Military reforms of modern times. Social aspects of the military reform of the Russian Armed Forces

In October 2008, Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov announced the upcoming reform of the Russian army. Initially, the leadership of the military department very superficially outlined the changes that await the Armed Forces. But gradually officials began to reveal their plans in more detail. Dissatisfied people have also appeared who are already trying to fight the reform with the most extraordinary methods. Let's try to imagine what the Russian army will become in the future and what this will be fraught with for it.

Number and structure

By 2012, all formations and units will be transferred to the category of constant combat readiness, and the strength of the army and navy will be 1 million people. At the same time, it is planned to cut about 250,000 officer positions in the army over several years, including 200 generals. In total, in 3 years, almost 120 thousand military men will go into reserve and retire, who, according to Anatoly Serdyukov, will be provided with housing and severance pay, and will also be helped in finding a job.

It is quite possible that by the end of 2009 there will be no representatives of the most famous and sung among the people category of military personnel - ensigns - in the army. According to the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, the modern Russian army does not need them. The functions of warrant officers are now to be performed by sergeants and foremen.

The very structure of the army will change fundamentally. The "four-tier" command and control system (military district, army, division, regiment) will be replaced by a "three-tier" one (military district, operational command, brigade) - brigades will appear in the Russian army instead of divisions and regiments.

Even the most famous divisions - Tamanskaya, Kantemirovskaya and others - will be reformed. The leadership of the military department intends to implement these plans in the near future.

Military education

Based on the existing 65 military educational institutions, it is planned to create 10 backbone universities, including 3 military educational and scientific centers, 6 academies and one university. Today, the system of military education in Russia consists of 15 military academies, 4 military universities and 46 military schools and institutes. The reform will entail not only a change in approaches to training specialists for the army, but also a significant reduction in officer positions in military educational institutions. In addition, as General Nikolai Pankov, Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, stated, the educational institutions of the Ministry of Defense will train 15,000 contract sergeants annually. Their training will begin on February 1 in six educational institutions, and on September 1 - in 48. They will be trained according to a special program for two years and 10 months. Courses for contract sergeants will open on the basis of ensign schools, which will no longer be trained.

At the same time, the plans of the Ministry of Defense have already caused dissatisfaction with military teachers of some universities. In particular, professors and veterans of the Air Force Engineering Academy named after Professor Zhukovsky issued an open letter in the pages of the Soviet Russia newspaper, warning of the possibility of the collapse of the university and the entire system of military education in the Russian Federation. The plans of the military department to train aviation technicians with secondary specialized education who will serve in the troops with the rank of sergeants raise particular doubts among the academy teachers. In their opinion, such a result directly contradicts the tasks of equipping the Air Force with the latest types of weapons and military equipment, which require appropriate knowledge and qualifications from service specialists. The fact that the reforms carried out in the army provoke criticism in society was also recognized by General Pankov. According to him, the demonstrations in Irkutsk related to the relocation of the Military Aviation Technical School to Voronezh came as a surprise to the Ministry of Defense.

However, as they say, there will be more.

Strategic Missile Forces

The planned reduction of the Russian army will practically not affect the officer corps of the strategic missile forces, as the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, Colonel-General Nikolai Solovtsov, recently said. The missilemen also do not plan to remove weapons from combat duty ahead of schedule. At the same time, international agreements between Russia and the United States, which limit the nuclear potential of both sides, will be respected.

According to Solovtsov, in accordance with the SOR Treaty, Russia and the United States in 2012 should have 1700-2200 nuclear warheads on all carriers - strategic bombers, nuclear submarines, strategic missiles. At the time of the agreement, this figure exceeded the established limits by 2-3 times. At first, in the words of the commander, in Russia "very zealously rushed to carry out this task - for American money they began to saw, blow up, cut." Now this process has been halted, and in the future, taking into account the creation of new complexes, Russia will be able to reach the quantitative parameters established by the SOR Treaty.

In the field of technical equipment of the Strategic Missile Forces, as a whole, good prospects are outlined. Thus, from 2009 the troops will begin re-equipping with a new missile system with the RS-24 intercontinental ballistic missile. The head regiment with this missile, consisting of a mobile command post and one division, is planned to be put on combat duty in the Teikovsky missile formation in December. The adoption of the Topol-M complexes will continue. The service life of older designs will be extended.

In the Russian Air Force, in the period from 2009 to 2012, it is planned to liquidate all aviation divisions and regiments, forming air bases on their basis, as well as to reduce over 50,000 officer positions. In three years, 55 air bases will be created on their basis, the basis of which will be squadrons. It is planned that in 2012 the Air Force will consist of an operational-strategic command, a long-range (strategic) aviation command armed with nuclear weapons, as well as a military transport aviation command and four air force and air defense commands. In addition, air defense corps and divisions will be transformed into aerospace defense brigades, and anti-aircraft missile brigades into anti-aircraft missile regiments. In the coming years, the military department plans to supply about 100 new helicopters to military units. According to the military, this will increase the potential of army aviation by 2.5-3 times. One of the most significant - about 30 units - will be a batch of new Ka-52 "Alligator" army aviation command vehicles.

The Russian Ministry of Defense will also purchase combat aircraft from the MiG Aircraft Corporation, which were previously intended for the Algerian Air Force. The contract, according to which the manufacturer will supply the Russian military department with 28 MiG-29SMT multifunctional fighters, has already been signed. In the near future, it is planned to conclude an agreement for the supply of six more MiG-29UB fighters. All aircraft will be delivered to the Russian Air Force during 2009.

In 2009, Tu-160 and Tu-95MS strategic bombers and Tu-22M3 long-range bombers will undergo a deep modernization. The age of aircraft today is about 15 years, they have worked out only a smaller part of their resource. It is planned to install new sighting and navigation systems on them, which will allow the use of unguided weapons with a high degree of accuracy. In addition, it is planned to carry out work to increase the range and duration of the flight of strategic bombers, as well as to improve the onboard defense kits.

The military wants to speed up the creation of a fifth-generation fighter for the Air Force - to begin testing in 2009, and to put it into service in 2015. The aircraft will have a number of unique features: round-the-clock, all-weather and secrecy of use, low visibility and long supersonic flight. It will receive a new onboard navigation station and a highly effective automated defense system. As Deputy Prime Minister of Russia Sergey Ivanov recently stated, Russia "is already close to creating a prototype of the first experimental batch aircraft."

The number of units of the Russian Navy should be reduced from 240 to 123. First of all, the reforms will affect the Baltic Fleet, where already in 2009 all framed units should be eliminated. The officer corps will be reduced by 2-2.5 times.

Nevertheless, according to NVO, by 2020 the Russian fleet should receive 8 strategic submarines and 12 conventional submarines, as well as 41 surface ships. It is also possible that the bases of the Russian fleet will appear in other countries. Thus, according to some reports, Russia is already negotiating the deployment of warships on the island of Socotra (Yemen), in Tartus (Syria) and in Tripoli (Libya).

Tartusa (Syria)

In 2009, the Navy intends to put into service the sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles "Bulava", as well as to complete their testing and begin mass production. Part of the test launches are planned to be carried out on board the newest nuclear submarine Yuri Dolgoruky, which is also to be put into service in 2009.

However, Bulava's prospects are still in doubt. It is 2009 that, apparently, will be decisive for the newest Russian rocket. The last one ended sadly for her - the last launch, which took place on December 23, 2008, was considered unsuccessful, because when the third stage was turned on, a failure occurred, as a result of which the Bulava self-destructed. Because of this, the number of missile tests in 2009 will increase to 5 or more. The construction of Project 677 Lada submarines, which are called "black holes" because of their low noise level, will continue. When creating submarines, more than 120 innovative technologies were used, as a result of which "an absolutely new product will be obtained."

Ground troops

Instead of 23 combined-arms divisions, the ground forces of the Russian army will have 12 motorized rifle brigades. In addition, 39 combined-arms brigades, 21 missile and artillery brigades, 7 army air defense brigades, 12 communications brigades, 2 electronic warfare brigades will be created.

Now, according to some information, the ground forces of the Russian Federation have 1890 military units, and after the reform there will be 172 units and formations. Their number will decrease to 270,000 servicemen. Nevertheless, the leadership of the military department is convinced that the ground forces will only benefit from such transformations. According to Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Makarov, military units will now become more self-sufficient and will be able to autonomously and in isolation perform any kind of task.

By 2015, five missile formations of the ground forces are promised to be re-equipped with Iskander-M complexes, two formations - with new Uragan-1M multiple launch rocket systems, and also to supply new tanks to the troops.

Iskander-M

The military intends to focus on the supply of modern means of reconnaissance, communications, electronic warfare, high-precision weapons, automated control systems and unmanned aerial systems. Last year, the "landers" were offended by some underestimation of their importance in modern warfare. The August events in South Ossetia gave them the opportunity to show that it is still too early to write off the infantry.

Rear structures

The central apparatus of the rear within the framework of the army reform is expected to be reduced by 70 percent. Only 300 posts are planned to be retained, 40 per cent of which will be held by civilians. It is also planned to disband a number of rear bases and warehouses, as a result of which 12.5 thousand people will be reduced.

At the same time, it is precisely with these plans that the recent resignation of the head of the rear services of the Armed Forces, Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, General Vladimir Isakov, who headed the rear of the Armed Forces since 1997, is associated. Unofficial information that Isakov, dissatisfied with the upcoming reforms, resigned, appeared in the media as early as November 29, 2008.

military medicine

The reform will be very tangible for the military medical structures, as well as for the doctors themselves in uniform. Their number, according to some reports, will be reduced by about 30 percent. Many positions will become civilian. Basically, the reduction should affect narrow specialists who are not needed in the field. The number of hospitals will also be significantly reduced - from 195 to 129, as well as military polyclinics - from 124 to 41. In addition, 5 sanatoriums and rest houses of the RF Ministry of Defense, as well as 17 infirmaries, will be liquidated.

It is planned that by 2013 all military medical institutes will be closed. In particular, Saratov and Samara should cease their activities by 2010, Tomsk - by 2011, and the State Institute for the Improvement of Doctors of the Ministry of Defense - by 2013.

At the same time, as Lieutenant General of the Medical Service Vladimir Shappo said in an interview with AIF, about 7 million people, including retired military personnel, are now being served in military hospitals and clinics, and no one is going to deprive them of this right. However, in garrisons where there will be no troops, there is now no need to maintain a hospital or clinic. Also, the military does not see the need for hospitals located close to each other.

Frank secret

The military reform, announced relatively recently, has already managed to acquire unexpected rumors and gossip. The most interesting among the news on this topic was the news that on November 11, 2008, Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Makarov signed a directive "On preventing the disclosure of information about the reform of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation." The appearance of this document was allegedly caused by the growing discontent among the officers. Violators of the secrecy regime were threatened with dismissal and criminal prosecution.

However, the Ministry of Defense immediately hastened to refute the news about the formidable directive. It is possible that it really was a "duck" skillfully launched by someone. Although, it is likely that the refutation of the directive is directly related to the fulfillment of its own requirements - for greater secrecy.

Difficult financial factor

The Russian leadership has already made it clear that they will no longer spare money for the rearmament of the army - from 2009 to 2011, about 4 trillion rubles will be allocated for this purpose. One trillion rubles, which is used to purchase new military equipment and weapons, will be allocated to the Defense Ministry in 2009. And the draft of a promising new state armaments program for 2011-2020 must be submitted to the government no later than February 2010. In the meantime, according to the military, things with the rearmament of some army structures are not entirely smooth. In particular, as Lieutenant-General Yury Balkhovitin, Commander of the Engineering Troops, said in an interview with Krasnaya Zvezda, the main publication of the Ministry of Defense, on January 21, 2009, samples of modern and promising engineering equipment are delivered to military units subordinate to him in single copies, and their staffing does not exceed 20 percent. .

The general also said that according to the state armament program for 2007-2015, significantly less funds were planned for the purchase of engineering weapons compared to the declared need. In 2008, the defense order for 2009-2011 was increased. However, rising prices will not allow the troops to purchase even those engineering weapons that were planned. Military officials, apparently, also calculated the expenses for organizational events not quite correctly, and the once announced deadlines for the implementation of plans to give the army a new look may be postponed.

As Interfax reported recently, citing a source in the capital, by February 1, the military planned to complete the transformations in the main and central departments of the General Staff and change the structure of the rear of the Armed Forces. However, now they are forced to admit that it is unlikely that they will be able to carry out such large-scale events within these terms, as well as transfer most of the troops to the brigade structure by June 1, 2009. The reduction in the staff of the Armed Forces may also be postponed, since, according to the interlocutor of the news agency, these events "require enormous funds, and taking into account the plans to adjust the federal budget in 2009, most likely, the timing of their implementation will also be adjusted."

The reform may well rest against the notorious "housing problem." After all, according to Russian law, retired military personnel must be provided with housing, the lack of which has been felt by the Ministry of Defense for many years. There are now more than 130,000 people in need of housing in the army. From year to year, the figure practically does not change, since the vacant seats are occupied by the next replenishment.

The Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, General Nikolai Makarov, has already announced that servicemen who will be early dismissed from the army will be offered to move to Siberia, the Far East, Tatarstan and Bashkiria. However, one can imagine what kind of reaction among the officers will be caused by an attempt to put these plans into practice. However, despite all the difficulties, there is no doubt that the country's leadership does not intend to refuse to reform the army. But now something else is becoming clear - it is not worth paying special attention to the previously announced deadlines for the implementation of these plans. Either the ideologists of the army reform did not calculate its scale a bit, or the need to adjust budgetary spending in connection with the financial crisis forced the Ministry of Defense to slow down a bit.

"new bear walkers"

When exactly the military department will keep its promise and create a more compact, modern and up-to-date army, one can only guess. And whether the service in it will become more prestigious as a result of the reforms is also not entirely clear. After all, it depends not only on weapons and structure, but also on the material support of military personnel. And for some reason, the military department is stubbornly silent about the prospects for a tangible improvement in the latter.

1. Necessity, prerequisites and purpose of the reform of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

The main task of the lesson is to consider: in-depth study of available documents and materials in order to provide moral and psychological support by personnel (especially officers) to the idea and plan of the reform of the Armed Forces, the formation of an interested attitude towards its results, a sense of ownership and personal responsibility for its progress and outcome.

The Russian Federation is going through a difficult and responsible period of its development. The tasks of deep economic and democratic transformations are being solved.

Historical experience shows that in the turning points in the life of our country, the Armed Forces have always been subjected to profound reforms. Their number, structure, recruitment methods, military-technical equipment were brought into line with the realities of the time.

At present, large-scale and active work has begun in our country to reform the army and navy, to give them a modern look, mobility, high combat capability and combat readiness.

On July 16, 1997, the President of Russia signed the Decree "On priority measures to reform the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and improve their structure." It substantiates the objective need for military reform, defines its stages, content, economic justification and timing of its implementation. The decree establishes proper control and responsibility for the implementation of the planned measures of military organizational development. This document is a detailed and reasoned program for the reform of the Armed Forces.

1. Necessity, prerequisites and purpose of the reform of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

Since the creation of the Russian Armed Forces (May 7, 1992) there has been a lot of talk about reforming them. In practice, the matter essentially did not move forward. Today in the country, in the military leadership, a clear and precise understanding of the objective necessity, goals, ways of reforming the army and navy has been formed.

What exactly are the regularities that determine the need for the ongoing reform? What is their essence and how do they influence military construction?

One of the determining factors , affecting the military construction of the state, is geostrategic position of the country, the nature and characteristics of the military-political situation in the world. The point is to correctly, soberly and balancedly determine whether there is a military threat to the country, its sources, scale and nature, to give a correct assessment of the real military-political situation and the prospects for its development. The nature and direction of the state's military development directly and directly depend on the answer to them.

After the end of the Cold War, the military-political situation in the world has changed significantly. It has seen many positive changes. The former sharp and dangerous military and ideological confrontation between the two systems is gone. For our country at present and in the near future there is no threat of a large-scale war. It must be emphasized that a large-scale armed clash with the NATO bloc is also unlikely, despite its expansion to the East. In other words, at present and in the near future, there is no serious external threat to the country. Russia, in turn, does not consider any state, any people as its potential enemy.

But these changes do not mean the complete disappearance of the military danger. It now proceeds from the possibility of local wars and armed conflicts. That is why it is important to decide what kind of army Russia should have, based on the nature of modern regional wars and conflicts in which it can participate in one way or another.

Today, the country's Armed Forces, not counting numerous other troops, are 1.7 million people. Their number is clearly inadequate to the existing military danger. There is a direct expediency of their reduction and reorganization. This is the starting point of the country's leadership, putting forward a well-founded and long overdue task of immediate reform of the Armed Forces.

The need to reform the Armed Forces is also dictated by considerations of an economic nature. The country has been implementing economic reform for the 6th year already. It is carried out in conditions of the most severe crisis. The decline in production has not yet been overcome. Russia is seriously lagging behind the main centers of power in the modern world in a number of key indicators. It accounts for only 2% of world economic production, but 4% of military spending. This means that the country's spending on the military sphere is twice the world average. And one more indicator: in terms of gross domestic product per capita, we are in 46th place in the world.

At present, up to 40% of the revenues of the country's annual budget are spent on the maintenance of the Armed Forces, other troops and law enforcement agencies. This hinders economic transformations and does not allow for an increase in investment in the development of industrial and agricultural production. Our economy, which is also in a crisis situation, is simply not able to withstand such a load. This is due to the underfunding of the army, especially for combat training and equipping with new weapons, delays in the payment of monetary allowances and an increase in the number of homeless servicemen. These circumstances have an extremely negative impact on the combat capability and combat readiness of the army and navy. Life requires bringing the Armed Forces in line with the level of the existing military danger and the economic capabilities of the state.

The need to reform the Armed Forces is also associated with a number of demographic restrictions. . The decline in the population is a matter of serious concern for the Russian leadership. In 1996, the population of the country decreased by 475 thousand people. The trends in 1997 are similar.

In recent years, despite the seeming sufficiency of human resources, only a quarter of the conscripts come to military service. The rest enjoy benefits, deferrals, etc. As a result, there is a large shortage of privates and sergeants, which reduces the level of combat readiness.

Today, every third young man cannot serve for health reasons (in 1995 - only every twentieth). 15% of conscripts have a body deficit; 2 times more prone to alcoholism (12%); 8% of young people recruited into the army are drug addicts.

The situation with staffing is aggravated by the presence of military formations in another 15 federal structures, which also claim to be a conscription contingent. Let's say the Ministry of Internal Affairs has about 540 thousand people, plus 260 thousand as part of the internal troops; Railway troops - 80 thousand; Border troops - 230 thousand; Ministry of Emergency Situations - 70 thousand; building structures - about 100 thousand people, etc. And from this point of view, the restructuring of the military organization is extremely necessary.

It would be expedient to drastically reduce the number of federal departments that have military formations, and more resolutely switch to a mixed, and then to a contract system of manning units. With the reduction of the Armed Forces, this prospect becomes quite real, making it possible to move on to a professional army.

What is the goal of the proposed reform? First of all, it is called upon to increase the country's defense capacity, to bring the troops in line with the requirements of the times.

“Modern Armed Forces,” notes the Address of the President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin to the soldiers of Russia - must be compact, mobile and equipped with modern weapons. “At the same time, the reform,” said the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, “will radically improve the social position and material well-being of a person in uniform.” ("Red Star", July 30, 1997).

As the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, General of the Army I.D. Sergeev, noted, these should be “highly equipped, with sufficient deterrence potential, a modern level of professional and moral and psychological training, combat-ready, compact and mobile Armed Forces of a rational composition, structure, and strength.” (“Red Star”, June 27, 1997)

2. Main stages and content of the reform.

Military reform is a nationwide, nationwide task. Being extremely complex, it is designed for a long period. In its course, there are two stages.

First (before 2000) optimization of the structure, combat composition and strength of the Armed Forces is being carried out.

During this period, a new military doctrine is being developed and approved, research and development work (R&D) is being actively carried out on new generation weapons, combat control and communications equipment, and dual-use technologies.

On the second (2000-2005) the qualitative improvement of the reduced Armed Forces is ensured,

increasing their combat capability, switching to the contract principle of recruitment, the development of weapons of the next generations continues. In short, over the next 8 years, the Russian Armed Forces will be completely reformed. And in the future, a large-scale rearmament of the army, navy and other troops will begin with models of equipment that will serve in the 21st century.

What are the specific priorities of military construction at the first stage of the reform of the Armed Forces? They are outlined in the reform plan approved by the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, the commanders-in-chief of the branches of the Armed Forces and approved by the President of the Russian Federation.

The reform of the army, despite insufficient budget allocations, began. We can say with satisfaction that it is gaining momentum. Reasonable and rational directions for its implementation have been chosen.

In order to bring the military organization of the state in line with the needs of defense and security, as well as the economic capabilities of the country, the number of military personnel is being reduced.

In total in 1997 - 2005. Almost 600,000 officers, ensigns and midshipmen will be fired from the Armed Forces. Including in 1998 more than 175 thousand regular military personnel, in 1999 - almost 120 thousand. The number of civilian personnel will decrease from 600 thousand people to 300 thousand people within a year and a half.

As of January 1, 1999, the number of servicemen in the army and navy was set at 1.2 million. Such a strength of the Armed Forces is quite optimal and will undoubtedly provide reliable defense of the Russian state.

However, the reduction of the army and navy is not the main thing in their reform. The main thing is to optimize the structure and combat strength, improve the controllability and equipment of the troops.

Therefore, it is necessary major organizational restructuring of the Armed Forces. Until January 1 next year, the Strategic Missile Forces, the Military Space Forces and the Air Defense Missile and Space Defense Forces will be united. It will be a qualitatively new branch of the Armed Forces. It will retain the name "Strategic Missile Forces". This merger will make it possible to abandon unnecessary parallel links, as well as to pool resources and get rid of excess financial costs. The main thing is that related defensive functions are concentrated in the same hands, the cause of the country's security wins. As a result of this reorganization, the effectiveness of the possible use of the Strategic Missile Forces will increase by about 20%, and the economic effect will exceed 1 trillion rubles.

In the same year, carried out measures to radically optimize the management bodies, including - central apparatus. Their number will be reduced by about 1/3. In particular, the Main Command of the Ground Forces is not only significantly reduced, but also transformed into the Main Directorate of the Ground Forces. It is reassigned to one of the Deputy Ministers of Defense and will focus mainly on issues of combat training of troops. The purpose of the transformation of the management bodies is to improve the quality and efficiency of management, professionalism, and staff culture. In 1998, the Air Force and the Air Defense Forces are merged.. On the basis of their association, a type of the Armed Forces is created - the Air Force. But the process of this unification will be far from simple, given the different methods and ways of managing these branches of the Armed Forces, and most importantly, they have different tasks. In the course of the unification, the combat composition of the Air Force and Air Defense will also be optimized, and the problem of managing them under the conditions of the new structure will be solved.

In connection with these transformations, the transition from the five-service to the four-service structure of the Armed Forces is being completed. Then a three-species structure is envisaged (according to the spheres of application of troops: land, air, space and sea). And ultimately we must come to two components: the Strategic Deterrence Force (SSF) and the General Purpose Force (SDF).

During the reform of the Navy there will also be changes, although its structure as a whole will remain. 4 fleets will remain - the Baltic, Northern, Pacific and Black Sea, as well as the Caspian flotilla. But they will be more compact than the current groupings of forces and assets in strategically important oceanic and maritime sectors. The Navy should retain ships of high combat effectiveness, strategic submarines, and support forces. The reduction in the number of ships will increase the importance of shore-based naval aviation. The fleet will perform more limited combat missions than at present.

Ground troops - the basis of the Armed Forces. And yet the number of divisions in them will decrease. It is supposed to keep 25 divisions. Some of them will be fully manned and combat-ready in every strategic direction. They will be able to effectively solve the relevant tasks. On the basis of the remaining divisions, bases for the storage of weapons and military equipment will be created. The combat potential of the retained divisions will increase. They will be equipped with new weapons and control systems. Thanks to this, the effectiveness of the striking actions of the division will almost double. Serious changes will also affect the military districts.

Military districts are given the status of operational-strategic (operational-territorial) commands Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the relevant areas. Within the boundaries of their responsibility, the military districts are entrusted with the functions of operational leadership of all military formations, regardless of their inclusion in various federal departments. This means that the border, internal troops, civil defense units and other military formations are operationally subordinate to the operational-strategic command.

In connection with the planned transformations, the military system on a national scale will undergo major changes. It will acquire harmony and completeness, the ability to more effectively solve the pressing issues of strengthening the country's defense.

As already mentioned, the reform of the Armed Forces is being carried out under conditions of severe financial constraints, when the defense budget is not only not increased, but even cut. Therefore, it is important to persistently seek out internal reserves and skillfully use them.

This thesis is rejected by a number of opponents and is heavily criticized by some media. Meanwhile, there are internal reserves. They are serious enough.

Already at the first stage of the reform, it is necessary to get rid of unjustified and unproductive expenditures that do not meet the interests of strengthening the country's defense capability. The Armed Forces must get rid of enterprises and organizations, objects and structures, without which their vital activity will practically not suffer and they are quite capable of existing.

Already at present the process of withdrawing the so-called support structures from the Armed Forces began. Some of them are substantially reorganized and corporatized. This will reduce the number of military and civilian personnel. At the same time, considerable funds will be received to replenish the defense budget and ensure social protection.

There is a major reorganization of the military construction complex. It is carried out on the basis of the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation signed on July 8, 1997 "On the reform of state unitary enterprises that are part of the construction and quartering bodies of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation." Over 100 organizations of the military-construction complex being withdrawn from the Armed Forces will be transformed into joint-stock companies. At the same time, the number of military personnel will be reduced by 50,000 people, while the controlling stake will remain in federal ownership. On this basis, considerable funds will be received. As part of the Armed Forces, 19 state-owned enterprises are temporarily retained, which will be engaged in construction and industrial activities, as well as ensuring the life of remote garrisons.

On July 17, 1997, the President of the Russian Federation signed the Decree on the formation of the Federal Service for Special Construction of Russia . The reorganized Rosspetsstroy will provide the most important special construction works. At the same time, the number of military personnel will be reduced from 76,000 to 10,000 people. Also on July 17, 1997, by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation the Federal Road Construction Administration was reorganized. It operated under the Ministry of Defense, and is now transferred to the Federal Road Service of the country. At the same time, the number of servicemen of this department is reduced from 57 to 15 thousand people.

Thus, only according to the three decrees of the President of the Russian Federation, due to structural changes, it will be possible to reduce about 150 thousand military personnel. In general, as a result of the reform, the number of military builders will be reduced by 71%, and civilian personnel in military construction by 42%. Military construction is planned to be conducted on a competitive basis. All this will significantly reduce the burden on the defense budget. Moreover, it will be significantly replenished due to the withdrawal of numerous enterprises from the Armed Forces.

At the first stage of the reform, such problems will also have to be solved. There are about 100 agricultural enterprises in the system of the Ministry of Defense. Many of them are profitable. They were created during a period of shortage of products. At present, their preservation in their former form is not everywhere justified. Therefore, their corporatization is envisaged. However, in a number of regions (Kola Peninsula, Sakhalin, Kamchatka, Tiki, etc., they still significantly fill the need for essential food products.

The number of military representations at enterprises in which officers are involved, numbering 38 thousand people, is being reduced. Moreover, representatives of various branches of the Armed Forces sometimes perform duplicating functions. There is a need to have a unified system of state representations at enterprises. It is also expedient to liquidate numerous hunting farms, recreation centers, etc., for the maintenance of which subsidies and compensations from the Ministry of Defense are constantly increasing.

In the course of the reform of the Armed Forces, transfer of social infrastructure facilities to local authorities(parts of housing and communal services, kindergartens and nurseries, schools, household enterprises, etc.), which are on the balance sheet of the Ministry of Defense. These are tens of thousands of buildings and structures. The cost of maintaining social infrastructure sometimes reaches 30% of the cost of maintaining troops. Their transfer to local budgets will begin this year and end in 1999. This measure will save 2-3 trillion rubles annually. They will also go to provide social guarantees for servicemen.

Currently started a radical reorganization of military trade, which employs about 62 thousand people. The administrative apparatus is being restructured and reduced. Unprofitable enterprises are liquidated. There is a sale of the largest objects of military trade in Moscow and large centers, where they have lost their functional purpose. All this will make it possible to almost halve the number of military trade personnel, including military personnel by 75%. More than a trillion rubles will be received from corporatization of trade enterprises. At the same time, the Ministry of Defense retains a controlling stake. It is possible to manage these enterprises and earn income.

It should be especially noted that military personnel and their families will not suffer in the slightest from the reorganization of the military trade system. Indeed, up to 70% of enterprises serve closed and remote garrisons.

In the course of the reform, many military camps are freed up. A large number of various weapons become redundant. Military property is released.

The reform of the Armed Forces is designed to adjust the structure of the defense budget . Recently, an extremely unfavorable structure for financing the Armed Forces has taken shape. Up to 70% of the allocated funds are spent on salaries for officers and salaries for civilian personnel. Moreover, in 1996 more than 7 trillion rubles were spent for these purposes in excess of budgetary funds. And combat training and the purchase of new equipment are not actually funded. At a meeting of the Federation Council on July 4 this year. Defense Minister General of the Army I.D. Sergeev declared: "In the Armed Forces, with the exception of the Rocket Forces and several formations of the Ground Forces, there is practically no combat training" (Krasnaya Zvezda, July 5, 1997). The troops almost do not receive new military equipment and weapons. As a result, the level of combat and mobilization readiness of troops and their technical equipment are decreasing. The reduction of the army and navy, their organizational changes will allow about half of the defense budget to be used for combat training and the acquisition of new weapons.

The most important problem determining the success of the reform is financing. This is the "question of questions" today. As is already clear from the previous explanations, it is envisaged to have three sources of funding: 1) budget money for improving the combat training of troops, the daily maintenance of the entire structure of combat readiness (Today this figure is 1%, but in 1998 it will rise to 10%); 2) the sale of surpluses of released military property, trade enterprises; 3) an item in the budget for social guarantees for retired servicemen.

It will be decided in a completely new way question of military training. The task of reforming the military education system is to raise the level of personnel training and, at the same time, optimize training costs. Currently, the Ministry of Defense has 100 universities, incl. 18 military academies. Their number clearly exceeds the needs for personnel in the army and navy under the new conditions. It will be reduced, including through mergers. For example, at present, aviation specialists for the Air Force, Air Defense and Ground Forces are training 17 military educational institutions, incl. two academies (VVA VVS and VA PVO). After their reorganization, 8 aviation schools will remain. The two academies will be merged into the Air Force and Air Defense Military Academy, which will train command personnel. A military technical aviation university. NOT. Zhukovsky will focus on training engineering personnel for all branches of the Armed Forces.

In the course of the military reform, such a complex task will also have to be solved. It, of course, goes beyond the Ministry of Defense, but its experience in reorganizing the system of training military personnel will have to be used in every possible way. Now each power ministry and department has its own system of training military personnel. In addition to the Ministry of Defense, military universities operate in the Ministry of Internal Affairs (more than 30), in the Federal Border Service (7), etc. Unfortunately, the activities of numerous universities are not coordinated by anyone. There is a need to create a unified (federal) system for training military personnel for all power ministries and departments. At the same time, the quality of personnel training will certainly increase. This will be facilitated by the increase in the professionalism of the teaching staff of universities. In particular, the replacement of a number of posts by trained civilian specialists, the extension of the service life of officer scientists and highly qualified specialists, etc.

Further - in the current state of affairs, primarily because of the low prestige of military service, many cadets of military schools after completing their second year of study break their contracts. At the same time, they are credited with a two-year term of military service and they continue their education in related civilian educational institutions from the 3rd year. As a result, the Ministry of Defense incurs huge costs and does not receive the required number of trained officers. This problem requires an optimal solution.

Practice shows that up to 40% of graduates leave the Armed Forces upon graduation. The reasons are well known. All this leads to a shortage of young officer cadres. Here we have to find the right and optimal solutions.

The logistic organs of the Armed Forces will have to be substantially reformed. They are being brought into line with the new branch structure of the army and navy. Their optimization, adaptation to market conditions of management is envisaged. The rear of the Armed Forces is called upon to be more economical and use budget funds rationally. All this should contribute to improving the nutrition of soldiers, their clothing allowances, and, in general, the material and technical support of the troops.

Thus, the reform of the Armed Forces is a truly large-scale and responsible undertaking, requiring great efforts and significant material costs. The reform affects the fundamental interests of the country's national security. Its success depends on a number of conditions. First of all, from the nationwide support of the ongoing activities (material and moral support), from the level of state and military leadership of the transformations in the military sphere. No wonder the President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin took the course of the reform of the Armed Forces under his personal control.

3. The tasks of military personnel to ensure combat readiness, strengthen military discipline and law and order, and successfully implement the reform of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

The reform of the Armed Forces and their radical transformation have a decisive influence on changes in the scale and nature of the tasks they are solving.

It should be emphasized that under the new conditions, as follows from the essence of the reform, the function of the Armed Forces has been and remains the same. This is to ensure the security of Russia from external threats to its territorial integrity, sovereignty, economic and political interests.

Despite the low probability of large-scale aggression against our country in modern conditions, the task of ensuring external security is still relevant. The main sources of military danger are local wars and regional conflicts in which Russia may be involved.

Under these conditions, there is a need for a certain adjustment of both general tasks and their individual types. And this will inevitably determine the content and direction of the entire process of combat training and military service. The Armed Forces are called upon to reliably deter any possible aggression, and at the same time to have the ability and skill to prevent or fend off local wars and regional conflicts.

The main task of deterring aggression is still entrusted to the Strategic Missile Forces. In connection with the reform, they acquire new fighting qualities. While playing a decisive role in deterring aggression, they are also less expensive than other branches of the Armed Forces. Nuclear deterrence remains at the core of Russia's national defense system. This is a reliable guarantee of the country's security for a period of deep economic and political transformations, including the reform of the Armed Forces.

In terms of conventional Armed Forces and armaments, Russia will have sufficient capabilities to successfully solve combat missions in local wars and regional conflicts. The ground forces will be small in number, compact and mobile. They will have means of transfer for operations in various strategic directions. In local wars and regional conflicts, the Air Force will play an increasing role. The combat power of conventional Armed Forces during the years of reform will increase significantly as a result of equipping them with high-precision weapon systems.

The navy, while maintaining a largely modern structure, will have the ability to solve problems in important oceanic and sea strategic areas, ensuring the state interests of the country. But the volume of these tasks may be limited due to positive changes in the military-political situation in the world.

The likelihood of local wars and armed conflicts will necessitate more active participation in international peacekeeping operations. They are organized by the UN, OSCE, CIS. For the Russian Armed Forces, this is a fundamentally new task. To solve it, special military contingents may be required, as is happening, for example, now in Tajikistan.

As you can see, the reform of the Armed Forces, their deep transformation does not in the least remove the task of ensuring the country's security from the army and navy. But the content of the tasks is specified and adjusted in connection with changes in the nature and scale of military dangers for the country.

The success of the reform of the Armed Forces and the fulfillment by them of the tasks of ensuring the security of our state directly depends on the activity and efficiency of the military labor of the personnel of the army and navy. The challenges of reform are complex. But any reforms are carried out by people - specific military personnel. And active participation in the implementation of reforms in practice is our common patriotic duty.

The leader of the classes must emphasize that the main efforts of the personnel in the context of the reform should be aimed at maintaining high combat readiness, which is unthinkable without high proficiency of military personnel, strong military discipline and law and order.

The leadership of the Ministry of Defense considers the prevention of crimes and incidents, primarily related to the death and injury of people, the manifestation of hazing, the loss and theft of weapons, ammunition and military property, to be a task of paramount importance at the stage of reforms. Such facts reduce the effectiveness of the course of reforms and divert much effort from solving the main tasks related to reforming the army and navy.

The level of organization of the personnel is very important, it is necessary that the reorganization, mass dismissal of military personnel, the withdrawal of support structures from the Armed Forces, etc. are carried out according to plan, without any failures. The main thing is not to weaken attention to the tasks of increasing vigilance and combat readiness, because the modern world is not safe.

Under these conditions, the demands on officers who organize the training and education of subordinates, and the conductors of state policy in the army and navy, are immeasurably increasing. The quality of combat training, the level of military skill of soldiers and sergeants primarily depend on their professionalism, sense of responsibility, and initiative.

They are the bearers of high morale and discipline. Only their personal example in service, in observance of Russian laws and military regulations, serves as an effective means of establishing law and order and strong military discipline in the troops.

This is what he spoke about at a reception in honor of graduates of military academies on June 30, 1997, the Minister of Defense, General of the Army I.D. Sergeev: "We must not forget that the state of the army and navy is determined primarily by the state of the officers. It is the officers, true professionals, patriots devoted to their Fatherland, who with dignity carry their high title of defender of the Russian land" ("Red Star", July 1, 1997 .).

During the reform period, attention to the issues of social protection of soldiers should not be weakened.

The guarantee of success is to maintain a healthy moral and psychological state in military teams in today's difficult times.

It is necessary to see in each of your subordinates not a robot, not a blind tool, but a person, a person. However, humanity is not connivance, not lisping, but care combined with exactingness. The main thing is not to forget about the dignity of your subordinates, to always feel personal responsibility for their training and education, for their lives.

One of the most important tasks of the officer corps is to strengthen the patriotic, moral and military education of their subordinates.

It is important to achieve awareness by every soldier, every subordinate of the state significance of the reform of the Armed Forces that has begun, personal responsibility for maintaining high vigilance and combat readiness. Military personnel must deeply understand that the reduction of the army and navy should not weaken their combat power. It must be replenished by the growth of the combat skill of each soldier, the skillful possession of military equipment and weapons, the strengthening of military discipline, organization and military law and order.

During the period of reform, when individual units and subdivisions will be reduced, it is more important than ever to treat a variety of material resources with care and economy.

And one more problem. Today, when there is a spiritual and political confrontation in society, various forces are trying to influence the army. The involvement of servicemen in political processes would lead to destabilization in military collectives and would be not only illegal, but in the full sense, disastrous for the cause of reforming the army and society. Skepticism, discrediting the ideas of military reform, the reform of the Armed Forces, is capable of causing serious damage to the cause of ensuring the country's national security. But there is no turning back. Behind is only the degradation and destruction of the army and navy. Ahead, on the path of reform, are the powerful Russian Armed Forces of the 21st century. Great Russia needs a strong, reformed army. Everyone should realize this.

In conclusion, let us emphasize once again that the reform of the Russian Armed Forces is a major, historic event in the life of the people and their armed defenders, a matter of great national importance. It is objectively conditioned and natural. The reform will bring the Armed Forces into full conformity with the nature and characteristics of the current military-political situation and the economic potential of the country. The army and navy, having decreased in number, will increase their combat capability and combat readiness due to qualitative parameters.

One of the strategic tasks of the reform, as emphasized by the President of the Russian Federation, is to qualitatively improve the life of military personnel, “... to restore the former prestige and respect of the Russians to the military profession.” (Red Star, July 30, 1997).

The implementation of the reform will contribute to the economic and political stabilization of the country. The tasks of the reform cannot be accomplished without raising the level of combat readiness, without strengthening military discipline and law and order, without the interest of every serviceman in its successful implementation.

Sample questions for the seminar (conversation):

What caused the need for such a radical reform - the Armed Forces of the country?

In what recent speeches of the leadership of the country and the army, and how are the goals and priorities of the reform formulated?

Tell us about the main stages of the reform of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

Personnel policy in the course of reform.

Restructuring of military education.

Tell us how the defense budget will be adjusted.

What should be done to increase the prestige of military service?

What sources of funding are envisaged to ensure the reform?

What measures are planned to be taken to ensure social protection of servicemen and their families?

Tell us about the tasks of the Armed Forces in modern conditions.

How do you imagine the tasks of your unit, subdivision and your personal ones in the course of the reform?

Literature

1. The Constitution of the Russian Federation. - M., 1993.

2. Federal Law of the Russian Federation "On Defense". - M., 1996.

3. Message on national security of the President of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly. - Russian newspaper, 1997, March 7.

4. "Toward an active foreign policy and effective military reform." From the message of the President of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly. - Krasnaya Zvezda, 1997, March 11.

5. Address of the President of the Russian Federation "To the soldiers of Russia". - Red Star, 1997, March 28.

6. Answers of the President of the Russian Federation to the questions of the "Red Star" / "Towards a new look for the army." - Red Star, 1997, May 7.

7. "Meeting of the Defense Council: severity of presidential assessments". - Red Star, 1997, May 23.

8. Decree of the President of the Russian Federation "On priority measures to reform the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and improve their structure." - Red Star, 1997, July 19.

9. Answers of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, General of the Army I.D. Sergeev to the questions of the "Red Star" / "Reforms are our common concern." - Red Star, 1997, June 27.

10. Sergeev I.D. Speech at a meeting of the Federation Council. - Red Star, 1997, July 5.

11. Sergeev I.D. The new image of the army: realities and prospects. - Red Star, 1997, July 22.

12. Text of the radio address by B.N. Yeltsin dated 25.07.97

13. Address of the President of the Russian Federation, Supreme Commander-in-Chief “To the soldiers of Russia”. - Red Star, 1997, July 30.

14. Sergeev I.D. New Russia, new army. - Red Star, 1997, September 19.

The development and formation of the Armed Forces of Russia, their purpose is inextricably linked with the development of the Russian state, its social system, economy and policy pursued in the interests of protecting the state from external aggression.

The origins of the birth of a new military organization in our Fatherland fall on the reign of Ivan III the Great.

- Ivan the Terrible. 1550 - 1571 . Carrying out reforms.

The efforts of Ivan III to create a strong military organization were continued by Ivan IV, who created a large army in Europe, 250-300 thousand people (about 3% of the population of Russia at that time). Ivan the Terrible laid the foundation for reforms by Decree of October 3, 1550 - this date is supposed to be the Day of the creation of the Russian army.

The main content of the reform:

creation of a permanent archery army and guard service on the southern border;

local army , the noble cavalry, which constituted the main branch of the Russian army of the 15-17 centuries, had the character of a militia. In organizational terms, it was divided into hundreds.

Reorganized by Peter I in 1701 into regular regiments of dragoons.

Streltsy army - this is the first permanent army in the Russian state. Organizationally, at first it consisted of instruments (detachments), orders (500-1000 people each). In the period 1632 - 1634. century was reorganized into regiments of the "new system". Gradually, the regiments of the new system forced out the old army. By 1680, the regiments of the new system accounted for 67% of the entire army, they numbered 90 thousand people.

These regiments already bore the features of a regular army, they were divided into companies, the order of appointment of officer ranks was determined, drill and tactical exercises were carried out with personnel.

So, what is the content of the reforms of Ivan the Terrible?

The main content of the reform:

streamlining the recruitment of local troops;

organization of centralized command and control of the army;

· Creation of a permanent archery army and guard service on the southern border.

What is the result of this reform?

Disbanded by decree of Peter I at the beginning of the 18th century.

- Reforms of Peter I . 1701 - 1711

The main content of the reform:

creation of a regular army;

· military training;

creation of the Russian fleet.

The reforms of Peter I began after the defeat of the Russian troops near Narva from the Swedish army. Then the Russian army lost more than 6 thousand people, and the archery regiments and noble cavalry showed their helplessness. Peter introduced a new system of recruiting troops. They were in the full sense of the regular troops.

Which of you will remember why Peter I disbanded the archery army? The main reason is the rebellion of the archers due to the decrease in their monetary allowance, and the duration of the wars in that period, as well as due to dissatisfaction with the ongoing reforms that infringed on the rights of the archers ..

recruiting set.

10-20 peasant households by lot supplied one person for lifelong military service . By this, Peter I increased the size of the army. In addition to recruits, there were also “eager people” from among personally free subjects of various ranks.

A commission was established in the village of Preobrazhenskoye to conduct recruiting, staffing units, and train recruits, headed by Fyodor Golovin and Veide

(Ivan Suvorov, the grandfather of the future commander, worked with them). As a result, 27 infantry and 2 dragoon regiments were created. On June 25, 1700, in the village of Preobrazhensky, a solemn transfer of the first 14 regiments to division commanders took place.

This day is accepted by Russian military-historical science as the date of the establishment of the regular army of Russia (officially confirmed under Nicholas I in “ Chronicle of the Russian Imperial Army of 1852). All matters relating to the army were in charge of the Government Senate and the Military Collegium subordinate to it (the prototype of the Ministry of Defense).

In comparison with the Western armies, where the recruitment took place according to the mercenary-recruiting type, the Russian army had a homogeneous national composition.

Military training.

-- Military training under Peter was carried out not according to military training, but according to the “article”, according to a single drill charter. Two statutory documents were drawn up: “ Company infantry ranks” and " Military articles, how a soldier should keep himself in life, in the ranks and teaching how to manage.

Great importance was attached to the education of military partnership in the army and the maintenance of firm discipline. “Every initial man and soldier must and is obliged to rescue his comrade from the enemy, to defend a cannon shell and his banner, as much as possible, to harrow him so much as he loves his stomach and his honor” - says in the Military Articles.

To encourage those who distinguished themselves in battle, Peter I introduced orders and medals. They were received not only by generals and officers, but also by soldiers. First Russian OrderSt. Andrew the First-Called - was established in 1698. The award No. 1 was received by Admiral General Fyodor Andreevich Golovin on March 10, 1699. Peter I himself received an award under No. 7 in 1703 for the capture of the Swedish ships Astrild and Gedan.

-- The main merit of Peter I was the creation of the Russian fleet in the Baltic. This allowed Russia to declare itself as a maritime power.

So, the reforms of Peter I are:

The main content of the reform:

introduction of recruitment;

creation of a regular army;

· military training;

creation of the Russian fleet.

- At Catherine II continued improvement of the armed forces.

Key points in the reform:

creation of the military ministry;

new tactics of warfare.

This made it possible to quickly rebuild the troops, but the reforms of Peter I, the organization of the armed forces and their management brought many victories to the Russian troops in individual battles and entire companies.

The military collegium ceased to depend on the senate and began to turn into a military ministry.

- Military reform D.A. Milyutin. 1864 - 1874

The main content of the reform:

literacy training for soldiers;

rearmament of the army.

In 1861, Count Dmitry Alekseevich Milyutin was appointed to the post of Minister of War. On his initiative, a special commission was created to revise the recruiting charter. The conscription commission was selected from representatives of various ministries. He saw the main task of military reforms in the fact that in peacetime the size of the army was minimal, and in wartime - maximum at the expense of trained personnel. For three years, the number of troops decreased by almost 2 times. The first demobilization in the army was carried out.

In 1874, a new Charter on military service was approved. According to the accepted provision, all males aged 21-40 years were subject to military service. In the "general principles" it is said that "defence of the fatherland is the sacred duty of every Russian citizen." The total service life was set at 15 years, of which 6 years in active service and 9 years in reserve, in the Navy - 10 years, of which 7 in active service and 3 years in reserve.

Particular attention was paid to improving the professional training of officers. The network of special military educational institutions was expanded, and literacy training for soldiers became mandatory.

An important component of the transformations in the army is its re-equipment. The rifled Mosin rifle of 7.62 mm caliber was adopted for service. The artillery received guns with a rifled barrel, which made it possible to increase the firing range.

A special place in the rearmament was occupied by the fleet; the steam fleet replaced the sailing fleet. By the end of the century, Russia had 107 combat steam ships of various displacements.

So what were Milyutin's reforms?

The main content of the reform:

Creation of a mobilization reserve for the duration of the war;

· increasing professional training;

literacy training for soldiers;

rearmament of the army.

Count D.A. Milyutin recalled: “My most notorious enemies had to admit that the Russian army had never been to the theater of war so well prepared and equipped.” This statement refers to the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, where the positive aspects of the ongoing reforms were manifested. The main result is the return to the state life of the Bulgarian people, who had been under the Turkish yoke for several centuries. In the city of Pleven there is a panorama that tells about the capture of the Shipka Pass. Having visited the panorama, I felt the smell of battle, heard the sounds of shots, cries of cheers. It's an amazing sight."

- Nicholas II. 1912

The main content of the reform:

· increased centralization of military command;

Reduced service life rejuvenated officers;

· adopted new programs for military schools, new statutes;

new samples of artillery pieces;

· improved material supply.

There have been defeats in the history of the development of the Russian armed forces. The most bitter thing is the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Japan was better prepared for the war and, despite the heroism and valor of the soldiers and sailors, the war was lost. Each failure entails a crisis that cannot be overcome without additional reforms.

Nicholas II took steps to revive the combat capability of the Russian armed forces. The need and timeliness of the transformations was dictated by the impending First World War.

But the First World War became another heroic and at the same time tragic page for Russia and its armed forces.

- IN AND. Lenin. Military reform 1917-1918

The formation of the Red Army began with the reform of the old army in December 1917.

The Council of People's Commissars adopted decrees;

· canceled military ranks, titles, distinctions;

1. Necessity, prerequisites and purpose of the reform of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

The main task of the lesson is to consider: in-depth study of available documents and materials in order to provide moral and psychological support by personnel (especially officers) to the idea and plan of the reform of the Armed Forces, the formation of an interested attitude towards its results, a sense of ownership and personal responsibility for its progress and outcome.

The Russian Federation is going through a difficult and responsible period of its development. The tasks of deep economic and democratic transformations are being solved.

Historical experience shows that in the turning points in the life of our country, the Armed Forces have always been subjected to profound reforms. Their number, structure, recruitment methods, military-technical equipment were brought into line with the realities of the time.

At present, large-scale and active work has begun in our country to reform the army and navy, to give them a modern look, mobility, high combat capability and combat readiness.

On July 16, 1997, the President of Russia signed the Decree "On priority measures to reform the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and improve their structure." It substantiates the objective need for military reform, defines its stages, content, economic justification and timing of its implementation. The decree establishes proper control and responsibility for the implementation of the planned measures of military organizational development. This document is a detailed and reasoned program for the reform of the Armed Forces.

1. Necessity, prerequisites and purpose of the reform of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

Since the creation of the Russian Armed Forces (May 7, 1992) there has been a lot of talk about reforming them. In practice, the matter essentially did not move forward. Today in the country, in the military leadership, a clear and precise understanding of the objective necessity, goals, ways of reforming the army and navy has been formed.

What exactly are the regularities that determine the need for the ongoing reform? What is their essence and how do they influence military construction?

One of the determining factors , affecting the military construction of the state, is geostrategic position of the country, the nature and characteristics of the military-political situation in the world. The point is to correctly, soberly and balancedly determine whether there is a military threat to the country, its sources, scale and nature, to give a correct assessment of the real military-political situation and the prospects for its development. The nature and direction of the state's military development directly and directly depend on the answer to them.

After the end of the Cold War, the military-political situation in the world has changed significantly. It has seen many positive changes. The former sharp and dangerous military and ideological confrontation between the two systems is gone. For our country at present and in the near future there is no threat of a large-scale war. It must be emphasized that a large-scale armed clash with the NATO bloc is also unlikely, despite its expansion to the East. In other words, at present and in the near future, there is no serious external threat to the country. Russia, in turn, does not consider any state, any people as its potential enemy.

But these changes do not mean the complete disappearance of the military danger. It now proceeds from the possibility of local wars and armed conflicts. That is why it is important to decide what kind of army Russia should have, based on the nature of modern regional wars and conflicts in which it can participate in one way or another.

Today, the country's Armed Forces, not counting numerous other troops, are 1.7 million people. Their number is clearly inadequate to the existing military danger. There is a direct expediency of their reduction and reorganization. This is the starting point of the country's leadership, putting forward a well-founded and long overdue task of immediate reform of the Armed Forces.

The need to reform the Armed Forces is also dictated by considerations of an economic nature. The country has been implementing economic reform for the 6th year already. It is carried out in conditions of the most severe crisis. The decline in production has not yet been overcome. Russia is seriously lagging behind the main centers of power in the modern world in a number of key indicators. It accounts for only 2% of world economic production, but 4% of military spending. This means that the country's spending on the military sphere is twice the world average. And one more indicator: in terms of gross domestic product per capita, we are in 46th place in the world.

At present, up to 40% of the revenues of the country's annual budget are spent on the maintenance of the Armed Forces, other troops and law enforcement agencies. This hinders economic transformations and does not allow for an increase in investment in the development of industrial and agricultural production. Our economy, which is also in a crisis situation, is simply not able to withstand such a load. This is due to the underfunding of the army, especially for combat training and equipping with new weapons, delays in the payment of monetary allowances and an increase in the number of homeless servicemen. These circumstances have an extremely negative impact on the combat capability and combat readiness of the army and navy. Life requires bringing the Armed Forces in line with the level of the existing military danger and the economic capabilities of the state.

The need to reform the Armed Forces is also associated with a number of demographic restrictions. . The decline in the population is a matter of serious concern for the Russian leadership. In 1996, the population of the country decreased by 475 thousand people. The trends in 1997 are similar.

In recent years, despite the seeming sufficiency of human resources, only a quarter of the conscripts come to military service. The rest enjoy benefits, deferrals, etc. As a result, there is a large shortage of privates and sergeants, which reduces the level of combat readiness.

Today, every third young man cannot serve for health reasons (in 1995 - only every twentieth). 15% of conscripts have a body deficit; 2 times more prone to alcoholism (12%); 8% of young people recruited into the army are drug addicts.

The situation with staffing is aggravated by the presence of military formations in another 15 federal structures, which also claim to be a conscription contingent. Let's say the Ministry of Internal Affairs has about 540 thousand people, plus 260 thousand as part of the internal troops; Railway troops - 80 thousand; Border troops - 230 thousand; Ministry of Emergency Situations - 70 thousand; building structures - about 100 thousand people, etc. And from this point of view, the restructuring of the military organization is extremely necessary.

It would be expedient to drastically reduce the number of federal departments that have military formations, and more resolutely switch to a mixed, and then to a contract system of manning units. With the reduction of the Armed Forces, this prospect becomes quite real, making it possible to move on to a professional army.

What is the goal of the proposed reform? First of all, it is called upon to increase the country's defense capacity, to bring the troops in line with the requirements of the times.

“Modern Armed Forces,” notes the Address of the President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin to the soldiers of Russia - must be compact, mobile and equipped with modern weapons. “At the same time, the reform,” said the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, “will radically improve the social position and material well-being of a person in uniform.” ("Red Star", July 30, 1997).

As the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, General of the Army I.D. Sergeev, noted, these should be “highly equipped, with sufficient deterrence potential, a modern level of professional and moral and psychological training, combat-ready, compact and mobile Armed Forces of a rational composition, structure, and strength.” (“Red Star”, June 27, 1997)

2. Main stages and content of the reform.

Military reform is a nationwide, nationwide task. Being extremely complex, it is designed for a long period. In its course, there are two stages.

First (before 2000) optimization of the structure, combat composition and strength of the Armed Forces is being carried out.

During this period, a new military doctrine is being developed and approved, research and development work (R&D) is being actively carried out on new generation weapons, combat control and communications equipment, and dual-use technologies.

On the second (2000-2005) the qualitative improvement of the reduced Armed Forces is ensured,

increasing their combat capability, switching to the contract principle of recruitment, the development of weapons of the next generations continues. In short, over the next 8 years, the Russian Armed Forces will be completely reformed. And in the future, a large-scale rearmament of the army, navy and other troops will begin with models of equipment that will serve in the 21st century.

What are the specific priorities of military construction at the first stage of the reform of the Armed Forces? They are outlined in the reform plan approved by the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, the commanders-in-chief of the branches of the Armed Forces and approved by the President of the Russian Federation.

The reform of the army, despite insufficient budget allocations, began. We can say with satisfaction that it is gaining momentum. Reasonable and rational directions for its implementation have been chosen.

In order to bring the military organization of the state in line with the needs of defense and security, as well as the economic capabilities of the country, the number of military personnel is being reduced.

In total in 1997 - 2005. Almost 600,000 officers, ensigns and midshipmen will be fired from the Armed Forces. Including in 1998 more than 175 thousand regular military personnel, in 1999 - almost 120 thousand. The number of civilian personnel will decrease from 600 thousand people to 300 thousand people within a year and a half.

As of January 1, 1999, the number of servicemen in the army and navy was set at 1.2 million. Such a strength of the Armed Forces is quite optimal and will undoubtedly provide reliable defense of the Russian state.

However, the reduction of the army and navy is not the main thing in their reform. The main thing is to optimize the structure and combat strength, improve the controllability and equipment of the troops.

Therefore, it is necessary major organizational restructuring of the Armed Forces. Until January 1 next year, the Strategic Missile Forces, the Military Space Forces and the Air Defense Missile and Space Defense Forces will be united. It will be a qualitatively new branch of the Armed Forces. It will retain the name "Strategic Missile Forces". This merger will make it possible to abandon unnecessary parallel links, as well as to pool resources and get rid of excess financial costs. The main thing is that related defensive functions are concentrated in the same hands, the cause of the country's security wins. As a result of this reorganization, the effectiveness of the possible use of the Strategic Missile Forces will increase by about 20%, and the economic effect will exceed 1 trillion rubles.

In the same year, carried out measures to radically optimize the management bodies, including - central apparatus. Their number will be reduced by about 1/3. In particular, the Main Command of the Ground Forces is not only significantly reduced, but also transformed into the Main Directorate of the Ground Forces. It is reassigned to one of the Deputy Ministers of Defense and will focus mainly on issues of combat training of troops. The purpose of the transformation of the management bodies is to improve the quality and efficiency of management, professionalism, and staff culture. In 1998, the Air Force and the Air Defense Forces are merged.. On the basis of their association, a type of the Armed Forces is created - the Air Force. But the process of this unification will be far from simple, given the different methods and ways of managing these branches of the Armed Forces, and most importantly, they have different tasks. In the course of the unification, the combat composition of the Air Force and Air Defense will also be optimized, and the problem of managing them under the conditions of the new structure will be solved.

In connection with these transformations, the transition from the five-service to the four-service structure of the Armed Forces is being completed. Then a three-species structure is envisaged (according to the spheres of application of troops: land, air, space and sea). And ultimately we must come to two components: the Strategic Deterrence Force (SSF) and the General Purpose Force (SDF).

During the reform of the Navy there will also be changes, although its structure as a whole will remain. 4 fleets will remain - the Baltic, Northern, Pacific and Black Sea, as well as the Caspian flotilla. But they will be more compact than the current groupings of forces and assets in strategically important oceanic and maritime sectors. The Navy should retain ships of high combat effectiveness, strategic submarines, and support forces. The reduction in the number of ships will increase the importance of shore-based naval aviation. The fleet will perform more limited combat missions than at present.

Ground troops - the basis of the Armed Forces. And yet the number of divisions in them will decrease. It is supposed to keep 25 divisions. Some of them will be fully manned and combat-ready in every strategic direction. They will be able to effectively solve the relevant tasks. On the basis of the remaining divisions, bases for the storage of weapons and military equipment will be created. The combat potential of the retained divisions will increase. They will be equipped with new weapons and control systems. Thanks to this, the effectiveness of the striking actions of the division will almost double. Serious changes will also affect the military districts.

Military districts are given the status of operational-strategic (operational-territorial) commands Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the relevant areas. Within the boundaries of their responsibility, the military districts are entrusted with the functions of operational leadership of all military formations, regardless of their inclusion in various federal departments. This means that the border, internal troops, civil defense units and other military formations are operationally subordinate to the operational-strategic command.

In connection with the planned transformations, the military system on a national scale will undergo major changes. It will acquire harmony and completeness, the ability to more effectively solve the pressing issues of strengthening the country's defense.

As already mentioned, the reform of the Armed Forces is being carried out under conditions of severe financial constraints, when the defense budget is not only not increased, but even cut. Therefore, it is important to persistently seek out internal reserves and skillfully use them.

This thesis is rejected by a number of opponents and is heavily criticized by some media. Meanwhile, there are internal reserves. They are serious enough.

Already at the first stage of the reform, it is necessary to get rid of unjustified and unproductive expenditures that do not meet the interests of strengthening the country's defense capability. The Armed Forces must get rid of enterprises and organizations, objects and structures, without which their vital activity will practically not suffer and they are quite capable of existing.

Already at present the process of withdrawing the so-called support structures from the Armed Forces began. Some of them are substantially reorganized and corporatized. This will reduce the number of military and civilian personnel. At the same time, considerable funds will be received to replenish the defense budget and ensure social protection.

​​​​​​​

There is a major reorganization of the military construction complex. It is carried out on the basis of the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation signed on July 8, 1997 "On the reform of state unitary enterprises that are part of the construction and quartering bodies of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation." Over 100 organizations of the military-construction complex being withdrawn from the Armed Forces will be transformed into joint-stock companies. At the same time, the number of military personnel will be reduced by 50,000 people, while the controlling stake will remain in federal ownership. On this basis, considerable funds will be received. As part of the Armed Forces, 19 state-owned enterprises are temporarily retained, which will be engaged in construction and industrial activities, as well as ensuring the life of remote garrisons.

On July 17, 1997, the President of the Russian Federation signed the Decree on the formation of the Federal Service for Special Construction of Russia . The reorganized Rosspetsstroy will provide the most important special construction works. At the same time, the number of military personnel will be reduced from 76,000 to 10,000 people. Also on July 17, 1997, by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation the Federal Road Construction Administration was reorganized. It operated under the Ministry of Defense, and is now transferred to the Federal Road Service of the country. At the same time, the number of servicemen of this department is reduced from 57 to 15 thousand people.

Thus, only according to the three decrees of the President of the Russian Federation, due to structural changes, it will be possible to reduce about 150 thousand military personnel. In general, as a result of the reform, the number of military builders will be reduced by 71%, and civilian personnel in military construction by 42%. Military construction is planned to be conducted on a competitive basis. All this will significantly reduce the burden on the defense budget. Moreover, it will be significantly replenished due to the withdrawal of numerous enterprises from the Armed Forces.

At the first stage of the reform, such problems will also have to be solved. There are about 100 agricultural enterprises in the system of the Ministry of Defense. Many of them are profitable. They were created during a period of shortage of products. At present, their preservation in their former form is not everywhere justified. Therefore, their corporatization is envisaged. However, in a number of regions (Kola Peninsula, Sakhalin, Kamchatka, Tiki, etc., they still significantly fill the need for essential food products.

The number of military representations at enterprises in which officers are involved, numbering 38 thousand people, is being reduced. Moreover, representatives of various branches of the Armed Forces sometimes perform duplicating functions. There is a need to have a unified system of state representations at enterprises. It is also expedient to liquidate numerous hunting farms, recreation centers, etc., for the maintenance of which subsidies and compensations from the Ministry of Defense are constantly increasing.

In the course of the reform of the Armed Forces, transfer of social infrastructure facilities to local authorities(parts of housing and communal services, kindergartens and nurseries, schools, household enterprises, etc.), which are on the balance sheet of the Ministry of Defense. These are tens of thousands of buildings and structures. The cost of maintaining social infrastructure sometimes reaches 30% of the cost of maintaining troops. Their transfer to local budgets will begin this year and end in 1999. This measure will save 2-3 trillion rubles annually. They will also go to provide social guarantees for servicemen.

Currently started a radical reorganization of military trade, which employs about 62 thousand people. The administrative apparatus is being restructured and reduced. Unprofitable enterprises are liquidated. There is a sale of the largest objects of military trade in Moscow and large centers, where they have lost their functional purpose. All this will make it possible to almost halve the number of military trade personnel, including military personnel by 75%. More than a trillion rubles will be received from corporatization of trade enterprises. At the same time, the Ministry of Defense retains a controlling stake. It is possible to manage these enterprises and earn income.

It should be especially noted that military personnel and their families will not suffer in the slightest from the reorganization of the military trade system. Indeed, up to 70% of enterprises serve closed and remote garrisons.

In the course of the reform, many military camps are freed up. A large number of various weapons become redundant. Military property is released.

The reform of the Armed Forces is designed to adjust the structure of the defense budget . Recently, an extremely unfavorable structure for financing the Armed Forces has taken shape. Up to 70% of the allocated funds are spent on salaries for officers and salaries for civilian personnel. Moreover, in 1996 more than 7 trillion rubles were spent for these purposes in excess of budgetary funds. And combat training and the purchase of new equipment are not actually funded. At a meeting of the Federation Council on July 4 this year. Defense Minister General of the Army I.D. Sergeev declared: "In the Armed Forces, with the exception of the Rocket Forces and several formations of the Ground Forces, there is practically no combat training" (Krasnaya Zvezda, July 5, 1997). The troops almost do not receive new military equipment and weapons. As a result, the level of combat and mobilization readiness of troops and their technical equipment are decreasing. The reduction of the army and navy, their organizational changes will allow about half of the defense budget to be used for combat training and the acquisition of new weapons.

The most important problem determining the success of the reform is financing. This is the "question of questions" today. As is already clear from the previous explanations, it is envisaged to have three sources of funding: 1) budget money for improving the combat training of troops, the daily maintenance of the entire structure of combat readiness (Today this figure is 1%, but in 1998 it will rise to 10%); 2) the sale of surpluses of released military property, trade enterprises; 3) an item in the budget for social guarantees for retired servicemen.

It will be decided in a completely new way question of military training. The task of reforming the military education system is to raise the level of personnel training and, at the same time, optimize training costs. Currently, the Ministry of Defense has 100 universities, incl. 18 military academies. Their number clearly exceeds the needs for personnel in the army and navy under the new conditions. It will be reduced, including through mergers. For example, at present, aviation specialists for the Air Force, Air Defense and Ground Forces are training 17 military educational institutions, incl. two academies (VVA VVS and VA PVO). After their reorganization, 8 aviation schools will remain. The two academies will be merged into the Air Force and Air Defense Military Academy, which will train command personnel. A military technical aviation university. NOT. Zhukovsky will focus on training engineering personnel for all branches of the Armed Forces.

In the course of the military reform, such a complex task will also have to be solved. It, of course, goes beyond the Ministry of Defense, but its experience in reorganizing the system of training military personnel will have to be used in every possible way. Now each power ministry and department has its own system of training military personnel. In addition to the Ministry of Defense, military universities operate in the Ministry of Internal Affairs (more than 30), in the Federal Border Service (7), etc. Unfortunately, the activities of numerous universities are not coordinated by anyone. There is a need to create a unified (federal) system for training military personnel for all power ministries and departments. At the same time, the quality of personnel training will certainly increase. This will be facilitated by the increase in the professionalism of the teaching staff of universities. In particular, the replacement of a number of posts by trained civilian specialists, the extension of the service life of officer scientists and highly qualified specialists, etc.

Further - in the current state of affairs, primarily because of the low prestige of military service, many cadets of military schools after completing their second year of study break their contracts. At the same time, they are credited with a two-year term of military service and they continue their education in related civilian educational institutions from the 3rd year. As a result, the Ministry of Defense incurs huge costs and does not receive the required number of trained officers. This problem requires an optimal solution.

Practice shows that up to 40% of graduates leave the Armed Forces upon graduation. The reasons are well known. All this leads to a shortage of young officer cadres. Here we have to find the right and optimal solutions.

The logistic organs of the Armed Forces will have to be substantially reformed. They are being brought into line with the new branch structure of the army and navy. Their optimization, adaptation to market conditions of management is envisaged. The rear of the Armed Forces is called upon to be more economical and use budget funds rationally. All this should contribute to improving the nutrition of soldiers, their clothing allowances, and, in general, the material and technical support of the troops.

Thus, the reform of the Armed Forces is a truly large-scale and responsible undertaking, requiring great efforts and significant material costs. The reform affects the fundamental interests of the country's national security. Its success depends on a number of conditions. First of all, from the nationwide support of the ongoing activities (material and moral support), from the level of state and military leadership of the transformations in the military sphere. No wonder the President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin took the course of the reform of the Armed Forces under his personal control.

​​​​​​​

3. The tasks of military personnel to ensure combat readiness, strengthen military discipline and law and order, and successfully implement the reform of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

The reform of the Armed Forces and their radical transformation have a decisive influence on changes in the scale and nature of the tasks they are solving.

It should be emphasized that under the new conditions, as follows from the essence of the reform, the function of the Armed Forces has been and remains the same. This is to ensure the security of Russia from external threats to its territorial integrity, sovereignty, economic and political interests.

Despite the low probability of large-scale aggression against our country in modern conditions, the task of ensuring external security is still relevant. The main sources of military danger are local wars and regional conflicts in which Russia may be involved.

Under these conditions, there is a need for a certain adjustment of both general tasks and their individual types. And this will inevitably determine the content and direction of the entire process of combat training and military service. The Armed Forces are called upon to reliably deter any possible aggression, and at the same time to have the ability and skill to prevent or fend off local wars and regional conflicts.

The main task of deterring aggression is still entrusted to the Strategic Missile Forces. In connection with the reform, they acquire new fighting qualities. While playing a decisive role in deterring aggression, they are also less expensive than other branches of the Armed Forces. Nuclear deterrence remains at the core of Russia's national defense system. This is a reliable guarantee of the country's security for a period of deep economic and political transformations, including the reform of the Armed Forces.

In terms of conventional Armed Forces and armaments, Russia will have sufficient capabilities to successfully solve combat missions in local wars and regional conflicts. The ground forces will be small in number, compact and mobile. They will have means of transfer for operations in various strategic directions. In local wars and regional conflicts, the Air Force will play an increasing role. The combat power of conventional Armed Forces during the years of reform will increase significantly as a result of equipping them with high-precision weapon systems.

The navy, while maintaining a largely modern structure, will have the ability to solve problems in important oceanic and sea strategic areas, ensuring the state interests of the country. But the volume of these tasks may be limited due to positive changes in the military-political situation in the world.

The likelihood of local wars and armed conflicts will necessitate more active participation in international peacekeeping operations. They are organized by the UN, OSCE, CIS. For the Russian Armed Forces, this is a fundamentally new task. To solve it, special military contingents may be required, as is happening, for example, now in Tajikistan.

As you can see, the reform of the Armed Forces, their deep transformation does not in the least remove the task of ensuring the country's security from the army and navy. But the content of the tasks is specified and adjusted in connection with changes in the nature and scale of military dangers for the country.

The success of the reform of the Armed Forces and the fulfillment by them of the tasks of ensuring the security of our state directly depends on the activity and efficiency of the military labor of the personnel of the army and navy. The challenges of reform are complex. But any reforms are carried out by people - specific military personnel. And active participation in the implementation of reforms in practice is our common patriotic duty.

The leader of the classes must emphasize that the main efforts of the personnel in the context of the reform should be aimed at maintaining high combat readiness, which is unthinkable without high proficiency of military personnel, strong military discipline and law and order.

The leadership of the Ministry of Defense considers the prevention of crimes and incidents, primarily related to the death and injury of people, the manifestation of hazing, the loss and theft of weapons, ammunition and military property, to be a task of paramount importance at the stage of reforms. Such facts reduce the effectiveness of the course of reforms and divert much effort from solving the main tasks related to reforming the army and navy.

The level of organization of the personnel is very important, it is necessary that the reorganization, mass dismissal of military personnel, the withdrawal of support structures from the Armed Forces, etc. are carried out according to plan, without any failures. The main thing is not to weaken attention to the tasks of increasing vigilance and combat readiness, because the modern world is not safe.

Under these conditions, the demands on officers who organize the training and education of subordinates, and the conductors of state policy in the army and navy, are immeasurably increasing. The quality of combat training, the level of military skill of soldiers and sergeants primarily depend on their professionalism, sense of responsibility, and initiative.

They are the bearers of high morale and discipline. Only their personal example in service, in observance of Russian laws and military regulations, serves as an effective means of establishing law and order and strong military discipline in the troops.

This is what he spoke about at a reception in honor of graduates of military academies on June 30, 1997, the Minister of Defense, General of the Army I.D. Sergeev: "We must not forget that the state of the army and navy is determined primarily by the state of the officers. It is the officers, true professionals, patriots devoted to their Fatherland, who with dignity carry their high title of defender of the Russian land" ("Red Star", July 1, 1997 .).

During the reform period, attention to the issues of social protection of soldiers should not be weakened.

The guarantee of success is to maintain a healthy moral and psychological state in military teams in today's difficult times.

It is necessary to see in each of your subordinates not a robot, not a blind tool, but a person, a person. However, humanity is not connivance, not lisping, but care combined with exactingness. The main thing is not to forget about the dignity of your subordinates, to always feel personal responsibility for their training and education, for their lives.

One of the most important tasks of the officer corps is to strengthen the patriotic, moral and military education of their subordinates.

It is important to achieve awareness by every soldier, every subordinate of the state significance of the reform of the Armed Forces that has begun, personal responsibility for maintaining high vigilance and combat readiness. Military personnel must deeply understand that the reduction of the army and navy should not weaken their combat power. It must be replenished by the growth of the combat skill of each soldier, the skillful possession of military equipment and weapons, the strengthening of military discipline, organization and military law and order.

During the period of reform, when individual units and subdivisions will be reduced, it is more important than ever to treat a variety of material resources with care and economy.

And one more problem. Today, when there is a spiritual and political confrontation in society, various forces are trying to influence the army. The involvement of servicemen in political processes would lead to destabilization in military collectives and would be not only illegal, but in the full sense, disastrous for the cause of reforming the army and society. Skepticism, discrediting the ideas of military reform, the reform of the Armed Forces, is capable of causing serious damage to the cause of ensuring the country's national security. But there is no turning back. Behind is only the degradation and destruction of the army and navy. Ahead, on the path of reform, are the powerful Russian Armed Forces of the 21st century. Great Russia needs a strong, reformed army. Everyone should realize this.

In conclusion, let us emphasize once again that the reform of the Russian Armed Forces is a major, historic event in the life of the people and their armed defenders, a matter of great national importance. It is objectively conditioned and natural. The reform will bring the Armed Forces into full conformity with the nature and characteristics of the current military-political situation and the economic potential of the country. The army and navy, having decreased in number, will increase their combat capability and combat readiness due to qualitative parameters.

One of the strategic tasks of the reform, as emphasized by the President of the Russian Federation, is to qualitatively improve the life of military personnel, “... to restore the former prestige and respect of the Russians to the military profession.” (Red Star, July 30, 1997).

The implementation of the reform will contribute to the economic and political stabilization of the country. The tasks of the reform cannot be accomplished without raising the level of combat readiness, without strengthening military discipline and law and order, without the interest of every serviceman in its successful implementation.

​​​​​​​

Sample questions for the seminar (conversation):

- What caused the need for such a radical reform - the Armed Forces of the country?

- In what recent speeches of the leadership of the country and the army, and how are the goals and priorities of the reform formulated?

- Tell us about the main stages of the reform of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

- Personnel policy in the course of reform.

- Restructuring of military education.

- Tell us how the defense budget will be adjusted.

- What should be done to increase the prestige of military service?

- What sources of funding are envisaged to ensure the reform?

- What measures are planned to be taken to ensure social protection of servicemen and members of their families?

- Tell us about the tasks of the Armed Forces in modern conditions.

- How do you imagine the tasks of your unit, subdivision and your personal ones in the course of the reform?

A radical transformation of the system of international relations, the adoption of a new military doctrine, a reduction in the size of the Armed Forces, a focus on qualitative parameters in defense construction - these and many other factors dictate the need for military reform in Russia. Therefore, military reform became an imperative of social and political practice in Russia after the end of "cold war". The need for military reform in the Russian Federation is due to geopolitical changes. It is geopolitical features that predetermine the significant scale of transformations that must be carried out in the context of large-scale socio-economic reforms.

The armed forces inherited by the Russian Federation from the USSR were created as a means of confrontation in "cold war" and in many ways do not meet the requirements for modern armed forces. The Russian army is not sufficiently prepared for local and ethnic conflicts, the weak technical equipment of the Russian army, the insufficient professionalism of soldiers and officers are affecting. One of the main problems of the Russian army was insufficient funding "human resource", as well as ineffective mechanisms for the social protection of military personnel. All these problems and many others cannot be solved by gradually correcting the shortcomings inherent in the Russian army - in order to solve the numerous problems of the Russian armed forces, it is necessary to implement military reform as a comprehensive series of measures aimed at radically transforming the RF Armed Forces.

The military reform should not be identified with the reform of the Armed Forces, since the reform of the Armed Forces is considered as an integral part of the reform of the entire military construction in the country. In this context, we should also note some other problems that accompany the implementation of the process of military reform in modern Russia, which, one way or another, require close study.

The crisis of the Russian army worsened in the late 1980s. By the end of the 80s. spending on the military-industrial complex and the maintenance of a multimillion-strong army exacerbated the economic crisis. The underestimation of the factor of the unpreparedness of the Russian army to repel threats to global, regional and national security has led to miscalculations in the ongoing military reform in Russia. It should also be noted that all these factors create the prerequisites for the implementation of military reform in order to strengthen the combat capability of the Russian army.

As the main negative factors that predetermined the decrease in the combat readiness of the Soviet, and then the Russian army, K. Cirulis and V. Bazhanov indicate:
1. The irreconcilable contradiction of the corrupt caste with the rest of the officer mass;
2. Alienation between the generals, officers, sergeants and soldiers;
3. "Hazing", which created a tendency to criminalize the army and a system of ugly informal relationships;
4. Intensive development of equipment and weapons, which exacerbated the contradiction between the need to increase the professionalism of personnel and outdated methods of combat training and its organization;
5. The decline in the prestige of military service in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation due to the involvement of servicemen of combat specialties in household work, which led to a decrease in combat readiness.

Unsatisfactory combat readiness is associated with the transition from the form of organization of the army inherent in the command-administrative system of the Soviet type to the form of organization of the army of a democratic state. However, the events of the early 1990s prevented the rapid implementation of military reforms. In the 1990s military reform was not carried out. The state policy of reducing military spending without reforming the Armed Forces led to the collapse of the army. The lack of funding for the Armed Forces has led to the use of emergency reserves.

The military reform programs being developed had political significance, and military reform in practice meant a theoretical, methodological, organizational and legal basis. However, the successful implementation of the military reform in the late 1990s. were hampered by insufficient funding, a lack of funds and a lack of political will to implement the planned measures. During the period of the military reform from 1992 to 2001, which can be called, in the words of L. Peven "a decade of missed opportunities", its main tasks were not fulfilled:
- high combat readiness of troops is not ensured;
- effective measures for the social security of servicemen have not been developed.

The aspect of the gradual transition of the Russian army to a contract basis for staffing positions deserves special attention. In the context of military reform in Russia, this process can be seen as affecting not only the organization of the Russian army, but also affecting Russian society. This leads to the effective use of the latest technology by contractors and the improvement of the professionalism of military personnel and the Russian army as a whole. However, the initial cost of maintaining contract soldiers is much higher than the cost of conscript soldiers. The first experiments on the formation of military units from contract soldiers were carried out in the early 1990s. The first unsuccessful experiment in transferring the army to a contract system for recruiting privates and sergeants in Russia began in 1992. The peak of the unsuccessful experiment came in the summer - autumn of 1993 - the experiment failed due to insufficient funding and the absence of a social package of benefits for contract soldiers.

However, even now material rewards and social benefits for contractors are minimal. It can be assumed that, provided that favorable socio-economic conditions are provided for a significant part of the conscripts, this type of service in the Armed Forces can become an attractive and prestigious type of public service. An important role in the growth of motivation to serve under the contract can be played by positive advertising in the media. Support for the transition to a professional army is significantly higher among groups with higher social resources and the potential to implement them.

The introduction of alternative civil service (ACS) has become an important event in the socio-political life of the Russian Federation. Perhaps in the future, the ACS Institute will be replenished with a large number of potential participants, the number of which can be measured in tens and hundreds of thousands. Jobs for those mobilized as part of the alternative civil service can be found in orphanages and homes, nursing homes, and disabled people. These jobs, as a rule, are characterized by relatively difficult working conditions and are not prestigious and unattractive for most of the traditional workers, but the social demand for the volume of such work is increasing. Military reforms are met with support in Russian society, especially among those categories of conscripts and other social groups who receive social benefits or advantages as a result of the introduction of the recruitment of the alternative civilian service. The problem of assessing the socio-economic consequences of recruiting the composition of the alternative civilian service is difficult to predict in the long term. It should be assumed that many social groups will benefit from these innovations. However, in its current form, these transformations cannot solve the main problem of the Russian army - the plight of soldiers (called for military service) and officers.

Social aspects of the military reform of the Russian Armed Forces

In post-reform Russia, complex, contradictory and often unpredictable social processes have a significant impact not only on certain social groups in Russian society, but also on servicemen and their families. Indeed, one of the main problems of the Russian army was insufficient funding. "human resource", ineffective mechanisms of social protection of soldiers and officers. All these and many other problems cannot be solved by gradually correcting the shortcomings inherent in the Russian army. Therefore, in order to solve the numerous social problems of the Russian army, it is necessary to implement comprehensive measures, the purpose of which is to take targeted actions aimed at radically transforming the system of social protection of Russian military personnel.

The low wages of the military and insufficient funding for the maintenance of the army have become one of the important problems that need to be addressed immediately. In this regard, economic measures of the Government were adopted or are planned to be adopted, the purpose of which is to replace the benefits of military personnel with monetary compensation. Calculated for 2002-2010. The program "State housing certificates" partly contributed to the solution of this problem. The functioning of the mortgage system for officers will solve the housing problem for many servicemen.

Having considered the main aspects of the military reform and the impact of its social aspects on Russian society, we can come to the following conclusions:
1. Russia, as a great power on which international security depends, must have a combat-ready army that meets the most modern requirements. The need to counter terrorist threats and repel the threats of potential aggressors obliges servicemen to constantly improve the military-technical equipment of the army.
2. A very negative social climate has developed in the modern Russian army, cases of "hazing relationship". To increase public confidence in the army, it is necessary to curb bullying. Frequent cases of violation of basic human rights in the army determine the negative attitude of many conscripts to military service. Numerous illegal ways of evading military conscription are widespread.
3. The military reform carried out in Russia for more than a century and a half has become one of the key events in Russian social and political life. It has a great influence on Russian society and affects the interests of many social groups and lobbies.
4. The most urgent problem of military reform has a rational solution feasible for the Russian economy and society. Since 2001, it has entered the accelerated implementation process. The successful implementation of the military reform of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation will make it possible to move to a new system of troop recruitment without prejudice to the combat capabilities of military units, ensure the necessary number of trained reserves, eliminate many aspects of social tension in society, which is characteristic of the current conscription system, and ensure Russian society's support for reforms.

Work with personnel

Referring to the authoritative studies of domestic experts in the field of military construction and military management, B.L. Belyakov singles out the problems of educating the personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, and also focuses his research interest on the substantive characteristics of their influence. He points out that the problems of modern military education cause such a factor as the disintegration of the relatively effective system of educational work that previously functioned in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and has developed over decades, including the strengthening of military discipline, with servicemen of various ethnic groups and nations, along with introducing a confessional factor into the military environment.

Slow and protracted phased creation of a new system of indoctrination work that does not meet the main goals and objectives of the concept of transition to a unitary system of indoctrination work in military collectives of various branches of the Armed Forces. This slow process of transition to a unitary system of education, in his opinion, also hinders more efficient and well-coordinated work of the command and commanders of military units, as well as the system of bureaucratic departments of educational work to unite and conduct educational work in multinational or multi-ethnic military collectives of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Moreover, the absence in the Armed Forces of a scientifically and conceptually substantiated system and training program for specialists in the humanities (philologists, ethnologists and historians) who are specially trained to conduct socially oriented work (information, educational, etc.) with military personnel of various ethnic groups and nationalities inhabiting the Russian Federation.

In the 70s of the last century, there were no serious interethnic or interethnic conflicts in the Soviet army, and the grandfather structure prevailed in the system of social relations in army collectives. Later, when solidarity in army collectives on the basis of nationality, ethnicity, or compatriotism acquired a large-scale character, the compatriot-status system of social relations in many cases prevailed in army collectives over the traditional "grandfather" and even destroy the latter. With the collapse of the USSR and the increased national homogeneity of the Russian army, the criminal system came to the fore.

In the modern Russian army, many commanders and their educational assistants need to work and act mainly in extraordinary conditions and with some elements of innovation and even, under certain conditions, the risk of solving urgent problems and tasks of increased pedagogical complexity. At the same time, it is also necessary to take into account that some commanders have lost their former ideological and moral and value orientations of the traditional system of educational work that has developed in the Russian and Soviet army, and new spiritual values ​​in educational activities have not been formed. Unsuccessful experiments with the search for a national idea, an ostentatious appeal to national and ethno-confessional sources, a drop in the standard of living of a significant number of the country's population led to social and legal vulnerability and uncertainty about the future for a significant number of the military. All these factors have a negative effect on the pedagogical activity of officers in the army in strengthening military discipline in military collectives. It should also be noted that the solution of many of the above problems and challenges is possible by referring to the theoretical, conceptual and practical methods of sociological science and involving professional sociologists in eliminating the consequences of these dysfunctional phenomena in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

Along with this they read:
Politics and military reform
Army reform
MTC with France