76 years ago, on the night of June 21-22, 1941, hostilities broke out almost along the entire western border of the Soviet Union. The Red Army suffered heavy losses, but, nevertheless, started battles in the border regions, which eventually made it possible to mobilize the army, as well as evacuate industry and property.

The first day of the war did not become the bloodiest or the most significant in the series that followed it - everything was just beginning, and there were four years of battles ahead. Nevertheless, it was June 22, 1941 that became the watershed that forever changed the fate of tens of millions of Soviet people. How did the events of that day develop?

22.06, 03:55–03:57

22.06, 04:30–05:00

22.06, 06:40–07:00

22.06, 08:30–09:00

22.06, 12:00–13:00

22.06, 14:00–16:00

03:45, Baltic Sea. The death of the steamer "Gaisma"

Returning after laying mines, four German boats off the southeastern coast of the island of Gotland intercepted the Soviet steamer Gaisma. The ship was heading from Riga to Lübeck with a load of timber. Without any warning, the ship was fired upon and then sunk by two torpedoes. Radio operator Stepan Savitsky at 4:15 at the last moment managed to broadcast a radiogram: "Torpedoed. Gaisma is sinking. Farewell". His radiogram saved several other Soviet ships.

The blast wave threw most of the crew overboard. Sailors caught in the water were machine-gunned by the Germans. Six people were killed, two were captured. The remaining 24 crew members after 14 hours reached the Latvian coast on a boat, where they buried Captain N.G., who died from wounds. Duve.

German torpedo boats of the 3rd flotilla, moored at the side of the mother ship "Adolf Luderitz", Finland, 1941. It was the boats of this flotilla S 59 and S 60 that sank the steamer Gaisma.

The air battle of June 22 was one of the most intense in the history of wars. The symbol of the first day of the Great Patriotic War was the German air strikes on Soviet airfields. The former pilot of the 165th Fighter Aviation Regiment, later Hero of the Soviet Union Sergei Dmitrievich Gorelov recalls: “Three regiments were concentrated at the airfield of the city of Lvov - about 200 aircraft. And just on my birthday, at three in the morning, they started bombing us. We all jumped up, ran to the airfield, and there ... Almost all the planes were destroyed or damaged. My I-16 was no exception. When I approached him, it seemed to me that he, lopsided, with a broken left wing, seemed to be looking at me and asking: “Where do you go? What the hell are you sleeping for?"

“Sleeping airfields”, which turned into gasoline fires in the very first few minutes of the war, are, in fact, just an established stamp. Of course, there were also such cases - for example, the 66th assault aviation regiment in the Lvov region lost 34 aircraft at once, more than half of the regiment's 63 aircraft. However, a much more common scheme was the warning of a raid by ground services, the rise in the air of the duty link and the battle, successful or unsuccessful. So, at 04:55 in the morning in the Dubno region, a fighter pilot of the 46th IAP, Ivan Ivanovich Ivanov, shot down a German Heinkel-111 bomber with a ramming blow after the ammunition was used up.

A line of I-153 Chaika fighters destroyed on June 22 at the Alytus airfield. In the newly formed 236th IAP, to which they belonged, due to the lack of flight personnel, there was no one to lift them into the air.

It was a large-scale operation of the Luftwaffe, the goal of which was achieved in the course of successive strikes on the same objects. Success for the attackers was often brought not by the first, but by the third or even fifth strike on airfields, when Soviet duty units found themselves in the process of refueling or reloading weapons. The main problem of the Soviet Air Force was the lack of airfield maneuver, that is, the ability to fly to another site, since in the spring of 1941, the construction of concrete runways began at many airfields in the border districts, and the air regiments were forced to remain on the same sites where they met the war. The rest was already a matter of technology - a conveyor of air strikes against the same targets brought success to the Luftwaffe, if not on June 22, then a day or two later.

USSR border. Artillery preparation begins lasting 20–30 minutes along the entire length of the border

From the memoirs of the German tank officer Oskar Münzel: “Powerful artillery fire from heavy guns breaks wisps of fog. Here and there behind the Bug, explosions of shells are heard. At 03:15 Berlin time, the infantry begins the offensive. For the enemy, it turned out to be a complete surprise, and he almost does not offer resistance ... The forcing of the Bug is proceeding flawlessly.

The German infantry is preparing to cross the Bug in rubber boats.

They did not have time to withdraw troops from the Brest Fortress before the start of hostilities. The withdrawal took three hours, and in fact it did not even have time to begin. The fortress became a mousetrap for the units located in it. Already in the first minutes of the war, a hail of artillery shells and volleys of rocket launchers fell upon her.

The defender of the Brest Fortress Ivan Dolotov recalls: “On the night of June 22, 1941, about half of the regiment was on the territory of the fortress. A large team was on the night shift at the construction of the pillbox at Fort Berg. Regimental school in the camp. As a result of a sudden hurricane attack by artillery and aircraft, catastrophic destruction of the barracks and other buildings occurred in the fortress. There were many killed and wounded, stone buildings and the ground were on fire. On combat alert, Lieutenant Korotkov, on duty in the unit, lined up the cash in the corridor and ordered: to take up defense at the windows of the first floor of the barracks ... "

Everything that was outside the strong casemates was swept away by fire. Artillery and motor vehicles in open parks instantly became a heap of twisted iron. Next to the guns at the hitching posts stood the horses of the artillery and mortar units. Unfortunate animals already in the first hours of the war were killed by fragments. All exits from the citadel of the fortress were cluttered with broken equipment.

Due to the fact that parts of two Soviet divisions were unable to leave the Brest Fortress, they were unable to take up defense on the border. On both sides of Brest, bypassing the fortress, units of the 2nd Panzer Group of Guderian invaded the territory of the USSR.

As for the assault on the fortress itself, the German command seriously miscalculated in assessing the strength of its walls. Later, in his report on the assault, the commander of the 45th Infantry Division, General Schlipper, admitted: "The plan for the artillery offensive was calculated not so much on actual action, but rather entirely on surprise."

In other words, they wanted to scare the Soviet soldiers and commanders. This was one of the first miscalculations of the German command in the war with the USSR. The fighters stationed in the casemates of the fortress survived a flurry of artillery preparation. When German infantrymen entered the fortress, they were met by counterattacks and machine gun and rifle fire from all sides. For the first time during the war with the USSR, the German commander gave the order to retreat. A group of Germans that broke into the citadel was surrounded and blocked in the club - the former church. Instead of a quick capture within a few hours, the battles for the Brest Fortress turned into a multi-day epic for the Germans with constant losses.

USSR border. German infantry goes on the offensive

Recalls the border guard Anatoly Loginov: “When the war started, I was just on duty at the outpost. At 2-3 o'clock, heavy bombers, Junkers, passed at high altitude to the east. At four o'clock the artillery opened fire. Shoot for ten minutes. The head of the outpost asks:

- Well, foreman? War or provocation?

- War.

- Well, then take the right flag with the fighters. We will fight.

Soon the infantry went, I won’t say that it was a shaft. We had good weapons: two heavy machine guns, SVT automatic rifles and one PPD assault rifle. We fought until about five o'clock, the guys went 3-4 times to counterattack. At 5 o'clock, an order was received from the commandant's office with a messenger to set aside the state border and join the regular units of the Red Army.

The Red Army machine gunners fought to the last.

Berlin. Meeting of Soviet Ambassador Vladimir Dekanozov with German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop. The minister handed the ambassador a note, which actually announced the beginning of the war

The interpreter of the USSR Ambassador in Berlin Vladimir Dekanozov Valentin Berezhkov recalled:

“Suddenly at 5 o’clock in the morning Moscow time … the phone rang. An unfamiliar voice announced that Reich Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop was waiting for the Soviet representatives in his office at the Foreign Office on Wilhelmstrasse.

On reaching the Wilhelmstrasse, we saw from a distance a crowd in front of the building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Although it was already dawn, the cast-iron canopy entrance was brightly lit by spotlights. Photojournalists, cameramen, and journalists fussed around. The official jumped out of the car first and opened the door wide. We left, blinded by the light of Jupiters and the flashes of magnesium lamps. A disturbing thought flashed through my head - is this really a war? There was no other way to explain such a pandemonium on the Wilhelmstrasse, and even at night ...

When we came close to the writing table, Ribbentrop stood up, silently nodded his head, extended his hand and invited him to follow him to the opposite corner of the hall at the round table. Ribbentrop had a swollen face of a crimson color and cloudy, as if stopped, inflamed eyes. He walked ahead of us with his head down and staggering a little. "Is he drunk?" flashed through my head.

After we sat down at the round table and Ribbentrop began to speak, my assumption was confirmed. He must have been drinking really hard.

Stumbling over almost every word, he began to explain, rather confusedly, that the German government had data on the increased concentration of Soviet troops on the German border. Ignoring the fact that in recent weeks the Soviet embassy, ​​on behalf of Moscow, has repeatedly drawn the attention of the German side to egregious cases of violations of the borders of the Soviet Union by German soldiers and aircraft, Ribbentrop stated that Soviet military personnel violated the German border and invaded German territory, although there are no such facts in there was no reality."

It looked like the building of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Wilhelmstrasse, 76

Moscow. Meeting of People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov and German Ambassador to Moscow Schulenburg. The Ambassador handed over the note of the German government

On the night of June 22, a telegram arrived from Berlin instructing Schulenburg to immediately go to Molotov and declare that the movements of Soviet troops on the German border had taken on such a scale that the Reich government could not ignore. Therefore, it decided to take appropriate countermeasures. The telegram emphasized that the ambassador should not enter into any discussions with Molotov.

On the morning of June 22, the USSR Foreign Minister saw the German ambassador for the second time in a few hours, but the situation had changed dramatically during that time.

From the report of the German 51st Assault Engineer Battalion: “The Russian soldiers offered outstanding resistance, surrendering only if they were wounded, and fighting to the last opportunity. Separate elements of the Russian fortified line were exceptionally good in terms of material and weapons. The concrete consisted for the most part of a mixture of granite, cement and iron, which was very strong and withstood heavy artillery fire."

The fortifications just built on the new border and their garrisons, following the border guards, came to the defense of the country. Their stubborn resistance held back the onslaught of the enemy. The fortified areas inflicted the first significant losses on the Germans. The commander of the German 28th Infantry Division, in a report on the battles in the Sopotskin area in Belarus, wrote: “In the area of ​​fortifications from Sopotskino and to the north ... we are talking primarily about the enemy, who firmly decided to hold on at any cost and did it ... Only with the help of powerful subversive means it was possible to destroy one pillbox after another ... The division’s means were not enough to capture numerous structures.”

German sappers are moving forward to undermine the Soviet bunker.

Even unoccupied and non-combat-ready bunkers in the Baltic States forced the Germans to spend time on artillery preparation for concrete boxes in the formwork. Only then did the infantry approach them cautiously. However, the insufficient number of troops in the border armies did not allow them to take up a solid defense along the line of fortifications on the state border. The pillboxes held back the onslaught of the German armies, but could not stop it for more than a few hours. German heavy artillery and sappers punched through corridors in the defense of fortified areas. Columns of tanks and motorized infantry broke through them into the territory of the USSR.

Tallinn. The command of the Baltic Fleet received a radiogram from People's Commissar N.K. Kuznetsov with the order to begin the activities provided for by the cover plan. The fleet started minelaying

Minelayer "Marty" - a participant in the first Soviet mine productions of the Great Patriotic War in the Baltic.

The first raids by Soviet bombers on enemy territory. Planes of the 7th Composite Air Division bombard troop concentrations in the Tilsit area

Destroyed SB bomber. It was this aircraft that was the main machine of the Soviet bomber aviation at the beginning of the war - unfortunately, it was extremely vulnerable, both due to obsolescence and due to improper use.

Moscow. As a result of the official declaration of war, Directive No. 2 was sent to the troops

"one. Troops to attack the enemy forces with all their strength and means and destroy them in areas where they violated the Soviet border.

2. Reconnaissance and combat aviation to establish the places of concentration of enemy aviation and the grouping of its ground forces.

Destroy aircraft at enemy airfields and bomb groupings of his ground forces with powerful strikes by bomber and attack aircraft. Air strikes should be carried out to the depth of German territory up to 100-150 km.

Crew of a Soviet BT tank, 1941. On the faces of calm and determination.

Bombing of airfields in the capital of Ukraine Kyiv

Recalls Nikolai Dupak, in 1941, a film actor who was on the set in Kyiv: “On Saturday I read and re-read something - went to bed late and woke up from the shooting. I go out onto the balcony, a man also comes out of the next room: “What is it?” - "Yes, maybe the maneuvers of the Kyiv military district." As soon as he said this, and suddenly, in meters, maybe a hundred, a plane with a swastika turns around and goes to bomb the bridge across the Dnieper. It was at 7 o'clock in the morning ... ".

Not all the first raids of the Luftwaffe went with impunity - as for this Junkers Yu-88.

Lithuania. The motorized brigade of the German 7th Panzer Division reached Kalwaria

Soldiers of the 7th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht march on Lithuanian soil, summer 1941

Lithuania. The Germans are introducing mechanized troops into battle in the directions of Taurage, Siauliai; Kybartai, Kaunas and Kalvaria, Alytus

Soviet T-28 tanks left by the crews in the Alytus area. Under conditions of retreat, the slightest malfunction meant the loss of equipment.

Lithuania. Infantry of the 291st division of the Wehrmacht occupied Palanga

As long as the offensive is developing well, you can be supportive of the prisoners. Interrogation of an unknown Soviet pilot, everyone is in a good mood.

Brest is captured, only fighters in the Brest Fortress and in the building of the railway station offer resistance

German infantryman in the Brest Fortress on the banks of the Bug, in front - the ring barracks of its citadel. You can see how serious the artillery and mortar fire was, which destroyed almost all the vegetation.

Moscow. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov on the radio read out an appeal to the citizens of the Soviet Union

Soviet people met the news of the beginning of the war in different ways.

Dmitry Bulgakov recalls: “I lived in the village of Skorodnoye, Bolshesoldatsky District, Kursk Region. It was pouring rain that day. I was sitting at home, suddenly I see - my friend and like-minded Seryozhka is running through the mud. He and I were very worried that we would not be able to get into the war - Khalkhin Gol and Finnish ended without us. It was possible ... Runs: "War!" In the rain, through the mud, we ran to the club. And there people gather, a rally. There were no visitors from the district, only a local asset - an accountant, an accountant. Speak: “We will break them! This and that”… And when the Germans came, they collected eggs for them… The mood was such that it’s a pity that we won’t get there, because they will be quickly defeated, and again we won’t get anything.”

Sofia Fatkulina: “When the war started, it was such a terrible picture! Horsemen rode to all the villages and reported that the war had begun. The draft age went to the military registration and enlistment office. On the Volga, those leaving for the front were loaded onto ships. You know, everyone was standing on the shore, and the whole Volga was crying.

Announcement of the beginning of the war.

Alexey Maksimenko: “I met the war in Kuibyshev on the way to the duty station. The train stopped. I went out to the platform, took a mug of beer, I looked - people gathered at the loudspeaker, they were listening: “War!” The women are baptized. I did not finish my glass of beer, I quickly got on the train so as not to miss it. Something like: “There is a war, and you are drinking beer here.” I got into the car, and in it the conversation was only about the war: “How is it ?! Do we have a treaty of friendship with the Germans?! Why did they start?!" Who is older, says: “They certainly promised, but look - they have already captured half of Europe, and now it's our turn. There were bourgeois states, they occupied them, and we have a communist regime - all the more so for them as a bone in the throat. Now it will be difficult for us to fight them.” There was an understanding that something terrible had happened, but at that time, being 18 years old, I was not able to appreciate the tragedy and the complexity of the situation.”

Maryana Milyutina recalls: “I studied in the third year of the 1st Medical Institute. That day we had an exam in physiology, which I did not know. When I heard on the radio that the war had begun, I thought: “How good, maybe they’ll give me at least a three!” So my first feeling was a sense of relief.”

Olimpiada Polyakova writes in her diary: “… Is our liberation really approaching? Whatever the Germans are, it will not be worse than ours. And what do we care about the Germans? We will live without them. The Germans will win - there is no doubt. Forgive me Lord! I am not an enemy to my people, my homeland ... But you need to face the truth: we all, all of Russia, passionately desire victory for the enemy, whatever it may be.

Sobering up will come in just six months, when Polyakova will be in the hungry and cold occupied Gatchina. Three years later, in the spring of 1945 near Munich, according to her friend Vera Pirozhkova, “... she has already stated that all Germans should be sent to a concentration camp. I asked: "Everyone?" She thought for a second and answered firmly: “Everyone.”.

On the faces of Muscovites - the whole gamut of feelings.

Valentin Rychkov recalls: “Adults met the war with tears in their eyes, with concern, upset. They ran to each other, whispered, exchanged opinions, understood that a terrible disaster was coming. And we, the youth, are enthusiastic and militant. They gathered in the city garden on the dance floor, but there was no talk of any dances. We all split into two groups. One group of “military specialists” claimed that in 2–3 weeks nothing would be left of the Nazis. The second, more sedate group, said: "No, not 2-3 weeks, but 2-3 months - and there will be our complete victory, they will defeat the Nazis." Excitement was given to this by another unusual phenomenon. At this time in the west, it was not the usual "sunset like sunset", but crimson-red-bloody! They also said: “It is our Red Army that attacked the Germans with all their firepower, which can be seen even in Siberia!” And I ... Now I don’t know for what reason, but then I stood and thought: “What are they talking about?” My friend Romashko, who is still alive and can confirm, asks: “And you, Valka, why are you standing and not speaking your opinion?” And I say the following verbatim: "No, guys, it will take at least 2-3 years for our victory." What noise-din began here! How could I not be insulted! How not to blame! I kept thinking, if only they wouldn’t punch me in the face for such a forecast. But it turned out that although I was closer to the truth, I was very, very mistaken ... "

The optimistic mood was characteristic of most young patriots, brought up by "victorious" films like "If Tomorrow is War", literary works of writers like Nikolai Shpanov and massive propaganda that assured that "we will beat the enemy on his territory". The organizational and instructor department of the personnel department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks reported: “The mobilization is proceeding in an organized manner, in accordance with the plans. The mood of the mobilized is cheerful and confident ... a large number of applications for enrollment in the Red Army are received ... There are many facts when girls ask to go to the front ... rallies in factories and plants, in collective farms and institutions are held with great patriotic enthusiasm ".

Unlike the youth, who perceived what was happening almost as a holiday, the older generation, who remembered the First World War and the Civil War, was not particularly enthusiastic and habitually began to prepare for long-term hardships. In the very first hours of the war, queues grew in shops and markets. People bought up salt, matches, soap, sugar and other products and essential goods. Many took their savings from the savings banks and tried to cash out domestic bonds. “Rushed to the store. People ran through the streets, buying everything they had in stores, but there was nothing left for us, there were only assorted sets, we bought five boxes and returned home., - Nikolai Obrynba recalls.

Rome, Italy. Italian Foreign Minister Ciano di Cortelazzo reads to USSR Ambassador Gorelkin the Italian government's declaration of war

Due to the fact that Germany declared war on the USSR, Italy, as an ally of Germany and a member of the Triple Alliance, also declared war on the Soviet Union from the moment German troops entered Soviet territory - that is, from 05:30 am on June 22. The exchange of embassies between the government of Italy and the government of the Soviet Union had to be settled through intermediaries.

For the Italians, entering the war against the USSR turned out to be a disastrous adventure. In the photo, the commander of the Italian expeditionary force, General Giovanni Messe, is reviewing his soldiers.

Western Belarus. The German 18th Panzer Division engages the Soviet 30th Panzer Division of the 14th Mechanized Corps. The first tank battle on the Soviet-German front

Left by the crews in the city of Kobrin, T-26 tanks of late production series from the 14th mechanized corps.

Lithuania. The Germans are drawn into street fighting for the city of Tauragė in Lithuania

Recalls Lieutenant General V.F. Zotov: “At 4:00 on June 22, we were awakened by explosions of artillery shells ... From the explosion of the very first shells, the house where the headquarters of the 125th rifle division was located ... The city was shelled by a hurricane of enemy artillery fire. Knowing that the buildings in the city were mostly wooden, the enemy fired mainly with incendiary shells, as a result, 15-20 minutes after the start of the artillery shelling, the city was on fire.

Nevertheless, the troops of the Baltic District managed to occupy the defense lines assigned to them even before the war.

Soon, German tanks and motorized infantry in armored personnel carriers approached the burning city. The highway bridge across the Jura River was blown up, but the undamaged railway bridge fell into the hands of the attackers. The battle for Taurage resulted in intense street fighting. The combat log of the German 1st Panzer Division, which stormed the city, emphasized: "The enemy fights stubbornly and fiercely".

German motorcyclists at the entrance to Taurage (German: Tauroggen)

Until late at night in Taurage there were fights for every house and every intersection. Only by midnight the Soviet units defending the city were pushed back to the northeastern outskirts. Serving at that time in the 6th Panzer Division advancing in the same direction, German Colonel Ritgen recalled: “The resistance of the enemy in our sector turned out to be much stronger than expected. Our path was blocked by six anti-tank ditches, covered by infantrymen and snipers who sat in the trees. Luckily for us, they didn't have anti-tank guns or mines. Since no one surrendered, there were no prisoners."

The Soviet infantrymen defended stubbornly and fiercely, but the forces were unequal. A whole tank corps of the Germans immediately fell on the 125th Rifle Division, stretched along the front. By the night of June 22-23, the division was practically defeated. The last finishing blow followed at night. The headquarters of the division was subjected to a surprise attack. A number of headquarters commanders were killed or went missing, communications equipment was lost. To all other troubles, the connection was beheaded. German tanks continued their advance along the highway to Siauliai.

Lithuania. A major success of the German 3rd Panzer Group: two bridges over the Neman near the city of Alytus were captured intact

The preparation of the bridges across the Neman for the explosion was carried out by the 4th Engineer Regiment of the Baltic Special District, but it was not possible to destroy the bridges. It is possible that saboteurs from Brandenburg had a hand in this.

Capturing intact existing bridges and quickly building temporary ones is one of the components of the success of the German blitzkrieg. In the photo, an 88-mm anti-aircraft gun, the famous “akht-akht”, is crossing the river.

As soon as the first German tanks were on the east bank of the river, they were met by Soviet tank fire. This was the first meeting of German tankers with T-34 tanks. The "thirty-four" standing in position next to the bridge immediately knocked out the PzKpfw 38 (t) that crossed the river. The return fire of the 37 mm guns of the German tanks was ineffective. Fighters recalled:

“The chief of staff, Major Belikov, ordered us to go to the western part of the city and find out what was burning there ... A whole column of civilians was walking towards us from the city ... The crowd parted in both directions and we drove at full speed. But, when we passed, then from the crowd they began to shoot at us from machine guns and already in front of our barracks they knocked out our motorcycle.

At about 11:30 a wet woman was brought to the headquarters, having swum across the Neman, who said that she had seen German tanks outside the city, but immediately the prosecutor shouted “provocation, spy”, and immediately shot her. 30 minutes later, near the bridge, the fighters detained a man who was Lithuanian and told us in broken Russian that German tanks were already in the city, but the detective shot him dead too, calling him a provocateur.

We approached our tank, knocked, the hatch opened. We say that the German tanks on the road are next to us, and the tanker replies that he does not have armor-piercing shells. We approached another tank, there was a platoon commander, who quickly ordered: follow me! and immediately two or three tanks turned out of the bushes, which went straight to the German tanks - shooting on the move in the side of the German ones, and then came right up close - rammed them and threw them into a ditch (destroyed half a dozen German tanks and did not lose a single one). And they themselves rushed across the bridge to the west bank. But as soon as they crossed the bridge, they met a group of German tanks, of which one immediately caught fire, and then ours caught fire. Then I saw only fire, smoke, heard the roar of explosions and the clang of metal.

Moscow. At a meeting with Stalin, a decision was made to mobilize according to an enhanced version, a decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces on mobilization was prepared and signed

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR announces mobilization on the territory of the following military districts: Leningrad, Baltic Special, Western Special, Kyiv Special, Odessa, Kharkov, Oryol, Moscow, Arkhangelsk, Ural, Siberian, Volga, North Caucasian and Transcaucasian. Those liable for military service who were born from 1905 to 1918 inclusive are subject to mobilization.

As of the morning of June 22, the Red Army de jure and de facto remained a peacetime army. The signal to prepare for the mobilization was a government announcement on the radio at noon. The formalities followed a few hours later. The telegram announcing the mobilization was signed by the People's Commissar of Defense on June 22, 1941 at 16:00 and handed over to the Central Telegraph of the Ministry of Communications at 16:40. In 26 minutes, the mobilization telegram was distributed to all republican, regional, regional and district centers.

The first day of mobilization in Moscow - the queue to the Oktyabrsky district military registration and enlistment office

Why was the mobilization not announced earlier? What happened during these few hours in the Kremlin and the General Staff? Sometimes they say that Stalin fell into prostration and fled to the dacha. Entries in the journal of visits to the Kremlin office do not confirm this version. Already the first decisions taken speak of hard work and analysis of the situation several steps ahead. According to the pre-war mobilization plan, 4.9 million people were required to be called up to transfer the army and navy to wartime. However, during the actual announcement of mobilization, conscripts of 14 ages were called up at once, the total number of which amounted to about 10 million people, i.e. almost 5.1 million people more than theoretically required. This suggests that the top leadership of the country already in the middle of the day on June 22 realized the scale of the disaster.

In fact, already a few hours after the start of the war, a plan was prepared to bring the country and the army out of the crisis. A call with a large margin made it possible to form new divisions. It was these new formations, not envisaged by pre-war plans, that became saving reserves. They appeared at the front at critical moments, preventing the crisis from turning into a catastrophe. The famous Panfilov division, the formations that saved Leningrad, Moscow, delayed the fall of Kyiv - they were all the brainchild of mobilization telegrams sent out on June 22. When planning Barbarossa, the German staff officers greatly underestimated the ability of the USSR to rebuild the army after defeats in the first battles.

Great Britain, London. Broadcast speech by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill

« Today at 4 o'clock in the morning Hitler invaded Russia. The danger for Russia is our danger and the danger of the United States. The cause of every Russian who fights for his land and home is the common cause of free people and free peoples in any part of the globe. We will give Russia and the Russian people all the help we can.”

The future allies kept their word - after a little over two months, deliveries began in the USSR, which were later secured by the Lend-Lease agreement. In the photo - British Hurricane fighters near Murmansk, autumn 1941.

Moscow. Directive No. 3 sent to the troops

June 22 began and ended with a directive from Moscow. It was already the third directive of the day. However, as before, the orders of the high command were late for the rapid development of events. Directive No. 3 remained in history thanks to the pronounced offensive spirit that permeated all its lines. Yes, it stated: “The armies of the Southwestern Front, firmly holding the state border with Hungary, with concentric strikes in the general direction towards Lublin with the forces of 5 and 6 Army [armies] ... encircle and destroy the enemy grouping advancing on the Vladimir-Volynsky, Krystynopol front, by the end of 26.6, capture the Lublin region ».

For the troops that could not hold the line of the state border, these words sounded mocking. However, this had its reasons. The head of the operational department of the Southwestern Front, the future Marshal I.Kh. Bagramyan recalled: “I involuntarily thought that the optimism of the assessments in the document from the center was largely inspired by our rather peppy reports”.

Alas, in the confusion of the first days, for many soldiers of the Red Army, the war ended without even starting. Surrendering prisoners pass by a column of German equipment and German soldiers lying in a ditch.

Lithuania. The vanguards of the German 57th Panzer Corps of the 3rd Panzer Group reached the village of Varenai (Lithuania), advancing 70 km in a day

“On June 22, we opened the door, not understanding what was behind it,”- this is how Hitler described the beginning of the war with the USSR. The significance of this day for the course of world history is enormous, but from a military point of view, it was not special: the decisions made on this day could not radically change the situation. The turning point came before the invasion, when the chance for the Red Army to deploy on the western frontier was missed. This decided the fate of the border battle - it was lost even before the start of hostilities.

German soldiers cross the border. The war has just begun...

June 22 was by no means the bloodiest day in the history of the war. It would be a mistake to assume that the Germans, having achieved a strategic surprise attack, immediately destroyed the large forces of the Red Army. On the first day of the war, there were no major encirclements yet.

A different picture emerged in the war in the air. The air battle of June 22, 1941 immediately covered a large area, German fighter and bomber squadrons penetrated deep into the rear areas of special districts. The bases of the Soviet navy were also hit. If the mining of exits from the bases of the fleet pursued the task of intimidating, then the strikes on airfields on June 22 became part of a multi-day operation to destroy the air forces of the western districts. She was the biggest success of the Germans. Most of the losses of Soviet aircraft fell precisely on June 22.

The first day of the war, of course, was remembered by everyone who lived at that time, better than many others from the 1418 days of the Great Patriotic War, since it was he who became the watershed that divided people's lives into “before” and “after”. Konstantin Simonov, who was at the front from the first days, later wrote in the novel The Living and the Dead:

“Where they were now in a hurry, the smoke of the burning village rose higher and higher. The battalion commander Ryabchenko, who was riding ahead of Sintsov, either covered this smoke with himself, then, when the horse, stumbling, took it to the side, opened it again. - Komarov, but Komarov! - What? - Let me smoke! - What's on the go? “Yes, I suddenly felt like it…” Sintsov did not begin to explain why he felt like it. And he wanted to because, looking now at this distant smoke ahead, he tried to force himself to get used to the difficult thought that, no matter how much they had behind them, there was still a whole war ahead.

Nikita Khrushchev claimed that in the first week of the war, Stalin retired from business and was in prostration. Western historians also wrote that the head of the USSR disappeared from the media for 10 days. We decided to find out what Stalin was doing after June 22, 1941.

22nd of June

Georgy Zhukov claimed that he called Stalin at half past one in the night before the start of the war and informed him about the state of affairs on the border. The Kremlin already knew about the defector's reports about Hitler's order to attack the USSR. Most sources indicate that Joseph Vissarionovich expressed doubts about the reliability of this information.

After receiving the first information about the bombing, he appeared in his office at 5 hours 45 minutes, about which there is an entry in the visitors' notebook.

“His pockmarked face drooped. A depressed mood was visible in him, ”recalled the manager of the affairs of the Council of People's Commissars, Yakov Chadaev. At seven in the morning, Stalin made a call to Minsk to the First Secretary of the CP (b) of Belarus, Panteleimon Ponomarenko, and urged him to "personally transfer his work to the Military Council of the front."

In this conversation, Joseph Stalin spoke unsatisfactorily about the military. In particular, he said: "The staff knows the situation poorly."

In general, historians characterize this day as a time of uncertainty and waiting for reliable information from the fronts. The last visitor left Stalin's office at 4:45 pm.

June 23

The visitor's notebook notes that Stalin twice received top Soviet officials. Molotov was the first to enter at 3:20, the last to leave was the head of the department of the 1st department (protection of senior officials) of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR Nikolai Vlasik at one in the morning of the next day. On this day, Stalin signed the Decree on general open mobilization.

June 24

On this day, Vyacheslav Malyshev, People's Commissar of Medium Machine Building of the USSR, was the first to enter Stalin's office. It was at 4:20 p.m. According to the general opinion, the realization of the impending catastrophe came to the USSR.

Stalin decided to form the Evacuation Council, headed by Kosygin and Shvernik. Subsequent events showed how correct and timely this step was. The same can be said about the creation of the Soviet Information Bureau.

June 25

On this day, numerous meetings were recorded in the notebooks of visitors. Stalin received his subordinates twice: from midnight to 5:50 in the morning and from 19:40 to 1 am on June 26.

He signed a directive "On the formation of an army group of the High Command Reserve" under the command of Marshal of the Soviet Union Semyon Budyonny. This decision testified to the fact that Moscow was aware of the possibility of turning the main attack of the Wehrmacht from the center to the south.

Orders were also given for the forced withdrawal of the 3rd and 10th armies in order to get out of the threat of encirclement near Minsk. At the same time, the manager of the affairs of the Council of People's Commissars, Yakov Chadaev, witnessed a conversation between Stalin and the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Semyon Timoshenko about Yakov Dzhugashvili, who asked for war.

Stalin categorically spoke out against any benefits for his eldest son. Order No. 222 "On the immediate introduction of the procedure for considering cases by military tribunals" was signed. The Kremlin did not forget about Germany's allies either. Soviet aviation bombed Southern and Central Finland, primarily Helsinki and Turku.

June 26

Stalin's working day began at 12:10 and ended at 23:20. Information from the fronts was still unstable. Of the orders signed that day, it should be noted the specifics of the decisions made:

The procedure for issuing allowances and field money to servicemen of the army in the field.
- Transformation of the transport prosecutor's offices of railways and water basins into military prosecutor's offices.
- The transfer to the ownership of uniforms issued to the rank and file and junior commanding staff, descending to the front.

Stalin also held an emergency meeting with Zhukov, who was urgently recalled from the Southwestern Front, with Timoshenko and Vatutin. It was about the dramatic situation on the Western Front. German tanks approached Minsk.

27th of June

On this day, Stalin began to receive visitors in his office from half past five in the evening until almost three in the morning on the 28th. A meeting of members of the Politburo was held.

Iosif Vissarionovich proposed to mobilize the communists in order to strengthen control in the troops and focus on ideological and political work in the Red Army.

Decrees of the Central Committee of the Communist Party "on the export from Moscow of state stocks of valuable metals, precious stones, the USSR Diamond Fund and the values ​​of the Kremlin Armory" were also signed.

By this time, numerous facts of German atrocities had already become known, so it was decided to organize the removal of people from territories that could be occupied by the enemy.

June 28

In the visitors' notebook, Molotov is the first to enter Stalin's office at half past seven in the evening. Merkulov was the last to leave at 00:15 on the 29th.

Stalin spent most of the day alone. The historian Georgy Kumanev, who repeatedly spoke with Molotov, referring to the words of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, wrote about the deep feelings of the first person of the state, associated primarily with political miscalculations.

“He really did not believe that the war was so close. And this position of his turned out to be erroneous, ”Molotov recalled. The British historian Simon Montefiore also adheres to this version: “A nervous breakdown seems quite plausible and possible. Stalin was greatly depressed by the failures at the front and was mortally tired.

At the same time, there is disagreement among historians regarding the date of the psychological crisis that led to the conflict with the military.

June 29

According to Zhukov, on June 29, Stalin twice visited the People's Commissariat of Defense, where a conflict occurred between the head of state and the high command. The military was sharply criticized about the helplessness of the highest ranks of the Red Army, who cannot even establish normal communications.

Molotov subsequently spoke about the conversation in raised tones, turning into insulting reproaches.

“... Stalin lost his temper when he learned that the Germans were hosting the second day in Minsk, and to the west of the capital of Belarus, the enemy slammed the trap around the bulk of the troops of the Western Front, which meant: the way for the Nazi armies to Moscow was open,” wrote Ivan Stadnyuk, relying on eyewitnesses of that meetings.

Meanwhile, there are other official documents that speak of overcoming the crisis of power. In particular, on this day, the People's Commissariat of Defense, in agreement with Stalin, established the post of commander of the Air Force with the broadest powers. Pavel Zhigarev was appointed to this position.

Stalin expanded the range of issues that the new head of military aviation could decide independently. He explained this by saying that this type of troops should respond to threats as quickly as possible, and not engage in various coordination.

The situation in the sky began to gradually improve, as far as it was possible under those conditions. The battle for Moscow showed the obvious correctness of this decision.

There is also an alternative version, according to which Stalin himself withdrew from governing the country. It is based on the memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, who referred to the stories of Lavrenty Beria.

The general position of anti-Stalinist historians boils down to the actual desertion of the head of state at the beginning of the war. In particular, the American bibliographers of Stalin (Jonathan Lewis and Philip Whitehead described this period as follows: “Stalin was in prostration. During the week he rarely left his villa in Kuntsevo. His name disappeared from the newspapers. For 10 days the Soviet Union had no leader Only on July 1 did Stalin come to his senses.” However, historical documents testify to the contrary.

When active hostilities began at 3 am, Adolf Hitler decided for the first and last time to comply with international rules. Being absolutely confident in his success, he decided half an hour before the start of hostilities to declare war on the USSR.

By handing over a note to the government of the USSR 30-40 minutes before the attack, Germany had absolutely nothing to lose.

How was it?

Vyacheslav Molotov left two memories of those events. The first is in the presentation of Felix Chuev.

Here is how Molotov described it

"... Between two and three in the morning they called from Schulenburg to my secretariat, and from my secretariat to Poskrebyshev, that the German ambassador Schulenburg wanted to see People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov. Well, then I went upstairs from Stalin's office to myself, we were in one house, but in different areas.My office went out at a corner directly on Ivan the Great.

The members of the Politburo stayed with Stalin, and I went to my place to receive Schulenburg - it's two or three minutes to pass ... I received Schulenburg at half past three or three in the morning, I think, no later than three o'clock.

The German ambassador delivered the note at the same time as the attack. Everything was agreed with them, and, apparently, the ambassador had instructions: to appear at such and such an hour, he knew when it would begin ... "

F. Chuev. Molotov. semi-dominant ruler

But Molotov described the case to Ivan Fotievich Stadnyuk in a slightly different way. Stadnyuk wrote:

“But how and when did Moscow find out about the beginning of the war? Molotov took my word that for the time being I would keep secret the details that then, in the late sixties, could make a fuss abroad. The essence of these details is as follows (they have already been made public by me printed: Questions of History, No. 6, 1988, and did no harm).
Here is what I heard from Vyacheslav Mikhailovich:

On June 22, 1941, between two and three in the morning, at the dacha of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Molotov, the phone rang from the German ambassador, Count von Schulenburg.

He asked to urgently accept him for the presentation of the most important state document. It was not difficult for Molotov to guess that this was Hitler's memorandum declaring war.

He replied to the ambassador that he would be waiting for him at the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, and immediately called Stalin's dacha, woke him up and informed him of the conversation with Schulenburg.

Stalin replied:

“Go to Moscow, but accept the German ambassador only after the military informs us that the invasion has begun ... I am also going and gathering the Politburo. We'll be waiting for you..."
Molotov did just that. "

Vyacheslav Molotov at 2 o'clock in the morning was already waiting for the note of the declaration of war, and knowing that Schulenburg would hand over this document, he was in no hurry to meet him

That is, between two and three in the morning, Schulenburg only called Molotov with a demand for a meeting. Molotov was at the dacha at that time and officially could not receive Schulenburg at three in the morning.
Therefore, the presentation of the note declaring war by the German ambassador took place at 5:30 in the morning. Hitler failed to cover his perfidious attack with an external diplomatic veneer.

Stalin beat Hitler in a diplomatic skirmish.

He knew that Schulenburg would give Molotov a note and ordered not to meet with Schulenburg until the start of hostilities.

Already after the German troops crossed the state border of the USSR, and German aviation began to bombard peaceful Soviet cities, the German ambassador to the USSR, Schulenburg, at 5:30 am on June 22, 1941, told the Soviet government that Germany had started the war, allegedly due to the concentration of Soviet troops on western border of the USSR. The Soviet government dismissed this version and stated that

"until the last minute, the German government did not make any claims against the Soviet government that Germany attacked the USSR, despite the peace-loving position of the Soviet Union, and that thereby fascist Germany is the attacking side"

So, on June 22, 1941, German troops invaded the USSR, on the same day Romania and Italy declared war on the Soviet Union.

On June 21, Adolf Hitler will write a letter to Benito Mussolini, where he will let him know that he has decided to start a war with the USSR.

Benito Mussolini learned the bad news on June 21 - Hitler decided to attack the USSR

And he was forced to comply with his allied duties by declaring war on the USSR

...........................................................................

The Nazi leadership, like the Soviet one, did not sleep either. Joseph Goebbels wrote in his diary in the early hours of June 22:

"The offensive will begin at 3.30. 160 completed divisions. The front is 3 thousand kilometers. A lot of debate about the weather. The biggest campaign in world history. The closer the blow, the faster the Fuhrer's mood improves. It's always like that with him. He just thaws. He immediately all fatigue is gone.

We spend 3 hours walking around in his salon back and forth ... Dekanozov (USSR Ambassador) again made a performance in Berlin because of the border flights by our planes. An evasive answer!.. In relation to Hess, the Fuhrer finds only words of contempt. If he wasn't crazy, he should have been shot. He inflicted colossal damage on the party and, above all, on the army...

After long hesitation, the time for reading the appeal was set at 5.30 in the morning . Then everything will become clear to the enemy. The people and the world will also know the truth... Our preparations are over. He (Hitler) had been working on it since July of last year, and now the decisive moment had come. Everything possible has been done. Now military happiness must decide.

…3 hours 30 minutes. The guns thundered. Lord bless our weapons ! Outside the window on Wilhelmplatz everything is quiet and empty. Berlin sleeps, the empire sleeps. I have half an hour, but I can't sleep.

I walk restlessly around the room. You can hear the breath of history ... Another fanfare sounded. Powerful, loud, majestic. I proclaim on all German stations the Führer's appeal to the German people.

Solemn moment also for me … Some more urgent business. Then I go to Schwanenwerder. The wonderful sun rose high in the sky. Birds are chirping in the garden. I fell into bed and slept for two hours. Deep, healthy sleep."

Joseph Goebbels read out on the radio Adolf Hitler's address to the German people:

"German people! At the moment, the greatest in terms of its length and volume of troops, which the world has ever seen .... Formations of the German Eastern Front are deployed from East Prussia to the Carpathians. On the banks of the Prut and in the lower reaches of the Danube to the Black Sea coast, Romanian and German soldiers unite under the command of the head of state, Antonescu.

The task of this front is no longer to protect individual countries, but to ensure the security of Europe and thereby the salvation of all. That is why I have decided today to once again place the fate and future of the German Reich and our people in the hands of our soldiers. May the Lord help us in this struggle!”

Joseph Goebbels reads Adolf Hitler's address to the German people on the radio

German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop at a press conference in Berlin announces the start of the war against the Soviet Union.

Hitler's adjutant Nikolaus von Below wrote:

"On June 22, 1941, Hitler's campaign against Russia began. His plan was as follows: in about three months to bring Russia to the ground, in order to then turn again against the West. So, he believed, he would be able to avoid a war on two fronts.

It was Hitler's war. He enjoyed the greatest goodwill of the people, and behind him was the strength of the party and its formations.

For two years the Fuhrer had not lost a single campaign and felt confident that he would win this one as well. He even said that the US would still consider whether to enter the European war or not.

Hitler had been preparing for this battle for a long time, choosing the areas of concentration and deployment of troops on maps, studying the structure of the Russian army and the alleged reserves of its weapons. He knew the number of Russian formations, and he was clearly aware that the struggle would be very severe.

Expecting this severity from the enemy, he wanted to impose it on his own troops as well. With the same cruelty with which Lenin and Stalin established their power in Russia, this power, in his opinion, must now be crushed.

These and similar thoughts occupied Hitler when he boarded his special train at noon on Monday, June 23, to go to East Prussia. He arrived there late in the evening. The Fuhrer gave the name "Wolf's Lair" to his Headquarters. Built over the winter, it was located in a small forest east of Rastenburg and was reliably camouflaged from aircraft.

The core of the entire structure was ten concrete bunkers, the back of which was covered with concrete slabs 2 meters thick and had compartments for sleeping. The front part provided protection only from fragments, and here were the premises for work.

In Keitel's bunker, a slightly larger room was intended for daily discussion of the situation.

In the Fuhrer's bunker of the same model, there was a special smaller room for meetings in a narrower circle. In the center of the camp was a canteen bunker with a dining table for 20 people and a small side table for 6 people. This is where we settled for an indefinite time, here in the first days of a huge fight, incoming reports awaited with tension.

It was an important site, underestimated by the command of the Red Army

General Guderian wrote:

" “On the fateful day of June 22, 1941, at 2:10 am, I went to the command post of the group and went up to the observation tower south of Bogukala. At 03:15 our artillery preparation began.

At 3 o'clock 40 min. - the first raid of our dive bombers. At 04:15, the forward units of the 17th and 18th Panzer Divisions began to cross the Bug.

At 6 hours 50 minutes at Kolodno, I crossed the Bug in an assault boat.

General Hermann Goth wrote:

" “On June 22, at three hours and minutes, four corps of the tank group, with the support of artillery and aviation, which was part of the 8th aviation corps, crossed the state border. Bomber aircraft attacked enemy airfields, with the task of paralyzing the actions of his aircraft.

On the first day, the offensive proceeded completely according to plan.

There are memories of that event from German soldiers:

Alfred Dürwanger, lieutenant wrote:

"Enthusiasm (we have) was not in sight! Rather, everyone was seized by a sense of the grandeur of the forthcoming campaign. And then the question arose: where, at which settlement will this campaign end?!”

Helmut Pabst, non-commissioned officer

“The advance continues. We are constantly moving forward through enemy territory, we have to constantly change positions. I'm terribly thirsty. There is no time to swallow a piece.

By 10 am, we were already experienced, fired upon fighters, who had time to see a lot: positions abandoned by the enemy, tanks and vehicles wrecked and burned out, the first prisoners, the first killed Russians.

German soldiers advance along the railway bridge on the Eastern Front.

Rudolf Gshöpf, chaplain:

“This artillery preparation, gigantic in terms of power and coverage of the territory, was like an earthquake. Huge mushrooms of smoke were visible everywhere, instantly growing out of the ground. Since there was no talk of any return fire, it seemed to us that we had completely wiped this citadel off the face of the earth.

Hans Becker, tanker:

“On the Eastern Front, I met people who can be called a special race. Already the first attack turned into a battle not for life, but for death.

Erich Mende, chief lieutenant noted this:

“My commander was twice my age, and he had already had to fight the Russians near Narva in 1917, when he was in the rank of lieutenant.

“Here, in these endless expanses, we will find our death, like Napoleon ...” he did not hide his pessimism. “Mende, remember this hour, it marks the end of the old Germany.”

One of the German commanders remembered Napoleon, saying that June 22 would be the end for the existing Germany

The offensive of the Army Group "North", "South" and "Center" began quite promisingly. Soviet troops came under a powerful blow from the enemy.

Franz Halder writes:

Morning reports report that all armies except the 11th [on the right flank of Army Group South in Romania] went on the offensive as planned.

The offensive of our troops, apparently, was a complete tactical surprise for the enemy on the entire front.

The border bridges across the Bug and other rivers have been everywhere captured by our troops without a fight and in complete safety. "

On the southern flank, all crossings over the Bug remained intact and fell into the hands of the Germans.

Alexander Vasilevsky wrote:

"At 4 o'clock with minutes, we became aware from the operational bodies of the district headquarters about the bombing of our airfields and cities by German aircraft."

After the failure of the sudden capture of the Brest Fortress, the Germans had to dig in. The photo was taken on the North or South Island.

Shooting time: 06/22/1941

Konstantin Rokossovsky, Lieutenant General of the Red Army wrote:

“At about four in the morning on June 22, upon receiving a telephone message from the headquarters, I was forced to open a special secret operational package. The directive indicated: immediately put the corps on combat readiness and advance in the direction of Rovno, Lutsk, Kovel.

Iosif Geibo, deputy regiment commander of the 46th IAP, ZapVO:

“... My chest went cold. In front of me are four twin-engine bombers with black crosses on their wings. I even bit my lip. Why, these are Junkers!

German Ju-88 bombers! What to do? .. Another thought arose: "Today is Sunday, and on Sundays the Germans do not have training flights." So it's a war? Yes, war!

Fight at the border

Nikolai Osintsev, chief of staff of the division of the 188th anti-aircraft artillery regiment of the Red Army, recalled:

“On the 22nd, at 4 o’clock in the morning, we heard sounds: boom-boom-boom-boom. It turned out that it was German aircraft that unexpectedly flew into our airfields. Our planes did not even have time to change these airfields and all remained in their places. Almost all of them were destroyed."

Vasily Chelombitko, head of the 7th department of the Academy of armored and mechanized troops wrote:

“On June 22, our regiment stopped to rest in the forest. Suddenly we see planes flying, the commander announced a drill, but suddenly the planes began to bomb us.

We understood that the war had begun. Here in the forest at 12 noon they listened to Comrade Molotov's speech on the radio and on the same day at noon received the first combat order of Chernyakhovsky about the division moving forward towards Siauliai.

Yakov Boyko, lieutenant:

“Today, i.e. 06/22/41, day off. While I was writing a letter to you, I suddenly heard on the radio that the brutal Nazi fascism bombed our cities ...

But this will cost them dearly, and Hitler will no longer live in Berlin ... I now have only hatred in my soul and the desire to destroy the enemy where he came from ... "

Pyotr Kotelnikov, defender of the Brest Fortress:

“In the morning we were awakened by a strong blow. Broke the roof. I was stunned. I saw the wounded and the dead, I realized: this is no longer an exercise, but a war. Most of the soldiers of our barracks died in the first seconds.

Following the adults, I rushed to the weapon, but they did not give me rifles. Then I, with one of the Red Army men, rushed to extinguish the wares.

Timofei Dombrovsky, Red Army machine gunner:

“Airplanes poured fire on us from above, artillery - mortars, heavy, light guns - below, on the ground, and all at once! We lay down on the banks of the Bug, from where we saw everything that was happening on the opposite bank. Everyone immediately understood what was happening. The Germans attacked - war!

Together with the units of the spacecraft, the first strike of the enemy was taken over by the personnel of the border units and subunits stationed on the western border, although it was not intended for this. The border troops of the northwestern and western directions included 8 border districts: 48 border detachments, 10 separate border commandant's offices, 7 detachments of border courts, and other units with a total number of 87,459 people

Halder wrote:

"In the afternoon, reports were received about the successful advance of our troops, especially north of Brest (Group Gotha) and on the front of the 4th Panzer Group (Göpner)."

Both tank groups, after successful breakthroughs of the border defenses, moved non-stop to the east. On June 24, the 2nd Panzer Group reached the Slonim region, the 3rd Panzer Group reached the Vilnius region. They were followed by the 4th and 9th armies. The enemy troops, located in the Bialystok region, tried to retreat to the east and break out of the gradually formed cauldron.

The advancing tank groups, supported by large air forces, nevertheless managed to delay the enemy's withdrawal until June 29, in the area east of Bialystok, communication was established between the 4th and 9th armies.

For two more days, units of the Red Army made desperate attempts to break through to the east and southeast and break the narrowing encirclement. Then their strength dried up. The encirclement was completed and the fighting in the area ceased on 1 July.

Meanwhile, both German panzer groups were moving further east in order to encircle again those Russian forces that had withdrawn to the east and escaped the pocket in the Bialystok region. On June 27, the 2nd Panzer Group reached the southern outskirts of Minsk and met there with the 3rd Panzer Group, which the day before, having advanced through Vilnius, reached the northern outskirts of the city.

A breakthrough in two sections in the direction of Minsk was a tactical surprise

The troops of the Western Front from June 22 to July 9 suffered significant losses and were unable to fulfill their tasks. The enemy advanced 550 km deep, captured almost all of Belarus and reached the Dnieper
The enemy attack found most of the Soviet units in the border zone at a tactical disadvantage.

Some divisions, for example, in the Baltic Special Military District, managed to take their positions according to the cover plan, but the majority only advanced to the defense sectors assigned to them or to the concentration areas and were forced to engage in battle on the move

At the same time, all this was done under constant enemy air raids. The air defense system was not brought to a state of combat readiness and therefore could not cover the ground units.
As a result of the hostilities from June 22 to July 9, the troops of the Northwestern Front did not fulfill the tasks that were set before them. They left the Baltic, having suffered heavy losses, and allowed the enemy to advance up to 500 km deep into Soviet territory.

German soldiers next to a burning Soviet village.

In Ukraine, the 1st Panzer Group crossed the Soviet border on June 22, 1941. The conditions of the terrain of Galicia and Western Ukraine, through which she advanced, were far from ideal for the operations of armored forces. Border battles ensued.

The troops of the Southwestern Front (South-Western Front) met the enemy strike with staunch defense and counterattacks. With great difficulty and significant losses, the German 1TG and the 6th Army nevertheless managed to advance from the Sokal region in the direction of Dubno .

Scheme of actions in the South-Western Front

Fighting in the south

The command of the SWF, having determined the direction of the enemy's main attack, decided to launch a counterattack. Against the German 1TG, the 15th, 8th, 9th and 19th mechanized corps were advanced to the Brody area from the depths.

But as a result of the lack of a unified leadership, proper reconnaissance (especially aerial), clear interaction between tanks, aircraft and artillery, and also as a result of the fact that the corps entered the battle in parts, right from the march, the counterattack turned into a series of separate oncoming battles and did not achieved the set goal.

Nikolaus von Below wrote:

"The advance of our troops was stunningly fast. On the northern flank, in Lithuania, and in the center, in the Bialystok region, the enemy is already on the verge of collapse. The command of the units has completely ceased.

Only separate battle groups are still fighting, trying to get out of the boiler. From Dunaburg, our troops, apparently, will quickly make their way to Peipus See, so that no one can escape there.

But the strongest Russian resistance is in the south. Here he has a good command. Rundstedt, who is in command of our troops here, says that he has never had such a good opponent before him in all this war. But since last night, it seems that resistance is weakening here too.

Therefore, we must hurry to create a bag. It is believed that one German army, together with the Romanians, pushed forward from Northern Romania and established contact with Kleist.

Manstein wrote:

“Already on this first day, we had to get acquainted with the methods by which the war was waged on the Soviet side. One of our reconnaissance patrols, cut off by the enemy, was later found by our troops, it was cut out and brutally mutilated. My adjutant and I traveled a lot in areas where enemy units could still be located, and we decided not to surrender alive into the hands of this enemy.

Blumentritt:

“The behavior of the Russians, even in the first battle, was strikingly different from the behavior of the Poles and allies who were defeated on the Western Front. Even being in the encirclement, the Russians staunchly defended themselves.

In turn, Colonel of the Red Army Ivan Bagramyan wrote:

“... The first strike of German aviation, although it turned out to be unexpected for the troops, did not at all cause panic. In a difficult situation, when everything that could burn was on fire, when barracks, residential buildings, warehouses were collapsing before our eyes, communications were interrupted, the commanders made every effort to maintain leadership of the troops.

They firmly followed the combat regulations that they became aware of after opening the packages they had stored.

In the western direction, the strike groups of the 3rd and 2nd tank groups, which are part of the Army Group "Center", having completed the breakthrough of the defense of the 13th Army, on June 28, 1941, united in the Minsk region. Thus, the withdrawal routes of the formations of the 3rd and 10th armies of the Western Front were intercepted

As a result, within a week from the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the enemy achieved major operational successes: he inflicted a heavy defeat on the covering armies of the Western Front and captured a significant part of Belarus, advancing more than 300 km deep into the territory. There was a real threat of a quick exit of the enemy's mobile formations to the Dnieper and their breakthrough to Smolensk.

Breakthrough encirclement near Minsk

The German tank groups now formed a new pocket, which was gradually created around the Russian troops that remained west of Minsk and in the Novogrudok region. The army corps of the 4th and 9th armies, advancing behind the tank groups, finally completed the encirclement of the Russian grouping from the west. By July 9, the boiler was cleaned.

In a summary of the German High Command on July 11, it was reported that as a result of the first big double battle for Bialystok and Minsk, 328,898 people were taken prisoner, including several major generals, 3,332 tanks, 1,809 guns and numerous other spoils of war were captured.

German aggressors set fire to houses in a Belarusian village

From the very first days of the war, the policy of genocide of the population of the USSR began.

In most of the memoirs of Soviet military leaders, the idea is tirelessly repeated that the beginning of the Great Patriotic War found the majority of the Red Army soldiers sleeping peacefully, which is why the troops of the border districts were defeated. Naturally, Stalin is to blame, who did not heed the warnings of the military and to the last opposed bringing the army to combat readiness ...

Similarly, the French and German generals swore in their memoirs that they tried with all their might to dissuade Napoleon and Hitler, respectively, from attacking Russia, but they did not listen. The goal in all three cases is the same - to shift the blame for the defeat from oneself to the head of state, and each time a study of the documents gives a completely opposite picture.

Ten days to assemble an army

In normal times, a military unit resembles a disassembled designer: each part is in its own box. Equipment - in the parks, in a mothballed form. Ammunition, fuel, food, medicines, etc. - in the appropriate warehouses. In order for a unit to fight, the designer must be assembled. That is, put the troops on alert.
By the Directive of the Revolutionary Military Council No. 61582ss of April 29, 1934, three positions were established in the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA): normal, reinforced and full readiness. Each involved a whole list of activities. Somewhat later, in Soviet times, such a list for putting a howitzer division on alert (it was given to me by the writer Valery Belousov, a former artillery officer), looked like this:
Howitzer division of 122-mm M-30 howitzers. Divisional artillery level. Three batteries of six guns. Management (scouts, signalmen, headquarters), rear services (household, traction, first-aid post). Personnel of about one and a half hundred people.
Of the three batteries in ordinary civilian life, the first is deployed, firing. The remaining 12 guns are in the gun park. On the blocks to unload the springs. With barrels sealed with inhibitor paper, with hydraulics drained from the pistons of the knurler and recoil brake cylinders. Naturally, there are practically no personnel in the two batteries.
What is full combat readiness?
1. To accept personnel up to the number of staff, namely, six people per gun, drivers for all tractors, and an economic platoon.
2. Re-mothball the tractors, that is, install batteries, fill the vehicles with fuel, water and oil.
3. Scroll the mechanisms, clean the guns from grease, wash them with kerosene, fill in the hydraulics, pump the pneumatics, get and install the sights (the optics are stored separately).
4. Receive ammunition and bring it to the oksnarvid, that is, finally equip it: remove it from the boxes, wipe it with kerosene, unscrew the stop covers and screw in the fuses, put it back in the boxes, spread it out according to the scales (pluses to pluses, minuses to minuses), immerse in equipment .


5. Get compass, rangefinders, binoculars, radio stations, telephones, cable, check communications, get code tables. The foremen receive dry rations, the drivers fill up their cars.
6. Get personal weapons and ammunition.
7. Carry out elementary combat coordination, at least a couple of times going to the training ground.
When the “alarm” command is given, everyone grabs clothes, without dressing, runs to the equipment and takes it out of the location to the concentration area.
And that is not all. Ammunition is received at warehouses, and warehouses are subordinate to the Main Artillery Directorate, and without an order from Moscow, not a single warehouse worker will even sneeze. The same applies to all other types of allowance. Bringing the unit to combat readiness is preceded by an avalanche of orders. Without all this, the army simply cannot fight.
But she fought, which means she was put on alert, and the documents confirm this.
“From the directive of the Military Council of the KOVO to the military councils of the 5th, 6th, 12th, 26th armies. June 11, 1941.
"one. In order to reduce the terms of combat readiness of the cover units and detachments allocated to support the border troops, carry out the following measures:
Rifle, cavalry and artillery units
a) Have a portable supply of rifle cartridges in sealed boxes. For each heavy machine gun, have 50 percent of the ammunition loaded and boxed, and 50 percent of the equipped magazines for a light machine gun.
Boxes with cartridges, boxes with stuffed tapes and disks should be stored sealed in subdivisions in specially protected premises.
b) Store hand and rifle grenades in sets in the depots of the unit in special boxes for each unit.


c) 1/2 ammunition load of artillery shells and mines of the emergency reserve for all parts of the cover must be fully equipped. For military anti-aircraft artillery, have 1/2 ammunition load of non-reserve artillery shells in the final equipped form.
d) Military-chemical, engineering and communication property to store parts in warehouses, in sets for each unit.
e) Keep the portable supply of food and personal belongings of the fighters in a prepared form for packing in duffel bags and satchels.
f) Fuel supply for all types of vehicles to have two refuelings - one filled in the tanks of vehicles (tractors) and one in tanks (barrels).
Please note: the directive was issued on June 11th. There are still ten days before the war, and measures to bring the troops to combat readiness are being carried out at full speed. The same directive established the terms of readiness for alarm after the implementation of the indicated measures: for rifle and artillery units on horse-drawn traction - 2 hours; for cavalry, motorized units and artillery on mechanical traction - 3 hours. The pre-war night would have been enough.
"Execution to be delivered by 24 o'clock on June 21"
The next line of preparation for war is June 18. On this day, a directive came from the General Staff, after which the units began to withdraw to the areas of concentration.
“From the order for the 12th mechanized corps No. 0033. June 18, 1941.
[…] 4. At 23:00 on 06/18/41, the units will move out of the occupied winter apartments and concentrate ... (then he signs which division goes where - approx. "Lenta.ru").
5. Marches only at night. In areas of concentration, carefully disguise and organize all-round security and observation. Dig cracks, disperse troops to a company with a company removed from the company 300-400 meters.
Pay attention to the timing - the corps literally rushed out of the military camps.
“[...] 8. By 23:00 on 06/18/41, report to the corps headquarters (Jelgava) by telephone or telegraph with the conditional figure “127” about the performance from winter quarters.
10. Command post of the 12th mechanized corps from 04:00 06/20/41 - in the forest 2 km west of the city of DV. Nice (1266). Until 22:00 on 06/18/41, the command post of the corps is Jelgava.
In the early 1950s, the Military Scientific Directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces conducted a survey of Soviet military leaders regarding the concentration and deployment of troops in the western border military districts in June 1941. They recalled that they received orders to withdraw their units to the areas of concentration on June 18-19.
“Colonel General of the Tank Forces P.P. Poluboyarov (former head of the PribOVO armored forces):
“On June 16, at 23:00, the command of the 12th mechanized corps received a directive to put the formation on alert… On June 18, the corps commander raised formations and units on alert and ordered them to be withdrawn to the planned areas. During June 19 and 20 this was done.
On June 16, by order of the district headquarters, the 3rd mechanized corps was also put on alert, which concentrated in the indicated area at the same time.


Lieutenant General P.P. Sobennikov (former commander of the 8th Army):
“By the end of the day, verbal orders were given to concentrate troops on the border. On the morning of June 19, I personally checked the progress of the order.”
Major General I.I. Fadeev (former commander of the 10th Infantry Division of the 8th Army):
“On June 19, 1941, an order was received from the commander of the 10th Rifle Corps, Major General I.F. Nikolaev about bringing the division to combat readiness. All units were immediately withdrawn to the defense area, occupied bunkers and artillery firing positions. With dawn, the commanders of regiments, battalions and companies on the ground clarified combat missions according to a previously developed plan and brought them to the commanders of platoons and squads.
Major General P.I. Abramidze (former commander of the 72nd Mountain Rifle Division of the 26th Army):
“On June 20, 1941, I received the following code from the General Staff: “All units and units of your formation located on the very border should be taken back a few kilometers, that is, to the line of prepared positions. Do not respond to any provocations from the German units until they violate the state border. All parts of the division must be put on alert. Execution is to be delivered by 24:00 on June 21, 1941.”
As you can see, the troops concentrated, and, if necessary, deployed, and even the date of the attack was known exactly. So the famous Directive No. 1 issued on the night of June 21-22 was not the last desperate attempt to save the situation, but the natural finale of a whole series of orders.

Who was in Stalin's office

If you believe the memoirs of the then Chief of the General Staff Georgy Zhukov, when on the evening of June 21 he and People's Commissar of Defense Semyon Timoshenko, having received information about another defector, came to Stalin to persuade him to allow the troops to be put on alert, they found the leader alone, then members of the Politburo appeared .
However, according to the visitor's log of Stalin's office, by the time Tymoshenko arrived (7:05 pm), People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov had been sitting there for half an hour. Together with the people's commissar of defense, people's commissar of the NKVD Lavrenty Beria, chairman of the State Planning Commission Alexei Voznesensky, head of the personnel department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Georgy Malenkov, who oversaw the defense industry, chairman of the defense committee under the Council of People's Commissars, commander of the Kyiv military district, Marshal Kliment Voroshilov and several other people came up.
After the end of the part of the meeting devoted to the mobilization of industry, at 20:15 Voznesensky leaves. At the same time, Timoshenko also retired to return half an hour later with Zhukov, the first deputy people's commissar for defense, Marshal Semyon Budyonny, and the People's Commissar of State Control Lev Mekhlis.


The second, military part of the meeting began. The military districts were transformed into fronts, Budyonny was appointed commander of the armies of the second line, Mehlis received the post of head of the political propaganda department of the Red Army, Zhukov was entrusted with the overall leadership of the Southwestern and Southern fronts. All four and Malenkov, then head of the personnel department of the Central Committee and secretary of the Central Committee, left Stalin's office at 10:20 pm. Molotov, Beria and Voroshilov remained with the leader. At 11 o'clock the office was empty. What did they do next?
The answer is simple: people worked hard all afternoon - they, in fact, would need to eat! Stalin dined just about eleven in the evening, his dinners served at the same time as working meetings. So the assumption that the future members of the State Defense Committee moved from the Stalinist office to the Stalinist apartment seems the most logical.
At this time, Tymoshenko and Zhukov in the People's Commissariat of Defense wrote down Directive No. 1 in a cipher notebook. According to the first edition of the memoirs of the People's Commissar of the Navy Nikolai Kuznetsov (later, the admiral corrected them in accordance with the general line about Stalin resisting the proposals of the military), at about 11 pm in the People's Commissariat of Defense "the people's commissar in an unbuttoned tunic walked around the office and dictated something.
Sitting at the table was Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov and, not looking up, continued to write a telegram. Several sheets of a large notebook lay to the left of him ... An attack by the Nazi troops is possible, - S. K. Timoshenko began the conversation. According to him, the order to put the troops on alert to repel the expected enemy attack was received by him personally from I.V. Stalin, who by that time already apparently had the relevant reliable information ... "
Now this is more like the truth!
Writing, encoding and decoding a directive is a long process. The telegram went to the troops at 00:30 in the morning, to the fleets even later. What did Admiral Kuznetsov do when he learned about the impending attack? That's right: he immediately gave the order to call the fleets and warn his subordinates verbally. Why, as is commonly believed, did not the People's Commissar of Defense do this?

And who, by the way, said that he did not?

The most interesting memories were left by the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR Matvey Zakharov, who was the Chief of Staff of the Odessa Military District before the war. On the evening of June 21, he was in Tiraspol at a field command post, fully equipped in case of war, and the district commander was still in Odessa.

Zakharov Matvey Vasilievich
“At about 10 p.m. on June 21, I was summoned by the BODO apparatus for negotiations from Odessa, the commander of the district troops. He asked if I could decipher the telegram if I received it from Moscow. The commander was given the answer that I could decipher any encryption from Moscow.
Another question followed: “They ask again, confirm your answer, can you decipher the encryption from Moscow?” I was extremely surprised by the repetition of the request. I replied: “I report for the second time that I can decrypt any encryption from Moscow.” An instruction followed: “Expect the receipt of an encryption of particular importance from Moscow. The Military Council authorizes you to immediately decipher the encryption and give the appropriate orders.
Naturally, he immediately gave the appropriate orders. But here's what happened next:
“Having assessed the situation, at about 11 p.m. on June 21, I decided to call the commanders of the 14th, 35th and 48th rifle corps and the chief of staff of the 2nd cavalry corps to the apparatus ... All of them were given the following instructions: 1. Headquarters and troops raise on combat alert and withdraw from settlements. 2. Parts of the cover to occupy their areas. 3. Establish contact with border units.
Please note: the chief of staff of the Odessa district begins to act two hours before receiving the directive. He, in fact, does not need an order - the order of actions is dictated to him by previous events and a plan to cover the state border. Therefore, he took the strange double request from the district headquarters (obviously following the double request from Moscow) as a signal for action, like most other military leaders.
But what about the famous story about the three divisions of the 4th Army of the Western Military District stationed in Brest and coming under fire from German artillery right in the barracks? Is this a fabrication? No, the purest truth.
However, one should not forget that the commander of the 4th Army, Alexander Korobkov, and the commander of the Belarusian Military District, Dmitry Pavlov, were shot shortly after the start of the war for acts very similar to sabotage. But this is already the subject of a separate investigation, as well as the question of why the Soviet military leaders, who received documents in advance about bringing the troops to combat readiness, already in the autumn of 1941 found themselves near the walls of Moscow and Leningrad.

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