The Russian army under the command of Field Marshal Kutuzov, after leaving Moscow, moved on a flank march to the city of Podolsk. Due to the fact that the Great Army occupied the capital on September 14-16, and then fought the fires, the Russian troops were able to slowly retreat inland along the Ryazan road. However, after two crossings, at night, unexpectedly for the vanguard of Marshal Murat accompanying her, the troops turned west to Podolsk, and then onto the Old Kaluga Road, along which they reached Krasnaya Pakhra. On September 21, they stopped for a six-day rest.

Bivouac of Russian troops
Alexander AVERYANOV

The commander of the French avant-garde missed this maneuver, taking small Cossack detachments and the corps of General Raevsky, who continued to move to Ryazan, and then imperceptibly dissolved in the forests, for the rearguard of the Russians and thus the Russian army disappeared from sight for Napoleon for 9 days, which allowed Kutuzov to calmly withdraw her to a safe position. To search for the enemy's army, Napoleon was forced to send several detachments in three directions, and only near Podolsk Murat again overtook the rearguard under the command of Miloradovich, who successfully repelled all the attacks of the marshal.

Before continuing the story about the Tarutino camp, I will make a small digression, about which it is not customary for us to expand. The fact is that Kutuzov, for reasons known only to him, ordered the evacuation of food warehouses from Kaluga to Vladimir, and, on the contrary, moved the army towards Kaluga. This led to the fact that elementary hunger began in the troops. Here is how Rostopchin wrote about this in a letter to Alexander I: On August 29 (September 10, O.S.), without the knowledge of the quartermaster general Lanskoy, the Most Serene gave the order to send food supplies from Kaluga to Vladimir, and then to Ryazan ... as a result, for three days now, the troops have had nothing to eat. And in a letter to Arakcheev he continued: The disorder has reached such an extent that, in front of the generals, soldiers begin to rob the houses of poor peasants, and the country is devastated for 50 miles in a circle.. Soldiers are dying like flies from hunger and cold ... The number of patients reaches 400 people a day

Tarutinsky camp
A. SOKOLOV A. SEMYONOV

Nevertheless, the Russian army, at the very least, continued its movement and by October 3 arrived in the area of ​​​​the village of Tarutino, where it settled in a fortified camp. Thanks to the Tarutino maneuver, Russian troops were withdrawn from the attack of the Great Army and covered supply bases rich in human resources, weapons and food. In addition, they had the opportunity to threaten the messages and communications of the French on the Smolensk road, and also deprived Napoleon of the opportunity to undertake any sabotage against the capital or to attack St. Petersburg without hindrance (which, however, he did not aspire to).

Moscow Sketches by Christian Wilhelm Faber du FORT

Protection of the artillery park of the Third Army Corps near Vladimirskaya Zastava, October 2, 1812
Christian Wilhelm Faber du FORT

In Moscow, the artillery park of the 3rd Army Corps was first located outside the Kamer-Kollezhsky Val, at the Vladimirskaya outpost, and its protection was entrusted to a post made up of Württembergers, French and Dutch, who were stationed in the guardroom of this outpost. Later, it was decided that it was dangerous to remain behind the rampart line, and it was moved to a large area, and a nearby stone house was taken to accommodate the guards. Both the first and second places chosen for the location of the park were located near the apartments of the artillery of the 3rd Army Corps.

The drawing that the reader sees depicts a guardhouse at the Vladimir outpost and a post. The night and morning cold forced the sentries to dress in the most unusual costumes: the Dutch gunner standing on guard was wearing a fur cap, he put his hands in a muff, and under a military cloak he put on a home dressing gown. These strange outfits were only a prelude to those that had to be resorted to when retreating to protect themselves from the cold.

The large barracks, or Military School, which housed the artillerymen of the 3rd Army Corps during our stay in Moscow, was located in the area called Lefortovsky, on the left bank of the Yauza, near the Saltykovsky bridge and the court garden, not far from the large park and the Vladimirskaya outpost. This splendid countryside was full of trees, which is a rarity in those parts, and offered a pleasing view to the eye.

So, on the border of this district of the city, called Rogozhsky, on the high left bank of the Yauza, covered with bushes, we noticed a beautiful church, which, half hidden by charming groups of trees, had a very picturesque view. Its dark blue domes, studded with golden stars and rising up among the beautiful crowns of trees, painted with the joyful colors of autumn, looked simply magnificent. This is the church of the old faith, as we were told by the Germans living in Moscow, or, according to the Russians, schismatics, but we have not been able to figure out whether it belongs to believers who adhere to the old rite, which differs from the dominant Greek church not in fundamental dogmas, but only in some features of the rites, or to inveterate schismatics.

On October 4, another event took place that I would like to mention. To be honest, Field Marshal Kutuzov did not favor Infantry General Barclay de Tolly, his dislike reached the point that he did not consider it necessary to inform the commander of the First Army about his orders and movements in it, which in those days was considered tantamount to public insult.

Portrait of Mikhail Bogdanovich Barclay de Tolly
Francesco VENDRAMINI after a drawing by Louis de SAINT-AUBIN, 1813

This was repeated more than once or twice, but Barclay tried not to notice, and always, with innate composure, tried to hide his bitterness. He was not an insensitive person, passions also seethed in his soul, but he tried not to give in to his emotions and feelings, realizing that this could harm the cause. In vain, Barclay de Tolly reported on the outrageous things that were happening: Both armies, knowing only that it was necessary to follow the high road, marched without order. Crews, artillery, cavalry, infantry, often broken bridges stopped the movement, and no effort was made to repair them. Arriving after a tedious march to the appointed place, the troops wandered the rest of the day either to the left or to the right, not knowing where to stop, and, finally, they stopped on the sides of the main road in columns, without bivouacs and food. I myself for several days did not have with me anyone from the quartermaster corps who could give me information about the transitions and parking lots. Three times in the same day, orders are issued to attack enemy outposts and canceled three times. Finally, they are used uselessly in the evening, without purpose and reason, because the night makes them stop their actions. Such actions make one fear that the army will lose all confidence in their superiors and even courage.

And near Tarutino, Mikhail Bogdanovich could not stand it, he was completely tired ... In addition, he fell ill, which was the reason: All these circumstances, taken together, upset my health and made me unable to continue my service. General Barclay de Tolly submitted a resignation letter addressed to Kutuzov, which was granted without further ado. Moor did his job...

After Borodino, the attitude of colleagues towards the general changed, but the resentment and bitterness that deeply wounded his heart did not pass. In addition, the merger of the First and Second Western armies led to the fact that Barclay de Tolly was out of work, he realized that in essence he had become superfluous. I cannot be accused of indifference; I expressed my opinion directly, but it is as if they are avoiding me and hiding a lot from me ...(from a letter from Mikhail Bogdanovich to his wife)

So the resignation was not a whim of the general, it was predetermined. Moreover, the emperor's order to dismiss him from the post of Minister of War was not long in coming. Even, not noticed in special sympathy for Mikhail Bogdanovich, General Yermolov later wrote in his Notes: On the 22nd of September, the Minister of War, General Barclay de Tolly, left the army and went further through Kaluga. He lost his patience: he saw with annoyance the continuing unrest, was indignant at the incredulous disposition towards him, inattention to his ideas.

Infantry General Mikhail Barclay de Tolly, who went through with the Russian army all its sad and difficult path - from Vilna to Tarutino, left the location of the troops on October 4. This was the end of his participation in the Patriotic War of 1812.

Leaving the Tarutino camp, Barclay said to the adjutant: I must leave. This is necessary, since the field marshal does not give me the opportunity to do what I consider useful. Moreover, the main thing is done, it remains to reap the rewards. I love the Fatherland and the Emperor too much not to rejoice in advance at the successes that can be expected in the future. Posterity will give me justice. The thankless part of the campaign fell to my lot; Kutuzov's share will fall to a more pleasant and more useful part for his glory. I would have stayed if I had not foreseen that this would bring more evil to the army. The field marshal does not want to share with anyone the glory of expelling the enemy from the sacred land of our Fatherland. I considered Napoleon's cause lost from the moment he moved from Smolensk to the capital. This conviction turned into confidence in me from the moment he entered Moscow ... Moreover, the emperor, to whom I always told the truth, will be able to support me against accusations from public opinion. Time will do the rest: truth is like the sun, which in the end always disperses the clouds. My only regret is that I cannot be of service to the army and personally to all of you who have shared your labors with me. I handed over to the field marshal an army preserved, well-dressed, armed and not demoralized. This gives me the greatest right to the gratitude of the people, who will now perhaps throw a stone at me, but later will give me justice ...

And sparkling with gilded domes, luxurious and mysterious Moscow, as it seemed to Emperor Napoleon from the height of Poklonnaya Hill, became more and more unfriendly and dangerous. Bonaparte's anxiety and confusion grew, and with them the feeling of a trap. The emperor's expectations that the war would end with the capture of Moscow and the Russians themselves would sue for peace did not come true. Therefore, he once again attended to the search for peace with these recalcitrant Russian emperors.

Peace no matter what. Napoleon and Adjutant General Lauriston
Vasily VERESHCHAGIN

At first, Napoleon wanted to send the diplomat Alexander Caulaincourt to St. Petersburg, but he was able to convince him that this voyage could do more harm than good, as it would make Emperor Alexander understand the difficult situation of the French troops.

Portrait of the Marquis de Lauriston
Unknown artist of the French school

On October 3, Napoleon wrote a letter to Field Marshal Mikhail Kutuzov, which he handed to his adjutant general and diplomat, former ambassador to Russia, General Jacques Alexandre Bernard Law, Marquis de Lauriston, and sent it to Kutuzov in Tarutino with the words: I want peace! All I need is peace, and I certainly want to get it! Save only honor!(from Notes de Segur)

Letter from Emperor Napoleon to Prince Kutuzov

On October 5, Loriston arrived at the Tarutino camp. Not without difficulty, having achieved a meeting with the commander-in-chief, he handed the field marshal a letter from Napoleon, which said: Prince Kutuzov, I am sending one of my adjutant generals to you for negotiations on many important matters. I want Your Grace to believe what he tells you, especially when he expresses to you the feelings of respect and special attention that I have long had for you. Having nothing else to say with this letter, I pray to the Almighty that he will keep you, Prince Kutuzov, under his sacred and good cover. Moscow October 3, 1812. Napoleon.

Loriston at Kutuzov's headquarters
Nikolay ULYANOV

At the insistence of Lauriston, the meeting took place face to face. The negotiations went on for about an hour. Lauriston offered to conclude a truce and allow him to travel to Petersburg with a letter from Napoleon to Emperor Alexander I, which contained the terms of the peace treaty.

Prince Kutuzov rejects the peace proposed by Napoleon through General Lauriston
Ivan IVANOV

And although Kutuzov refused to let the diplomat go to St. Petersburg, he said that the letter he had brought for Emperor Alexander would be forwarded. On the proposal of Loriston to conclude peace, the field marshal refused, saying that he did not have the authority to do so and recalled that it was not the Russians who started this war and it had just begun. On this, the mission of General Lauriston ended and he returned to Moscow.

After the departure of the Marquis de Loriston from Tarutino, the main apartment of Field Marshal Kutuzov moved to the village of Letashovka, 5 kilometers from Tarutino. The camp itself continued to be fortified: along the entire front and on the flanks, earthen fortifications were erected, and a notch was made in the forest. Partisan detachments under the command of Dorokhov, Seslavin and Figner operated in the camp area. Routine work continued to call up new militias, replenish the strength of the army, provide it with weapons, food, and uniforms.

In Moscow, Emperor Napoleon still hoped for an answer from Alexander I, and Christian Wilhelm Faber du FORT admired the beauty of Moscow that remained intact...

In the southern part of Moscow, very close to the Kamer-Kollezhsky Val and a little further than a large powder warehouse, on the high bank of the Moscow River, is the Simonov Monastery. Unlike most Russian monasteries, it is fortified and surrounded by a Tatar wall with towers and has a very picturesque view. During our stay in Moscow, it first served as a warehouse for harnessing fallen horses and, if I am not mistaken, it was partially burned down during our retreat from the city.

Before us is the southeastern part of Moscow, about a third of its length. First of all, you can see the ruins of the Krutitsy Sloboda, the towering walls of the Krutitsy Metochion, which before the fire served as a barracks for a military police company. Behind the courtyard one can see, separated only by a moat along which a stream flows, the Novospassky Monastery with its magnificent bell tower, the largest in Moscow after the Kremlin bell tower of Ivan the Great. To the right, farther, towers of the Intercession Monastery rise above a forest of fruit trees. All these places belong to the Taganskaya part (XIX district). On the left, a part of the Earthen City is visible - palaces and embankments on Pyatnitskaya, on the right bank of the Moskva River, as well as churches and plots where there were burnt houses, the Yauzskaya part (VII district), located on the left bank. The background of the picture depicts Kitay-Gorod, which is adjoined by the quarters of the White City, the Earthen City and the suburbs, located on the right.

If you look at the setting sun from the northwestern bastion of the powder warehouse, you can see that on the right bank of the Moskva River there are quarters devastated by fire and the remains of houses of Kozhevnicheskaya Sloboda, and in the center there is one of the picturesque churches, remarkable for its simplicity and endless variety. There are hundreds of them in Moscow, and they speak of the closeness of Asia. The fire spared her, like almost all Moscow churches. Their massive structures dominating the rest of the buildings, and the roofs, for the most part covered with iron, as well as a small amount of combustible materials inside, allowed them to survive in the general fire. This was also facilitated by the arsonists' respect for religion. In the distance, through the autumn fog, you can see the buildings and churches of the Kolomenskaya Yamskaya Sloboda, as well as some buildings of Pyatnitskaya, located in Zemlyanoy Gorod. Kozhevnicheskaya Sloboda and Kolomenskaya Yamskaya belong to the Serpukhov part (XX district), which is located between Kamer-Kollezhsky Val and Zemlyanoy Gorod.

“We didn’t know how to take Murat alive in the morning”: Tarutinsky battle

When it became clear to Kutuzov that it was impossible to defend Moscow with cash forces, he decided to break away from the enemy and take a position that would cover the Russian supply bases in Tula and Kaluga and threaten the operational line of the Napoleonic troops in order to buy time and create conditions for going on the counteroffensive. . It was this maneuver that went down in the history of the war of 1812 as the Tarutino maneuver. So, on the evening of September 5 (17), the commander-in-chief gave the order to the retreating Russian army to turn off the Ryazan road and go to Podolsk. None of the corps commanders knew where and why the army was turning, and only by the evening of the next day the army reached the Tula road near Podolsk. Further, the Russian troops set off along the old Kaluga road south to Krasnaya Pakhra, passing which they stopped at the village of Tarutino.

The military historian and adjutant of Kutuzov A. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky described in detail the advantages that the Russian army received from these movements: “Becoming a firm foot on the Kaluga road, Prince Kutuzov had the opportunity:

1) to cover the midday provinces, which abounded in supplies;

2) to threaten the path of enemy actions from Moscow through Mozhaisk, Vyazma and Smolensk;

3) to cross in detachments the messages of the French stretched over excessive space and

4) in the event of Napoleon's retreat to Smolensk, warn him along the shortest route.

This march maneuver, which was considered brilliant by both supporters and opponents of Kutuzov, ended successfully. Indeed, he allowed the Russian troops to cover from the enemy at the same time provisions in Kaluga, and arms factories in Tula, and foundries in Bryansk. Napoleon was also cut off from the fertile Ukrainian provinces. And it was precisely this location that deprived the French of the opportunity to carry out the so-called "autumn plan" of the campaign against St. Petersburg.

French General A. Jomini admitted that in the history of wars from ancient times, “the retreat that the Russian army made in 1812 from the Neman to Moscow ... not allowing itself to be upset or partially defeated by such an enemy as Napoleon ... of course, should be placed above all others" not so much in terms of the "strategic talents" of the generals, but "in relation to the amazing confidence, stamina and firmness of the troops."

Separately, it must be pointed out that the Tarutinsky maneuver went unnoticed by the French. So, Kutuzov wrote in a report to the emperor: “The army, making a flank movement, for the secrecy of this direction, introduced the enemy into bewilderment on every march. Heading herself to a certain point, she camouflaged herself in the meantime with false movements of light troops, making demonstrations first to Kolomna, then to Serpukhov, after which the enemy followed in large parties.

The reaction of the French themselves was described in his memoirs by the German doctor Murat G. von Roos: “We drove off, accompanied by smoke that drove us from the side of the city. The sun shone through the smoke, turning everything visible yellow. The Cossacks were very close in front of us, but on this day we did not even exchange pistol shots ... The next day, September 16, we stretched further along the road leading to Vladimir and Kazan. We saw our opponents only in the evening, when we approached the wooden town of Bogorodsk, which stood to the right of the road. After that, the French moved for another day in the direction in which the Cossacks had disappeared. And only on the third day “in the early morning,” wrote Roos, “I paid a visit to my commander, Colonel von Milkau. He greeted me with the words: “We have lost the enemy and every trace of him; we have to stay here and wait for new orders.”

In fact, Murat, moving along the Ryazan road, missed the flank movement of the Russian troops, and when the Cossacks dispersed along with the fog on September 10 (22), he found an empty road in front of him. The mood of the French troops at that time was quite colorfully described by Marshal B. de Castellant: “Our vanguard is twelve miles away. The Neapolitan king, standing in the mud in his yellow boots, with his Gascon accent, spoke to the officer sent by the emperor in such expressions: “Tell the emperor that I honorably led the vanguard of the French army beyond Moscow, but I’m tired, tired of all this, you hear Do you? I want to go to Naples to attend to my subjects."

Kutuzov himself was very pleased with the implementation of his plan. In another report to Emperor Alexander I, he noted: “I still receive information about the success of my fake movement, because the enemy followed the Cossacks in parts (that is, the detachment left on the Ryazan road). This gives me the convenience that the army, having made a flank march of 18 versts tomorrow on the Kaluga road and sending strong parties to Mozhayskaya, should be very concerned about the enemy's rear. In this way, I hope that the enemy will seek to give me a battle, from which, at a favorable location, equal success, as at Borodino, I expect.

After some time, as Roos wrote, the French “regained the Russians, who seemed to have sunk into the abyss from the moment when ... they saw them on the top of the hill near Bogorodsk. The bloody military fun began again; all types of weapons were brought into action, daily, often from morning to evening, cannon fire took place ... "

Thus, after the withdrawal from Moscow, the Russian army by the beginning of October 1812 was located in a fortified camp near the village of Tarutino across the Nara River (southwest of Moscow). The soldiers received rest, and the army as a whole received the opportunity to replenish materiel and manpower.

In early October, the commander-in-chief sent an official report to Emperor Alexander I, in which he reported that he had brought 87,035 people to the camp with 622 guns. There is evidence that immediately after arriving in Tarutino, Kutuzov announced: "Now not a step back!"

In the Tarutinsky camp, an official renaming of the troops took place. Since that time, the 1st and 2nd Western armies merged into the Main Army, commanded by M.I. Golenishchev-Kutuzov. The first days of the army's stay in the camp were accompanied by certain difficulties: there was not enough food and ammunition, as well as organization. Radozhytsky wrote about the lack of provisions: “Approaching the devastated road, we ourselves began to suffer need, especially our horses: there was no fodder at all, and the poor animals fed only on rotten straw from the roofs. I also had a small supply of oats from the Tarutinsky camp; being a master in Figner's artillery company, I saved a lot of oats and only regaled the horses with them. Day by day it became more painful; the serviceability of artillery depended on horses, and therefore I tried to save them by covering them with blankets; the gunners sometimes fed them with breadcrumbs.

In the Tarutinsky camp, the conflict between M. Kutuzov and M. Barclay de Tolly, which had subsided for a while, escalated. In a letter to Alexander I, Kutuzov explained the surrender of Moscow by the poor condition of the troops after the loss of Smolensk, thus, in fact, shifting all the blame on Barclay de Tolly. The latter, however, perfectly understood that the army was in desolation after Borodin, and it departed from Smolensk in full battle formation. Accordingly, Barclay de Tolly also remembered the fact that at the military council in Fili he advocated a retreat without a fight, while criticizing the disposition proposed by Bennigsen. It is known that in the Battle of Borodino, Barclay de Tolly demonstrated unprecedented courage and personal courage. Despite the fact that this was noted by many, he did not succeed in getting rid of the reputation of a "German traitor". As a result, on October 4, Barclay de Tolly wrote a note to Kutuzov, in which he asked "due to illness" to relieve him of his post. This request was granted, and the former commander of the 1st Western Army left the troops.

While in the Tarutinsky camp, Kutuzov took special care of the material component of the army. In the presence of problems for the transportation of surviving supplies in Riga, Pskov, Tver, Kyiv and Kaluga, he demanded active cooperation from the authorities of all nearby provinces in this matter, constantly receiving ammunition, bread, boots, sheepskin coats and even nails for horseshoes from them. The field marshal wrote the following to the governors of Kaluga and Tula about this: “I can’t find words to express how the greatest benefit can come from if the donated provisions continuously overtake the army and satisfy the needs for its non-stop food; and, on the contrary, I cannot explain without the greatest regret that the slow delivery of food to the army is able to stop the movement of the army and completely stop the pursuit of the fleeing enemy.

In addition to the official authorities, local residents also helped the Russian troops. Taken together, all the measures taken by Kutuzov led to the fact that by October 21, the Russian army already had more provisions than it needed.

At the same time, Napoleon, who occupied Moscow, found himself, as we have already said, in a very difficult situation - his troops could not fully provide themselves with what they needed in the city. In addition, the intensified guerrilla war prevented the normal supply of the army. For foraging, the French had to send significant detachments, which did not often return without loss. At the same time, to facilitate the collection of provisions and the protection of communications, Napoleon was forced to keep large military formations far beyond the borders of Moscow.

Indeed, using these circumstances, Kutuzov refrained from active hostilities and resorted to a "small war with a big advantage" - a guerrilla war. In particular, Russian troops even threatened the Moscow-Smolensk highway, through which the French received reinforcements and food.

Later, an additional advantage of Kutuzov's position near the village of Tarutino appeared. So, without waiting for peace from the Russian emperor, Napoleon, as already mentioned, considered the option of a campaign against St. Petersburg. But in addition to the reasons mentioned for abandoning such an idea (in particular, the approach of winter), it is also necessary to name the actual location of Kutuzov's troops near Tarutino, that is, in fact, south of Moscow. Accordingly, in the event of the start of the French campaign against St. Petersburg, the Russian army would be in his rear.

In particular, since mid-September, Murat's vanguard has been stationed, watching the Russian army, not far from their Tarutinsky camp on the Chernishna River, 90 kilometers from Moscow. This grouping consisted of the following units: Poniatowski's 5th Corps, two infantry and two cavalry divisions, all four cavalry corps of Emperor Napoleon. Its total strength, according to army records at the end of September, totaled 26,540 people (this data was given by the captain of the horse artillery guards Chambray). At the same time, Chaumbray himself, taking into account the losses of the previous month, estimated the strength of the vanguard on the eve of the battle at 20,000 people.

It should be noted that the vanguard had strong artillery (197 guns). However, as Clausewitz pointed out, they "rather burdened the avant-garde than could be useful to it." The front and right flank of Murat's extended position were covered by the Nara and Chernishnaya rivers, the left flank came out into an open area where only the forest separated the French from the Russian positions.

For some time, both the Russian army and the French avant-garde coexisted without clashes. As General A. Ermolov pointed out, “Messrs. generals and officers gathered at the front posts with expressions of courtesy, which led many to conclude that there was a truce. Both sides remained in this position for two weeks.

When the partisans reported that Murat, in case of an attack, had no reinforcements closer than in Moscow, it was decided to attack the French, using a successful disposition.

The plan of attack was developed by General of the Cavalry Bennigsen, Chief of the General Staff of Kutuzov. First of all, it was decided to use the fact that a large forest approached the left flank of the French almost very close, and this made it possible to covertly approach their location.

According to the plan, the army was to attack in two parts. The first (four infantry corps, one cavalry corps, ten regiments of Cossacks under the command of Adjutant General Count Orlov-Denisov), under the personal command of Bennigsen, was supposed to covertly bypass the left flank of the French through the forest. Another, under the command of Miloradovich, to forge the other (right) flank of the French avant-garde in battle. At the same time, a separate detachment of Lieutenant General Dorokhov received the task to cut off the escape route for Murat. The commander-in-chief Kutuzov himself had to remain with the reserves in the camp and carry out general leadership.

Realizing the riskiness of his position, Murat also had information about the upcoming attack. Most likely, the training of Russian troops did not remain a secret for him. Therefore, the day before the battle, the French stood under arms in full readiness all night. But the expected attack did not come. As it turned out, the planned attack by the Russian troops was a day late due to the absence of the chief of staff Yermolov, who was at the dinner party at the time.

In fact, this circumstance played into the hands of Kutuzov. So, the next day, Murat issued an order to withdraw artillery and carts. But his adjutant, having delivered the order to the chief of artillery, found him sleeping and, unaware of the urgency of the package, decided to wait until morning. As a result, the French were absolutely not prepared to repel the attack. The moment for the battle turned out to be successful for the Russian army.

Preparations for the attack began with Bennigsen's columns carefully crossing the Nara River near Spassky. But again, another mistake influenced the course of events. In particular, the night march and the miscalculation of the bypass movement led to a slowdown, so the Russian troops did not have time to approach the enemy in time. Only the Cossack regiments of Orlov-Denisov reached the village of Dmitrovsky behind the left flank of the French before dawn. Miloradovich on the right flank of the French also did not make active movements until dawn.

When dawn began (at this time the attack was planned), Bennigsen's infantry corps did not appear at the edge. In such a situation, not wanting to miss the surprise and opportunity, Orlov-Denisov decided to attack on his own. As a result, the French from the corps of General Sebastiani managed to fire a few shots in a hurry, but fled in disarray behind the Ryazanovsky ravine. After that, the Cossacks rushed to rob the camp and Orlov-Denisov could not gather them for a long time. The left flank of the French was saved from complete defeat by Murat, who, having gathered the fugitives, organized counterattacks and stopped the advance of the Cossacks.

One of the witnesses of this battle recalled: “King Murat immediately rushed to the attacked point and, with his presence of mind and courage, stopped the offensive that had begun. He rushed to all bivouacs, gathered all the riders that came across to him, and as soon as he managed to recruit such a squadron, he immediately rushed to attack with them. Our cavalry owes its salvation precisely to these successive and repeated attacks, which, having stopped the enemy, gave the troops time and opportunity to look around, gather and go to the enemy.

It was at this moment that one of Bennigsen's corps appeared at the edge of Teterinka, directly opposite the French battery. They were commanded by Lieutenant General K. Baggovut. Artillery skirmish ensued. Baggovut, who had previously taken part in the Battle of Borodino, died in it. This event did not allow his corps to act more decisively. Bennigsen, also not prone to improvisation on the battlefield, did not dare to act only with part of the forces and gave the order to withdraw before the approach of the rest of the troops, who continued to wander through the forest.

Murat successfully took advantage of this confusion of the Russian troops. Repulsing the attacks of the Orlov-Denisov Cossacks, he ordered the artillery convoys to retreat. Therefore, when the rest of Bennigsen's corps finally appeared from the forest, the moment for defeating the French was already lost.

Shell-shocked during this battle, Bennigsen was furious and wrote in a letter to his wife: “I can’t come to my senses! What could be the consequences of this beautiful, brilliant day if I received support ... Here, in front of the entire army, Kutuzov forbids sending even one person to help me, these are his words. General Miloradovich, who commanded the left wing, was eager to get closer to help me - Kutuzov forbids him ... Can you imagine how far our old man was from the battlefield! His cowardice already exceeds the dimensions allowed for cowards, he already under Borodin gave the greatest proof of this, and therefore he covered himself with contempt and became ridiculous in the eyes of the whole army ... Can you imagine my position, that I need to quarrel with him whenever it’s a matter of it's about taking one step against the enemy, and you need to listen to rudeness from this person!

Indeed, as already mentioned, Miloradovich's troops were on the other flank. But in the midst of the battle, they slowly moved along the old Kaluga road. Most likely, given the delay of the bypass columns, Kutuzov ordered Miloradovich's troops to be stopped. Assessing this decision, some researchers point out that, despite the retreat of the French, there were significant chances to cut off their individual parts.

Kutuzov himself, in turn. even during the battle, he noted that “if we didn’t know how to take Murat alive in the morning and arrive on time at the places, then the pursuit would be useless. We can't move away from the position."

Retreating with the main forces to Spas-Kupla, Murat fortified the position with batteries and opened frontal fire on the Orlov-Denisov Cossacks pursuing him. Under such conditions, the Russian regiments with songs and music returned to their camp in the evening.

Assessing the results of the Tarutino battle, it should be noted that the defeat of Murat did not work out not only because of mistakes in planning the attack, but also due to the inaccurate execution of the planned plans by the Russian troops. As the historian M. Bogdanovich pointed out, 5,000 infantry and 7,000 cavalry took part in this battle from the Russian side.

At the same time, some unwillingness of Kutuzov to get involved in another battle with the French also mattered. Most likely, the commander-in-chief of the Russian army considered military operations unnecessary, since time was already working in his favor. In addition, there was already information that Napoleon was preparing to withdraw from Moscow, so Kutuzov did not want to expose the troops to additional danger by withdrawing them from the camp. At the same time, the commander-in-chief tried to solve one of his personal problems: to disable Bennigsen, who had been intriguing against him all the time. Accordingly, by appointing this general to command the troops, he did not give him full authority, first of all, regarding the decision on the question of possible reinforcements, as well as on taking up positions at the end of the battle.

General A. Yermolov spoke rather critically about the results of the Tarutinsky battle: “The battle could have ended incomparably more beneficial for us, but in general there was little communication in the action of the troops. The field marshal, confident of success, remained with the guard, did not see it with his own eyes; private chiefs disposed of arbitrarily. A huge number of our cavalry close to the center and on the left wing seemed more collected for the parade, showing off harmony more than speed of movement. It was possible to prevent the enemy from joining the infantry scattered in parts, bypassing and standing in the way of his retreat, for there was a considerable space between his camp and the forest. The enemy was given time to gather troops, bring artillery from different sides, reach the forest without hindrance and retreat through the village of Voronovo along the road that runs through it. The enemy lost 22 guns, up to 2,000 prisoners, the entire convoy and crews of Murat, King of Naples. Rich carts were a tasty bait for our Cossacks: they took up robbery, got drunk and did not think to prevent the enemy from retreating.

Thus, the main goal of the battle was not fully achieved, but its result was still quite successful. This concerned, first of all, raising the spirit of the Russian troops. Also, before that, throughout the entire war of 1812, in no battle, either side (even at Borodino) had such a number of captured guns - 36 (according to other sources 38) guns.

As for the losses of the parties, Kutuzov, in a letter to Emperor Alexander I, reported 2,500 Frenchmen killed and 1,000 prisoners. Another 500 prisoners were taken the next day by the Cossacks during the pursuit. The commander-in-chief estimated the losses of the Russian side at 300 killed and wounded.

The military theorist Clausewitz confirmed the losses of the French in 3-4 thousand soldiers. Two generals of Murat, Deri and Fisher, were killed in the battle. The day after the battle, Russian posts received a letter from Murat asking them to hand over the body of General Deri, the head of his personal guard. This request could not be granted because the body could not be found.

It should be pointed out that the military historian Bogdanovich cited a list of losses of the Russian army, which included 1,200 people (74 killed, 428 wounded and 700 missing). According to the inscription on the marble slab on the wall of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior, the loss of killed and wounded amounted to 1,183 people.

Alexander I generously rewarded his commanders: Kutuzov received a golden sword with diamonds and a laurel wreath, Bennigsen received diamond signs of the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called and 100 thousand rubles. Dozens of other officers and generals - awards and regular promotions. As after the battle of Borodino, the lower ranks, participants in the battle, received 5 rubles per person.

The described inconsistency of actions on the field of the Tarutinsky battle caused an aggravation of the long-standing conflict between Kutuzov and Bennigsen. The latter reproached the commander-in-chief for refusing support and recalling Dokhturov's corps from the battlefield. The result of this confrontation was the removal of Bennigsen from the army. As Kutuzov wrote to his wife in a letter dated October 30, 1812: “I almost don’t let Bennigsen in and will send him soon” (which in the end was done).

Most likely, it was the battle near Tarutino that prompted Napoleon to retreat from Moscow. In his notes, Roos pointed out: “this ... camp on the Chernishna River, near the village of Teterinka, where our division stood and I, with the last remnant of our regiment, was the final point of our difficult campaign deep into Russia, and October 18 was the day when we were forced were to start retreating.

Accordingly, despite the fact that the decision to withdraw was made by Napoleon before the start of the Tarutino battle, it was after receiving news of this battle that he finally decided to withdraw from Moscow. And the very next day, the retreat of the French towards Kaluga began.

Interestingly, in memory of the Tarutino victory over the French, the owner of Tarutino, Count S. Rumyantsev, freed 745 peasants from serfdom in 1829, obliging them to erect a monument on the battlefield.

As already mentioned, initially Napoleon planned to spend the winter in Moscow: “There was a minute,” noted the French officer Bosse, “when the emperor thought to spend the winter in Moscow; we collected a significant amount of provisions, which were replenished daily with the discoveries that soldiers made in the cellars of burned houses ... In the cellars they found whole piles of all kinds of things, flour, pianos, hay, wall clocks, wines, dresses, mahogany furniture, vodka, weapons, woolen fabrics, superbly bound books, furs at different prices, etc. And the churches were overflowing with things. Napoleon was so determined to spend the winter in Moscow that one day at breakfast he ordered me to draw up a list of artists from the Comedi Francaise who could be called to Moscow without disturbing the performances in Paris.

As already mentioned, on October 4 (16) Napoleon sent the Marquis of Loriston to Kutuzov's camp, who was ambassador to Russia just before the war. The Soviet historian E. Tarle wrote: “Napoleon wanted, in fact, to send General Caulaincourt, Duke of Vicenza, who was also ambassador to Russia even before Lauriston, but Caulaincourt strongly advised Napoleon not to do this, pointing out that such an attempt would only indicate to the Russians the uncertainty of the French army . Napoleon was irritated, as always, when he felt the justice of the argument of the one arguing with him; Yes, and he has already lost the habit of disputants. Lauriston repeated the arguments of Caulaincourt, but the emperor cut off the conversation with a direct order: “I need peace; so long as honor is saved. Immediately go to the Russian camp "... Kutuzov received Loriston at headquarters, refused to negotiate peace or a truce with him, and only promised to bring Napoleon's proposal to the attention of Alexander."

Interestingly, Kutuzov decided to take advantage of Loriston's visit to give him the impression of the high morale of the army. The Russian commander-in-chief ordered to light as many fires as possible, to give meat to the soldiers for dinner and to sing at the same time.

During this meeting, Lauriston categorically denied the involvement of the French in the fire in Moscow and reproached the Russian soldiers for excessive cruelty. But Kutuzov insisted that Moscow was plundered by the enemy, and the fire was also the work of marauders of the Great Army. The meeting ended with Kutuzov assuring Loriston that he personally would never go to peace talks with the French, because he would be "cursed by posterity for the very possibility of such a thing." But he promised to convey Napoleon's peace proposals to Alexander I. Although Loriston sought permission to go to St. Petersburg himself, the next morning Prince Volkonsky was sent to the Russian emperor with a report on the meeting.

Alexander I expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that Kutuzov, despite his order not to enter into any negotiations with the French, nevertheless received Lauriston. But the field marshal, most likely, went into negotiations solely with the aim of gaining additional time in order to put the army on alert. He perfectly understood that every day his army was growing stronger in the Tarutinsky camp, and the Great Army was decomposing in Moscow. As it turned out, such a calculation by Kutuzov fully justified itself: Napoleon waited in vain for a few more days for an answer from Alexander I. But, as you know, the Russian emperor once again left this proposal unanswered, which was the last one.

When the futility of concluding peace agreements with the Russian emperor and the impossibility of providing food for the troops had finally become clear, Napoleon decided to leave Moscow. This was also facilitated by the sharply deteriorated weather with early frosts. In addition, the Battle of Tarutino showed that Kutuzov had strengthened, and further clashes could be expected at the initiative of the Russian army. Baron Dedem wrote: “To spend the winter in Moscow was unthinkable. We made our way to this city, but not one of the provinces we passed through was conquered by us.

Soon Napoleon gave the order to Marshal Mortier, appointed by him as the Moscow governor-general, before leaving Moscow, to set fire to wine shops, barracks and all public buildings in the city, with the exception of the Orphanage. An order was also given to set fire to the Kremlin Palace and the Kremlin walls. It was planned that the explosion of the Kremlin was to follow the exit of the last French troops from the city.

On October 7 (19), the army moved from Moscow along the old Kaluga road. Only the corps of Marshal Mortier remained in the city. A bad feeling did not leave the French soldiers during the exit from Moscow: “There was something gloomy in this campaign. The darkness of the night, the silence of the soldiers, the smoking ruins that we trampled under our feet, and each of us anxiously foresaw all the troubles of this memorable retreat. Even the soldiers understood the difficulty of our position; they were gifted both with intelligence and with that amazing instinct that distinguishes French soldiers and which, forcing them to weigh danger from all sides, seemed to double their courage and give them the strength to face danger in the face.

The convoy of the retreating French army made a special impression on the eyewitness. Christopher-Ludwig von Jelin recalled and was surprised: “But what a terrible picture the Great Army now presented: all the soldiers were loaded with a wide variety of things that they wanted to take from Moscow - maybe they hoped to take them to their homeland - and at that At the same time, they forgot to finally stock up on the most necessary for the duration of their long journey. The convoy looked like a horde, as if coming to us from strange, unfamiliar countries, dressed in the most diverse dresses and having the appearance of a masquerade. This wagon train was the first to break order during the retreat, since each soldier tried to send the things he had taken in Moscow in front of the army in order to consider them safe.

Immediately after the start of the retreat, Napoleon planned to attack the Russian army and, having defeated it, get into the regions of the country not devastated by the war in order to provide his soldiers with food and fodder. But, being for several days in the village of Troitskoye on the banks of the Desna River, he abandoned his original plan - to attack Kutuzov, since in this case he had to endure a battle similar to Borodino.

After that, Napoleon decided to turn right from the old Kaluga road and, bypassing the Russian army, go to the Borovskaya road. Further, he planned to move the army in places untouched by the war in the Kaluga province to the southwest, to Smolensk. He intended, having calmly reached Smolensk through Maloyaroslavets and Kaluga, to spend the winter in Smolensk or in Vilna and continue the war in the future.

In a letter to his wife dated 10 (22) October, Napoleon wrote: "I left Moscow with the order to blow up the Kremlin." This order was sent to Marshal Mortier the night before. The latter, having completed it, was to immediately join the army with his corps. But due to lack of time, Mortier did not have time to thoroughly prepare for the explosion of the Kremlin.

One of the local workers, who was forced to dig tunnels for explosives, recalled: “The French took me there, and they brought many other workers from ours and ordered us to dig tunnels under the Kremlin walls, under the cathedrals and the palace, and they dug themselves right there. And we just did not raise our hands. Let everything die, but at least not by our hands. Yes, it was not our will: no matter how bitter, but dig. The accursed ones are standing here, and as soon as they see that one of us is bad at digging, they are now beating them with rifle butts. My whole back is bruised."

When Mortier left Moscow, explosions of mines began behind him: “Undressed, wounded by fragments of glass, stones, iron, the unfortunate people ran out into the streets in horror. Impenetrable darkness enveloped Moscow; cold autumn rain poured down in torrents. Wild cries, squeals, groans of people crushed by falling buildings were heard from everywhere. There were calls for help, but there was no one to help. The Kremlin was illuminated by the ominous flame of a fire. One explosion followed another, the earth did not stop shaking. Everything seemed to resemble the last day of the world.

As a result, only the Vodovzvodnaya Tower was destroyed to the ground, the Nikolskaya, 1st Bezymyannaya and Petrovskaya towers, as well as the Kremlin wall and part of the arsenal, were badly damaged. The explosion burned the Faceted Chamber. Contemporaries noted that the attempt to undermine the tallest building in Moscow, the Ivan the Great Bell Tower, failed. It remained unscathed, unlike later additions: “A huge extension to Ivan the Great, torn off by an explosion, collapsed near him and at his feet, and he stood as majestic as the one just erected by Boris Godunov to feed the workers in times of famine, as if mocking over the fruitless fury of nineteenth-century barbarism.

After the withdrawal of the French troops from Moscow, the cavalry vanguard of the Russian army under the command of A. Benckendorff entered the city. On October 14, he wrote to M. Vorontsov: “We entered Moscow on the evening of the 11th. The city was given over to the plunder of the peasants, of whom there were a great many, and all drunk; the Cossacks and their foremen completed the rout. Entering the city with the hussars and Life Cossacks, I considered it my duty to immediately take over the command of the police units of the unfortunate capital: people killed each other in the streets, set fire to houses. Finally, everything calmed down, and the fire was extinguished. I had to endure some real battles.”

A. Shakhovskaya also wrote about the presence in the city of crowds of peasants who fled to rob him from all over the district: to the turmoil of our entry, they arrived in wagons to seize the unlooted, but gr. Benckendorff calculated otherwise and ordered that bodies and carrion be loaded onto their cart and taken out of the city, to places convenient for burial or extermination, which saved Moscow from infection, its inhabitants from peasant robbery, and the peasants from sin.

A. Bulgakov, an official for special assignments under Count Rostopchin, described his first thoughts when he saw Moscow: “But God, what I felt at every step forward! We passed Rogozhskaya, Taganka, Solyanka, Kitay-gorod, and there was not a single house that had not been burned or destroyed. I felt cold in my heart and could not speak: every face that came across seemed to ask for tears about the fate of our unfortunate capital.

There were many destroyed houses: “From the Nikitsky to the Tver Gates, on the left side, everything was burned, and on the right, the houses of Prince. Shcherbatova, gr. Stroganova and about two more houses ... Tverskaya from the Tver Gates to the house of the commander-in-chief, on both sides, is all intact; and then, from Chertkovo down to Mokhovaya, everything burned out, on both sides ... ”At the same time, the German settlement suffered greatly,“ a vast field formed, covered with burnt pipes, and when the snow falls, they will seem like tombstones, and the whole quarter will turn into cemetery". Although Muscovites were talking about miraculously surviving houses: “The arsenal flew into the air, the wall, near the Nikolsky Gate, too, the tower itself was destroyed, and among these ruins not only the icon survived, but also the glass and the lantern in which the lamp is located. I was amazed and could not tear myself away from this spectacle. It is clear that in the city the only sense is that about these miracles.

From the data of the Moscow Chief of Police Ivashkin, you can find out about the number of human corpses taken out of the streets of Moscow - 11,959, as well as horse ones - 12,546. Most of the dead are wounded soldiers of the Russian army left in the city after the Battle of Borodino.

After returning to the city of Rostopchin, it was ordered not to arrange a property redistribution and leave the stolen goods to those in whose hands it fell. Having learned about this order, the people rushed to the market: “On the very first Sunday, mountains of stolen property blocked a huge area, and Moscow poured into an unprecedented market!”

Despite all the problems of the city described, the departure of the French troops from Moscow and the return of the Russians had a huge psychological impact on both the population and the imperial court. The maid of honor of the Empress R. Sturdza wrote in her memoirs: “How to portray what we experienced when we learned about the cleansing of Moscow! I was waiting for the Empress in her study, when the news captured my heart and head. Standing at the window, I looked at the majestic river, and it seemed to me that its waves were rushing somehow more proudly and solemnly. Suddenly, a cannon shot was heard from the fortress, the gilded bell tower of which is exactly opposite the Kamennoostrovsky Palace. From this calculated solemn firing, which marked a joyful event, all the veins in me trembled, and I had never experienced such a feeling of living and pure joy. I would not have been able to endure such excitement any longer if it had not been for the relief of the floods of tears. I experienced in those moments that nothing shakes the soul so much as the feeling of noble love for the fatherland, and this feeling then took possession of all of Russia. The dissatisfied fell silent; the people, who never abandoned the hope of God's help, calmed down, and the sovereign, having assured himself of the mind of the capital, began to prepare for his departure for the army.

The same M. Volkova, who met the news of Kutuzov’s decision to leave Moscow with such misunderstanding, wrote: “The French left Moscow ... Although I am convinced that only the ashes of the dear city remain, I breathe more freely at the thought that the French do not go along nicely dust and do not defile with their breath the air that we have breathed. General unanimity. Although it is said that the French left voluntarily and that the expected successes did not follow their removal, yet from that time we all cheered up, as if a heavy burden had been lifted from our shoulders. The other day, three runaway peasant women, ruined like us, pestered me in the street and did not give me peace until I confirmed to them that there really was not a single Frenchman left in Moscow. In the churches they again pray fervently and say special prayers for our dear Moscow, whose fate worries every Russian. You cannot express the feeling we experienced today, when after Mass we began to pray for the restoration of the city, asking God to send down a blessing on the ancient capital of our unfortunate Fatherland. The merchants who fled from Moscow are going to return there along the first sledge track, to see what has become of her, and to the best of their ability to restore what they have lost. One can hope to look at dear places that I tried not to think about, believing that I had to forever give up the happiness of seeing them again. O! How dear and sacred is the native land! How deep and strong is our affection for her! How can a person sell the welfare of the Fatherland, the graves of their ancestors, the blood of brothers for a handful of gold - in a word, everything that is so dear to every creature gifted with soul and mind.

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Tarutinsky fight- the battle that took place on October 6 (18), 1812, in the area of ​​​​the village of Tarutino, Kaluga region, between Russian troops under the command of Field Marshal Kutuzov and the French troops of Marshal Murat. The fight is also called battle under the river Chernishnia, Tarutino maneuver or battle in Vinkovo.

The victory at Tarutino was the first victory of the Russian troops in the Patriotic War of 1812. Success strengthened the spirit of the Russian army, which went over to the counteroffensive.

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✪ Kutuzov maneuvers and the battle under the Chernishnia River

✪ Patriotic War of 1812. Tarutino maneuver.

✪ Tarutino maneuver

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"Gg. generals and officers gathered at the front posts with an expression of courtesy, which was a reason for many to conclude that there was a truce.

Both sides remained in this position for two weeks.

The remaining corps under the command of Miloradovich were to forge the right flank of the French in battle. A separate detachment of Lieutenant General Dorokhov, according to the plan, should cut Murat's escape route on the Old Kaluga Road near the village of Voronovo. Commander-in-Chief Kutuzov remained with the reserves in the camp and carried out general leadership.

The battle could have ended with an incomparably greater advantage for us, but in general there was little communication in the action of the troops. The field marshal, confident of success, remained with the guard, did not see it with his own eyes; private chiefs disposed of arbitrarily. A huge number of our cavalry close to the center and on the left wing seemed more collected for the parade, showing off harmony more than speed of movement. It was possible to prevent the enemy from joining the infantry scattered in parts, bypassing and standing in the way of his retreat, for there was a considerable space between his camp and the forest. The enemy was given time to gather troops, bring artillery from different sides, reach the forest without hindrance and retreat through the village of Voronovo along the road that runs through it. The enemy lost 22 guns, up to 2000 prisoners, the entire convoy and crews of Murat, King of Neapolitan. Rich carts were a tasty bait for our Cossacks: they took up robbery, got drunk and did not think to prevent the enemy from retreating.

The goal of the Tarutinsky battle was not fully achieved, but its result was successful, and success was even more important for raising the spirit of the Russian troops. Before in the course of the war, in no battle, either side (even at Borodino) had such a number of captured guns as in this one - 36 or 38 guns. In a letter to Tsar Alexander I, Kutuzov reports 2,500 Frenchmen killed, 1,000 prisoners, and another 500 prisoners the next day were taken by the Cossacks during the pursuit. Kutuzov estimated his losses at 300 killed and wounded. Clausewitz confirms French losses of 3-4 thousand soldiers. Two generals of Murat were killed (Deri and Fisher). The next day after the battle, a letter from Murat was sent to the Russian posts with a request to hand over the body of General Deri, the head of Murat's personal guard. The request could not be granted, as the body was not found.

In commemoration of the victory over the French, the owner of Tarutin, Count S.P. Rumyantsev, freed 745 peasants from serfdom in 1829, obliging them to erect a monument on the battlefield.

Tarutino. 1812. Electronic reproduction from the Wikimedia Foundation.

Tarutinsky maneuver (Patriotic War, 1812). The transition of the Russian army under the command of Field Marshal M.I. Kutuzov from Moscow to the village of Tarutino on September 5-21, 1812. After Battle of Borodino Kutuzov took it upon himself to surrender Moscow to the French in order to save the army. “With the loss of Moscow, Russia has not yet been lost ... But if the army is destroyed, both Moscow and Russia will perish”- said Kutuzov to the generals at the military council in Fili. So the Russians left their ancient capital, which for the first time in 200 years was in the hands of foreigners.

Leaving Moscow, Kutuzov began to withdraw in a southeasterly direction, along the Ryazan road. At the same time, the Cossack units and the corps N.N. Rayevsky continued to retreat to Ryazan, and then "dissolved" in the forests. By this they misled the French vanguard of the marshal I. Murata , which followed on the heels of the retreating army, and the Russians broke away from the pursuit. Murat again overtook the Russian army in the Podolsk region. However, attempts to attack her were thwarted by the rearguard of General M.A. Miloradovich . He withstood a number of battles, not allowing the French cavalry to disrupt the ranks of the retreating army (see. Spas Purchase ).

During the withdrawal, Kutuzov introduced tough measures against desertion, which began in his troops after the surrender of Moscow. Having reached the Old Kaluga road, the Russian army turned to Kaluga and, having crossed the Nara River, camped in the village of Tarutino. Kutuzov brought 85 thousand people there. cash composition (together with the militia). As a result of the Tarutino maneuver, the Russian army got out of the attack and took an advantageous position.

While in Tarutino, Kutuzov covered the southern regions of Russia, rich in human resources and food, the Tula military-industrial complex, and at the same time could threaten French communications on the Smolensk road. The French, on the other hand, could not advance unhindered from Moscow to St. Petersburg, having the Russian army in the rear. Kutuzov actually imposed on Napoleon the further course of the campaign. Most importantly, the Russian commander, having retained the army, received all the advantages of his position - the owner of his own land.

In the Tarutinsky camp, the Russian army received reinforcements and increased its strength to 120 thousand people. One of the most significant additions was the arrival of 26 Cossack regiments from the Don region. The share of cavalry in the Kutuzov army increased significantly, reaching a third of its composition, which played an extremely important role during the persecution of the Napoleonic troops. The issue of providing the cavalry with everything necessary was also thought out in advance, in particular, more than 150 thousand horseshoes were delivered to the army.

In addition to manpower reserves, the army received substantial material and technical support in a short time. Only in August - September, the main weapons forge of the country - the Tula plant manufactured 36 thousand guns for the army. Kutuzov also entrusted the governors of Tula, Kaluga, Oryol, Ryazan and Tver with the duty to prepare 100,000 sheepskin coats and 100,000 pairs of boots for the army.

Despite all their tactical achievements, the French army in Moscow found itself in a strategic blockade. In addition to the Tarutinsky camp, where Kutuzov's troops were stationed, a second army was actually created around Moscow, consisting of partisans and militias. Its number reached 200 thousand people. Having reached the ancient Russian capital, the Napoleonic army fell into a dense blockade ring. Napoleon, who came to a country deeply alien to him, could not establish his base here and found himself isolated. The only thread connecting the French with the familiar world remained the Smolensk road, along which they carried out a constant supply of provisions, ammunition and fodder to Moscow. But it was under the control of partisan detachments and could at any moment be tightly blocked by a blow from Tarutino. At the same time, Napoleon's hopes that the capture of Moscow would force the Russians to make peace were not justified because of the tough position of Alexander I, who firmly decided to continue the fight.

During his stay in Moscow, Napoleon lost 26 thousand people. killed, missing, died from wounds and diseases, i.e. suffered losses comparable to a major battle. Gradually, the illusory nature of success from the occupation of Moscow by the French became quite obvious. All this forced Napoleon to leave Moscow. In 1834, in Tarutino, with funds raised by peasants, a monument was erected with the inscription: “In this place, the Russian army, led by Field Marshal Kutuzov, having strengthened, saved Russia and Europe” (see Chernishnya, Maloyaroslavets).

Used materials of the book: Nikolai Shefov. Russian battles. Military History Library. M., 2002.

Tarutino maneuver of 1812, a march maneuver of the Russian army during the Patriotic War of 1812 from Moscow to Tarutino (a village on the Nara River, 80 km southwest of Moscow), carried out under the leadership of General Feldm. M. I. Kutuzova 5-21 Sept. (Sept. 17 - Oct. 3). After the battle of Borodino in 1812, when it became obvious that it was impossible to keep Moscow with the remaining forces, M.I. communications, prevent the enemy in the south. districts of Russia (not devastated by the war) and prepare Russian. army to launch a counteroffensive. Kutuzov kept his plan a great secret. 2 (14) Sept., leaving Moscow, Rus. the army headed to the south-east. along the Ryazan road. 4(16) sept. after crossing the Moskva River at the Borovsky ferry, Kutuzov, under the cover of the rearguard of Gen. H. H. Raevsky suddenly turned Ch. Russian forces. army by 3. The Cossacks of the rearguard succeeded in demonstrative retreat to Ryazan to carry away the vanguard of the French. army. 7(19) sept. Russian the army arrived in Podolsk, and two days later, continuing the flank maneuver, in the area of ​​the village of Krasnaya Pakhra. Riding the Old Kaluga Road, Rus. the army camped and stayed here until 14 (26) Sept. In the direction of Moscow, the vanguard of Gen. M.A. Miloradovich and the detachment of H.H. Raevsky; detachments for partisans were allocated. actions. Lost Russian. army out of sight, Napoleon sent strong detachments along the Ryazan, Tula and Kaluga roads. For several days they searched for Kutuzov, and only on 14 (26) Sept. Marshal I. Murat's cavalry discovered Russian. troops in the Podolsk region. Subsequently, Kutuzov secretly (mainly at night) retreated along the Old Kaluga road to the river. Nara. 21 Sept. (Oct 3) Russian troops stopped in the district with. Tarutino, where they took a new fortified position (see Tarutino camp). The brilliantly organized and conducted T. m. allowed the Russian. army to break away from the army of Napoleon and take advantage of a strategist, a position that provided her with preparations for a counteroffensive. As a result, T. m. Kutuzov kept the message from the south. regions of Russia, which made it possible to strengthen the army, cover up the arms factory in Tula and the supply base in Kaluga, maintain contact with the armies of A.P. Tormasov and P.V. Chichagov. Napoleon was forced to abandon the attack on St. Petersburg and, ultimately, leaving Moscow, retreat along the Old Smolensk Road, that is, through the districts already devastated by the war. Kutuzov's outstanding military leadership talent, his ability to impose his will on the project, put him in unfavorable conditions, and achieve a turning point in the war, manifested itself in T. m.

D. V. Pankov

Used materials of the Soviet military encyclopedia in 8 volumes, volume 7.

Read further:

Patriotic War of 1812 (chronological table).

Tyrion. Tarutino. (memoirs of a participant).

Griou. Tarutino. (memoirs of a participant).

By the beginning of October 1812, the Russian army was quite ready to launch a counteroffensive. The Russian command followed the actions of the enemy and waited for the right moment. Mikhail Kutuzov believed that the French army would soon leave Moscow. Intelligence data gave reason to assume that Napoleon would soon move on to active operations. However, the enemy tried to hide his intentions and for this purpose carried out false maneuvers.

The first signs of an unusual movement of the enemy appeared by the evening of 3 (15) October. General Ivan Dorokhov announced the possibility of the enemy moving towards Kaluga. True, on the same day, the heads of the partisan detachments Alexander Figner, who was operating near Mozhaisk, and Nikolai Kudashev from the Ryazan road reported that there were no grounds for concern. However, Dorokhov's message alerted the commander in chief. He ordered the commanders of the army partisan detachments to increase surveillance in order to obtain more accurate information about the enemy and not miss his movements.

Mikhail Kutuzov knew that Napoleon, having occupied Moscow, found himself in a difficult position. The French army could not fully provide itself with everything necessary in Moscow. The command of the Russian army launched a widespread guerrilla war, which prevented the normal supply of troops. To search for food and fodder, the French command had to send significant detachments that suffered losses. To protect communications and collect provisions, Napoleon was forced to keep large military formations far beyond the boundaries of the ancient Russian capital. Napoleon's attempts to start peace negotiations with Alexander and Kutuzov failed. The time for the decision to withdraw the army from Moscow was fast approaching.

The generals of the Russian army took the news of the possible movement of the enemy from Moscow as the beginning of the retreat of Napoleon's troops. Quartermaster General Karl Tol proposed his plan of attack on Murat's vanguard, which was to significantly weaken the French army. The realization of this goal, according to Tol, did not present any particular difficulties. Murat's vanguard could only receive reinforcements from Moscow, it became possible to defeat a significant part of the French army separately from the main forces. According to intelligence data on the Chernishna River (a tributary of the Nara), 90 km from Moscow, Murat's forces have been stationed there since September 24, watching the Russian army, there were no more than 45-50 thousand people. And, most importantly, the enemy settled freely, poorly organized the security system. In reality, under the command of Murat there were 20-26 thousand people: the 5th Polish corps of Poniatowski, 4 cavalry corps (or rather, all that was left of them, after the battle of Borodino, the French command could not restore their cavalry). True, the French avant-garde had strong artillery - 197 guns. However, according to Clausewitz, they "burdened the avant-garde rather than could be useful to it." The front and right flank of the extended disposition of the forces of the Neapolitan king were protected by the rivers Nara and Chernishnia, the left wing went out into an open place where only the forest separated the French from the Russian positions. For about two weeks, the positions of the Russian and French armies were side by side.

It turned out that the left flank of the French, resting on the Dednevsky forest, was actually not guarded. The opinion of Tolya was joined by the Chief of the General Staff of the Army Leonty Bennigsen, the general on duty under the commander-in-chief Pyotr Konovnitsyn and Lieutenant General Karl Baggovut. Mikhail Kutuzov approved the idea and decided to attack the enemy. On the same evening, he approved the disposition, according to which the movement of troops was to begin the next day - October 4 (16), at 18 o'clock, and the attack itself - 6 o'clock in the morning on October 5 (17).

On the morning of October 4 (16), Konovnitsyn sent an order to the chief of staff of the 1st Western Army, Yermolov, which confirmed that the performance would take place "today at 6 o'clock in the afternoon." However, the performance of the troops on this day did not take place, since the disposition was not delivered on time to the units. Mikhail Kutuzov was forced to cancel the order. Apparently, the responsibility for disrupting the timely delivery of the disposition to the troops lies both with Bennigsen, who was entrusted with the command of the troops of the right flank, he did not check the receipt of the order by the corps commanders, as well as Yermolov, who was hostile to Bennigsen, and did not check the execution of the instructions. In addition, there was another reason that forced the command to cancel the performance. On the night of October 5 (17), Kutuzov received information about the beginning of the movement of enemy forces along the Old and New Kaluga roads. The commander-in-chief suggested that the French army had left Moscow and might be at Tarutin at the time of the battle with Murat's vanguard. Not wanting to meet with the main enemy forces in unfavorable conditions, Kutuzov canceled the attack. Then it turned out that this information turned out to be false and the commander-in-chief appointed the offensive for October 6 (18).

Battle plan

The Russian headquarters assumed that the enemy forces were 45-50 thousand people and consisted of the cavalry corps of Murat, the corps of Davout and Poniatowski. The main forces of the Russian army were sent to attack the reinforced vanguard of Marshal Murat. The army was divided into two parts. The composition of the right wing under the command of Bennigsen included the 2nd, 3rd, 4th infantry corps, 10 Cossack regiments, parts of the 1st cavalry corps. The left wing and center under the command of the chief of the vanguard of the Main Army, Mikhail Miloradovich, included the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th infantry corps and two cuirassier divisions.

The 2nd, 3rd, 4th cavalry corps, the Cossack regiments under the leadership of Major General Fyodor Korf, were located in front of the left flank. The headquarters of the commander-in-chief was also to be located on the left flank. The main blow was to be delivered by the troops of the right wing of Bennigsen on the left flank of the enemy. Bennigsen divided his forces into three columns and a reserve. The first column was made up of cavalry under the command of Vasily Orlov-Denisov: 10 Cossack regiments, one cavalry chasseur, two dragoons, one hussar, one lancer regiment. Orlov-Denisov was supposed to go around the left flank of the French troops through the Dednevsky forest and go to their rear near the village of Stremilova. The second column consisted of the infantry of Baggovut's 2nd Corps. She received an order to attack the left wing of the enemy from the front near the village of Teterino (Teterinka). The 4th Infantry Corps under the command of General Alexander Osterman-Tolstoy entered the third column. The third column was supposed to line up with the second column and attack the center of the French troops, also located near the village of Teterino. The reserve included the 3rd Infantry Corps of Pavel Stroganov, the 1st Cavalry Corps of Peter Meller-Zakomelsky. The reserve had the task of assisting Baggovut's 2nd Infantry Corps.

At the same time, the troops of M.A. were supposed to hit the enemy. Miloradovich with the support of part of the forces of the Russian army under the command of Kutuzov himself. Their task was to forge the right flank of the enemy. The troops were located in two lines. According to the disposition in the first line, near the village of Glyadovo (Glodovo), there were units of the 7th and 8th infantry corps. Behind in the second line is the reserve (5th corps). The 6th Infantry Corps and two cuirassier divisions were to leave Tarutino to the edge of the Dednevsky forest and act in the center, advancing in the direction of the village of Vinkov. Finally, the army partisan detachments of I.S. Dorokhov and Lieutenant Colonel A.S. Figner struck at the rear of the enemy, they received the task of cutting off the retreat of the enemy army. According to the plan of Mikhail Kutuzov, Russian troops were supposed to surround and destroy the enemy vanguard. The plan was good, but its implementation depended on the simultaneous actions of the Russian troops. In the conditions of that time, at night and in a wooded area, it was very difficult to achieve this plan.

The course of the battle

To carry out the maneuver, the commander-in-chief sent the author of the plan, Tolya, to help Bennigsen, who reconnoitered the routes. However, in practice, neither Bennigsen nor Toll succeeded in carrying out the maneuver according to the planned plan. Only the first column of Orlov-Denisov arrived at the appointed place to the village of Dmitrievsky on time. The other two columns got lost in the night forest and were late. As a result, the moment of surprise was lost.

As soon as dawn broke, Orlov-Denisov, fearing that his troops would be discovered by the enemy, decided to launch an offensive. He hoped that the other columns were already in position to support his attack. At 7 o'clock in the morning, the Cossack regiments attacked Sebastiani's cuirassier division. The Russian Cossacks took the enemy by surprise. Orlov-Denisov noted the feat of 42 officers of the Cossack regiments, who “being always in the hunters in front, were the first to cut into the enemy cavalry columns, overturned and drove to the infantry, covering their batteries; when the enemy formed up and prepared to attack, they, warning him, despising all the danger and horror of death, regardless of either shotgun or rifle volleys, rushed desperately at the enemy, cutting into the ranks, laying down many on the spot, and drove the rest in great disorder. several miles." The enemy threw 38 guns and fled in a panic. The Cossacks went to the Ryazanov ravine, along which the road to Spas-Kuplya ran, but here they were met by the cavalry of Claparede and Nansouty and pushed back.

While the left flank of the enemy was crushed, in the center the French managed to prepare to repel the attack of the Russian troops. When units of the 4th corps of the third column entered the northwestern edge of the forest and began an attack on Teterinka, the French were ready for battle. In addition, at first only one Tobolsk regiment went on the offensive (the rest of the units had not yet left the forest), then the 20th Jaeger regiment from the Orlov-Denisov detachment joined it. Finally, parts of the second column of Baggovut began to appear, with which Bennigsen was also. Having deployed the rangers at the edge, Baggovut led them on the attack, without waiting for the rest of the troops of the column to approach.

The Russian huntsmen pressed the enemy and captured the Ryazanov defile (a narrow passage between hills or water barriers), along which the French troops retreated. Marshal Murat, realizing the danger of the situation, gathered troops and drove the rangers out of the ravine. Karl Fedorovich Baggovut died during this fight. Bennigsen took command of the column. He did not dare to attack with the forces available to him, he began to wait for the approach of the third column and the reserve. Joachim Murat, took advantage of the respite and, under cover of artillery fire, withdrew the main forces, carts and part of the artillery to Spas-Kupl.

Karl Fedorovich Baggovut.

The reserve, the 3rd Infantry Corps, finally joined the second column. According to the original plan, he was supposed to advance in the direction of the Ryazanov ravine. However, Bennigsen ordered Strogonov's corps to go in support of the 2nd Corps and act in the direction of the village of Teterinka. Later, parts of the 4th Corps left the forest, and Bennigsen sent them to the central position of Murat. It was a gross mistake, since the enemy had already withdrawn troops.

Thus, only the forces of Orlov-Denisov and part of the troops of the third column of Osterman-Tolstoy struck at the original plan. Still, this attack brought some success. French batteries were suppressed by Russian artillery fire. The Russian infantry drove the enemy from their positions and forced them to hastily retreat. The enemy retreat soon turned into a rout. The Cossack regiments of Orlov-Denisov and Miloradovich's cavalry pursued the French to Voronovo. The success could have been more significant if the bulk of the troops of the right wing of the Russian army had acted in a more coordinated manner.

The troops of the right flank of the Russian army did not take part in the battle at all. They were stopped by order of the commander-in-chief. Kutuzov suspended the movement of troops for several reasons. He received a package from Kudashev, in which there was an order from Marshal Berthier to General Arzhan dated October 5 (17) to send them convoys and cargo to the Mozhaisk road and move his division to the New Kaluga road to Fominsky. This indicated that the French army was leaving Moscow and was going to move towards Kaluga and Tula along the New Kaluga road. Therefore, Mikhail Kutuzov decided not to lead his main forces into battle with Murat. On October 4 (16), Seslavin reported to the commander-in-chief that he had met significant enemy forces at Fominsky. After analyzing this information, Kutuzov began to suspect that Napoleon was starting the movement of his main forces. He orders Dorokhov's detachment, instead of moving to the rear of Murat's avant-garde, to return to the Borovskaya road. The detachment of Dorokhov, who arrived at Fominsky on October 6 (18). Dorokhov met a large French force and asked for reinforcements. The commander-in-chief sent two regiments to him and ordered the 6th Corps of Dokhturov, the guards cavalry division and Figner's army partisan detachment to also advance to this area. Thus, Mikhail Kutuzov created in advance on his left flank such a grouping that could withstand the battle until the main forces of the Russian army approached.

It was information about the movement of large enemy forces that forced the Russian commander to act so carefully in the Battle of Tarutino. Further active actions against the forces of Murat lost their former significance, a more serious "game" began. Therefore, the Russian commander-in-chief rejected the proposals of Miloradovich and Yermolov to pursue the forces of Marshal Murat.

The result of the battle

The defeat of Murat's troops did not work out due to the mistakes of the command, both in planning the offensive and in the fuzzy execution of the planned plans by the troops. According to the estimates of the historian M.I. Bogdanovich, 5,000 infantry and 7,000 cavalry actually participated in the battle with the French.

However, despite the fact that Murat's forces were not destroyed, significant tactical success was achieved in the Tarutino battle. The battle ended with the victory and flight of the enemy, large trophies and a significant number of prisoners strengthened the morale of the army. This private victory was the beginning of active offensive operations of the army of Mikhail Kutuzov.

38 guns were captured. The French army lost about 4 thousand killed, wounded and captured (of which 1.5 thousand were prisoners). The Russian army lost about 1200 people killed and wounded.