One of the myths of the Great Patriotic War about "miracle tanks", invulnerable, sweeping everything out of their way, was the myth of the new tanks of the Soviet Union - T-34, KV, in the initial period of the war. There were even suggestions that the German armed forces had to use aircraft to knock them out, as conventional anti-tank weapons could not cope. From this followed another myth - the reason for the defeat at the beginning of the war was the lack of "wonder tanks". The blame, of course, was laid on the Soviet leadership, which allegedly did not understand their significance before the war, and Stalin personally.

Examples were given when KV (Klim Voroshilov) returned from battle with dozens of dents from enemy shells, but without holes, such facts really took place. Even more interesting were the memories of the Germans; one of the most famous was the memoirs of the commander of the 2nd Panzer Group G. Guderian based on his message about the "invulnerability" of the T-34 for German guns, about the heavy battle of the 4th Panzer Division in October 1941 south of Mtsensk - it was attacked by T-34s tank brigade Katukov. As a result, they created a myth, including in Anglo-American literature, about the "invincible" T-34 tanks, which overcome slopes and swamps with lightning speed, they are not taken by shells, they sow death and destruction. Although it is clear that the tanks of that time moved over rough terrain at a speed of no more than 10-15 km per hour.

Although it is clear that if the German column was attacked in march formation and taken by surprise, then the fault of the German commanders, its commander, Major General W. von Langemann und Erlenkamp, ​​is here. He did not organize reconnaissance in order to deploy the column in battle order ahead of time. The 4th Panzer Division had enough funds to organize anti-tank defense: 50-mm Pak-38 guns, 88-mm anti-aircraft guns, hull guns. But the Germans let themselves be taken by surprise and, in order not to admit their mistakes, they blamed the "terrible" Russian "wonder tanks". Guderian supported Langemann's report so as not to undermine his reputation.

Interestingly, Guderian had previously stated that: “... the Soviet T-34 tank is a typical example of backward Bolshevik technology. This tank cannot be compared with the best examples of our tanks, made by the faithful sons of the Reich and repeatedly proving their superiority…”

T-34 model 1940.

The first battles of new Soviet tanks with the Wehrmacht

The Wehrmacht met in battle with the new Soviet tanks at the very beginning of the war. With normal reconnaissance, well-oiled interaction of tank units with artillery and infantry, our new tanks would not come as a surprise to the Germans. German intelligence reported on new tanks in April 1941, although they made a mistake in assessing armor protection: KV was estimated at 40 mm, but it was from 40 to 75 mm, and T-34 - at 30 mm, and the main armor was 40-45 mm.

One of the battles with new tanks is the clash of the 7th Panzer Division of the 3rd Panzer Group Gotha on June 22 at the bridges across the Neman near the city of Alytus (Olita) with the 5th Soviet Panzer Division, it had 50 of the latest T-34s, not counting other tanks. The German division was mainly armed with Czech tanks "38 (t)", there were 167 of them, there were only 30 T-34s. The battle was difficult, the Germans failed to expand the bridgehead, but our T-34s could not knock them out, the Germans pulled up artillery, developed an offensive to the flank and rear, and under the threat of encirclement, our division withdrew. That is, already on the first day, the Wehrmacht "met" the latest Soviet tanks, and no disaster.

Another battle took place in the area of ​​​​the town of Radzechow on June 23, units of the 4th mechanized corps and units of the 11th German Panzer Division collided. German tanks broke into the town and there they collided with our T-34s. The battle was hard, but the forces were unequal - a German tank regiment, reinforced by artillery, and two of our tank battalions without artillery, ours withdrew. According to Soviet data, the Germans lost 20 tanks, 16 anti-tank guns, our losses - 20 BT tanks, six T-34s. Thirty-fours were hit by 88-mm anti-aircraft guns. In further battles, German tankers, supported by 88-mm anti-aircraft guns, taking advantage of a good defensive position, knocked out, according to them, 40-60 Soviet tanks, according to our data, a detachment of the 4th mechanized corps lost 11 tanks, knocking out another 18 enemy tanks. In the battle on June 25, 88-mm anti-aircraft guns destroyed 9 KV, Soviet data confirm this number.

On June 24, the 6th tank division of the Wehrmacht of the Reinhardt corps met with the 2nd Soviet tank division of the 3rd mechanized corps. The Soviet division had 30 KV, 220 BT and several dozen T-26s, the Landgraf division had 13 command tanks (without guns), 30 Panzer IVs, 47 Panzer IIs, 155 Czech Panzer 35 (t). But the Germans had a variety of artillery pieces, as a result, the Germans were able to fight off 30 KV, and then go on the offensive with the 1st Panzer Division, surrounding and destroying the 2nd Soviet Panzer Division.

From the first days, the Wehrmacht was faced with new Soviet tanks, but this did not stop him, he had, capable of hitting the KV and T-34. Most of them were hit by 105-mm guns (10.5 cm) and 88-mm anti-aircraft guns, this is also confirmed by F. Halder.

The main means of combating "wonder tanks"

Anti-aircraft guns and 10.5 cm field guns played a major role in the fight against the KV and T-34 at the beginning of the war, but then the 50 mm Pak-38 began to play the main role, it was accepted into service in 1940. The armor-piercing projectile of this anti-tank gun pierced 78-mm homogeneous armor at a distance of 500 meters, and this made it possible to hit the KV and T-34 in favorable conditions. The main problem was - to hit the frontal armor of the T-34, the shells ricocheted, it was possible to hit it only at a certain angle.

On June 1, 1941, the Wehrmacht had 1047 of these guns, as their production increased, anti-tank units began to receive them, their role in the fight against the KV and T-34 was constantly growing. According to the NII-48 of 1942, the Pak-38 accounted for 51.6% of the dangerous hits of the total number of hits.

50 mm gun PAK-38.

105 mm German light field howitzer.

A gun from the famous series of German anti-aircraft guns 8.8 cm FlaK 18, 36 and 37. It is considered one of the best anti-aircraft guns of World War II. It was successfully used not only as an air defense weapon, but also as an anti-tank gun, since the standard German anti-tank artillery in 1941 turned out to be weak for Soviet heavy tanks.

Problems of KV and T-34

When a projectile and large-caliber bullets hit the KV, the tower could jam, jamming of armored caps. The KV engine had a small power reserve, so the engine was often overloaded and overheated, the failure of the main and onboard clutches. In addition, "Klim Voroshilov" was slow, poorly maneuverable. By the beginning of the war, the V-2 diesel engine was "raw", its total resource did not exceed 100 hours on the bench, on the tank 40-70 hours. For example: German gasoline Maybachs worked 300-400 hours, our GAZ-203 (on T-70 tanks) and M-17T (stood on BT-5, BT-7, T-28, T-35) up to 300 hours .

At the T-34, armor-piercing shells of 37-mm anti-tank guns pierced armor from a distance of 300-400 meters, and 20-mm armor-piercing shells also pierced the sides. With a direct hit by a projectile, the driver's front hatch and the “apple” of the machine gun mount fell through, weak tracks, failure of the main and side clutches. The ball mount of the Dektyarev tank machine gun was calculated on bullets and fragments, it did not hold 37-mm shells. The front hatch of the tank was also a problem.

But it cannot be said that most of the new tanks "broke" before reaching the battlefield, or were abandoned due to breakdowns. In general, about half of the tanks died in battle, the Wehrmacht quite successfully beat them. The rest of the "non-combat losses" are quite understandable, for the retreating army, breakdowns, damage to tanks that could be corrected in a different situation (with a stable front or during an offensive), forced them to blow up and abandon. This is also true for tanks that ran out of fuel during the retreat. Tank units of the Wehrmacht, retreating in 1943-1945, lost about the same amount of equipment due to the inability to evacuate it.

The Nazis inspect the padded KV-1 with additional. armor screens.

Other methods of the Wehrmacht

The command of the Wehrmacht, faced with new Soviet tanks, tried to strengthen the anti-tank capabilities of the army. The 75-mm French field gun of the 1897 model was massively converted into an anti-tank gun - the body of the gun was placed on the PAK-38 carriage. But the effect was small, there were no guarantees to hit the Soviet tanks in the forehead, so they tried to hit the side. But in order to successfully hit the tanks, it was necessary to hit from a distance of 180-250 meters. In addition, there were almost no armor-piercing shells for it, only cumulative and high-explosive fragmentation ones. The disadvantage when firing HEAT projectiles was the low initial velocity of the projectile - about 450 m / s, this made the calculation of lead more complicated.

Soviet tanks hit the German T‑IV (Pz. IV) tanks with 75-mm cannons using cumulative ammunition. It was the only German tank projectile capable of hitting the T-34 and KV.

German 75-mm anti-tank guns with kinetic armor-piercing and sub-caliber shells, PAK-40, Pak-41 guns (it was produced for a short time and in small batches) became truly effective weapons against the KV and T-34. The Pak-40 became the basis of the German anti-tank defense: in 1942, 2114 units were fired, in 1943 - 8740, in 1944 - 11 728. These guns could knock out the T-34 at a distance of 1200 meters. True, there was a problem of circular firing, after several shots the coulters dug so deep into the ground that it was possible to deploy the gun only with the help of a tractor.

That is, the Wehrmacht was forced to use heavy, inactive guns against new Soviet tanks, which were vulnerable to detour maneuvers of armored vehicles, aircraft, and artillery of the enemy.

PAK-40 German 75 mm anti-tank gun.

Outcome

The myth about "Russian supertanks" has extremely negative information - it elevates technology, belittles people. Like, the Russians had "miracle tanks", but they could not really use them and eventually retreated to Moscow.

Although it is clear that even well-protected tanks had their weaknesses and were vulnerable to the enemy. This is true for the latest German tanks - "tigers", "panthers". There were anti-aircraft guns, heavy hull guns, it was possible to hit tanks on the side with anti-tank guns. In addition, tanks were knocked out by aircraft and heavy artillery, which struck before the offensive of the troops. Quite quickly, both the Wehrmacht and the Red Army increased the main caliber of anti-tank and tank guns to 75 mm.

There is no need to create another myth - "about the weakness of the Soviet new tanks." The new Soviet tanks had the disadvantages of "childhood", they were eliminated by modernization, and the T-34 is not without reason considered the best tank of the Second World War.

T-34 1941 issue in the Armored Museum in Kubinka.

Sources:
Guderian G. Memoirs of a soldier. Smolensk, 1999.
Zheltov I. G. and others. Unknown T-34. M., 2001.
Isaev A.V. Antisuvorov. Ten myths of World War II. M., 2004.
Isaev A. V. Dubno 1941. The greatest tank battle of World War II. M., 2009.
Müller-Hillebrand B. Land Army of Germany 1933-1945 M., 2002.
http://militera.lib.ru/tw/ibragimov/index.html
http://armor.kiev.ua/Tanks/WWII/KV/KV_MK5_95.php

Combat use of tank and motorized (panzergrenadier) troops of the Wehrmacht

Experience combat operations of the Wehrmacht in the wars against Poland, the countries of Western and Northern Europe and in the Balkans, he showed that tank formations, acting at great depth, gave offensive operations a maneuverable character and a high pace.

During the Polish campaign, sudden such strikes involving a large number of tanks and motorized infantry carried out a breakthrough of the poorly prepared defense of the Polish troops. The density of tanks in the direction of the main attack reached 50-80 vehicles per 1 kilometer. Polish troops were unprepared for action against massive tank attacks. In the Polish army there was a lack of effective anti-tank weapons, outdated tanks had low fighting qualities. As a result, the Wehrmacht's tank divisions achieved significant success in a short time.

Tank troops, like all formations of the Wehrmacht, successfully operated in the course of hostilities in Western Europe. The High Command of the Wehrmacht skillfully used the mistakes of the Anglo-French command in the deployment of troops, the backwardness of the military doctrines of the Western Allies, in particular on the use of tanks, as well as their lack of anti-tank weapons. From May 10 to June 24, the Wehrmacht troops defeated the Dutch, Belgian and French armies and inflicted a major defeat on the British expeditionary forces.

In all the political and military leadership of the Third Reich managed to successfully implement the blitzkrieg strategy. However, the experience gained was insufficiently analyzed and critically comprehended. In the military leadership of Germany, there was a tendency to overestimate their capabilities and their weapons and underestimate the forces of the enemy. The combat experience gained in France began to be absolutized, and the forms and methods of conducting operations in the West were recognized as universal and suitable for use in any conditions and against any enemy.

Medium tank Pz Kpfw IV in France

During the Second World War, the main part of the tank and motorized units of the Wehrmacht operated on the Eastern (Soviet-German) front. In North Africa, Italy and on other fronts, several mobile formations fought battles that did not have a significant impact on the theory of the combat use of tanks. In 1941-1942, tank and motorized troops were used mainly in offensive operations. After the transition of Germany in the fall of 1943 to strategic defense and until the end of the war, they were used for counterattacks, counterattacks and deterrence actions.

When conducting offensive operations tank troops were used for combat operations against prepared defenses, developed success in operational depth, pursued the enemy and crossed water barriers. The main principles of the combat use of tank troops were surprise, massing in the direction of the main attack. Favorable terrain was needed for the actions of the tank troops. The main forms of maneuver for the tank troops were the frontal offensive, the breakthrough, and the enveloping and flank offensive.

When meeting with the prepared defense in the operational depth, the tank troops sought to bypass it, and if it was impossible to bypass, they made a breakthrough.

Tank groups (armies) received the immediate, further tasks and the direction of the further offensive. The depth of the operation in 1941 was 400-500 km; in subsequent years, it was reduced to 125 km or less. This was due to large losses in people and equipment and the increased capabilities of the Soviet troops.

Motorized (tank) corps received tasks, as a rule, to capture three or four lines (regions), which corresponded in depth to the immediate tasks of tank groups (armies). During the course of the war, the depth of the tasks of the corps was reduced from 200-300 km to 50 km or less. The rate of advance was reduced from 20-30 km per day in separate operations in 1941 to 1.5-2 km in subsequent years.

To break through the defense significant densities of forces and means were created, which in 1941-1942. amounted to 40 - 50 tanks and self-propelled guns, 15 - 20 armored personnel carriers, 30 - 40 guns and mortars per 1 km in the breakthrough area. During the war, the density of artillery and mortars increased to 150-200 per 1 km. Artillery preparation began to be used in the battle for the second and subsequent lines of defense. The duration of the artillery preparation was reduced from 50-60 minutes to 30 minutes or less due to increased artillery densities and ammunition difficulties. The Wehrmacht High Command overestimated the ability of tanks to overcome defenses. Despite the fact that, starting from 1943, a significant part of the shock tank groups were heavy tanks Pz Kpfw V "Panther" and Pz Kpfw VI "Tiger", the German troops could not quickly break through the tactical defense zone of the Soviet troops. Tank divisions and corps were forced to fight long and fierce battles for the main line of defense and subsequent lines, during which they suffered heavy losses. Therefore, tank formations and units could not develop success, even if in some areas they broke through into the depths of the defense of the Soviet troops, as, for example, in the offensive in the summer of 1943 near Kursk and in the counteroffensive in March 1945 near Balaton.

The operational formation of formations of German tank forces was, as a rule, one-echelon. There were no strong second echelons and reserves. Tank corps and divisions built their battle formations in most cases in one echelon, which did not ensure the build-up and development of success during the battle.

Actions in operational depth took place only in 1941-1942, as well as in the course of December 1944. Tank troops sought to develop tactical success into an operational one, while they received deeper tasks than during a breakthrough. In front of the advancing troops, forward detachments operated, including tanks, motorized infantry, artillery and sappers. The removal of forward detachments was 20-50 km. Their task was to capture important lines, settlements, bridges, as well as to conduct a pursuit. The pursuit in 1941-1942 It was carried out non-stop, mainly along the roads, on a wide front. During the persecution, forcing water barriers. It was carried out on the move or with systematic preparation. First, motorized infantry crossed water barriers, and after building bridges, tanks crossed. During the period of preparation and forcing, aviation delivered strikes against enemy troops. In 1941 and in December 1944, airborne units and units were dropped. The forward detachments of units and formations of tank troops interacted with them.

Reflection of counterattacks was assigned to motorized infantry (panzergrenadier) units and formations, as well as anti-tank units. Tank units and formations were used to strike at the flank and rear.

Panzergrenadier squad in an armored personnel carrier Sd Kfz 251

In most cases, tanks could not operate effectively without support. motorized infantry(since the end of 1942 - panzergrenadiers). Tanks could be vulnerable to small enemy groups or even individual infantrymen, especially in rough terrain and in cities. If the enemy infantry had anti-tank guns or other anti-tank weapons, the vulnerability of the tanks increased. When breaking through the enemy defenses, tanks needed the support of motorized infantry. Periodically, motorized infantry moved forward, making a breakthrough through the enemy's defense line, the success of which was then developed by tanks. When advancing in the operational depth, motorized infantry quickly advanced behind the tanks on armored personnel carriers, trucks or motorcycles, and sometimes on the tanks themselves. She dismounted when necessary. The tanks bypassed the centers of stubborn resistance of the enemy, continuing to move on. The task of the motorized infantry (panzergrenadiers) included the destruction of such centers.

In theory, there was the concept of an attack by motorized infantry (panzergrenadiers) on enemy defense armored vehicles with the support of tanks. The main means of transportation for motorized infantry (panzergrenadiers) were Sd Kfz 251 armored personnel carriers of various modifications, but these vehicles were always not enough to fully provide them with motorized infantry (panzergrenadier) units and formations. Most of the motorized infantry shooters (panzergrenadiers) were transported on trucks and motorcycles. Deprived of armor protection, they were more vulnerable.

The production of Sd Kfz 251 armored personnel carriers was increased at the beginning of 1941. However, not all motorized infantry (panzergrenadier) divisions have them in sufficient quantity. AT tank divisions only one of the two motorized battalions was equipped with armored personnel carriers.

Armor Sd Kfz 251, which was 13 mm, provided sufficient protection against enemy small arms, but was vulnerable even to small-caliber anti-tank weapons. The heavy casualties suffered by the armored personnel carriers and their personnel forced the motorized infantry to dismount 400 meters or more from enemy positions, even when they used the Sd Kfz 251 armored personnel carriers. . Then they attacked like regular infantry, supporting the advance of the tanks. Sometimes motorized infantry fought directly from armored personnel carriers, which provided convenient firing positions. The main tactical advantage of motorized infantry over conventional infantry was that, thanks to their motorization, they could quickly be brought into battle in the right place.

The smallest motorized infantry (panzergrenadier) unit was the squad (gruppe). Typically, a motorized infantry (panzergrenadier) squad consisted of 12 soldiers transported by truck or, less commonly, by an armored personnel carrier. The squad leader was usually a corporal armed with a machine gun. He also commanded a vehicle and fired from a machine gun mounted on it. The assistant squad leader was usually a corporal and was armed with a rifle. If the squad was divided in two, one half was commanded by an assistant. The squad consisted of two crews of light machine guns, two soldiers each, four infantrymen and a driver with a partner. They were usually armed with rifles. When the car was moving, one of the squad soldiers constantly watched the sky in case enemy aircraft appeared, the rest watched what was happening on both sides of the car. When dismounting the department, the driver was forbidden to leave the car.

When armored personnel carriers collided with enemy tanks or artillery, they sought cover. Machine gunners and shooters of the squad could fire while the armored personnel carrier was moving. At the same time, the (Panzergrenadier) units used a combination of maneuver and fire. Moving forward, they made short stops and fired to cover the advance of other armored personnel carriers. When armored personnel carriers were in the enemy's fire zone, they were not recommended to stop for more than 15 - 25 seconds. Usually, the soldiers of the squad were disembarked from the rear of the vehicle, and, if necessary, on both sides. Disembarking from the vehicle, the Panzergrenadiers fought like ordinary infantry. When faced with anti-tank defences, panzergrenadiers often had to go ahead of the tanks or form mixed groups of tanks and soldiers in order to jointly break through the enemy defenses.

The motorized infantry (panzergrenadier) platoon consisted of three squads. His headquarters was located in a separate staff car, where they were: the platoon commander (junior officer or non-commissioned officer), driver, radio operator, orderly and two messengers. An anti-tank gun could be installed on the machine.

In a platoon column, the distance between vehicles was usually 5-10 meters. In battle, the vehicles moved either in a checkerboard pattern or in an uneven line at distances of up to 50 meters from each other. The battalion in battle was usually built in a wedge. Most of the vehicles used to transport troops moved at an average speed of no more than 30 kilometers per hour. Therefore, even with minimal enemy resistance, a tank division could not advance more than 200 kilometers in a day.

During the fighting on the Eastern Front, the German tank forces developed one of the most important combat formations, the so-called "pulk" (pulk: panzer und lastkraftwagen- tank and truck) - construction of tanks and vehicles. It was an advancing tank wedge, inside which motorized infantry (Panzergrenadiers) moved. At the tip of the wedge were the best tanks, on the sides were self-propelled guns and other tanks. As the "pulka" moved deeper, the gap in the enemy's defenses expanded. The motorized infantry at the same time attacked the pockets of enemy resistance, which bypassed the tanks. Sometimes, in order to find a weak point in the enemy's defense, the offensive pulk could have the shape of a blunt quadrangle. When a breach was made in any place of the enemy's defense, this part of the "bullet" became the point of attack.

The main task of the panzergrenadiers was interaction with tanks, but they could also act independently, like ordinary infantry in the offensive and defense, especially in counterattacks when repelling the advancing enemy. Panzergrenadiers stormed the enemy's fortified points, captured bridges, and cleared the way for tanks in wooded areas and city blocks.

In 1944 - 1945. in the fighting of the tank troops of the Wehrmacht, an innovation appeared - the transition to night operations, which were previously rejected by the German charters. Such a change in views was influenced by the successful night operations of Soviet tank formations.

German tank troops in battle, they closely cooperated with aviation (1941-1943), widely used technical means of communication for command and control of troops, and on the scale of the battle group of a tank division organized interaction with self-propelled field artillery. In 1941, interaction with tactical airborne assault forces was widely used.

Among the first units that used the MP 38 submachine gun in combat conditions were the newly formed airborne regiments. When, as part of Operation Weserübung, in April 1940, German troops simultaneously invaded Denmark and Norway, paratroopers were at the forefront of the offensive. They were faced with the task of capturing the main airfields of the enemy so that they could receive the rest of the German troops.

To accomplish this task, they were delivered to the target on Ju 52 transport aircraft for parachute landing. Their armament, including the MP 38, was dropped separately in containers, which were hung on slings from the wings of the aircraft. They acted suddenly, took the enemy by surprise, and airfields were captured, as a rule, within one or two hours. A few weeks later, parachute units dropped on the enemy with the help of gliders again took part in the hostilities to capture the Belgian fortress of Eben-Emael. Their participation was the cornerstone of Hitler's Gelb plan to invade the Netherlands, Belgium and France.
At the beginning of World War II, an airborne company consisted of a control and support platoon and three rifle platoons. Each platoon consisted of three squads of 10 people each, armed with two MG 34 machine guns and six rifles. Unlike the squads of other parts of the German army, due to its "elite" status, each squad had two MP 38 submachine guns.
In order to obtain the greatest benefit and advantage during the assault on the Eben-Emael fortress and during the implementation of Operation Nivi (the landing of the Great Germany infantry regiment), it was necessary to quickly connect the landing forces with the main attacking forces. To do this, it was necessary to capture a number of border bridges intact. One of them was a railway bridge on the river Meuse, five kilometers inland from the Dutch border. The task of capturing the bridge was assigned to an eight-man assault group from the Brandenburg Regiment, the German equivalent of the British SAS or American Green Berets.
On the morning of May 10, 1940, two German soldiers dressed as Dutch military police escorted six German "prisoners of war" to the railway bridge. The compactness of the MP 38 allowed the “prisoners” to carry submachine guns on their chests under their overcoats. In a matter of seconds, they neutralized the sentries from the German bridge and cut the wires to the detonators planted in order to blow up the bridge. Then, by telephone, they informed the guards of the Dutch side that they were crossing the bridge with prisoners, and after that they cut the telephone line. On the opposite side of the bridge, the Dutch began to escort the "prisoners" to the truck. Disguised Germans, with the help of their "prisoner" comrades, "waiting" for escort, captured the remaining guards.

After that, a German armored train followed the bridge, followed by a train with troops. Meanwhile, the “prisoners” got rid of those who “held them and captivated”, attacked a number of fortified posts organized along the river bank, and themselves captured 10 Dutchmen.
Three days later, soldiers of the Grossdeutschland Infantry Regiment were on the western outskirts of Sedan trying to cross the Meuse River and move deep into French territory. Sedan itself was well fortified and defended stubbornly, having an average of 8 firing points for every 200 m of the front. However, the goal of the infantry regiment "Grossdeutschland" were the heights of Murphy, in particular the height 247, located and 6.5 km to the poop of Sedan. With its second battalion in front, the regiment stubbornly moved forward. For five hours before this offensive, German aircraft bombarded the positions of the defenders from the air, forcing them to burrow into the ground, and the howl of German sirens, nicknamed "Jerekhon trumpets", terrified and panicked them. Having crossed the river, the Germans were soon at the foot of the heights. Here is how Lieutenant von Kubier describes the final stage of the offensive in the book of General Heinz Guderian “With Tanks in the East and in the West”:
“They climb a slope pitted with shell craters, overcome several rows of barbed wire, until the French open a massive barrage from behind the ridge. Machine guns and submachine guns pour their deadly fire on the advancing ones. Grenades burst, as if enemy fire does not exist, there is no time to stop. Those in front are already breaking into the enemy's position. Close combat, hand-to-hand combat - and, having gained wild strength, the offensive continues."

INFANTRY SECTION OF THE WEHRMACHT IN 1940

For the first time, the MP 38 and MP 40 submachine guns began to appear in service with the German infantry divisions in 1940. At that time, the division consisted of three infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, a communications battalion, an engineer battalion, a reconnaissance battalion and an anti-tank battalion. Each infantry regiment in the division consisted of three infantry battalions of four companies each. In turn, each company consisted of three platoons.
The platoon consisted of a command and three squads of 10 people, although by 1943, due to a lack of manpower, the squad consisted of 9 people. The size of the company's personnel was also reduced to 80 people. In some cases, it was only 40 people. In addition to the shortage of personnel, the fact that larger units suffered heavy losses and their combat effectiveness did not increase also played a role in reducing the number of personnel of the units. Another reason was that it was more difficult for junior officers to control larger units.
In the period between the wars, much time was devoted to increasing the firepower of troops. The command came to the conclusion that the key to success on the battlefield was a light machine gun. Since the enemy can only be seen for a matter of seconds while moving between cover, such a machine gun must be able to fire the maximum number of shots in the shortest possible time. To this end, in 1934, the Germans created the MG 34 machine gun, the firepower of which was equal to that of 20 soldiers firing rifle fire. The charter of the German infantry in 1939 for the performance of a combat mission attached particular importance to the factor of surprise in combination with mobility and maneuverability. As we said earlier, the fighting was supposed to be a series of local battles that would expand and increase in scale. Even in the largest battle, a squad could, if possible, be expected to perform flanking maneuvers. Based on these two principles, the squad with machine gunners armed with MG 34s and other soldiers - ammunition carriers became the main unit in all types of combat. Quite the opposite was the case with the rifle squad in the American army, in which the basis of firepower was the rifle shooters, while the Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR) served as a means of fire support.
The structure of the branch remained basically the same throughout the war for all branches of service and formations in the SS troops, infantry and parachute regiments:
Squad leader (Gruppenfuhrer). His main task was to direct the fire of the MG 34 machine gun (later MG 42) and rifle fire. He was responsible for the performance of the combat mission, the condition of the weapons and the supply of ammunition. Since he was directly in charge of the squad's combat operations, his own weapon was a submachine gun. Its limited range meant it could only be used in close combat.
Machine gunner (eister MG-Schutze) - the first number. He was responsible for the firing and good condition of the MG-34 and was the commander of the machine gun group. And although all members of the group could fire from a machine gun, the best shooter was appointed commander. Assistant machine gunner (Zweiter MG Schutze) - second number. The Allies often called him Zwo - a corruption of the German word Zwei, he was armed only with a pistol. He carried 200 rounds in four drums and another 300 rounds in a box, as well as a spare barrel. He was supposed to provide ammunition for the MG 34. When he ran out of cartridges, he took them from an ammunition carrier. Usually, with sufficient cover, the second number lay next to or behind the machine gunner, ready to change him if necessary. The ammunition carrier (dritter MG Schutze, munition Schutze) - the third number - was supposed to supply cartridges, reload drum magazines and monitor the state of ammunition. In battle, he was located behind the machine gunner, was armed with a carbine and, if necessary, acted as a shooter.
Arrows - numbers from 4th to 9th (Gewehr Schutzen). The eldest among them was the deputy squad leader (Truppenfuhrer), who in battle commanded a group of riflemen (Schutzentrupp). They were supposed to support the machine-gun group and conduct close combat with a rifle, bayonet and grenades.

In 1943, the US military intelligence service published the reference book "German Squad in Battle", which was a translation of the regulations in force in the German army in the early 1940s. It outlined the ideal character traits of the squad leader, such as a strong will that can subjugate the soldiers of the squad, selflessness and perseverance in overcoming hardships and hardships, the ability to serve as an example for personnel in moments of danger, the calmness and confidence of a "severe father and kind mother" . The role and importance of the squad leader can be summed up in the words of a Luftwaffe mechanic who was transferred to the 16th airfield division during the battle of Caen: "I did not see the sea, but I knew that there was a whole armada of warships that fired on our
positions ... I was so scared that I wanted, as in childhood, to curl up and hide somewhere. But behind us, a non-commissioned officer with a submachine gun in his hands yelled and drove us forward.

Squad on the offensive

The offensive of the infantry squad was usually carried out in three stages. First of all, it had to come as close as possible to the position of the enemy, without opening fire and using the already existing shelters and camouflage. If necessary, the squad could make a detour maneuver, while maintaining the element of surprise during the attack. Immediately before the offensive and during it, the enemy had to test the full power of fire from all types of available weapons. This stage of the fighting was called to press the enemy to the ground (niederhalten).
At the second stage, the advancing troops moved forward, seeping through the positions of the enemy, and finally, fire fell on the positions of the enemy, with which the attackers tried to destroy the enemy.
In the second and third phases of the advance, the platoon leader (Zugfuhrer) can order one squad to support another. The supporting squad concentrates fire on the point of breakthrough or on the flanks of the enemy, or directs it to the rear of the position on which the attack is directed. In this case, all weapons of the squad are used.

DEFENSE SECTION

In defense, the width of the front for a platoon (Zug) is 200-300m, with each squad having 30-40 meters. This distance is considered the maximum at which the squad leader in battle could command the personnel. All gaps between adjacent compartments were to be covered by fire. First of all, the squad leader had to choose a position for the MG 34, which would allow the most effective shelling of the enemy. Often several spare positions were chosen at a distance of 50 meters from one another. The rest of the shooters with rifles were divided into pairs, usually in ditches or rifle cells with an echeloned defense order. These positions also had to be close enough to each other that the soldiers could hear each other in battle. If time allowed, closer to the rear, they dug a second row of camouflaged rifle cells where the soldiers could be in anticipation of the battle.
An American handbook reports that the increased firepower of German automatic weapons strengthened the defense capability of the troops to such an extent that well-camouflaged and sheltered positions in deep defense could be successfully attacked only with the closest cooperation and coordination of all attacking units.
During an enemy attack, when he was still at a considerable distance, artillery and heavy company machine guns were used against him in the first place. The squads were in cover until they were able to effectively use their weapons against targets that could not be hit by artillery fire and heavy machine guns. When the enemy approached within range of fire, the squad leader directed the fire of a machine gun and rifle shooters. He used his submachine gun only at close range.
The Germans did not always use rifle cells to prepare their defensive positions. In 1944, in Albanet, Italy, they used wrecked and burned-out Allied tanks to do this, turning them into well-camouflaged gun emplacements. As prescribed by their instructions and regulations, they let the attackers very close, and then rose to counterattack with only a handful of soldiers armed with machine guns, grenades and submachine guns. It was these firing points that stopped the advance of the 2nd Polish Corps and the 2nd US Corps in Italy immediately after the battle of Cassino. It cost the Allies many efforts and soldiers' lives to knock out the stubbornly defending paratroopers from their positions.
The light (jaeger) company of the December 1943 model was armed somewhat differently. Due to the tasks set, it did not have heavy weapons. Like a regular company, it had three platoons of three squads each. In each department, all personnel (with the exception of the machine-gun group), including non-commissioned officers, had submachine guns.

PANTZERGRENADER

Each panzer division, in addition to a brigade of 561 single tanks, had a motorized infantry brigade, which included a regiment of three infantry battalions and a motorcycle battalion. Later there were two regiments, two battalions each. Motorized infantry divisions were smaller than usual, although their organization was the same. The main difference was that both personnel and weapons and equipment traveled on vehicles. At a later stage of the war, these motorized divisions became part of the tank troops and received the name Panzer Grenadier.
In November 1943, a fully equipped standard tank grenadier company had three officers, 44 non-commissioned officers and 178 ordinary soldiers. The command of the company consisted of the company commander, the commander of the control department and two commanders of the transport departments, as well as the driver of the company commander, who were all armed with submachine guns. There was an anti-tank squad of four people - two calculations of two people each - a gunner and a loader. The gunner had a submachine gun. Then there were four infantry platoons of three squads each. In a motorized company, each squad had a two-ton truck, and in an armored motorized company, each squad moved on a SdKfz 251/1 half-track vehicle. To support infantry platoons, there were two sections of heavy machine guns and a mortar section. Each of the five non-commissioned officers and three drivers also had a submachine gun for self-defense. The fourth squad of eight people, each of whom was armed with a submachine gun, moved on half-tracked SdKfz 251/9 vehicles with 75 mm guns.
As in all other units of the German army, the infantry squad of the Panzergrenadiers consisted of 10 people with a commander armed with a submachine gun. Second in command of the squad was the deputy squad leader (or group leader) with a rifle. Two machine-gun crews with a machine gun on the car consisted of two people each, who, dismounting, took their weapons with them. The rest of the personnel of the squad consisted of four shooters, a driver and his assistant. The second submachine gun remained on board each vehicle and could only be taken from there by order of the squad leader.
By April 1944, the strength of the Panzergrenadier company was reduced to three officers, 29 non-commissioned officers and 115 ordinary soldiers, who were in three platoons, two machine gun squads with heavy machine guns and a mortar squad. In November
In 1944, the heavy machine gun squads were abolished, while the anti-tank squad remained. In addition, the first platoon of the company was reorganized into an assault platoon, all three sections of which were fully armed with submachine guns. By this time, the Germans had adopted an assault rifle, which was supposed to replace rifles and submachine guns. However, the production of this completely new weapon was very limited, and by the end of the war, submachine guns were still in service with the army. By April 1945, the German army was simply not enough people. As a result, the strength of the tank-grenadier company decreased even more - to 23 non-commissioned officers and only 63 ordinary soldiers, organized in just two platoons without heavy weapons and anti-tank support.

EASTERN FRONT

At dawn on June 22, 1941, the German army invaded the Soviet Union. And although many units of the Red Army were defeated by the rapidly advancing enemy, many of them nevertheless resisted him and held back his advance. But this was not France. Less than a year after the outbreak of World War II, the blitzkrieg had found a worthy opponent. Many factors contributed to Germany's defeat. Not only the stubbornness of the Soviet troops held back the advance of the Germans, but also the stupid calculations of the German command to end the war before winter and unpreparedness for the Russian climate. In October 1941 alone, 6,000 supply vehicles got stuck in a sea of ​​impassable mud that turned the Smolensk-Vyazma road into. Soon the snows began to fall, and the Germans on the Eastern Front began to realize how ill-prepared they were for what awaited them. The chief of staff of the 12th Army, General von Greyfeiburg, wrote that "weather conditions in the Soviet Union are such that in spring and autumn, because of the mud, it is impossible to either pass or drive, in summer there is unbearable heat, and in winter frosts are unbearable for the Germans. The climate in Russia is a series of natural disasters."
In the north of Russia and in its central part, the air temperature in the middle of winter often dropped to 40 below zero. At such temperatures, the metal of the submachine gun became so brittle that the firing mechanism could easily break. Another problem was that at such low temperatures, grease and lubricating oils would solidify in the weapon and it could not fire. Without foreseeing such harsh conditions, the Germans did not create low-temperature ointments and oils, and the soldiers had to cope with such difficulties on the spot with improvised means. The most common of these is to carefully remove all grease and oil, and then sprinkle a very fine powder on the striking mechanism. In the southern regions of Russia, where the climate was less severe, the solution was sunflower oil, which replaced the usual gun oil.
The geographical position of Russia also played a role in the defeat of Germany. To the south were arid steppes and sandy wastelands. The central part was dominated by extensive swamps and forests. To the north there were more forests with swamps and swamps. These virgin forests, untouched swamps and marshes nullified the German warfare tactics that the Germans had used so successfully in Western Europe and which were based mainly on good roads. According to German tactical plans, the tanks were supposed to bypass forests and swamps and meet the Russians in open areas. However, the Russians thought differently, they retreated deep into the forests and swamps to turn them into defensive fortifications.
or simply hide in them only to later appear in the German rear, far behind the front line. Unlike the Germans, who usually dug in at the edge of the forest, the Russians went deep into it, dug trenches and cut down the undergrowth to waist height, creating circular fields of fire that were almost impossible to spot. The Russians paid special attention to the rear of the enemy, when the troops moving in their positions could be taken by surprise from behind. The German army had no experience of combat operations in such conditions when tanks, aircraft and artillery did not find a use for themselves and turned out to be useless. Even the machine gun found only limited use in the forest thicket. Here the troops had to rely on submachine guns, rifles and grenades, as well as on the only means of support - heavy mortars.
Over time, the Germans realized that the mountain divisions were the most adapted to combat operations in dense forests and swamps. Accordingly, they formed light infantry divisions and temporary brigades, the main weapon of which was the submachine gun. One of these brigades was the cavalry brigade under the command of the 9th Army, also known as the Model cavalry brigade. In the winter of 1941-1942. 60,000 Soviet troops infiltrated in small groups behind General Model's 9th Army using the "ant strategy" (a term coined by the British military theorist Basrsh Liddell-Harth). Here, in the swampy forests along the Volga, between Rzhev in the north and Vyazma in the south, they forced the Germans to fight on two fronts, threatening their supply lines. In July 1942, Model issued an order for the creation of a special cavalry brigade to neutralize this threat.

COMBAT ACTIONS AGAINST GUERRILLAS
Model formed a brigade from the reconnaissance battalions located in each of the eight divisions under his command and subordinated it to Colonel Karl-Friedrich von der Meden. The brigade consisted of three cavalry regiments. The first and third regiments had two squadrons of cyclists, one squadron of cavalry and one squadron of heavy weapons. The second regiment was organized in the same way, except that it had an additional cavalry squadron. Each squadron had 12 squads of 10 people each, not counting the machine gun squad. The personnel, if possible, were armed with submachine guns. The cavalry units had German horses. However, for the transport of ammunition, food and transportable property, each squadron of cyclists was given two wagons drawn by local horses. This meant that the entire brigade could move through any terrain. After six weeks of training, a brigade formed south of the village of Olenino near the Luchesa River was ready to march south and take part in Operation Seidlitz. Within a few days before the offensive, reconnaissance discovered all enemy positions and trees cut down for the construction of gates that led to the area of ​​\u200b\u200bconcentration of troops. The offensive began on July 2 at 3.00.
The cavalry rushed out of the thick turman at the stunned Russians on the first and second lines of defense and took many soldiers prisoner. By noon, the cavalry units turned west to attack the main road, which the Russians were defending, setting up anti-tank ditches and barriers. One regiment crossed the dense swampy forest to attack the Russian positions from the rear, which again took the Russians by surprise. By evening, the Germans controlled most of the road, which allowed the tank units to move forward. By the middle of the next day, the Russian 39th Army was retreating along the entire front. By the end of Operation 3Eidlitz, 50,000 Red Army soldiers were taken prisoner, 230 tanks and 760 guns, as well as 10,000 small arms were captured. Summing up the results of the operation, Colonel von der Meden twice emphasized the special importance for the personnel of such weapons as a submachine gun. Although troops on all sectors of the Eastern Front were armed with MP 38 and MP 40 submachine guns, they also made extensive use of captured Soviet submachine guns. They preferred to use them because their magazine capacity was much larger and they were more reliable in adverse weather conditions. SS-Untersturmführer Erich Heller of the Reich Gunnery Division describes his weapons when he was on the Russian front in August 1942: “I had enough weapons. I had a pistol, a rifle, and also an excellent Finnish submachine gun. There were a few more grenades that I hid better from a stray bullet. I was just a walking arsenal."

STREET FIGHTING
In the battle for Stalingrad, battles were fought over every inch of land. Russian defenses consisted of pockets of resistance, usually a group of well-fortified houses connected by trenches or sewers. One house could be defended by both a squad and a whole company - it depended on its importance for the defense of the city. Here, among the ruins and broken stone, the Germans lost their advantage in mobility of action. Tanks, limited in their movement on the streets of the city, were put out of action one by one by stubborn and tenacious Russian infantrymen. German searchers usually attacked buildings during the day with tank support where possible. Following the instructions of the German charters on tactics. the Russians formed strike groups, consisting of an assault group, reinforcements and a reserve. Their task was to break into the building and carry out independent battles in it, a battle in miniature. These attacks usually took place at rest and meal times, as well as at the change of sentries, and were almost always carried out at night or under the cover of a smokescreen. Fierce combat skirmishes took place, in which the opponents were separated by a wall between adjacent rooms of the same building. In such conditions, even a rifle was not so effective. The main weapons of both sides were submachine guns, grenades, flamethrowers and pistols. Opponents returned to medieval ways of warfare, using sharpened sapper shovels and daggers.
In such conditions, submachine guns have repeatedly demonstrated their advantage. They were compact and did not require much space for firing. It did not require particularly precise aiming, and the firepower mowed down the enemy to the root. The main disadvantage of the MP 38 and MP40 - the insufficient capacity of the magazine - also became even more obvious in close combat, when the distance between opponents was sometimes measured in several steps, the magazine was discharged in an instant, and the German shooter did not have time to change it, as the Russians already attacked him. This shortcoming accelerated the development of the MP 40.II model with a double magazine.
Another kind of street fighting, in which submachine guns were destined to play an important role, can be shown by the example of the fighting of the Scherer group. After the Germans retreated near Moscow, the Soviet 3rd shock army began to advance towards the strategically important city of Kholm, surrounded by impenetrable swamps. Here was the only bridge through which these swamps could be crossed, as well as the main junction of the crossing of roads in the directions north - south and west - east. In this small town were the motley remnants of two infantry divisions, a Luftwaffe field regiment and a small Kriegsmarine-driven police force totaling 500 men. By January 21, they were already completely cut off from the main forces and for many days repulsed the attacks of the Red Army along the front perimeter of 2 km. February 23 (on Red Army Day, Soviet troops launched a major offensive on Kholm. The advancing tanks were soon stopped by anti-tank groups and the only anti-tank gun that the Germans had at their disposal. On the eastern outskirts of the city, Soviet soldiers advanced along the narrow streets in such a dense mass that they interfered with each other and could not even turn freely. The Germans, at the end of each street, installed 2-3 MG 34 machine guns, which shot the mass of soldiers advancing on them. Despite the victims and the bloody massacre, the Soviet units continued to advance. In the end, the Germans could not stand it and retreated .

During the Second World War, the submachine gun gained real recognition when it was used for the tasks for which it was originally intended. A striking example of this can be the attack of an assault parachute battalion and the capture of a ridge between two heights held by a Red Army battalion. With the demining team in front and supported by flamethrower crews, the German companies moved forward in complete silence. Suddenly, two mines exploded one after the other. It was not possible to take the Russians by surprise, and the German battalion had to launch a swift frontal attack on the Soviet troops before they had time to prepare for defense. In his book The Eagles Are Flying, James Lucas describes what happened next:
"The commander of the sapper group gives the order -“ Flamethrowers ”, and a fiery sheet envelops the first firing point of the Russians. Submachine guns pour fire on the bunker, in which a deafening explosion is heard. Probably, in addition to the soldiers, there were also ammunition. along the entire front of the battalion's offensive, the rest of the Russian fortifications were destroyed by a swift attack of paratroopers. They overcome the first line of trenches, in which there are no soldiers, and appear along a dry channel at the dugouts and dugouts in which Russian soldiers sleep. They wake up from the shots and run out, but before before they realize what is happening, they fall, mowed down by the fire of submachine guns. Paratroopers make their way with grenades and automatic fire.

WESTERN FRONT 1944-1945

By the start of the Battle of Normandy, the Allies had complete air superiority. This meant that, due to air raids, it was now impossible for the Germans to create large transport columns with equipment and weapons, which were common in the campaigns of the beginning of the war. In addition, on the offensive, the infantry had only limited, if any, air support. Despite the setbacks on the Eastern Front, there was still a lot of emphasis on infiltration tactics and fighting in small groups. Assault battalions were used at the forefront of counterattacks. Small groups, sometimes 2-3 people each, often armed only with submachine guns and anti-tank "plateau" mines, found gaps in the positions of the allies and penetrated into their rear.
The density of fire was still considered a critical condition for success, and the actions of small groups were the main component of a larger offensive. Here is how German combat methods are described in one of the Canadian combat reports in 1944:
“Experience shows that the Germans almost always launch a counterattack with small groups of infantry. You can expect such a counterattack, which is carried out by 10 to 20 people, no later than five minutes after you have approached the German positions. They are usually heavily armed with light machine guns and submachine guns and counterattack using their firepower and maneuverability. They are firing heavily, and small teams, even individual soldiers, replacing each other, are moving forward. The Germans almost always attack the enemy's flanks. They rarely end the fight in hand-to-hand combat, but try to knock the enemy out of position with fire.
An example of this kind of defense is the battle of Falaise at the end of the leg of 1944.
The 12th SS Panzer Division "Hitler Youth" entered Normandy only two months before D-Day (the day of the landing of the Allied troops), taking up positions between Alençon and Kreluzh. By August, she, along with other units, numbering thousands of soldiers, was forced out and surrounded in a "cauldron" with a center in Falaise, the main railway junction of the region. It was necessary to hold the city for as long as possible in order to enable as many troops as possible to get out of the encirclement. Such a task was assigned to only two hundred soldiers - the remnants of the 1st battalion of the 26th tank-grenadier regiment - and two Tiger tanks from the 102nd tank battalion. They were opposed by a Canadian infantry brigade in full force with two tank companies attached with Sherman tanks. Of course, seeing such a small defense in front of him; Canadians broke through the right flank and moved to the city center. Upon learning of e1'om, Sturmbannführer Krause, who led the defense, immediately launched a counterattack from the command post with a group of 20 people. Led by Krause, the Germans attacked the Canadians, showering them with grenades and firing submachine guns, and then engaged in hand-to-hand combat with them, using sapper shovels and bayonets. In the end, they repulsed the attack. However, this only delayed the inevitable for a while. Gradually, the Canadians squeezed the ring around the city more and more. The Germans offered fierce resistance. Small groups of Germans, determined to fight to the last bullet, counterattacked again and again, firing from submachine guns. Soon, given the overwhelming superiority of the enemy, they held only the building of the monastery school of John the Baptist, and then it turned into burning ruins. By the end of August, the encirclement closed. Thousands of Germans who tried to flee north and reach the Seine ended up in a mousetrap. However, the courage and determination of the soldiers of the Hitler Youth division to defend themselves to the last soldier allowed thousands more German soldiers to break out of the encirclement and again take part in the battles.
In Europe, far from the frosty expanses of Russia, the MP 40 was much more reliable. American
the soldiers nicknamed him "belching", and for them he was a valuable acquisition. They often preferred this submachine gun to their own weapons. It was recognizable by its distinctive firing sound, and Allied soldiers who used the MP 40 liked to provoke the Germans into returning fire, especially at night. And in order not to become a target for their own, American soldiers who managed to get their hands on the MP 40 often shortened the recoil spring by 2 inches (5.08 cm), thereby changing the sound when firing (and at the same time its pace).

"WEREWOLF"

In September 1944, the Allied forces began to advance towards Berlin. Desperate to delay inevitable defeat and drive the enemy into a stalemate, Hitler and Nazi Party activists tried to provoke the German population into mass uprisings against the Allies. For this purpose, a partisan army was formed from teenagers and the elderly, which was called "Werwolf" ("Werewolf") and was supposed to operate in the rear of the allies. The training of members of this secret organization began already in the late spring of 1944. By the end of the war, more than 5,000 people had completed the 5-week course. Having learned how to use weapons, explosives and communications, as well as methods of survival in extreme conditions, they had to return home and wait for orders. Secret warehouses were organized with equipment and weapons, which they were supposed to receive at the right time. Most of these werewolf guerrillas were armed with submachine guns because they were easy to hide and handy in combat. After the end of the war, they undertook numerous sorties in Eastern and Western Europe, which, however, did not bring the desired result. Goebbels, in his radio address, called on the population to open rebellion and not only for the first time publicly acknowledged the existence of such an organization, but thereby turned it into a motley rabble, when anyone who had a weapon could attack a foreigner. The effect of this appeal was the opposite of what the Nazis had hoped for. If the werewolves were under the direct control of the Nazi authorities, they would be able to exert more influence on the course of events. And when Hitler committed suicide, the resistance he had conceived died with him.

MP 38 AND MP 40 AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR

In the final stages of the Second World War, many German weapons factories, along with weapons not sent to the front, were seized.
allies. Western countries that had experienced German invasion and occupation were in need of rearmament. A significant number of the MP 40s remaining after the war were distributed between these countries, especially many submachine guns were transferred to the Netherlands and Norway. Later they were in service with tank crews and were used there until the mid-1980s. France also armed some of its units with the MP 40 submachine gun until a replacement was found.
The Soviet Union handed over captured MP 40s as military aid to communist regimes that emerged in the post-war decades, such as Cuba, as well as some countries in South and Central America. MP40 submachine guns were also used in the Greek Civil War (1946-1949) and in the First Arab-Israeli War (1948-1949). They even appeared in Vietnam in the hands of the Viet Cong guerrillas. But now they can be seen primarily in the hands of collectors and enthusiasts of military-historical reconstruction.

Early in the morning of June 22, a short, but very powerful, shocking artillery and bomb strike suddenly hit the sleeping Red Army soldiers. As soon as the shells and bombs stopped exploding, two German tank divisions of the 3rd Panzer Group Gotha, about 500 tanks, went on the attack on the survivors.

The 128th Rifle Division fled, its commander, Major General Zotov, surrendered. The 7th Panzer Division of Major General von Funk with a swift forced march, driving crowds of retreating (then called scurrying) in front of them, broke into the Lithuanian town of Alytus and captured strategically important bridges across the Neman. The NKVD special unit guarding them, seeing enemy tanks, ran along with everyone else. The Germans advanced for several more kilometers until they met with the advanced units of the Soviet 5th Panzer Division. In these short violent skirmishes, the Panzerwaffe suffered their first losses on the Eastern Front and retreated for the first time - back to Alytus, taking up defensive positions on its outskirts.

The 5th Panzer Division (268 tanks, 50 of them T-34s), whose commander, Colonel Fedorov, was ordered to drive the Germans out of the eastern bank of the Neman, attacked the city. According to one version, the advanced group of "thirty-fours" broke through to the south bridge, forcing the Germans to hastily retreat. The 2nd tank battalion, under the command of Alexei Pchelintsev, who fought in Poland and subsequently took Berlin, took up positions at the eastern end of the bridge. According to another version, they failed to dislodge the Germans from the eastern bridgehead, the Soviet tanks got stuck in street battles.

Everything now depended on the speed of reinforcements. By the middle of the day, Colonel Fedorov pulled almost all the forces of the 5th Panzer Division to the city, and in the city, where tank duels did not stop, a balance arose: the Germans could not break through the Soviet orders in Alytus, and Fedorov's tankers could not knock them out over the bridge and create a stable defense along the river bank. By evening, the 20th Panzer Division of Lieutenant General Stumpf approached and crossed the northern bridge, suddenly creating a threat for Fedorov to encircle his division. The colonel ordered to retreat.

A German PzKpfw38(t) tank drives past a burning Soviet tank. In tow at the "Czech" - a barrel of fuel. Alytus area

The 5th Panzer Division lost about 70 tanks (70 according to German data, 73 according to Soviet data), the Panzerwaffe lost 11 vehicles. Here it must be understood that the battlefield was left behind by the Germans, so the 5th Panzer Division lost all its wrecked vehicles, and the Germans recorded as losses only those tanks that they could not restore.

Raseiniai

The 4th Gepner Panzer Group - the 1st and 6th Panzer Divisions, 145 and 265 combat vehicles, respectively, mostly light Czech Pz.Kpfw.35 (t) - on the first day of the war advanced in much more favorable conditions than their neighbors from the Gotha group. Almost without resistance, the Germans reached the Lithuanian city of Raseiniai in a day. Their only loss is the deceased commander of a reconnaissance motorcycle regiment, who, flaunting his courage, rode ahead of the column and was killed by an unknown Soviet sniper.

After spending the night in Raseiniai, the Germans split up: the Raus battle group went north, the Seedorf battle group went south. Around noon on June 23, the reconnaissance motorcycle regiment, which had lost its commander the day before, came across the advanced units of the 2nd Panzer Division of the Red Army, Major General Solyankin, walking in front of the Seedorf group. The consequences of this meeting the Germans in their combat journals reflected very restrainedly, but there are references to the complete loss of combat capability, and about the exodus, and about the harsh measures that managed to stop the spread of panic.

And this is not surprising: at the forefront of the Soviet counterattack of the 2nd Panzer Division was a group of fifty heavy KV tanks, and behind them about two hundred lighter tanks.

Until this hour, the German tankers did not suspect the existence of such huge steel monsters. Although the Soviets on the eve of the war demonstrated their new tanks at the May Day parade on Red Square, Germany did not pay attention to them. And now the German tankers had to correct the miscalculations of their intelligence, recognizing the combat and tactical and technical characteristics of the KV during the battle.

In battle, it quickly became clear that the guns of any German tanks were powerless against the frontal and side armor of the KV. With anti-tank artillery, things were no better. The main 37-mm gun of the Wehrmacht, which showed itself well in Poland and France, turned out to be a useless “mallet” in Russia. The 50-mm gun pierced the KV into the side with a sub-caliber projectile from 300 meters, armor-piercing - from 500 meters. On the forehead, Wehrmacht anti-tank artillery became effective against KV only at a distance of 40 meters.

Fifty heavy tanks crushed Seedorf's group and went to Raseiniai. On the outskirts of the city, the Germans fought desperately, trying to stop the Soviet tanks, but they were invulnerable until the Germans managed to pull up 88-mm anti-aircraft guns and 150-mm field howitzers. At Hill 139, the Germans set up six-barreled mortars that covered the Soviet rear units (Solyankin had almost one and a half thousand trucks following the tanks, and German mines destroyed most of them). The Soviet offensive slowed down, but did not stop.

The next day, the German command demanded that the Raus combat group bypass the Soviet units and go behind their lines. But this was not possible for an almost anecdotal reason: a Soviet KV stood on the road, which ran out of fuel, but the crew did not leave the car and took up battle with the entire tank group. 88-mm anti-aircraft guns and 150-mm howitzers were busy repelling the attack on Raseiniai, and the Rous group had nothing to oppose this immobile steel fortress.

The Germans tried to hunt the KV like cavemen hunted mammoths: while light tanks distracted the beast, a 50-mm gun was manually rolled up to it at close range to inflict a sudden fatal blow on the side. This resulted in the loss of several light tanks and a battery of 50 mm anti-tank guns, but Routh's group made no progress on 24 June. Only on June 25 was she finally handed over an 88-mm gun, which destroyed the KV with a sniper shot at the gun mask - during the Raseiniai battle, the Germans found the weak point of the armored monster. German tankers drove Jews from nearby villages to the battlefield, forced them to pull the dead Soviet crew out of a wrecked tank (the names of the heroes remained unknown) and bury them. At the same time, the Panzerwaffe officers gave military honors to the enemy, and the tank itself was then dragged to the main square of Raseiniai, and it stood there until 1944 as a German monument to the courage of the enemy.

When the Routh group went to the rear of the Solyankin division, the Soviet attack had already fizzled out, most of the tanks were lost. The next day, June 26, German saboteurs defeated the headquarters of the 2nd Panzer Division and killed its commander. The division at that time consisted of one BT-7 tank.

Luga border

After the border defeat near Leningrad, they began to hastily build a defensive line along the banks of the Luga River. The tank units of the Red Army in the Baltic States were almost completely destroyed, the infantry units were dispersed and disorganized, the Luga line, which was being dug by the Leningraders, was occupied by divisions of the militia. The border victories were also not cheap for Army Group North, and they stood in front of Luga for almost a month, pulling up reinforcements and repairing wrecked vehicles.

Tank battles in Alytus and Raseiniai became a violation of the charters of both armies. Before the war, both the Wehrmacht and the Red Army believed that tanks on the battlefield would not have to fight other tanks, anti-tank artillery would deal with their destruction. And the tanks were intended for other tasks, as can be seen from their pre-war classification: “breakthrough tanks”, “infantry support tanks”, “tanks to destroy fortifications”.

After the October battles near Mtsensk, it became completely clear that a tank could deal with all these tasks only by eliminating its main enemy, the enemy tank, from the battlefield, and less mobile anti-tank artillery was often absent in such situations. Therefore, the next generation of tanks was already classified as boxers, according to weight categories: light, medium, heavy.

Behind the Luga, the German tankers were waiting for another oncoming tank battle, which went down in history as the “Leningrad Prokhorovka”. But this battle did not resemble the famous Prokhorovka - a furious tank meat grinder at short distances in mixed battle formations, because both sides conducted it in accordance with their pre-war doctrines.

"Brandenburg-800"

On July 14, a Soviet armored car with a crew in Red Army uniform drove up to the bridge across the Luga near the village of Porechye at high speed. The saboteurs slipped through the security posts of the NKVD, on the move in Russian, demanding to call the commander for important news. They drove to the east end of the bridge, and the truck following them stopped at the west end.

At that moment, a sniper, who had previously entered the Soviet rear under the guise of a refugee, shot the commander of an anti-tank gun who was covering the bridge with a shot in the head. German infantry jumped out of an armored car and truck, seized the bridge and cut all the wires on it that they found, in case it was mined. A heavy skirmish began, in which the Germans who did not have time to disperse were initially strongly pressed, but the commander of the capture group, Lieutenant Renner, set up a smoke screen that allowed his soldiers to take up positions for defense. When the smoke cleared, the security officers realized that without a lot of bloodshed the Germans could not be knocked out of the bridge, and retreated.

The commander of the NKVD special unit guarding the bridge across the Luga described this firefight in a report to the authorities: “Enemy tanks, disguised by our identification marks, came close to the bridge ... the garrison, on alarm, occupied the trenches and opened rifle and machine-gun fire on the tanks. Following the tank, up to a company of enemy infantry approached the bridge in vehicles, with which the garrison entered into battle. The battle went on for an hour and a half. As a result of the battle, up to 70 fascists were destroyed.

In fact, in the Renner group from the 800th Brandenburg Special Purpose Regiment, one saboteur was slightly wounded during the capture of the bridge. The Luga line was broken through, the Wehrmacht received a bridgehead on the eastern coast.

moloskovitsy

In August, the attack on Leningrad by the German 1st Panzer Division began from this bridgehead. Having broken through the Soviet defenses, the tanks went into a deep breakthrough to the Moloskovitsy railway station, which connected the defenders of the Luga line with Leningrad. Under the command of Major General Walter Krueger were 98 different tanks, they were supported by motorized batteries of anti-tank artillery.

To meet them, the Soviet command threw its last reserve - the 1st Red Banner Tank Division of Major General Viktor Baranov, 108 tanks (KV-1, T-28, BT-7, BT-5, T-26). The division did not have tractors, so its anti-tank artillery lagged far behind the advanced units. The day before, Baranov received 12 new KV tanks from the Kirov Tank Plant, shielded with 25-mm armored shields.

On August 11, in the forest near Moloskovitsy, Soviet tanks met with enemy tanks. In the first battle, the Germans lost 20 tanks, but gained time to install anti-tank guns in their rear, after which Major General Kruger ordered the crews to make a feigned retreat. Delighted by the first victory in the war, the Soviet tankers were brought by the Germans to a convenient distance for camouflaged 88-mm guns and destroyed by a sudden heavy fire. In this ambush, 11 KV, 8 BT-2, 9 BT-7, 2 BA-10 burned down. There would have been more losses, but it turned out that the shielded KVs, which took the brunt of the artillery, were hardly vulnerable even to the "eighty-eighths", they broke through to the batteries and crushed the guns with caterpillars. The Soviet attack bogged down. Tanks with red stars disorganized out of the battle and retreated to the railway station. At night, Baranov ordered the surviving crews to bury their cars in the ground on the road to Moloskovitsy and stand to death in the morning.

On August 12, tanks with crosses went on the attack. Now the Germans began to suffer heavy losses. They had a particularly hard time near Kotino, where the KVs were buried in the ground under the command of senior political officer Vasiliev. Only in this position the Germans lost 14 tanks. By evening, Kruger's last reserves had pushed through the defenses of the Red Banner Division and reached Moloskovitsy, directly ambushed by anti-tank artillery approaching Baranov. 152-mm howitzers camouflaged on the outskirts of the station let the enemy advance group in and shot 14 light tanks at close range, tearing them to pieces with direct hits.

The German attack failed with heavy losses, just like the Soviet one the day before. But at night, two more German tank divisions crossed over the Luga bridges, outflanking Baranov. However, in the morning he would still have to retreat, because not a single tank remained in his division.

Troops

Now Leningraders hastily dug the Krasnogvardeisky defensive line around modern Gatchina. It was necessary to buy time for them, but the Soviet command no longer had army units, and they ordered border guard cadets from the NKVD school armed with rifles and one machine gun to stop the tanks.

Two battalions of boys detained three tank divisions of Army Group North for three days. The cadets threw Molotov cocktails from the trees, burned a lot of cars, and most importantly, confused the German command, which did not understand what was happening. When the generals figured it out, almost all the cadets died, but during this time five more KVs left the Kirov Plant. They were received by a platoon of Senior Lieutenant Zinovy ​​Kolobanov from the fallen Red Banner Tank Division.

The platoon dispersed behind the positions of the cadets on three roads that led to Gatchina. Kolobanov put two tanks on the Luga road, two on the Kingisepp road, and he himself took up a position on the seaside road. First, the Germans moved along the Luga road and lost 5 tanks and 3 armored personnel carriers. Then the 1st Panzer Division went along the seaside road.

Near the Voiskovitsy state farm, a column of light tanks came under fire from KV Kolobanov buried in the ground. The position was chosen by the senior lieutenant perfectly: the road went through marshy meadows, impassable for vehicles. The KV opened fire on the side of the enemy, destroying two tanks in front and two rear ones with the first shots. The Germans were trapped on a narrow strip of asphalt in the middle of Russian mud. Kolobanov began to shoot their tanks one by one.

For some time the enemy could not understand where they were being fired from, and in response the Germans beat the haystacks in the collective farm field. Then the HF noticed and concentrated fire on him. After the battle, 156 marks from hits were counted on the armor, but there were no penetrations. In half an hour, Kolobanov, having spent 98 shells, destroyed all 22 tanks of the 1st Panzer Division. When the Germans delivered a battery of 88-mm guns to the battlefield, Kolobanov destroyed it as well.

After the war, the master of the Minsk Automobile Plant, Zinovy ​​​​Kolobanov, spoke about this battle at a meeting of front-line soldiers, and he was ridiculed. After the death of the professional Red Army near the western border, Soviet tank crews were formed from hastily trained conscripts. They are accustomed to paying dearly for every destroyed enemy tank. The story about Soviet tankers, who destroyed dozens of German tanks in the summer of 1941, seemed like a fabrication to the workers.

In the overwhelming majority of cases, it was our fighters who were the first to rush into hostility.

For the Nazi troops that attacked the USSR, the ability of the Red Army to fight with bayonets, knives and sapper shovels turned out to be as unexpected as the T-34 tank, Katyusha and Russian snipers. By the way, the leader of the Belgian Nazis, Leon Degrel, commander of the 28th SS Volunteer Division "Wallonia", which fought on the Eastern Front, was imbued with deep respect for the Russian soldier for the rest of his life. In the mid-90s, in one of his interviews (the text of which we will publish separately), he literally stated the following: “Russians are a great people. When we came to this war, we were sure that we would meet there Marxist “untermenschs” (“subhumans” - the term of the official ideology of the Third Reich - ed.) of the Asian type, who forcibly seized power in Russia and barbarously destroy the Russian people. That's what our propaganda told us.

We really encountered the terrible realities of communist reality there, both on the battlefields and in the territories we occupied. But very soon they realized that the political system is one thing, and the people and their way of life is another.

Russians and Ukrainians are great nations, courageous, noble and generous. I admire them. Faced with the Russians, I realized that they should be part of the Reich on an equal footing. Like a great European nation."

In his office there was a poster depicting German and Russian soldiers - in this way Leon Degrel emphasized his respect for the Russian soldier as a worthy enemy!

Single complex

The Finnish war showed how important it is to train the Red Army in hand-to-hand combat. As a result of the reform of the Soviet ground forces, which took place before the Second World War, shooting, grenade throwing and bayonet fighting were combined into a single complex. Later, already in battles with the Nazis, especially in urban conditions and in the trenches, this experience was generalized and strengthened.
Lieutenant General Gerasimov described the tactics of storming enemy fortified areas in the following way:

From a distance of 40-50 meters, the attacking infantry ceases fire in order to reach the enemy trenches with one decisive throw. From a distance of 20-25 meters, she uses hand grenades thrown on the run. This is followed by a point-blank shot and the defeat of the enemy with melee weapons.

The NKVD fighter Yakov Fedorovich Kovshar spoke about the details of the pre-war preparation for hand-to-hand combat:

“It is important for each fighter not only to know, but also to be able to wield a bayonet and hands in hand-to-hand combat with enemies. I myself began my military service in 1935. He graduated from the courses of junior commanders and was sent to a special rifle regiment of deep front-line reconnaissance. We were taught well.

With hand-to-hand combat, we also prepared well. Twice a week we went to "boxing" - competed in gloves, got used to the blows. The strongest could withstand up to five blows at the same time. Three months later, we learned not to be afraid of blows, and then they began to teach us how to throw. They threw it to the right, and to the left, and over the back, and with a grip.

Special training - to the masses

The catastrophe of 1941 led to significant losses of the Red Army. At the same time, the strengths of our Armed Forces were also revealed. It turned out that in hand-to-hand combat, Wehrmacht soldiers were inferior to trained Red Army soldiers. The disputes that simmered before the war that the bayonet had lost its relevance showed the correctness of those military specialists who nevertheless insisted on mass training in the skills of its use.

A special visual aid was even issued by Major General A.A. Tarasov "Destroy the enemy in hand-to-hand combat", which was sent to all units where there was an accelerated training of mobilized fighters.
The deadly and insidious enemy of your Motherland - German fascism - is armed to the teeth with fire and technical means of war, - Tarasov wrote in the preface. “At the same time, the fascist German hordes avoid meeting us in hand-to-hand combat, because our fighters have shown that there was and is no equal to them in courage and dexterity in hand-to-hand combat. But we must seriously consider the technique and tactics of the enemy. Therefore, in battles with our fierce enemy: - move quickly and secretly - throw a grenade far and accurately - hit with a bayonet and butt firmly reception - in their own or in the trenches of the enemy, inflict an accurate blow with a bayonet in the throat. But the most formidable weapon of our fighter was a sapper shovel.

Collective farmers who joined the ranks of the Red Army and numerous builders, who often had to work with carpenter's axes, were especially good at it. Their blows were continuous, sharp and sometimes so strong that they cut limbs, not to mention broken heads. Funeral German teams after hand-to-hand fighting often saw their soldiers with their skulls cut open.

Face to face

This is the name of the book of the commander of the 181st special reconnaissance and sabotage detachment of the Northern Fleet, Viktor Leonov. He and his fighters had to engage in numerous hand-to-hand fights with the most trained soldiers of the mountain rifle units of the Wehrmacht. Among themselves, the Red Army called them chasseurs. It was about the German elite, consisting, as a rule, of young physically strong soldiers with a height of at least 176 cm. These Germans were trained to fight in harsh climatic conditions and were excellent at martial arts. However, the fascist huntsmen could not resist our scouts-saboteurs.

An unusual battle broke out and flared up, rare in its intensity and suddenness, - Leonov recalled. - It was that deadly fight, when both the fist and cold weapons, and the cobblestone that turned up under the arm, are used. I saw Andrei very close, hiding behind a large stone.
On the other side of the stone, two huntsmen were waiting for him to appear. A short lunge forward, then a deceptive movement, and now one huntsman fell down, knocked down by a blow from the butt. But, falling, he hooked Andrei, and he stretched out on a slippery stone. Another huntsman immediately rushed towards him. I threw up my machine gun, but fired a burst, seeing behind the huntsman Tarashnin and Guguev.

The tall huntsman had already raised his rifle over the scout sprawled on the ground. I didn't see how Andrey dangled to the side like a bird, but I heard the clang of the butt on the stone. The rifle fell out of the hands of the huntsman, and he bent down to pick it up. At that moment, I jumped over a stone and stunned the huntsman with a blow from the butt of my machine gun.
According to the twice Hero of the Soviet Union Viktor Leonov, often the huntsmen and our fighters did not shoot at each other during the approach, preferring short and fierce fights. The reason lay in the terrain, which allows you to covertly approach the enemy. Both ours and the Germans came out to meet almost close - at a distance of twenty meters. Before the fight, the Red Army always smiled contemptuously and evilly, forcing the Nazis to get nervous and think if there was a catch here.
“... A smile and a vest have become our weapons. The enemies could not withstand this pressure on the psyche, ”said the commander of the scouts.

In the trenches of Stalingrad

Remembering European companies, the Wehrmacht soldiers more and more often expressed the idea in conversations with each other and in letters home: "whoever did not fight the Russians in hand-to-hand combat did not see a real war." Skirmishes, artillery fire and bombardments, grueling marches through the mud, hunger and cold were no match for short and furious battles in which it was almost impossible to survive.

“We fought for 15 days for one house, using mortars, grenades, machine guns and bayonets,” a German lieutenant of the 24th Panzer Division, a participant in the Battle of Stalingrad, wrote in a letter home. - Already on the third day, the corpses of 54 of my killed comrades were lying in the basements, on the stairwells and stairs.

"Front Line" runs along the corridor separating the burnt rooms, along the ceiling between the two floors. Reinforcements are brought in from nearby houses via fire escapes and chimneys. From morning to night there is a continuous struggle. From floor to floor, faces blackened with soot, we throw grenades at each other in the roar of explosions, clouds of dust and smoke, among heaps of cement, pools of blood, fragments of furniture and parts of human bodies. Ask any soldier what half an hour of hand-to-hand combat means in such a fight. And imagine Stalingrad. 80 days and 80 nights of hand-to-hand fighting. The length of the street is now measured not by meters, but by corpses ... "

Hand-to-hand fighting statistics show that during the Great Patriotic War, eighty percent of the fights were initiated by our fighters.

It should be noted that in Nazi Germany a special award was established specifically for hand-to-hand combat. And she was highly valued. It was called "Sign of Close Combat" (German. Nahkampfspange des Heeres). This badge was established on November 25, 1942 by Hitler's personal order. The design for the award was designed by the firm of Wilhelm Pickhaus in Berlin. Hitler, Himmler and Guderian were among the first to be awarded the gold degree of the badge. On March 26, 1944, Hitler declared his unquestioning sole right to appropriate and present the golden badge.

The sign was introduced in order to celebrate the courage and valor of the infantrymen, who repeatedly won in hand-to-hand combat.

Awarded to military personnel who directly participated in hand-to-hand combat. The proximity of the battle was determined by the fact whether the soldier saw during the battle

As a matter of fact, the Wehrmacht already had an award that marked a fighter for participating in close combat. This award was established at the end of 1939, "Assault Infantry Badge". But the mass character of the troops participating in the battles and the duration of the new war led to the fact that any infantryman who proved himself to be on the front line for several weeks could actually count on receiving an assault badge. Here, in order to highlight the merits of the best, most experienced soldiers who have been fighting for several months, and sometimes even years, it was decided to introduce a new award, with much higher award criteria. The sign was of three degrees:

• "Bronze Sign" - 15 days of hand-to-hand fights.
• "Silver Badge" - 30 days of hand-to-hand combat.
• "Golden Sign" - 50 days of hand-to-hand fights.

As an exception, for military personnel who, as a result of injury, could no longer return to the front, it was allowed to reduce these terms to 10, 20 and 40 days, respectively. Also, the badge could be awarded posthumously, but not to those who were missing or taken prisoner. Together with the presentation of the highest degree of the award, a leave of 21 days could also be granted.

In addition, continuous stay at the front for a certain time was counted accordingly for a certain number of days of hand-to-hand combat.

The gradation of time served was as follows:

• Eight months of continuous service was equated to hand-to-hand fighting for 5 days;
• Twelve months of service was equivalent to hand-to-hand combat for 10 days;
• Fifteen months of service was equivalent to hand-to-hand combat for 15 days.

Among the soldiers, the sign enjoyed high prestige and respect. During the Second World War were awarded:

• Bronze badge - 36,400 people
• Silver - 9,400 people
• Gold - 631 people.