the desired result. The weakness of the state apparatus in the face of

external and internal enemy forced the top of the nobility, including

the emperor himself, to look for new means of improving him.

Under these conditions, Alexander I brings the young, but already

experienced reformer M. M. Speransky, in order to implement

progressive reforms, which, in the opinion of the king, should have

appease both the people and the nobility. In 1809 Speransky prepared

program of liberal transformations of the entire system of state bodies.

It is set out in his work "Introduction to the code of state laws."

The most progressive and therefore unrealized element

the system of state bodies planned by Speransky should have been

become representative bodies - local dumas and the State Duma.

The latter was proposed to be created to discuss bills and control over

ministerial activities. It was given the right of an absolute veto over everything.

introduced draft laws. It was a significant step towards constitutional

monarchy, given that the right to elect and be elected was received by all

real estate owners.

According to Speransky, in his project the pinnacle of the entire state

organization was not the State Duma, but the State Council,

which was supposed to be "an estate in which all parts

legislative, judicial and executive power in their main relations

unite and through him ascend to sovereign power. State Council appears

in the "Introduction" as a universal, multifunctional, but

advisory body. The members of the state council were to be appointed by the emperor,

who was its chairman. Recalling the previous

advisory bodies under the tsar in general terms, the state council due to

changes in the role of autocracy in the system had a lot of new. Another became his

structure - now departments were created along with the general meeting

Council. The new device was also received by his office.

Contrary to the logic of the note “On the need to establish the State Council” and

the very meaning of this reform, the draft "Formation of the State Council" was not discussed

in the Senate, or in the Permanent Council, or in any other body.

work of the general meeting of the State Council. At the first meeting, he delivered a speech

written by Speransky, Alexander I. He stated that he always wished that

the welfare of the empire was established in the law, and the law was motionless on

resolutions, and therefore from the beginning of the year lays a solid foundation for one of

the most important bodies - the State Council.

The "root laws" of the State Council, set out by Speransky in his "Introduction to

Code of State Laws", entered the "Education" with minor changes.

"Education" was replenished with only one new article, which forbade ministers

to be chairmen of departments of the State Council.

There were many shortcomings and contradictions in the “Formation of the State Council”,

which could only partially be eliminated in the implementation of the entire plan

transformations of Speransky, however, not only the State Duma was not created, on

even the reform of the Senate approved by the emperor was not carried out, and therefore

organization of the Council, which, according to the creator, was supposed to streamline

work of the state apparatus and establish a regime of legality, in practice did not lead to

separation, but on the contrary, to a confusion of the functions of the highest state bodies.

At the same time, as A. V. Predtechensky correctly noted, with absolute

the inviolability of the rights of autocratic power was nullified

the Council of State as the body that establishes order in the matter of legislation.

The State Council, like the previous councils under the emperor, continued

to remain a universal deliberative body, in which also gradually

not legislative, but judicial and executive cases prevailed.

"Formation of the State Council" in structure is

a two-pronged act, consisting of the Manifesto and the "Education" itself. In the first

the reasons that caused the creation of the State Council are revealed, the main

laws defining the competence and composition of the State Council are proclaimed by its

priority tasks. "Education" consists of two departments, which according to

branch, called "The Root Laws of the State Council", is divided by numbers into

16 parts. The second section consists of 144 paragraphs, combined into 8

sections.

Some sections, in addition to paragraphs, have other structural

divisions.

According to this document, the State Council was divided into 4 departments: laws,

military affairs, civil and spiritual affairs, state economy. AT

department of laws includes everything that essentially constitutes the subject

law. The Legislative Commission will have to submit this

department of all bills.

The Department of Military Affairs included the subjects of military and

maritime ministries.

The Department of Civil and Spiritual Affairs "Education" included cases

justice, spiritual administration and police.

And the department of state economy included items of general

industry, sciences, commerce, finance, treasury and accounts.

The State Council was headed by its chairman. He signed all the papers

opened and closed meetings, appointed cases for consideration by the State Council. At

the work of the State Council was supposed to protect the order and unity of the subject

consideration.

The departments also had chairmen. They led

departments, opened and closed meetings of departments, appointed

examination of a case etc. . (the same as the chairmen of the State Council).

The Secretary of State managed the office. Under it

responsibility was the accuracy of the information offered to the council and

proper clarity of their presentation, as well as the preparation of all executive

papers in the magazines of the Council, both in its general meeting and in departments.

Each department of the council had one secretary of state and

several helpers. Their duty was to assemble additional

information needed for the hearing.

The competence of the State Council included:

change or repeal of existing laws

giving clarifications on current legislation

domestic politics

state budget

reports of ministries in the management of their parts

All cases to be considered by the State Council first came to

departments. They could be sent there from ministers. In them, through

state council. The cases were then transferred directly to the

Details

In April 2009, the Irkutsk Regional State Research Institution "Institute of Legislation and Legal Information" was named after the outstanding statesman, lawmaker and reformer Mikhail Mikhailovich Speransky.

Mikhail Mikhailovich Speransky, Russian statesman, count (1839). Born in the village of Cherkutino, Vladimir province, in the family of a poor priest. Entering the Vladimir Seminary, in 1790 he graduated. For outstanding abilities, the gifted seminarian received the surname "Speransky" from the Latin "sperare" ("hope"). As the best student, Speransky was sent to the Alexander Nevsky Seminary in St. Petersburg and, after completing his studies, was left as a professor of mathematics, physics and eloquence. In 1795, he was offered the position of prefect (head) of the seminary, but Mikhail, having abandoned this career and monasticism, left the seminary and entered the civil service with the rank of IX class according to the "Table of Ranks". At the same time, Speransky became the house secretary of Prince A.B. Kurakin, and after the latter received the rank of Prosecutor General, went to serve in his office.

Speransky's further transition to the Ministry of the Interior coincided with the beginning of the reign of Emperor Alexander I. Possessing a great capacity for work, the ability to write beautifully and speak convincingly, Mikhail Mikhailovich quickly attracted the attention of the emperor. Soon Speransky received the rank of real privy councilor, and in 1807 he became secretary of state under Alexander I. Along with the gigantic amount of work and the actual creation of the Russian bureaucratic machine of the 19th - early 20th centuries. Speransky wrote works that put him forward among the first political thinkers: “Reflections on the State Structure of the Empire”, “A Note on the Arrangement of Judicial and Government Institutions in Russia”, “On the Spirit of Government”, etc. Attending a meeting of two emperors in Erfurt in 1808, Speransky attracted the attention of Napoleon, who jokingly offered Alexander to exchange his secretary of state for some German principality.

By 1809, Speransky drew up a plan for state reorganization, the main results of which were to be a constitution and the abolition of serfdom. The essence of the reforms was a clear division of power into legislative, executive, and judicial. The reforms assumed the partial election of officials and the expansion of freedom of the press "in certain, precisely defined sizes." According to Speransky, the legislative initiative should belong to the monarch, but no law should enter into force without consideration in the State Duma. According to the draft state system developed by Speransky, only the nobility and the “middle class” (merchants, philistines, state peasants who elected the legislative State Duma and administrative district and provincial dumas, as well as the judiciary) received political rights. The “working people” (serfs, workers, domestic servants) were given only some civil rights while maintaining serfdom. Speransky believed that it would be abolished gradually, under the influence of the development of industry, trade and education. On the initiative of Speransky, in 1809 a decree was issued requiring officials to have a certain level of education, and in 1810 the State Council was created.

Speransky's activities in the state field aroused dissatisfaction among the higher nobility with the exaltation of the former seminarian. Through the efforts of representatives of the nobles, Speransky was accused of treason and fell into disgrace. In 1812, Mikhail Mikhailovich was exiled to Nizhny Novgorod, and then to Perm. In 1816 he was appointed governor of Penza, and in 1819 governor-general of Siberia. The stay paid off. In 1821, Speransky returned to St. Petersburg and was appointed a member of the State Council and the Siberian Committee, managing the Law Drafting Commission. Since 1826, Speransky actually headed the 2nd department of His Imperial Majesty's Own Chancellery, which carried out the codification of laws. Under his leadership, the Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire in 45 volumes, the Code of Laws of the Russian Empire in 15 volumes were compiled. and others. In 1839, shortly before his death, Speransky was elevated by the emperor to the dignity of a count.

A supporter of the constitutional order, Speransky was convinced that new rights to society must be bestowed by power. A society divided into estates, whose rights and obligations are established by law, needs civil and criminal law, public conduct of court cases, and freedom of the press.

The views of the new reformer M. M. Speransky are most fully reflected in the note of 1809 - "Introduction to the Code of State Laws." Speransky's "Code" opens with a serious theoretical study of "the properties and objects of state, indigenous and organic laws."

Speransky wrote: “If the rights of state power were unlimited, if the state forces were united in sovereign power and they would not leave any rights to subjects, then the state would be in slavery and rule would be despotic.” He explained that since freedom in itself is not sufficiently guaranteed, it is necessary to protect it through the creation and strengthening of the basic law, that is, the Political Constitution. Without constitutional guarantees, civil rights and freedoms are powerless, therefore, it was precisely the requirement to strengthen the civil system that formed the basis of Speransky's entire plan of state reforms and determined their main idea: "the government, hitherto autocratic, should be established and established on the basis of law." The idea was that state power should be built on a permanent basis, and the government should stand on a solid constitutional and legal basis.

Speransky considered it necessary to have a system of separation of powers. Here he fully shared the ideas that then dominated Western Europe, and wrote that "it is impossible to base government on the law if one sovereign power will draw up the law and execute it." Therefore, Speransky saw a rational structure of state power in its division into three branches: legislative, executive and judicial, while maintaining the autocratic form. Since the discussion of bills involves the participation of a large number of people, he believed, it is necessary to create special bodies representing the legislative branch.

The activities of Speransky had a huge impact on the formation and development of liberalism in Russia as a current of political thought. In his works, he pointed out the ways and means of gradual liberalization of autocratic power, the creation of a rule of law state and the establishment of civil and political freedoms. Speransky's ideas remain relevant to this day.

“The struggle of 1812 still occupies historians in France, Germany and here. Those who participated in it disappear, and this war already enters the track of ordinary History, for which scientists begin to take on, sometimes who were not yet in the world when the events they describe took place.<…>It goes without saying that we and the French were the main figures in this field. Until now, many issues between us have not been resolved, many more events of this struggle have not been explained.<…>The slightest ambiguity in the presentation, the slightest contradiction to oneself, the omission of this or that material, the unspoken, the absence of references in the description of what one did not witness, not to mention slips and negligence, will serve as a pretext for both us and the French to refute the fact which is beyond doubt<…>Along with success there are often failures; there is no perfection on earth, and therefore I see no reason to hide the truth and to get carried away by the historian with false patriotism.

I. P. Liprandi, participant in the war of 1812

Chapter one

Preparing for war

Russia prepared ahead of time for the war of 1812. Almost no one doubted that it would be, because the Russian command received timely data on Napoleon's strategic plans. Moreover, it is now no longer a secret to anyone that the Russian headquarters knew about the day it began long before the war.

As a result, the military spending curve went up sharply.

In 1807 these expenses amounted to 43 million rubles, in 1808 - 53 million rubles, in 1809 - 64.7 million rubles, and in 1810 - 92 million rubles.

As you can see, Russia's military spending has more than doubled in three years. But in 1811 they already made 113.7 million rubles, and only for ground forces.

As is usually the case in countries where politics dominates the economy, everything ended in a serious crisis. By the way, it struck long before the start of the war of 1812. Indeed, if “the curve of military spending has sharply gone up,” then why ask where inflation and other manifestations of economic trouble came from ...

In fact, State Chancellor N. P. Rumyantsev in his report to Emperor Alexander I wrote so bluntly that "the main cause of the financial crisis is by no means the break with England, but the incredible military spending."

And this means that the matter was not at all in the Continental blockade directed by Napoleon against England, to which Russia was forced to join under the terms of the Tilsit peace. Moreover, in the report of the Department of Economy of the State Council dated September 20, 1810, it was clearly written: “Russia is more harmed by the perverse implementation of the Continental system than by the very adoption of the sowing system.”

To understand the meaning of what was said, you need to look at the numbers. So, immediately after the conclusion of the Tilsit Peace, that is, in 1808, Russia's military spending amounted to 53 million rubles. For comparison: the budget shortfall due to Russia's accession to the Continental System (due to the reduction of customs duties and taxes) amounted to only 3.6 million rubles. At the same time, only income from the sale of vodka gave the Russian budget 34.2 million rubles!

As they say, feel the difference.

A much more serious problem was the war with Sweden that began in 1808, because "war, as you know, is the same provocateur of inflation as alcohol is a provocateur of cirrhosis."

The development of the financial catastrophe in Russia in the period up to 1812 clearly presents a graph of the dynamics of the exchange rate of banknotes, that is, paper money, in relation to silver. Author of Napoleon. Attempt No. 2” A.P. Nikonov calls this dynamic “the chronicle of a dive bomber” and emphasizes that Russia’s financial crisis was not at all due to the “cursed Napoleon” who undermined Russian trade and forced Emperor Alexander to close his ports to the British. In fact, the Continental blockade began to really operate in the spring of 1808, and the ruble began to fall from the middle of 1805, that is, after Russia entered the first war with Napoleonic France.

Then there were more wars, and just as unsuccessful. As a result, in the period from the end of 1805 to the end of 1809, the rate of banknotes fell from 80 kopecks to 40 kopecks, that is, twice. Then, towards the end of 1811, it fell even lower. In fact, “in an effort to increase military spending<…>Tsar Alexander brought the country to a state where ruble fell from eighty kopecks to twenty-five. And only fire-fighting anti-crisis measures stabilized the situation. It was announced that the reprinting of banknotes that were not secured by anything was announced, government bonds were issued, expenses were reduced, taxes were raised, part of state property was sold into private hands ... "

All this happened under the guidance of the outstanding Russian economist M. M. Speransky.

In January 1810, according to the project of M. M. Speransky, the State Council was created, consisting of the General Assembly and four departments - laws, military, civil and spiritual affairs, state economy (later there was also a fifth department - for the affairs of the Kingdom of Poland) .

To organize the activities of the State Council, the State Chancellery was created, and Mikhail Mikhailovich Speransky himself was appointed its state secretary, in whom L.N. stubbornness who has reached power and uses it only for the good of Russia.

The Chairman of the State Council was either Emperor Alexander himself, or one of its members appointed by the chairman. The State Council included all the ministers, as well as a number of senior dignitaries appointed personally by the emperor. It is important to note that the State Council did not create laws, but served only as an advisory body in their development.

On the other hand, in 1802 the Senate was declared the “supreme seat” of the Russian Empire, which concentrated the highest administrative, judicial and controlling power.

The Holy Synod, whose members were metropolitans and bishops, also underwent changes. Under Alexander, representatives of this higher clergy no longer gathered, but were called to meetings at the choice of the head of the Synod, who became a civil official with the rank of chief prosecutor (from October 1803 to November 1817, this place was occupied by Prince Alexander Nikolaevich Golitsyn).

Also in 1802, a ministerial reform was launched and instead of the previous collegiums (the brainchild of Peter the Great), eight ministries were approved: foreign affairs, military ground forces, naval forces, internal affairs, finance, justice, commerce and public education. In particular, Count A. R. Vorontsov became the first Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count S. K. Vyazmitinov became the first Minister of War (in 1808 he was replaced by Count A. A. Arakcheev), Count V. P. Kochubey became the first Minister of Internal Affairs , the first Minister of Finance - Count A. I. Vasiliev, etc.

The Decembrist A. M. Muravyov wrote about Alexander:

"To please the sovereign, one must be a foreigner or bear a foreign surname."

However, of the eight first ministers of Alexander, there was not a single foreigner! Another thing is that later there were much more “foreigners”: Count A. R. Vorontsov was replaced by Prince Adam Czartoryski in 1804, and then A. Ya. Budberg and K. V. Nesselrode were ministers, M. B. Barclay became Minister of War de Tolly, the Minister of the Sea - I. I. de Traverse, etc.

Nevertheless, according to the historian N. A. Troitsky, “the facts show that the tsar selected his employees according to the kinship of convictions, personal devotion, abilities, but regardless of their nationality and surname.”

After the publication of the manifesto "On the Establishment of Ministries", all matters began to be decided solely by the ministers, accountable to the emperor. Moreover, each minister had a deputy (the so-called “comrade minister”) and an office. The ministries were subdivided into departments, departments - into departments, departments - into tables headed by head clerks. A Committee of Ministers was established to discuss urgent matters together.

State Council- the highest legislative body of the Russian Empire in 1810-1906 and the upper house of the legislative institution of the Russian Empire in 1906-1917.

The creation of the State Council was announced by the manifesto "Formation of the State Council" of Emperor Alexander I, published on January 1 (13), 1810. The predecessor of the State Council was the Permanent Council, established on March 30 (April 11), 1801, which was also unofficially called the State Council, so the date of the foundation of the latter is sometimes attributed to 1801. The formation of the State Council was one of the elements of the program for the transformation of the system of power in Russia, developed by M. M. Speransky. The goals of its creation were detailed in Speransky's note "On the need to establish the State Council."

Members of the State Council were appointed and dismissed by the emperor, they could be any person, regardless of class, rank, age and education. The absolute majority in the State Council were the nobles, the appointment to the State Council in most cases was actually for life. Ministers were members ex officio. The chairman and vice-chairman of the State Council were appointed annually by the emperor. In 1812-1865, the chairman of the State Council was also the chairman of the Committee of Ministers, among the members of the State Council there were always representatives of the imperial family, and from 1865 to 1905 the Grand Dukes were the chairmen of the State Council (until 1881 - Konstantin Nikolaevich, then - Mikhail Nikolaevich). If the emperor was present at the meeting of the State Council, then the chairmanship passed to him. In 1810 there were 35 members of the State Council, in 1890 - 60 members, and at the beginning of the 20th century their number reached 90. In total, in the years 1802-1906, the State Council consisted of 548 members.

The powers of the State Council included consideration of:

• new laws or legislative proposals;
• issues of internal management requiring the abolition, restriction, addition or clarification of previous laws;
• issues of domestic and foreign policy in emergency circumstances;
• annual estimate of general state income and expenditure (since 1862 - the state list of income and expenditure);
• reports of the State Control on the execution of the list of income and expenses (since 1836);
• emergency financial measures, etc.

The Council of State consisted of general meeting, State Chancellery, departments and standing committees. In addition, various temporary special meetings, committees, presences and commissions operated under it.

All cases came to the State Council only through the State Chancellery in the name of the Secretary of State who headed it. After determining whether the case belongs to the jurisdiction of the State Council, the secretary of state assigned it to the appropriate department of the office, which prepared it for hearing in the appropriate department of the State Council. Urgent cases, by order of the emperor, could immediately be transferred to the general meeting of the State Council, but usually the case first went through the corresponding department, and then it fell into the general meeting. According to the manifesto on January 1, 1810, all adopted laws had to pass through the State Council, but in reality this rule was not always observed. The decision in the departments and the general meeting was taken by a majority vote, but the emperor could also approve the opinion of the minority of the State Council, if it was more in line with his views. For example, out of 242 cases on which the votes in the Council were divided, Alexander I approved the opinion of the majority in only 159 cases (65.7%), and several times supported the opinion of only one member of the State Council.

According to the decree of April 5 (17), 1812, the State Council subordinated the ministries during the absence of the emperor, and the decree of August 29 (September 10), 1801, determined that in the event of a prolonged absence of the emperor in the capital, decisions of the majority of the general meeting of the State Council take the force of law. In 1832, the powers of the Council were somewhat reduced: the ministers stopped sending him annual reports on their activities.

On April 15 (27), 1842, a new document was adopted defining the activities of the Council, replacing the manifesto of 1810: “Establishment of the State Council”, developed by a committee chaired by Prince IV Vasilchikov. The new provision somewhat limited the scope of the State Council's activities, designating a number of areas of legislative activity that are not subject to consideration at its meetings, but at the same time expanded it at the expense of administrative cases and judicial proceedings.

Department of Laws (1810-1906). He considered bills in the field of administrative-territorial structure, legal proceedings, taxation, significant reforms of the state apparatus, draft regulations and states of individual state institutions, industrial, financial and commercial societies, public organizations.

Chairmen: Count P. V. Zavadovsky (1810-1812), Count V. P. Kochubey (1812), Most Serene Prince P. V. Lopukhin (1812-1819), Prince Ya. I. Lobanov-Rostovsky (1819-1825) , V. A. Pashkov (1825-1832), Count I. V. Vasilchikov (1832-1838), Count M. M. Speransky (1833-1839), D. V. Dashkov (1839), Count D. N. Bludov (1840-1861), Prince P. P. Gagarin (1862-1864), M. A. Korf (1864-1871), Prince S. N. Urusov (1871-1882), E. P. Staritsky (1883) , Baron A. P. Nikolai (1884-1889), Count D. M. Solsky (1889-1892), M. N. Ostrovsky (1893-1899), E. V. Frish (1900-1905).

Department of Civil and Ecclesiastical Affairs (1810-1906). Considered legal issues and cases of spiritual administration: forms and procedure for legal proceedings; interpretation and application in judicial practice of certain articles of civil and criminal legislation; elevation to the nobility and deprivation thereof, of the case on the assignment of princely, count and baronial titles; cases on inheritance, land and other property disputes, on the alienation of real estate for state needs or its transfer from state ownership to private hands; on the establishment of new dioceses and parishes of the Orthodox and other faiths. Also, the department considered cases that caused disagreements when they were resolved in the Senate or between the Senate and individual ministries.

Chairmen: His Serene Highness Prince P. V. Lopukhin (1810-1816), Count V. P. Kochubey (1816-1819), V. S. Popov (1819-1822), Count N. S. Mordvinov (1822-1838), S. S. Kushnikov (1839), Prince P. G. of Oldenburg (1842-1881), D. N. Zamyatin (1881), V. P. Titov (1882-1883), N. I. Stoyanovskiy (1884-1897) , E. V. Frish (1897-1899), N. N. Selifontov (1899), N. N. Gerard (1902-1905).

Department of State Economy (1810-1906). He dealt with issues of finance, trade, industry and public education. He considered bills related to the development of the economy, state revenues and expenditures, financial estimates of ministries and main departments, reports of state banks, taxation issues, granting privileges to individual joint-stock companies, cases of discoveries and inventions.

Chairmen: N. S. Mordvinov (1810-1812), His Serene Highness Prince P. V. Lopukhin (1812-1816), N. S. Mordvinov (1816-1818), Count N. N. Golovin (1818-1821), Prince A. B. Kurakin (1821-1829), Count Yu. P. Litta (1830-1839), Count V. V. Levashov (1839-1848), Count A. D. Guryev (1848-1861), P. F Brock (1862-1863), K. V. Chevkin (1863-1873), A. A. Abaza (1874-1880), Count E. T. Baranov (1881-1884), A. A. Abaza (1884- 1892), Count D. M. Solsky (1893-1905)

Department of Military Affairs (1810-1854). Considered questions of the military legislation; recruiting and arming the army; creation of central and local institutions of the military department; means to meet his economic needs; class and service rights and privileges of persons assigned to the military department, their judicial and administrative responsibility. In fact, it ceased to operate in 1854, but its chairman was appointed until 1858, and members until 1859.

Chairmen: Count A. A. Arakcheev (1810-1812), Most Serene Prince P. V. Lopukhin (1812-1816), Count A. A. Arakcheev (1816-1826), Count P. A. Tolstoy (1827-1834) , I. L. Shakhovskaya (1848-1858).

Provisional Department (1817). It was formed to consider and prepare bills in the financial field: on the establishment of the State Commercial Bank, the Council of State Credit Establishments, as well as the introduction of a drinking tax, etc.

Department of Affairs of the Kingdom of Poland (1832-1862). It was formed after the abolition of the constitutional autonomy of the Kingdom of Poland to consider general issues of policy in relation to the Polish lands, develop relevant bills, as well as list the income and expenses of the Kingdom of Poland.

Chairmen: Prince I. F. Paskevich (1832-1856), Prince M. D. Gorchakov (1856-1861).

Department of Industry, Sciences and Trade (1900-1906). Considered bills and budget allocations in the field of development of industry and trade, as well as education; cases on the approval of the charters of joint-stock companies and railways; granting privileges for discoveries and inventions.

Chairman: N. M. Chikhachev (1900-1905).

Law Drafting Commission (1810-1826). Formed in 1796 to implement the codification of legislation. With the formation of the State Council, she became a member of it. It was abolished in connection with the creation of the II Department of His Imperial Majesty's Own Chancellery, which assumed these functions. In 1882, the II Division was again transferred to the State Council, forming Codification Department (1882-1893), abolished after the transfer of issues of codification of legislation to the State Chancellery.

Commission for the Acceptance of Petitions (1810-1835). It was created to receive complaints related to the activities of government bodies, as well as petitions related to the appointment of various kinds of benefits. After 1835, it was withdrawn from the State Council and subordinated directly to the emperor. It existed until 1884, after which it was transformed into a special Office for the Acceptance of Petitions, which was abolished in 1917.

Special presence for the preliminary consideration of complaints against the decisions of the departments of the Senate (1884-1917). His task was to consider complaints against decisions of the departments of the Senate and determine the possibility of transferring relevant cases to the general meeting of the State Council.

The Manifesto of February 20, 1906, and the new edition of the Fundamental Laws of the Russian Empire of April 23, 1906 established the State Council as a legislative body - the upper house of the first Russian parliament, along with the lower house - the State Duma.

Half of the members of the State Council were appointed by the emperor, the other half were elected. Members by election enjoyed parliamentary immunity, while members by appointment remained primarily officials. The total number of members of the State Council by appointment could not exceed the number of members by election, their composition was reviewed annually on January 1. In total, the first composition of the State Council had 196 members (98 appointed and 98 elected).

The election was carried out in 5 categories (curia): from the Orthodox clergy - 6 people; from noble societies - 18 people; from provincial zemstvo assemblies - one from each; from the academy of sciences and universities - 6 people; from the council of trade and manufactories, exchange committees and merchant councils - 12 people; in addition, 2 people were elected from the Finnish Diet. The term for electing members by election was 9 years. Every 3 years, a rotation was carried out, as a result of which 1/3 of the members of the Council for each of the categories dropped out in the next order. This did not apply to members elected from zemstvos, who were re-elected every three years in full force. Persons who did not have the right to participate in elections to the State Duma, persons under 40 years of age or who had not completed a course in secondary educational institutions and foreign nationals could not be elected to the State Council. The Chairman of the State Council and his deputy were annually appointed by the emperor from among the members of the Council for Appointment.

Article 106 of the Fundamental State Laws determined that "the State Council and the State Duma enjoy equal rights in matters of legislation"; in reality, the Duma had certain powers that the Council did not have. In the event of termination or interruption in the activities of the State Council and the State Duma, the bill could be discussed in the Council of Ministers and approved by the emperor in the form of an imperial decree, which would immediately take effect. But in most cases, the usual procedure was in effect: the bill passed through the Duma and entered the State Council. Here it was discussed in the relevant commission and department, and then - in the general meeting of the Council.

The structure of the State Council after 1906 changed significantly. In it, in addition to general meeting and State Chancellery only two left department(instead of four), the number of permanently operating commissions. Meetings of the General Assembly of the State Council now became public, they could be attended by the public and members of the press.

During the February Revolution, on February 25, 1917, Emperor Nicholas II issued decrees on the “break in classes” of the State Council and the State Duma with a planned date for the resumption of their activities no later than April 1917. However, the State Council never resumed its activities. Its general meetings no longer met. In May 1917, the Provisional Government abolished the positions of members of the State Council by appointment. In December 1917, the State Council was abolished by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars.

First department concentrated in his hands mainly legal issues. He made decisions on issues that caused disagreement in the Senate, between the Senate and the Ministry of Justice, the Military Council or the Admiralty Council. He considered cases relating to liability for crimes committed by members of the State Council and the State Duma, ministers and other senior officials (holding positions of 1-3 classes according to the Table of Ranks), as well as cases of approval in princely, count and baronial dignity, etc.

Chairman: A. A. Saburov (1906-1916).

Second department specialized in matters related to finance and economics. He considered the annual reports of the Ministry of Finance, the State Bank, the State Noble Land Bank, the Peasant Land Bank, state savings banks, cases related to private railways, the sale of state lands to private individuals, etc.

Chairmen: F. G. Turner (1906), N. P. Petrov (1906-1917).

Political groupings in the State Council in 1906-1917

Group of the Right- organized in May 1906. The backbone of the composition was formed from members of the State Council by appointment. The number of the group constantly increased: 1906 - 56 members, 1907 - 59 members, 1908 - 66 members, 1910 - 77 members, 1915 - 70 members, in February 1917 - 71 members. Within the group, its members were divided into extreme and moderate currents. The extreme wing of the group insisted that "... the historical task of Russia, the Russian government ... is to Russify everything non-Russian and justify everything non-Orthodox." They considered it unacceptable that the supreme power "does not regulate life", but "is an organ controlled by life and subordinate to its currents." The moderate wing of the group, while agreeing with monarchism, nevertheless objected to "the triumph of the all-leveling, all-in-the-hands centralizing bureaucracy." Over the years, the group was headed by: S. S. Goncharov (extreme; 1906-1908), P. N. Durnovo (extreme; 1908-1911 and 1911-1915), P. P. Kobylinsky (extreme; 1911), A. A. Bobrinsky (moderate, 1915-1916), I. G. Shcheglovitov (moderate, 1916), A. F. Trepov (moderate, 1917)

Right Center Group- officially organized as an independent group in 1911, a breakaway from the Center Group, the Neutgard Circle, named after its inspirer. Therefore, this group was distinguished by the best internal discipline. Later, some deputies from the moderate wing of the Group of the Rights also joined the group. The backbone of the group consisted of elected members of the State Council. Standing in solidarity now with the "Group of the Center" and now with the "Group of the Rights" until 1915, it was this group that exerted the main influence on the outcome of the vote of the State Council. Despite the exodus of members who supported the ideas of the Progressive Bloc, members of the Right Center Group rejected the proposal for a coalition of the Right Group against the Progressive Bloc. The size of the group was notable for constancy - 20 deputies. Head of the group: A. B. Neidgardt (1911-1917)

Circle of non-party association- Formed in December 1910 by non-Party members by appointment, some members of the moderate-right wing of the "Group of the Rights" and the "Group of the Center", who had fallen away from their groups. Number: 1911 - 16 members, 1912 - 12 members, 1913 - 12 members, in February 1917 - 18 members. Until 1915, it did not have a common ideology, after which the group was solidarized by the “Center Group”, supporting the Progressive Bloc. Heads of the group: Baron Yu. A. Ikskul von Gildenbandt (1910-1911), Prince B. A. Vasilchikov (1911-1917), V. N. Kokovtsov (1917)

Center Group- was formed in May 1906 by a member of A.S. Ermolaev from moderate-liberal members of the State Council by appointment. The members of the group were quite heterogeneous in their political views, formally uniting on a common conservative-liberal platform, close to the Octobrist one. Initially, being the largest group of the State Council in terms of the number of members (in 1906 - 100 members), due to the ideological diversity of members in 1907-12. was numerically reduced and structurally split up (in 1910 - 87 members; in 1911 - 63 members; in February 1917 - 50 members). From 1906-07 several subgroups emerged within the group, voting separately from the group on a number of issues. In May 1906, the subgroup “Polish Kolo” (14 members) stood out ideologically. In 1907, inside the “Gr. Center ", 2 more subgroups stood out:" Circle of Neidgardtsev "(since 1911 -" Group of the Right Center ") (15-20 members; mostly elected from zemstvos and local nobles-Ostsees). The most disciplined and independent subgroup of all. Head - A. B. Neidgardt. United members of the center with a shift to the right regarding voting on national and religious issues. The "main subgroup" (mostly all appointees, some elected from the zemstvos, the nobility, landowners) included the remaining members of the "Center Group". In 1909-12. from the main subgroup, the “Commercial and Industrial Subgroup” stood out, uniting industrialists and financiers who voted based on their own and corporate interests. In 1915-17. - joined and headed the Progressive Bloc in the State Council, thereby becoming the actual opposition. It was their position that determined the voting in that period. Heads of the group: A. S. Ermolaev (1906-1907), Prince P. N. Trubetskoy (1907-1911), A. A. Saburov (1912-1913), V. V. Meller-Zakomelsky (1913-1917)

Group of the Left- was formed in April-May 1906 only from elected deputies-supporters of the Cadet Party, but subsequently reflected the mood of a near-progressive persuasion (while retaining the backbone of the leadership of the Cadets). Consisted only of elected deputies. Membership: 1906 - 13 members; 1907 - 13 members; 1908 - 16 members, 1910 - 11 members; 1911 - 6 members; in February 1917 −19 members. In 1915 the group joined the Progressive Bloc. Heads of the group: D. I. Bagalei (1906), D. D. Grimm (1907-1917).

1. Count Nikolai Petrovich Rumyantsev (1810-1812)
2. Prince Nikolai Ivanovich Saltykov (1812-1816)
3. His Serene Highness Prince Pyotr Vasilyevich Lopukhin (1816-1827)
4. Prince Viktor Pavlovich Kochubey (1827-1834)
5. Count Nikolai Nikolaevich Novosiltsev (1834-1838)
6. Prince Illarion Vasilyevich Vasilchikov (1838-1847)
7. Count Vasily Vasilyevich Levashov (1847-1848)
8. His Serene Highness Prince Alexander Ivanovich Chernyshev (1848-1856)
9. Prince Alexei Fedorovich Orlov (1856-1861)
10. Count Dmitry Nikolaevich Bludov (1862-1864)
11. Prince Pavel Pavlovich Gagarin (1864-1865)
12. Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolayevich (1865-1881)
13. Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich (1881-1905)
14. Count Dmitry Martynovich Solsky (1905-1906)

In 1906-1917

1. Eduard Vasilievich Frish (1906-1907)
2. Mikhail Grigorievich Akimov (1907-1914)
3. Sergei Sergeevich Manukhin (1914)
4. Ivan Yakovlevich Golubev (1915)
5. Anatoly Nikolaevich Kulomzin (1915-1916)
6. Ivan Grigoryevich Shcheglovitov (1917)

The State Council, as the highest legislative body of the Russian Empire, was located directly in the Winter Palace for a long time. Its meetings were held in the hall on the first floor. After the explosion in the Winter Palace on February 5 (17), 1880, during an unsuccessful attempt on the life of Emperor Alexander II, Secretary of State E. A. Peretz wrote a special note on ensuring the security of the premises of the State Council or transferring it to another building.

In 1885, the State Council was moved to the Mariinsky Palace, where it remained until 1917. After the transformation of the State Council in 1906 and a significant increase in the number of its members, the premises of the Mariinsky Palace were rebuilt, in particular, the meeting room was expanded. The work was completed by October 15 (28), 1908, and until then the renewed Council met in the premises of the St. Petersburg Nobility Assembly, specially rented for this purpose.

LECTURE VIII

Alexander's decision to return to internal transformations in 1809 - M. M. Speransky. – Development of a plan for state transformation. - Starting to implement it: the establishment of the Council of State and the transformation of the ministries. - Decrees on exams for ranks and on court ranks. – The desperate state of Russian finance in 1809-1810. - Speransky's financial plan. - Karamzin's note on ancient and new Russia. - The fall of Speransky. - The state of public education. – Opening of learned societies.

Personality and state activity of Speransky

Mikhail Mikhailovich Speransky. Portrait by A. Varnek, 1824

The general discontent that engulfed all classes of Russian society after the Peace of Tilsit greatly embarrassed and worried Alexander. He understood that police measures could sometimes reveal a conspiracy, in the existence of which, however, he hardly seriously believed, although he allowed the intriguer Savary to expand on this subject in intimate conversations with him. But he understood that by these measures it was impossible to change the mood of minds in society.

Therefore, he tried to regain his general disposition in a different, more reasonable and more noble way - a return to those internal transformations that were planned, but were not carried out in the first years of his reign. This time, Alexander's main collaborator in the development of these transformations was a new statesman - Mikhail Mikhailovich Speransky.

In terms of intelligence and talent, Speransky is undoubtedly the most remarkable of the statesmen who worked with Alexander, and, perhaps, the most remarkable state mind in all of recent Russian history. The son of a village priest, a pupil of the theological seminary, Speransky himself, without any patronage, managed not only to get out into the people, but also to get acquainted without outside help with the best political, economic and legal writings in French, which he mastered perfectly. In four years, from the house secretary of Prince Kurakin, he managed, solely by virtue of his talents, to advance to the state secretaries of the emperor, and already at the very beginning of Alexander's reign, because of the desire to have him in his department, there were even quarrels between the most powerful ministers of that time - between Troshchinsky and Kochubey. And Alexander himself knew and appreciated Speransky already at that time.

I have already spoken about the note that Speransky, on behalf of Alexander, given to him through Kochubey, prepared back in 1803. Actually, the same principles that he put into this note were developed in his famous plan for state transformation, although, as you You will see that Speransky's mood, perhaps, depending on his trip abroad (to Erfurt in 1808) and in connection with Alexander's mood, changed greatly in an optimistic direction regarding the country's readiness for a constitutional order.

Alexander, having stopped direct studies on the question of the constitutional system as early as 1802, did not, however, cease to occupy others with it. Such an order was received, for example, in 1804 by Baron Rosenkampf, who at that time served in the commission of laws and did not know Russian at that time. His project, which he called the “cadre of the constitution,” was then transferred to Novosiltsev and Czartorysky, but since hostilities began in 1805, this plan lay dormant for a long time and only in 1808, among other materials, was received by Speransky, when he, on his return from Erfurt, received from Alexander an order to deal with the general plan for state reforms. Korf tells, and Schilder repeats, an anecdote that allegedly in Erfurt, where Speransky met the then famous Napoleon, Talleyrand, and others, the following conversation took place between him and Alexander: Alexander asked Speransky about the impression made on him by Europe, and Speransky allegedly answered: "We have better people, but here the institutions are better." Alexander said that this was also his idea, and added: "Upon returning to Russia, we will talk about this again." In direct connection with this conversation, some researchers put a new attack on reforms in 1809.

I think that this conversation could hardly have taken place. In Prussia at that time there was no constitution, and its whole system was in decay, and the Germans were faced with the task of creating it anew; in France at that time there was only the ghost of a constitution, and all its "constitutional" institutions were clearly charlatan in nature. Alexander and Speransky knew this very well, and therefore it is difficult to assume that the phrase “We have better people, but institutions here” could belong to Speransky, especially since he had no reason to give a flattering review of Russian figures. It would be more correct to assume that Alexander, who was embarrassed by the growing opposition in society, in the form of calming society, decided to resume his previous concerns about improving the internal administration of Russia, hoping in this way to restore the former sympathy for himself in society. It is important to note the change in the views of Speransky himself, which took place since 1803: then he recognized the radical reform as unrealizable, and now the implementation of broad reform plans seemed to him completely possible. This change in Speransky's views could have been influenced by the conversations he had in Erfurt with Talleyrand and others, and in particular by the change in Alexander's mood. Subsequently, in his acquittal letter from Perm, Speransky emphasized that the main idea of ​​the transformation plan was prescribed to him by Alexander himself.

The liberalism of the Speransky program

In his “plan”, in the chapter “On the Reason of the State Code”, Speransky analyzes in detail the question of the timeliness of introducing a correct state system in Russia. Noting at the same time that while in the West constitutions were arranged "in fragments" and after cruel coup d'etat, the Russian constitution will owe its existence to the beneficent thought of the supreme power, on which it depends, therefore, to choose the time of its introduction and give it the most correct forms. , he turns to an assessment of the "opportuneness" of the moment and embarks on rather extensive historical and political research, and reduces all the political systems that existed in the world to three main ones: the republic, the feudal monarchy and despotism. The history of the Western European states since the time of the Crusades is, according to Speransky, the history of the struggle, as a result of which the feudal form is giving way more and more to the republican one. As for Russia, Speransky believes that Russia has already emerged from purely feudal forms, since the fragmented power is already united in the hands of one person, and there were already attempts to introduce a constitution - with the accession to the throne of Anna Ioannovna and under Catherine II. Recognizing these attempts as "ill-timed", Speransky, contrary to the view expressed in 1803, believes that a radical state reform is feasible at the present time. The presence of serfdom no longer bothers him, since he finds that a constitutional device can exist even in the absence of equality in the country. Therefore, he builds his plans on the same system of class rights, and even recognizes the right to own inhabited estates as a distinctive feature of the nobility, so that serfdom in his plan for the near future is, as it were, one of the essential elements of the transformed system. He gives political rights only to those citizens who have property; thus, he puts the qualification system at the basis of the planned state structure.

Speransky considers the important measures that prepared Russia for a constitution to be the permission for people of all free estates to buy land, the establishment of the estate of free cultivators, the publication of the Livonian Regulations on Peasants and the establishment of ministries with responsibility the cost of this responsibility). More important is Speransky's recognition of the importance of public sentiment. As symptoms of the fact that the moment for reform is ripe, he recognizes the fall in society of respect for ranks, orders and, in general, for external signs of power, the decline in the moral prestige of power, the growth of the spirit of criticism of government actions. He points to the impossibility under such conditions of partial corrections of the existing system, especially in the field of financial management, and concludes that the time has come to change the old order of things. These considerations of Speransky, undoubtedly approved by Alexander himself, are precious to us: they testify to the extent to which the government was aware that elements had developed that aspired to participate in state administration.

Turning to the consideration of a way out of this situation, Speransky points out two ways out: one is an insincere, fictitious way out, the other is a sincere, radical one.

The first way out is to clothe autocratic rights in the external form of legality, leaving, in essence, them in their former strength; the second way out lies in such a device, “not only to cover autocracy with external forms, but to limit it with the internal and essential force of institutions and establish sovereign power on the law not by words, but by deed itself.” Speransky emphatically points out that at the very beginning of the reforms one must definitely choose one or the other way out. Institutions can serve as fictitious reforms, which, while presenting the appearance of a free legislative power, would in fact be under the influence and in complete dependence on autocratic power. At the same time, the executive power must be established in such a way that it expression the law was responsible, but also mind his would be completely independent. And the authorities of the court should be given (with such a device) all the advantages visible freedom, but to tie her up in reality with such institutions that she being its always been dependent on autocratic power. As an example of such a fictitious constitutional structure, Speransky points to the system of Napoleonic France.

If, on the contrary, it is proposed to accept the second alternative, then the picture of the state system will have to turn out to be completely different: firstly, the legislative institutions must then be so arranged that, although they could not carry out their assumptions without the approval of the sovereign power, but so that at the same time, their judgments were free and would express the real opinion of the people; secondly, the judicial department must be formed in such a way that in its existence it depends on free choice, and only supervision over the execution of the judicial form belongs to the government; thirdly, the executive power must be made accountable to the legislative power.

“Comparing these two systems with each other,” explains Speransky, “there is no doubt that the first of them has only the appearance of a law, and the other has its very essence; the first - under the pretext of the unity of sovereign power - introduces perfect autocracy, and the other - seeks to actually limit it and moderate it ... "

The question was thus put so directly and clearly that Alexander was barred from all sorts of dreamy uncertainties and had to seriously choose one of the two, the first system having been discredited in advance.

Speransky reform project

Alexander chose the second exit. Speransky developed a corresponding plan for the state structure, and Alexander, after a two-month almost daily discussion of this plan with Speransky, in the autumn of 1809 ordered that it be put into action.

This plan was as follows: according to the existing administrative division of the country, the main territorial units were recognized provinces, divided into counties, in turn divided into volosts. In each volost, volost dumas were designed, which would include elected from state peasants (from 500 one) and all personal land owners. The composition of these dooms would be updated every three years. The main subjects of the department of the volost duma were to be: 1) in the selection of members of the volost board, which, according to the plan, would be in charge of the local zemstvo economy, 2) in control of volost incomes and expenditures, 3) in the selection of deputies to the district (district) duma, 4) in representations to a district thought about volost needs. The district duma was to consist of deputies elected by the volost councils; its competence was corresponding to the competence of volost councils, but concerned the affairs of the county; she elected deputies to the provincial duma, the district council and the district court.

The provincial duma was supposed to have similar competence, and then the State Duma, formed from deputies of all provincial dumas, was to meet annually in St. Petersburg. However, the meetings of this State Duma, according to Speransky's project, could be postponed by the supreme power for a year; its dissolution could follow only after the selection of the composition of the deputies of the next Duma. The State Chancellor, that is, an appointed person, was to preside over the State Duma; work was to be carried out on commissions. The right of legislative initiative would belong only to the supreme power, with the exception of ideas about state needs, about the responsibility of officials and about orders that violate fundamental state laws. The Senate was to become the highest court and consist of persons elected for life by the provincial dumas, who would be approved by the supreme power.

In addition to the State Duma, the plan was to establish a State Council, consisting of the highest state dignitaries for the election of the monarch himself; but the State Council, according to Speransky's plan, was not to be a second legislative chamber, as it is now, but an advisory institution under the monarch, which would consider all new proposals of ministers and proposed financial measures before they were submitted to the State Duma.

Such was the general outline of Speransky's plan, approved by Alexander in principle. Undoubtedly, there were many imperfections in this plan, some of which are already visible from the very presentation of it, while others consisted in an insufficiently precise definition of the law and an administrative order, in an insufficiently clear establishment of the order of responsibility of ministries, etc. But we will not dwell here on these imperfections, because this plan was not carried out. Recognizing its satisfaction and usefulness, Alexander decided, however, to introduce it in parts, especially since there was no ready-made bill item by article. For the first time, it was decided to publish a new institution of ministries and the Council of State as an advisory institution under the monarch.

At the same time, the State Council, of course, did not receive - until the implementation of the entire plan - that preparatory character, which was given to it in Speransky's plan; it was divided into four departments - the department of civil and religious affairs, the department of laws, the department of military and the department of state economy. Each department had a position of secretary of state. Speransky was appointed secretary of state, and in his hands, in addition to the affairs that were part of the general meeting of the Council, all the threads of state reforms and all the then legislative activity were connected.

The project for the establishment of the State Council, before its publication, was shown to some influential dignitaries - Zavadovsky, Lopukhin, Kochubey and others, without, however, initiating them into the secret of the whole conceived transformation. All these dignitaries reacted quite favorably to him, having no idea of ​​the significance that the State Council was supposed to have according to Speransky's plan.

Decrees of Speransky on court ranks and promotion to ranks

Meanwhile, despite all the efforts of Speransky to occupy a secluded position outside of any parties, an extremely hostile attitude was already formed against him in bureaucratic, noble and court circles. It was especially aggravated due to two decrees - April 3 and August 6, 1809, which were attributed to the direct influence of Speransky. The first decree prescribed that all persons who bore court titles should choose some service for themselves. After this law, all court ranks, which until then were considered positions, became only honorary distinctions and no longer reported any official rights. The second decree, in the form of improving the staff, required that the ranks of collegiate assessor and state adviser be given only after passing a certain exam or upon presentation of a university diploma.

Both of these decrees aroused indignation in the court and bureaucratic milieu against Speransky; all sorts of undermining and intrigues began, with the help of which, in the end, Speransky's enemies managed to topple this remarkable statesman, after he incurred general displeasure in the then noble society, through no fault of his own, by a failed attempt to streamline state finances, brought almost to complete collapse a constant increase in spending and issuance of paper money due to the results of the continental system.

Speransky's measures in the field of finance

I have already said that after the Peace of Tilsit in 1808, the treasury's revenues amounted to 111 million rubles. banknotes, which amounted to about 50 million rubles for silver, while expenses reached 248 million rubles. banknotes. The deficit was covered by a new issue of banknotes, and their exchange rate this year was below 50 kopecks. per ruble, and in the summer months it fell even below 40 kopecks. The following year, 1809, it did not exceed 40 kopecks on average per year, and by the end of the year it had dropped to 35 kopecks. Revenues this year amounted to 195 million rubles. banknotes (less than 80 million rubles for silver), and expenses - 278 million rubles. banknotes (about 114 million rubles in silver). The deficit was again covered by a new issue of banknotes, but they were no longer in circulation: the market refused to accept such a large number of banknotes. By the end of 1810, their rate dropped below 20 kopecks. for a ruble of silver. The bankruptcy of the country was approaching. In this difficult situation, as early as 1809, Alexander turned to the same Speransky on this difficult and formidable issue.

I have just mentioned the significance of the narrowing of the market and the contraction of trade for the depreciation of paper money. This narrowing was due, as I have already said, to the continental system, which stopped the export of flax and hemp to England, which then accounted for about half of our total export of goods. At the same time, the customs tariff that existed at that time was very unfavorable for the development of our large-scale industry, since, due to the insignificance of the customs duty on foreign manufactured goods, Russian factories could not compete with foreign ones. In addition, due to the excess of imports over exports, the balance turned out to be very unfavorable for Russia: we had to pay for imported items in specie, meanwhile, we received very little specie from abroad, thanks to the relative insignificance of our exports. Thus, the course of these commercial transactions resulted in a large leakage of specie abroad, as a result of which only banknotes remained in the country, which more and more depreciated. In addition, the Russian court paid large subsidies to the Prussian court. Finally, during these same years we fought four whole wars: we had, as I have already said, a long-term war with Persia (from 1804 to 1813); the war with Turkey, which actually died down, then resumed, in general, lasted for 6 whole years (from 1806 to 1812); then there was a war with Sweden, which ended with the conquest of Finland (1808-1809); finally, being in alliance with Napoleon, we had to take part in 1809 in the war with Austria. Although we did this against our will and the war was, in fact, bloodless: our troops evaded, on orders from above, from meeting with the Austrians, but this war also required quite a lot of money.

These reasons - the unprofitability of the trade balance and the need to maintain armies abroad in hard currency - determined the plight of the treasury, since the population paid taxes in banknotes, and foreign expenses were paid in metal money.

Nominally, our budget has been constantly increasing during these years, but in fact it has been steadily falling. For example, the cost of maintaining the court in 1803 amounted to 8600 thousand rubles, or, in terms of silver, 7800 thousand rubles; in 1810, the expenses for the yard were equal to 14,500 thousand rubles. on banknotes, but this amounted to only 4200 thousand rubles. for silver; thus, the actual amount of funds that the court received at its disposal decreased by 45% over the years. Here are the data on the budget of the Ministry of Public Education (expressed in million rubles):

1804 - 2.8 million rubles. banknotes - 2.3 million rubles. silver

1809 - 3.6 million rubles. banknotes - 1.114 million rubles. silver

1810 - 2.5 million rubles. banknotes - 0.727 million rubles. silver

Thus, the budget of the Ministry of Public Education for six years, in fact, has decreased by almost four times. In this state of affairs it was impossible, of course, to even think of opening new schools - and the old ones barely continued to exist, and then only because the salaries of teachers were paid in banknotes, like all officials, but judge what their position was when everything items have risen in price four times, and some (colonial goods) even much more.

Thus, the state economy was rapidly approaching collapse, and general anxiety and discontent grew in the country. Under such conditions, Speransky, who had already completed his plan for a general state transformation, received an order from the sovereign to take up this matter.

Speransky himself had long ago paid attention to the state of finances and was very attentive to the plan of financial reforms presented to him by Professor Balugiansky, who served under his command in the commission of laws. He began very diligently to study a new business for him with the help of young scientists Balugiansky and Yakob (Kharkov professor), who had been invited from abroad not long before. Soon they drew up a detailed note on the state of the state economy and the necessary improvements, which he first subjected to discussion of a private meeting of all the then statesmen who were somewhat knowledgeable in finance. These were Count Severin Osipovich Pototsky, Admiral Mordvinov, Kochubey, State Comptroller Kampfenghausen, and Speransky's closest associate, Balugiansky.

By January 1, 1810, the opening of the State Council, Speransky had already submitted to Alexander a complete plan for financial transformation. The essence of the plan was to find measures to bring state revenues in line with spending. The plan began with an indication that the state did not have the funds to meet basic needs, because in fact the revenues of the treasury decreased due to the depreciation of paper money, on which the high cost of goods on the market also depended. Recognizing that the first reason for the fall in the exchange rate lies in the exorbitant issues of banknotes, Speransky proposed, first of all, to stop further issues of banknotes, and recognize those issued earlier as public debt and take measures to gradually pay off this debt by buying banknotes for their destruction. To obtain the funds necessary for this, Speransky suggested taking the following measures: 1) to reduce the deficit, cut current expenditures, even the most useful ones, for example, for the needs of public education, for the construction of new communications, etc.; 2) he proposed to introduce a new tax, which would apply specifically to the repayment of the state debt, and to form for this purpose a special commission for the repayment of state debts with separate funds independent of the state treasury; 3) make an internal loan secured by state property. Speransky even suggested putting some of the state property on sale. It was assumed that this loan, as urgent and secured by certain property, could not play the role of an assigned loan. But since all these measures would still not be enough, especially since the wars with Turkey and Persia continued, Speransky suggested establishing another special tax of 50 kopecks. from the soul to landlord and specific estates for only one year. In general, deficits, according to Speransky's plan, were to be covered, if possible, by percentage increases to existing taxes, so that the population could immediately cover these deficits without forcing future generations to pay for them. To improve credit conditions and to streamline the economy, Speransky proposed introducing orderly reporting and publicity into the conduct of the state economy. This reform, however, was destined to be seriously implemented only in the 60s. Realizing that the depreciation of the paper ruble is supported by a particularly unfavorable balance of trade, Speransky, energetically supported in this matter by Mordvinov, who was chairman of the state economy department, proposed to revise the customs tariff and argued that the conditions adopted in Tilsit regarding the continental system should be interpreted in in a restrictive sense, explaining that, after all, Napoleon offered these conditions for the ruin of England, and not Russia; meanwhile, they are ruining not England, but Russia. In view of this, in 1810, at the suggestion of Speransky and Mordvinov, it was established that all Russian harbors were open to all ships flying a neutral flag, no matter whose goods they brought. On the other hand, the new customs tariff of 1810 the import of various luxury items was prohibited, and high customs duties were imposed on other items of foreign factory industry; this tariff was supposed to reduce the import of manufactured goods, while the opening of the harbors immediately led to the resumption of the export of Russian raw materials and some products (linen and hemp fabrics) to England, which was not slow to send its ships for these goods under Tenerife flag. Both of these circumstances had a very favorable effect on the establishment of a favorable trade balance for Russia. And if Speransky's plan had been fully implemented, the exchange rate of the paper ruble would undoubtedly have risen. Unfortunately, in 1810 it was still issued for 43 million rubles. new banknotes. Although this issue took place on the basis of an old command, however, it radically undermined all measures and especially the confidence of the public, and the rate of paper money continued to fall; in 1811 it did not rise above 23 kopecks for a whole year, but in some months it fell below 20 kopecks. But the customs tariff of 1809 played a huge role in the economic life of the country: one can say that it saved Russia from final ruin. Nevertheless, the measures that were taken by the State Council not only did not earn Speransky the gratitude of his contemporaries, but even increased the hatred that broad sections of the nobility and officials had for him.

As for the public, she drew very disappointing conclusions from Speransky's financial plans. It became clear to her: 1) that our finances were in a bad position, 2) that the treasury was involved in significant internal debts (for many this was news, since almost no one understood before that the issuance of banknotes is a kind of internal loan) and 3) that ordinary funds are not enough to cover expenses in 1810, why new taxes and loans are coming. This last conclusion was the most unpleasant, since the position of the taxpayers, especially the landowners, was already very unenviable. This dissatisfaction, in an absurd way, was directed not at those who caused financial upset, but at the one who honestly opened the eyes of society to the existing state of affairs, hiding nothing. The new taxes were especially annoying because they came at a difficult time when the country was already ruined; the nobility was especially indignant at the tax on noble estates. Irritation intensified even more when it turned out that, despite the new hardships, banknotes continued to fall. The tax, intended to pay off the debt, was used for the current needs of the state, which had become extremely intensified in view of the already expected war with Napoleon, so that society seemed to have reason to say that the State Council or the author of the plan of the State Council simply deceived it. Thus, Speransky's plan was not actually carried out.

For the non-fulfillment of Speransky's plan, which fell into the hands of the bad Minister of Finance Guryev, they blamed, as I have already said, Speransky himself; even voices were heard asserting that he had deliberately invented his financial plan in order to irritate the opposition, that he was in criminal relations with Napoleon. And Alexander could not withstand the onslaught of Speransky's enemies. He considered it necessary then to strengthen the heightened patriotic mood, no matter how this mood was expressed, since he hoped to repel Napoleon only if the war had a popular character; he did not see the opportunity to enter into explanations and decided to sacrifice his best collaborator to the fury of the privileged crowd. In March 1812, Speransky was dismissed and even exiled to Nizhny Novgorod, and then, according to a new denunciation, to Perm, although Alexander could not doubt that there was and could not be any serious fault for Speransky. All his actual guilt consisted in the fact that he received through one official copies of all the most important secret papers from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which he could, of course, in his position, receive and ask for official permission.

"Note on Ancient and New Russia" by Karamzin

The hatred of society for Speransky found a vivid and strong expression in the well-known note "On Ancient and New Russia" by Karamzin, who, it would seem, should not have mixed with the crowd. The essence of this note, presented to Alexander through Grand Duchess Ekaterina Pavlovna, was to criticize Alexander's domestic policy and to prove the need to preserve the autocracy in Russia forever. A brief review of Russian history was written vividly, figuratively, in places picturesquely, but not always impartially. After a vivid characterization of Catherine and Paul, and the first Karamzin exalted to the skies, and for the gloomy characterization of the extravagant deeds of the second, as you know, he spared no colors - he moves on to his contemporary era, calls on all his civic courage to help and writes this indictment against the innovations of Alexander's reign. “Russia is filled with disaffected,” he writes, “they complain in the wards and huts; have neither confidence nor zeal for government; severely condemn its aims and measures. An amazing state phenomenon! It usually happens that the successor of a cruel monarch easily wins universal approval, softening the rules of power; soothed by the meekness of Alexander, innocently fearing neither the secret office nor Siberia, and freely enjoying all the pleasures allowed in civil societies, how can we explain this woeful disposition of minds? - The unfortunate circumstances of Europe and important, as I think, the mistakes of the government; for, unfortunately, it is possible with a good intention to err in the means of good ... "

Portrait of N. M. Karamzin. Artist A. Venetsianov

The main mistake of the inexperienced legislators of Alexander's reign was, according to Karamzin, that instead of improving Catherine's institutions, they undertook organic reforms. Here Karamzin spares neither the Council of State, nor the new establishment of ministries, nor even the government's extensive undertakings to spread public education, which he himself had once praised in Vestnik Evropy. He argues that instead of all the reforms, it would be enough to find 50 good governors and provide the country with good spiritual shepherds. About the responsibility of ministers, Karamzin says: “Who elects them? - Sovereign. - Let him reward the worthy with his grace, and otherwise remove the unworthy without noise, quietly and modestly. A bad minister is a sovereign’s mistake: he must correct such mistakes, but secretly, so that the people have a power of attorney for the personal elections of the tsar ... "

Karamzin argues in exactly the same way about the inappropriate, in his opinion, admissions of the government regarding the troubles in financial management. Regarding the excessive issuance of banknotes in previous years, he notes: “When an inevitable evil has been done, then it is necessary to reflect and take measures for silence, not to groan, not to sound the alarm, which is why the evil increases. Let the ministers be sincere in the face of one monarch, and not before the people, God forbid, if they follow a different rule: to deceive the sovereign and tell all the truth to the people ... ”(!) Karamzin agrees that it is possible to redeem and cancel banknotes, but the announcement He considers banknotes to be the height of frivolity. Remarkable for its naivete is Karamzin's reasoning; as if he did not understand that with the existence of such a secret in matters of administration, it is easiest for ministers to deceive the sovereign. No less remarkable is his reasoning about what can be a guarantee against the tyranny of autocratic power under an unbridled and insane monarch: according to Karamzin, the sovereign should be restrained by fear - “the fear of arousing universal hatred in the event of an opposing system of kingship,” and Karamzin does not notice that from here only one step before approving the natural consequences of such hatred - a coup d'état.

A curious feature of Karamzin's note is his estate, noble point of view. This, of course, is not the point of view of the constitutionalist nobles, not the point of view that was held at that time by the then liberals from the nobleman Mordvinov to the commoner Speransky; this was the point of view adopted and carried out by Catherine; the nobility should be the first estate in the state, all its privileges in relation to other estates, including in relation to serfdom over peasants, should be recognized as inviolable, but in relation to the autocratic monarchical power, the nobility should be a faithful and obedient servant.

Reasons for Speransky's resignation

That dissatisfaction, to which Karamzin testifies and whose existence Speransky recognized, really existed and developed in almost all strata of Russian society. Speransky, attributing it to the maturity of society, saw in it a sign of the existence of a need to transform the political system; Karamzin, on the contrary, explained this dissatisfaction with unsuccessful innovations, which were the first steps towards changing the political system. These two so different explanations were equally wrong: the discontent had a more real basis - its roots lay in the unsuccessful foreign policy of the government, which caused unnecessary - at least in the opinion of contemporaries - wars (1805-1807), the continental system and the resulting ruin of the country ; finally, in the humiliation of Tilsit, which hurt national pride and evoked the sharpest patriotic opposition to the friendship of the Russian tsar with Napoleon. However, Karamzin incidentally points out all these circumstances, without giving them, however, the primary importance that they undoubtedly had.

It is remarkable that Speransky's enemies tried - and, I must say, quite successfully - to spread the opinion that Speransky wanted to introduce Napoleonic laws in Russia, that he was an admirer of Napoleon and almost his slanderer. The success of these insinuations is explained by the prevailing patriotic protest mood, which we have already characterized.

Russian education before the Patriotic War of 1812

Before moving on to the next period, I must say a few words about the situation at that moment in the matter of popular education.

The educational activity of the Ministry of Public Education, which had developed quite widely in the previous period, especially in 1803-1804, has now subsided due to a lack of funds. However, private societies and literature continued to grow and develop. A number of new literary and philanthropic societies opened up. In addition to the Shishkov Society (“Russian Conversation”), mention should be made of the “Society of Lovers of Russian Literature”, founded by D. Yazykov at Moscow University; The “Society of Mathematical Lovers”, founded by Mikhail Muravyov, then a 15-year-old student, then turned, under the leadership of his father N. N. Muravyov, into a free educational institution for “column leaders”, which served as the cradle of the Russian General Staff and was also of great importance in history of secret societies in the 20s, as many of their members were brought up here. At Moscow University, prof. Chebotarev "Society of Russian History and Antiquities". Then, back in 1804, also at Moscow University, the "Society of Naturalists" was founded, which still enjoys well-deserved fame; it was founded by A.K. Razumovsky and in 1810–1811. showed vigorous activity.

Even in the provinces, the same societies were founded: for example, in Kazan in 1806, the “Society of Lovers of Russian Literature” was opened, in which by 1811 there were 32 members.

Bogdanovich(III, p. 69), following incorrect information Shevyreva, cited in his "History of Moscow University", claims that this society did not take place. But this statement contradicts more accurate information given in the biography of M. N. Muravyov, compiled Kropotov according to archival data and according to the stories of brother Mikhail Muravyov, Sergey Nikolaevich. Cm. Kropotov, pp. 52 et seq.