another name - strategic reserve , High Command Reserve Troops .
Story
The concept of high command reserves ( "reserves generales") responds primarily to the idea of economy, or, in other words, to the idea of extracting maximum usefulness from limited resources. This idea was born during the World War, - approximately, in 1916; at that time, the high command wanted to have at its disposal certain forces that had their own organization, independent of large operational formations and could be directed to those sectors of the land front where their presence was considered most necessary. These general reserves included aviation, tanks and some artillery units.
Pre-war and war period
Armor forces
By order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the Union, dated May 21, 1936, separate brigades were allocated to the Reserve of the High Command of the Red Army, for the qualitative reinforcement of rifle and tank formations when breaking through the enemy's fortified defense lines. By the end of 1938, the RGK Armed Forces of the Union from the armored forces (ABTV) of the Red Army had four separate heavy tank brigades. Two of the brigade: the 10th and 20th took part in the fighting on the Karelian Isthmus, during the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940.
- 2nd Guards Artillery Breakthrough Division
Engineering Troops
In addition to units and formations that actually have the status of permanent "membership" in the RVGK, such as artillery divisions or guards heavy tank brigades, ordinary combined arms formations, for example, rifle divisions and brigades, could also be in the Reserve of the Supreme High Command. Thus, any military formations and associations, military units of all branches of the military, temporarily or permanently directly subordinate to the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, are considered to be related to the Reserve of the Supreme Command.
Total
On June 1, 1944, the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters consisted of two combined arms, one tank and one air armies, about 30 rifle and cavalry divisions, 8 tank and 7 mechanized corps, 11 artillery and mortar divisions and 11 separate brigades, in which there were about 650 thousand people, 9.5 thousand guns and mortars, 2 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns and 3 thousand aircraft.
post-war period
In the first half of the 1950s, on the basis of the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 3540-1647 “On special formations and special construction in the Military Ministry of the USSR”, dated September 19, 1951, four special-purpose brigades were formed as part of the Armed Forces of the USSR RVGK.
The first missile formation armed with long-range ballistic missiles was the 72nd Special-Purpose Engineering Brigade of the High Command Reserve (commander - Major General of Artillery A. F. Tveretsky), created on August 15, 1946 as part of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, withdrawn a year later to Soyuz at the Kapustin Yar training ground. Then the brigade was relocated to the village of Medved near Novgorod and, finally, to Gvardeysk, Kaliningrad region. In December 1950, the second special purpose brigade of the RVGK was formed. In 1951 - 1955, 5 more such brigades were created, which since 1953 received a new name - the engineering brigades of the RVGK. Until 1955, they were armed with R-1 and R-2 ballistic missiles with a range of 270 kilometers and 600 km, equipped with warheads with conventional explosives (general designer S. P. Korolev). These brigades were part of the RVGK artillery and were subordinate to the artillery commander of the Soviet Army. They were managed by a special department of the artillery headquarters of the Soviet Army of the Union Armed Forces. In March 1955, the post of Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR for special weapons and rocket technology was introduced (Marshal of Artillery M. I. Nedelin), under which the headquarters of rocket units was created.
The combat use of engineering brigades was determined by the order of the Supreme Command, the decision of which provided for the assignment of these formations to the fronts. The front commander carried out the leadership of the engineering brigades through the artillery commander.
Modernity
In modern Russia, the only reserve of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief is the Airborne Troops. Most of the military units of the Airborne Forces, which are part of the Reserve of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, are also guards. In relation to the Russian Airborne Forces, as a reserve of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, two largely equivalent terms are officially used: reserve and means- the latter reflects the instrumental status of the troops among a set of other measures of a military and non-military nature for the implementation of state power at the disposal of the country's top leader. The specific status lies in the fact that the Airborne Forces, being the reserve of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, are always ready to fulfill any order of the President of Russia and the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, - emphasized the Commander of the Airborne Forces, Colonel General V. A. Shamanov, - at the same time, as he specifically noted Commander, in the light of reforms and structural changes in the military department (during the transition from military districts to a system of operational-strategic commands), the status of the Airborne Forces and their role remain unchanged, their independence as a separate branch of the military is preserved: “We remain the operational-strategic reserve of the Minister of Defense and the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, ”said the Commander of the Airborne Forces. As a reserve of the Supreme Commander, the troops will be designed to conduct independent operations in selected areas, as well as to strengthen the ground grouping, based on decisions taken by the General Staff.
The airborne troops have always been the reserve of the Supreme Commander. The most important, but not the only factor that makes the Airborne Forces the reserve of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief is their mobility - to ensure the defense of such a large-scale territory as Russia has, it is possible only with the use of airmobile formations, which can be landed at any time on any theater of operations. For this task, the Airborne Forces are most suitable, which de facto perform the function of a rapid reaction force.
In relation to the Airborne Forces of the Russian Armed Forces, the concept of elite troops is often used, but this concept is journalistic, while the official term that fixes the special status of a particular type of troops is the very fact of belonging to the reserve of the Supreme Commander. “The airborne troops are a special kind of troops, which are on a special account with the Ministry of Defense, with the country's leadership. The Airborne Forces have always been and should remain the reserve of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, ”S. M. Mironov, Chairman of the Federation Council, noted in his speech.
Notes
Sources
- Votier, Pierre (Vauthier, Pierre), Military Doctrine of General Douai, - M .: Military Publishing House of the USSR NPO, 1937.
- Site noo-journal.ru, Reserves.
- Wattier P. Military Doctrine of General Douai. - M .: Military Publishing House of the NPO of the USSR, 1937.
- 5th Heavy Tank Brigade, since 1939? 14th Heavy Tank Brigade. // Website "Mechanized corps"
- A. G. Pervov. Experience in the use of aviation reserves of the Supreme High Command during the Great Patriotic War and its significance in modern conditions = Materials of the IX Military Scientific Conference of the Air Force. Collection. The role of the Air Force in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945 / Air Force. - Moscow: Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1986.
