Stalin's line. myths and reality

Mikhail Vinichenko, Valentin Runov

"Stalin Line" in battle

Introduction

The appearance on the battlefield and a sharp increase in the number of tanks and aircraft, the mechanization and motorization of military formations and the activities of troops, including sappers, the experience of using underground space by armed formations during the struggle for fortresses and in the field during the First World War could not but affect on the further development of the theory and practice of using underground space for military purposes. The desire of the leadership of many states in peacetime to protect themselves from a sudden invasion of the enemy led to the emergence in the interwar period of a new type of use of the underground space of long-term fortifications, which was laid during the First World War. Then, having lost operational independence, fortresses and forts began to fit into the defense of armies as its constituent parts. As a result, they were transformed into long-term field-oriented fortifications. With the improvement of the defense of armies, field positions and fortresses began to form a single whole, which served as the basis for the emergence of a trend towards the creation of lines of long-term fortifications by many European states. This trend was significantly developed in the 30s of the XX century, when fortification lines began to be erected on the borders of various countries. The main ones were the "lines" of Maginot, Siegfried, Mannerheim, fortified areas on the western Soviet border, in the Far East and others.

The essence of the new use of the underground space of long-term fortifications by armed formations was the integration of forms with a significant shift in the emphasis in the ground-underground system to the underground component. The lines of long-term fortifications embodied almost all the experience of using underground space gained during the First World War, including conducting mine (counter-mine) combat in the field.

In the interwar period, the main forms of using the underground space were the shelter of troops, underground maneuvers and mine (counter-mine) combat. Each of these forms in this period had its own peculiarity and differences from those used earlier. The form that appeared during the First World War, such as conducting combined arms combat underground in the field, as well as its combination with other forms of using underground space, as well as with ground, air-ground combat operations, has not yet found a clear description and comprehension by military scientists and practices. Therefore, in scientific works, instructions, in the training of troops, they were not given sufficient attention.

The development of the underground infrastructure of large cities and the theater of operations itself created favorable conditions for the evolution of views on the use of underground space by armed formations in the lines of long-term fortifications. In many European cities, subways, underground communications, sewerage, water supply, cable routing, gas pipelines, etc. began to be laid. Streletsky) and near Saratov (designed by engineer V.V. Vishnitsky). The construction of the subway in Moscow began. By 1931, the Rovsky underground canal was put into operation in France and the Brommat underground hydroelectric power station was under construction.

Rovsky underground channel was part of the Marseille-Rhone canal and had a length of 7118 meters with a navigable width of 18 meters. Its clear opening reached 22 meters and a height of 15.4 meters, which exceeded the width of the Paris Metro tunnel at the Auteuil station, where the tunnel had a clear opening of 20 meters, as well as the Barcelona Metro stations.

The Brommat Underground Power Plant was a 7,200 meter long underground channel that housed a 180,000 hp turbine. After passing through the turbine of the underground station, the water went out through the sewer at the confluence of the Truyère and Bromme rivers. The placement of energy sources underground made it possible to increase their survivability from the impact of enemy aircraft in the event of hostilities in the area, as well as the stability of industrial enterprises dependent on electricity.

These and other underground structures testified to the desire of civil builders to develop underground infrastructure. However, in the theory and practice of the use of underground space by armed formations, there have been no significant changes in the use of existing and under construction underground structures in cities and field conditions.

Long-term structures, on the contrary, absorbed the accumulated experience of using the underground to strengthen the defense of the borders of states. The lines of fortified areas became the basis of the strategic defense of the Soviet Union and other European states. Absorbing large material and labor resources, they gave hope to the military and political leadership to gain time in the event of foreign aggression. However, not a single state was able to put into practice the strengths of these fortifications in the event of a surprise attack by the enemy.

Unlike the "lines" created in the West (Maginot, Siegfried, Mannerheim), the official term "Stalin's line" did not exist in the Soviet Union. This term first appeared in colloquial jargon, and later was used by some researchers for the general name of what was created along the line of our western borders in case of war. Therefore, the "Stalin Line" significantly went beyond the defensive engineering structures and, in addition to the fortified areas proper, also included the defensive positions of the border troops, the foreground of the military cover formations, the positions of the field filling of the state border cover army formations, army and front reserves.

It is known that on June 22, 1941, ten armies were deployed from the Baltic to the Black Sea as part of three Soviet fronts.

Two armies were deployed in the Baltic region. The 8th Army of the Northwestern Front was commanded by Lieutenant General P.P. Sobennikov, and the chief of staff was Major General G.A. Larionov, the 11th Army was commanded by Lieutenant General V.I. Morozov, Chief of Staff Major General I.T. Shlemin. These armies were to resist the German troops advancing on Leningrad.

In the zone of the Western Front were deployed: 3rd Army - Commander Lieutenant General V.I. Kuznetsov, Chief of Staff, Major General A.K. Kondratiev; 10th Army - Commander Major General K.D. Golubev, Chief of Staff Major General P.I. Lyapin and the 4th Army - Commander Major General A.A. Korobkov, Chief of Staff Colonel A.M. Sandals. These armies were intended to repel the aggression of the German troops advancing on Minsk and further on Moscow.

The largest was the Southwestern Front, in which four armies were deployed to cover the state border. The 5th Army was commanded by Major General of the Tank Forces M.I. Potapov, and the chief of staff was Major General D.S. Pisarevsky. It was followed by: 6th Army - Commander Lieutenant General I.N. Muzychenko, chief of staff - brigade commander N.P. Ivanov; 26th Army - Commander Lieutenant General F.Ya. Kostenko, chief of staff - Colonel I.S. Varennikov; 12th Army - Commander Major General P.G. Ponedelin, Chief of Staff - Major General B.I. Arushunyan. These armies covered the Soviet territory in the Kiev strategic direction and directly Kyiv from the German troops.

On the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, to counteract mainly the allies of Germany - Hungary and Romania - the 9th Army of the Odessa Military District was deployed, commanded by Colonel General Ya.T. Cherevichenko, Chief of Staff - Major General M.V. Zakharov. On June 25, 1941, the Southern Front was deployed on the basis of this army and other formations - commander I.V. Tyulenev, Chief of Staff Major General G.D. Shishenin. These armies had to resist the German troops, who were striving to capture the southern (seaside) regions of Ukraine.

Then the tactical level begins, at the top of which were the corps controls. These were rifle corps, which, as a rule, constituted the first echelon of armies covering the state border, behind which powerful army reserves were deployed, which were based on mechanized corps. The covering armies included 20 rifle, 15 mechanized, 2 cavalry and one airborne corps. The commanders and staffs of these formations planned and conducted battles in one or two operational directions.

Each division and corps relied on one or two fortified areas, and frontier guards were in front of each fortified area.

The Mannerheim line and the Maginot line, the Molotov line and the Eastern Wall, the Stalin line and the Siegfried line, Soviet and Japanese fortified areas in the Far East, etc., etc. - in this book you will find comprehensive information about all the "Chinese walls of the XX century » and professional analysis of their effectiveness.

Why in 1939-1945. did not repeat the "positional impasse" of the First World War? Is it possible in principle to create an "irresistible" line of defense? Are the colossal costs of building fortified areas justified? And how exactly did the assault groups manage to break through the most powerful defensive systems?

The construction of the first fortified areas along the western border, by order of the Soviet leadership, began almost immediately after the end of the Civil War. Conventionally, this process can be divided into three stages: preparatory, first and second.

The preparatory stage (1921–1928) was characterized by the fact that in the first peaceful years, practical work on the construction of fortifications was carried out on a very limited scale due to the limited capabilities of the country. “It is clear, with our resources and means,” noted M.V. Frunze, in a report at a meeting of military delegates to the XI Congress of the RCP (b) in the spring of 1922, “there is no need to talk about the development of the fortress system, but nevertheless, even now, despite limited funds, we are allocating something for the needs of fortress defense.”

Within the framework of this program, the first, with the entry of the Red Army to the Caucasian coast of the Black Sea (March 1921), was the Batumi fortified region. Then, after the liquidation of the Belofinsk armed conflict in Karelia, they began to build long-term fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus, intended to cover Petrograd from aggressive actions from the territory of Finland. At the same time, certain fortification works were also carried out to improve coastal fortresses and sea positions in the Baltic (Kronstadt) and Black Sea (Sevastopol, Ochakov, Kerch) theaters of military operations.

At the same time, preparations were underway for the construction of fortifications on the borders of the Soviet state: the system and forms of military engineering training of various theaters of operations were studied, fortification structures for fortified areas, standard field and long-term structures made of reinforced concrete and armor were developed. Field tests of such structures were carried out by shelling them with artillery fire from land and sea, bombing from the air, and explosions.

The first stage of active construction of fortified areas along the western border of the USSR began after 1927 with the construction of the Polotsk fortified area. This was due to the proximity of the city of Polotsk to the Soviet-Polish border (about 20 kilometers).

Large-scale construction of a number of other fortified areas has been underway since 1928. In accordance with the developed theoretical views, these fortified areas were built on the most probable directions of the enemy's offensive. Their system was designed for close cooperation between the permanent garrisons of fortified areas and field troops.

According to archival data, as of March 20, 1932, 12 fortified regions were built in three western military districts on the borders of the USSR with Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Poland and Romania in 1928-1937: Karelian, Kingisepp, Pskov, Polotsk, Minsk, Mozyr, Korostensky, Novograd-Volynsky, Letichevsky, Mogilev-Yampolsky, Rybnitsky, Tiraspolsky. In addition, another one - Kyiv UR - was erected 250 kilometers from the border to cover the capital of Ukraine. Each of the fortified regions, covering a specific operational direction, had a length of 50 to 140 kilometers and, as a rule, both or one of the flanks adjoined large natural barriers.

The intensive mass construction of fortified areas required not only the military department, but also the country's leadership to take urgent measures to significantly increase the number of special military construction organizations and units. For the construction of each fortified area, its own directorate of the chief of work (UNR) was created, which, as a rule, had 6-12 military construction sites (APU), which included offices of work supervisors, military construction units and subdivisions, and civilian labor force. Civilian personnel during construction work sometimes had restrictions on freedom of movement and were obliged to keep state secrets about the nature and content of defensive objects. In addition, engineering, sapper, rifle battalions from the troops of the border military districts took an active part in the construction of fortified areas.

During the construction of fortified areas, much attention was paid to its road equipment. Each of them adjoined the state railway network. In necessary cases, special railway lines were built inside the fortified areas (communications and railroads, ways for maneuvering armored trains, transportation of personnel). A network of auto-drawn roads from the rear, along the front of fortified areas, to warehouses and large facilities was constantly developed. Usually an airfield or landing site was built in a fortified area.

Within each fortified area, several defense centers were created, long-term defensive structures were erected, as well as living quarters for the garrison and field troops, as well as other infrastructure facilities (club, hospital, bath-laundry, etc.).

By the mid-1930s, all the main operational areas on the western Soviet border were covered by fortified areas. The military and political leadership highly appreciated the work of all those who participated in their creation. So, for example, the head of the military engineering department of the Red Army N.N. Petin and his deputy A.P. Balandin were awarded the Order of Lenin.

At the same time, these fortified areas were not without some significant shortcomings.

Firstly, the fortified areas that were being built were designed mainly to repel the offensive of the enemy infantry and cavalry. Thus, an analysis of the fortification equipment of the fortified areas built on the western border in 1928–1937 indicates that the number of gun structures designed to fight enemy tanks was only about 10% of all erected long-term structures. So, for example, in the Letichevsky fortified area there were 343 bunkers, of which 332 were machine guns and only 11 gun semi-caponiers. In the Novograd-Volynsky fortified region, which covered the Zhytomyr-Kiev operational direction, which was an open, tank-accessible area, 210 combat structures were built, of which only 44 had artillery weapons. Thus, in the fortified areas built at that time, out of 3196 fortifications, 409 were designed to accommodate caponier artillery capable of fighting enemy tanks.

Secondly, the quality of the erected structures already at that time did not ensure their resistance to the fire of new artillery. So, Ivanovsky, assistant head of the 5th department of the special department of the OGPU, and the representative of this department, Kozlov, who carried out the inspection of the fortified areas of the Ukrainian military district, on March 17, 1932, in a report addressed to the chief of staff of the Red Army A.I. Yegorova wrote that during the construction of defensive structures in the fortified areas they tested, there were cases when military structures of the M-3 type, designed only for resistance from hitting a projectile of a 75-mm cannon and 122-mm howitzer and intended to cover secondary defense sectors, were erected directly on the border, "at the forefront of the defensive line." On this basis, it was concluded that these structures, under the influence of intense artillery fire from heavy enemy guns, “will fail in a short time and can lead to disbelief among the Red Army soldiers and command staff in the power of reinforced concrete structures of normal resistance.”

Thirdly, as some military experts noted, many bunkers were tactically illiterately installed, since they did not provide mutual fire support. In addition, they were designed to repel enemy frontal attacks and were not prepared to fire at the flanks and rear.

By decision of the Soviet government in 1938 and 1939, the third stage of the construction of fortified areas began. In order to increase their density on the western border, the construction of eight more fortified regions was begun: Kamenets-Podolsky, Izyaslavsky, Ostrovsky, Ostropolsky, Sebezhsky, Slutsky, Starokonstantinovsky and Shepetovsky.

At the same time, the improvement of previously built fortified areas continued. Within them, the number of firing structures of various types was increased and obstacles were strengthened, primarily due to the creation of new minefields. To strengthen the anti-tank defense, artillery pieces were additionally installed in pillboxes. The protective properties of long-term structures increased. So, 1028 structures were concreted, the rest received reinforcement by pouring an additional layer of earth.

The fortified area consisted of a chain of defense centers (battalion defense areas), each of which occupied an area from 3 to 5 kilometers along the front and from 2 to 3 kilometers in depth and was supposed to be engaged in a separate machine gun and artillery battalion (opab). The battalion areas were placed in such a way that the gaps between them were difficult to access, swamped or occupied by rivers and lakes. Each of them, in turn, consisted of 3-4 company strongholds (ROP) with 3-4 machine-gun long-term defensive structures (DOS) in each. The garrison of each DOS was equated to a platoon. Thus, in total, the BRO could contain 10-15 machine guns (bunkers) and 1-3 artillery semi-caponiers.

For a better understanding of the equipment of fortified areas, it is desirable to first understand the specific terminology.

DOT (long-term firing point) - a fortification made of strong and durable materials (reinforced concrete, armor), designed for artillery, mortar and machine gun fire. According to the military engineering terminology of the first half of the 20th century, long-term firing points were divided into caponiers, semi-caponiers, wardrobe trunks, blockhouses, defensive barracks, etc. According to the design features, bunkers were built with one-, two- and multi-penetration. By the number of tiers - one- and two-tier. The bunkers consisted of premises for various purposes - casemates.

DZOT (wood-earth firing point) - a field-type fortification structure made of logs, boards, turf, etc., designed for machine-gun fire.

Caponier (from the French word "saroniege" - niche) - a fortification for flanking fire in two opposite directions.

POLUKAPONIR - a fortification for flanking fire in one direction.

According to the materials used in construction, caponiers and semi-caponiers were divided into casemated (reinforced concrete, brick), armored (armor, steel), open (logs, earth, etc.). According to the nature of the weapons and the method of combat use, they differed:

Artillery or artillery-machine-gun caponiers (APK) and semi-caponiers (APK) erected in the most important, critical areas of defense;

Machine-gun caponiers (PC) and semi-caponiers (PPK) being built in auxiliary directions.

CASEMAT (from the French word "kazemate" - a room with thick walls) - a room in closed fortifications that protects people and weapons from the effects of enemy firepower.

According to their purpose, the following types of casemates are distinguished:

The casemate of the bunker commander, which was equipped with observation devices (periscopes, spheroscopes, etc.). In the Red Army, the PSF periscopes (1.5x magnification, 30-degree view), TU (4x magnification, 10-degree view) were most often used. In the agro-industrial complex, more advanced periscopes of the PDN-2 type (10x magnification, 40-degree view) were installed. The protective tubes of the periscopes had locking covers at the upper end, which were closed from the inside with a special rod.

Casemates for cannons and machine guns. In these casemates, loopholes were arranged for firing. The size of the embrasures along the outer surface of the walls is from 1.2 to 2.2 meters with a height of 0.8 meters. The edges of the embrasure are either smooth or stepped. The latter are more common in frontal walls. A steel frame was installed inside the embrasure with a rectangular hole for a machine gun or a square one for a cannon. Some frames in the lower part form a steel table for moving the gun (installation). A metal bracket was provided in the vault above the table, which was used when servicing the gun. From the inside, the embrasures were closed with steel hemispherical shutters.

In some structures, oblique shafts for cartridge cases were arranged to throw cartridges out. But more often special cellars with hatches were equipped for the same purposes. But in some cases, pillboxes did not have devices for removing shells from the casemate at all.

A casemate for accommodating a garrison is more common in large - two-tier agro-industrial complex and agro-industrial complex. It was adapted for resting personnel, eating and providing medical care. The room was equipped with wooden or metal bunks, in some cases replaced with simple straw. Here, in the absence of other premises, ammunition, personal belongings, washing accessories, uniforms, etc. were stored.

Casemates for filter-ventilation installations (FVU) were located on the lower tier, and in single-tier structures - closer to the rear wall. Diesel plants (DU) were designed to generate electricity and power life support systems, including ventilation and air purification. Here, apparently, was the stock of G.M. Unfortunately, we do not have information about the brands and types of FVU and remote control.

In addition, there were casemates for the placement of the garrison, casemates for filter-ventilation and diesel installations, casemates-warehouses, casemates-sunblocks. All of them communicated with each other through hatches, galleries, metal and lattice doors, as well as airlocks with gas-tight doors.

The entrance to the caponier or semi-caponier was locked with a steel door, protected from shells and the impact of the shock wave by an elbowed draft (U-shaped corridor).

In some bunkers, it was planned to place an arsenal warehouse for storing ammunition, weapons, various zips, uniforms, equipment, food, medicines, building materials.

The project provided for equipping the casemates with lighting, communication systems (telephones, radio stations and speaking pipes), water supply (wells and boreholes), sewerage, less often - a collective chemical protection system (PCS) with gas-tight locks. For this, the inner walls had numerous niches, holes, openings, pipes of various sizes and sections.

Some buildings were equipped with emergency exits and numerous wells, shafts and cellars, the purpose of some of which we have not established. Probably, many of them were used in accordance with the direct purpose of this or that casemate.

In the fortified areas built on the western borders of the USSR until the autumn of 1939, most machine-gun pillboxes were blockhouses, that is, structures that could fire in a wide sector. Gun semi-caponiers could fire in a relatively narrow sector, mainly flank or oblique. The intervals between the areas were shot through by machine-gun and artillery fire and could reach 5 kilometers.

The most common structures were machine-gun pillboxes-blockhouses, which in turn were divided into two types - large and small.

Large DOS were usually two-story and measured approximately 12 by 12 meters. The thickness of their walls ranged from 1.4 to 1.9 meters, and the ceilings - from 0.9 to 1.35 meters. On the top floor of these DOSs, from 3 to 6 embrasures were equipped.

The most common version of the small type DOS had 2 or 3 loopholes. They were one-story, 8–9 by 6 meters in size, with walls from 1 to 1.5 meters thick, ceilings 0.8–0.9 meters. Such DOSs were placed behind large structures, between them, or covered them from the rear. In addition, they were installed in the intervals between the BRO.

These fortifications with one and a half meter walls could withstand multiple hits of 203 mm concrete-piercing shells and single hits of 280–305 mm caliber shells. DOSs with thinner walls withstood multiple hits of 152 mm and single hits of 203 mm shells. From the inside, the walls and ceilings usually had a spall-resistant coating of steel 5–7 mm thick, which excluded the garrison from being hit by concrete fragments. Sometimes, instead of an anti-spall coating, a fine-mesh wire mesh in two or three layers was placed in the inner layer of concrete.

Machine-gun embrasures had a conical shape, tapering inwards. Their outer opening was 1.5–3 meters wide and about 0.4 meters high, while the inner one was 0.12 meters wide and 0.18 meters high. It was almost impossible to get into such an embrasure, especially located near the ground itself, even from an anti-tank gun. In addition, it was covered with an armored shutter 20-40 mm thick, which could take three fixed positions in height, so that the size of the hole could be adjusted using a special lever depending on the position of the machine gun barrel.

In pillboxes, Maxim machine guns of the 1910 model were mounted on a special metal or wooden machine. If the first was used, then the gunner sat astride a bicycle seat and could turn the machine gun, resting his feet on the floor. Vertical aiming during firing was carried out by the second number using a special lifting screw (as was also provided for a machine gun on a field machine). If the machine was wooden, then the first number carried out horizontal aiming, moving the machine gun with his hands. Each one was supposed to have 20 thousand rounds of ammunition, and for a manual one - 10 thousand each. thousand were kept in zinc in a storehouse on the lower floor of the bunker or in a casemate-shelter.

Gun semi-caponiers (orpk) were designed to conduct, as a rule, flanking fire. For the most part, they were two-storeyed and positioned so as to flank anti-tank ditches with their fire, to shoot through the gaps between the battalion defense areas. The approaches to them were usually covered by machine-gun dos.

Each orpk was armed with one or two guns and could have, in addition, one or two more machine guns. The thickness of their walls and coverings was the same as that of the large-type machine-gun DOS, but the defensive qualities of these structures were further enhanced by earthen sprinkling.

Artillery pillboxes were armed with 45 mm and 76 mm guns. 45-mm guns could fire on the horizon in a sector of 60 degrees, at elevation and declination angles of 10-15 degrees. The firing range is up to 2 kilometers, and for tanks - up to one kilometer. They were also equipped with a 76-mm cannon of the 1902 model with a barrel of 30 calibers on a casemate gun carriage of the Putilov factory of 1932. Sometimes, instead of the classic “three-inch gun”, its “anti-assault” version of the 1903 model with a barrel shortened to 20 calibers was installed. The firing range of the three-inch casemate reached 5500 meters, elevation angle - 12 degrees, descent - 7 degrees, horizontal aiming - 40 degrees.

From the side of the front, the barrels of the guns were additionally protected by baffle walls, the casemates of the two-gun bunkers were located in a ledge. Even those structures that did not have a lower floor were equipped with a room for spent cartridges under a combat casemate or diamond ditches, where a pipe was led out for ejecting spent cartridges. The storages made it possible to have a supply of several hundred shells per gun.

In addition, there were cases of the construction of heavy-duty defensive structures to accommodate a battery of 152-mm ML-20 howitzer guns, which were called "Million" because of their high cost. In particular, such structures were erected at the end of the 30s in the strip of the Karelian fortified region. These were four original artillery semi-caponiers on Mount Kallelovo. Their guns could fire at a section of the Vyborg highway in Finland from the river. Sister to the village Kivennap (Pervomayskoye) to a depth of 15 kilometers.

Particular attention was paid to the anti-tank defense of all BROs. For this purpose, anti-tank ditches were widely used, but military engineers most often sought to use the terrain, escarpment of natural slopes, covering structures with rivers, swampy streams and lakes. Before the war, gouges were used extremely rarely, they were made of granite and were called "dragon's teeth". During the war, reinforced concrete pyramids were used as gouges.

All structures of the fortified area were interconnected by telephone, and the largest, in addition, were equipped with a 6PK radio station with a transmission range of 3 kilometers by telephone and 6 kilometers by telegraph. Intercom pipes were used for intercom. The commandants of the bunkers watched the battlefield with the help of a periscope with one and a half magnification, enclosed in an armored tube. If necessary, the periscope opening was closed with a sliding armored cover 20 mm thick, controlled from the inside. Correction of artillery fire was carried out from special observation towers, which were equipped on high-rise buildings (for example, bell towers) or in tree crowns. In exceptional cases, stationary towers were arranged, which were disguised as local objects.

The ventilation system of each DOS was equipped with smoke and gas filters. In small structures, it operated from a hand-held fan with a capacity of up to 500 cubic meters. m per hour in the supply version and up to 75 cubic meters. m per hour in the exhaust. In large, machine-gun and artillery DOSs, the fans operated from a mechanical drive to a gasoline-powered unit.

All DOSs were equipped with electric lighting. In small pillboxes, current was supplied from large pillboxes through underground cables. In addition, large buildings had stoves for heating and cooking, and some artillery rooms were also equipped with a central heating system. There was no sewerage in the vast majority of buildings: during the battle, it was supposed to use portable buckets with sealed lids.

The entrance to the pillboxes was closed with an armored riveted door. Special loopholes made it possible to fire at an enemy approaching the entrance from a light machine gun.

All artillery and machine-gun DOSs of a large type were equipped with an emergency exit - a manhole with a width and height of about 0.7 meters. If the building was two-story, then the hole was arranged on the lower floor, usually on the back side of the pillbox. The manhole hole was blocked by a thin concrete wall without reinforcement, which, if necessary, had to be broken with a crowbar. After that, the personnel could get out, digging the ground. In order to prevent this wall from being pierced by a close gap of a heavy projectile, the manhole was additionally blocked by a collapsible jumper made of segments of metal channels, and the space between the channels and concrete was covered with sand. In rare cases, a concrete well led to the manhole from the outside. A trench, often covered, approached the building from behind. The same trench could surround the pillbox, which made it difficult for enemy assault groups to approach it.

Despite this, the plan for the construction of fortified areas was not even half fulfilled. In 1938, it was completed only by 45.5%, and in 1939 - by 59.2%. As it turned out, Soviet industry was unable to provide everything necessary for the construction of a line of fortified areas. In 1938, the builders received from the planned 28% cement and 27% timber. In the next year, 1939, deliveries improved somewhat, but still, according to individual indicators, they did not reach even half, for example, timber - 34%, cement - 53% of what was planned for this year. The commission of the Main Military Engineering Directorate of the Red Army, after checking the progress of work, noted that the concreted "structures do not have military weapons and internal equipment."

In total, by 1939, 22 fortified areas were built on the western border of the USSR, which were supposed to cover a distance of 2067 kilometers. Within them, 3279 long-term firing structures and a number of structures for other purposes were erected. Another 538 DOSs and many structures for other purposes were under construction.

NUMBER OF MAIN STRUCTURES IN FORTIFIED AREAS CONSTRUCTED ON THE OLD BORDER OF THE USSR DURING 1928–1930

The main shortcomings of this line of fortified areas include its relatively shallow depth (from 2 to 5 kilometers) and the low percentage of long-term defensive structures designed to deal with enemy tanks (no more than 10%). In addition, not all Red commanders considered fortified areas a promising direction in the development of military art and useful in a future war. Some of them, including the senior leadership, looked at the fortified areas "as obsolete and lost their operational-tactical significance", which led in some districts to the decision of the command to conserve them without instructions from above.

The "Stalin Line", which was never officially called that in the USSR, was one of the largest defensive projects ever implemented in mankind. It was a chain of fortified areas stretching along the western borders of the USSR, practically "from sea to sea." With its flanks, the line rested against the Karelian Isthmus and the Black Sea. The total length of the fortifications reached 1200 km. On the one hand, it actually could not be bypassed, on the other hand, too large a length did not allow creating a sufficiently dense defense. In terms of its fortifications, the line was clearly inferior to the Maginot line, although it brought much more benefit.

"Stalin Line"

Officially, the chain of these URs (mostly not bordering on each other) was never called the "Stalin Line". This name first appeared in December 1936, with the light hand of journalists from the Latvian Russian-language newspaper Segodnya. Later, her article was reprinted by the English newspaper "Daily Express", and the term "Stalin's Line" became firmly established in everyday life.

The construction of fortifications on the Stalin Line began in 1928 and continued until 1939. The line included 23 fortified areas (UR), in which more than 4,000 different long-term firing points (bunkers) were built, which were designed not only for the installation of machine guns, but also artillery pieces - first 45-76 mm, and since 1938 and guns of caliber 107, 122 or 152 mm. The battles on the "Stalin Line" even left their artistic mark in literature. Soviet writer Igor Alekseevich Akimov wrote the adventure story "The Legend of the Small Garrison".

The construction of the defensive line began in 1928 on the western border of the USSR (with Finland, the Baltic countries, Poland and Romania), initially 13 fortified areas were created: Karelsky, Kingisepp, Pskov, Polotsk, Minsk, Mozyr, Korostensky, Novograd-Volynsky, Kyiv, Letichevsky, Mogilev-Podolsky, Rybnitsky, Tiraspol. These fortified areas had a length along the front from 50 to 150 km, if possible, the flanks of the URs were covered by natural obstacles. Fortified areas were built in such a way that each of them provided control over some important route. In total, by 1938, 3196 various defensive structures were erected in 13 URs.

Artillery two-gun semi-caponier

All fortified areas built in these years had a number of identical features. The length of one UR along the front averaged 35-50 km. For defense, dense machine-gun and artillery fire was used, dispersed along the front and in depth, with a noticeable predominance of machine-gun fire. The main form of defense organization was battalion defense areas (BRO), which were in fire communication with each other. The dimensions of the BRO on the ground were most often 1x1 or 2x2 km. Such an area was intended to be occupied by one rifle battalion. For each BRO, the construction of up to 18-20 bunkers was envisaged. The firing points were located in several lines, the first line consisted of 7-8 firing points. Pillboxes were located with the possibility of fire cover for neighboring structures. The gaps between the armored personnel carriers were to be covered by artillery fire. Often the gaps between battalion defense areas were 2.5-3 km.

Reinforced concrete firing points provided the possibility of all-round fire with a predominance of frontal fire. The most common structure was a bunker with three machine gun embrasures. Among the artillery, the most widespread were two-gun semi-caponiers, in which 76.2-mm field guns were installed. In addition, anti-tank pillboxes and small machine-gun embrasures were created, with 1-2 machine-gun embrasures. The level of protection of bunkers allowed them to withstand 1-2 hits of 152-mm shells. Since the bunkers had the ability to cover each other with fire, the distance between them was usually 500-600 meters. A common feature of SDs is the relatively low number of artillery emplacements.

Three-hambrazurny machine-gun bunker

In 1938, the construction of 8 more fortified areas began in the USSR: Ostrovsky, Sebezhsky, Slutsky, Shepetovsky, Izyaslavsky, Starokonstantinovsky, Ostropolsky, Kamenetz-Podolsky. During the period from 1938 to 1939, 1028 structures were erected in these URs (according to plans, it was planned to build about 2 thousand). The construction of the fortification was stopped due to the transfer of the border to the west in 1939-1940. The construction of new SDs on the new border has begun. Most of the fortifications on the "Stalin Line" were mothballed.

Minsk fortified area

On the territory of Belarus, 4 Urs were built - Polotsk, Minsk, Slutsk and Mozyr, in which there were 966 bunkers. The strongest not only of the Belarusian, but also of all the other URs of the "Stalin Line" was considered the Minsk UR. Which is not surprising, because it was here that the direct road to Moscow passed, which for hundreds of years has been used by all would-be conquerors.

The length of the Minsk UR was 140 km. In total, it consisted of about 327 bunkers. The depth of its line of defense in the main directions reached 6 km, in peripheral directions up to 2-3 km. The fortified area included in its structure not only bunkers, but also a developed network of various engineering barriers, full profile trenches, overhead and underground communication lines, as well as a developed network of roads.

The machine-gun pillboxes of the Minsk UR were mostly three-pipe and were armed with machine guns of the Maxim system mounted on a special caponier machine. Most of the artillery was located in two-gun semi-caponiers. Such a semi-caponier was equipped with two 76-mm guns in an armored caponier mount. In addition, there were special anti-tank firing points, which were created using turrets decommissioned from T-26 tanks (45-mm cannon and machine gun).

Machine gun "Maxim" on caponier installation

The reinforced concrete walls of the pillboxes were up to 1.5 meters thick, and the ceilings were up to 1.1 meters and could withstand heavy artillery shells of up to 152 mm caliber. Each bunker was equipped with a gas filter-absorber, a fan for the removal of powder gases from the bunker and the inflow of fresh air, a periscope, electrical alarms, speaking pipes, and telephone communications.

In tactical terms, the bunkers of the Minsk UR were supposed to cover the capital of the Republic of Minsk and the city of Borisov from enemy attacks from the Molodechno and Vileyka regions. Already on June 24, units of the 3rd Panzer Group of Gotha crossed Viliya, and on June 25, the German 57th Motorized Corps captured Molodechno. On the same day, German tanks came close to the fortification zone of the Minsk UR, which was not occupied by troops. The fortified area was to be defended by units of the 44th Rifle Corps of Divisional Commander Yushkevich, who was assigned the task of defending the UR on the evening of June 24. The echelons of the 64th and 108th rifle divisions of his corps went from Smolensk and Vyazma to Minsk, and from there they went on foot to occupy the fortifications in its western sector. Two more rifle divisions, the 100th and 162nd, from the 2nd rifle corps occupied the defense zone east and northeast of Minsk. At the junction of Minsk and Slutsk URs, the 20th mechanized corps of General Nikitin was supposed to take up defense.

German soldiers inspecting a bunker on the Stalin Line

However, the units simply did not have time to completely occupy the fortification zone, while the northwestern approaches to Minsk turned out to be virtually uncovered. The Soviet command dispersed the available forces on a broad front, thereby predetermining their further defeat. On average, one division accounted for up to 50 km along the front. With such a density of defense, many pillboxes were simply not occupied by troops, which negatively affected the possibility of holding the UR.

Already on the 26th, the German 20th Panzer Division broke through the Minsk SD in the zone of the 64th Infantry Division. And on June 27, the commander of the 100th Infantry Division Russiyanov, in order to rectify the situation, was forced to conduct a counterattack without artillery and anti-tank weapons. Instead, the division commander, relying on his Spanish combat experience, ordered 12 trucks of glass containers and several tons of fuel to be delivered from the Minsk glass factory. The 100th division was one of the first to meet the German tanks with Molotov cocktails.

In the end, all the fortified areas were broken through to the full depth, and by December 1941 the Germans stood at the gates of Moscow. But even those days, somewhere weeks, and near Kyiv and months, during which the built URs helped the Red Army units to restrain the advance of the Nazis to the East, contributed to the victory of 1945.

Sources used:

www.belgazeta.by/20060626.25/010162211/
www.volk59.narod.ru/Stalinline.htm
www.fortressby.com/index.php?option=com_deeppockets&task=catShow&id=10&Itemid=15
www.belarustourism.by/belarus/history/sovet/object-war/stalin-line/

Sergey GRINCHEVSKY

IN MEMORY OF THE COURAGE OF SOVIET SOLDIERS IN 2005, on the year of the 60th anniversary of the Great Victory, a unique open-air military historical museum “Stalin's Line” was created 30 km from Minsk. The opening of the museum caused a big fuss in the Belarusian opposition press - they wrote about the "restoration of Stalinism" in Belarus (after all, the official name "Stalin's line" never existed), that the "line" itself did not exist either, since all the fortifications on the old western The border of the USSR was blown up on the eve of the war, and the long-term firing points (DOT) shown to visitors are nothing more than a remake, that the “Stalin Line” did not play any role in the Great Patriotic War, and if so, why then reconstruct it?

The creator of the term "Stalin's line" can rightfully be considered ... Minister of Public Education and Propaganda of the Third Reich P.J. Goebbels, who in the summer of 1941 announced the breakthrough of powerful fortifications on the old Soviet border. For political reasons, the Soviet Information Bureau denied this statement, stating that "no special line of Stalin existed and does not exist", and instead the Germans stumbled upon "fortifications of the usual field type", and that the Germans invented the "Stalin line" in order to attribute undeserved success and glory.

In fact, the construction of fortified regions (UR) on the western border of the Soviet Union dates back to 1928, when they began to build the Karelian fortified area (covering Leningrad from Finland) in Leningrad (LVO), Polotsk and Mozyr - in the Belarusian military district (BVO) . In 1929, they began to create the Kyiv fortified area, and in 1930-1932. - six more fortified areas in Ukraine as part of the Kyiv Special Military District (KOVO): Korostensky, Letichevsky, Novograd-Volynsky, Mogilev-Podolsky, Rybnitsa and Tiraspolsky (since 1939 - as part of the newly formed Odessa Military District), as well as Minsk - in the BVO , Pskov and Kingisep - in the LVO.

The main type of defensive structures were long-term firing points, prepared for a long and stubborn defense, with a staff of specially designed troops. As a rule, these formations consisted of several machine-gun and artillery battalions, support and service units, and could defend themselves independently or in cooperation with combined arms units.

Each fortified area was assigned a corresponding line and depth of defense. As stated in the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense, fortified areas should “reliably cover the most important operational areas or areas, as well as create strongholds for the actions of field troops in defense and offensive operations; to be a solid base for the maneuver of our forces in the event of an enemy offensive in neighboring operational axes. The defense of fortified areas should be built on the destruction of the enemy by fire in front of the front edge of the main line of defense and by counterattacks by field troops in the event that he is wedged into the location of our troops.

Minsk fortified area

Start of construction - 1932. The first commandant of the UR is Gailit.

The construction of the UR was supervised by the chief of armaments of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA) M.N. Tukhachevsky, commander of the BVO troops I.P. Uborevich, Head of the Combat Training Department of the Red Army A.I. Sedyakin.

Granite for construction was mined in Ukraine, fittings, steel, I-beams were supplied by factories in the Urals, caponier obturators, loophole shutters, etc. were cast at enterprises in Leningrad. The work was carried out by workers hired from the local population. The concrete work was generally completed in 1934. Staffing with weapons and equipment was carried out intermittently until the start of the war.

In 1936, a plan was developed for the construction of the second stage of this SD, but it was not implemented. By the beginning of 1936, the UR included 242 machine-gun firing points (one-, two- and three-armours), nine anti-tank defense structures (with T-26 turrets), 16 semi-caponier guns (OPK) for two 76.2-mm guns of the 1902 model years and one gun caponier for four of the same 76.2-mm guns. Front of SD - 160 km.

The greatest depth of defense is up to 5.5 km.

In 1938, a decision was made to strengthen the SD, primarily artillery. The work was carried out under the guidance of F.A. Pomerantseva, V.A. Vishnevsky and I.A. Telyatnikova. As part of the reinforcement, ten new-type RPKs were built on the main defense line. Work ceased after September 1939, the unfinished facilities were liquidated, and the completed ones were mothballed.

Why were fortified areas created?

It should be noted that the decision to create fortified areas at that time was made in a difficult political situation both within the USSR and abroad. The country, which had just recovered from the devastation caused by the First World War and the Civil War and intervention, was in international isolation, various provocations broke out on its borders every now and then. Accordingly, it was necessary to reliably cover the borders of the state. The primary task was to create powerful defensive fortifications on the border with Poland, which at that time seemed to be the vanguard of a possible anti-Soviet front.

In 1938 - early 1939, due to the general deterioration of the international situation that followed the conclusion of the Munich Agreement between Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy in 1938 and the division of Czechoslovakia between Germany, Poland and Hungary, the construction of eight more fortified areas on the western border began. : Ostrovsky, Sebezhsky (LVO), Slutsky (BVO), Shepetovsky, Izyaslavsky, Staro-Konstantinovsky, Ostropolsky and Kamenetz-Podolsky (KOVO). The new fortified areas were supposed to fill operational gaps in the "Stalin Line", linking together, in most cases, already built fortifications.

However, the construction was stopped after the annexation of Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, Bessarabia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia to the Soviet Union, when the "Stalin Line" lost its strategic purpose, and the so-called "Molotov Line" began to be built on the new western borders, however, so to the end and not completed by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War.

In total, by June 22, 1941, 21 fortified areas were built on the old border of the USSR. It should be noted that all structures built in 1938-1939 remained unarmed and without loopholes.

Fortified areas on the "Stalin Line" were mothballed. Here is what Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. wrote about this in his memoirs. Zhukov: “The fortified areas on the old state border were not liquidated and disarmed, as stated in some memoirs and historical developments. They were retained in all the most important sectors and directions, and it was intended to further strengthen them. But the course of hostilities at the beginning of the war did not allow the full implementation of the planned measures and the proper use of the old fortified areas ... ".

Contrary to numerous myths, the "Stalin Line" has never been an impregnable armored fortress, even closely comparable to the same Maginot Line, and with the help of which it would be possible to stop and destroy the advancing tank groups of Nazi troops without any problems.

Such a task was never set before her - the vast majority of the fortified areas of the "Stalin Line" were built against a specific potential enemy - the Polish army, an army of cavalry-infantry type, which was armed with an extremely small number of tanks, aircraft and heavy artillery. Accordingly, in many fortified areas there were not even artillery (Polotsk UR) and anti-tank positions (Mozyr and Korosten fortified areas).

The armament of 90% of the structures on the "Stalin Line" were machine guns, and only 10% of them were equipped for artillery guns - fortified areas on the "Stalin Line" were designed and created to withstand large masses of infantry and cavalry and protect from field artillery shelling.

The total length of the "Stalin Line" was 1835 km. It included about 3,000 firing points, that is, there were 1.7 combat structures per 1 km of the fortification line. The depth of the fortified areas was small and amounted to only 1 to 5 km.

In the mid-1930s, caponiers of the “M” type with two to four embrasures for “Maxim” machine guns on special machines were the most common in fortified areas. The garrison of such bunkers consisted of 10-12 Red Army soldiers and commanders.

Type B machine-gun caponiers with several embrasures, two-story (with personnel rest rooms located on the lower floor) and single-embrasure machine-gun semi-caponiers and similar structures for 45-mm guns were also built. Gun caponiers for 76 mm guns in the 1930s were most often built with 2 guns, and 4 guns were the most powerful. Gun embrasures were closed with armored shields, which were raised and lowered by cables using a winch (camouflage nets moved in the same way). The gun structures, in addition to cannons, had machine guns and were complex fortifications, the garrisons of which numbered more than 30 people. and were provided with warehouses for weapons, food, a sanitary unit, a canteen and other underground facilities. Sometimes 45-mm cannons and machine guns were mounted on structures in armored turrets. All bunkers were equipped with periscopes for surveillance, a telephone with an underground cable, the simplest plumbing, as well as filter-ventilation installations that allowed the garrisons to withstand a gas attack. In particularly important directions, bunkers could be placed tens of meters apart and connected by underground concrete passages (terns). In addition to firing structures, the fortified areas had underground warehouses, power plants, barracks and other structures.

Slutsk fortified area

The order to start work on the construction of the Slutsk SD was issued by a directive of June 25, 1938. It was planned to build six defense units of three different types. In August 1939, it was decided to reinforce the fortified area with eight positions for artillery batteries.

The main line of defense of the UR with a length of up to 60 km passed along the Velikaya Raevka, Timkovichi, Semezhevo line. By the autumn of 1939, 145 fortifications out of the planned 262 were erected in five defense centers. The constructed structures were already mothballed in the fall of 1939. Armament and embrasure boxes were not supplied.

What the inspection found

In 1938 - early 1939, a large-scale inspection of the fortified areas on the "Stalin Line" was carried out by the services of the People's Commissariats of Defense and Internal Affairs of the USSR, which revealed numerous violations during construction. So, for example, the act of the commission stated that the Pskov SD "cannot be occupied by troops ... since up to half of the structures are 20-40 cm filled with water that appeared due to an incorrect assessment of the depth of groundwater. At the same time, the water supply does not work... There is no electrical equipment in the fortified areas... The living quarters of the UR have high humidity and stale air... The supply centers of the UR have not been built...

There are no food depots ... Due to the illiterate planning of the SD, their firing structures cannot fire at a distance of more than 50-100 m, since the terrain has hillocks, ravines and uncut forests ...

The embrasures of the bunkers are designed for the use of Maxim machine guns, but are equipped with machines of an unknown design ... The artillery armament of the UR consists of 6 obsolete field guns of 1877, for which there are no shells ... The territory of the UR is not guarded.

In the course of its work, the commission repeatedly met local residents passing in the immediate vicinity of firing structures to shorten the path between the villages ... ".

Other fortified areas on the "Stalin Line" were awarded similar characteristics.

Kyiv fortified area

Start of construction - 1929. The first commandant - P.E. Knyagitsky.

The total length of the front edge of the Kyiv fortified area was 85 km, the depth of the defensive zone was up to 5 km. A total of 257 long-term firing points were built. Basically, these were machine-gun pillboxes for one or four embrasures. To strengthen the defense through four or five machine-gun bunkers, long-term artillery structures were erected - semi-caponiers for two guns. The main work was completed in 1935.

Taking into account the lessons of the beginning of World War II ...

The beginning of World War II (Wehrmacht blitzkriegs in Europe, the breakthrough of the Mannerheim line by the Red Army), as well as the revealed shortcomings in the design and construction of fortified areas, made their own adjustments to the system of building fortified areas and their modernization. Thus, the Main Military Engineering Directorate of the Red Army recommended significantly increasing the depth of fortified areas (up to 30-50 km) and, simultaneously with long-term defensive points and structures, building field fortifications for the troops, as well as arranging a fortified area ahead of the fortified areas with barriers, blockages, anti-tank obstacles and mines. fields, which has never been done before.

Unfortunately, by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, work on the modernization of the “Stalin Line” had not begun, which allowed the Nazi troops, in most cases, to overcome and capture it without any problems.

At the same time, it cannot be said that the fortified areas on the “Stalin Line” did not play any role at all in the Great Patriotic War. Thus, the Karelian fortified area, occupied by the troops of the 23rd Army, for three years held back the attack on Leningrad from the north of the German-Finnish troops. The Kingisep UR, which since 1940 was under the jurisdiction of the border troops of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, held out for two weeks, but its fortifications could not withstand the massive bombardments and turned out to be of little use for repelling tank attacks.

For a little more than ten days, the Ostropolsky and Letichevsky fortified areas were fighting, left only because of the threat of encirclement. The garrison of one of the bunkers of the Mogilev-Podolsky UR was completely killed, for a week in full encirclement, heroically repelling enemy attacks.

The Kyiv fortified area, the most powerful UR on the "Stalin Line", played a huge role in the defense of Kyiv, helping to contain the German offensive on this sector of the front for a month. Only by pulling up long-range guns and firing pillboxes almost point-blank, the Germans were able to break the resistance of its defenders.

The courageous defense of the Soviet troops in the fortified areas of the “Stalin Line”, despite the imperfection of the structures that were not adapted to repel the attacks of the army of the 20th century, which was the German Wehrmacht, undoubtedly made an indisputable contribution to the disruption of the German plans for a lightning war, forcing the enemy to change plans on the go, to attract to destroy the fortified areas, considerable forces from the shock groups of troops, losing time and the pace of the offensive.

After the war…

After the war, the structures on the former “Stalin Line” were not used for a long time, until in 2004 enthusiasts from the Belarusian Charitable Foundation for Assistance to Internationalist Soldiers “Memory of Afghanistan” began work on the restoration of the surviving structures of the Minsk fortified area.

In 2005, with significant support from the Belarusian authorities, the Stalin Line military history museum was opened.

The historical basis of the museum is the bunkers of the Minsk fortified area. According to pre-war drawings, the engineering equipment of the area was recreated. The exposition has all kinds of trenches, trenches and anti-tank ditches of various profiles, positions for rifle squads, dugouts for sheltering personnel, buried positions for guns, gouges (wooden, concrete, metal), wire fences of various types.

It should be noted that the density of firing structures in the museum is much higher than it was in the prewar years. This was done in order to provide the most complete representation of all types of long-term shelters, for which the surviving long-term firing structures from all Belarusian fortified areas were brought there.

The unique museum is visited daily by thousands of tourists from all over the world.

Current page: 1 (total book has 18 pages) [accessible reading excerpt: 12 pages]

Mikhail Vinichenko, Valentin Runov

"Stalin Line" in battle

Introduction

It is known that on June 22, 1941, ten armies were deployed from the Baltic to the Black Sea as part of three Soviet fronts.

Each division and corps relied on one or two fortified areas, and frontier guards were in front of each fortified area.

Thus, the "Stalin Line" in practice was the first operational echelon of forces covering the state border and had a depth of 50 to 100 kilometers. According to pre-war views, this space was quite enough to wear down and bleed the enemy’s main strike groupings with a tough defense of units and formations of the first army echelon in order to then defeat them with counterattacks by army and front reserves, restore the state border line, and, if necessary, transfer combat actions on enemy territory.

Therefore, the actions of the troops within the "Stalin Line" should be considered in their entirety, starting from the battles of border detachments and outposts and ending with the conduct of army and front-line counterattacks. In time, they began at dawn on June 22 and continued throughout the first week of the war.

Chapter first

Creation of the "Stalin Line" and other fortifications

What were the fortified regions of Soviet Russia for?

The Soviet state after the Civil War and military intervention in Russia 1917–1922 sought to cover its borders. The previous experience of defending the stretched borders of Russia, as a number of military theorists and practitioners believed, was not suitable for the Soviet Republic. It was necessary to rely on the latest achievements of domestic and foreign science, which carefully studied and partly introduced experience into practice.

Scientific research in the field of military theory developed especially widely after the end of the Civil War and the military intervention in Russia in 1917–1922. Their main content was a comprehensive study and generalization of the experience of using fortified areas, fortresses, underground space on the battlefields of the Civil and First World Wars, taking into account the expected conditions for future military clashes with the enemies of Soviet Russia.

Soviet military scientists, the bulk of the senior leadership, believed that a future war would be waged by massive, multimillion-strong armies, military operations would unfold over vast expanses. The war will most likely take on a protracted character and will require the maximum exertion of the material and spiritual forces of the country. Based on the practice of the final phase of the First World War, the Civil War and military intervention in Russia 1917-1922. military theorists made a well-grounded conclusion that in such a war, maneuverable, offensive forms of action would mainly prevail. Positional warfare was not completely ruled out, but the emphasis was on the offensive.

E.P. Egorov, V.P. Andreev, S.F. Begunov and other military scientists who studied the history of Soviet military engineering believed that, based on such an assessment of the nature of a future war, enemy actions in it, as well as taking into account the state and prospects of the technical equipment of the army and navy, the most appropriate methods of combat operations and the use in them, the available forces and means will at the first stage repulse enemy aggression based on fortified areas using underground space and subsequently go on the counteroffensive.

One of the main tasks of the Soviet military art was to conduct theoretical research and practical work in the field of military engineering preparation of the territory of the state for war. The defense of the country, which was surrounded mainly by unfriendly states, had to be based on the solid defense of its borders, and primarily in those directions from which aggression was most likely. Since the borders of the Russian Empire had changed, it was necessary to organize the preparation of defense in engineering terms, especially from the western border, completely anew. Therefore, from the beginning of the 1920s, Soviet scientists and military engineers conducted extensive research on the system of military engineering preparation of the borders and territory of the state for war, forms and structures of long-term fortification.

The experience of the First World War showed that under the action of mass armies a separate, isolated fortress (Verden, Przemysl, Osovets, etc.) as the basis of a system of long-term fortifications in the theater of military operations had already outlived its usefulness. In a situation where military operations are being deployed on broad fronts, long-range fortified zones are accordingly required, capable of resisting the onslaught of large masses of people and withstanding the fire of large-caliber artillery by their system of fire and their depth. This form of fortification appeared during the war. With the transition to positional forms of combat, continuous positional fronts were created, within which the underground space was actively used to deploy troops, move units during the battle, conduct combat operations, underground mine and counter-mine attacks. Fortresses became only tactically important areas, strongholds of the general defensive front, and in this case, relying on field troops, they played a certain role in repelling the enemy offensive.

During the years of the Civil War and military intervention in Russia 1917-1922. new contours of the development of border fortifications were only fragmentarily outlined. Then, in order to cover the main directions and protect important political and economic centers of the country, closed circular and linear (with an open rear) fortified areas of the field type were erected in advance. They helped the troops of the Red Army to successfully resist the advancing enemy, and also served as springboards for them to go on the offensive.

Scheme of the fortified area of Golenkin: A-D - arc positions; a, b, c - intermediate positions

Based on the analysis of the use of fortifications in wars of the early 20th century, in the first post-war years, the development of general principles, systems and forms of military engineering training of theaters of military operations was carried out, corresponding to the new conditions of armed struggle. The main requirements put forward by Soviet fortifiers were that, firstly, the fortifications in the border zone should be echeloned to a great depth and, secondly, they would allow their troops to conduct not only defensive, but also offensive operations.

As studies by E.P. Egorova, V.P. Andreeva, S.F. Begunova and others, in 1920 F.I. Golenkin suggested building fortified areas (UR) of a circular shape with a diameter of up to 80 kilometers in the border zone, which were supposed to serve as a base for a covering army. The main element of the SD was considered to be "arc positions" - strongholds located at a distance of 25-35 kilometers from each other. In the intervals, the linear positions of the field troops were to be erected. In depth, at a distance of 100-200 kilometers, it was supposed to create a second defensive line, designed to cover the areas of mobilization, deploy the main forces and provide favorable conditions for going on the offensive.

Scheme of the arc position of the Golenkin area: I–VIII – traverse positions; A-3 - main nodes; a-and - auxiliary nodes

In the work “Experience in the study of forms of advance fortification” published in 1922, G.G. Nevsky proposed the form of a fortified area, consisting of strongholds being built in the most important directions - "outposts" and "fortresses". The fortification-tactical element of the stronghold, in his opinion, should be a “small knot” with an area of up to 4 square meters. kilometers, having up to 12 armored and reinforced concrete firing structures, of which a third are artillery. The supporting section - the "outpost" should include up to 16, and the "fortress" - up to 30 small knots. The total area of the fortified area could reach 3 thousand square meters. kilometers.

Scheme of the long-term part of the defense unit G.G. Nevsky: K - cannon caponier; BU - armored gun mounts; P - armored machine gun installations

A harmonious system of engineering fortification of border regions (theaters of military operations) was proposed by N.I. Kokhanov. He believed that the fortification preparation of the border area should include: a strategic forefield, equipped in advance with strongholds of border guard units and outpost forts of field troops, to ensure defensive operations to cover the deployment of the main forces; a line of fortified areas covering the concentration and deployment of armed forces and consisting of positions created in advance in the most important operational areas; the rear line of fortified areas in case the main line is breached; cut-off lines between the main and rear lines; prepared bases of the front in depth (a set of storage facilities for material resources and devices that provide for the needs of the troops).

The complete scheme of the defense unit G.G. Nevsky

Interesting research in the field of engineering training of theaters of military operations was carried out by S.A. Khmelkov, who became one of the creators of the theoretical foundations of new forms of long-term fortifications. Based on the experience of the First World War, in his work "Knots of resistance of modern long-term fortified positions" (1926), he proposed the form of a linear fortified area. In contrast to the established form of fortifications - a fortress, a circular position, protected from attack from all sides, the proposed fortified area was a deep frontal position with protected flanks and an open rear. It was envisaged that it would consist of a forward position, a line of main resistance and a rear line. The basis of its engineering equipment will be long-term resistance nodes, with an area of 3-3.5 square meters. kilometers, which are group locations of firing points protected from artillery fire and covered by artificial anti-personnel and anti-tank obstacles. In the intervals between the nodes, field-type structures should be created.

As noted in the book "Engineering Troops of the Soviet Army 1918-1945", in 1927, at a meeting of chiefs of engineers of districts and representatives of central administrations, recommendations were adopted regarding fortification forms of advance engineering preparation of state borders for defense. It was decided to consider the fortified area (not a fortress) as the main form, and the battalion defense area as the main fortification-tactical element of the fortified area.

The next step in the development of the theory of the use of fortified areas and underground space was a proposal to improve border fortifications. In the early 1930s, it was believed that the length of the fortified area along the front would depend on its purpose and terrain conditions. Its length should not exceed 40–60 kilometers, and its depth should be within 20 kilometers and consist of a strip of advanced positions of one or two defensive and rear lines.

General scheme of the fortified area

The line of advanced positions was to be located 2-4 kilometers ahead of the first defensive line and equipped with long-term points forming a continuous front of automatic fire; at the same time, it was advisable to create strongholds capable of independent defense in the main directions. The first defensive line was to consist of long-term nodes of resistance located at a distance of about 3 kilometers from each other. Between the nodes, even in peacetime, it was necessary to equip intermediate strongholds, as well as flanking firing structures and shelters for field troops. The second lane was located 8-10 kilometers from the first and was equipped in the same way as the previous one, but with fewer permanent structures. Between the first and second lanes, the basis of cut-off positions was to be arranged. Artillery batteries and ammunition depots were located in the rear of the first and second lanes and in the inter-positional space.

Scheme of the main line of defense

The rear lanes, equipped mainly with field-type structures, were supposed, according to some military theorists and commanders, to cover the most important routes, road junctions and unloading stations located near them, artillery, engineering, food and other warehouses, workshops, hospitals, airfields or landing sites , power stations and other rear institutions and structures. It was assumed that the fortified area would be connected with the rear by railroads and highways for the transportation of all necessary means. In the most fortified area, it was planned to create a network of radial and lateral highways and narrow-gauge railways and a communication system.

In peacetime, the fortified area was supposed to have a permanent garrison, consisting of several machine-gun battalions, artillery, sapper, electrical, chemical and other special units. In wartime, the fortified area became subordinate to the commander of the army with which, according to the plan of the upcoming operations, it was necessary to act.

Skeleton diagram of the battalion area

On the basis of research conducted by military engineers and combined arms commanders, the Provisional Field Manual of 1936 clearly formulated the provisions on the purpose of fortified areas and their place in the fighting of the Red Army. Isserson, Karbyshev, Varfolomeev and others played a special role in the development of this charter. Fortified areas, designed for long-term resistance in them by special garrisons and combined arms formations, it was noted in the charter, provide the command with freedom of maneuver and allow you to create powerful groups to deliver a crushing blow to the enemy. They are created in advance with the aim of keeping important economic, political and strategic points or areas in their hands; provide space for deployment and maneuver; cover the flanks of formations striking in the main direction, providing them with freedom of maneuver. The task of a fortified area is to force the enemy to a frontal attack, to concentrate large forces and powerful means of suppression for this, which is associated with the loss of time by the enemy, to weaken the enemy with the fire of long-term fortifications and thereby create favorable conditions for his defeat by a strike of field troops on the flank.

The work that began on the construction of a system of fortifications at land and sea borders, as well as the construction of protective structures for various purposes in the depths of the country (large underground command posts, communication centers, underground air defense shelters, warehouses, etc.) that began in the 1930s, put before the military engineers the problem of expanding theoretical and experimental research in the field of calculation of fortifications and structures, finding appropriate materials, methods for performing surface and underground work, and creating more advanced fortification structures. The leading role in solving these problems was played by the teaching staff of the Military Engineering Academy, the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze, scientists of the Scientific and Testing Engineering and Technical Testing Ground (since 1935 - the Scientific Research Institute of Engineering Technology).

Scheme of long-term firing points

Specialists in fortification have been successful in creating special grades of concrete that surpass foreign designs in their impact and blast resistance. The authors of the work "Engineering Troops of the Soviet Army 1918-1945." noted in their work Soviet scientists and military engineers who developed the theory of strength, deeply investigated the issues of reinforcing fortifications, determining the composition and technology of concrete, compacting the concrete mixture by vibration, and accelerating its setting. Among others, E.V. Sakhnovsky, B.G. Skramtaev, A.I. Pamgksen, B.A. Kuvykin, P.M. Miklashevsky. The discoveries of Soviet scientists made it possible to increase the strength of fortifications, speed up the process of their construction with a more rational use of building materials.

In the works of V.M. Keldysh, S.S. Davydova, K.A. Vakhurkina, D.I. Shora, V.V. Yakovlev and others outlined the theory of calculation and design of underground fortifications, developed various types of structures and methods for their construction. THEM. Rabinovich, O.E. Vlasov and others in the prewar years created a new theory for calculating engineering structures for the action of loads arising from weapons of destruction, i.e., for the action of impact and explosion, and developed the application of this theory to solving practical problems related to the design of protective structures.

Taking into account the experience of building fortified areas under the leadership of K.I. Ivanova, V.N. Uskov and S.Ya. Nazarov, intensive design and testing of more advanced long-term fortifications (DFS), their protective structures and internal equipment continued. For example, for long-term firing structures, special installations were developed for an easel machine gun, a 45-mm anti-tank gun coaxial with a machine gun, and a 76-mm gun (ball and ball-mask design), which provided protection for crews and weapons from direct hits of bullets and small-caliber projectiles and from the penetration of toxic substances. Thanks to such installations, the embrasures of the pillboxes were tightly closed even during firing, which significantly increased the combat and protective properties of long-term structures. The desire to protect the garrisons of fortifications from defeat was based on the experience of building and using DOS during the First World War, in various wars and military conflicts of the interwar period.

The experience of the Soviet-Finnish war, the aggression of fascist Germany against Poland and France made it necessary to look for new solutions to the problem of the effectiveness of firing with casemate guns. In the prewar years, more advanced and powerful long-term structures with armored gun turrets were developed, which eliminated the shortcomings of the casemate gun mounts that had a limited firing sector (60 °) and increased the activity of the gun in battle. Armored turret installations of 45-mm and 76-mm guns were created and successfully tested, which made it possible to fire in a wider or even circular sector. Unfortunately, before the war they did not go into mass production. Armored closures for observation posts, metal protective doors and hatches were developed.

New samples of fortifications were seriously tested at the training grounds, in the fortified areas under construction, as well as during special exercises. As a result, by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, promising types of fortifications were created, which were used in the construction of new ones, as well as in the retrofitting and strengthening of already built fortified areas.

In general, in the interwar period, as a result of the hard work of Soviet military scientists and practical engineers, fundamentally new systems and forms of engineering preparation of state borders were developed and partially implemented. The system of fortified areas, covering a large area along the front, was supposed to provide the possibility of stubborn joint defense of permanent garrisons of permanent structures and field troops and create favorable conditions for repelling an enemy offensive and conducting the first counteroffensive operations of friendly troops.

In addition to the defense of land borders, the reflection of the aggression of the enemy's naval forces was considered. For example, N.I. Ungerman and a number of other scientists have developed the basic methods of engineering training of naval theaters of war. It was believed that, depending on the specific strategic tasks of a particular theater, the composition of the naval forces of the parties and local conditions, the engineering preparation of naval theater of operations can take on a variety of forms: fortresses, forts, fortified areas, positions, stationary batteries, coastal groups, etc.

It was envisaged to conduct joint actions of naval and ground forces to ensure the protection of important objects, naval bases, and repel enemy attacks from the sea, land and air. To do this, it was planned to create long-term fortified points in the form of a seaside fortress, capable of providing all-round defense of the object and repelling enemy attacks from various directions. At the same time, the equipment of its land front was to be organized on the same principles that are used in the creation of fortified areas in the land theater. If it was necessary to protect a separate object only from the sea, it was recommended to equip a coastal fortified position, the outline of which could be straight or arc, depending on local conditions. Primorsky fortified areas were considered as a form of fortification preparation of the entire or part of the coast to repulse large enemy amphibious assault forces by coastal defense forces. They were supposed to be created in the most threatened directions and include the main lane 3-5 kilometers deep, equipped directly on the coastline, rear and cut-off lanes designed to repel attacks by enemy landing units that broke through the main lane, as well as lines of communication and communications along the front and in depth. At the same time, the enemy landing could be supported from the sea by both naval artillery and aviation.

On the eve of the war, there were some changes in the views on the conduct of defense, especially with regard to the border armies, which were supposed to operate based on fortified areas.

The actions of the fortified areas were considered in close connection with the repulse of aggression by the combined arms army, whose troops partially served as field reinforcements for the fortified areas.

On an army scale, the engineering equipment of lines, areas and positions was carried out in two zones: tactical and operational. In addition, in the absence of direct contact with the enemy, a forward operational zone of obstacles 25–50 kilometers deep was to be created in front of the tactical defense zone. When organizing defense on a frontal scale, it was supposed to create a "rear zone of defensive operations" up to 50 kilometers deep. The defense of the operational zone of obstacles was to be carried out by part of the troops allocated by the army.

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