Estonian Lithuanian Latvian armies in 1939. Soviet occupation and annexation of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania gained independence after the 1917 revolution in Russia. But Soviet Russia and later the USSR never gave up trying to regain these territories. And according to the secret protocol to the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, in which these republics were assigned to the Soviet sphere of influence, the USSR got a chance to achieve this, which it did not fail to take advantage of. On September 28, 1939, a Soviet-Estonian mutual assistance pact was signed. A 25,000-strong Soviet military contingent was introduced into the territory of Estonia. Stalin told Selter on his departure from Moscow: “It could work out with you, as with Poland. Poland was a great power. Where is Poland now?

On October 2, 1939, Soviet-Latvian negotiations began. From Latvia, the USSR demanded access to the sea - through Liepaja and Ventspils. As a result, on October 5, an agreement on mutual assistance was signed for a period of 10 years, which provided for the entry of a 25,000-strong contingent of Soviet troops into Latvia. And on October 10, an "Agreement on the transfer of the city of Vilna and the Vilna region to the Republic of Lithuania and on mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and Lithuania" was signed with Lithuania.

On June 14, 1940, the Soviet government delivered an ultimatum to Lithuania, and on June 16 to Latvia and Estonia. In general terms, the meaning of the ultimatums coincided - the governments of these states were accused of gross violation of the terms of the Mutual Assistance Treaties concluded earlier with the USSR, and a demand was put forward to form governments capable of ensuring the implementation of these treaties, as well as to allow additional contingents of troops into the territory of these countries. The conditions were accepted.

Riga. The Soviet Army enters Latvia.

On June 15, additional contingents of Soviet troops were brought into Lithuania, and on June 17 - into Estonia and Latvia.
Lithuanian President A. Smetona insisted on organizing resistance to the Soviet troops, however, having been refused by most of the government, he fled to Germany, and his Latvian and Estonian colleagues - K. Ulmanis and K. Päts - began to cooperate with the new government (both were soon repressed) , as well as the Lithuanian Prime Minister A. Merkys. In all three countries, friendly USSR, but not communist governments were formed, headed, respectively, by J. Paleckis (Lithuania), I. Vares (Estonia) and A. Kirchenstein (Latvia).
The process of Sovietization of the Baltic countries was monitored by authorized governments of the USSR - Andrey Zhdanov (in Estonia), Andrey Vyshinsky (in Latvia) and Vladimir Dekanozov (in Lithuania).

The new governments lifted bans on communist parties and demonstrations and called early parliamentary elections. In the elections held on July 14 in all three states, the pro-communist Blocks (Unions) of the working people won - the only electoral lists admitted to the elections. According to official data, in Estonia the turnout was 84.1%, while 92.8% of the votes were cast for the Union of the Working People, in Lithuania the turnout was 95.51%, of which 99.19% voted for the Union of the Working People, in Latvia The turnout was 94.8%, with 97.8% of the votes cast for the Bloc of the Working People.

The delegation of the Estonian State Duma returns from Moscow with good news about the admission of the republic to the USSR, August 1940.

Vares is received by comrades-in-arms: in uniform - the chief political officer of the Defense Forces, Keedro.

August 1940, the delegation of the newly elected Estonian State Duma in the Kremlin: Luus, Lauristin, Vares.

On the roof of the Moscow Hotel, the prime minister of the government formed after the Soviet ultimatum of June 1940, Vares and Foreign Minister Andersen.

Delegation at the Tallinn railway station: Tikhonova, Luristin, Keedro, Vares, Sare and Ruus.

Telman, couple Lauristin and Ruus.

Estonian workers at a demonstration demanding joining the USSR.

Welcoming Soviet ships in Riga.

The Saeima of Latvia welcomes the demonstrators.

Soldiers at a demonstration dedicated to the Soviet annexation of Latvia

Rally in Tallinn.

Welcoming the delegates of the Estonian Duma in Tallinn after the annexation of Estonia by the Soviet Union.

On June 14, 1941, the internal affairs bodies of the USSR, with the support of the Red Army and communist activists, deported 15,424 people from Latvia. 10,161 people were resettled and 5,263 were arrested. 46.5% of the deportees were women, 15% were children under 10 years old. The total number of dead victims of deportation was 4884 people (34% of the total), of which 341 people were shot.

Employees of the Estonian NKVD: in the center - Kimm, on the left - Jacobson, on the right - Riis.

One of the transport documents of the NKVD on the deportation of 1941, for 200 people.

Memorial plaque on the building of the Estonian government - to the highest officials of the Estonian state who died during the occupation.

Introduction
1 Background. 1930s
2 1939. The beginning of the war in Europe
3 Pacts of Mutual Assistance and Treaty of Friendship and Boundary
4 The entry of Soviet troops
5 The ultimatums of the summer of 1940 and the removal of the Baltic governments
6 The entry of the Baltic states into the USSR
7 Consequences
8 Contemporary politics
9 Opinion of historians and political scientists
Bibliography
Accession of the Baltic states to the USSR

Introduction

Accession of the Baltic States to the USSR (1940) - the process of including the independent Baltic states - Estonia, Latvia and most of the territory of modern Lithuania - into the USSR, carried out as a result of the signing of the USSR and Nazi Germany in August 1939 by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the treaty of friendship and border, whose secret protocols fixed the delimitation of the spheres of interest of these two powers in Eastern Europe.

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania consider the actions of the USSR an occupation followed by an annexation. The Council of Europe in its resolutions characterized the process of the entry of the Baltic states into the USSR as occupation, forced incorporation and annexation. In 1983, the European Parliament condemned it as an occupation, and later (2007) used such concepts as "occupation" and "illegal incorporation" in this regard.

The text of the preamble to the Treaty on the Fundamentals of Interstate Relations between the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and the Republic of Lithuania of 1991 contains the lines: “referring to the past the events and actions that prevented the full and free exercise by each High Contracting Party of its state sovereignty, being confident that the elimination by the USSR of violating the sovereignty of Lithuania as a result of the 1940 annexation will create additional conditions of confidence between the High Contracting Parties and their peoples”

The official position of the Russian Foreign Ministry is that the accession of the Baltic countries to the USSR complied with all the norms of international law as of 1940, and that the entry of these countries into the USSR received official international recognition. This position is based on the de facto recognition of the integrity of the borders of the USSR as of June 1941 at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences by the participating states, as well as on the recognition in 1975 of the inviolability of European borders by the participants of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

1. Background. 1930s

The Baltic states in the period between the two world wars became the object of the struggle of the great European powers (England, France and Germany) for influence in the region. In the first decade after the defeat of Germany in the First World War, there was a strong Anglo-French influence in the Baltic states, which later, from the beginning of the 1930s, began to interfere with the growing influence of neighboring Germany. He, in turn, tried to resist the Soviet leadership. By the end of the 1930s, the Third Reich and the USSR became the main rivals in the struggle for influence in the Baltics.

In December 1933, the governments of France and the USSR put forward a joint proposal to conclude an agreement on collective security and mutual assistance. Finland, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were invited to join this treaty. The project, called the "Eastern Pact", was seen as a collective guarantee in the event of aggression from Nazi Germany. But Poland and Romania refused to join the alliance, the United States did not approve of the idea of a treaty, and England put forward a number of counter conditions, including the rearmament of Germany.

In the spring and summer of 1939, the USSR negotiated with England and France on the joint prevention of Italian-German aggression against European countries, and on April 17, 1939, invited England and France to commit themselves to providing all kinds of assistance, including military assistance, to the Eastern European countries located between the Baltic and the Black Seas and bordering the Soviet Union, as well as to conclude for a period of 5-10 years an agreement on mutual assistance, including military, in the event of aggression in Europe against any of the contracting states (USSR, England and France).

The failure of the "Eastern Pact" was caused by the difference in the interests of the contracting parties. Thus, the Anglo-French missions received detailed secret instructions from their general staffs, which determined the goals and nature of the negotiations - the note of the French general staff said, in particular, that, along with a number of political benefits that England and France would receive in connection with by the accession of the USSR, this would allow him to be drawn into the conflict: "it is not in our interests for him to remain out of the conflict, keeping his forces intact." The Soviet Union, which considered at least two Baltic republics - Estonia and Latvia - as a sphere of its national interests, defended this position at the negotiations, but did not meet with understanding from the partners. As for the governments of the Baltic states themselves, they preferred guarantees from Germany, with which they were connected by a system of economic agreements and non-aggression pacts. According to Churchill, “An obstacle to the conclusion of such an agreement (with the USSR) was the horror that these same border states experienced before Soviet help in the form of Soviet armies that could pass through their territories to protect them from the Germans and, along the way, include them in the Soviet-Communist system. After all, they were the most violent opponents of this system. Poland, Romania, Finland and the three Baltic states did not know what they feared more - German aggression or Russian salvation.

Simultaneously with negotiations with Great Britain and France, the Soviet Union in the summer of 1939 stepped up steps towards rapprochement with Germany. The result of this policy was the signing on August 23, 1939 of a non-aggression pact between Germany and the USSR. According to the secret additional protocols to the treaty, Estonia, Latvia, Finland and the east of Poland were included in the Soviet sphere of interests, Lithuania and the west of Poland - in the sphere of German interests); By the time the treaty was signed, the Klaipeda (Memel) region of Lithuania had already been occupied by Germany (March 1939).

2. 1939. The beginning of the war in Europe

The situation escalated on September 1, 1939 with the outbreak of World War II. Germany launched an invasion of Poland. On September 17, the USSR sent troops into Poland, declaring the Soviet-Polish non-aggression pact of July 25, 1932, invalid. On the same day, the states that were in diplomatic relations with the USSR (including the Baltic states) were handed a Soviet note stating that "in relations with them, the USSR will pursue a policy of neutrality."

The outbreak of war between neighboring states gave rise to fears in the Baltics of being drawn into these events and prompted them to declare their neutrality. However, during the hostilities, a number of incidents occurred in which the Baltic countries were also involved - one of them was the entry on September 15 of the Polish submarine "Ozhel" into the Tallinn port, where she was interned at the request of Germany by the Estonian authorities, who began to dismantle her weapons. However, on the night of September 18, the crew of the submarine disarmed the guards and took her out to sea, while six torpedoes remained on board. The Soviet Union claimed that Estonia violated neutrality by providing shelter and assistance to a Polish submarine.

On September 19, Vyacheslav Molotov, on behalf of the Soviet leadership, blamed Estonia for this incident, saying that the Baltic Fleet was tasked with finding the submarine, as it could threaten Soviet shipping. This led to the actual establishment of a naval blockade of the Estonian coast.

On September 24, Estonian Foreign Minister K. Selter arrived in Moscow to sign the trade agreement. After discussing economic problems, Molotov turned to the problems of mutual security and proposed "to conclude a military alliance or an agreement on mutual assistance, which at the same time would provide the Soviet Union with the right to have strongholds or bases for the fleet and aviation on the territory of Estonia." Selter tried to evade discussion, citing neutrality, but Molotov stated that “The Soviet Union needs an expansion of its security system, for which it needs access to the Baltic Sea. If you do not wish to conclude a pact of mutual assistance with us, then we will have to look for other ways to guarantee our security, perhaps more abrupt, perhaps more difficult. Please do not force us to use force against Estonia.”

3. Pacts of Mutual Assistance and Treaty of Friendship and Boundary

As a result of the actual division of Polish territory between Germany and the USSR, the Soviet borders moved far to the west, and the USSR began to border on the third Baltic state - Lithuania. Initially, Germany intended to turn Lithuania into its protectorate, but on September 25, 1939, during the Soviet-German contacts "on the settlement of the Polish problem", the USSR proposed to start negotiations on Germany's renunciation of claims to Lithuania in exchange for the territories of the Warsaw and Lublin provinces. On this day, the German ambassador to the USSR, Count Schulenburg, sent a telegram to the German Foreign Ministry, in which he said that he had been summoned to the Kremlin, where Stalin pointed to this proposal as a subject for future negotiations and added that if Germany agreed, "the Soviet Union immediately will take up the solution of the problem of the Baltic states in accordance with the protocol of August 23 and expect the full support of the German government in this matter.

The situation in the Baltic states themselves was alarming and contradictory. Against the background of rumors about the impending Soviet-German partition of the Baltic States, which were refuted by diplomats from both sides, part of the ruling circles of the Baltic states were ready to continue rapprochement with Germany, while many others were anti-German and counted on the help of the USSR in maintaining the balance of power in the region and national independence, while the underground left forces were ready to support joining the USSR.

Meanwhile, on the Soviet border with Estonia and Latvia, a Soviet military group was created, which included the forces of the 8th Army (Kingisepp direction, Leningrad MD), 7th Army (Pskov direction, Kalinin VO) and 3rd Army (Belarusian Front).

In conditions when Latvia and Finland refused to support Estonia, England and France (which were at war with Germany) were not able to provide it, and the Third Reich recommended accepting the Soviet proposal, the Estonian government entered into negotiations in Moscow, as a result of which 28 In September 1939, a Mutual Assistance Pact was concluded, providing for the creation of Soviet military bases in Estonia and the deployment of a Soviet contingent of up to 25 thousand people on them. On the same day, the German-Soviet Treaty "On Friendship and Border" was signed. According to the secret protocol to it, the conditions for the division of spheres of influence were revised: Lithuania went into the sphere of influence of the USSR in exchange for Polish lands east of the Vistula, which went to Germany. Stalin, at the end of negotiations with the Estonian delegation, told Selter: “The Estonian government acted wisely and for the benefit of the Estonian people by concluding an agreement with the Soviet Union. With you it could turn out, as with Poland. Poland was a great power. Where is Poland now?

On October 2, 1939, similar Soviet-Latvian negotiations began. From Latvia, the USSR also demanded access to the sea - through Liepaja and Ventspils. As a result, on October 5, 1939, an agreement on mutual assistance was signed for a period of 10 years, which provided for the entry of a 25,000-strong contingent of Soviet troops into Latvia.

On October 5, 1939, the USSR suggested that Finland also consider the possibility of concluding a mutual assistance pact with the USSR. Negotiations were started on October 11, 1939, but Finland rejected the proposals of the USSR both on the pact and on the lease and exchange of territories, which led to the Mainil incident, which became the reason for the denunciation of the USSR non-aggression pact with Finland and the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 gg.

On October 10, 1939, an “Agreement on the transfer of the city of Vilna and the Vilna region to the Republic of Lithuania and on mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and Lithuania” was signed with Lithuania for a period of 15 years, which provided for the introduction of a 20,000-strong contingent of Soviet troops.

Almost immediately after the signing of mutual assistance treaties, negotiations began on the basing of Soviet troops on the territory of the Baltic states.

On October 18, 1939, units of the 65th Special Rifle Corps and the Special Group of the Air Force began to enter Estonia, the deployment areas of which were Paldiski, Haapsalu, the islands of Saaremaa and Hiiumaa (at the same time, the Baltic Fleet received the right to be based in Rohuküla and Tallinn for the period of construction of the bases) .

In Latvia, Liepaja, Ventspils, Priekule and Pitrags became the base points. On October 23, 1939, the cruiser "Kirov" arrived in Liepaja, accompanied by the destroyers "Sharp-witted" and "Swift". On October 29, the introduction of units of the 2nd Special Rifle Corps and the 18th Air Brigade began.

In Lithuania, Soviet troops were deployed in the areas of Novaya Vileyka, Alytus, Prienai, Gaizhunai during November - December (they had been in Vilnius and the territory of the Vilna region since the Polish campaign), while they were withdrawn from Vilnius at the insistence of the Lithuanian side. Parts of the 16th Special Rifle Corps, the 10th Fighter and 31st Medium Bomber Separate Air Regiments were stationed in Lithuania.

On April 1, 1940, geographical maps were published in the Third Reich, on which the territories of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were designated as part of the Soviet Union.

Winston Churchill, who at that time held the post of First Lord of the Admiralty, in his speech on the radio on October 1, 1939 said:

The fact that the Russian armies had to stand on this line was absolutely necessary for the security of Russia against the Nazi threat. Be that as it may, this line exists, and the Eastern Front has been created, which Nazi Germany will not dare to attack. When Mr. Ribbentrop was summoned to Moscow last week, he had to learn and accept the fact that the implementation of the Nazi plans in relation to the Baltic countries and Ukraine must be finally stopped.

The Soviet leadership also stated that the Baltic countries did not comply with the signed agreements and were pursuing an anti-Soviet policy. For example, the political union between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Baltic Entente) was characterized as having an anti-Soviet orientation and violating mutual assistance treaties with the USSR.

4. The entry of Soviet troops

A limited contingent of the Red Army (for example, in Latvia its number was 20,000) was introduced with the permission of the presidents of the Baltic countries, and agreements were concluded. So, on November 5, 1939, the Riga newspaper Gazeta dlya Vsego in the article “Soviet troops went to their bases” published a message:

On the basis of a friendly agreement concluded between Latvia and the USSR on mutual assistance, the first echelons of Soviet troops proceeded on October 29, 1939 through the border station Zilupe. To meet the Soviet troops, a guard of honor with a military band was lined up ....

A little later, in the same newspaper on November 26, 1939, in the article “Freedom and Independence”, dedicated to the celebrations of November 18, the President of Latvia published a speech by President Karlis Ulmanis, in which he stated:

... The recently concluded mutual assistance agreement with the Soviet Union strengthens the security of our and its borders ...

5. Ultimatums of the summer of 1940 and the removal of the Baltic governments

On May 10, 1940, Nazi Germany launched a decisive offensive, after which the Anglo-French bloc was defeated: on June 14, Paris fell.

On June 3, Charge d'Affaires of the USSR in Lithuania V. Semyonov writes a review note on the situation in Lithuania, in which the Soviet embassy drew Moscow's attention to the desire of the Lithuanian government to "surrender into the hands of Germany", and to intensify "the activities of the German fifth column and arm the members of the Union of Riflemen ", preparation for mobilization. It speaks of the “genuine intentions of the Lithuanian ruling circles”, which, in the event of a settlement of the conflict, will only strengthen “their line against the treaty, moving on to a“ businesslike ”conspiracy with Germany, waiting only for an opportune moment for a direct strike on the Soviet garrisons.”

On June 4, 1940, under the guise of exercises, the troops of the Leningrad, Kalinin and Belorussian Special Military Districts were alerted and began advancing to the borders of the Baltic states.

On June 13, 1940, Marshal Petain and General Weygand demanded from the government the immediate surrender of France to the German troops. Paris is declared an "open city".

On June 14, 1940, the Soviet government delivered an ultimatum to Lithuania, and on June 16 to Latvia and Estonia. In basic terms, the meaning of the ultimatums coincided - these states were required to bring governments friendly to the USSR to power and allow additional contingents of troops into the territory of these countries. The conditions were accepted.

Lithuanian President A. Smetona insisted on organizing resistance to the Soviet troops, however, having been refused by most of the government, he fled to Germany, and his Latvian and Estonian colleagues - K. Ulmanis and K. Päts - began to cooperate with the new government (both were soon repressed) , as well as the Lithuanian Prime Minister A. Merkys. In all three countries, friendly USSR, but not communist governments were formed, headed, respectively, by J. Paleckis (Lithuania), I. Vares (Estonia) and A. Kirchenstein (Latvia).

6. The entry of the Baltic states into the USSR

The newly elected parliaments already on July 21-22 proclaimed the creation of the Estonian SSR, the Latvian SSR and the Lithuanian SSR and adopted the Declaration on joining the USSR. On August 3-6, 1940, in accordance with the decisions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, these republics were admitted to the Soviet Union. From the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian armies, the Lithuanian (29th rifle), Latvian (24th rifle) and Estonian (22nd rifle) territorial corps were formed, which became part of the PribOVO.

The entry of the Baltic states into the USSR was not recognized by the United States, the Vatican and a number of other countries. It was recognized de jure by Sweden, Spain, the Netherlands, Australia, India, Iran, New Zealand, Finland, de facto by Great Britain and a number of other countries. In exile (in the USA, Great Britain, etc.), some diplomatic missions of the pre-war Baltic states continued to operate; after the Second World War, the Estonian government in exile was created.

7. Consequences

After the entry of the Baltic states into the USSR, the socialist transformations of the economy that had already been completed in the rest of the country and repressions against the intelligentsia, clergy, former political figures, officers, and wealthy peasants began here. In 1941, “due to the presence in the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian SSR of a significant number of former members of various counter-revolutionary nationalist parties, former policemen, gendarmes, landowners, manufacturers, high officials of the former state apparatus of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia and other persons leading subversive anti-Soviet work and used by foreign intelligence services for espionage purposes”, deportations of the population were carried out.

In the Baltic republics, just before the start of the war, an operation was completed to evict an “unreliable and counter-revolutionary element” - a little more than 10 thousand people were expelled from Estonia, about 17.5 thousand from Latvia from Lithuania - according to various estimates, from 15.4 to 16.5 thousands of people. This operation was completed by June 21, 1941.

In the summer of 1941, after the German attack on the USSR, in Lithuania and Latvia, in the first days of the German offensive, there were actions of the “fifth column”, which resulted in the proclamation of short-lived states “loyal to Great Germany”, in Estonia, where the Soviet troops defended longer, this process almost immediately was replaced by the inclusion in the Reichskommissariat Ostland, like the other two.

In 1944-45, as a result of the Baltic operation, the surrender of German troops in Memel and the Kurland pocket, the territory of the modern Baltic countries was cleared of the troops of the Germans and their allies and the Soviet republics were restored.

In 1949, part of the inhabitants of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia were deported to Siberia - Operation Surf, during which about 100 thousand people were evicted.

8. Modern politics

In 1991, even before the collapse of the USSR, the Baltic republics regained full state sovereignty, recognized by resolutions of the USSR State Council on September 6, 1991. The events of 1940 are considered by the leadership of the Baltic states as an act of occupation that dragged on for almost half a century. The modern Baltic republics consider themselves successors of the respective states that existed in 1918-1940, while the Soviet Baltic republics consider themselves to be illegal occupation regimes.

The entry of the Baltic states into the USSR did not receive legal recognition from the United States and Great Britain. During the Cold War, the official diplomatic missions of the Baltic countries did not stop working here.

On September 16, 2008, the US Senate unanimously approved a resolution stating that Russia should recognize the illegality of the Soviet occupation of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.

“Congress asks the President of the United States and the Secretary of State to call on the Government of the Russian Federation to recognize that the Soviet occupation of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania under the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact for the next 51 years was illegal… The United States never recognized this illegal and violent occupation, and subsequent presidents The United States maintained uninterrupted diplomatic relations with these countries throughout the Soviet occupation, never recognizing them as "Soviet republics""

In 1960 and 2005, the Council of Europe in its resolutions characterized the entry of the Baltic states into the USSR as occupation, forced incorporation and annexation. In 1983 and 2005, the European Parliament condemned it, characterizing the period of entry of these states into the USSR as Soviet occupation.

The European Court of Human Rights delivered the following judgment on the events of 1939-1991 (14685/04, PENART v Estonia, pp. 8-9):

“The Court notes that Estonia lost its independence as a result of the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the USSR (also known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact), concluded on 23 August 1939, and additional secret protocols. Following the ultimatum on the deployment of Soviet military bases in Estonia in 1939, in June 1940, the introduction of large forces of the Soviet army took place. The legitimate government was overthrown and Soviet rule was established by force. The totalitarian communist regime of the Soviet Union carried out extensive and systematic actions against the population of Estonia, including, for example, the deportation of 10 thousand people on June 14, 1941 and more than 20 thousand people on March 25, 1949. After the Second World War, tens of thousands of people went to the forests in order to avoid reprisals from the Soviet authorities. Some of them actively resisted the occupation regime. According to the security authorities, about 1,500 people were killed and almost 10,000 were arrested during the period of the resistance movement 1944-1953.

Differences in the assessment of the events of 1940 and the subsequent history of the Baltic countries within the USSR are a source of unrelenting tension in relations between Russia and the Baltic countries.

After the declaration of independence, Lithuania adopted the concept of "zero option" citizenship. All residents registered in Lithuania at the time of independence were granted the right to acquire Lithuanian citizenship. At the same time, in Latvia and Estonia, many issues concerning the legal status of Russian-speaking residents - migrants of the 1940-1991 era have not yet been resolved. and their descendants (see Non-citizens (Latvia) and Non-citizens (Estonia)), since only citizens of the pre-war Republics of Latvia and Estonia, their descendants (in Estonia who also supported the independence of the Republic of Estonia in a referendum on March 3, 1991, citizens of the ESSR) were initially recognized as citizens of these states ), the rest could obtain citizenship only after passing the naturalization procedure, which created a situation of mass statelessness on its territory, unique for modern Europe.

International organizations have recommended to Latvia: to give non-citizens the right to vote in municipal elections; simplify naturalization; reduce the difference between the rights of citizens and non-citizens; not require those naturalized to express beliefs that contradict their vision of the history of their cultural community or nation. In Estonia, international organizations have recommended simplifying naturalization in general or for the elderly, as well as more efficient registration of children of non-citizens as citizens.

Of particular public resonance in Russia were the facts of initiation by the law enforcement agencies of the Baltic states of criminal cases against former employees of the Soviet state security agencies living here, accused of participating in repressions and crimes against the local population during the Second World War.

In 2008, the Historical and Documentary Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia in a brief note about the "MOLOTOV-RIBBENTROP PACT" wrote:

From the very beginning, the conclusion of the Soviet-German pact was perceived in the West ambiguously and caused a lot of comments, mostly of a critical nature. Recently, attacks on Russia in this regard have acquired a special scope. The conclusion of the pact is actively used by our opponents from the Baltic countries and Eastern Europe as a "justification" for a certain "equal responsibility" of the USSR and Nazi Germany for unleashing the Second World War. However, the actual side looked different, and when evaluating the signed documents, it would be wrong to pull them out of the military-political context of that time.

9. Opinion of historians and political scientists

Some foreign historians and political scientists, as well as some modern Russian researchers, characterize this process as the occupation and annexation of independent states by the Soviet Union, carried out gradually, as a result of a series of military-diplomatic and economic steps and against the backdrop of the Second World War unfolding in Europe. In this regard, in journalism, the term Soviet occupation of the Baltic states is sometimes used, reflecting this point of view. Modern politicians also talk about incorporation as a softer option for joining. According to the former Latvian Foreign Minister Janis Jurkans, "It is the word incorporation that appears in the American-Baltic Charter." Baltic historians emphasize the facts of violation of democratic norms during the extraordinary parliamentary elections held at the same time in all three states in the conditions of a significant Soviet military presence, as well as the fact that in the elections held on July 14 and 15, 1940, only one list of candidates put forward by the Bloc of the Working People, and all other alternative lists were rejected. Baltic sources believe that the election results were rigged and did not reflect the will of the people. For example, in a text posted on the website of the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, information is provided that “In Moscow, the Soviet news agency TASS provided information about the mentioned election results already twelve hours before the counting of votes in Latvia began.” He also cites the opinion of Dietrich A. Loeber (Dietrich André Loeber) - a lawyer and one of the former soldiers of the Abwehr sabotage and reconnaissance unit "Brandenburg 800" in 1941-1945 - that the annexation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania was fundamentally illegal, since it is based on intervention and occupation.. From this it is concluded that the decisions of the Baltic parliaments to join the USSR were predetermined in advance.

Soviet, as well as some modern Russian historians, insist on the voluntary nature of the entry of the Baltic states into the USSR, arguing that it was finalized in the summer of 1940 on the basis of decisions of the highest legislative bodies of these countries, which received the widest support of voters in the elections for the entire existence of independent the Baltic states. Some researchers, without calling the events voluntary, do not agree with their qualification as occupations. The Russian Foreign Ministry considers the accession of the Baltic states to the USSR as consistent with the norms of international law of that time.

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Archive of foreign policy of the USSR. The Case of the Anglo-French-Soviet Negotiations, 1939 (vol. III), l. 240. cited in: Military Literature: Studies: Zhilin P. A. How Nazi Germany prepared an attack on the Soviet Union

Winston Churchill. Memoirs

Meltyukhov Mikhail Ivanovich Stalin's missed chance. The Soviet Union and the struggle for Europe: 1939-1941

Mutual Assistance Pact between the USSR and the Republic of Estonia // Plenipotentiaries inform ... - M., International relations, 1990 - pp. 62-64 See also. text online

Mutual Assistance Pact between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Latvia // Plenipotentiaries inform ... - M., International relations, 1990 - pp. 84-87 See also. text online

Agreement on the transfer of the city of Vilna and the Vilna region to the Republic of Lithuania and on mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and Lithuania // Plenipotentiaries inform ... - M., International relations, 1990 - pp. 92-98

Baltic operation 1940

FALSIFIERS of HISTORY (Historical Survey) Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1948

David Childs. The British Communist Party and the War, 1939-41: Old Slogans Revived. Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 12, no. 2 (Apr., 1977), pp. 237-253

That the Russian armies should stand on this line was clearly necessary for the safety of Russia against the Nazi menace. At any rate, the line is there, and an Eastern front has been created which Nazi Germany does not dare assail. When Herr von Ribbentrop was summoned to Moscow last week it was to learn the fact, and to accept the fact that the Nazi designs upon the Baltic States and upon the Ukraine must come to a dead stop.

On July 2, 1940, the responsible head of the TASS news agency, Y. Khavinson, wrote a letter to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, V. Molotov:

... There can be no doubt that the Baltic Entente is a legal form of Anglo-French influence in the Baltics, that even at the present time the Baltic Entente is engaged in behind-the-scenes anti-Soviet fuss. It is possible that, given the changes that have taken place in the international situation, the Baltic Entente may try (if not already trying) to "reorient" towards Germany.

He informs the People's Commissar and the Minister of Foreign Affairs about the disloyalty of the Baltic press to the USSR, Khavinson posed the question:

Isn't the time ripe for us to take real measures to liquidate the Baltic Entente?

the contract did not specify the maximum number of contingents allowed, so their number was unknown

Sergei Zamyatin. Fire storm

Recording of the conversation of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania J. Urbshis, 06/14/1940. // The plenipotentiaries report ... - M., International relations, 1990 -p. 372-376

Recording of the conversation of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov with the Latvian envoy to the USSR F. Kotsins, 06/16/1940. // Plenipotentiaries report ... - M., International Relations, 1990 - pp. 384-387

Recording of the conversation of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov with the Estonian envoy to the USSR A. Rey, 06/16/1940. // The plenipotentiaries report ... - M., International Relations, 1990 - pp. 387-390

Statement of the Government of Lithuania on the departure abroad of the President of the Republic A. Smetona // Plenipotentiaries inform ... - M., International Relations, 1990 - p. 395

Act i. about. President of the Republic of Lithuania A. Merkys, 06/17/1940. // Plenipotentiaries report ... - M., International relations, 1990 - p. 400

Decree of the President of the Republic of Estonia, 06/21/1940.// Plenipotentiaries inform ... - M., International relations, 1990 - p. 413

Message from the Secretariat of the President of Latvia on the establishment of a new government, 06/20/1940. // Plenipotentiaries report ... - M., International relations, 1990 - p. 410

Vlad Bogov "How we chose the USSR"

Report of the Estonian newspaper "Communist" on the results of the elections to the State Duma, 07/18/1940. // Plenipotentiaries report ... - M., International Relations, 1990 - p. 474

Report of the main election commission of Lithuania on the results of the elections to the People's Seimas, 07/17/1940. // Plenipotentiaries report ... - M., International relations, 1990 - p. 473

Smirin G. Basic facts of the history of Latvia - Riga: SI, 1999 - p. 99

Mangulis V. VIII. September 1939 to June 1941//Latvia in the Wars of the 20th Century - Princeton Junction: Cognition Books. ISBN 0-912881-00-3

Declaration of the State Duma of Estonia on state power, 07/21/1940. // Plenipotentiaries report ... - M., International relations, 1990 - pp. 482-484

Declaration of the People's Saeima of Latvia on state power, 07/21/1940. // Plenipotentiaries report ... - M., International relations, 1990 - pp. 475-476

Declaration of the People's Seimas of Lithuania on state power, 07/21/1940. // Plenipotentiaries report ... - M., International relations, 1990 - pp. 478-480

Declaration of the People's Seimas of Latvia on the entry of Latvia into the USSR, 07/21/1940. // Plenipotentiaries report ... - M., International Relations, 1990 - pp. 476-478

Declaration of the State Duma of Estonia on the entry of Estonia into the USSR, 07/22/1940. // Plenipotentiaries report ... - M., International relations, 1990 - pp. 484-485

Declaration of the People's Seimas of Lithuania on the entry of Lithuania into the USSR, 07/21/1940 // Plenipotentiaries inform ... - M., International relations, 1990 - pp. 480-481

Law of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the admission of the Republic of Lithuania to the USSR, 08/03/1940. // Plenipotentiaries report ... - M., International relations, 1990 - pp. 496-497

Law of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the admission of the Republic of Latvia to the USSR, 08/05/1940. // Plenipotentiaries report ... - M., International Relations, 1990 - p. 498

Law of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the admission of the Republic of Estonia to the USSR, 08/06/1940. // Plenipotentiaries report ... - M., International Relations, 1990 - pp. 499-500

Order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR S. K. Timoshenko, 08/17/1940. // Plenipotentiaries report ... - M., International relations, 1990 - pp. 505-508

Mälksoo L. Soviet annexation and state continuity: the international legal status of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 1940-1991. and after 1991 (inaccessible link) - Tartu, Tartu Likooli Kirjastus, 2005 - pp. 149-154

Baltic: history, society, politics. Historical events

http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Parliament/7231/narod/pribalt.htm (link not available)

60th anniversary of Operation Surf

The United States never recognized Soviet sovereignty over Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania. US Department of State

The UK and most other western countries never recognized de jure the Baltic States" incorporation into the USSR. Foreigh and Commonwealth Office

The US Senate demands that Russia recognize the illegality of the occupation of the Baltic States - Delfi

IA REGNUM. Prospects for the development of relations between Russia and Lithuania

Ilya KudryavtsevRussian speaking

Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Latvia (2003) - Section 12

OSCE PA Resolution on National Minorities (2004) - Paragraph 16 (see page 28)

Recommendation 257(2008) of the CoE Congress of Local and Regional Authorities - para. 11 b)

Report of the CoE Commissioner for Human Rights on the visit to Latvia from 5 to 8 October 2003 (2004) - see pt. 132.4.

PACE Resolution No. 1527 (2006) - Section 17.11.2. (English)

PACE Resolution No. 1527 (2006) - Section 17.9. (English)

European Commission against Racism and Intolerance Third report on Estonia (2005) - see Paragraph 129, 132

Second Opinion on Estonia, Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 2005 - see Para. 189

UN Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance Report on mission to Estonia (2008) - see Paragraph 91

Report of the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe on the visit to Estonia from 27 to 30 October 2003 - see para. 61

Lebedeva N. S. The USSR and the Republic of Lithuania (March 1939 - August 1940), Introductory article, p. 23-68. 2006, 774 pp., ISBN 9986-780-81-0

Y. Afanasiev. ANOTHER WAR: HISTORY AND MEMORY, May 1995

Interview with historian Alexei Pimenov

Former Latvian Foreign Minister Janis Jurkans "The US does not recognize the occupation?!"

Feldmanis I. Occupation of Latvia - historical and international legal aspects Latvian MFA Portal

Dietrich André Loeber - Internet-Auftritt der BHK

Ryanzhin V. A. The Socialist Revolution of 1940 in Estonia and the transformation of the State Duma of Estonia into the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR, Jurisprudence. −1960. - No. 4. - S. 113-122

Chernichenko S. V. On the "occupation" of the Baltic States and the violation of the rights of the Russian-speaking population "International Affairs", August 2004

Original taken from nord_ursus in the Black myth about the "Soviet occupation" of the Baltics

As you know, the current Baltic countries - Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, whose fate in the 20th century is almost the same - currently adhere to the same historiographic policy regarding this period. The Baltic states count their independence de jure not from 1991, when they separated from the USSR, but from 1918, when they gained independence for the first time. The Soviet period - from 1940 to 1991 - is interpreted only as the Soviet occupation, during which from 1941 to 1944 there was also a "softer" German occupation. The events of 1991 are interpreted as the restoration of independence. At first glance, everything is logical and obvious, but a detailed study can lead to the conclusion that this concept is untenable.

In order to make the essence of the problem under consideration more understandable, it is necessary to give the background and circumstances of the formation of the statehood of all three countries in 1918.

The independence of Latvia was proclaimed on November 18, 1918 in Riga occupied by German troops, the independence of Estonia on February 24, 1918, Lithuania on February 16, 1918. In all three countries, after that, civil wars went on for two years, or, in the tradition of the Baltic countries themselves, wars for independence. Each of the wars ended with the signing of an agreement with Soviet Russia, according to which it recognized the independence of all three countries and established a border with them. The treaty with Estonia was signed in Tartu on February 2, 1920, with Latvia in Riga on August 11, 1920, and with Lithuania in Moscow on July 12, 1920. Later, after the annexation of the Vilna region by Poland, the USSR continued to consider it the territory of Lithuania.

Now about the events of 1939-1940.

To begin with, we should mention a document that modern Baltic historiography directly links with the accession of the Baltic states to the USSR, although it has only an indirect relation to it. This is a non-aggression pact between the USSR and Nazi Germany, signed by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov and the German Foreign Minister I. Ribbentrop in Moscow on August 23, 1939. The treaty is also known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. At present, it is customary to condemn not so much the pact itself as the secret protocol attached to it on the division of spheres of influence. According to this protocol, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and the eastern territories of Poland (Western Belarus and Western Ukraine) went into the sphere of influence of the USSR; later, when the Treaty of Friendship and Borders was signed on September 28, 1939, Lithuania also moved into the sphere of influence of the USSR.

Does this mean that the USSR has already planned the inclusion of the Baltic states in its composition? Firstly, there is nothing out of the ordinary either in the treaty itself or in the secret protocol, this is a common practice of those years. Secondly, the clauses of the secret protocol that mention the division of spheres of influence only mention the following:

In the event of a territorial and political reorganization of the regions that are part of the Baltic states (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern border of Lithuania is simultaneously the border of the spheres of interests of Germany and the USSR. At the same time, the interests of Lithuania in relation to the Vilna region are recognized by both parties.

As you can see, there is no clause raising the question of the potential entry of the territories of the Soviet sphere of influence into the USSR. Along with this, let's turn to another similar precedent - the division of spheres of influence in Europe between the USSR and Great Britain after the Second World War. As you know, for almost 50 years the sphere of influence of the USSR included the states of Eastern Europe - Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. However, the USSR did not seek to include them in its composition; moreover, it refused to admit Bulgaria to the Union. Consequently, the accession of the Baltic states to the USSR has nothing to do with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

But what influenced this decision of the Soviet government? The strong pro-German orientation of the authorities of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and, as a result, the potential threat of turning these countries into an outpost of Nazi Germany as a result of the voluntary admission of German troops to their territory by the authorities of these countries, in connection with which the Germans could attack not from Brest , as it happened on June 22, 1941, but from near Narva, Daugavpils, Vilnius. The border with Estonia passed 120 km from Leningrad, and there was a real threat of the fall of Leningrad in the first days of the war. I will cite some facts substantiating the fears of the Soviet leadership.

On March 19, 1939, Germany presents an ultimatum to Lithuania demanding the transfer of the Klaipeda region. Lithuania agrees, and on March 22 an agreement is signed on the transfer of the city of Klaipeda (Memel) and the adjacent territory to Germany. According to the text of the internal memorandum of the chief of the German Foreign News Service Dertinger dated June 8, 1939, Estonia and Latvia agreed to coordinate with Germany all defensive measures against the USSR - in accordance with the secret articles from the non-aggression pacts between the Baltic countries and Germany. In addition, the "Directive on the unified preparation of the armed forces for the war of 1939-1940", approved by Hitler, reported the following: The position of the limitrophe states will be determined exclusively by the military needs of Germany. “With the development of events, it may become necessary to occupy the limitrophe states up to the border of old Courland and include these territories in the empire» .

On April 20, 1939, in Berlin, the celebrations marking the 50th anniversary of Adolf Hitler were attended by the Chief of Staff of the Latvian Army M. Hartmanis and the Commander of the Kurzeme Division O. Dankers, as well as the Chief of the Estonian General Staff, Lieutenant General N. Reek. In addition, in the summer of 1939 Estonia was visited by the head of the General Staff of the German Land Forces, Lieutenant General Franz Halder and the head of the Abwehr, Admiral Wilhelm Franz Canaris.

In addition, since 1934 Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have been part of an anti-Soviet and pro-German military alliance called the "Baltic Entente".

In order to prevent the appearance of German troops in the Baltic states, the USSR first tries to get Germany to give up its claims to these territories for a while, and then seeks to place its troops there. A month after the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact, the Soviet Union consistently concludes agreements on mutual assistance with the Baltic countries. The treaty was concluded with Estonia on September 28, 1939, with Latvia on October 5, and with Lithuania on October 10. On the Soviet side, they were signed by Molotov, and on the side of the Baltic republics, by their foreign ministers: Karl Selter (Estonia), Vilhelms Munters (Latvia) and Juozas Urbshis (Lithuania). According to the terms of these treaties, the states were obliged to "to provide each other with all kinds of assistance, including military, in the event of a direct attack or threat of attack from any great European power." The military assistance provided by the USSR to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania consisted in supplying the armies of these countries with weapons and ammunition, as well as in placing on their territory a limited contingent of Soviet troops (20-25 thousand people for each country). This position was mutually beneficial - the USSR could secure both its own borders and the borders of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. According to the agreement with Lithuania, the USSR also transferred the Vilna region to Lithuania, as the former territory of Poland (as mentioned above, the USSR recognized it as the territory of Lithuania occupied by Poland), occupied by Soviet troops in September during the Polish operation. It is worth mentioning that when signing the treaties, the ministers of the Baltic countries were subjected to certain diplomatic pressure by the Soviet side. However, firstly, if we proceed from the realities of the time, this is logical, because when a world war begins, any prudent politician will act harshly towards unreliable neighbors, and secondly, even the fact of pressure that has taken place does not cancel the legality of the signed agreements .

The deployment of a limited contingent of Soviet troops on the territory of neighboring states with the consent of their governments, even as a result of diplomatic pressure, does not contradict the norms of international law. From this it follows that, from a legal point of view, the entry of the Baltic republics into the USSR is not a consequence of the introduction of Soviet troops into their territory. In accordance with this, it can be argued that the Soviet government has no plans for the Sovietization of the Baltic states. Any attempts to prove that the Soviet leadership had such plans, as a rule, boil down to lengthy arguments about the "imperial essence" of Russia and the USSR. Of course, I cannot rule out the possibility of Stalin's intentions to annex the Baltic states to the USSR, but it is impossible to prove their existence either. But there is evidence to the contrary. Stalin's words from a private conversation with Georgy Dimitrov, General Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Comintern: “We think that in the mutual assistance pacts (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) we have found the form that will allow us to place a number of countries in the orbit of influence of the Soviet Union. But for this it is necessary to endure - to strictly observe their internal regime and independence. We will not seek their Sovietization".

However, in the spring of 1940 the situation changed. Supporters of the thesis about the "Soviet occupation" of the Baltics prefer to take the events in the Baltics out of their historical context and not consider what was happening in Europe at that time. And the following happened: on April 9, 1940, Nazi Germany occupied Denmark with lightning speed and without resistance, after which, within 10 days, it established control over most of Norway. On May 10, the troops of the Third Reich occupy Luxembourg, after 5 days of military operation the Netherlands capitulate, on May 17 Belgium surrenders. France falls under German control within a month. In this regard, the Soviet government expresses fears about the possibility of an early opening by Germany of the eastern front, that is, an attack on the Baltic countries, and then, through their territory, on the USSR. The contingent of Soviet troops that was at that time in the Baltic States was not enough to successfully confront the Wehrmacht. In the autumn of 1939, when Soviet military bases were deployed in the Baltic countries, the leadership of the USSR did not count on such a turn of events. To fulfill the terms of the Mutual Assistance Agreements concluded in the autumn of 1939, it was necessary to introduce an additional contingent of troops into the territory of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which would be able to resist the Wehrmacht, and, accordingly, provide assistance to the Baltic countries, which was provided for in the agreements. At the same time, the pro-German orientation of the authorities of these states continued, which in essence could be considered as non-compliance by these states with mutual assistance treaties. These states did not leave the Baltic Entente. In addition, during the Soviet-Finnish War, Latvia and Estonia provided assistance to the Finnish army by intercepting Soviet radio signals (despite the fact that the RKKF ships participating in hostilities against Finland went to the Gulf of Finland from a naval base near the city of Paldiski in Estonia ). In connection with the above circumstances, the Soviet Union is taking rather tough, but completely justified actions in relation to the Baltic neighbors. On June 14, 1940, the USSR presents a note to Lithuania, where, in an ultimatum form, it demands that a government friendly to the USSR be formed within 10 hours, which will implement the Mutual Assistance Treaty and organize free passage to the territory of Lithuania for an additional contingent of Soviet armed forces. The Lithuanian government agrees, and on June 15 additional Soviet units enter Lithuania. On June 16, similar demands were made to Estonia and Latvia. Consent was also received, and on June 17 Soviet troops entered these countries. It was the introduction of additional troops in June 1940 that is considered to be the beginning of the "Soviet occupation." However, the actions of the Soviet Union are absolutely lawful, since they correspond to the provision written in mutual assistance treaties, according to which the countries “undertake to provide each other with all kinds of assistance, including military, in the event of a direct attack or threat of attack from any great European power”. In June 1940, the threat of attack increased greatly, which meant that the troops intended to assist in the event of a potential threat had to be increased accordingly! This circumstance justifies the actions of the Soviet government in issuing ultimatums. As for whether these actions were occupation (a number of politicians also use the concept of “armed aggression” or even “attack”), the consent of the governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania was given to the introduction of additional troops, albeit not entirely voluntary. In this case, they had a choice - they could not accept the ultimatums and resist the Red Army. Or they might not even have, in which case it would still have turned out that the Red Army entered their territory without consent. Then one could still talk about the Soviet occupation. But it turned out differently. The troops were admitted with official consent. Consequently, there can be no talk of occupation either.

Before the entry of troops, additional agreements were concluded between the USSR and the Baltic countries, which determined the procedure for the entry and location of Soviet military units, and the officers of the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian armies participated in the coordination of the troops. On June 17, at 22:00, President of Latvia Karlis Ulmanis addressed the people of Latvia by radio, where he announced that the introduction of Soviet troops was taking place "with the knowledge and consent of the government, which follows from the friendly relations between Latvia and the Soviet Union". The acting president of Lithuania, Antanas Merkys, similarly notified the Lithuanians.

Supporters of the opposite point of view prefer to draw a parallel here with the German occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939. The scheme is the same: on the evening of March 14, 1939, Hitler presented an ultimatum to the President of Czechoslovakia, Emil Gakhe, demanding that he sign an act on the liquidation of the independence of Czechoslovakia by 6 a.m. on March 15. At the same time, Gakh was confronted with a fact - at night the German troops would cross the border with Czechoslovakia. The president was under pressure and threatened with execution if he refused. Reich Minister of Aviation Hermann Göring threatened to wipe Prague off the face of the earth with carpet bombing. Four hours later, Emil Gakha signed the agreement. BUT! .. Firstly, the ultimatum was presented when the German troops had already received an order to cross the border, and the Soviet troops did not receive an order until the answer to the ultimatum followed. Secondly, when Gakh signed the consent, the German troops had already crossed the border. The difference, I think, is obvious.

The population of the Baltic states, whose pro-Soviet sentiments were extremely strong, greeted the Soviet troops with jubilation. These sentiments, thanks to the events that took place, intensified, in a number of cities rallies were held for joining the USSR. Modern Baltic politicians who are engaged in falsification of history prefer to claim that these demonstrations were allegedly organized and financed by the "occupiers", while the population in its mass allegedly resisted.

Demonstrations in Kaunas, Riga and Tallinn. July 1940

On July 14-15, 1940, extraordinary parliamentary elections were held in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. According to their results, the candidates of the "Unions of the working people" received: in Estonia - 93% of the vote, in Latvia - 98%, in Lithuania - 99%. The elected new parliaments on July 21 transformed Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania into Soviet socialist republics, and on July 22 signed declarations on joining the USSR, which were considered and approved by the Soviet Union on August 6.

Here, supporters of the concept of occupation draw a parallel with the occupation (Anschluss) of Austria in March 1938. They say that a plebiscite was held there in the same way, and the majority of the population voted for reunification with Germany, but this does not cancel the fact of occupation. But meanwhile, they do not take into account the significant difference that German troops entered Austria on March 12, 1938 without any consent from the government of this country, and the plebiscite, in which 99.75% voted for the Anschluss (German. Anschlüss- reunion), was held on April 10. Thus, the plebiscite can be considered illegitimate, since it was held at a time when the occupation of Austria by German troops had already been carried out. The fundamental difference from the Soviet troops already stationed in the Baltic states is that the governments of the Baltic countries gave their consent to their deployment, even after diplomatic pressure. Moreover, according to the instructions for the Soviet troops in the Baltic states, the contacts of the Red Army with the population were limited, and they were strictly forbidden to support any third-party political forces. It follows from this that the Soviet troops present on the territory of these three countries could not influence the political situation. And the mere fact of their presence does not change anything. After all, using the same standard, one can question the legal status of the pre-war Baltic states, since they were proclaimed in the presence of Imperial German troops.

In short, the government of the USSR never planned to include the Baltic states in the USSR. It was only planned to include it in the Soviet orbit of influence and make the Baltic states allies of the USSR in a future war. In October 1939, the Soviet leadership considered it sufficient for this to place Soviet troops there so that German troops would not subsequently be stationed there, more precisely, so that in the event of an invasion of German troops there, they would fight with them already there. And in June 1940, more serious measures had to be taken - to increase the number of troops and force the authorities of these countries to change their political course. On this, the Soviet government fulfilled its task. The new governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have already voluntarily signed declarations on joining the USSR, with the existing support of the pro-Soviet course by the majority of the population.

Proponents of the occupation thesis often try to prove the opposite by the existence of war plans with Estonia and Latvia already in the summer of 1939 and the fact of the concentration of Soviet troops near the border, sometimes citing an Estonian phrasebook for interrogating prisoners of war as an argument. Yes, there really were such plans. Such a plan was also for the war with Finland. But, firstly, the goal of implementing these plans was not set, the plans themselves were developed in case the situation could not be resolved peacefully (as happened in Finland), and secondly, the military action plans were not aimed at joining the Baltic states to the USSR, but to change the political course there through military occupation — if this plan were realized, then, of course, we could talk about Soviet occupation.

Of course, the actions of the USSR in June 1940 were very tough, and the actions of the authorities of the Baltic countries were not fully voluntary. But, firstly, this does not cancel the legality of the introduction of troops, and secondly, in the legal status of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the period from 1940 to 1991, they could not de jure be in a state of occupation, since even after the introduction of troops into these states continued to operate their legitimate authority. The personnel of the government was changed, but the power itself did not change; talk that "people's governments" were puppet and were brought on Red Army bayonets is nothing more than a historical myth. These same legitimate governments decided to join the USSR. An obligatory sign according to which a territory can have the legal status of an occupied one is the power brought on the bayonets of the occupying army. There was no such power in the Baltic States, but legitimate governments continued to operate. But in the same Czechoslovakia, this scheme took place - on March 15, 1939, when German troops crossed the German-Czechoslovak border, the territory of the Czech Republic (Slovakia became an independent state) by Hitler's personal decree was declared a German protectorate (Bohemia and Moravia), that is Germany declared its sovereignty over this territory. The Reich Protectorate became the occupying power of the Czech Republic, brought by the German army. Formally, Emil Hacha still continued to be the current president, but was subordinate to the Reich Protector. The difference with the Baltics is again obvious.

So, the concept of Soviet occupation is based on the fact that there was diplomatic pressure from the Soviet Union. But, firstly, this was not the only case of the use of diplomatic pressure, and secondly, it does not cancel the legality of the actions taken. The governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, both in October 1939 and in June 1940, themselves allowed Soviet troops to be deployed on the territories of their countries, and already in July 1940, the new legally elected governments voluntarily decided to join the USSR. Consequently, there was no Soviet occupation of the Baltic countries in 1940. Moreover, it did not exist in 1944, when the Baltic republics were already the territory of the USSR, and Soviet troops liberated them from Nazi occupation.

Opponents of the opposite often use the argument: "The Balts were forced to impose a system that they did not choose. So, there was an occupation." About "did not choose" has already been said above. This is first. Secondly, is it even appropriate to talk about what they chose or did not choose under the system that existed in these three countries before 1940? A myth widespread at the present time claims that these three states were democratic before joining the USSR. In fact, authoritarian dictatorial regimes reigned there, not in many ways inferior to the Stalinist regime in the USSR. In Lithuania, as a result of a military coup on December 17, 1926, Antanas Smetona came to power. Apparently inspired by the success of Adolf Hitler in Germany, the prime ministers of Estonia (Konstantin Päts) and Latvia (Karlis Ulmanis) carried out coups d'état on March 12 and May 15, 1934, respectively. In all three countries, in the same way, there was no real freedom of speech, there was severe censorship, as well as a ban on political parties, on the basis of which repressions against the communists were carried out. There were also things close to the cult of personality. In particular, Antanas Smetona was proclaimed the great leader of the Lithuanian people, and Karlis Ulmanis was called "the greatest figure in Europe" and "twice a genius" in the Latvian press. It follows from this that talk about a system imposed by force and not chosen by the Balts is completely inappropriate here, since the system that existed earlier can be called with much greater certainty imposed by force.

In addition, modern Baltic historiography mentions repressions against the inhabitants of the newly formed Baltic Soviet republics and, in particular, their deportation to Siberia on June 14, 1941. The greatest lie in this historiography lies, firstly, in the traditional overestimation of figures in relation to the Stalinist repressions, and secondly, in the allegations about the alleged genocide of Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians. In reality, in May 1941, a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR "On measures to clean up the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian SSR from the anti-Soviet, criminal and socially dangerous element" was issued. Of all the Baltic republics taken together, about 30 thousand people were deported. Given that the population of all three republics at that time was about 3 million, the number of deportees is approximately 1%. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that although there were, of course, innocents among the deported, far from the full number and even the majority of the deported were "anti-Soviet elements"; among them were banal criminals who, even before 1940, were kept in places of deprivation of liberty of the independent Baltic states, and in 1941 were simply transferred to other places. In addition, it should be borne in mind that the deportation was carried out immediately before the war (8 days before it began) and was carried out to prevent the cooperation of "anti-Soviet, criminal and socially dangerous elements" with the enemy in the event of a possible Nazi occupation of the territory. The deportation of one percent of the population, among which, moreover, there were many ethnic Russians (since there were already many Russians in the pre-war Baltic states) can only be called a genocide of the Baltic peoples with an overly rich imagination. The same, however, also applies to larger-scale deportations carried out in 1949, when about 20 thousand people were taken out of each republic. For the most part, those who during the war "distinguished themselves" by direct cooperation with the Nazis were deported.

Another common misconception regarding the Baltics is that during the Great Patriotic War, most of the Balts collaborated with the Germans, and most of the residents of the Baltic cities greeted the Germans with flowers. In principle, we cannot judge how many people were happy about the arrival of the "German liberators", but the fact that people were standing on the streets of Vilnius, Riga and other cities, joyfully greeting them and throwing flowers, does not yet speak of that they were in the majority. Moreover, there were no less people who just as joyfully met the Red Army in 1944. There are, however, other facts. During the years of Nazi occupation on the territory of the Baltic republics, as well as on the territory of the occupied Byelorussian SSR, there was a partisan movement, numbering about 20 thousand people in each republic. There were also Baltic divisions of the Red Army: the 8th Rifle Estonian Tallinn Corps, the 130th Rifle Latvian Order of the Suvorov Corps, the 16th Rifle Lithuanian Klaipeda Red Banner Division and other formations. During the war years, military orders and medals were awarded to 20,042 members of Estonian formations, 17,368 members of Latvian formations and 13,764 members of Lithuanian military formations.

Already against the background of the above facts, the assertion about the predominance of moods of cooperation with the Nazis among the Balts becomes untenable. The movements of the Baltic "forest brothers", which existed until the end of the 1950s, were not so much national as criminal-criminal in nature, naturally, diluted with nationalism. And often civilians of the Baltic republics died at the hands of the forest brothers, and more often of the Baltic nationalities.

In addition, the Baltic republics within the USSR in no way occupied the position of the occupied. They were controlled by national authorities, consisting of Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians, citizens of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in August 1940 automatically received Soviet citizenship, and the armies of these states became part of the Red Army. Throughout the Soviet period, the population of the Baltic peoples increased, their national culture developed. In addition, the Baltic republics occupied a privileged position in the "Empire of Evil". Huge investments were made in the economy and the tourism sector (Jurmala and Palanga were considered one of the best resorts in the entire Union). In particular, for the ruble of their own funds, the Baltic republics received about 2 rubles from the RSFSR. The Latvian SSR with a population of 2.5 million people received almost 3 times more funds from the budget than the Voronezh region with the same population. In the villages of the RSFSR, for 10 thousand hectares of arable land, there were an average of 12.5 km of paved roads, and in the Baltic states - almost 70 km, and the Vilnius-Kaunas-Klaipeda highway was considered the best highway in the Soviet Union.In Central Russia, for 100 hectares of agricultural land, the cost of fixed production assets was 142 thousand rubles, and in the Baltic States - 255 thousand rubles. It was the Baltic republics and, to a slightly lesser extent, the Moldavian and Georgian SSRs that had the highest standard of living in the entire Soviet Union. I must say that in the 1990s a huge number of factories in the Baltic countries were closed and destroyed (in Russia, of course, too, but this is a separate conversation) under the pretext that "we do not need Soviet monsters." The oil shale processing plant in Kohtla-Järve, the machine-building plant in Pärnu (partially functioning), most of the buildings of the Riga Carriage Works were closed under the knife(Rīgas Vagonbūves Rūpnīca), which supplied electric trains and trams to the entire Soviet Union, the Riga Electrotechnical Plant VEF (Valsts Elektrotehniskā Fabrika), built before the revolution and significantly expanded in the Soviet years, is in decline, in 1998 the Riga Bus Factory fell apart and has not yet been restored RAF (Rīgas Autobus Fabrika); other infrastructure facilities also got it, for example, a sanatorium in Jurmala built in Soviet times was abandoned.

In addition, there is another interesting circumstance that makes the concept of "restoring independence" untenable. Namely, the fact that the independence of Lithuania - March 11, 1990, Estonia - August 20, 1991, and Latvia - August 21, 1991 - was proclaimed respectively by the parliaments of the Lithuanian, Estonian and Latvian SSR. From the point of view of the existing concept, these parliaments were local bodies of occupation power. If this is so, then the legal status of the current Baltic states can be called into question. It turns out that indirectly the current Baltic authorities call themselves occupiers in the recent past, and directly they deny any legal continuity from the Soviet republics.

Thus, we can conclude that the concept of "Soviet occupation" of the Baltics is artificial and far-fetched. At the moment, this concept is a convenient political tool in the hands of the authorities of the Baltic countries, where, on the basis of this, mass discrimination against the Russian population is carried out. In addition, it is also a tool for issuing large invoices to Russia demanding compensation. In addition, Estonia and Latvia demand (now unofficially) from Russia the return of part of the territories: Estonia - Zanarovye with the city of Ivangorod, as well as the Pechora district of the Pskov region with the city of Pechory and the ancient Russian city, and now the rural settlement of Izborsk, Latvia - Pytalovsky district of Pskovskaya areas. As a justification, the borders under the treaties of 1920 are given, although they are currently not valid, since they were denounced in 1940 by the declaration of joining the USSR, and the borders were changed already in 1944 when Estonia and Latvia were republics of the Soviet Union.

Conclusion: the concept of "Soviet occupation" of the Baltic states has little in common with historical science, but, as mentioned above, is just a political tool.

Hello! In the Fight Myths blog, we will analyze the events of our history, surrounded by myths and falsifications. These will be small reviews dedicated to the anniversary of a particular historical date. Of course, it is impossible to conduct a detailed study of the events within the framework of one article, but we will try to outline the main problems, show examples of false statements and their refutation.

In the photo: Railway workers rock Weiss, a member of the Plenipotentiary Commission of the State Duma of Estonia, after returning from Moscow, where Estonia was admitted to the USSR. July 1940

71 years ago, on July 21-22, 1940, the parliaments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania transformed their states into Soviet socialist republics and adopted Declarations on joining the USSR. Soon the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted laws that approved the decisions of the Baltic parliaments. Thus began a new page in the history of the three states of Eastern Europe. What happened during the few months of 1939-1940? How to evaluate these events?

Let's consider the main theses used by our opponents in discussions on this topic. We emphasize that these theses are not always a direct lie and deliberate falsification - sometimes it is just an incorrect formulation of the problem, a shift in emphasis, an involuntary confusion in terms and dates. However, as a result of the use of these theses, a picture is formed that is far from the true meaning of events. Before the truth can be found, the lie must be exposed.

1. The decision to join the Baltic States to the USSR was spelled out in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and / or secret protocols to it. Moreover, Stalin planned to annex the Baltic States long before these events. In a word, these two events are interconnected, one is a consequence of the other.

Examples.

"In fact, if we do not ignore the obvious facts, then of course, it was the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact that sanctioned the occupation of the Baltic states and the occupation of the eastern territories of Poland by Soviet troops. And it is surprising that the secret protocols to this treaty are so often mentioned here, because, in fact, even without them the role of this treaty is clear.
Link .

"As a professional, I began to more or less deeply study the history of the Second World War in the mid-80s, dealing with the now infamous, but then still almost unexplored and classified the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the secret protocols that accompanied it, which decided the fate of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia in 1939".
Afanasiev Yu.N. Another war: history and memory. // Russia, XX century. Under total ed. Yu.N. Afanasiev. M., 1996. Book. 3. Link.

"The USSR received from Germany the opportunity for freedom of action for further "territorial and political transformations" in the sphere of Soviet influence. On August 23, both aggressive powers were of the same opinion that a "sphere of interest" meant the freedom to occupy and annex the territories of the respective states. The Soviet Union and Germany divided their spheres of interest on paper in order to "make the division also a reality."<...>
"The government of the USSR, which needed mutual assistance treaties with the Baltic states in order to destroy these states, did not think to be satisfied with the existing status quo. It took advantage of the favorable international situation created in connection with the German attack on France, Holland and Belgium in order to completely occupy the Baltic states in June 1940.
Link .

Comment.

The conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and its significance in international politics in the 1930s. 20th century - a very complex topic that requires separate analysis. Nevertheless, we note that most often the assessment of this event is of an unprofessional nature, comes not from historians and lawyers, but sometimes from people who did not read this historical document and did not know the realities of international relations of that time.

The realities of the time are that the conclusion of non-aggression pacts was a common practice of those years, not involving allied relations (and often this pact is called an "alliance treaty" between the USSR and Germany). The conclusion of secret protocols was also not out of the ordinary diplomatic move: for example, the British guarantees to Poland in 1939 contained a secret protocol, according to which Great Britain provided military assistance to Poland only in the event of an attack by Germany, but not by any other country. The principle of dividing a particular region into spheres of influence between two or more states, again, was very common: suffice it to recall the delimitation of spheres of influence between the countries of the Anti-Hitler coalition at the final stage of World War II. So it would be wrong to call the conclusion of the treaty on August 23, 1939 criminal, immoral, and even more so illegal.

Another question is what was meant by the sphere of influence in the text of the pact. If you look at Germany's actions in Eastern Europe, you can see that its political expansion did not always involve occupation or annexation (for example, as in the case of Romania). It is difficult to say that the processes in the same region in the mid-40s, when the same Romania fell into the sphere of influence of the USSR, and Greece - into the sphere of influence of Great Britain, led to the occupation of their territory or forced annexation.

In a word, the sphere of influence implied a territory on which the opposite side, according to its obligations, was not supposed to pursue an active foreign policy, economic expansion, or support for certain political forces that were beneficial to it. (See: Makarchuk V.S. Sovereign-territorial status of Western Ukrainian lands during the period of the Other World War (1939 - 1945): historical and legal record. Kiev, 2007. p. 101.) This, for example, happened after the Second world war, when Stalin, in accordance with the agreements with Churchill, did not support the Greek communists, who had a great chance of winning the political struggle.

Relations between Soviet Russia and independent Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania began to take shape in 1918, when these states gained independence. However, the hopes of the Bolsheviks for victory in these countries of the communist forces, including with the help of the Red Army, did not come true. In 1920, the Soviet government concluded peace treaties with the three republics and recognized them as independent states.

Over the next twenty years, Moscow gradually built the "Baltic direction" of its foreign policy, the main goals of which were to ensure the security of Leningrad and prevent a possible military adversary from blocking the Baltic Fleet. This explains the turn in relations with the Baltic states that took place in the mid-1930s. If in the 20s The USSR was convinced that the creation of a single bloc of three states (the so-called Baltic Entente) was not beneficial to it, because. this military-political alliance can be used by the countries of Western Europe for a new invasion of Russia, then after the Nazis came to power in Germany, the USSR insists on creating a system of collective security in Eastern Europe. One of the projects proposed by Moscow was a Soviet-Polish declaration on the Baltics, in which both states would guarantee the independence of the three Baltic countries. However, Poland rejected these proposals. (See Zubkova E.Yu. The Baltic States and the Kremlin. 1940-1953. M., 2008. S. 18-28.)

The Kremlin also tried to obtain guarantees for the independence of the Baltic countries from Germany. Berlin was invited to sign a protocol in which the governments of Germany and the USSR would promise to "invariably take into account in their foreign policy the obligation to preserve the independence and inviolability" of the Baltic states. However, Germany also refused to go towards the Soviet Union. The next attempt to reliably ensure the security of the Baltic countries was the Soviet-French project of the Eastern Pact, but it was not destined to come true either. These attempts continued until the spring of 1939, when it became clear that Great Britain and France did not want to change their tactics of appeasing Hitler, embodied by that time in the form of the Munich Agreements.

Karl Radek, head of the Bureau of International Information of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, described very well the change in the attitude of the USSR towards the Baltic countries. He stated the following in 1934: "The Baltic states created by the Entente, which served as a cordon or bridgehead against us, today are for us the most important wall of protection from the West." So, it is possible to talk about the orientation towards the "return of the territories", "restoration of the rights of the Russian Empire" only by resorting to speculation - the Soviet Union has long sought the neutrality and independence of the Baltic states for the sake of its security. Arguments cited as arguments about the "imperial", "powerful" turn in Stalin's ideology that occurred in the mid-1930s can hardly be transferred to the sphere of foreign policy; there is no documentary evidence for this.

By the way, this is not the first time in Russian history when the security issue was not resolved by joining neighbors. The "divide and conquer" recipe, despite its apparent simplicity, could sometimes be extremely inconvenient and unprofitable. For example, in the middle of the XVIII century. representatives of the Ossetian tribes sought the decision of St. Petersburg on their inclusion in the empire, because. Ossetians have long been subjected to pressure and raids from the Kabardian princes. However, the Russian authorities did not want a possible conflict with Turkey, and therefore did not accept such a tempting offer. (For more details, see Degoev V.V. Rapprochement along a complex trajectory: Russia and Ossetia in the middle of the 18th century. // Russia XXI. 2011. Nos. 1-2.)

Let us return to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, or rather, to the text of paragraph 1 of the secret protocol: "In the event of territorial and political transformations in the areas belonging to the Baltic states (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern border of Lithuania will be a line separating spheres of influence Germany and the USSR. In this regard, Lithuania's interest in the Vilna region is recognized by both sides." (Link.) On September 28, 1939, by an additional agreement, Germany and the USSR will adjust the border of spheres of influence, and in exchange for Lublin and part of the Warsaw Voivodeship of Poland, Germany will not lay claim to Lithuania. So, there is no talk of any accession, we are talking about spheres of influence.

By the way, on the same days (namely, September 27), Ribbentrop, the head of the German Foreign Ministry, in a conversation with Stalin asked: "Does the conclusion of the pact with Estonia mean that the USSR intends to slowly penetrate into Estonia, and then into Latvia?" Stalin replied: "Yes, it means. But the existing state system will be temporarily preserved there, etc." (Link.)

This is one of the few pieces of evidence that indicates that the Soviet leadership has intentions to "Sovietize" the Baltics. As a rule, these intentions were expressed in specific phrases by Stalin or representatives of the diplomatic corps, but intentions are not plans, especially when it comes to words thrown during diplomatic negotiations. There is no confirmation in archival documents of a connection between the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and plans to change the political status or "Sovietization" of the Baltic republics. Moreover, Moscow forbids the plenipotentiaries in the Baltics not only to use the word "Sovietization", but also to communicate with the left forces in general.

2. The Baltic states pursued a policy of neutrality, they would not fight on the side of Germany.

Examples.

"Leonid Mlechin, writer: Tell me, please, witness, there is a feeling that the fate of your country, as well as Estonia and Latvia, was sealed in 1939-40. Either you become part of the Soviet Union, or part of Germany. There wasn't even a third option. Do you agree with this point of view?
Algimantas Kasparavičius, historian, political scientist, researcher at the Institute of Lithuanian History: Of course I don't, because before the Soviet occupation, until 1940, all three Baltic countries, including Lithuania, professed a policy of neutrality. And they tried to defend their interests and their statehood in this neutral way in the war that had begun.
Judgment of Time: Accession of the Baltic states to the USSR - loss or gain? Part 1. // Channel Five. 08/09/2010. Link .

Comment.

In the spring of 1939, Germany finally occupied Czechoslovakia. Despite the obvious contradiction of the Munich agreements, Great Britain and France limited themselves to diplomatic protests. However, these countries, together with the USSR, Poland, Romania and other states of Eastern Europe, continued to discuss the possibility of creating a system of collective security in this region. The most interested party was, of course, the Soviet Union. Its principal condition was the neutrality of Poland and the Baltic states. However, these countries were against guarantees from the USSR.

Here is how Winston Churchill wrote about this in his work "The Second World War": "The negotiations seemed to have reached a hopeless dead end. Accepting an English guarantee Note.), the governments of Poland and Romania did not want to accept a similar obligation in the same form from the Russian government. The same position was held in another important strategic area - in the Baltic states. The Soviet government made it clear that it would join the mutual guarantee pact only if Finland and the Baltic states were included in the general guarantee.

All four of these countries have now refused such a condition and, horrified, would probably have refused to agree to it for a long time to come. Finland and Estonia even stated that they would regard as an act of aggression a guarantee given to them without their consent. On the same day, May 31, Estonia and Latvia signed non-aggression pacts with Germany. In this way, Hitler was able to penetrate without difficulty into the weak defenses of the belated and indecisive coalition directed against him. "(Reference .)

Thus, one of the last opportunities for collective opposition to Hitler's expansion to the East was destroyed. At the same time, the governments of the Baltic states were willing to cooperate with Germany, never ceasing to talk about their neutrality. But isn't this an obvious indicator of the policy of double standards? Let's once again dwell on the facts of cooperation between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania with Germany in 1939.

At the end of March of this year, Germany demanded that Lithuania transfer the Klaipeda region to it. Just two or three days later, the German-Lithuanian treaty was signed on the transfer of Klaipeda, according to which the parties assumed an obligation not to use force against each other. At the same time, there were rumors about the conclusion of a German-Estonian treaty, according to which German troops received the right to pass through the territory of Estonia. The extent to which these rumors were true was not known, but subsequent events increased the Kremlin's suspicions.

On April 20, 1939, the chief of staff of the Latvian army M. Hartmanis and the commander of the Kurzeme division O. Dankers arrived in Berlin to participate in the celebrations dedicated to the 50th anniversary of Hitler, and were personally received by the Fuhrer, who presented them with awards. The chief of the Estonian general staff, Lieutenant-General Nikolai Reek, also arrived for the anniversary of Hitler. Following this, Estonia was visited by the head of the General Staff of the German Land Forces, Lieutenant General Franz Halder and the head of the Abwehr, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris. This was a clear step towards military cooperation between countries.

And on June 19, the Estonian ambassador to Moscow, August Rei, at a meeting with British diplomats, said that the help of the USSR would force Estonia to take the side of Germany. What is it? Blind faith in the sincerity of treaties with Germany after the annexation of Austria and Czechoslovakia, and even more so after the annexation of a small part of the Baltic lands (ie the Klaipeda region)? The unwillingness to cooperate (and at that time it was only about cooperation) with the Soviet Union, apparently, was much stronger than the fear of losing their own sovereignty. Or, perhaps, the unwillingness to cooperate was so strong that their own sovereignty was not a value for part of the political elite.

On March 28, Litvinov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, handed over the declarations to the Estonian and Latvian envoys in Moscow. In them, Moscow warned Tallinn and Riga that the assumption of “political, economic or other domination by a third state, granting it any exclusive rights or privileges” could be considered by Moscow as a violation of the agreements concluded earlier between the USSR, Estonia and Latvia. (Link.) At times, some researchers view these statements as an example of Moscow's expansionist aspirations. However, if you pay attention to the foreign policy of the Baltic countries, this statement was a completely natural action of the state, worried about its security.

At the same time, in Berlin on April 11, Hitler approved the "Directive on the unified preparation of the armed forces for war in 1939-1940." It stated that after the defeat of Poland, Germany should take control of Latvia and Lithuania: "The position of the limitrophe states will be determined solely by the military needs of Germany. With the development of events, it may become necessary to occupy the limitrophe states to the border of old Courland and include these territories in the empire" . (Link.)

In addition to the above facts, modern historians make assumptions about the existence of secret agreements between Germany and the Baltic states. It's not just guesswork. For example, the German researcher Rolf Amann found in the German archives an internal memorandum from the head of the German News Service for Foreign Affairs, Dertinger, dated June 8, 1939, which states that Estonia and Latvia agreed to a secret article requiring both countries to coordinate with Germany all defensive measures against the USSR. The memorandum also stated that Estonia and Latvia had been warned of the need to wisely apply their policy of neutrality, which required the deployment of all defensive forces against the "Soviet threat." (See Ilmjärv M. Hääletu alistumine. Eesti, Läti ja Leedu välispoliitilise orientatsioni kujunemine ja iseseisvuse kaotus 1920. aastate keskpaigast anneksioonini. Tallinn, 2004. lk. 558.)

All this suggests that the "neutrality" of the Baltic states was only a cover for cooperation with Germany. And these countries consciously cooperated, hoping with the help of a powerful ally to protect themselves from the "communist threat." It is hardly necessary to say that the threat from this ally was much more terrible, because. threatened real genocide against the peoples of the Baltic states and the loss of all sovereignty.

3. The accession of the Baltic States was violent, it was accompanied by mass repressions (genocide) and military intervention by the USSR. These events can be considered "annexation", "forced incorporation", "illegal incorporation".

Examples.

"Because - yes, indeed, there was a formal invitation, or rather, there were three formal invitations, if we talk about the Baltics. But the fact is that these invitations were already made when Soviet troops were stationed in these countries, when all three Baltic countries were flooded with NKVD agents, when in fact repressions were already being carried out against the local population ... And, of course, I must say that this action was well prepared by the Soviet leadership, because in fact everything was completed by the fortieth year, and already in July 40 governments were created.
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Interview with historian Alexei Pimenov. // Russian service "Voice of America". 05/08/2005. Link .

"We did not support forced incorporation of the Baltic states into the USSR US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told three Baltic foreign ministers yesterday.
Eldarov E. Does the United States not recognize the occupation?! // News today. 06/16/2007. Link .

"The Soviet side also confirmed its aggressive position and decision not to comply with the norms of international law and to use force at the Moscow negotiations with representatives of Latvia during the conclusion of an agreement on mutual assistance, which began on October 2, 1939. The next day, Latvian Foreign Minister V. Munters informed government: I. Stalin told him that "because of the Germans, we can occupy you," and also threateningly pointed out the possibility of the USSR to take "the territory with the Russian national minority." The Latvian government decided to capitulate and agree to the demands of the Soviet Union, letting its troops into its territory."<...>
“Given aspects of international law, it is difficult to assess the treaties that were concluded on mutual assistance between parties so unequal in strength (a power and small and weak states) as legitimate. Several opinions have been expressed in the historical and legal literature on how one could characterize signed basic treaties between the USSR and the Baltic States Some authors believe that these treaties, in accordance with international law, are not valid from the moment they are signed, because their Baltic states were simply imposed by force".
Feldmanis I. Occupation of Latvia - historical and international legal aspects. // Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia. Link .

Comment.

"Annexation is the forcible annexation of the territory of another state (in whole or in part) to the state. Before the Second World War, not every annexation was considered illegal and invalid. This is due to the fact that the principle prohibiting the use of force or the threat of its use, which has become one of the main principles of modern international law, was first enshrined in 1945 in the UN Charter," writes Doctor of Law S.V. Chernichenko.

Thus, speaking of the "annexation" of the Baltics, we are again faced with a situation where modern international law does not work in relation to historical events. After all, the expansion of the British Empire, the United States, Spain and many other states that once annexed territory that belonged to other countries can just as well be called annexation. So even if you call the process of joining the Baltic States an annexation, then it is legally incorrect to consider it illegal and invalid (which is what a number of researchers, journalists and politicians want to achieve), because there simply were no relevant laws.

The same can be said about specific mutual assistance pacts concluded between the USSR and the Baltic countries in September-October 1939: September 28 with Estonia, October 5 with Latvia, October 10 with Lithuania. They were concluded, of course, under strong diplomatic pressure from the USSR, but strong diplomatic pressure, very often used in the face of a constant military threat, does not make these pacts illegal. Their content was practically the same: the USSR had the right to rent military bases, ports and airfields agreed with the states and introduce a limited contingent of troops (20-25 thousand people for each country) into their territory.

Can we assume that the presence of NATO troops on the territories of European countries limits their sovereignty? Of course you can. It can also be said that the United States, as the leader of NATO, is going to use these troops to put pressure on the political forces of these countries and change the political course there. However, you will agree that this will be a very dubious assumption. The assertion that the treaties between the USSR and the Baltic states were the first step towards the "Sovietization" of the Baltic states seems to us to be the same dubious assumption.

The Soviet troops stationed in the Baltics were given the strictest instructions regarding their behavior towards the local population and authorities. Contacts of the Red Army soldiers with local residents were limited. And Stalin, in a confidential conversation with the General Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, G. Dimitrov, said that the USSR must "strictly observe them (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania - Note.) internal regime and independence. We will not seek their Sovietization." (See USSR and Lithuania during the Second World War. Vilnius, 2006. Vol. 1. P. 305.) This suggests that the factor of military presence was not decisive in relations between states, and consequently, the process was not an annexation and a military takeover, it was precisely an agreed introduction of a limited number of troops.

By the way, the introduction of troops into the territory of a foreign state in order to prevent its transition to the side of the enemy was used more than once during the Second World War. The joint Soviet-British occupation of Iran began in August 1941. And in May 1942, Great Britain occupied Madagascar to prevent the capture of the island by the Japanese, although Madagascar belonged to Vichy France, which was neutral. Similarly, in November 1942, the Americans occupied French (i.e. Vichy) Morocco and Algeria. (Link.)

However, not everyone was happy with the situation. The leftist forces in the Baltics clearly counted on the help of the USSR. For example, demonstrations in support of the Mutual Assistance Pact in Lithuania in October 1939 turned into clashes with the police. However, Molotov telegraphed the plenipotentiary and the military attache: "I categorically forbid interfering in inter-party affairs in Lithuania, supporting any opposition currents, etc." (See Zubkova E.Yu. The Baltic States and the Kremlin. S. 60-61.) The thesis about the fear of world public opinion is very doubtful: Germany, on the one hand, France and Great Britain, on the other, entered World War II at that time, and hardly any of them wanted the USSR to join the other side of the front. The Soviet leadership believed that by introducing troops it had secured the northwestern border, and only strict observance of the terms of the agreements would, in turn, ensure compliance with these agreements by the Baltic neighbors. It was simply unprofitable to destabilize the situation by military takeover.

We also add that Lithuania, as a result of the mutual assistance pact, significantly expanded its territory, including Vilna and the Vilna region. But despite the impeccable behavior of the Soviet troops noted by the Baltic authorities, in the meantime they continued to cooperate with Germany and (during the Winter War) with Finland. In particular, the radio intelligence department of the Latvian army provided practical assistance to the Finnish side by forwarding intercepted radio messages from Soviet military units. (See Latvijas arhivi. 1999. Nr. 1. 121., 122. lpp.)

The allegations of mass repressions carried out in 1939-1941 also look untenable. in the Baltic States and began, according to a number of researchers, in the autumn of 1939, i.e. before the accession of the Baltic states to the USSR. The facts are that in June 1941, in accordance with the May decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR "On measures to clean up the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian SSR from the anti-Soviet, criminal and socially dangerous element," a deportation of approx. 30 thousand people from the three Baltic republics. It is often forgotten that only a part of them were deported as "anti-Soviet elements", while a part of them were banal criminals. It should also be taken into account that this action was carried out on the eve of the war.

However, more often, as evidence, the mythical order of the NKVD No. 001223 "On operational measures against anti-Soviet and socially hostile elements", wandering from one publication to another, is cited as evidence. It was first mentioned... in the book "Die Sowjetunion und die baltische Staaten" ("The Soviet Union and the Baltic States"), published in 1941 in Kaunas. It is easy to guess that it was not written by painstaking researchers, but by employees of the Goebbels department. Naturally, no one was able to find this order of the NKVD in the archives, but its mention can be found in the books “These Names Accuse” (1951) and “The Baltic States, 1940-1972” (1972) published in Stockholm, as well as in numerous modern literature. up to the study by E.Yu. Zubkova "The Baltic States and the Kremlin" (see this edition, p. 126).

By the way, in this study, the author, considering Moscow's policy in the annexed Baltic lands in one pre-war year (from the summer of 1940 to June 1941), writes only two paragraphs (!), one of which is a retelling of the myth mentioned above. This shows how significant the repressive policy of the new government was. Of course, it brought cardinal changes in political and economic life, the nationalization of industry and large property, the elimination of capitalist exchange, and so on. Part of the population, shocked by these changes, turned to resistance: this was expressed in protest actions, attacks on the police, and even sabotage (arson of warehouses, etc.). What did the new government need to do so that this territory, taking into account, if not overwhelming, but still existing social resistance, does not become an easy "prey" for the German occupiers, who were planning to start a war soon? Of course, to fight against "anti-Soviet" sentiments. That is why, on the eve of the war, a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on the deportation of unreliable elements appeared.

4. Before the inclusion of the Baltic states into the USSR, the communists came to power in them, and the elections were rigged.

Examples.

"Illegal and unlawful change of government took place on June 20, 1940. Instead of the cabinet of K. Ulmanis, the Soviet puppet government headed by A. Kirchenstein came, which was officially called the government of the Latvian people.<...>
"In the elections held on July 14 and 15, 1940, only one list of candidates nominated by the "Block of the Working People" was allowed. All other alternative lists were rejected. It was officially reported that 97.5% of the votes were cast for the mentioned list. The election results were rigged and did not reflect the will of the people. In Moscow, the Soviet news agency TASS gave information about the mentioned election results already twelve hours before the beginning of the counting of votes in Latvia.
Feldmanis I. Occupation of Latvia - historical and international legal aspects. // Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia. Link .

"July 1940 In the elections in the Baltic States, the communists received: Lithuania - 99.2%, Latvia - 97.8%, Estonia - 92.8%.
Surov V. Icebreaker-2. Mn., 2004. Ch. 6.

Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia gained independence after the 1917 revolution in Russia. But Soviet Russia and later the USSR never gave up trying to regain these territories. And according to the secret protocol to the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, in which these republics were assigned to the Soviet sphere of influence, the USSR got a chance to achieve this, which it did not fail to take advantage of.

Implementing the Soviet-German secret agreements, the Soviet Union in the autumn of 1939 began preparations for the annexation of the Baltic countries. After the Red Army occupied the eastern provinces in Poland, the USSR began to border on all the Baltic states. Soviet troops were moved to the borders of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. At the end of September, these countries were offered, in an ultimatum form, to conclude treaties of friendship and mutual assistance with the USSR. On September 24, Molotov told Estonian Foreign Minister Karl Selter, who arrived in Moscow: “The Soviet Union needs an expansion of its security system, for which it needs access to the Baltic Sea ... Do not force the Soviet Union to use force in order to achieve its goals.”

On September 25, Stalin informed the German ambassador, Count Friedrich-Werner von der Schulenburg, that "the Soviet Union will immediately take up the solution of the problem of the Baltic states in accordance with the protocol of August 23."

Mutual assistance treaties with the Baltic states were concluded under the threat of the use of force.

On September 28, a Soviet-Estonian mutual assistance pact was signed. A 25,000-strong Soviet military contingent was introduced into the territory of Estonia. Stalin told Selter on his departure from Moscow: “It could work out with you, as with Poland. Poland was a great power. Where is Poland now?

On October 5, a mutual assistance pact was signed with Latvia. A 25,000-strong Soviet military contingent entered the country.

And on October 10, an "Agreement on the transfer of the city of Vilna and the Vilna region to the Republic of Lithuania and on mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and Lithuania" was signed with Lithuania. When Lithuanian Foreign Minister Juozas Urbšys declared that the proposed terms of the treaty were tantamount to the occupation of Lithuania, Stalin countered that “the Soviet Union does not intend to threaten the independence of Lithuania. Vice versa. The introduction of Soviet troops will be a genuine guarantee for Lithuania that the Soviet Union will protect it in the event of an attack, so that the troops will serve the security of Lithuania itself. And he added with a grin: "Our garrisons will help you put down the communist uprising if it happens in Lithuania." 20 thousand Red Army soldiers also entered Lithuania.

After Germany defeated France with lightning speed in May 1940, Stalin decided to expedite the annexation of the Baltic states and Bessarabia. On June 4, strong groupings of Soviet troops under the guise of exercises began to advance to the borders of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. On June 14, Lithuania, and on June 16, Latvia and Estonia were presented with ultimatums of a similar content with a demand to allow significant Soviet military contingents into their territory, 9-12 divisions in each of the countries and to form new, pro-Soviet governments with the participation of the Communists, although the number Communist parties in each of the republics consisted of 100-200 people. The pretext for the ultimatums was provocations allegedly carried out against the Soviet troops stationed in the Baltic states. But this pretext was sewn with white thread. It was alleged, for example, that the Lithuanian police kidnapped two Soviet tankers, Shmovgonets and Nosov. But already on May 27, they returned to their unit and stated that they were kept in the basement for a day, trying to get information about the Soviet tank brigade. At the same time, Nosov mysteriously turned into Pisarev.

The ultimatums were accepted. On June 15, Soviet troops entered Lithuania, and on June 17 they entered Latvia and Estonia. In Lithuania, President Antanas Smetana demanded to reject the ultimatum and show armed resistance, but, not having received the support of the majority of the cabinet, he fled to Germany.

From 6 to 9 Soviet divisions were introduced into each of the countries (previously, each country had a rifle division and a tank brigade). There was no resistance. The creation of pro-Soviet governments on Red Army bayonets was presented by Soviet propaganda as "people's revolutions", which were given out as demonstrations with the seizure of government buildings, organized by local communists with the help of Soviet troops. These "revolutions" were carried out under the supervision of the representatives of the Soviet government: Vladimir Dekanozov in Lithuania, Andrei Vyshinsky in Latvia and Andrei Zhdanov in Estonia.

The armies of the Baltic states could not really offer armed resistance to Soviet aggression either in the autumn of 1939, or even more so in the summer of 1940. In the three countries, in the event of mobilization, 360,000 people could be put under arms. However, unlike Finland, the Baltics did not have their own military industry, there were not even sufficient stocks of small arms to arm so many people. If Finland could also receive supplies of weapons and military equipment through Sweden and Norway, then the way to the Baltic States through the Baltic Sea was closed by the Soviet fleet, and Germany complied with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and refused to help the Baltic states. In addition, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia did not have border fortifications, and their territory was much more accessible for invasion than the territory of Finland covered with forests and swamps.

The new pro-Soviet governments held elections to local parliaments on the principle of one candidate from an unbreakable bloc of non-partisans per seat. Moreover, this bloc in all three Baltic states was called the same - "Union of the working people", and the elections were held on the same day - July 14th. People in civilian clothes who were present at the polling stations took note of those who crossed out candidates or threw empty ballots into the ballot boxes. The Nobel laureate Polish writer Czeslaw Milosz, who was in Lithuania at that time, recalled: “It was possible to vote in the elections for the only official list of the “working people” - with the same programs in all three republics. I had to vote, as each voter was stamped in his passport. The absence of a stamp certifies that the owner of the passport is an enemy of the people who evaded the elections and thereby revealed his enemy essence. Naturally, the Communists received more than 90% of the votes in all three republics - 92.8% in Estonia, 97% in Latvia, and even 99% in Lithuania! The turnout was also impressive - 84% in Estonia, 95% in Latvia and 95.5% in Lithuania.

Not surprisingly, on July 21-22, three parliaments approved a declaration on Estonia's entry into the USSR. By the way, all these acts contradicted the constitutions of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, which stated that the issues of independence and changes in the state system can only be resolved through a popular referendum. But in Moscow they were in a hurry to annex the Baltic States and did not pay attention to formalities. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR satisfied the appeals written in Moscow for admission to the Union of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in the period from 3 to 6 August 1940.

At first, many Latvians, Lithuanians and Estonians saw the Red Army as a defense against German aggression. The workers were happy to reopen businesses that had been dormant due to the World War and the resulting crisis. However, soon, already in November 1940, the population of the Baltic states was completely ruined. Then local currencies were equated to the ruble at sharply undervalued rates. Also, the nationalization of industry and trade led to inflation and a shortage of goods. The redistribution of land from the more prosperous to the poorest peasants, the forced relocation of farmers to villages, and repressions against the clergy and intelligentsia provoked armed resistance. Detachments of "forest brothers" appeared, so named in memory of the rebels of 1905.

And already in August 1940, the deportations of Jews and other national minorities began, and on June 14, 1941, the turn came to Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians. 10 thousand people were deported from Estonia, 17.5 thousand people from Lithuania and 16.9 thousand people from Latvia. 10,161 people were resettled and 5,263 were arrested. 46.5% of the deportees were women, 15% were children under 10 years old. The total number of dead victims of deportation was 4884 people (34% of the total), of which 341 people were shot.

The capture of the Baltic countries by the Soviet Union was fundamentally no different from the German capture of Austria in 1938, Czechoslovakia in 1939 and Luxembourg and Denmark in 1940, also carried out peacefully. The fact of occupation (in the sense of the seizure of territory against the will of the population of these countries), which was a violation of international law and an act of aggression, was recognized as a crime at the Nuremberg trials and imputed to the main Nazi war criminals. As in the case of the Baltic states, the Anschluss of Austria was preceded by an ultimatum to establish a pro-German government in Vienna, headed by the Nazi Seyss-Inquart. And already it invited German troops to Austria, which previously were not in the country at all. The annexation of Austria was carried out in such a way that it was immediately incorporated into the Reich and divided into several Reichsgau (regions). Similarly, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, after a short period of occupation, were included in the USSR as union republics. The Czech Republic, Denmark and Norway were turned into protectorates, which did not prevent them both during the war and after it from talking about these countries as occupied by Germany. This formulation was also reflected in the verdict of the Nuremberg trials of the main Nazi war criminals in 1946.

Unlike Nazi Germany, whose consent was guaranteed by the secret protocol of August 23, 1939, most Western governments regarded the occupation and annexation as illegal and continued de jure to recognize the existence of an independent Republic of Latvia. As early as July 23, 1940, U.S. Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles denounced the "dishonest processes" by which "the political independence and territorial integrity of the three small Baltic Republics... were premeditated and deliberately destroyed by one of their more powerful neighbors." Non-recognition of the occupation and annexation continued until 1991, when Latvia regained its independence and full independence.

In Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, the entry of Soviet troops and the subsequent annexation of the Baltic countries to the USSR is considered one of the many Stalinist crimes.

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