Russia and Turkey in the 17th century

The history of Russian-Turkish relations is filled with both pictures of grandiose victories and many pages of unfortunate failures and defeats. In the 17th century, the main enemy of Russia in the south was not even the Port itself, but its vassal the Crimean Khan, whose intervention in Russian-Polish conflicts more than once changed the balance of power in the wars with the Commonwealth. At the end of the century, however, the Turks themselves became increasingly afraid of Russian expansion to the south and southeast.

Map of Eastern Europe in the second half of the 17th century

Turkish troops took part in the so-called "Chigirin war", which Russia actually lost - the right-bank Ukraine was under Turkish rule, and Moscow managed to save only Kyiv and its surroundings. The Chigirin War was followed by several Russian campaigns to the south: to the Crimea and Azov. Only in 1696 did the Russian troops manage to take Azov and secure territories on the shores of the “warm sea”. Even at the beginning of the 18th century, the Krymchaks brought many problems - the lion's share of the Khan's earnings were Russian slaves and income from robberies of the southern territories of the Commonwealth and the Russian Kingdom. To protect against the raids of the Tatars, "security lines" were built and fortresses were founded.

Northern War from Poltava to the opening of "southern front"

After the defeat of the Swedish army in the campaign of 1708-1709 at Lesnaya and Poltava, Charles XII was forced to flee from the south, to the Turkish Sultan, hoping for his location and a warm welcome, because there was simply no one to break through Poland to the north - in fact, all the Swedish army was taken prisoner and only the king and his closest associates managed to escape.

Karl's headquarters near Bendery was nicknamed Carlopolis

At the court of the Turkish sultan, the Swedish king was received warmly, but the proposal to immediately start a war with the "Muscovites" received a restrained refusal. The headquarters of the king in a foreign country was located in Bendery, on the Dniester. Here Karl began to draw up plans for the defeat of Peter, but, that's bad luck - in order to effectively resist the Russians, Karl had to at least return to Sweden, but it was better to overthrow the Polish king Augustus, replacing him with his protege Leshchinsky.

Peter, however, did not waste time in vain and during the absence of Karl managed to win back Livonia, Estonia from the Swedes, Vyborg was taken - the main base of the Swedes in the eastern Baltic. Everything went well: Charles was blockaded in the south, and the Turks did not dare to declare war on the campaign of 1710. By the end of 1710, the Russian tsar managed not only to take control of the Baltic states, but also to actually establish his protectorate over the Commonwealth - this, just half a century ago, a powerful and formidable state, de facto became a satellite of Russia - Russian troops calmly marched across the Polish lands , and the actions of the armies cooperated (at least on paper).

Charles XII in Bendery

The prestige of the “Swedish lion” (Charles XII considered himself the new Gustavus Adolphus) and French diplomacy helped the Turkish Sultan “open his eyes” to the aggressive aspirations of Peter - if he so quickly managed to seize such vast territories, then whether this “Muscovite” would decide after the defeat Sweden, in the absence of his king (by the way, Charles did not consider himself defeated at all, confidently flaunting his military talents), move his innumerable hordes directly to Constantinople, wanting to revive the “Roman Empire” (Byzantium)? Skillful juggling of facts and pressure on the Ottoman cabinet bore fruit - in the middle of 1710, the Grand Vizier Cherchyulyu (who advocated maintaining peace with Russia) was removed. Instead of him, the sultan appointed a vizier from the Köprülü family, a Franco- and Swedephile, a supporter of an alliance with Sweden and unleashing a war with Russia.

The Prut campaign was to become the Danube

The Swedish party at court argued (Karl himself assured most of all) that the only chance to save the future of Turkey and Sweden was to hit the "aggressor" from two directions - from the north and south, thus crushing the Russians. This option, of course, promised an undoubted victory, and solid profits from Turkey's mastery of the left-bank Ukraine, the return of Azov, the capture of all Ukraine (both "Polish" and "Russian") and Russian reparations, and so on.

Unleashing a new war

In Istanbul, however, they hesitated, the Sultan himself hesitated: the Russians had solid resources, and the glory of the victories of Russian weapons over the Swedes spread throughout Europe, whether Charles wanted it or not. The finances of the Porte were not in the best condition, and the army no longer met the latest achievements of military thought. In the event of the defeat of the Turks, Peter could, if not revive Byzantium, then at least shake Turkish power in the Balkan vilayets by establishing his protectorate over the Christians of European Turkey. Nevertheless, they managed to convince the Sultan of the expansionist manners of Peter and the large profits from the "campaign to the north."

Sultan Ahmet III

To keep up appearances, the Sultan sent Peter an ultimatum. To preserve the peace that the Sultan so desires, Peter needs “nothing but nothing”: to allow Turkish garrisons into southern Poland, to ensure the safety of Muslims, to return Azov, to tear down Taganrog and other Black Sea fortresses, to return the conquered territories to the Swedes, to destroy St. Petersburg, to terminate the alliance with King Augustus and recognize the Swedish protege Leshchinsky as the Polish king. Of course, it was not worth hoping that Peter would comply with these requirements - on a much less ambitious proposal that Charles be accompanied to Sweden by a small escort of 30 thousand Turks, Peter firmly declared that this would be a direct violation of the peace with Russia with all the corresponding consequences. War became inevitable.

Side Plans

The specifics of the theater of operations dictated a limited number of options for the development of events.

1. If desired, the Russians could limit themselves (at least at first) to a deaf defense - to gather an army on the banks of the Dnieper, take the crossings, and wait until the Turks themselves cross the border and invade Right-Bank Ukraine. The advantages are obvious: the Russians have the advantage of defense, it will be easier for them to concentrate, they have the opportunity to choose the place of battle themselves. In addition, the Turks will have, in this case, to overcome much more significant distances than the Russian army. The disadvantages are also understandable - the strategic initiative was initially transferred into the hands of the enemy, the Turks could easily invade "foreign land" and plunder to their heart's content. The dissatisfaction of the Polish gentry would be guaranteed.

Neither side wanted war - the French and Swedes forced

2. The second option was the defense of the Dniester, along which the Polish-Turkish border passed. In this case, the army did not receive such a gain in time for rest and arrangement of positions, as if it had been necessary to act on the Dnieper, but the main forces of the Turkish army would not have been able to break into Poland and Ukraine without a fight. Nevertheless, the initiative would again remain in the hands of the Turks, who could calmly delay the moment of the decisive battle, accumulating forces (however, the “seasonality” of the actions of the Turkish cavalry seriously reduced the period when the Turkish army was most combat-ready) and distracting Peter from actions in the north.

3. Peter's desire to achieve a solution in the south in the shortest possible time, in order to return to the fight against the Swedes in the Baltic, left only one way out: to go on the offensive ourselves, occupying Moldavia, where anti-Turkish sentiments were strong and, having crossed the Prut, follow to the Danube - the main river of European Turkey.

Of course, the march to the south was a risky business, but in Russia they relied on Christian uprisings in the Turkish rear: in addition to the border Moldavia and Wallachia, Serbs, Montenegrins, Greeks and Bulgarians were to rise, especially since such uprisings were not at all uncommon. These hopes were fueled by rumors that reached the Russian cabinet and the assurances of the Balkan Christians themselves, primarily the Moldavian ruler Cantemir. In the end, relying on a general anti-Turkish uprising became the main means of achieving victory in the war.

Map of the Prut Campaign

Porta, contrary to the ideas of the Russian command, did not plan to wage an offensive war at all - the time had already passed when the Turks were dashing conquerors, especially since the Russians themselves were interested in the speedy completion of the campaign, which they were well aware of in Istanbul. For the war with Russia, they planned to assemble an army of the same size as 30 years before for a campaign against Vienna - 200 thousand people! While the troops were being assembled, in order to complicate the march of the Russians to the Turkish territories, the Crimean Khan had to devastate the southern Ukrainian territories, or better yet, capture several strongholds in Podolia and Zaporozhye.

The Russians relied on an uprising in the rear of the Turks, the Turks - on defense

Even at the planning stage of the campaign, the strategy of the Turkish side looked more thorough and rational than the Russian stake on a general anti-Turkish uprising, which required skillful diplomatic play, an understanding of the balance of power throughout the Balkan Peninsula and excellent cooperation between the main forces and local detachments.

Side forces and command

Peter, realizing the complexity of the march to the Danube, decided to assemble a small corps, consisting of the most combat-ready units. Nevertheless, in order to bring the regiments to full strength, recruits were enrolled in the troops - more than 12 thousand people, about a quarter of the entire army! It was on the recruit that the largest share of the losses of the Russian side in the campaign fell.

The soldiers of both armies had to overcome considerable distances: Russian troops from the northern provinces and the Baltic states - more than one and a half thousand kilometers in total! The Turks had a somewhat easier time, but the detachments sent from the eastern vilayets traveled almost 2,000 kilometers. Peter I decided to personally lead the army, mobilizing the best officers and generals, both foreigners and Russians.

Baltaji Mehmed Pasha, a clever courtier and intriguer, was appointed Turkish commander, a man who took the post of admiral (kapudan pasha) after the mass purges carried out by the young Sultan Ahmet III. Baltaji suited everyone, the people liked him and more than once held the post of Grand Vizier. However, he had no combat experience and was an amateur in the art of war: he was frightened by the prospect of meeting on the battlefield with the "iron" Russian regiments, he began the campaign with a heavy heart, afraid of being defeated. According to the combat schedule, the Turks really mobilized 200 thousand fighters from all over the empire.

Janissaries - the basis of the Turkish army

About 50 thousand more were gathered by the Crimean Khan for operations in the Dnieper region, planning to join the main forces at the height of the campaign. To somewhat offset the numerical superiority of the Turks, the Russians planned at the expense of the risen Balkan peoples, but even if the Moldavian and Wallachian nobles mobilized, Peter had to rely on the qualitative superiority of his infantry and the tactical perfection of linear tactics.

Campaign start. Crimean raid

Until the last moment, the Russian government hoped for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, so that preemptive strikes by light cavalry forces and flying squads were not provided. The Turks, on the contrary, tried to use all the benefits of their strategic position. The Crimean Khan was ordered to mobilize the Tatar and Nogai hordes as soon as possible and set fire to the southern borders of the enemy country. The Krymchaks opened the fighting already in February 1711 - long before the main campaign.

Russian soldiers

And here the Turkish side managed to deceive and outplay the Russian government: M. M. Golitsin, who was instructed to defend the southern border of Russia and Poland, was sure that the Turks and their satellites, if they hit from the south, would strike the main blow on Kamenetz-Podolsky, trying to break into Poland. Rumors about the performance of the Krymchaks in Zaporozhye, Podolia and the Don region were perceived as a military trick. Despite the fact that the khan failed to achieve any major successes, the southern regions where the Russian troops were supposed to pass were devastated by the enemy, so Peter had to change the route of the army, which seriously lengthened its path and helped the Turks gain some more time. Enemy raids continued until April, and after a short respite, the khan began operations against the main forces of the Russian army.

Rapprochement of the armies

While the Tatars were ravaging the south, Peter gathered forces and led the troops in an arc to Ukraine. On May 16, the vanguard of the Russian army was still only on the Southern Bug, and only on May 23 did it reach the Dniester River. The Turks were also in no hurry - the campaign formally began on February 19, but the main forces of the army gathered in Edirne only on April 8. Nevertheless, the pace of movement of the Turkish army (despite three times the number of people) was twice as fast as the Russians. On June 3, the Turks approached the Danube, while Sheremetyev's vanguard, at that moment, only moved away from the border and advanced through Moldova.

On June 3, a significant event took place - Moldova passed under the Russian protectorate. According to the Russian government, this should have been only the beginning of establishing control in the Balkans. Sheremetiev moved to Iasi, to join the Moldavian militia, having learned that the Turks were already standing on the Danube. The race for the Danube was lost.

When the main forces of the army approached the Dniester, the question arose: should we cross the border with all our might, if the Turks were already in large numbers on the Danube? The march across the waterless steppe to Iasi was a dangerous undertaking, especially considering that the Russian troops were increasingly pressed by the Tatar detachments, but to stay on the Dniester meant to untie the hands of the Ottomans, transferring the initiative to them, and actually “surrender” Cantemir and his supporters in Moldova. Relying on the low morale of the Turkish army and the help of Christians and, above all, Kantemir with food and troops, it was decided to adhere to Sheremetyev's plan and head to Iasi.

March to the Prut

The Russian army had to travel more than 100 km across the waterless and deserted steppe, there were no stores laid along the route of the army, so one had to rely only on one's own supplies. And if the situation with provisions was even more or less, then there was not enough water during the march - there was “almost no water” half the way, we went to the Prut in “waterless places”. The march took about 10 days - on June 24, Peter was already in Iasi, although all the forces of the Russian army crossed the river only on July 5.

During the campaign, Moldova passed under the Russian protectorate

What about the Turks? Baltaji, having reached the Danube, began to concentrate forces, fearing a sudden attack by the "treacherous Muscovites", and only on June 18 moved up the Danube, and then along the Prut. The betrayal of Cantemir and the transition of Moldavia under the Russian protectorate was a complete surprise for the Porte, so the Turkish commander preferred to act cautiously.

Dmitry Cantemir Moldavian ruler

As soon as the Russians approached Iasi, it seemed that all the difficulties were already behind - the difficult steppe transition was overcome, only glory and victory awaited ahead: the Turks themselves had to scatter, and the Russian banner would shine over the Balkan Christians. In Moldova, Russians were really welcomed very warmly - both by Cantemir himself and by ordinary people. Volunteers began to flock to Iasi to help in the fight against the Ottomans, but these people had no combat experience and were not suitable for a “regular” battle. The Moldavian ruler did not spare wine, but he did not have enough food to support the 40,000-strong Russian army (however, it had thinned somewhat during the march): provisions remained for 20 days and Peter thought about whether to go further?

On June 27, celebrations were held on the occasion of the second anniversary of the Poltava victory, which only increased confidence in the victory over the Turk. The parade was hosted by Cantemir, after which there was a big fireworks display and a feast. Who would have thought that in just a few days heavy fighting would begin, and the victorious march would end in an inglorious peace?

To be continued…

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Prut campaign of Emperor Peter 1

The so-called Prut campaign of Tsar Peter the Great began in mid-summer in 1711. It was then that on the territory belonging to modern Moldova there was an aggravation of the confrontation within the framework of the war waged between Turkey and Russia. At the same time, the results of these military operations were rather bad for the Russian side. As a result of the war, Peter had to give up the fortress of Azov, which he had previously conquered, which was necessary for Russia both for the development of trade routes and acted as an important naval base. Let's look at the main events of the Prut campaign.

Two years before the events described above, Russia inflicts a defeat on the army of the Swedish king Charles the Twelfth as part of the Northern War. In the battle of Poltava, the entire army was practically destroyed, and the monarch himself was forced to flee to Turkey, where he hid until 1711, when Turkey declared war on Russia. But, military operations stood still, because none of the parties actually wanted to enter into a large-scale war.

Modern historians often blame Peter the Great for the fact that it was because of his omissions that the war became possible during this period. Indeed, if the Russian tsar, after the Battle of Poltava, began the persecution of Charles, then most likely the outcome of events would have been different. However, Peter begins the pursuit of the fleeing king only three days after his flight. This miscalculation cost the Russian ruler that the Swedish king managed to turn the Turkish sultan against Peter.

The Russian side had at its disposal the Russian army and the Moldavian corps. In total, about eighty-six thousand men and one hundred and twenty guns were gathered. The Turkish side consisted of the Ottoman army and the troops of the Crimean Khanate. According to the calculation of contemporaries, the Turkish army consisted of four hundred and forty guns and one hundred and ninety thousand people!

For the Prut campaign, the Russian tsar sends an army to Poland through Kyiv, bypassing the fortress of Soroca, located on the banks of the Dniester. On June 27, 1711, the army, led by Peter himself and his associate Sheremetev, crosses the Dniester and advances to the Prut River. The implementation of the plan took a little less than a week, and if it were not for the frankly weak discipline in the Russian ranks and the lack of organization, many Russian soldiers would not have had to die from dehydration and exhaustion.

Chronology of the Prut campaign of Peter I

The following events developed in this way:

• On July 1, Sheremetev's troops reach the eastern bank of the Prut River, where they are suddenly attacked by the Crimean cavalry. As a result, about three hundred Russian soldiers were killed, but this raid was repulsed.
• Two days later, the army continues its movement along the banks of the river and goes to the town of Yassy.
• On the sixth day of the same month, Peter the Great orders to cross the Prut. After a successful crossing, Dmitry Kantemir joins the troops.
• Two days later, the Russian army splits up to better provide provisions in this territory, and already on the fourteenth of July they unite again.
• A 9,000-strong garrison remains in Iasi, and the rest of the forces move forward.
• On the eighteenth of July, a new battle begins. At about two o'clock in the afternoon, the Ottoman soldiers strike at the rear of the Russian troops. Despite a significant numerical superiority, the Turkish garrisons retreat. The main reason for this lay in the weakly armed infantry and the lack of artillery.
• On the nineteenth of July, the encirclement of the army of Peter the Great began. At noon, the Turkish cavalry completely surrounds the Russian army, while not entering the battle. The Russian tsar decides to advance up the river in order to choose a better place to take the fight.
• On the 20th, a huge gap is formed during the movement of Peter's troops. The Turks instantly took advantage of this, striking at the convoy, which was left without cover. Then the pursuit of the main forces begins. Russian troops take up a defensive position near the village of Stanileshti and prepare for battle. By evening, the Turkish army also approaches there. The battle begins at seven o'clock in the evening, but the first Turkish attack was repulsed. In total, in this battle, the Russians lost about two thousand soldiers (half fell on the field, while others were wounded). However, the losses of the Turks were much greater. They lost more than eight thousand people, wounded and killed.
• On July 21, a massive artillery attack on the Russian army begins. At the same time, in between the implementation of shelling, the Turks now and then attacked with cavalry and infantry. However, even with such an onslaught, the Russian army continued to take a hit. Peter the Great himself was well aware of the hopelessness of the situation on the battlefield, and therefore he decides to propose the signing of a peace treaty at the military council. As a result of the negotiations, Shafirov was sent to the Turks as an after peace.

This ended the Prut campaign of Peter the Great.

Map of the Prut campaign of 1711:

Table: Prut campaign of 1711

Video lecture: Prut campaign of Peter 1

PRUT CAMPAIGN OF 1711

[…] The route of the Russian troops was a line from Kyiv through the fortress of Soroca (on the Dniester) to the Moldavian Iasi through the territory of friendly Poland (part of modern Ukraine) with the crossing of the Prut. Due to food difficulties, the Russian army during June 1711 concentrated on the Dniester - the border of the Commonwealth with Moldova. Field Marshal Sheremetev with the cavalry was supposed to cross the Dniester in early June and then rush to the Danube in a direct way to take the places of possible crossings for the Turks, create food stores to provide the main army, and also draw Wallachia into an uprising against the Ottoman Empire. However, the field marshal encountered problems in supplying the cavalry with fodder and provisions, did not find sufficient military support on the ground and remained in Moldova, turning to Iasi. After crossing the Dniester on June 27, 1711, the main army moved in 2 separate groups: 2 infantry divisions of generals von Allart and von Densberg with Cossacks were in front, followed by guards regiments, 2 infantry divisions of Prince Repnin and General Weide, and also artillery under Lieutenant General Bruce. In the 6-day transition from the Dniester to the Prut through waterless places, with exhausting heat during the day and cold nights, many Russian soldiers from the recruits, weakened by lack of food, died of thirst and disease. Soldiers died, having seized and drunk water, others, unable to withstand the hardships, committed suicide. On July 1 (New Style), the Crimean Tatar cavalry attacked Sheremetev's camp on the eastern bank of the Prut. The Russians lost 280 dragoons killed, but repulsed the attack.

[…] On July 18, the Russian avant-garde learned about the beginning of the crossing to the western bank of the Prut near the town of Falchi (modern Felchiu) of a large Turkish army. Turkish cavalry at 2 pm attacked the vanguard of General Janus von Eberstedt (6 thousand dragoons, 32 guns), who, lining up in a square and firing from guns, on foot in complete encirclement of the enemy, slowly retreated to the main army. The Russians were saved by the absence of artillery from the Turks and their weak weapons, many of the Turkish horsemen were armed only with bows. At sunset, the Turkish cavalry withdrew, which allowed the vanguard to join the army in the early morning of July 19 with an accelerated night march.

[…] July 19, the Turkish cavalry surrounded the Russian army, not approaching closer than 200-300 paces. The Russians did not have a clear plan of action. At 2 p.m. they decided to advance to attack the enemy, but the Turkish cavalry pulled back without accepting the battle. The army of Peter I was located in the lowlands along the Prut, all the surrounding hills were occupied by the Turks, who had not yet been approached by artillery. At the council of war, it was decided to retreat at night up the Prut in search of a more advantageous position for defense. At 11 pm, having destroyed the extra wagons, the army moved in the following order of battle: 6 parallel columns (4 infantry divisions, guards and the dragoon division of Janus von Eberstedt), in between the columns they led the convoy and artillery. Guards regiments covered the left flank, on the right flank, adjacent to the Prut, Repnin's division was moving. From the dangerous sides, the troops covered themselves from the Turkish cavalry with slingshots, which were carried by soldiers in their arms. The loss of the Russian army killed and wounded that day amounted to about 800 people.

By this time, the army consisted of 31,554 infantry and 6,692 cavalry, mostly horseless, 53 heavy guns and 69 light 3-pounder guns. On July 20, by the morning, a gap had formed between the lagging far-left column of the guard and the neighboring division of Allart due to the uneven march of the columns over rough terrain. The Turks immediately attacked the wagon train, which was left without cover, and before the flank was restored, many wagonmen and members of officer families died. For several hours, the army stood, waiting for the restoration of the combat march formation. Due to the delay of the Turkish infantry, the Janissaries with artillery managed to catch up with the Russian army during the day. At about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, the army rested its extreme right flank against the Prut River and stopped for defense near the town of Stanileshti. On the opposite eastern steep bank of the Prut, the Tatar cavalry and the Zaporozhian Cossacks allied to them appeared. Light artillery approached the Turks, which began to fire at the Russian positions. At 7 pm, the Janissaries attacked the location of the divisions of Allart and Janus, moving forward somewhat according to the conditions of the terrain. The Turks, beaten off by rifle and cannon fire, lay down behind a small hill. Under the cover of powder smoke, 80 grenadiers bombarded them with grenades. The Turks counterattacked, but were stopped by rifle salvos in the line of slingshots.

[…] At night, the Turks made sorties twice, but were repulsed. Russian losses as a result of the fighting amounted to 2680 people (750 killed, 1200 wounded, 730 captured and missing); the Turks lost 7-8 thousand according to the report of the British ambassador in Constantinople and the testimony of the brigadier Moro de Braze (the Turks themselves admitted to the losses).

THE FAILURE OF THE PRUTS CAMPAIGN

[…] The main army crossed the Prut and marched in the designated direction until July 7, despite the news that the khan had crossed the river from behind. On July 7, at six o'clock in the afternoon, General Janus, who was walking ahead of the troops for about three miles, made it known that the vizier at the Prut and the Janissaries were already crossing the river. Peter sent a decree to Janus to retreat to connect with the main army to Rennes, so that he would also immediately go back, taking with him provisions, as much as he could collect. Janus, having received a decree, began to move back, despite the advance of the Turks, he managed to bring his detachment without damage. The enemy followed him and, despite the fact that he was met with strong fire, did not stop attacking the Russians until the evening, and at night he stood up the mountain. The Russians had a general council that night: they reasoned that there was a severe shortage of provisions and horse fodder, the cavalry left with General Rennes, the enemy was in excellent numbers: the total Turkish army was 119,665 and the Tatars were 70,000, and the Russians had only 38,246. It was supposed to retreat , and early in the morning moved back up the Prut, the enemy cavalry pursued the retreating, but to no avail. On July 9, in the afternoon, the army reached a place called New Stanelishche: here they placed a wagon train to the river, and the army stood near it in a line; in the evening, the enemy infantry and artillery appeared and stood up to the mountain, from the Russian line about a verst; the enemy also occupied the other side of the river. The Turkish infantry and cavalry advanced fiercely, the battle continued until nightfall, but the enemy could not damage the Russian line anywhere; finally, the enemy cavalry retreated, and the infantry fired cannons all night, and under this firing, the Turks made a retreat around their camp and put up 300 cannons.

PEACE AGREEMENT WITH THE PORT

Even a major failure in the Russian-Turkish conflict of 1710-1711, inspired by England and Charles XII, could not change the course of the Northern War, which was favorable for Russia. Porta declared war on Russia in the autumn of 1710, but hostilities began in January of the following year with Crimean Tatar raids on Ukraine. The Russian command decided to succeed in offensive operations on enemy territory. Counting on the help of the peoples languishing under the yoke of the Ottoman feudal lords, Peter I intended to enter Moldavia and Wallachia before the enemy and seize the crossings across the Danube. In the spring of 1711, the Russian army moved south and in June, overcoming the heat and food difficulties, reached the Prut River. Here ok. 45 thousand Russian troops led by Peter I were surrounded by three times the number of the enemy. The expected help from the allies did not arrive in time. Despite this, the enemy in the battle on July 9, 1711 did not achieve an advantage. Negotiations with the vizier, skillfully conducted by Vice-Chancellor P. Shafirov, ended on July 12 with the signing of the Prut Treaty: Azov returned to the Ottoman Empire. Russia pledged not to interfere in the affairs of the Commonwealth. Charles XII was granted free passage to Sweden. Although Peter returned from the Prut campaign "not without sorrow", the peace treaty with the brilliant Porte allowed Russia to concentrate its efforts on solving the main foreign policy task - the struggle for strengthening on the Baltic Sea.

With an excessive supply of hopes for Turkish Christians, empty promises from the Moldavian and Wallachian rulers, and with a significant amount of his own Poltava self-confidence, but without a sufficient convoy and study of circumstances, Peter set off in the summer of 1711 in the sultry steppe in order not to protect Little Russia from the Turkish invasion, and to defeat the Turkish Empire and on the Prut River, he received another lesson, being surrounded by five times the strongest Turkish army, he was almost taken prisoner and, by agreement with the vizier, gave the Turks all his Azov fortresses, losing all the fruits of his 16-year-old Voronezh, Don and Azov effort and sacrifice.

Klyuchevsky V.O. Russian history. Full course of lectures. M., 2004. http://magister.msk.ru/library/history/kluchev/kllec61.htm

THE ROUGH TRAVEL AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY

The Prut campaign of 1711 got its name from the fact that the outcome of the Russian-Turkish war of 1710-1711. occurred on the banks of the Prut River. This Russian-Turkish war was the result of the diplomatic activity of Charles XII and the friendly French court. Karl lived in Turkey after the Poltava defeat, and more than once he was threatened with extradition into the hands of Peter. Russia demanded the extradition of Charles, and he proved to the Turks the timeliness and necessity for the Turks to fight Peter. The result of his insistence was Turkey's diplomatic break with Russia. Peter declared war on Turkey (in November 1710) and planned to wage it offensively. He counted on the help of the Turkish Slavs, on an alliance with the vassal Turkish rulers (rulers) of Moldavia and Wallachia, and on the support of Poland. In the spring of 1711, Peter hurried to the campaign, thinking before the Turks to take possession of Moldavia, Wallachia and crossings across the Danube. But none of the allies came to the rescue in time. The accession of the Moldavian ruler Cantemir to Peter did not save the Russian army from starvation, the transition through the steppes exhausted the people. To top it off, the Turks had earlier crossed the Danube and, on the banks of the Prut, surrounded Peter's army with enormous forces. Due to the lack of provisions and water (the Russians were cut off from the Prut), it was impossible to stay in place, and due to the comparatively small number of troops it was impossible to successfully break through the Turks. Peter entered into peace negotiations with the Grand Vizier. Sending trusted representatives to him, Peter gave them the authority to cede Azov, all the conquests in the Baltic Sea (if the Turks demand it for Charles), even Pskov […] to release the army and conclude peace. However, the concession was much less than what Peter was ready for. It happened because the Turks themselves wanted to end the war into which they were drawn by outside influences. In addition, the dexterity of the Russian diplomat Shafirov and the rich gifts sent by Peter to the vizier helped the cause. Peace was concluded, and the Russian army was released under the following conditions: Peter gave Azov and some fortified points near the Black Sea to Turkey, refused to interfere in the affairs of Poland (it should be noted that then there were already projects for the partition of Poland, which enjoyed the sympathy of Peter); finally, Peter gave Karl free passage to Sweden. […] Peter cheaply got rid of the Turks and continued to hold that high political position in the circle of European states, which the Poltava victory had given him.

[…] When, after the Prut campaign, Peter in 1711 and 1712. came to Germany, he managed to get closer to Prussia; but he was already dissatisfied with his other allies for their insincerity and inability to wage war in accordance. But at the same time, both diplomacy and Western European journalism were, in turn, dissatisfied with Peter. They attributed conquering views of Germany to him, they saw dictatorial habits in his diplomats and were afraid of the entry of Russian auxiliary troops into Germany. And after the failure on the Prut, Peter was terrible in Europe with his power.

Charles XII stayed in Turkey for a long time, setting the Sultan against Russia. At the end of 1710, the Turks declared war on Peter I. The Ottomans then owned most of the Balkans, and the Orthodox Greeks, Slavs and Vlachs who lived there had long called Russian armies to the peninsula, promising to raise a general uprising against the Ottoman oppressors with their arrival. Such promises were given to Peter by the rulers of Moldavia (Kantemir) and Wallachian (Brancovan). Relying on them, the king in the spring of 1711 moved to the so-called Prut campaign, which was not part of the Northern War, but had a considerable influence on its course. This campaign immediately went against the calculations of Peter. The Polish August did not help him, and there was no general uprising of the Moldavians and Vlachs. The Turks blocked Peter's path to the Danube. The main forces of the king with himself were surrounded on the Prut River by a 200,000-strong horde of the Ottoman vizier. Cut off from food, the Russians could only surrender, but Peter, by cunning diplomacy and bribery, persuaded the vizier to peace. The king returned to the Turks Azov, which he had previously taken. In the position in which Peter found himself, such conditions of the world had to be considered quite favorable.

1. The continuation of the Northern War in the Baltics and the project of the Russian-Swedish alliance (briefly)

Returning to Russia, the Tsar continued the Northern War. Russian troops occupied almost all of Finland. On July 5, 1714, the Russian squadron, with the personal participation of Peter, defeated the Swedish fleet at Cape Gangut (southwest Finland), occupying the Aland Islands, from where it was possible to threaten the Swedish capital, Stockholm. England and Prussia joined the military coalition against Charles XII. Russian troops fought together with the allies in northern Germany, taking many enemy fortresses there and by 1716 finally ousting the Swedes from the southern coast of the Baltic.

Peter I now held most of Finland, Courland, Estonia, had a strong influence on the affairs of Poland and North German Mecklenburg and Holstein. Such power of the king caused the strongest fears in all of Europe. Russia's allies began to treat her with distrust. At first, it was decided to continue the Northern War with a joint landing of the allies on the southern coast of Sweden, but due to the mutual hostility that arose, this expedition did not take place. Having quarreled with the allies, Peter I decided to drastically change the front in the Northern War: to get closer to the former sworn enemy, Charles XII and his ally France, and to start fighting with his own recent friends. In 1717 the tsar was received with honor in Paris. Charles XII, meanwhile, returned from Turkey to Sweden and began friendly negotiations with the Russians in the Åland Islands. The matter went to the creation of a Russian-Swedish coalition against Poland and Denmark. Karl wanted to compensate for the loss of the Baltic states by capturing Norway from the Danes, and Peter agreed to help him with this.

End of the Northern War. Peace of Nystadt (briefly)

The plans were upset after the unexpected death of Charles XII, who died in 1718 from an accidental shot during the siege of a fortress. The Swedish throne passed to his sister, Ulrike-Eleanor, who changed state policy. The new Swedish government made peace with the German opponents and Denmark, broke off negotiations with Peter and resumed a stubborn struggle with the Russians. But Sweden was already completely exhausted. In 1719 and 1720, the commanders of Peter I staged several invasions of Sweden across the sea, devastating even the environs of Stockholm. On August 30, 1721, at the negotiations in the Finnish town of Nystadt, a Russian-Swedish peace was concluded, which ended the Northern War. Sweden ceded to Russia Livonia, Estonia and the coast of the Gulf of Finland on it. Peter returned Finland to the Swedes and paid them two million efimki.

Thus ended the war, which turned Russia into the strongest power in the European north. At the celebrations on the occasion of its graduation, Peter I assumed the imperial title. The Northern War was not only of foreign policy importance: it also had a strong influence on the internal life of Russia, predetermining the course of many of Peter's reforms. During the Northern War, the tsar created a new permanent recruit army. By the time of the Nishtad peace, there were about 200 thousand regular troops and 75 thousand irregular Cossacks in it. The Russian state, which had not previously had naval forces, now had a fleet of 48 battleships and 800 small ships with 28,000 crew.