So - the Germans did not attack with their infantry? They attacked, but only by attack they didn’t mean running with rifles at the ready in order to run up and stab the enemy with a bayonet or hit with a shovel, but something else (about which a little later), but such attacks, as planned by the generals of the Red Army, they remained in history of the First World War.

To begin with, I propose to simply recall all the documentaries and photographs of the Second World War. Soviet "documentary" films and photos, I think, in 95% of cases were filmed in the rear during exercises, but this does not matter in this case. What does the offensive of the Soviet troops look like? The tanks go on the attack, and behind them the Soviet infantry runs in chains or in a crowd at the enemy shooting at them. Or this infantry runs on the enemy to attack on its own. But now there are a lot of photos and film frames of the German newsreel, so, are there any similar shots of the offensive of the German troops in it? Completely absent!

Interestingly, even a glance at the infantryman showed a difference in tactics. In Russia and the USSR, an infantryman has always been called a "private" - one who goes on the attack along with his other comrades. That is, the fact that he is in the ranks, from the position of Russian and Soviet generals, is the most important and valuable thing in him. And for the Germans, it was a "shütze" - a shooter. That is, from the position of the German army, the most valuable thing in an infantryman was that he shoots. The Germans taught their foot soldiers a lot, but they just didn’t teach bayonet fighting - it was unnecessary for those who knew how to shoot.

A little about it. We have military theorists from the Suvorov slogan "A bullet is a fool, a bayonet is well done!" they made a fetish, turning Suvorov into a cretin. Firstly, in the time of Suvorov, the bayonet was still a real weapon, and secondly, Suvorov insistently demanded that the soldiers learn to shoot, he even persuaded them, assuring them that lead was cheap and that a soldier in peacetime would not incur large expenses for target practice. In addition, Suvorov taught soldiers to shoot accurately and warned that although he was counting on a battle of 100 rounds per soldier, he would flog the one who shot all these rounds, since such a number of rounds in a real battle is shot only with non-aimed fire.

Yes, of course, it's not bad if a soldier knows how to operate with a bayonet, but with the rate of fire of weapons of the 20th century, who will let him in at a bayonet strike distance?

And I continue to be convinced that the point was, in fact, not in the bayonet, but in the fact that the bayonet was, as it were, the meaning and justification of the tactics of attacking the enemy defenses with manpower. Tactics that dramatically simplify the service of officers and generals, tactics that do not require extensive knowledge from them and reduce their work to primitive teams at the level of the 18th century.

But back to what the Germans considered an attack and an offensive.

The Intelligence Directorate of the 16th German Army in September 1941 translated the article "Peculiarities of offensive operations of the German infantry in a maneuver war" from Volume 1 "West" of the Soviet reference book on the Armed Forces of the border states. The book was captured in the band of the German 39th Army Corps. Let's read this article, omitting the ideological introduction.

“The experience of the war that Germany is waging in Europe and Africa allows us to draw some conclusions about the features of offensive tactics, which are generally close to the truth. Until now, fascist German troops have dealt with an enemy who could not resist them.

The fighting with the Polish, French, and especially with the Yugoslav and Greek troops led to a drop in military discipline in the Wehrmacht, inattention to the elementary requirements for camouflage and self-digging. Self-confidence, as a consequence of "victories", results in inattention to what is happening on the battlefield.

The facts show that the "victories" of the Wehrmacht were not achieved by the stubbornness of the infantry in overcoming the barrier zone or in breaking through the fortified positions of this or that enemy. These "victories" were achieved mainly due to the premature abandonment of the fortifications by the defenders as a result of the massive (in comparison with the Polish, French, Yugoslav or Greek armies taken separately) the use of artillery and aviation.

It should be noted that by mocking quoting the word “victory”, the Soviet military theorists who wrote this article, the massive action of German artillery and aviation on the enemy - the main principle of victory in battle - was brought to the weakness of the German infantry, massive fire on the enemy - to the lack of tactics!

“German infantry rarely goes into bayonet charges. In many cases, she seeks to avoid such actions. In the event of strong enemy resistance, the German infantry, as a rule, avoids attacking such positions. In each such case, the commander of any German unit or unit (platoon, company, battalion or regiment) is looking for a solution in a maneuver. Feeling the flanks and outflanking them is a common tactic of the German commanders.

A position that is steadfastly defended is subjected to artillery fire, bombardment and, according to the situation, dummy tank attacks. At the same time, the infantry (subunits and units), leaving minimal forces to pin down the enemy, the main forces and reinforcements perform a maneuver aimed at hitting the enemy flank.

We note the described complexity of the work of a German officer. Instead of shouting "For the Reich, for the Fuhrer!" to send soldiers into a bayonet attack, the officer must study the terrain and intelligence, be able to change both the direction of the attack and the combat formation of the troops entrusted to him if the enemy puts up stronger resistance than expected. The German officer needs to organize communication with all branches of the military, know how and when they need to be used, be able to issue target designation for artillery and aviation, and be able to maneuver his units on the battlefield.

“Experience shows that such German tactics will be used in the future.

With careful observation of the battlefield, such a maneuver would be discovered and used against the Germans.

If we read the introductory article PP-36, we will see that it says: an adversary bypassing or surrounding is himself in danger of being surrounded. Therefore, one must strive to oppose the enemy's maneuver with one's own counter-manoeuvre. Leaving at the front of a platoon, company or battalion such a quantity of fire weapons as is minimally necessary, the main forces attack on the flank of the bypassing enemy.

This is an effective method in the fight against such an enemy as the Nazi troops., - the Soviet theorist did not miss the opportunity to say a clever banality, which looks especially wild against the backdrop of the tragedy of the Red Army at the beginning of the war.

“Special mention should be made of the rapid maneuver in the offensive of motorized artillery, both individual guns and entire batteries. The battle that the Germans are waging is distinguished by the roar created by the fire of artillery, machine guns, and the howl of aircraft. Fiery jets of flamethrowers, puffs of black smoke create the impression of an attack sweeping away everything in its path.

Undoubtedly, all this is aimed at undermining the morale of the enemy. Morality, the will to resist must be suppressed. Cowards and alarmists are morally crushed.

This appearance of clear superiority is created, first of all, by artillery fire (anti-tank guns and anti-aircraft guns), as well as tanks.

Why "visibility"? When shells of all types of weapons that the Germans had are flying at you, when tanks are driving at you, which you cannot inflict any damage with your weapons, is this “visibility”?

“When the infantry takes up initial positions, motorized artillery fires from guns of all calibers at all objects on the front line. Infantry support is carried out jointly with tanks, often by direct fire, without the organization of reliable communications and adjustments, which are organized only in the event of an expansion of the battle.

Through the massive use of guns of all calibers, including 150-mm guns, the Germans seek to assure the enemy of the numerical superiority of the advancing forces and the approaching artillery.

Such a rapid concentration of artillery, characteristic of oncoming battles, the Germans try to use in the offensive in every case.

Another feature of offensive battles is the use of short artillery preparation, during which the infantry seeks to get close to the enemy. During the war with Poland, France, Yugoslavia and Greece, this method was widely used when attacking field fortified positions, and in exceptional cases when attacking long-term fortified lines.

Let's take a typical German company attack as an example.

The rifle company occupies initial positions from 800 to 900 meters, depending on the conditions of the terrain, after which it receives the direction of attack (sometimes the offensive zone). The usual order of battle is two platoons in the first line, one platoon in reserve. In such a battle formation, the company, combining fire and maneuver, moves at a speed of 600-800 meters per hour to the area of ​​​​concentration.

So, the German infantry advanced to the line (from which the Soviet infantry usually rises in a bayonet attack), maneuvering from cover to cover, and already at this distance firing at the enemy from their own heavy weapons. But since the Germans' own fire had to be accurate, it also took time to detect the target, install weapons (machine guns, mortars, infantry or anti-tank guns), zero in and destroy targets. As a result, as you can see, the advance to the line of the actual attack proceeded at a speed of only 600–800 meters per hour (infantry in a marching column moves at a pace of 110 steps per minute, that is, about 5 kilometers per hour). The Germans, as you can see, were in no hurry to get a bullet from the defending enemy, they first did everything to destroy him from afar.

"When an attack (of a battalion, regiment) begins, the artillery shells the front line of the enemy for 15 minutes." Note, not an hour, as in the per hectare calculations of Soviet generals, but only 15 minutes.

“The company, as a rule, is reinforced by a machine-gun platoon, as well as a platoon of infantry guns (mortars). The latter are used from the beginning of the attack to the assault, changing positions if necessary. Here we are not talking about breaking through long-term fortifications, since the Germans in these cases create assault groups consisting of engineering, infantry and artillery units. Artillery preparation in this case is carried out according to a special plan. After a 15-minute artillery preparation, the fire is transferred to the flanks of the breakthrough and to the rear objects. At the same time, the front line is bombarded by aircraft and fired upon by infantry guns and mortars.

From the defending enemy, in theory, there should be nothing left. And only after that the infantry begins what the Germans call an assault.

"The attack continues in rolls of 15-20 meters." That is, even here the Germans did not run to the enemy trenches, putting forward their bayonets, but moved in the direction of the enemy from cover to cover, or rather, from one position for firing to the next. And from these positions, rifles and light machine guns continuously aimed fire at the enemy, preventing him from leaning out of the trench to fire at the attackers. And they approached the enemy’s positions in this way until the distance was reduced to throwing a hand grenade, with which they finished off the enemy in his shelter if the enemy did not give up.

“If the starting positions are reached, then the company opens fire on the front line of the enemy from all available fire weapons. At this point, as a rule, flamethrowers and hand grenades are used. Anti-tank guns receive special tasks, namely: shelling of observation slots and embrasures of fortifications, as well as identified firing positions. The task of escort guns and assault guns is to suppress machine-gun nests and mortars.

That's what the German attack was like.

“Before the company goes on the attack, the decisive moment comes for the defenders. By this moment, you need to carefully prepare, you need to unleash the full power of the fire system on the enemy. Maneuvering weapons, the use of wandering guns and dagger machine guns (such machine guns that suddenly open fire at close range) can turn the tide in favor of the defenders.

Experience shows that the German infantry, under fire from machine guns and mortars, lies down and waits for the support of escort artillery. This favorable moment must be used. After the massive use of flamethrowers, mortars and hand grenades, one should switch to a surprise bayonet attack on the flank of the attacking enemy with the forces of a squad, platoon or company, attacking individual groups of the enemy, especially at a time when artillery is not firing at the front line. This will reduce your own losses.

It often happens that a short bayonet attack, carried out decisively, develops into a general counteroffensive.

While the Germans are in open space, approaching the defending enemy units, they are very vulnerable to fire from all types of artillery. There is a general conversation about the power of the “fire system”, but when it comes to clarifying what kind of “fire system” it is, it is specified that this is the fire of nomadic (individual and constantly changing positions) guns and it is not known how machine guns put forward at close range to the approaching Germans . There are no requirements to develop a system of barrage and concentrated artillery fire, there are not even requirements to simply cover hectares with artillery. Where is the advice to call on the Germans attacking and in open space the fire of regimental, divisional and corps artillery? After all, she was! But no, as you can see, such advice for the Soviet generals was prohibitive in terms of its military complexity, and their favorite bayonet attack, even if it was a squad, was their answer! Not fire, but a bayonet - that's the main thing that will repel a German attack!

The German General E. Middeldorf, in the book “Russian Campaign: Tactics and Weapons” written by him after the war, compares the Soviet and German infantry:

“There is no doubt that of the two largest land powers of the period of the last war - Russia and Germany - the German land army, both at the beginning and at the end of the war, had the most combat-ready infantry. However, on a number of important issues of combat training and armament, the Russian infantry, especially at the initial stage of the war, was superior to the German. In particular, the Russians were superior to the Germans in the art of night combat, combat in wooded and swampy areas and combat in winter, in the training of snipers and in the engineering equipment of positions, as well as in equipping the infantry with machine guns and mortars. However, the Germans were superior to the Russians in the organization of the offensive and the interaction between the military branches, in the training of junior officers and in equipping the infantry with machine guns. During the war, the opponents learned from each other and managed to some extent eliminate the existing shortcomings..

Let us note that, in the opinion of this general of that war, our infantry was strong where it could take cover from German fire. Even when he praised the equipment of our infantry with machine guns and mortars, he did not praise the fact that our infantry enjoyed this advantage. And he did not say a single commendable word about our bayonet attack as our advantage.

And since Middeldorf mentioned snipers, I'll digress a little more on the advantages of well-aimed fire and German tactics.

In the overwhelming majority of cases, it was our fighters who were the first to rush into hostility.

For the Nazi troops that attacked the USSR, the ability of the Red Army to fight with bayonets, knives and sapper shovels turned out to be as unexpected as the T-34 tank, Katyusha and Russian snipers. By the way, the leader of the Belgian Nazis, Leon Degrel, commander of the 28th SS Volunteer Division "Wallonia", which fought on the Eastern Front, was imbued with deep respect for the Russian soldier for the rest of his life. In the mid-90s, in one of his interviews (the text of which we will publish separately), he literally stated the following: “Russians are a great people. When we came to this war, we were sure that we would meet there Marxist “untermenschs” (“subhumans” - the term of the official ideology of the Third Reich - ed.) of the Asian type, who forcibly seized power in Russia and barbarously destroy the Russian people. That's what our propaganda told us.

We really encountered the terrible realities of communist reality there, both on the battlefields and in the territories we occupied. But very soon they realized that the political system is one thing, and the people and their way of life is another.

Russians and Ukrainians are great nations, courageous, noble and generous. I admire them. Faced with the Russians, I realized that they should be part of the Reich on an equal footing. Like a great European nation."

In his office there was a poster depicting German and Russian soldiers - in this way Leon Degrel emphasized his respect for the Russian soldier as a worthy enemy!

Single complex

The Finnish war showed how important it is to train the Red Army in hand-to-hand combat. As a result of the reform of the Soviet ground forces, which took place before the Second World War, shooting, grenade throwing and bayonet fighting were combined into a single complex. Later, already in battles with the Nazis, especially in urban conditions and in the trenches, this experience was generalized and strengthened.
Lieutenant General Gerasimov described the tactics of storming enemy fortified areas in the following way:

From a distance of 40-50 meters, the attacking infantry ceases fire in order to reach the enemy trenches with one decisive throw. From a distance of 20-25 meters, she uses hand grenades thrown on the run. This is followed by a point-blank shot and the defeat of the enemy with melee weapons.

The NKVD fighter Yakov Fedorovich Kovshar spoke about the details of the pre-war preparation for hand-to-hand combat:

“It is important for each fighter not only to know, but also to be able to wield a bayonet and hands in hand-to-hand combat with enemies. I myself began my military service in 1935. He graduated from the courses of junior commanders and was sent to a special rifle regiment of deep front-line reconnaissance. We were taught well.

With hand-to-hand combat, we also prepared well. Twice a week we went to "boxing" - competed in gloves, got used to the blows. The strongest could withstand up to five blows at the same time. Three months later, we learned not to be afraid of blows, and then they began to teach us how to throw. They threw it to the right, and to the left, and over the back, and with a grip.

Special training - to the masses

The catastrophe of 1941 led to significant losses of the Red Army. At the same time, the strengths of our Armed Forces were also revealed. It turned out that in hand-to-hand combat, Wehrmacht soldiers were inferior to trained Red Army soldiers. The disputes that simmered before the war that the bayonet had lost its relevance showed the correctness of those military specialists who nevertheless insisted on mass training in the skills of its use.

A special visual aid was even issued by Major General A.A. Tarasov "Destroy the enemy in hand-to-hand combat", which was sent to all units where there was an accelerated training of mobilized fighters.
The deadly and insidious enemy of your Motherland - German fascism - is armed to the teeth with fire and technical means of war, - Tarasov wrote in the preface. - At the same time, the Nazi hordes avoid meeting with us in hand-to-hand combat, because our fighters have shown that there was and is no equal to them in courage and dexterity in hand-to-hand combat. But we must seriously consider the technique and tactics of the enemy. Therefore, in battles with our fierce enemy: - move quickly and secretly - throw a grenade far and accurately - hit with a bayonet and butt firmly reception - in their own or in the trenches of the enemy, inflict an accurate blow with a bayonet in the throat. But the most formidable weapon of our fighter was a sapper shovel.

Collective farmers who joined the ranks of the Red Army and numerous builders, who often had to work with carpenter's axes, were especially good at it. Their blows were continuous, sharp and sometimes so strong that they cut limbs, not to mention broken heads. Funeral German teams after hand-to-hand fighting often saw their soldiers with their skulls cut open.

Face to face

This is the name of the book of the commander of the 181st special reconnaissance and sabotage detachment of the Northern Fleet, Viktor Leonov. He and his fighters had to engage in numerous hand-to-hand fights with the most trained soldiers of the mountain rifle units of the Wehrmacht. Among themselves, the Red Army called them chasseurs. It was about the German elite, consisting, as a rule, of young physically strong soldiers with a height of at least 176 cm. These Germans were trained to fight in harsh climatic conditions and were excellent at martial arts. However, the fascist huntsmen could not resist our scouts-saboteurs.

An unusual battle broke out and flared up, rare in its intensity and suddenness, - Leonov recalled. - It was that deadly fight, when both the fist and cold weapons, and the cobblestone that turned up under the arm, are used. I saw Andrei very close, hiding behind a large stone.
On the other side of the stone, two huntsmen were waiting for him to appear. A short lunge forward, then a deceptive movement, and now one huntsman fell down, knocked down by a blow from the butt. But, falling, he hooked Andrei, and he stretched out on a slippery stone. Another huntsman immediately rushed towards him. I threw up my machine gun, but fired a burst, seeing behind the huntsman Tarashnin and Guguev.

The tall huntsman had already raised his rifle over the scout sprawled on the ground. I didn't see how Andrey dangled to the side like a bird, but I heard the clang of the butt on the stone. The rifle fell out of the hands of the huntsman, and he bent down to pick it up. At that moment, I jumped over a stone and stunned the huntsman with a blow from the butt of my machine gun.
According to the twice Hero of the Soviet Union Viktor Leonov, often the huntsmen and our fighters did not shoot at each other during the approach, preferring short and fierce fights. The reason lay in the terrain, which allows you to covertly approach the enemy. Both ours and the Germans came out to meet almost close - at a distance of twenty meters. Before the fight, the Red Army always smiled contemptuously and evilly, forcing the Nazis to get nervous and think if there was a catch here.
“... A smile and a vest have become our weapons. The enemies could not withstand this pressure on the psyche, ”said the commander of the scouts.

In the trenches of Stalingrad

Remembering European companies, Wehrmacht soldiers increasingly expressed the idea in conversations among themselves and in letters home: "whoever did not fight the Russians in hand-to-hand combat did not see a real war." Skirmishes, artillery fire and bombardments, grueling marches through the mud, hunger and cold were no match for short and furious battles in which it was almost impossible to survive.

“We fought for 15 days for one house, using mortars, grenades, machine guns and bayonets,” a German lieutenant of the 24th Panzer Division, a participant in the Battle of Stalingrad, wrote in a letter home. - Already on the third day, the corpses of 54 of my killed comrades were lying in the basements, on the stairwells and stairs.

"Front Line" runs along the corridor separating the burnt rooms, along the ceiling between the two floors. Reinforcements are brought in from nearby houses via fire escapes and chimneys. From morning to night there is a continuous struggle. From floor to floor, faces blackened with soot, we throw grenades at each other in the roar of explosions, clouds of dust and smoke, among heaps of cement, pools of blood, fragments of furniture and parts of human bodies. Ask any soldier what half an hour of hand-to-hand combat means in such a fight. And imagine Stalingrad. 80 days and 80 nights of hand-to-hand fighting. The length of the street is now measured not by meters, but by corpses ... "

Hand-to-hand fighting statistics show that during the Great Patriotic War, eighty percent of the fights were initiated by our fighters.

It should be noted that in Nazi Germany a special award was established specifically for hand-to-hand combat. And she was highly valued. It was called "Sign of Close Combat" (German. Nahkampfspange des Heeres). This badge was established on November 25, 1942 by Hitler's personal order. The design for the award was designed by the firm of Wilhelm Pickhaus in Berlin. Hitler, Himmler and Guderian were among the first to be awarded the gold degree of the badge. On March 26, 1944, Hitler declared his unquestioning sole right to appropriate and present the golden badge.

The sign was introduced in order to celebrate the courage and valor of the infantrymen, who repeatedly won in hand-to-hand combat.

Awarded to military personnel who directly participated in hand-to-hand combat. The proximity of the battle was determined by the fact whether the soldier saw during the battle

As a matter of fact, the Wehrmacht already had an award that marked a fighter for participating in close combat. This award was established at the end of 1939, "Assault Infantry Badge". But the mass character of the troops participating in the battles and the duration of the new war led to the fact that any infantryman who proved himself to be on the front line for several weeks could actually count on receiving an assault badge. Here, in order to highlight the merits of the best, most experienced soldiers who have been fighting for several months, and sometimes even years, it was decided to introduce a new award, with much higher award criteria. The sign was of three degrees:

• "Bronze Sign" - 15 days of hand-to-hand fights.
• "Silver Badge" - 30 days of hand-to-hand combat.
• "Golden Sign" - 50 days of hand-to-hand fights.

As an exception, for military personnel who, as a result of injury, could no longer return to the front, it was allowed to reduce these terms to 10, 20 and 40 days, respectively. Also, the badge could be awarded posthumously, but not to those who were missing or taken prisoner. Together with the presentation of the highest degree of the award, a leave of 21 days could also be granted.

In addition, continuous stay at the front for a certain time was counted accordingly for a certain number of days of hand-to-hand combat.

The gradation of time served was as follows:

• Eight months of continuous service was equated to hand-to-hand fighting for 5 days;
• Twelve months of service was equivalent to hand-to-hand combat for 10 days;
• Fifteen months of service was equivalent to hand-to-hand combat for 15 days.

Among the soldiers, the sign enjoyed high prestige and respect. During the Second World War were awarded:

• Bronze badge - 36,400 people
• Silver - 9,400 people
• Gold - 631 people.

Among the first units that used the MP 38 submachine gun in combat conditions were the newly formed airborne regiments. When, as part of Operation Weserübung, in April 1940, German troops simultaneously invaded Denmark and Norway, paratroopers were at the forefront of the offensive. They were faced with the task of capturing the main airfields of the enemy so that they could receive the rest of the German troops.

To accomplish this task, they were delivered to the target on Ju 52 transport aircraft for parachute landing. Their armament, including the MP 38, was dropped separately in containers, which were hung on slings from the wings of the aircraft. They acted suddenly, took the enemy by surprise, and airfields were captured, as a rule, within one or two hours. A few weeks later, parachute units dropped on the enemy with the help of gliders again took part in the hostilities to capture the Belgian fortress of Eben-Emael. Their participation was the cornerstone of Hitler's Gelb plan to invade the Netherlands, Belgium and France.
At the beginning of World War II, an airborne company consisted of a control and support platoon and three rifle platoons. Each platoon consisted of three squads of 10 people each, armed with two MG 34 machine guns and six rifles. Unlike the squads of other parts of the German army, due to its "elite" status, each squad had two MP 38 submachine guns.
In order to obtain the greatest benefit and advantage during the assault on the Eben-Emael fortress and during the implementation of Operation Nivi (the landing of the Great Germany infantry regiment), it was necessary to quickly connect the landing forces with the main attacking forces. To do this, it was necessary to capture a number of border bridges intact. One of them was a railway bridge on the river Meuse, five kilometers inland from the Dutch border. The task of capturing the bridge was assigned to an eight-man assault group from the Brandenburg Regiment, the German equivalent of the British SAS or American Green Berets.
On the morning of May 10, 1940, two German soldiers dressed as Dutch military police escorted six German "prisoners of war" to the railway bridge. The compactness of the MP 38 allowed the “prisoners” to carry submachine guns on their chests under their overcoats. In a matter of seconds, they neutralized the sentries from the German bridge and cut the wires to the detonators planted in order to blow up the bridge. Then, by telephone, they informed the guards of the Dutch side that they were crossing the bridge with prisoners, and after that they cut the telephone line. On the opposite side of the bridge, the Dutch began to escort the "prisoners" to the truck. Disguised Germans, with the help of their "prisoner" comrades, "waiting" for escort, captured the remaining guards.

After that, a German armored train followed the bridge, followed by a train with troops. Meanwhile, the “prisoners” got rid of those who “held them and captivated”, attacked a number of fortified posts organized along the river bank, and themselves captured 10 Dutchmen.
Three days later, soldiers of the Grossdeutschland Infantry Regiment were on the western outskirts of Sedan trying to cross the Meuse River and move deep into French territory. Sedan itself was well fortified and defended stubbornly, having an average of 8 firing points for every 200 m of the front. However, the goal of the infantry regiment "Grossdeutschland" were the heights of Murphy, in particular the height 247, located and 6.5 km to the poop of Sedan. With its second battalion in front, the regiment stubbornly moved forward. For five hours before this offensive, German aircraft bombarded the positions of the defenders from the air, forcing them to burrow into the ground, and the howl of German sirens, nicknamed "Jerekhon trumpets", terrified and panicked them. Having crossed the river, the Germans were soon at the foot of the heights. Here is how Lieutenant von Kubier describes the final stage of the offensive in the book of General Heinz Guderian “With Tanks in the East and in the West”:
“They climb a slope pitted with shell craters, overcome several rows of barbed wire, until the French open a massive barrage from behind the ridge. Machine guns and submachine guns pour their deadly fire on the advancing ones. Grenades burst, as if enemy fire does not exist, there is no time to stop. Those in front are already breaking into the enemy's position. Close combat, hand-to-hand combat - and, having gained wild strength, the offensive continues."

INFANTRY SECTION OF THE WEHRMACHT IN 1940

For the first time, the MP 38 and MP 40 submachine guns began to appear in service with the German infantry divisions in 1940. At that time, the division consisted of three infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, a communications battalion, an engineer battalion, a reconnaissance battalion and an anti-tank battalion. Each infantry regiment in the division consisted of three infantry battalions of four companies each. In turn, each company consisted of three platoons.
The platoon consisted of a command and three squads of 10 people, although by 1943, due to a lack of manpower, the squad consisted of 9 people. The size of the company's personnel was also reduced to 80 people. In some cases, it was only 40 people. In addition to the shortage of personnel, the fact that larger units suffered heavy losses and their combat effectiveness did not increase also played a role in reducing the number of personnel of the units. Another reason was that it was more difficult for junior officers to control larger units.
In the period between the wars, much time was devoted to increasing the firepower of troops. The command came to the conclusion that the key to success on the battlefield was a light machine gun. Since the enemy can only be seen for a matter of seconds while moving between cover, such a machine gun must be able to fire the maximum number of shots in the shortest possible time. To this end, in 1934, the Germans created the MG 34 machine gun, the firepower of which was equal to that of 20 soldiers firing rifle fire. The charter of the German infantry in 1939 for the performance of a combat mission attached particular importance to the factor of surprise in combination with mobility and maneuverability. As we said earlier, the fighting was supposed to be a series of local battles that would expand and increase in scale. Even in the largest battle, a squad could, if possible, be expected to perform flanking maneuvers. Based on these two principles, the squad with machine gunners armed with MG 34s and other soldiers - ammunition carriers became the main unit in all types of combat. Quite the opposite was the case with the rifle squad in the US Army, in which the basis of firepower was the rifle shooters, while the Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR) served as a means of fire support.
The structure of the branch remained basically the same throughout the war for all branches of service and formations in the SS troops, infantry and parachute regiments:
Squad leader (Gruppenfuhrer). His main task was to direct the fire of the MG 34 machine gun (later MG 42) and rifle fire. He was responsible for the performance of the combat mission, the condition of the weapons and the supply of ammunition. Since he was directly in charge of the squad's combat operations, his own weapon was a submachine gun. Its limited range meant it could only be used in close combat.
Machine gunner (eister MG-Schutze) - the first number. He was responsible for the firing and good condition of the MG-34 and was the commander of the machine gun group. And although all members of the group could fire from a machine gun, the best shooter was appointed commander. Assistant machine gunner (Zweiter MG Schutze) - second number. The Allies often called him Zwo - a corruption of the German word Zwei, he was armed only with a pistol. He carried 200 rounds in four drums and another 300 rounds in a box, as well as a spare barrel. He was supposed to provide ammunition for the MG 34. When he ran out of cartridges, he took them from an ammunition carrier. Usually, with sufficient cover, the second number lay next to or behind the machine gunner, ready to change him if necessary. The ammunition carrier (dritter MG Schutze, munition Schutze) - the third number - was supposed to supply cartridges, reload drum magazines and monitor the state of ammunition. In battle, he was located behind the machine gunner, was armed with a carbine and, if necessary, acted as a shooter.
Arrows - numbers from 4th to 9th (Gewehr Schutzen). The eldest among them was the deputy squad leader (Truppenfuhrer), who in battle commanded a group of riflemen (Schutzentrupp). They were supposed to support the machine-gun group and conduct close combat with a rifle, bayonet and grenades.

In 1943, the US military intelligence service published the reference book "German Squad in Battle", which was a translation of the regulations in force in the German army in the early 1940s. It outlined the ideal character traits of the squad leader, such as a strong will that can subjugate the soldiers of the squad, selflessness and perseverance in overcoming hardships and hardships, the ability to serve as an example for personnel in moments of danger, the calmness and confidence of a "severe father and kind mother" . The role and importance of the squad leader can be summed up in the words of a Luftwaffe mechanic who was transferred to the 16th airfield division during the battle of Caen: "I did not see the sea, but I knew that there was a whole armada of warships that fired on our
positions ... I was so scared that I wanted, as in childhood, to curl up and hide somewhere. But behind us, a non-commissioned officer with a submachine gun in his hands yelled and drove us forward.

Squad on the offensive

The offensive of the infantry squad was usually carried out in three stages. First of all, it had to come as close as possible to the position of the enemy, without opening fire and using the already existing shelters and camouflage. If necessary, the squad could make a detour maneuver, while maintaining the element of surprise during the attack. Immediately before the offensive and during it, the enemy had to test the full power of fire from all types of available weapons. This stage of the fighting was called to press the enemy to the ground (niederhalten).
At the second stage, the advancing troops moved forward, seeping through the positions of the enemy, and finally, fire fell on the positions of the enemy, with which the attackers tried to destroy the enemy.
In the second and third phases of the advance, the platoon leader (Zugfuhrer) can order one squad to support another. The supporting squad concentrates fire on the point of breakthrough or on the flanks of the enemy, or directs it to the rear of the position on which the attack is directed. In this case, all weapons of the squad are used.

DEFENSE SECTION

In defense, the width of the front for a platoon (Zug) is 200-300m, with each squad having 30-40 meters. This distance is considered the maximum at which the squad leader in battle could command the personnel. All gaps between adjacent compartments were to be covered by fire. First of all, the squad leader had to choose a position for the MG 34, which would allow the most effective shelling of the enemy. Often several spare positions were chosen at a distance of 50 meters from one another. The rest of the shooters with rifles were divided into pairs, usually in ditches or rifle cells with an echeloned defense order. These positions also had to be close enough to each other that the soldiers could hear each other in battle. If time allowed, closer to the rear, they dug a second row of camouflaged rifle cells where the soldiers could be in anticipation of the battle.
An American handbook reports that the increased firepower of German automatic weapons strengthened the defensive capability of the troops to such an extent that well-camouflaged and sheltered positions in deep defense could only be successfully attacked with the closest cooperation and coordination of all attacking units.
During an enemy attack, when he was still at a considerable distance, artillery and heavy company machine guns were used against him in the first place. The squads were in cover until they were able to effectively use their weapons against targets that could not be hit by artillery fire and heavy machine guns. When the enemy approached within range of fire, the squad leader directed the fire of a machine gun and rifle shooters. He used his submachine gun only at close range.
The Germans did not always use rifle cells to prepare their defensive positions. In 1944, in Albanet, Italy, they used wrecked and burned-out Allied tanks to do this, turning them into well-camouflaged gun emplacements. As prescribed by their instructions and regulations, they let the attackers very close, and then rose to counterattack with only a handful of soldiers armed with machine guns, grenades and submachine guns. It was these firing points that stopped the advance of the 2nd Polish Corps and the 2nd US Corps in Italy immediately after the battle of Cassino. It cost the Allies many efforts and soldiers' lives to knock out the stubbornly defending paratroopers from their positions.
The light (jaeger) company of the December 1943 model was armed somewhat differently. Due to the tasks set, it did not have heavy weapons. Like a regular company, it had three platoons of three squads each. In each department, all personnel (with the exception of the machine-gun group), including non-commissioned officers, had submachine guns.

PANTZERGRENADER

Each panzer division, in addition to a brigade of 561 single tanks, had a motorized infantry brigade, which included a regiment of three infantry battalions and a motorcycle battalion. Later there were two regiments, two battalions each. Motorized infantry divisions were smaller than usual, although their organization was the same. The main difference was that both personnel and weapons and equipment traveled on vehicles. At a later stage of the war, these motorized divisions became part of the tank troops and received the name Panzer Grenadier.
In November 1943, a fully equipped standard tank grenadier company had three officers, 44 non-commissioned officers and 178 ordinary soldiers. The command of the company consisted of the company commander, the commander of the control department and two commanders of the transport departments, as well as the driver of the company commander, who were all armed with submachine guns. There was an anti-tank squad of four people - two calculations of two people each - a gunner and a loader. The gunner had a submachine gun. Then there were four infantry platoons of three squads each. In a motorized company, each squad had a two-ton truck, and in an armored motorized company, each squad moved on a SdKfz 251/1 half-track vehicle. To support infantry platoons, there were two sections of heavy machine guns and a mortar section. Each of the five non-commissioned officers and three drivers also had a submachine gun for self-defense. The fourth squad of eight people, each of whom was armed with a submachine gun, moved on half-tracked SdKfz 251/9 vehicles with 75 mm guns.
As in all other units of the German army, the infantry squad of the Panzergrenadiers consisted of 10 people with a commander armed with a submachine gun. Second in command of the squad was the deputy squad leader (or group leader) with a rifle. Two machine-gun crews with a machine gun on the car consisted of two people each, who, dismounting, took their weapons with them. The rest of the personnel of the squad consisted of four shooters, a driver and his assistant. The second submachine gun remained on board each vehicle and could only be taken from there by order of the squad leader.
By April 1944, the strength of the Panzergrenadier company was reduced to three officers, 29 non-commissioned officers and 115 ordinary soldiers, who were in three platoons, two machine gun squads with heavy machine guns and a mortar squad. In November
In 1944, the heavy machine gun squads were abolished, while the anti-tank squad remained. In addition, the first platoon of the company was reorganized into an assault platoon, all three sections of which were fully armed with submachine guns. By this time, the Germans had adopted an assault rifle, which was supposed to replace rifles and submachine guns. However, the production of this completely new weapon was very limited, and by the end of the war, submachine guns were still in service with the army. By April 1945, the German army was simply not enough people. As a result, the strength of the tank grenadier company decreased even more - to 23 non-commissioned officers and only 63 ordinary soldiers, organized in just two platoons without heavy weapons and anti-tank support.

EASTERN FRONT

At dawn on June 22, 1941, the German army invaded the Soviet Union. And although many units of the Red Army were defeated by the rapidly advancing enemy, many of them nevertheless resisted him and held back his advance. But this was not France. Less than a year after the outbreak of World War II, the blitzkrieg had found a worthy opponent. Many factors contributed to Germany's defeat. Not only the stubbornness of the Soviet troops held back the advance of the Germans, but also the stupid calculations of the German command to end the war before winter and unpreparedness for the Russian climate. In October 1941 alone, 6,000 supply vehicles got stuck in a sea of ​​impassable mud that turned the Smolensk-Vyazma road into. Soon the snows began to fall, and the Germans on the Eastern Front began to realize how ill-prepared they were for what awaited them. The chief of staff of the 12th Army, General von Greyfeiburg, wrote that "weather conditions in the Soviet Union are such that in spring and autumn, because of the mud, it is impossible to either pass or drive, in summer there is unbearable heat, and in winter frosts are unbearable for the Germans. The climate in Russia is a series of natural disasters."
In the north of Russia and in its central part, the air temperature in the middle of winter often dropped to 40 below zero. At such temperatures, the metal of the submachine gun became so brittle that the firing mechanism could easily break. Another problem was that at such low temperatures, grease and lubricating oils would solidify in the weapon and it could not fire. Without foreseeing such harsh conditions, the Germans did not create low-temperature ointments and oils, and the soldiers had to cope with such difficulties on the spot with improvised means. The most common of these is to carefully remove all grease and oil, and then sprinkle a very fine powder on the striking mechanism. In the southern regions of Russia, where the climate was less severe, the solution was sunflower oil, which replaced the usual gun oil.
The geographical position of Russia also played a role in the defeat of Germany. To the south were arid steppes and sandy wastelands. The central part was dominated by extensive swamps and forests. To the north there were more forests with swamps and swamps. These virgin forests, untouched swamps and marshes nullified the German warfare tactics that the Germans had used so successfully in Western Europe and which were based mainly on good roads. According to German tactical plans, the tanks were supposed to bypass forests and swamps and meet the Russians in open areas. However, the Russians thought differently, they retreated deep into the forests and swamps to turn them into defensive fortifications.
or simply hide in them only to later appear in the German rear, far behind the front line. Unlike the Germans, who usually dug in at the edge of the forest, the Russians went deep into it, dug trenches and cut down the undergrowth to waist height, creating circular fields of fire that were almost impossible to spot. The Russians paid special attention to the rear of the enemy, when the troops moving in their positions could be taken by surprise from behind. The German army had no experience of combat operations in such conditions when tanks, aircraft and artillery did not find a use for themselves and turned out to be useless. Even the machine gun found only limited use in the forest thicket. Here the troops had to rely on submachine guns, rifles and grenades, as well as on the only means of support - heavy mortars.
Over time, the Germans realized that the mountain divisions were the most adapted to combat operations in dense forests and swamps. Accordingly, they formed light infantry divisions and temporary brigades, the main weapon of which was the submachine gun. One of these brigades was the cavalry brigade under the command of the 9th Army, also known as the Model cavalry brigade. In the winter of 1941-1942. 60,000 Soviet troops infiltrated in small groups behind General Model's 9th Army using the "ant strategy" (a term coined by the British military theorist Basrsh Liddell-Harth). Here, in the swampy forests along the Volga, between Rzhev in the north and Vyazma in the south, they forced the Germans to fight on two fronts, threatening their supply lines. In July 1942, Model issued an order for the creation of a special cavalry brigade to neutralize this threat.

COMBAT ACTIONS AGAINST GUERRILLAS
Model formed a brigade from the reconnaissance battalions located in each of the eight divisions under his command and subordinated it to Colonel Karl-Friedrich von der Meden. The brigade consisted of three cavalry regiments. The first and third regiments had two squadrons of cyclists, one squadron of cavalry and one squadron of heavy weapons. The second regiment was organized in the same way, except that it had an additional cavalry squadron. Each squadron had 12 squads of 10 people each, not counting the machine gun squad. The personnel, if possible, were armed with submachine guns. The cavalry units had German horses. However, for the transport of ammunition, food and transportable property, each squadron of cyclists was given two wagons drawn by local horses. This meant that the entire brigade could move through any terrain. After six weeks of training, a brigade formed south of the village of Olenino near the Luchesa River was ready to march south and take part in Operation Seidlitz. Within a few days before the offensive, reconnaissance discovered all enemy positions and trees cut down for the construction of gates that led to the area of ​​\u200b\u200bconcentration of troops. The offensive began on July 2 at 3.00.
The cavalry rushed out of the thick turman at the stunned Russians on the first and second lines of defense and took many soldiers prisoner. By noon, the cavalry units turned west to attack the main road, which the Russians were defending, setting up anti-tank ditches and barriers. One regiment crossed the dense swampy forest to attack the Russian positions from the rear, which again took the Russians by surprise. By evening, the Germans controlled most of the road, which allowed the tank units to move forward. By the middle of the next day, the Russian 39th Army was retreating along the entire front. By the end of Operation 3Eidlitz, 50,000 Red Army soldiers were taken prisoner, 230 tanks and 760 guns, as well as 10,000 small arms were captured. Summing up the results of the operation, Colonel von der Meden twice emphasized the special importance for the personnel of such weapons as a submachine gun. Although troops on all sectors of the Eastern Front were armed with MP 38 and MP 40 submachine guns, they also made extensive use of captured Soviet submachine guns. They preferred to use them because their magazine capacity was much larger and they were more reliable in adverse weather conditions. SS-Untersturmführer Erich Heller of the Reich Gunnery Division describes his weapons when he was on the Russian front in August 1942: “I had enough weapons. I had a pistol, a rifle, and also an excellent Finnish submachine gun. There were a few more grenades that I hid better from a stray bullet. I was just a walking arsenal."

STREET FIGHTING
In the battle for Stalingrad, battles were fought over every inch of land. Russian defenses consisted of pockets of resistance, usually a group of well-fortified houses connected by trenches or sewers. One house could be defended by both a squad and a whole company - it depended on its importance for the defense of the city. Here, among the ruins and broken stone, the Germans lost their advantage in mobility of action. Tanks, limited in their movement on the streets of the city, were put out of action one by one by stubborn and tenacious Russian infantrymen. German searchers usually attacked buildings during the day with tank support where possible. Following the instructions of the German charters on tactics. the Russians formed strike groups, consisting of an assault group, reinforcements and a reserve. Their task was to break into the building and carry out independent battles in it, a battle in miniature. These attacks usually took place at rest and meal times, as well as at the change of sentries, and were almost always carried out at night or under the cover of a smoke screen. Fierce combat skirmishes took place, in which the opponents were separated by a wall between adjacent rooms of the same building. In such conditions, even a rifle was not so effective. The main weapons of both sides were submachine guns, grenades, flamethrowers and pistols. Opponents returned to medieval ways of warfare, using sharpened sapper shovels and daggers.
In such conditions, submachine guns have repeatedly demonstrated their advantage. They were compact and did not require much space for firing. It did not require particularly precise aiming, and the firepower mowed down the enemy to the root. The main disadvantage of the MP 38 and MP40 - the insufficient capacity of the magazine - also became even more obvious in close combat, when the distance between opponents was sometimes measured in several steps, the magazine was discharged in an instant, and the German shooter did not have time to change it, as the Russians already attacked him. This shortcoming accelerated the development of the MP 40.II model with a double magazine.
Another kind of street fighting, in which submachine guns were destined to play an important role, can be shown by the example of the fighting of the Scherer group. After the Germans retreated near Moscow, the Soviet 3rd shock army began to advance towards the strategically important city of Kholm, surrounded by impenetrable swamps. Here was the only bridge through which these swamps could be crossed, as well as the main junction of the crossing of roads in the directions north - south and west - east. In this small town were the motley remnants of two infantry divisions, a Luftwaffe field regiment and a small Kriegsmarine-driven police force totaling 500 men. By January 21, they were already completely cut off from the main forces and for many days repulsed the attacks of the Red Army along the front perimeter of 2 km. February 23 (on Red Army Day, Soviet troops launched a major offensive on Kholm. The advancing tanks were soon stopped by anti-tank groups and the only anti-tank gun that the Germans had at their disposal. On the eastern outskirts of the city, Soviet soldiers advanced along the narrow streets in such a dense mass that they interfered with each other and could not even turn freely. The Germans, at the end of each street, installed 2-3 MG 34 machine guns, which shot the mass of soldiers advancing on them. Despite the victims and the bloody massacre, the Soviet units continued to advance. In the end, the Germans could not stand it and retreated .

During the Second World War, the submachine gun gained real recognition when it was used for the tasks for which it was originally intended. A striking example of this can be the attack of an assault parachute battalion and the capture of a ridge between two heights held by a Red Army battalion. With the demining team in front and supported by flamethrower crews, the German companies moved forward in complete silence. Suddenly, two mines exploded one after the other. It was not possible to take the Russians by surprise, and the German battalion had to launch a swift frontal attack on the Soviet troops before they had time to prepare for defense. In his book The Eagles Are Flying, James Lucas describes what happened next:
"The commander of the sapper group gives the order -“ Flamethrowers ”, and a fiery sheet envelops the first firing point of the Russians. Submachine guns pour fire on the bunker, in which a deafening explosion is heard. Probably, in addition to the soldiers, there were also ammunition. along the entire front of the battalion's offensive, the rest of the Russian fortifications were destroyed by a swift attack of paratroopers. They overcome the first line of trenches, in which there are no soldiers, and appear along a dry channel at the dugouts and dugouts in which Russian soldiers sleep. They wake up from the shots and run out, but before before they realize what is happening, they fall, mowed down by the fire of submachine guns. Paratroopers make their way with grenades and automatic fire.

WESTERN FRONT 1944-1945

By the start of the Battle of Normandy, the Allies had complete air superiority. This meant that, due to air raids, it was now impossible for the Germans to create large transport columns with equipment and weapons, which were common in the campaigns of the beginning of the war. In addition, on the offensive, the infantry had only limited, if any, air support. Despite the setbacks on the Eastern Front, there was still a lot of emphasis on infiltration tactics and fighting in small groups. Assault battalions were used at the forefront of counterattacks. Small groups, sometimes 2-3 people each, often armed only with submachine guns and anti-tank "plateau" mines, found gaps in the positions of the allies and penetrated into their rear.
The density of fire was still considered a critical condition for success, and the actions of small groups were the main component of a larger offensive. Here is how German combat methods are described in one of the Canadian combat reports in 1944:
“Experience shows that the Germans almost always launch a counterattack with small groups of infantry. You can expect such a counterattack, which is carried out by 10 to 20 people, no later than five minutes after you have approached the German positions. They are usually heavily armed with light machine guns and submachine guns and counterattack using their firepower and maneuverability. They are firing heavily, and small teams, even individual soldiers, replacing each other, are moving forward. The Germans almost always attack the enemy's flanks. They rarely end the fight in hand-to-hand combat, but try to knock the enemy out of position with fire.
An example of this kind of defense is the battle of Falaise at the end of the leg of 1944.
The 12th SS Panzer Division "Hitler Youth" entered Normandy only two months before D-Day (the day of the landing of the Allied troops), taking up positions between Alençon and Kreluzh. By August, she, along with other units, numbering thousands of soldiers, was forced out and surrounded in a "cauldron" with a center in Falaise, the main railway junction of the region. It was necessary to hold the city for as long as possible in order to enable as many troops as possible to get out of the encirclement. Such a task was assigned to only two hundred soldiers - the remnants of the 1st battalion of the 26th tank-grenadier regiment - and two Tiger tanks from the 102nd tank battalion. They were opposed by a Canadian infantry brigade in full force with two tank companies attached with Sherman tanks. Of course, seeing such a small defense in front of him; Canadians broke through the right flank and moved to the city center. Upon learning of e1'om, Sturmbannführer Krause, who led the defense, immediately launched a counterattack from the command post with a group of 20 people. Led by Krause, the Germans attacked the Canadians, showering them with grenades and firing submachine guns, and then engaged in hand-to-hand combat with them, using sapper shovels and bayonets. In the end, they repulsed the attack. However, this only delayed the inevitable for a while. Gradually, the Canadians squeezed the ring around the city more and more. The Germans offered fierce resistance. Small groups of Germans, determined to fight to the last bullet, counterattacked again and again, firing from submachine guns. Soon, given the overwhelming superiority of the enemy, they held only the building of the monastery school of John the Baptist, and then it turned into burning ruins. By the end of August, the encirclement closed. Thousands of Germans who tried to flee north and reach the Seine ended up in a mousetrap. However, the courage and determination of the soldiers of the Hitler Youth division to defend themselves to the last soldier allowed thousands more German soldiers to break out of the encirclement and again take part in the battles.
In Europe, far from the frosty expanses of Russia, the MP 40 was much more reliable. American
the soldiers nicknamed him "belching", and for them he was a valuable acquisition. They often preferred this submachine gun to their own weapons. It was recognizable by its distinctive firing sound, and Allied soldiers who used the MP 40 liked to provoke the Germans into returning fire, especially at night. And in order not to become a target for their own, American soldiers who managed to get their hands on the MP 40 often shortened the recoil spring by 2 inches (5.08 cm), thereby changing the sound when firing (and at the same time its pace).

"WEREWOLF"

In September 1944, the Allied forces began to advance towards Berlin. Desperate to delay inevitable defeat and drive the enemy into a stalemate, Hitler and Nazi Party activists tried to provoke the German population into mass uprisings against the Allies. For this purpose, a partisan army was formed from teenagers and the elderly, which was called "Werwolf" ("Werewolf") and was supposed to operate in the rear of the allies. The training of members of this secret organization began already in the late spring of 1944. By the end of the war, more than 5,000 people had completed the 5-week course. Having learned how to use weapons, explosives and communications, as well as methods of survival in extreme conditions, they had to return home and wait for orders. Secret warehouses were organized with equipment and weapons, which they were supposed to receive at the right time. Most of these werewolf guerrillas were armed with submachine guns because they were easy to hide and handy in combat. After the end of the war, they undertook numerous sorties in Eastern and Western Europe, which, however, did not bring the desired result. Goebbels, in his radio address, called on the population to open rebellion and not only for the first time publicly acknowledged the existence of such an organization, but thereby turned it into a motley rabble, when anyone who had a weapon could attack a foreigner. The effect of this appeal was the opposite of what the Nazis had hoped for. If the werewolves were under the direct control of the Nazi authorities, they would be able to exert more influence on the course of events. And when Hitler committed suicide, the resistance he had conceived died with him.

MP 38 AND MP 40 AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR

In the final stages of the Second World War, many German weapons factories, along with weapons not sent to the front, were seized.
allies. Western countries that had experienced German invasion and occupation were in need of rearmament. A significant number of the MP 40s remaining after the war were distributed between these countries, especially many submachine guns were transferred to the Netherlands and Norway. Later they were in service with tank crews and were used there until the mid-1980s. France also armed some of its units with the MP 40 submachine gun until a replacement was found.
The Soviet Union handed over captured MP 40s as military aid to communist regimes that emerged in the post-war decades, such as Cuba, as well as some countries in South and Central America. MP40 submachine guns were also used in the Greek Civil War (1946-1949) and in the First Arab-Israeli War (1948-1949). They even appeared in Vietnam in the hands of the Viet Cong guerrillas. But now they can be seen primarily in the hands of collectors and enthusiasts of military-historical reconstruction.

Wehrmacht "invincible and legendary" [Military art of the Reich] Runov Valentin Alexandrovich

DEFENSE OF THE WEHRMACHT

DEFENSE OF THE WEHRMACHT

Preparing to conduct lightning wars, the Wehrmacht command primarily assumed that the German armed forces would have to at least temporarily go on the defensive in certain areas. Therefore, in the pre-war charters and manuals, this type of hostilities was spelled out quite fully. However, the offensive campaigns of 1939 and 1940 did not provide practical experience in defense, with the result that most German military leaders began to treat him superficially.

With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, cases of the transition of German troops to tactical defense became more frequent. So, already in border battles, the frequent counterattacks and counterattacks of the Soviet troops in a number of cases, the German command preferred to repel blows from the spot, for which their troops temporarily took up defensive positions. The peculiarities of this defense were that it was based on random lines and nodes of resistance, unprepared in advance in engineering terms. The troops advancing earlier hurriedly occupied these lines, building their battle formation in one echelon, and tried to inflict maximum defeat on the enemy on the outskirts of the defense. Most of the artillery, as a rule, was brought to direct fire. Often the defensive actions of ground forces were linked to air strikes or offensive actions in other directions. In the overwhelming majority, such defense was short in time and was an integral part of a larger offensive operation.

In the summer of 1941, German troops also used defense to block the encircled Soviet troops (internal encirclement front) and prevent their breakthrough or strike from the outside with the aim of deblocking (external encirclement front). In this case, too, the main forces of the German troops were concentrated in the first echelon, which included tanks and artillery for direct fire. As a rule, engineering equipment for defensive lines was not carried out, defensive actions of ground forces were closely linked with air strikes. Such a defense was considered temporary, and after solving a particular task, the troops undertaking it immediately went on the offensive and were used, after regrouping and replenishment, as reserves of armies or army groups.

For the first time, the German command began to think seriously about the problem of defense with the start of the Soviet counteroffensive near Moscow in early December 1941. By that time, the German troops operating in this direction had practically lost their offensive capabilities and ran into the Soviet defense. For some time, the parties stood in front of each other: the Soviet troops did not dare to launch a counteroffensive until the reserves approached, the German troops did not plan to defend themselves. But the fate of the latter had already been sealed by the decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Red Army.

In early December 1941, the Soviet command managed to gather significant forces of its troops in the Moscow direction, which were distributed along three fronts: Kalinin, Western and Southwestern. It was planned to defeat the strike groups of German troops operating north and south of Moscow with simultaneous powerful strikes by the troops of the Western, left wing of the Kalinin and the right wing of the Southwestern Fronts, and then complete the encirclement and defeat of the main forces of Army Group Center with a swift offensive to the west.

The main forces went to the Western Front. By the beginning of the offensive, he outnumbered the enemy in personnel by about 1.5 times, in guns and mortars - 1.3 times, in tanks - 1.5 times. One rifle or cavalry division accounted for more than 8 kilometers of front. On each kilometer of the front, from 10 to 12 guns and mortars, about 5 tanks could be used. It was difficult to attack with such superiority, but it is quite possible.

The German military command was well aware that their troops would not be able to hold out in such a position near Moscow for a long time, but Hitler's Headquarters did not allow this. So, General G. Guderian in his book “Memoirs of a Soldier” wrote: “The attack on Moscow failed ... The High Command of the Ground Forces, being far from the front of East Prussia, had no idea about the actual situation of its troops ...

The timely withdrawal of troops and the occupation of the defense at a favorable and previously prepared line would be the best and most effective means of restoring the situation and gaining a foothold before the onset of spring. In the zone of operations of the 2nd Panzer Army, such a line could be the line of defense it occupied in October along the Zusha and Oka rivers. However, Hitler did not agree with this.

South of Moscow, on the 350-kilometer line along the line of Tula, Serebryannye Prudy, Mikhailov, Chernava, the troops of the 2nd Panzer Army of General G. Guderian were stopped. The front line of defense of the tank army was occupied by the 24th tank, 53rd army and 47th tank corps, having divisions in one line with very small reserves. All divisions were stretched along the front from 25 to 50 kilometers and had regiments, also lined up in one line, and regiments - one line of battalions. Thus, in view of the one-echelon construction of the battle order of the formations, the depth of the main defensive line of the German troops did not exceed 3-4 kilometers. Only two divisions were left in the reserve of the tank army - the 25th motorized and 112th infantry, which were located, respectively, in the areas of Venev and Stalinogorsk.

There was no continuous front line on the main line of German defense. The troops were garrisoned in settlements, which were turned into strongholds and adapted to all-round defense. There were significant gaps between the strongholds, which were not occupied by the troops, were not equipped in engineering terms, but according to the plan of the command, they were to be shot through by artillery and rifle-machine-gun fire. Minefields were laid on the outskirts of the strongholds.

Schematic diagram of the defense of the Wehrmacht in December 1941

Usually, centers of resistance in large settlements were defended by forces up to an infantry battalion, reinforced with tanks. Smaller villages housed infantry or tank companies. Larger forces were in the cities. So, in Serebryanye Prudy there was a motorized infantry regiment, in Mikhailov - two motorized infantry and one artillery regiment. In the operational depth of defense, the defensive lines along the western banks of the Pronya and Don rivers were prepared in engineering terms by the forces of the local population, but they were not engaged in troops.

For the offensive against Mikhailov, formations of the 10th Army (commander - Lieutenant General I.F. Golikov) were put forward, which, by decision of the Headquarters, was transferred to the Western Front only on December 2. It consisted of eight rifle, three cavalry and one mixed aviation divisions. The army was armed with 254 field guns, 81 anti-tank guns, 270 mortars of 82 and 120 mm caliber. In front of the offensive front of the army was one motorized division, reinforced with tanks.

A neighbor of the 10th Army on the right was a group of General P. A. Belov consisting of a cavalry corps, one rifle division, a tank brigade and a separate tank battalion. Still further, in the Tula region, was the 50th Army. To the south, the 61st Army was advancing for an offensive from the Ryazhi region and preparing for the offensive the 3rd Army of the Southwestern Front.

Thus, in the area east of Tula, the troops of the 2nd Panzer Army of General G. Guderian were practically in a deep “cauldron”, the neck of which the Soviet troops could slam with counter strikes from the direction of Tula to the south and from the direction of Efremov to the north.

Under these conditions, General G. Guderian decides to withdraw his subordinate troops, covering the withdrawal with defense. In his memoirs, he writes: “In the face of a threat to my flanks and rear, and given the onset of incredibly cold weather, as a result of which the troops lost their mobility, on the night of December 6, for the first time since the start of this war, I decided to stop this isolated offensive and withdraw far advanced parts on the line of the upper reaches of the river. Don, r. Shat, r. Upa, where to take up defense.

Thus, the defense of the German troops east of Tula should be considered not as a well-prepared defensive operation of the 2nd Panzer Army, but as a tactical defense conducted in order to ensure the withdrawal from the battle and the withdrawal of the main group of troops.

The offensive of the Soviet troops of the 10th Army began on December 6, and during the day slowly, through a deep snow cover, its formations approached the city of Mikhailov. At 24 hours on December 6, after a 10-minute artillery preparation, the Soviet regiments again went on the attack. At 2 o'clock on December 7, they broke into the city and completely liberated it by 7 o'clock. The Germans systematically withdrew troops from Mikhailov to the west.

Information about how the battles for Mikhailov were fought is contained in the textbook of the Department of the History of Military Art of the M.V. Frunze Military Academy "Preparation and conduct of an offensive with the advancement of the formations of the 10th Army from the depths in the counteroffensive near Moscow." In particular, it says: “By 2 o’clock on December 7, the troops of the 330th Infantry Division broke into the city. Regimental artillery, being in infantry combat formations, destroyed enemy firing points with direct fire. The enemy troops began to panic. In order to cut off the escape routes for the Germans, the division commander ordered the commander of the 1111th Infantry Regiment to send one battalion to the road southwest of Mikhailov and block the enemy's withdrawal routes. But due to deep snow, the battalion did not complete the task. The remnants of the defeated enemy units managed to escape unhindered in the south-west direction under the cover of darkness.

In the battles for Mikhailov, the 330th Rifle Division captured about 50 people, captured 16 guns, 6 vehicles, one tank, 16 motorcycles, a large amount of ammunition, as well as documents from the 32nd, 63rd motorized infantry and 422nd motorized artillery regiments of the 10th and motorized division.

The tank battalion, attached to the 330th rifle division, did not participate in the battle due to the failure of the materiel. The 28th Aviation Division on the first day of the operation in the interests of reconnaissance and with the aim of defeating the enemy in the city of Mikhailov produced (total. - Auth.) 11 sorties. Other formations of the army on December 6 acted less successfully.

From this academic textbook, one can draw reasonable conclusions that the offensive of the troops of the 10th Army in the counteroffensive near Moscow was badly organized. Soviet troops advanced on a wide front after advancing from the depths for a long distance. Preliminary reconnaissance of the enemy was not carried out. There was no artillery and aviation preparation for the offensive. Tanks did not participate in the offensive. Nevertheless, the liberation of the city of Mikhailov by the morning of the next day of the offensive was presented as a great victory.

Thus, within the prescribed period, none of the divisions operating in the first echelon of the 10th Army, despite the practical absence of resistance from the enemy, failed to fully fulfill the task of the first day of the operation, which consisted in advancing from the concentration area to the front line of the enemy’s defense on 25-30 kilometers and mastering its tactical defense zone at a depth of 4-6 kilometers.

Subsequently, the advance of the troops of the 10th Army continued at a slow pace. Not knowing the situation at the front and not having a specific task, the division commanders acted slowly, cautiously and without initiative. When intelligence reported to the commander of the 323rd Rifle Division that a convoy of German vehicles with troops was moving along the Mikhailovo highway to Stalinogorsk, he did not take any measures to cut the highway and destroy the enemy. In general, the advance of the army troops on the second day of the operation, despite the absence of resistance from the enemy in front of all divisions, with the exception of one 322nd, was insignificant.

The 322nd Rifle Division was advancing on the city of Serebryanyye Prudy, which also represented a center of resistance. On December 7, by 15 o'clock, having overcome 8 kilometers off-road, the regiments of the division reached the city. But it was not possible to take it on the move. The attack of the Soviet infantry was repelled by machine gun and artillery fire. The troops lay down and were forced to spend several hours in this position.

With the onset of darkness, units of the 322nd Infantry Division again launched an attack on Silver Ponds. Its parts covered the city from the north and south. German troops not only repulsed attacks from a place, but also tried to go on a counterattack. By 20 o'clock the city was captured by the Soviet units, who took 50 prisoners, 6 artillery pieces and about 30 motorcycles.

In the other direction, the 326th Rifle Division at 7 o'clock in the morning, without much resistance from the enemy, captured the village of Gryaznoye, after which its commander, Colonel V. S. Andreev, decided to temporarily stop the offensive and make a day's rest. The commander of the 41st Cavalry Division, which was advancing on the left flank of the 10th Army, brigade commander P. M. Davydov, on the second day of the operation, did not make any attempts at all to continue the offensive. On the second day of the operation, the 28th Aviation Division made only 24 sorties.

The offensive on the left flank of the army developed even more slowly. The 10th Army did not have an elbow connection with its neighbor on the left, which was immediately used by the German troops defending there. On December 8, Guderian ordered the forces of the 40th Communications Regiment to counterattack the 41st Cavalry Division on the flank, which was forced to stop the offensive and begin a retreat in an easterly direction. Only after the commander of the 10th Army sent the 41st and 57th Cavalry Divisions to reinforce on December 9, the offensive resumed and the Soviet troops were able to occupy the village of Tabola by the end of December 10.

Thus, during the first four days of the operation, German troops were practically pushed out of the Stalinogorsk sack. By the end of December 10, the 330th Infantry Division reached the approaches to the Don near the settlement of Krutoye. The 328th Infantry Division captured Dubovo. And only the 324th Rifle Division completed the task of the first day of the operation and reached the Don. During the four days of the offensive, they covered 35–40 kilometers, advancing at an average rate of 8–10 kilometers per day. By that time, the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, in cooperation with the 322nd Rifle Division of the 110th Army, had captured the city of Venev.

On December 10, General G. Guderian reported the situation to A. Hitler's chief adjutant General Schmundt and the chief of personnel of the main command of the ground forces, warning that if effective measures were not taken in this direction, then they should not have any illusions about successful ones there actions of the German troops.

On December 12, Soviet troops occupied Efremov, on December 13, after a long battle, they captured the city of Epifan. The 1st Guards Cavalry Corps advanced several kilometers south of Venev.

Thus, by the end of December 13, the 10th Army had only partially reached the milestone determined by it as part of the first offensive operation. The average rate of advance of its formations fell to 4-5 kilometers per day. The opposing formations of the 2nd Panzer Army were able, having avoided encirclement, by defending the rearguards to delay the offensive of the Soviet troops and systematically withdraw to a new rear line of defense.

In general, the counter-offensive of the Soviet troops near Moscow in December 1941 achieved its goal. By throwing the enemy's shock grouping to the west and inflicting serious losses on it, the Red Army eliminated the danger looming over Moscow. The counteroffensive lasted 34 days. The total width of the front of hostilities was 1000 kilometers, and the depth of advance of the Soviet troops was 100–250 kilometers. The average daily rate of advance of rifle formations was 3–6 kilometers.

During this operation, the enemy's plan to capture Moscow was thwarted, the troops of Army Group Center were defeated, and the myth of the invincibility of the German troops was dispelled.

The German command does not publish the exact number of losses during the offensive of the Soviet troops near Moscow. But, referring to F. Halder's "War Diary", it can be calculated that from December 10, 1941 to February 10, 1942, the German ground forces lost 191 thousand people on the Eastern Front. A significant part of these forces was located near Moscow. It is known that during the operation, the Soviet troops irretrievably lost 139.6 thousand people, wounded and frostbite - 231.4 thousand people.

Schematic diagram of the defense of the Wehrmacht in the autumn of 1942

Almost a year has passed. Having exhausted their offensive capabilities and not having reached the goals of the summer offensive of 1942, the German troops were forced to go on the defensive along the entire Soviet-German front, the total length of which reached 2,300 kilometers. The order of the High Command of the German Ground Forces dated October 14, 1942 stated: “We have to conduct a winter campaign. The task of the Eastern Front is ... by all means to hold the achieved lines, to repel all enemy attempts to break through them and thereby create the prerequisites for our offensive in 1943.

To carry out this order, the German command began to create a defense that ran along previously occupied lines. Stalingrad became the main area of ​​this defense, where the troops of the 6th field and 4th tank armies, as well as the 3rd army of Romania, defended themselves. Moreover, the German troops acted directly in the area of ​​Stalingrad, and their flanks were covered by the Romanian troops.

On the northern face of the Stalingrad ledge, where the Romanian troops were defending, the defense consisted of one main strip 5–8 kilometers deep, on which the infantry divisions defended. In the operational depth of defense along the Krivaya and Chir rivers, separate centers of resistance were created in the main directions and road junctions, which were not engaged in advance by the troops. Even deeper in areas not equipped for defense, there were units of the 1st Panzer Division of the Romanians, the 22nd and 14th Panzer Divisions of the Wehrmacht, which by that time had already lost more than half of their tanks and were in a state of reformation.

Consequently, practically all the hope of defense was placed on the main strip, defended by the infantry divisions of Romania. It consisted of two positions, each of which was equipped with one or two trenches. In some directions, mainly in the area of ​​​​roads, minefields and barbed wire were set up in front of the first trench. The second position was located at a depth of 5-8 kilometers from the front line of defense, was equipped with one trench and was defended by regimental reserves up to a battalion. But due to winter conditions, a significant part of the reserves was attracted to the settlements, which were officially called "centers of resistance", in fact, they were a collection of headquarters, rear services, non-combat units and served as the location of hospitals.

Breaking through the defenses of the Romanian troops and enveloping from the north the main grouping of German troops located near Stalingrad was entrusted to the troops of the Southwestern and right wing of the Don fronts as part of the 65th, 21st field and 5th tank armies. From the southeast, the troops of the Stalingrad Front attacked them with the forces of the 57th and 51st field armies of the 4th mechanized and 4th cavalry corps. By that time, in the area of ​​Stalingrad, as part of the Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad fronts, significant forces of the Red Army had been accumulated at the expense of reserves. In total, the fronts included ten combined arms, one tank and four air armies. These troops included 66 rifle divisions, 15 rifle brigades, three motorized rifle brigades, 4 tank corps, 14 separate tank brigades, 4 separate tank regiments, 3 cavalry corps. This grouping included more than one million personnel, 900 tanks, 13,500 guns and mortars, including about 2,500 calibers of 76 mm and above, and more than a thousand combat aircraft.

The law of military art states that in order to achieve a rapid breakthrough of the enemy's defenses, the attacking side must go for a decisive massing of forces and means in the direction of the main attack, even at the cost of weakening other directions. By the end of the autumn of 1942, the Soviet command had already mastered this rule. So, in the zone of the 5th Panzer Army, where the Soviet troops outnumbered the Romanians in men and artillery by more than 2 times, in tanks - 2.5 times, in aviation - 1.5 times, in the direction of the main attack, the army commander concentrated four rifle divisions out of six, two tank and one cavalry corps, a tank brigade, a tank battalion, sixteen artillery and mortar regiments of the RGK. This made it possible to achieve superiority in people by 2.7 times, in artillery - by 5 times, in tanks - absolute. In the same direction, the overwhelming majority of Soviet aviation also struck. Approximately the same was the ratio of forces and means in the zone of the Romanian troops defending south of Stalingrad.

It is quite understandable that the defense, which has such weak flanks, the German command failed to contain the blows of the Soviet troops in the area of ​​Stalingrad. On November 19, 1942, the strike groups of the troops of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts, having gone on the offensive, broke through the main defense lines of the Romanians, brought tank corps into battle, which on November 23 united in the area of ​​​​the city of Kalach. The enemy defense was broken through in a 300-kilometer section, the depth of advance of the Soviet troops in the first 12 days of the operation reached from 40 to 120 kilometers.

After Stalingrad, the German command was still trying to advance (Kursk - in the summer of 1943, Balaton - in the spring of 1945, etc.), but since that time the main type of military operations of the Wehrmacht has become defense. A. Hitler on February 1, 1943, told the Chief of the General Staff of the German Land Forces, General K. Zeitzler: “I must say that the possibility of ending the war in the East by an offensive no longer exists. This we must be clear about."

Thus, the first place of the two main types of military operations is given to defense, the art of preparation and conduct of which was constantly improved in subsequent years.

The goals pursued by the Wehrmacht in this type of hostilities have also changed. The defense in the winter of 1941/42 and 1942-1943 was carried out, as a rule, with the aim of disrupting the offensive of the Soviet troops, holding the captured lines (regions), gaining time to prepare a new offensive (counteroffensive). In subsequent years, strategically, it pursued a different goal: to exhaust and bleed the Soviet Armed Forces, to prolong the war and thereby gain time in the hope of splitting the anti-Hitler coalition.

With the enormous length of the Soviet-German front, the limited number of forces and means, the German command tried to solve the problem of the stability of strategic defense by concentrating the main efforts on holding the most important areas in military, economic and political terms (city boundaries as road junctions); the location of the overwhelming majority of forces and assets in the first strategic echelon and the direction of the main efforts of army groups to hold the tactical zone of defense of fortress cities.

A characteristic feature of the organization of the enemy's defense in 1941 was the creation of strongholds ("hedgehogs") adapted for all-round defense. They were in fire interaction with each other and blocked the path of the advancing troops in the main directions. In connection with this reception of the enemy in the tactics of offensive combat of the Soviet troops, a desire appeared to bypass enemy strongholds at intervals and to act against them from the flanks.

In 1942, the Wehrmacht troops in some sectors of the front began to gradually create a deeper and more developed defense in terms of engineering. Separate strongholds began to be connected with each other by trenches, as a result of which a solid position appeared. There were strongholds and areas of defense in the depths. This immediately increased the requirements for the methods of organizing offensive combat by the Soviet troops. Already in the spring and summer of 1942, they began to use the actions of shock groups to a much greater extent than before, massaging equipment in the directions of the main attacks.

Starting in the spring of 1943, the Wehrmacht began to pay great attention to the use of lines, strips, natural defensive lines prepared in depth, which were large rivers - the Dnieper, Danube, Vistula, Oder, to stabilize the defense. The use of large settlements to strengthen the defense, such as Mozhaisk, Velikie Luki, Orel, Belgorod, Vyazma, Smolensk, Odessa, Vitebsk, Bobruisk, Vilnius, Brest, Kaunas, Riga and others, is noted. It is noted that the lack of reserves was the weakest link in the strategic defense of the Wehrmacht. They were created mainly at the expense of formations and units withdrawn to the rear for resupply after the losses suffered, and were intended mainly to restore the damaged front of the defense by delivering counterattacks and occupying important defensive lines in depth. In some cases, they were used to go on the counteroffensive.

Significant changes took place in the construction of the defense of the Wehrmacht in the summer of 1943, after the failure of the offensive near Kursk. Its tactical zone, up to 8–15 kilometers deep, included the main line of defense (“the main battlefield”) and the second line of defense (“positions of corps reserves”). The defense of the tactical zone was assigned to the army corps of the first echelon of the field army.

The main line of defense consisted of three positions. It was occupied by divisions of the first echelon. The basis of the first position was the strongholds of the companies, which formed the battalion defense areas. They were equipped with two or three lines of continuous trenches. The first position was usually occupied by battalions of the first echelons of regiments. The second position was also equipped with trenches, sometimes with separate strongholds. Within its boundaries were regimental reserves and artillery firing positions. The third position was a system of strongholds in which divisional reserves were located.

At a distance of 10-15 kilometers from the front edge of the main defense line, a second line was built. The reserve of the commander of the army corps could be located on it. The depth of the position of the corps reserves reached 2-5 kilometers.

Improving the construction of the defense lines of the German troops went along the lines of the development of engineering structures, the creation of intermediate and cut-off positions, a system of pillboxes, bunkers, anti-tank ditches, reinforced concrete caps. Within the main line of defense, all three positions began to be equipped with lines of continuous trenches.

Thus, the main line of defense of the German troops in the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky ledge (January 1944) had a depth of 6–8 kilometers and was built to hold individual strongholds and resistance centers, which were covered by minefields and barbed wire. Many of the strongholds were connected by fire, and only a few of them were connected by trenches, which were more suitable for maneuvering forces and means in battle than for the conduct of the battle itself.

In the summer of 1944, German troops, during the transition to the defense in Belarus, concentrated a grouping there consisting of 63 infantry divisions and 3 infantry brigades. But, being sure that the Soviet command was preparing the main blow in Ukraine, the main formations of tank and motorized troops were sent to this direction.

It must be remembered that at that time the territory of Belarus, which was characterized by the presence of large forests, rivers, swamps with a poorly developed road network, did little to facilitate large-scale military operations. In addition, numerous partisan detachments and groups operated in Belarus, which controlled a significant part of its territory. Therefore, the forces at the disposal of the German command in Belarus were concentrated in the areas of the cities of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk and Kovel, which were considered the most important operationally.

In order to maintain a wide front of defense in the absence of a sufficient number of forces and means, the command of Army Group Center was forced to deploy its troops in one echelon, concentrating its main efforts on maintaining a well-prepared tactical defense zone with a depth of 8 to 12 kilometers, which was occupied infantry divisions. In addition, in the depths along the western banks of numerous rivers with wide swampy floodplains, the forces of the local population also prepared defensive lines that could be occupied by troops in the event of a withdrawal. The total depth of defense, according to Soviet sources, reached 250–270 kilometers.

But the defense built by the German command in this way did not fulfill its task. There were several reasons for this. The main thing is that the Soviet command by that time already had experience in preparing and conducting large-scale offensive operations with decisive goals. Secondly, by the beginning of the operation, the superiority of Soviet troops in Belarus was 2 times in personnel, 3.6 times in artillery, 3.9 times in aviation, and 5.8 times in tanks and self-propelled guns. Thirdly, the operational and even tactical rear of the German troops were pinned down by Soviet partisans, the total number of which reached 143 thousand people.

Under these conditions, the Soviet command decided to conduct an operation to encircle several enemy groupings spaced along the front and in depth with the aim of dismembering and defeating the main forces of Army Group Center. The encirclement and defeat of the Vitebsk grouping were planned by the forces of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts. The encirclement and defeat of the Bobruisk grouping were entrusted to the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front and the Dnieper River Flotilla. Taking into account the concentration of efforts on narrow sectors of the front, the superiority of Soviet troops in the directions of the main attacks increased several times more.

To prevent German troops from maneuvering along the front between the indicated fronts, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front were to advance, which, together with other fronts, were to encircle and defeat the retreating enemy troops in the Minsk region.

The defeat of the German troops as a result of the Belarusian operation was very significant. According to Soviet sources, in the Vitebsk region during the first five days, as a result of a breakthrough and encirclement, they lost 20,000 people killed and 10,000 prisoners. In the Bobruisk region, their losses in killed and captured reached 74 thousand people. There are 105 thousand people in the Minsk region.

In total, during the Belarusian operation, German troops lost about 400 thousand people. In Hitler's entourage, this defeat was regarded as a catastrophe, equal to that which the Wehrmacht suffered at Stalingrad.

At the same time, it must be admitted that the victory in the Belarusian operation went to the Red Army at a high price. Only the irretrievable losses of the troops of the fronts amounted to 178 thousand people, to which more than half a million wounded must be added.

Schematic diagram of the defense of the Wehrmacht in 1943-1945.

Failures in the Byelorussian region forced the German command to pay even more serious attention to defense. But the forces of the Wehrmacht were dwindling every day, and it became more and more difficult to replenish them. Hopes for the allies were very weak.

A big point in German-Romanian relations was put by the Iasi-Kishinev operation, carried out by the Soviet command in August 1944 against the Southern Ukraine Army Group, which consisted of German and Romanian formations.

In the Yassko-Kishinev direction, by August 1944, the defense of the German and Romanian troops had been preparing for four months, was echeloned in depth and well developed in terms of engineering. In front of the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, where the 6th German and 4th Romanian armies were defending, it consisted of three lanes 25–25 kilometers deep. In the operational depth, several lines and cut-off positions were equipped, and fortified areas were erected near Tirgu Frumos and Yass. In front of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, the enemy also prepared three lines of defense with a total depth of 40–50 kilometers.

However, this defense did not fulfill the tasks assigned to it. The main reasons are the significant numerical superiority of the Soviet troops and the extremely low combat capability of the Romanian troops, in the zones of which the Soviet command delivered its main blows. In addition, it must be remembered that the Iasi-Kishinev operation was launched on August 20, and on August 23, forces opposed to Berlin raised an uprising in Bucharest. The pro-fascist government of Antonescu was overthrown on the same day, and the new government immediately declared war on Germany. What kind of resistance of the defense of the Romanian troops, mainly consisting of peasants and industrial workers, at the front in such conditions could be discussed?

Then the Bulgarians acted in exactly the same way, starting a “popular uprising” in Sofia when the Soviet troops approached. On September 8, Soviet troops crossed the Romanian-Bulgarian border without firing a shot, and on September 9, the new Bulgarian "government" declared war on Germany.

Under such conditions, the leadership of Germany had no choice but to defend the territories of the remaining allied Hungary and the territory of its own state. Nevertheless, in 1944 and 1945, the defense of the German troops received its further development, primarily due to the development of its operational depth. The operational defense zone at that time included the third army line of defense ("positions of army reserves") and the rear defensive line ("positions of army group reserves"). Its total depth reached 50–60 kilometers or more. It was characterized by careful selection of terrain for the construction of defensive lines and their skillful engineering equipment.

With the transfer of hostilities to the territory of Poland and Germany, pre-equipped intermediate lines and fortified areas began to be included in the defense system of the army group, its depth increased to 120-150 kilometers. The system of "city-fortresses" became very saturated. Operational densities on the main axes ranged from 3 to 12 kilometers per division. The density of artillery ranged from 15–20 to 50 guns and mortars per kilometer.

The activity of the defense on an operational scale was manifested in the delivery of counterattacks, which were carried out mainly by mobile formations. The operational density during the counterattack was: one division per 3.5-4 kilometers of the front. Counterattacks were most often delivered under the base of an enemy grouping that had penetrated from one or more directions. This was how counterattacks were launched when Soviet troops penetrated the German defenses north of Orel in July and south of Belgorod in August 1943, in Eastern Pomerania in 1945 and in a number of other operations. Sometimes counterattacks were carried out in the form of a frontal strike. In order to create counterattack groupings, the German command, in a limited time, carried out regroupings of large forces from various directions, and above all from non-attacked sectors of the front.

The enemy's defensive tactics, which were constantly being improved, underwent significant changes. At the beginning of it, only a small number of on-duty forces and means were usually at the forefront. The rest of the personnel were located in shelters at a depth of up to 1500 meters, in such a way as to occupy their areas within 15–20 minutes. But then, as the defense front was reduced, solid trenches were created and a second position was created, the units no longer left their areas to rest, but were located here, in dugouts and shelters. The activity of the defense increased as a result of the participation in counterattacks not only of divisional, but also of regimental reserves, as well as due to the maneuver of forces and means on the scale of the strongholds of the companies of the first echelon. As a result, the struggle for each defensive line and stronghold became more fierce. When wedging into the defense, the battle was transferred to the communication moves. It was combined with decisive and daring counterattacks, even with small forces (before secession).

During the war, the Headquarters of the Wehrmacht High Command sought to make the most of the experience gained. She developed special "Instructions for infantry combat training based on the experience of fighting on the Eastern Front", which were essential for the further development of defensive battle tactics. Exceptional attention was paid to the role of fire in combat, especially against attacking tanks and self-propelled guns. It was necessary to quickly concentrate the fire of various types of weapons using flat and mounted fire. “By concentrating the fire of all types of weapons at their disposal in place and time,” the document emphasized, “the fastest and most effective impact is achieved, all types of weapons must be able to maneuver and simultaneously operate in the lanes indicated by them.” Short-range fire, especially against attacking tanks, was considered more effective than long-range fire. It should be emphasized that in the third period of the war, during the artillery preparation of the attack by the Soviet troops, the enemy began to practice the withdrawal of the main forces from the advanced platoon strongholds to the second and even third trenches. He also used other elements of military cunning.

Also, the art of building defense and the tactics of the defensive battle of the Wehrmacht were constantly improved. The strengths of the enemy's defense can rightly be attributed to a developed network of engineering barriers, long-term and wood-and-earth structures. A major step aimed at increasing the stability and activity of the defense was the creation of cut-off trenches and positions adapted for the occupation of reserves and equipped with the formation of flanking fire lines and fire "bags", as well as the presence of mobile reserves in the depths of the defense. Skillfully used various engineering barriers, as well as protective and other terrain conditions. It should be noted that the enemy's defense also had weaknesses. This is a relatively low density of anti-tank weapons, a significant distance from the front edge of the firing positions, a low degree of massing of artillery fire. The desire to counterattack within the first position with relatively weak reserves (the strength of an infantry platoon) often did not give positive results. Therefore, starting from 1943, a completely new phenomenon came to the fore in the actions of German troops, connected with the art of timely disengagement from battle and a systematic retreat to the rear defensive lines.

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From the author's book

"Parade" of the Wehrmacht in Moscow How much the Fuhrer wanted to arrange a victory parade in Moscow, but for some reason he did not read Jomini's remarks regarding Napoleon's invasion: "Russia is a country that is easy to penetrate, but difficult to return from." In the first weeks of the invasion

On June 22, 1941, the Wehrmacht attacked the Soviet Union with its three million soldiers and officers. At the time of the invasion, the Panzerwaffe had approximately 3,000 tanks on the Eastern Front, distributed among 19 tank, 10 Wehrmacht motorized rifle divisions and four SS motorized rifle divisions. In addition, the tanks were in the regiment "Grossdeutschland". The strength of the Panzerwaffe was then so great that the command of the armed forces of Germany had no doubt that the USSR would be defeated in just four months. Unfortunately for themselves, the German generals did not pay attention to the scale of the topographic maps on which they planned wars: the Soviet Union turned out to be longer and wider than they expected. Vast spaces contributed to the wear and tear of equipment, and stretched lines of communication made it difficult to supply, and then winter came. And in winter, snow and frost occur in Russia. In addition, the Red Army for some reason resisted ...

Top photo - StuG III assault gun on a dusty road near Warsaw, September or October 1944. By this time, in many panzer divisions, assault guns had replaced communication tanks with a shortage of the latter.

Medium shot - Hungarian happily hugging a German tanker on a Budapest street recaptured by German troops from the Red Army, late 1944.

Bottom picture - Soldiers of the SS and Wehrmacht troops somewhere on the northern sector of the Eastern Front, autumn 1944. A light tractor Sd is moving along the road. Kfz. 10 with an old 50 mm RaK-38 anti-tank gun on a trailer. The tractor and the gun are disguised with branches.

Motorized infantry in the back of an armored personnel carrier Sd. Kfz.25l, in the background - a wrecked T-34 tank, summer 1941. At first, armored personnel carriers were intended only for transporting infantry and were not used directly on the battlefield. Half-track armored personnel carriers Sd. Kft.251 in the German army were very popular, they were produced in more than 20 versions throughout the war.

The infantry uses the Pz. Kpfw. IV Ausf, Air Force as a shelter during a fierce battle on the street of a Lithuanian village, June 26, 1941. Tactical number "622" is applied on the side of the tank's turret. This tank belonged to the 6th Panzer Division, which had to fight the KV-2 slippers from the Soviet 2nd Panzer Division.

Snapshot of the first days of Operation Barbarossa. The equipment of the headquarters of the tank regiment got into the frame - on the back of the turret of the PzKpfw tank. II marked with the letter "R". The vehicles probably belong to the 7th Panzer Division, which was the first to enter the streets of Minsk.

Two photographs were taken in Minsk at the beginning of July 1441 on the same street with an interval of a few minutes. In one picture and the frame hit tons of Pz. Kpfw. 38(t) with fuel drum or trailer. In another picture - half-tracked armored personnel carrier Sd. Kfz. 251, the fascist flag on an armored car is used as a means of rapid identification from the air. Guides for "Stuka zu Fuss" are installed on the armored personnel carriers.

The first days of the war - the vanguard of a mechanized column of German troops moving along the street of a destroyed Soviet city. The truck and motorcycle have black eagle emblems against a white shield. Most likely, the equipment belongs to the infantry unit of the Kleist tank group. Vehicles transport infantry into the depths of enemy territory. The Kleist tank group broke through the defenses of the Soviet troops and cleared the way for the main forces of the Wehrmacht.

Such dust was raised by columns of German troops in Ukraine in June and July 1941. Not in the picture is a tractor with a 105-mm field howitzer on a trailer, the SS Viking division. Through the clouds of dust, the markings of the stern of the tractor are clearly visible.

German tanks in the Ukrainian steppe, early August 1941. On the left - a column of tanks Pz. Kpfw. II. On the right is an armored personnel carrier Sd. Kfz.251 with a red cross on the stern. In the summer of 1941, the tank divisions had very few Sd. Kfz.251. They were used mainly for the urgent transfer of infantry from one place to another and for the evacuation of the wounded from the battlefield.

Panzer regiments moved at the forefront of the German military machine. Here are the headquarters tanks of the 2nd battalion. In the background - a wrecked Soviet tank BT-7 is on fire. German technology stopped at the outskirts of a burning Russian village - the bottom of the Pz. Kpfw. III (one of them is commander), armored personnel carriers Sd. Kfz.250 and Sd. Kfz.253. Not the nearest tank was marked with the side measurement "1103" or "1102". The roofs of the engine compartments of both tanks are littered with various important items of military life.

The crew is preparing the command tank Pz. BefWg.38(t) to fight. Incas, 1941. The tank belongs to the 2nd Panzer Group, commanded by Guderian.

A German tanker escorts a Red Army soldier, July 1941. A very rare shot - tank battles were brutal, no prisoners were taken here. The commanders drove the tanks forward with all possible speed, and the capture of enemy manpower slowed down the pace of advance.

Top photo - Sd. Kfz 10 with a Pak-36 cannon on a trailer in the street of a burning Russian village, late July 1941. Anti-tank guns were used on the Eastern Front not only to fight armored vehicles, but also as ordinary field artillery.

Bottom photo - A motorcyclist watches a building burn down, August 1941. Motorcyclists were very active on the Eastern Front, despite the poor road network. Look, you bastard, look - you won't see the burning Reichstag anymore.

Two columns of German units changing positions met on a narrow road and in early August 1941. Here you can see a horse-drawn cart, a Horch off-road vehicle, a Ladungsleger car on the chassis of the Pz. Kpfw I. Laduagsteger tanks, slow and underarmed, were widely used in 1941 by all panzer divisions.

Top photo - Tank Pz. Kpfw. III crosses a water barrier along a pontoon bridge built by sappers, late July 1941. This modification of the "troika" is armed with a 50-mm cannon, which had no chance against the armor of the T-34 tank. From the first days of the war in the East, German tankers did not get tired of noting the weakness of the weapons of the Pz. Kpfw. III, but the German industry continued to build these machines with 50-mm guns for another two years.

Bottom picture - Tank Pz. Kpfw. III Ausf. J against the backdrop of a burning village, early autumn 1941. The tank belongs to the 3rd platoon of the 7th company of the 7th tank regiment. On the side of the tower below the number "7" there is an emblem in the form of a white bison. The number "7" denotes the 7th company, the full number "731" is applied to the side of the hull, not visible in the picture.

Very rare half-track armored car Sd. Kfz.253 in the foreground. Not in the background - the German infantry on vacation in a pause between battles. Armored personnel carriers Sd. Kfz.253 were most often used as staff and artillery spotter vehicles, although on the Eastern Front they were also used to perform a much wider range of tasks by various units of the German army.

A column of Henschel 33D1 trucks transports boats designed to build pontoon crossings. Snapshot of the beginning of September 1941. The pontoon parks were very useful to the Germans, since in the Soviet Union there are many wide rivers that are difficult to cross. Pontoon parks were constantly accompanied by armored units.

A tractor from an anti-aircraft artillery unit of the 11th Panzer Division crosses the Desna River, late September 1941. A ghost is drawn on the right wing of the vehicle - the emblem of the 11th Panzer Division. On the left wing there is a tactical sign in the form of a circle, indicating that the vehicle belongs to the Luftwaffe battalion. The license plate is WL-141935.

Another picture of the crossing over the Desna in September 1941. A cross-country vehicle Xopx Kfz.4 is installed on the pontoon. The car is slightly camouflaged with tree branches.

Early October 1941 - Wehrmacht armored columns heading towards Moscow past captured Red Army soldiers. Not in the picture - three tanks Pz. Kpfw. IV, one PtKpfw. III and one Pz. Kpfw. II. Tower of one tank Pz,Kpfw. IV deployed - apparently the enemy is not far away.

Top picture - Equipment of the 7th panzerdivision on the highway near Moscow, early October 1941. Among other things, the picture shows Horch and the Pz. Kpfw.38(t). The yellow letter "Y" is marked on the stern plate of the tank's armored turret.

The middle shot is a car of some anti-aircraft artillery unit, most likely a Luftwaffe battalion attached to Guderian's tank group. The picture was taken on the street of the city of Orel, in October 1941. Orel was taken by units of the 4th Panzer Division on October 3. The letter "G" (Guderian) is painted on the stern of the car and tactical markings adopted in the Luftwaffe units are applied.

Bottom picture - Tank of the 11th panzer division on the outskirts of a Russian village, October 1941. Pz. Kpfw. III - 5th tank of the 3rd platoon of the 1st battalion. The Red Army soldiers with their hands raised up - prisoners come running to the tank.

Tanks and infantry from the 11th Panzer Division cross the river, autumn 1941. Tank Pz. Kpfw. III has already waded across the river, "twos" - even odd. In large numbers tanks Pz. Kpfw. II were used only in the first months of the Eastern campaign. Weak armament and thin armor did not allow these vehicles to fight on equal terms with Soviet armored vehicles.

Three pictures of armored vehicles of the 14th Panzer Division were taken on the streets of Rostov in November 1941. The code “6L1” written in yellow paint on the turret of the Pz. Kpfw. II - 1st tank of a light platoon of the 6th company. Despite all the successes of the Panzerwaffe in Russia, by November 1941 the number of tanks in the units was reduced to 65% of the standard, and winter, meanwhile, had not yet begun.

Armed with a 37 mm RaK-36 anti-tank gun, the Sd. Kfz. 251/10 Ausf. And it was photographed in the battle near Kalinin (Tver) in November 1941. Sandbags were placed next to the cannon for additional protection against shelling.

The top photo is the 3rd platoon of an unidentified reconnaissance unit off Kharkov street, early November 1941. In the foreground is a half-track armored car Sd. Kfz. 250, in the background - a motorcyclist. An additional MG-34 machine gun is installed in the fighting compartment of the armored personnel carrier, designed to provide armored vehicles with NGOs - a rare thing.

Bottom photo - armored vehicles of the reconnaissance battalion in the middle of the Ukrainian steppe, early November 1941. The lead vehicle is an armored car Sd. Kfz. 221. In the foreground - a four-axle armored car Sd. decorated only with crosses. Kfz. 223.

Top photo - A long column of trucks blocked on a narrow highway by a severe snow storm, late November 1941. Bad roads, combined with frost and snowfall, created truly insurmountable difficulties for the panzerdivisions.

Bottom picture - A common problem in the winter of 1941-1942: a tractor from the 7th battery of the artillery regiment got stuck in the snow. Pulling a huge tractor out of a snowdrift is like dragging a hippopotamus out of a swamp. Pay attention to the insulation of the radiator grille.

A white-painted Horch Kfz 18, late December 1941. Despite the arctic cold, the vehicle's canopy is up.

Two Horch cross-country vehicles in an open field covered with deep snow, March 1942. Both vehicles are very interestingly marked. The left vehicle bears the unit's emblem in the form of a white shield with a dark cross, and the right vehicle bears a completely unusual emblem in the form of an eye drawn against a white rectangle background; the fender liner of the car is decorated with painted white circles.

Horch Kfz.18, mid-December 1941. An awning was stretched over the body, and the car itself was placed in a gunner dug in the snow, which, if not warm, at least protected from the wind.

Soldiers in white camouflage are preparing for battle, in which they will be supported by the Pz. Kpfw. II. A snapshot of the beginning of March 1942. The tank is painted white. A machine gunner with an MG-34 machine gun settled down at the stern of the tank.

A column of tanks and an anti-tank gun crew dressed in white camouflage suits on a forest road, March 1942. On the Eastern Front, the Wehrmacht in general and the Panzerwaffe in particular faced a wealth of natural and climatic conditions. The northern regions of the Soviet Union turned out to be of little use for tank operations due to the hilly and marshy terrain and the long winter. The main tank battles unfolded in Ukraine and in the southern regions of Russia.

Top photo - Tank Pz. Kpfw. III Ausf. F shelling a Russian village, February 1942 Tanks Pz. Kpfw. III Ausf. F, which had more powerful cannons compared to the tanks of earlier versions, could still penetrate the armor of the KB and T-34 only by shooting at close range. The situation improved somewhat only with the manifestation of the Ausf modification. F2. The white camouflage paint on the tank's armor was heavily peeled off.

Bottom shot - An infantryman in a gray uniform, white German skiers and two white-camouflaged vehicles - a light Horch and a Ford truck, were captured in the frame, early March 1942.

Top shot - Tanker poses for a photographer, leaning out of the side turret hatch of the Pz. Kpfw. III, March 1942. The tank retained its winter white coloration.

Bottom picture - The crew of the tank Pz. Kpfw. III, armed with a short-barreled 50mm cannon, keeps a village at gunpoint. The white paint on the tank's armor was almost completely worn off. On board the tower we can distinguish the tactical number - "222". Spare tracked tracks are hung on the tower as a means of additional protection.

Armored vehicles in a pause between battles, early March 1942. Left - the bottom of the tank Pz. Kpfw. III, on the right - an early production StudG III assault gun. All equipment is painted white, and is devoid of any markings.

A fighter is repairing a Pz. Kpfw. IV, the beginning of the winter of 1942. The harsh winter had an extremely negative effect on the working capacity of people. In the winter of 1941, near Moscow, the Panzerwaffe suffered its first major defeat in World War II. The German army lost a large number of armored vehicles here.

Two shots of a German armored group in action, February 1942. The shots perfectly illustrate how darkly painted tanks and armored personnel carriers stood out against the white snow - excellent targets for superbly trained Soviet gunners.

The top photo shows three Pz. Kpfw. IV and two half-track armored personnel carriers Sd. Kfz. 251 advance in attacking battle formation.

Below - a half-track armored personnel carrier Sd. Kfz. 251, on the stern of which a machine gun armor plate is installed, but there is no machine gun itself, but in front there is a machine gun without an armor plate.

Top shot - The soldiers are trying to pull the truck out of the snowdrift. The cars have been repainted white. The terrible climate became a real disaster for the Panzerwaffe. The German army met the Russian winter absolutely unprepared - even white paint was not enough. The crews often painted their cars with improvised means - chalk, whitewash.

The bottom picture is a Pz. Kpfw. IV Ausf. V/S, March 1442. The vehicle belongs to the 5th Panzer Division - the painting style is typical for tanks of this unit. In the foreground is a machine gunner with an MG-34 machine gun.

The commander interrogates a captured Red Army soldier against the backdrop of a Pz. Kpfw. III Ausf. J. The tank is painted and white over the base yellow paint job. The area on the tower where the number "552" is written in white has not been repainted; the digits of the number are red with a white border.

Soldiers are clearing a snowdrift around the Pz. Kpfw. III Ausf. J of the 5th Panzer Division, late Myrtle 1942. This is a famous vehicle of the 5th Division, painted in two-tone camouflage: white streaks over the original gray coloring.

A column of German infantry follows the wake of the StuG III assault gun, the central sector of the Eastern Front, possibly the Demyansk region, early April 1942. A German flag is stretched on the roof of the assault gun cabin - a means of rapid identification from the air. Assault guns were widely used in panzer divisions for fire support of tanks.

Truck Krup "Protze" with a 20-mm anti-aircraft gun on a trailer. The guns and the truck are painted white. The anti-aircraft units attached to the panzer divisions remained under the jurisdiction of the Luftwaffe. On the shield of the gun there are marks about the destroyed targets.

Top photo - A column of trucks on a Russian motorway, March 1942. In the foreground is a captured Soviet truck, followed by a captured French truck. All cars are painted white for camouflage.

Bottom photo - Truck Krup "Protze", late winter 1941-1942. In any panzer division there was a fraction of light and heavy trucks - according to the states of 1941, the division was supposed to have 942 light and 1133 heavy trucks, but by the spring of 1942, the staffing of tank units with trucks did not exceed 60%.

Early spring 1942 - on the Eastern Front, if not frost, then mud. Panzer divisions could not realize their huge potential solely because of the weather and climate conditions. Now, if the Soviet Union was to the south and would be a little smaller ... The truck tightly sat down in a rut. The marking of the car is interesting: the emblem of the unit is applied on the left wing.

If not mud - then water, April - May 1942 Mud on the roads of Russia was replaced by puddles and whirlpools. On such roads, not only wheeled, but also tracked vehicles got stuck. The picture shows the tractor Sd. Kfz. 10 is struggling with the Russian spring thaw.

A cocktail of snow, water and mud is a road in Russia. The staff car is trying to drive over it.

And again the water-snow Russian road.

Top photo - In the spring of 1942, Panzer divisions took an active part in the battles in the Crimea. On the Kerch Peninsula, the 21st Panzer Division struck. Russian prisoners pass by a light armored radio vehicle Sd. Kfz. 221/223 from the 21st Panzer Division, Crimea, May 1942. The cross painted on the stern of the vehicle is clearly visible, and partially the license plates. The emblem of the 23rd Panzerdivision is depicted on the wing. Next to it is the number "5", the 5th communications company.

Bottom picture - New tanks Pz. Kpfw. IV Ausf. F on railway platforms. Transportation of armored vehicles by rail is the fastest way to transfer significant masses of equipment from one sector of the front to another. Even in Russia, the Germans used rail transport to maximum efficiency.

Tank Pz. Kpfw. IV Aus f. F2 (G) on exercises before being sent to the Eastern Front. The tank belongs to the 1st SS Panzergrenadier Division "Life Standard Adolf Hitler". In 1942, it was the best equipped and armed division, but it was not used on the Eastern Front in 1942.

Top photo - Soldiers of the 23rd Panzer Division and captured Red Army soldiers, Kharkov region, June 1942. Near Kharkov in the summer of 1942, the counterattacks of the German tank units were very successful, and the offensive of the Red Army turned into a major disaster. Motorcycle sidecar markings are unusual.

Bottom picture - Another picture of panzertruppen during exercises, late summer 1942. The tank is an old Pz. Kpfw. III Ausf. G, such machines were no longer used at the front. The tank is completely painted grey.

Early July 1942 - a group of German soldiers follows the Pz. Kpfw. III. The tank and helmets of the fighters are camouflaged, most likely with mud.

Top photo - German motorcyclists in Rostov, the first days of July 1942. The traffic controllers took up a post at the crossroads.

Bottom photo - Rostov, July 1942: tractor Sd. Kfz, 10 is masked by vegetation. In tow, the tractor pulls the RaK-40 anti-tank gun, also disguised with branches. In the summer of 1942, the RaK-40 guns were still a rarity at the front.

Motorcyclists cross the river in the vicinity of Rostov, July 1942. All motorcycles are equipped with sidecars. Motorcycle units were used in panzer divisions for reconnaissance, for communications, and so on. Each tank division had hundreds of motorcycles distributed among tank and infantry regiments, anti-aircraft and artillery units, support units, and in reconnaissance.

Half-track armored personnel carrier Sd. Kfz. 25 from the 23rd Panzer Division stopped at the Soviet fortifications, Rostov, July 1942. The emblem of the 23rd Panzer Division and the tactical sign of the motorized infantry are applied on the armor of the vehicle. Infantrymen - soldiers of the SS division "Viking". The Wehrmacht in battle often cooperated with the SS troops.

Heavy artillery crosses an anti-tank ditch, Rostov region, July 1942. Probably the cannon with the tractor belongs to the SS Viking division. The French tank Hotchkiss was used as a tractor, from which the turret was removed. The tractor is towing a 150 mm howitzer.

Top picture - Tankers pose on the armor of their combat vehicle for a front-line cameraman who is filming a story for the News of the Day chronicle. Tank Pz. Kpfw III. belongs to the SS division "Viking", North Caucasus, August 1942.

Bottom picture - The crew of the tank Pz. Kpfw II. And from the 24th Panzerdivision he looks at the surrendering Red Army soldiers, the south of Russia, July, 1942. The Panzerwaffe was still enveloped in an aura of invincibility.

Soviet prisoners, their fate is shrouded in darkness. The picture was taken in the south of Russia in mid-July 1942. The stern of a Sd. Kfz. 250/3. The emblem of the unit and the tactical sign of the communications unit are painted on the stern with white paint.

Panzerdivisions go deeper and deeper into the Soviet Union, July 1942. The picture shows burning Soviet trucks, which were most likely set on fire by machine-gun fire.

A motorcyclist makes a road sign out of an empty barrel. In panzer divisions and in 1942 there were a lot of motorcycles.

Two motorcyclists study a topographic map, the Voronezh region, June or July 1942. During the initial period of the war, motorcyclists often took direct part in hostilities, both on wheels and dismounted. Motorcycles, however, turned out to be very vulnerable to fire from all types of weapons, so at the end of 1941, they tried not to involve motorcyclists in combat. The main tasks of motorcyclists were reconnaissance and messenger service.

Top left - A long column of motorcycles with sidecars crosses a river over a bridge. The column closes the car Horch. In the foreground is a BMW motorcycle. A number is written on the sidecar, and the license plate “WH 57827” is fixed on the fender.

Right shot - Soldiers marching to the front under the protection of the Pz. Kpfw. III. The picture shows a division of the "Grossdeutschland" division. The division "Grossdeutschland" operated on the central and southern sectors of the Eastern Front, it was sent to the "hottest" sectors.

Bottom photo - Light staff car Horch and a motorcycle with a sidecar in a field near Voronezh, early July 1942. The license plate of the motorcycle is attached to the spare wheel. Riding motorcycles to Russia was very dangerous because of the bad roads.

Technique of an unidentified panzer division in the Don steppe, July - August 1942. Tank - Pz. Kpfw. III Ausf. J, the vehicle is armed with a long-barreled 50 mm gun.

Two shots of self-propelled guns Sd. Kfz. 132, which entered service with panzer divisions in 1942. Light self-propelled guns were built on the basis of the LaS.138 tank chassis; they were armed with captured Soviet guns of 76.2 mm caliber. The photographs were taken on the southern sector of the Eastern Front. Self-propelled guns Sd. Kfz. 132 proved to be an effective means of combating Soviet tanks.

Top photo - German vehicles against the backdrop of the Caucasus Mountains, September 1942. Pz. Kpfw. III, Pz. Kpfw. II, half-track armored personnel carriers Sd. Kfz. 251, motorcycles, 37 mm anti-tank guns.

Lower left picture - In the foothills of the Caucasus - an armored car Sd. Kfz. 222. The vehicle is painted in tricolor camouflage - sinuous lines of green and brown over the base dark yellow color.

Lower right picture - Half-track tractor Sd. Kfz. 10. Caucasus - mountains in the background, natives are standing behind the car. The tractor is most likely armed with a 20 mm Flak-38 anti-aircraft gun. Such vehicles were widely used on the Eastern Front as part of tank divisions.

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In the first months of the campaign in the East, success contributed to the success of the German troops. In just one month, almost half a million fighters and commanders of the Red Army were surrounded. The successful actions of the Wehrmacht were explained by the competent use of mechanized units. The Panzerwaffe moved from success to success, but the road to the East seemed endless, all the more difficult to call it a road. Russia has always been famous for its country roads. And why shouldn't Stalin build excellent autobahns for the Panzerwaffe? So after all, he didn’t build it, so you shouldn’t be surprised that Germany lost to the warrior. As the Panzerwaffe plunged into the bowels of the Soviet Union, the roads became worse and worse. The summer heat gave way to autumn rains, which turned the dust into mud, impassable even for such powerful combat vehicles as the Pz. Kpfw. IV.

Most of the German soldiers met the winter unprepared. The long journey from Brest to Moscow bled many parts almost by half. The number of tanks was only 2/5 of the original. There was not enough food for people and shells for cannons. The army was in short supply of warm clothes. At the end of 1941, the Panzerwaffe found themselves almost defenseless in the face of the mighty Red Army. The Germans were lucky that the Red Army did not conduct large-scale operations involving mechanized units. In the conditions of the Arctic temperature established in the East, the front line literally froze. Under such conditions, a significant number of Panzerwaffe units were removed from the front and sent to France for rest and reorganization. At the end of 1941, Army Group Center had only 405 tanks, while 780 were sent to the rear. According to official German data, out of 3266 tanks available to the troops on June 22. 2735 was lost. Industry sent 847 tanks to the front during the first six months of the campaign in the East. By the New Year, all tank units had no more than 1,400 serviceable and broken tanks.

Against the background of all the problems facing the Panzerwaffe at the beginning of 1942, the volume of tank production in Germany remained inadequate, and more and more tanks and tank divisions were required to crush the Red Army. New divisions were formed in parallel with the reduction in the number of tanks in existing divisions.

Pz. Kpfw. II Ausf C. 3rd Tank Regiment of the 2nd Panzer Division. Russia, summer 1941

The tank is completely painted in dark gray. The division's emblem on the side of the turret is painted in red and white, the red design is surrounded by a yellow border. Board number "8" - blue. The cross, black with a white border, is applied to the luggage box.

Pz. Kpfw. I Ausf A. 213th Artillery Regiment. Russia, summer 1941

Self-propelled artillery mount based on the Pz. Kpfw. I is armed with a 20 mm anti-aircraft gun. The machine is completely painted in dark gray, over which dark green camouflage spots are applied. The numbers of the number "213" are white. In the frontal part, the number "3" is drawn in yellow - the third car in the battery.

Tractor Sd. Kfz. 7, 24th Panzer Division. Summer 1941

The half-track tractor is completely painted in dark gray. Tactical number "8" is painted in black and outlined in white. The emblem of the division is depicted on the wing.

Top picture (A) - Fort/Mormon "Harrington" armored car, 8th Armored Division, Russia, summer 1941.

This armored vehicle was used by the Belgian army to tow a 47mm anti-tank gun. In 1940, several of these machines were captured by the Germans. The vehicle is completely painted in dark gray, the emblem of the Panzer Division is painted in yellow on the front door. The cross is depicted in white brackets on the back door. The flags of the headquarters of the panzerdivision were installed on the car.

Bottom picture (B) - Pz. Kpfw. II Ausf C. 31st Tank Regiment of the 5th Panzer Division. Russia, late 1941

The tank is completely painted yellow-brown over the factory gray paint - the vehicle is intended for shipment to North Africa. The entire 5th Panzer Division was planned to be moved to North Africa, but it ended up in Russia. On the side of the tank's turret is the emblem of the division - the head of the devil. The devil is painted with red paint on a gray background.

Tractor Sd. Kfz. 7/1 of an unidentified Luftwaffe anti-aircraft battalion. Russia, summer 1942

The half-tracked self-propelled anti-aircraft artillery mount is armed with a 20-mm Flak-38 quadruple anti-aircraft gun. The gray-painted vehicle is camouflaged with light sand-colored stripes.

SD. Kfz. 139 7.5 cm PaK 40 Pz. Kpfw. 38(t) Ausf. H of an unidentified tank destroyer battalion. Eastern front, summer 1942

The self-propelled gun is painted in summer tricolor camouflage of green and brown spots on a dark yellow background. Camouflaged even the barrel of the gun. The digits of the two-digit tactical number "39" are drawn in red paint and outlined in white. Below the number is a small cross.

Krupp "Protze", 4th Panzer Division, winter 1942.

1.5-ton truck Krupp "Protze" with a 20-mm FlaK-30 anti-aircraft gun on a trailer. The gun and the truck were temporarily repainted in white winter camouflage. Even the green awning is painted with white paint.

Tank destroyer "Ferdinand", 2nd company of the 653rd battalion of heavy tank destroyers. Eagle, summer 1943.

"Ferdinand" is camouflaged with green spots, edged with brown lines on a yellow base background. Camouflage applied with spray guns. The numbers of the tactical number "231" are written in black outline.

Half-track armored personnel carrier Sd. Kfz. 250/1, unidentified panzer division. Russia, autumn 1943

The armored car is camouflaged from an airbrush with large spots of dark sand color on a gray base. The armor plate of the machine gun is also camouflaged.

Pz. Bef.Wg. V Panther Ausf. A. Panzergrenadier Division "Grossdeutschland". Lithuania, summer 1944

The panther is unusually camouflaged with "chopped" spots of dark green on a dark yellow background. The letter and number "N1" are drawn in white and outlined in black.

SD. Kfz. 131 Mardert II, 49th Tank Destroyer Battalion. Eastern front, summer 1944

The Marder II self-propelled gun is camouflaged according to the summer scheme with green and brown spots on a yellow background. The numbers of the tactical number "119" are painted with white paint. The cross is normal.

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By the beginning of the summer offensive of 1942, it was not possible to equip all panzerdivisions with tanks, even in reduced states. The "old" divisions did not have time to make up for the losses of the winter of 1941-1942. Now the German army could no longer advance along the entire front - purely defensive tasks were assigned to the tank units of the Army Groups "North" and "Center". The best equipped and manned panzer divisions were concentrated in Army Group South, which was to launch active offensive operations in the Caucasus. Three new tank divisions were transferred here - the 22nd. 23rd and 24th. These three divisions had 495 tanks, most of all - 181 tanks - were captured by the 24th Panzer Division. These three divisions were better armed than the others, but the 22nd Panzer Division had 114 frankly obsolete Pz. Kpfw. 38(t).

In September 1942, two more tank divisions were formed, but by January 1943, the Wehrmacht had lost three panzer divisions - the 14th, 16th and 24th, which disappeared in Stalingrad. At the beginning of 1943, the quantitative and qualitative growth of the Panzerwaffe continued. By the summer, the Germans had 24 tank divisions on the Eastern Front. In June, 21 of them, including four SS divisions and two panzergrenadier divisions, were concentrated in the area of ​​the Kursk ledge, where the decisive offensive of 1943, or even the entire war, Operation Citadel, was planned. Here, near Kursk, the largest tank battle of World War II took place. The German command threw into battle - 17 divisions and two brigades: 1715 tanks and 147 assault guns. Each division had an average of 98 tanks and assault guns, not counting self-propelled anti-tank artillery. It was an outstanding achievement of military art - to collect in one place at one time such a powerful armored fist. However, the Panzerwaffe somehow failed to repeat the success of the 1941 children. Everything went awry. The mighty tank fist failed to break through the defenses of the invincible and legendary Red Army, after which the final and irrevocable retreat of the Teutons began in the western direction. Near Kursk, the soldiers of the Red Army completely defeated at least 30 German divisions, seven of which were tank divisions. German industry could no longer make up for such losses in technology.

A long column of equipment from some German tank division is moving towards the Caucasus Mountains, early September 1942. In the foreground is an Sd. Kfz. 221 or Sd. Kfz 223, the markings on it are not distinguishable.

The commander inspects the area from the body of a half-track armored car Sd. Kfz. 250/3, south of Russia, September 1942.

Two shots of armored vehicles of the German panzerdivision in battle on the central sector of the Eastern Front. The photos were taken in early September 1942 northwest of Kaluga. Most likely, the equipment belongs to the 19th panzer division that fought in these places. Near Kaluga in the second half of August 1942, the German command carried out the Wilberwind offensive operation. The offensive was not successful, and the 19th Panzer Division lost a large amount of manpower and equipment.

German tankers and infantrymen eating, central sector of the Eastern Front, July 1942. In the summer of 1942, eight tank divisions were concentrated in Army Group Center, but they failed to completely crush the resistance of the Red Army.

A group of panzergrenadiers took cover from the strongest fire of the Russian infantry behind the Pz. Kpfw. III. Panzergrenadiers in the German army were called motorized infantry. The Panzergrenadiers traveled through space-time primarily in armored personnel carriers and trucks rather than on foot like regular infantry.

Half-track tractor Sd. Kfz. 8 towing a truck along a forest road, Rzhev area, late July 1942. Due to heavy losses, many tank divisions have lost half their power. The number of tanks did not exceed 2/5 of the original.

Three shots of the vanguard of a tank division on the way to Stalingrad, July - August 1942. Tank Pz. Kpfw. III belongs to the 24th Panzer Division. The letter "K" on the left fender liner of the tank indicates its belonging to the Kleist tank group. In the early years of the war in the East, the Pz. Kpfw. III was the most massive in the Panzerwaffe, but in all respects it was significantly inferior to Soviet tanks. German designers had to create new models of armored vehicles, comparable in their tactical and technical data with Soviet tanks.

A group of tanks camouflaged with branches came under systematic fire from Soviet artillery, July 1942.

A heavy off-road vehicle Horch crossed the river on a pontoon bridge. The picture was taken somewhere on the Don in mid-July 1942. A large plate is installed on the wing, on which the letter “F” is written in white paint.

Tractor Sd. Kfz. 7 is towing a Pz. Kpfw. III over the bridge over the stream. The division emblem is painted on the left wing of the tractor, and the code “W8” is applied on the right. Two license plates (“WH868896”) are fixed on the bumper, the letters and numbers of the numbers are black or red with a white border.

Soldiers of the 25th Panzer Division are clearing the road from mines to ensure the movement of the reconnaissance battalion towards Stalingrad. On the right is a half-track armored personnel carrier Sd. Kfz. 250/10, armed with a 37 mm Cannon. The muzzle of the gun is covered with a cover so that dirt does not get into it. Most of the gun shield has been cut off. In the background is a standard Sd. Kfz. 250. He has the symbols of the 24th Panzerdivision on the left, the tactical sign 2.Kradschutzen Kompanie on the right.

Armored column of the panzerdivision on the street of the Russian village. In the foreground is a half-track armored personnel carrier Sd. Kfz. 251 filled with panzergrenadiers. On the right, a part of the Marder self-propelled gun is visible on the highway of the Pz. Kpfw. 38(t).

Armored vehicles of the 24th Panzer Division on the approaches to the Volga, August 1942. In the foreground is a Sd. Kfz. 251, then - the command tank Pz. Bef.Wg. III with tactical number "373" in white. The number stands for the headquarters vehicle of the 1st tank regiment of the 24th division.

Top photo - A group of soldiers from the 24th Panzerdivision on the outskirts of Stalingrad, September 1942. The Battle of Stalingrad was the moment of truth for the Panzerwaffe and the Wehrmacht. In street battles, the tanks suffered great losses, and the soldiers were constantly under fire, which could start from any direction.

Bottom picture - Fording the river. Tractor Sd. Kfz. 10 towing a multiple launch rocket system, Kavkaz, early September 1942. On the left wing of the tractor, the emblem of the division is depicted. In the background is a motorcycle with a sidecar.

Top picture - Two half-tracked armored personnel carriers in a pause between battles, Stalingrad. Panzergrenadiers dismounted from armored cars. Left - SD. Kfz. 251/1, right - Sd. Kfz. 251/3. Both armored personnel carriers do not have any markings, except for crosses on the sides.

Medium shot - Battle group on the street of a Russian village, summer 1942. Head - tank Pz. Kpfw. III Ausf. J with a late type commander's cupola. The tank retained the marking of the early type - the number is applied to a diamond-shaped metal plate. In the background is a half-track armored personnel carrier Sd. Kfz. 251/10, armed with a 37 mm anti-tank gun.

Bottom picture - Soldiers on the tractor Sd. Kfz. 10, south of Russia, September 1942. Tractors Sd. Kfz. 10 were regular vehicles in the anti-tank battalions of tank divisions. There were not enough tractors of this type, which is why the units had to widely use captured Soviet and French vehicles.

A group of panzergrenadiers on the armor of a Pz. Kpfw. IV. The tank is armed with a long-barreled 75 mm cannon, most likely a modification of the Ausf. G. Panzergrenadiers worked closely with tanks. Usually during the attack, the first wave of panzergrenadiers moved on the armor of tanks, the second - in armored personnel carriers.

A light tank platoon of an unidentified tank unit took up positions among grain crops, southern Russia, summer 1942. Pictured are Pz. Kpfw. II and Pz. Kpfw. IV. Despite its obsolescence, the Pz. Kpfw. II in 1942 took part in the battles on the Eastern Front, but by the beginning of 1941 I did not remain at the front.

Right picture - General Schell confers with General Kruger. Kruger commanded a tank division, in July - August 1942, operating on the central sector of the Eastern Front. Both generals became holders of the Knight's Cross long before the summer of 1942.

Left picture - Command tank Pz. Bef.Wg, III with extended 5m radio antenna. Effective radio transmission over long distances could only be carried out from a place. Pay attention to the antenna input at the top of the mast, a wire hangs from it to the tank. The car is camouflaged with tree branches.

At full speed to the firing position! ... or at full speed from a firing position. Heavy half-track tractor Sd. Kfz. 7 with 150mm sFH-18 howitzer but towed. Such tractors were widely used for towing heavy artillery systems in the artillery regiments of tank divisions. The tractor and gun are camouflaged with tree branches.

The machine gun crew either takes up a firing position, or prepares to be loaded onto the Pz tank. Kpfw. III Ausf. J. In Russia, infantry was often transported on tanks.

Here the summer ended, October 1942 came - again the roads turned into rivers of mud. Columns of equipment bogged down on the Soviet "autobahns". In October, the dry season began in Russia, only to the point - the dry season was arranged by frosts, and then snow fell.

It's cold, damn it! Tank commander Pz. Kpfw. IV Ausf. G thoroughly insulated, but still freezes. The tank is painted white. Well laid on armor of the superstructure of the hull. The barrel of the KwK-40 cannon, retouched by the censor, looks strange.

Half-track armored personnel carrier Sd. Kfz. 251/1 Ausf. B, south of Russia. An unusual white fish emblem depicted on the trunk of a car. The shield of the machine gun is missing.

Soldiers dig up the Horch Kfz. 18, covered with snow on the central section of the eastern front. The Horch is painted in standard Wehrmacht grey, which makes the vehicle stand out against the white snow.

Top picture - A couple of holders of the Knight's Cross - Chief Sergeant Becker and Sergeant Niemeck. The military were awarded the highest awards of the Reich for the battles near Kharkov in February - March 1943. Becker himself - alone destroyed 23 Soviet tanks, and Niemek - 32! Moreover, Niemek disabled 15 tanks between February 22 and March 7, 1943.

Bottom photo - Tank destroyer "Marder II" and infantry in Kharkov, February - March 1943. Self-propelled gun is armed with a 75 mm anti-tank gun. The car is thoroughly painted and white, and the crew is dressed in solid white warm clothes. The black cross painted on the front of the hull is unusual.

The Opel Blitz truck is not going anywhere from the rut. Track is a purely Russian concept. Since Russian drivers did not have high labor discipline, abusing alcohol at the workplace, special tracks were arranged on the roads for the wheels of vehicles, along which it was possible to move only forward and backward. The steering wheel in this case became redundant and the driver could drive the car only by means of the gas and brake pedals, as well as the gear lever. Some craftsmen put a brick on the gas pedal, and the gear lever was firmly fixed - what kind of Russian does not like fast driving on a track! Opel's problem is not only that it is in a rut, it is also unable to move forward or backward. German soldiers dig cars out of the snow. The engine hood is wrapped in skin - it was far from always possible to start the engine in the cold.

Lightly armed, but warmly dressed German soldiers: warm jackets, felt boots. It's a pity there is no doha for the kyubelwagen. The picture was taken in early 1943.

Command post of an unidentified panzer division, Russia, early 1943. In the foreground is a Tsundap motorcycle with a license plate "WB 1398598". All machines are painted and grey.

Tank Pz. Kpfw. III Ausf. M. Preparing to tow the ill-fated vehicle with the Pz. Kpfw. III with tactical number "524". The equipment belongs to the 1st SS Panzergrenadier Division "Life Standard Adolf Hitler", Kharkov region, March 1943.

Spring has come - the crew of the Pz. Kpfw. III Ausf. M closes the temporary winter coloration from the armor of his combat vehicle. The tactical number "813" is written on the turret, the digits of the number are red with a white border. At the stern of the hull is a barrel of gasoline. The protection of the frontal part of the hull is reinforced with spare tracks and applied armor.

Heavy tractor Sd. Kfz. 9 from the repair unit of a tank regiment with a trailer in tow, March 1943. Repair units were the most important component of the Panzerwaffe - equipment not only received combat damage, but also often broke down.

Two photographs of SS units were taken in the spring of 1943 shortly after the capture of Kharkov by the German troops. On the left fender of the tractor Sd. Kfz. 10, the emblem of the SS Panzergrenadier Division "Dead Head" is distinguishable.

Soldiers in the back of a Schwimmwagen pose for a photograph. Schwimmwagen was specially designed as an amphibious vehicle. The muffler mounted high aft is clearly visible so that water does not enter the exhaust pipe.

Top and middle shots - Two interesting shots of new recruits being tested by tanks, early summer 1943. Pz. Kpfw. I Ausf. F, of which only three dozen were built. The emblem 13.Pol.Pz is applied on the left side of the frontal hull plate. Kp.

Bottom shot - Grenadier aiming with the machine gun of an SD.Kfz armored personnel carrier. 250, Kursk Bulge. The MG-34 machine gun is equipped with an armored shield. Armored personnel carriers operated in the thick of the battle.

Three pictures taken in Borisovka during the battles near Khorkovo in May 1943. Officers of different divisions and branches of the military discuss and analyze the current situation. Sepp Dietrich is here. Straschwitz and Balck are all recipients of the Knight's Cross.

Artillerymen reload the Nebelwerfer rocket launcher. Ammunition stacked in the back of the tractor Sd. Kfz. II, the first days of Operation Citadel.

Soviet prisoners near the road along which a column of Pz. Kpfw. IV and Pz. Kpfw. III SS Panzer Division "Dead Head", Kursk Bulge.

Tanks Pz. Kpfw. IV and Pz. Kpfw. III, Kursk Bulge, July 1943. The number "560" is written on the tank on the left, the digits of the number are red with a white border. The tank on the far right is Pz. Kpfw. III with tactical number "0", the number is red with white trim. All three tanks have a tricolor camouflage pattern of green and brown stripes on a yellow background.

A group of panzergrenadiers on the armor of a Pz. Kpfw. IV, Kursk Bulge. By July 13, the offensive of the German troops near Kursk finally fizzled out. The Red Army defeated 30 German divisions on the Kursk Bulge, including seven tank divisions. The loss of German troops in manpower reached 50,000 people killed and drunk without a trace. The last, illusory, hopes for the success of Operation Citadel disappeared after Hitler's decision to remove the Totenkopf, Life Standard Adolf Hitler and Das Reich from the front.

Soldiers from the reconnaissance battalion of the SS troops with captured Red Army soldiers. In fact, in the summer of 1943, Red Army soldiers met with captured soldiers of the SS troops more often. The picture was taken near Kursk, in the summer of 1943. Two Sd. Kfz. 232, one of which is equipped with a frame radio antenna. Both vehicles are painted in tricolor camouflage of green and brown lines on a yellow background. No markings are visible.

Operation "Citadel" - joint actions of the Stud III assault gun and infantry. Tanks and assault guns were the key to victory in the battle, however, near Kursk, either the key broke, or the lock was different ... Near Kursk, assault guns had not so much to break into the defenses of the Soviet troops, but to fight Soviet tanks. It is said that only one SS assault gun battalion destroyed 124 Soviet tanks, at the cost of only two self-propelled guns.

Two photographs reflecting the harsh reality of Soviet road infrastructure. The pictures were taken in the summer of 1943. Any rain turned the dust into mud, in which the wheeled and tracked vehicles of the Wehrmacht got stuck. In the western regions of the Soviet Union, there were no paved roads at all, designed for the passage of heavy vehicles, and those few hard roads, designed for light vehicles, smashed German tanks with trucks. The tanks turned the lanes into a mess, along which normal cars no longer had the opportunity to drive, although they had a desire. Any rain turned such roads into a swamp.

A group of tanks Pz. Kpfw. III in the field, summer 1943. The number "211" is written on the turret of the nearest tank.

A close-up of the wall of the conning tower of the Hummel or Hornisse self-propelled artillery mount. Someone wrote something with chalk next to the cross.

Tank gunner Pz. Kpfw, III scans the area through an optical sight. German tanks were equipped with both binocular and monocular sights.

Armored personnel carrier Sd. Kfz. 251/7 units of the SS troops against the backdrop of a burning Russian village, the southern sector of the Eastern Front, late summer or early autumn 1943

Close-up of an armored car Sd. Kfz. 222, most likely the car belongs to the SS division. The four-wheeled armored car was armed with a 20 mm KwK-38 cannon and MG-34 machine guns. The armament was mounted in a 10-sided open-top circular rotation turret. The top of the tower was covered with nets that prevented grenades from flying into the tower.

Half-track armored personnel carrier Sd. Kfz. 250/1 from the SS unit. The picture was taken in the Dnieper region in the autumn of 1943. The car was camouflaged with dark yellow stripes over the original gray color - an old armored car somehow survived in the fire of battles. A cross is painted on the frontal wall of the hood - a rare case.

Top picture - General Doff congratulates the Tanker from the Knight's Cross, late summer 1943. In the background - Lieutenant Gerhard Stock.

Bottom photo - Multiple Launch Rocket System Sd. Kfz. 4/1 strikes, early 1944. Panzer divisions had units of rocket-propelled mortar systems - very effective weapons. Typically, MLRS were in service with special rocket and artillery battalions. The missiles were intended primarily to destroy enemy manpower, but they had the ability to disable even such powerful tanks as the T-34.

A rarity for 1943 - a half-track armored vehicle of an artillery spotter Sd. Kfz. 253. In the foreground - a group of Soviet prisoners of war. In the back of an armored car, a German radio operator with a portable radio station is visible. Due to the great vulnerability to any type of weapon, by the end of 1943, half-tracked armored personnel carriers began to be used only for transporting troops to the battlefield. It was in this way that these machines were used at the dawn of their careers.

Radio machine Sd. Kfz. 250/5, heavily loaded with equipment, autumn 1943. Vehicle painted entirely in dark yellow, over which camouflage of green and brown spots is applied. The numbers of the number "011" are probably red with a white border. The license plate is "WH 144491". The car belongs to the Wehrmacht, but there are SS soldiers in the back.

Left photo - StuG III assault gun crew repairing a torn track, early 1944. At the end of the war, assault guns were increasingly used to fight tanks - panzergrenadiers were left without fire support.

Right picture - General Baake studies a topographic map and assigns a task to subordinates, the first half of 1944. Baake distinguished himself in battles in Ukraine and in March 1944 gathered the remnants of several divisions into a battle group, which received the informal name "Baake's Regime".

Disguised with brushwood command tank Pz. Beob.Wg. III from the artillery regiment of the tank division. The picture was taken in January or February 1944. Instead of a cannon, a wooden model of the barrel was installed.

A long column of armored division equipment moves to the front, March 1944. The men and equipment probably belong to the 4th Panzer Division. The emblem of the 4th Panzer Division is on the stern of the nearest tank.

Soldiers of the communications battalion on an old half-track armored personnel carrier Sd. Kfz. 251 Ausf. With check the field telephone line. Eastern Front, March 1944. Armored car painted white. On the left fender liner there is a tactical sign of the communications unit, this place is not painted over with white paint.

General Model is talking to a tanker about combat successes. On the gun barrel of the self-propelled gun "Hummel" there are marks about four destroyed enemy tanks. The Hummel is a very effective heavy self-propelled artillery mount, but even she could not turn the tide on the Eastern Front.

Two shots give an idea of ​​the consumption of ammunition on the Eastern Front - hundreds of empty caps from shells and unguided rockets. In the background are Ford Multier half-track trucks. In one picture there is a tractor Sd. Kfz. 7 painted white. Next to the tractor is a "Maultier" with an unusual heart-shaped emblem painted on the left wing. The tactical badge of an artillery unit is applied on the right wing.

Another photo of General Model. A model encourages a young soldier from the crew of an Sd. Kfz. 251 Ausf. D, end of April 1944 On 31 January 1944, Model was appointed commander of Army Group North. Model was the first to use panzer divisions as a "shield and sword", when the withdrawal alternated with counterattacks.

Divisional signalmen on the road, April 1944. One of the vehicles is equipped with a 5-meter radio antenna. At the beginning of 1944, the panzer divisions in Russia experienced significant supply difficulties due to lack of transport and deep snow on the roads. The Russians successfully used the difficulties of the Germans, because of which the latter ended up in Berlin. Each people - their historical homeland! Other peoples have to be driven to their historical homeland by force. And do not look for it in the steppes of Ukraine!

Road to the West - tractor Sd. Kfz. 10 with a PaK-40 anti-tank gun on a trailer and a horse-drawn wagon. The picture was taken in the area of ​​the Soviet-Romanian border in the spring of 1944. By the spring of 1944, only a pale shadow remained of the German panzer divisions.

A machine gunner with an MG-34 machine gun in the back of a half-track armored personnel carrier Sd. Kfz. 251, on the back weeping - the tank "Tiger" from the 507th heavy tank battalion. The picture was taken in the spring of 1944 near Brody. Heavy tanks "Tiger" had a noticeable impact on the course of hostilities on the Eastern Front in the second half of the war.

Commander of the Sd. Kfz. 4/1 posing for a photographer, May 1944. Like: "Opening fire!" Obviously a staged shot - in all armies, soldiers do not like to be filmed before a battle - a bad omen. The design details of the launcher are clearly visible.

The crew of the assault gun of the Grossdeutschland division, during a break between battles, Romania, May 1944. In the spring of 1944, Grossdeutschland took part in numerous fierce battles. On the left, a bandage with the name of the famous division "Grossdeutschldand" is visible on the soldier's uniform. Other fighters do not have such armbands.

A column of trucks from the supply unit, May 1944. In the column are Ford "Maultier" and Opel "Blitz" cars. In the background are assault guns. The equipment belongs to the Assault Artillery Battalion of the Grossdeutschland Division.

A column of half-tracked armored personnel carriers of an SS unit, July 1944. Here are the standard armored personnel carriers Sd. Kfz. 251/1 Ausf. D and armored vehicles armed with powerful 75-mm KwK-37 anti-tank guns Sd. Kfz. 251/9 Ausf. D. All cars are camouflaged, camouflage spots are applied even to license plates. Camouflage - spots of green and brown on top of the base yellow paint.

Top photo - Self-propelled guns "Nashorn" in battle, central Russia, mid-1944. By this time, the Panzerwaffe in the East had suffered heavy losses. Each division has no more than a hundred tanks.

Bottom photo - Panzergrenadiers recaptured the village, East Prussia, autumn 1944. On the right - half-track armored personnel carrier Sd. Kfz. 251/1 Ausf. D from the Panzergrenadier Division "Grossdeutschland". The emblem of the division and the form of a steel helmet is depicted on the front wall of the hood of an armored vehicle.

Two photographs of a Panther tank from the 5th SS Viking Panzer Division, near Warsaw, autumn 1944. The photographs show a commander's tank with the alphanumeric code "K01" painted in white paint over zimmerite.

Tank Pz. Kpfw. IV and half-track armored personnel carrier Sd. Kfz. 251/3 (radio machine), September 1944. By this time, there were no more German troops left on the territory of the Soviet Union, the battles were going on in Poland. The problem of supply became even more complicated. The equipment had to be abandoned due to lack of fuel.

Infantry on the armor of a StuG III assault gun, September 1944. The assault guns provided fire support for the infantry.

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By August 1944, the losses of German troops in the East were simply horrendous. The Panzerwaffe were active in the hope of stopping the offensive of the Soviet troops. In August alone, German troops were missing 1,500 tanks and assault guns on the Eastern Front. All reserves were exhausted. Tank divisions de facto ceased to exist, but numerous improvised battle groups began to multiply. There was not enough fuel, ammunition, besides, it was summer - it was hot. The heat was replaced by autumn thaw, and then frosts hit. No brainer that in the summer the Germans could not win because of the heat, in spring and autumn - because of the mud, and in winter - because of the frost! So what about the Red Army?

SD. Kfz. 251/1 Ausf. C, unidentified Panzergrenadier Regiment, Eastern Front, summer 1944.

The camouflage of the half-tracked armored personnel carrier is unusual - a dark sand-colored "lattice" is applied with a brush over the basic gray coloring. Similarly to the body, the armored shield of the machine gun is camouflaged.

Pz. Kpfw. V Panther Ausf. A, Panzergrenadier Division "Grossdeutschland", Lithuania, summer 1944.

Panther Ausf. A of late construction is completely painted in dark yellow, over which dark green camouflage is applied. The numbers of the tactical number "321" are painted in white and outlined in red. A black and white cross is depicted on the side of the hull near the frontal armor plate. The cross is duplicated at the rear of the hull between the exhaust pipes.

StuG III Ausf. G, unidentified assault artillery battalion, Russia, 1944.

The assault gun lost its side screens in the war. The frontal part of the self-propelled gun is painted white camouflage. The white paint peeled off the sides, or maybe it was not applied to the sides either. The original color of the color is dark yellow.

Pz. Kpfw. IV Ausf. II, 89th company of the 31st Tank Regiment of the 5th Panzer Division, Eastern Front, winter 1944-1945.

The tank, including the elements of the running gear, is completely painted white. The numbers of the tactical number "831" are painted on the section of the turret screen with dark yellow paint. On the frontal "bracket" of the screen is the emblem of the division - the red head of the devil against the background of a black rectangle.