On September 13, 1942, German troops launched the first assault on Stalingrad. From a military point of view, it was not necessary to storm the ruins of the city. The German army has already solved the main tasks: the northeastern flank of the armies advancing on the Caucasus was secured; the Germans went to the Volga and practically cut this most important waterway; Stalingrad has ceased to be the most important communications hub - water and iron; the industry of Stalingrad was partly evacuated, partly destroyed, the rest could be finished off by systematic artillery strikes and air bombardments. The capture of the ruins of the city had no serious military-strategic and economic significance.

It was possible to confine ourselves to a blockade, following the example of Leningrad. However, for Adolf Hitler (and then for the whole world), the capture of the city had a symbolic, political meaning. Therefore, they began to storm the city, regardless of the losses, and as a result got stuck, lost time and initiative, not counting the huge amount of forces and means that were put in urban battles, and to hold the territory.

The second stage of the defensive operation of the Soviet troops to hold Stalingrad began on September 13 and lasted until November 18, 1942, on the eve of the transition of the Soviet troops to a decisive counteroffensive. At this stage of the operation, the enemy stormed the city four times. The battles within the city were distinguished by exceptional perseverance, steadfastness and mass heroism of the defenders of Stalingrad.

Even the German generals were amazed at the stamina and perseverance of the Soviet troops. A participant in the Battle of Stalingrad, German General G. Derr later wrote: “For every house, workshop, water tower, embankment, wall, basement, and, finally, for every pile of garbage, a fierce struggle was waged, which had no equal even during the First World War war with its gigantic expenditure of ammunition. The distance between our troops and the enemy was extremely small. Despite the massive actions of aviation and artillery, it was impossible to leave the melee area. The Russians were superior to the Germans in terms of terrain and camouflage and were more experienced in barricade battles behind individual houses: they took up a solid defense.

Broken Soviet 45 mm anti-tank gun on Lenin Street in Stalingrad

Side plans. Troop disposition

The situation in the Stalingrad region was critical. In early September 1942, the 62nd Army withdrew to the western and northern outskirts of the city, and the 64th Army to the south. The troops of these armies suffered heavy losses in manpower and equipment. However, there was no choice, so the command assigned the direct defense of Stalingrad to the 62nd and 64th armies. They were supposed to take the brunt of the enemy. The remaining troops of the Stalingrad direction, by their actions, pulled off part of the enemy forces from the directions of his main attacks. By September 13, the troops of the Stalingrad Front held the line of defense at the Pavlovsk, Panshino, Samofalovka, Yerzovka line, and the troops of the South-Eastern Front - at the line of Stalingrad - Elista. These fronts included a significant number of formations, but many of them were understaffed. Ground forces were supported by the 16th and 8th air armies, as well as the Volga military flotilla.

The German command continued to build up forces in the Stalingrad direction. Army Group B had 42 divisions in July, 69 divisions by the end of August, and 81 divisions by the end of September. This reinforcement was carried out primarily through the transfer of troops from Army Group A, from its reserve and from the Caucasian direction, which ultimately had a negative impact on the offensive operation of the Wehrmacht in the Caucasus (the Germans lost the battle for the Caucasus). The German command transferred here from Romania the 9th and 11th infantry divisions, from Italy - an infantry brigade, from the army group "A" - the 5th and 2nd Romanian army corps. The troops of their allies - Romanians and Italians - were placed by the Germans on passive sectors of the front. They were weaker - in terms of combat training, spirit and material and technical part - than the German divisions. As a result, by September 13, the 8th Italian, 6th and 4th German tank armies were operating against the Stalingrad and South-Eastern fronts, and a total of 47 divisions (including 5 tank and 4 motorized).

With the troops of the 6th field and 4th tank armies reaching the outskirts of Stalingrad, the German command decided to start an assault on the city. On September 12, the commander of Army Group "B" Weichs and the commander of the 6th Army arrived at Hitler's headquarters near Vinnitsa. At the meeting, the Fuhrer demanded the speedy capture of Stalingrad: “The Russians are on the verge of exhaustion of their forces. The resistance at Stalingrad should be assessed only as a local matter. They are no longer capable of retaliatory actions of a strategic nature, which could be dangerous for us. In addition, the northern flank on the Don will receive significant reinforcements from the Allies. Under these circumstances, I do not see a serious danger to the northern flank. As for the rest, we must take care to take the city into our own hands as soon as possible, and not allow it to turn into an all-devouring focus for a long time. As a result, it happened - Stalingrad turned into "an all-devouring focus for a long time."

The commander of the 6th Army, Paulus, asked for an additional three divisions and promised to take Stalingrad in 10 days. The German command believed that the capture of the city would take a little time. By the end of September 12, German troops were standing almost at the walls of the Stalingrad Tractor Plant and 3-4 km from the city center. The forces of the 6th Army of Paulus in this zone numbered about 100 thousand soldiers and officers, about 2000 guns and mortars, 500 tanks and assault guns. The Germans had complete air supremacy. It is worth noting that the German troops were already exhausted by the battles, 60 people remained in the companies, and the tank divisions had 60-80 serviceable tanks each. Paulus decided to start the assault on Stalingrad by capturing its northern and central regions. To do this, it was planned to inflict 2 powerful blows at the same time and break through to the Volga. For this purpose, two groups were concentrated: one - as part of the 295th, 71st, 94th infantry and 24th tank divisions - in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe village of Aleksandrovka, the other - from the 14th tank, 29th motorized and 20th th Romanian infantry division - in the Upper Elshanka area. The task seemed simple: to fight 5-10 km and throw the Russians into the river.

Colonel General F. Paulus talking with a subordinate near Stalingrad

The city was defended by the 62nd and 64th armies. The front line in front of the 62nd and 64th armies was continuous and ran for up to 65 km along the right bank of the Volga from the area of ​​​​the villages of Rynok, Orlovka in the north and further along the western outskirts of the city to its southern tip in the Kirovsky district to Maliye Chapurniki. The 64th Army was defending at the Kuporosnoe-Ivanovka line, about 25 km long. The army troops had an operational formation in one echelon. Its main forces were concentrated on the right flank, which covered the most dangerous direction.

The defense front of the 62nd Army was about 40 km long and ran from the right bank of the Volga near the village of Rynok, through Orlovka, east of Gorodishche and Razgulyaevka, Sadovaya, Kuporosnaya. The maximum distance from the banks of the Volga near Orlovka was 10 km. The entire burden of the task of protecting the central part of Stalingrad and the factory districts fell on the army. On September 5, General Lopatin was dismissed from his post, proposing to withdraw troops beyond the Volga. General V.I. Chuikov was appointed the new commander of the 62nd Army. There were 12 rifle divisions in the army (33rd and 35th guards, 87th, 98th, 112th, 131st, 196th, 229th, 244th, 315th, 399th I and the 10th rifle division of the NKVD), 7 rifle (10th, 38th, 42nd, 115th, 124th, 129th, 145th) and 5 tank brigades, 20th fighter brigade, 12 artillery and mortar regiments. However, the divisions were bled white, numbering 250-100 fighters. That is, some divisions had fewer soldiers than a full-blooded battalion. In addition, some divisions were armed with only a few guns. Tank brigades had 6-10 tanks each. The total number of the 35th Guards, together with attached units, was 664 people, the 23rd Tank Corps had 40-50 tanks, of which a third were used as fixed firing points. The 10th division of the NKVD (7500 people) and 3 separate rifle brigades were more or less completed. In total, the 62nd Army had about 54,000 men, 900 guns and mortars, and 110 tanks by mid-September. There was no elbow connection with the neighbors, the flanks of the army rested on the Volga. There were no reserves.

Defensive battles in Stalingrad

Storm

On September 13, German troops launched an assault on Stalingrad. They delivered the main blow in the direction of Mamaev Kurgan and the railway station. On the first day, they only succeeded in pushing the Soviet units a little. In the evening, the front commander ordered Chuikov to drive the enemy out of the occupied sectors and restore the situation. On September 14, in the early morning, units of the 62nd Army launched a counterattack, which was unsuccessful. By 12 o'clock the Germans had concentrated 5 divisions and more than 1,000 guns on a narrow sector of the front and delivered a powerful blow. Hundreds of aircraft supported them from the air. Fights were going on in the streets of the city. This day was one of the most difficult for the defenders of Stalingrad.

Chuikov described this moment as follows: “Despite the huge losses, the invaders climbed ahead. Columns of infantry in cars and tanks broke into the city. Apparently, the Nazis believed that his fate was sealed, and each of them sought to reach the Volga, the city center, as soon as possible and profit from trophies there. Our fighters ... saw drunken Nazis jumping off cars, playing harmonicas and dancing on the sidewalks. The Nazis were dying by the hundreds, but fresh waves of reserves flooded the streets more and more.

Our troops defending in Stalingrad had strong artillery support. From the left bank of the Volga, the defenders were supported by 250 guns and heavy mortars of the front-line artillery group - 6 artillery and mortar regiments, artillery of the 2nd tank corps, anti-aircraft artillery of the Stalingrad air defense corps area, 4 rocket artillery regiments. The ships of the Volga military flotilla fired on the enemy troops that broke into the city from their fifty guns.

However, despite the losses and heavy fire of the Soviet artillery, by the evening the Nazis captured the station and Mamayev Kurgan, which dominated the entire city and the left bank of the Volga. The battle was just a few hundred meters from the command post of the 62nd Army, located in the gully of the Tsaritsa River at its mouth. There was a threat of an enemy breakthrough to the central crossing. There were almost no troops in the center near Chuikov - in the area of ​​​​the station, the defense was kept by a detachment of the 62nd Army. In order to defend the crossing, Chuikov ordered that several tanks from the heavy tank brigade, his last reserve, be sent to reinforce the soldiers defending it. General N. I. Krylov (former head of the operational department of the headquarters of the Primorsky Army and head of this headquarters, became famous during the heroic defense of Odessa and Sevastopol) formed two groups of officers of the army headquarters and soldiers of the security company. The Germans, who broke through to the pier, were pushed back from the crossing to the Stalingrad-1 station. Stubborn battles also took place on the left flank, in the area of ​​the suburb of Minin, where the divisions of Goth's army rushed forward. The city was on the verge of falling.

On the same day, the enemy broke through the defenses at the junction of the 62nd and 64th armies: a 5-kilometer section of the Verkhnyaya Elshanka front - the Gornaya Polyana state farm. General I. K. Morozov, the former commander of the 422nd Rifle Division, noted in his memoirs: “Having thrown back the left flank of the 62nd Army - the Guards Division of General Glazkov - and the right flank of the 64th Army - the Guards Division of Colonel Denisenko, the enemy captured Kuporosny , a repair plant and went to the Volga, continuing to push units of the 64th Army to the south, to Staraya Otrada and Beketovka, and the left flank of the 62nd Army to Elshanka and the Zatsaritsyn part of the city. The breakthrough of the Nazis to the Volga in the area of ​​Kuporosnoye isolated the 62nd Army from the rest of the forces of the front. Our troops counterattacked, trying to restore the situation, but without much success.

The situation in the center was somewhat straightened out by the 13th Guards Rifle Division transferred from the left bank on the night of September 15 under the command of Major General A. I. Rodimtsev (10 thousand soldiers). She immediately rushed at the Germans and knocked the enemy out of the city center. By noon on September 16, the Germans were also thrown from the Mamaev Kurgan by a blow from the 39th Guards Regiment. Attack, according to the description of the commander of the 1st battalion I.I. Isakov, was almost the time of Suvorov and Kutuzov: “Let's go in a chain. Our attack from the outside looked fake. It was not preceded by either artillery preparation or air strikes. The tanks did not support us either. No one ran across, did not lie down - the fighters walked and walked ... The enemy opened machine-gun fire. You could see people falling in chains. Some rose and again moved forward ... The mound passed into our hands ... True, in a relatively short time of the attack - and it lasted an hour and a half to two - we suffered very tangible losses. There could have been much fewer killed and wounded if we had been supported by artillery.” Until the evening, the guards beat off 12 counterattacks. The Germans also suffered heavy losses.

The first days of the battle for the city were especially difficult for Chuikov's army, not only because of the superiority of the enemy forces, but also problems with the organization and supply of troops. Vasily Chuikov, the day before the enemy assault, was thrown onto the right bank to receive a defeated, bloodless army, in unfamiliar terrain, without normal supplies. It remained to fight to the last man, winning precious time, and "time is blood," as Vasily Ivanovich himself later put it. Chuikov himself, during the battles for Stalingrad, assessed the situation in the city in this way when he arrived there. “Communication worked, both telephone and radio. But wherever you look, there is a gap everywhere, a breakthrough everywhere. The divisions were so exhausted and drained of blood in previous battles that it was impossible to rely on them. I knew that something would be thrown to me in 3-4 days, and these days I sat like on coals when I had to scratch out individual fighters, knock something together like a regiment and plug small holes with them.

At the same time, the city itself was not a fortified area; it was not prepared for long-term defense. The firing points were hastily created, and the ruins of Stalingrad became the main fortifications of the soldiers. The Military Council of the 62nd Army, having heard on September 13 the report of Major General Knyazev on the state of defense of the city of Stalingrad, in its resolution noted: “Work to bring the city into a defensive state has been completed by 25%. The anti-tank defense system was not prepared. Warehouses of ammunition, medicines, food were not prepared in advance. For example, Rodimtsev's division, having lost a third of its composition, was left almost without ammunition in a day. All supplies had to be brought back through the only working ferry and only at night. Even the wounded at first had no one to worry about. The lightly wounded soldiers themselves made rafts, loaded the seriously wounded on them and independently swam across the Volga.

At the very crossing, as elsewhere in Stalingrad, there was hell. Machine tools and equipment from factories were lying on the sandbars, which were dismantled, but did not have time to take out. Half-flooded broken barges stood near the shore. From morning until dark, German aircraft circled over the Volga, and artillery hit at night. The moorings and approaches to them were under fire of German guns and 6-barreled mortars around the clock. The transport of Soviet troops, supplies and materials for the 62nd Army was complicated to an extreme degree. To minimize losses, the crossing operated at night. During the day, the wounded flocked to the shore, waiting for the crossing, there was almost no medical care. Many died.

“Combat losses, waste, lack of ammunition and food, difficulties in replenishing people and equipment - all this negatively affected the morale of the troops. Some had a desire to leave as soon as possible across the Volga, to escape from hell, ”recalls Chuikov. Therefore, they also had to perform a “black” service - NKVD detachments inspected all departing watercraft and patrolled the city, detaining suspicious persons. So, from September 13 to 15, a detachment of a special department of the army detained 1,218 servicemen. There were also cases of going over to the side of the enemy. In total, in September, 195 servicemen were shot by special departments in the 62nd Army.

The bitterness of both sides grew steadily, the battle took on an almost apocalyptic character never seen before. Not surprisingly, the survivors unanimously called it "Stalingrad hell." On the southern outskirts of Stalingrad, from September 17 to 20, there were battles for the tallest elevator building in this part of the city, which was defended by a battalion of guards of the 35th division. Not only the elevator as a whole, but also its individual floors and storage facilities changed hands several times. Colonel Dubyansky reported by telephone to General Chuikov: “The situation has changed. Previously, we were at the top of the elevator, and the Germans were at the bottom. Now we have knocked out the Germans from below, but they have penetrated upwards, and there, in the upper part of the elevator, there is a fight going on.”

There were dozens and even hundreds of such places in the city, where Russians and Germans fiercely and stubbornly fought, proving that they are the best warriors on the planet. Inside them, with varying success, for weeks there was a struggle not only for each floor and basement, but also for each room, for each ledge, for each flight of stairs. Until September 27, a fierce battle went on for the station. Thirteen times it changed hands, each assault costing both sides hundreds of lives. The Germans, who suffered more losses in the first still open, dashing attacks, began to change tactics. We switched to action by assault groups. Attacks were now carried out in small areas, within one or two blocks, by the forces of a regiment or battalion, supported by 3-5 tanks. The streets and squares also became the scene of bloody battles, which did not subside until the end of the battle.

“It was a truly titanic struggle of man against man,” General von Butlar noted, “in which the German grenadiers and sappers, who had all modern military equipment, slowly made their way through the city in street battles. Such large factories as the factory to them. Dzerzhinsky, "Red Barricades" and "Red October", had to be stormed separately and for several days. The city turned into a sea of ​​fire, smoke, dust and ruins. It absorbed the flows of German and Russian blood, gradually turning into the Verdun of the Second World War ... the Russians fought with fanatical tenacity ... The losses on both sides were enormous.

The calculation of the German 50-mm anti-tank gun PaK 38 at one of the crossroads of Stalingrad

On the night of September 18, Chuikov's command post was relocated to the banks of the Volga at the central crossing. To do this, they had to cross to the eastern bank, climb up the river and return to the western bank. In addition to the Rodimtsev division, in the first days of the assault, the 95th and 284th rifle divisions, the 137th tank and 92nd marine brigade were poured into the 62nd Army. The headquarters of the completely “used up” regiments were taken in turn behind the Volga, received replenishment and returned to their positions again.

After the army of Chuikov withstood the first terrible blow, it was significantly strengthened. According to Marshal F.I. Golikova: “In September, new reserves of the Stavka began to arrive intensively. Brigade by brigade, division by division. In total, in September, the 62nd Army received seven fresh full-blooded divisions and five separate rifle brigades ... during September, nine bloodless divisions were withdrawn from the 62nd Army for restoration ... The army's equipment with weapons increased sharply.

Red Army artillerymen at the 76-mm divisional gun F-22-USV on the street of Stalingrad

Soviet soldiers are firing from the crate of the glass roof of one of the factory workshops in Stalingrad

To be continued…

Many researchers and historians believe that the main reason for the defeat of the Red Army in June-July 1941 is that it was not put on full combat readiness and therefore could not enter the war in an organized manner and repel a sudden enemy attack. And that the beginning of the war could have turned out quite differently if the troops of the border districts had been brought to full combat readiness in advance. Our point of view is that the Red Army was not ready for the war that was imposed on the Soviet Union by Hitler and his generals. The dispute is on the issue - the defeat of the Red Army in the initial period of the war - an accident or a pattern? Now, having a more complete picture of the preparation, real combat and mobilization readiness of the Soviet troops on the eve of the war, we can finally try to answer what were the main reasons for our defeats in the border and subsequent battles in the summer of 1941.

First, about surprise. By the way, here is the time to note that surprise and suddenness in ordinary Russian are synonymous. But from a military point of view, surprise means a more complex phenomenon than simple surprise. There is no doubt that the German invasion of our territory was unexpected for our troops. But why and to what extent was it sudden? Much depends on the scale and consequences of a surprise attack. After all, here we are not talking about the actions of an individual criminal or an organized gang, but about an attack by a huge, well-trained and well-trained army of the country, whose rulers trampled on the treaties “On non-aggression” and “On border and friendship” with our country.

Strategically the war for our military and political leadership was not unexpected. They seriously prepared for it. Much has been written about this. But the measures taken by the leadership to strengthen the country's defense capability, to increase the combat readiness of the Red Army, turned out to be insufficient and, moreover, belated. On this occasion, the well-known German military historian and participant in the war, K. Tippelskirch, noted that “the Soviet Union prepared for an armed conflict, as far as it was in its power. The German command could not count on strategic surprise. The most that could be achieved was to keep the timing of the offensive secret so that tactical surprise would facilitate the invasion of enemy territory. The enemy managed to achieve complete tactical surprise, thus disrupting the implementation of our plans to cover the border. Having seized the initiative, the Germans on the very first day achieved maximum results with minimal effort, money and time. Halder wrote in his diary on the first day of the war:

“Tactical surprise led to the fact that the resistance of the enemy in the border zone turned out to be weak and disorganized ‹…›“. And further: “‹…› the Russian command, due to its sluggishness, will not be able to organize operational opposition to the German offensive in the near future at all. The Russians are forced to accept the battle in the grouping in which they were at the beginning of our offensive. But that's not all.

The Germans, having started the invasion immediately with large forces, achieved operational surprise. Using the overwhelming superiority in forces and means created by him in the chosen directions of strikes and the captured air supremacy, the enemy ensured a high rate of attack and in the first two days advanced 100-150 km in the main - western strategic direction, creating conditions for encircling and defeating the main forces of the Western Front. His offensive proceeded so rapidly that in all three main strategic directions of hostilities in the first week he managed to advance 200 km or more into the interior of the country.

Here is G.K. Zhukov admitted that the main surprise for our command was not the very fact of the attack, but the strength of the invading army and the power of the blow it delivered. And although here one can see the desire of the then Chief of the General Staff to relieve himself of responsibility for the fact that the invasion turned out to be sudden for the troops stationed near the border, on the whole, of course, he is right. But WHY was the General Staff not ready for such an outbreak of war? Why were our troops unable to oppose anything to the rapid advance of enemy tank formations into the operational depth of the Soviet defense?

It's not just about suddenness. Military catastrophes, more significant in scale, that befell our army near Kyiv, Vyazma and Bryansk and in the summer of 1942, when there was no surprise for a long time, are the best proof of this. A typical example is Operation Typhoon, carried out by the Germans in October 1941. Despite the enormous losses in people and weapons (the mechanized corps had to be disbanded, and other formations and units had to be drastically reduced), the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command made an unsuccessful attempt to seize the initiative in the battle of Smolensk. Our troops went over to a tough defense. They knew about the preparation of the Germans for a major offensive in the Moscow direction, they were preparing. But to determine the direction of the main attacks of the enemy and this time could not. There was no talk of any tactical surprise. On the Western Front, they even carried out counter-training, but - from scratch! . The enemy again managed to achieve operational surprise. Under the blows of his tank wedges, our defense collapsed. The main forces of the Western, Reserve and Bryansk fronts, covering the Moscow direction, were surrounded near Vyazma and Bryansk. In the strategic defense of the Soviet troops, a gap was formed almost 500 km wide, which there was nothing to close. The whole world expected the fall of Moscow. Only by a huge effort of all forces the enemy was stopped, and then thrown back from the capital. The Wehrmacht suffered a major defeat for the first time in its history.

This means that the main reason for our defeat lies not so much in the suddenness of the attack, but in the UNREADiness of the Red Army in 1941. Moreover, in the unpreparedness not only to repel a surprise attack, but in general to the war into which the Soviet Union was drawn. Actually, the previous chapters were devoted to listing the shortcomings and shortcomings inherent in the Red Army compared to the Wehrmacht. Now it remains to figure out why they appeared and why they were not eliminated by the beginning of the war. Here reference to one or two reasons is indispensable. Apparently, this happened due to a combination of a number of interrelated objective and subjective reasons. It is necessary to determine which of them had a decisive influence on the construction and preparation of the armed forces for war, and which acted only indirectly. These reasons can be divided into two groups.

To the first among them are subjective mistakes and miscalculations of the leadership related to the development of the armed forces and their preparation for war. This refers to the mistakes of the political leadership of the country, which first gave Germany the opportunity to defeat its enemies one by one, and then for various reasons excluded the possibility of a German attack on the USSR in the summer of 1941. They, in turn, led to mistakes and miscalculations of the military leadership. The leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff, due to lack of data and inability to distinguish the real from disinformation, did not proceed from a real assessment of the strength of a potential enemy, his intentions and capabilities, but from his own ideas about him.

But is it possible, in search of the causes of our failures and defeats, to reduce everything only to the subjective mistakes of the political and military leadership and to the problems of the armed forces? In our opinion, the causes of failures and defeats lie much deeper. They can make up second group reasons that did not depend on momentary decisions of the political and military leadership, but stemmed from objective conditions. They were caused by diseases of the rapid quantitative growth of our armed forces and the state of the country's economy, the insufficient capabilities of which limited the implementation of military programs in full. This predetermined not only the level of combat and mobilization readiness of our armed forces for modern warfare, but also undoubtedly affected the level and lifestyle of the country's population, its general and technical literacy, and, finally, its readiness to defend their homeland. Much has been said above. Now we will try to analyze in more detail the degree of influence of various causes on the results of military operations in the initial period of the war that were so tragic for our people.

Perhaps it is worth starting with the authoritarian structure of the state, otherwise it is impossible to understand what goals and motives our political leadership was guided by when making certain decisions. I.V. By the end of the 1920s, Stalin created with his own hands such a system of power in which all the most important decisions were made only by him and he alone. Despite the attempts of full-time propagandists to give the command-administrative system an external veneer of democracy, it remained essentially authoritarian. As head of the Bolshevik Party, Stalin virtually single-handedly made all the most important decisions on foreign, domestic, economic and cultural policy of the country. Then these decisions were formalized as decisions of the relevant bodies of the party or the administrative system, provided for by the country's constitution.

Enormous power, unlimited by anyone and nothing, placed an enormous burden of responsibility on Stalin's shoulders, because the lives and fate of many, many millions of people depended on the decisions he made. This was especially true of the problems of war and peace. At the same time, the absence of constructive criticism and the constant immoderate glorification of him by the people around Stalin could not but create in him excessive confidence in his own infallibility and infallibility. Too much rested on the personality of Stalin - the leader, the "Master". It is impossible to understand the reasons for the appearance of many shortcomings inherent in our army without revealing all the flaws of the Stalinist leadership system.

After the outbreak of World War II, events at first developed in full accordance with Stalin's expectations. Germany successfully defeated Poland and turned its forces to the West. In 1939–1940 The USSR, without making any special efforts, annexed territories with a total area of ​​426,700 square kilometers. At that time, 22.6 million people lived on them. Only with Finland there was a hitch: peace was concluded largely because the prolongation of hostilities in Finland threatened to draw the Soviet Union into a war with England and France on the side of Germany, and this could not be allowed to happen. The authority of Stalin, as a successful head of state and strategist, grew immeasurably.

During the many months of confrontation between the Wehrmacht and the French army, reinforced by the British Expeditionary Force, the USSR remained outside the main conflict and accumulated strength, preparing to enter the arena as the main player at an opportune moment. In such a situation, Stalin hoped to throw on the scales the very decisive weight that was supposed to decide the outcome of the war. Under such a scenario, a huge, well-armed and fresh Red Army would have a real chance of success. Especially considering that her opponents had to significantly weaken each other by the time of her intervention as a result of a long deadly struggle. And then it remained to dictate the terms of peace and reap the sweet fruits of victory.

Meanwhile, the “strange war” on the Western Front, after an 8-month pause, unexpectedly ended with a stunning victory for the Germans in just six weeks of active hostilities. It was then that it became clear that Stalin had miscalculated when he hoped to lure Hitler into the trap of a long war of attrition. The situation in Europe has changed radically. The USSR suddenly found itself face to face with victorious Germany, which no longer loomed behind, as it had before, the French army. On the contrary, the considerable resources of France and other European countries occupied by the Wehrmacht, which had previously worked against the Germans, were now in the hands of the Germans. It turned out that in the new conditions it was necessary to think not at all about entering the war at a convenient time and on favorable terms in order to decide its outcome in our favor. It was already about saving their country from the mortal danger that came from the formidable Wehrmacht, crowned with a halo of invincibility.

It is curious how Stalin himself at that time explained one of the main reasons for the impressive successes of the Germans. In his famous speech at the graduation ceremony for students of the Red Army academies in the Kremlin on May 5, 1941, he stated:

“In order to prepare well for war, it is not only necessary to have a modern army, but it is necessary to prepare the war politically.

What does it mean to prepare for war politically? Politically preparing for war means having a sufficient number of reliable allies and neutral countries. Germany, starting this war, coped with this task, but England and France did not cope with this task.

It is characteristic that he said this just at the moment when, as a result of his brute forceful actions, allies of Nazi Germany appeared on the borders of the USSR instead of potentially neutral countries, hoping to restore the status quo with its help. The country, thanks to his short-sighted foreign policy, found itself in almost complete international isolation. And his main political and economic partner was the same Germany, whose leader by that time had already set the final date for the attack on him. And before the onset of this period, there was only a month and a half left. Stalin's actions on the eve of the Second World War and at its first stage fell perfectly under the apt definition of Engels:

“This is the oblivion of great, fundamental considerations because of the momentary interests of the day, this pursuit of momentary successes and the struggle over them without regard for further consequences, this is the sacrifice of the future movement in sacrifice to the present “...”. The leaders of the USSR did not trust anyone, rejected any compromises (and if they did, then with dubious goals) and did not try diplomatically to find allies for themselves in a future war, or at least ensure neutrality from their closest neighbors. They were seriously preparing to fight the whole world. Soviet theoreticians timely determined that the war, which the imperialist powers could impose on the USSR, would be a coalition, long-term one and would require the maximum exertion of all the forces of the country, a combination of various methods of conducting military operations, and the use of new means of armed struggle. But the real military threats to the country and its probable opponents were correctly identified only in the early autumn of 1940, a year after the outbreak of World War II.

military building The armed forces of the USSR were conducted in accordance with the military doctrine, the content of which was determined by the political leadership of the country. Unfortunately, as Stalin's personality cult intensified, the discussion of projects and proposals for their further construction took on a formal, bureaucratic character. In fact, everything was decided by the will of one person, under whose opinion all the others were adjusted and not everyone could dare to criticize. This fettered the creative thought of our prominent theoreticians, and practice often lagged behind the mouth of theory. Thus, in the training of troops, headquarters and command at all levels, the main attention was paid to the organization and conduct of offensive operations. Defense, as a method of conducting combat operations, was verbally recognized, but it was allowed to be conducted only on an operational-tactical scale. The theory of conducting defensive operations on an operational-strategic scale has received unduly little attention. The governing bodies and troops were not ready to solve defensive tasks in a war with a strong enemy. A.A. Svechin was the last one who dared to declare: “‹…> whoever does not know how to defend himself will not be able to attack; one must be able, with the help of a solid defense, to create the preconditions for an offensive ‹…›» . The works of Svechin did not find a response, and he himself was shot. This way of solving theoretical disputes was not uncommon at that time.

In the pre-war years, at party congresses and meetings on the occasion of various anniversaries, the military might of the country was praised in every possible way. Incorporation without much effort of new territories with a large population gave rise to euphoria from success. From the high stands they announced their readiness to respond to the enemy’s strike with a triple blow, they boasted about the increase in the weight of the artillery salvo of the rifle division, but little thought was given to how to create the conditions for this salvo to accurately hit the target. In the garrisons, the Red Army sang the song "From the taiga to the British seas, the Red Army is the strongest ...". And the commander of the 2nd rank G.M. Stern at the 18th Party Congress in March 1939 declared that our people "will be able, if they have to give their lives, to do it in such a way as to get ten lives of enemies earlier for one life of our precious man." Voroshilov from the presidium retorted: “Ten is not enough. We need twenty." To the applause of the entire hall, Stern agreed, asking that this be included in the transcript of the congress. In fact, the degree of preparation of the army and the country for war was far from such boastful statements. This became clear during the armed conflicts in 1939-1940. and especially after the war with Finland.

Measures were taken to eliminate the identified numerous shortcomings, including the rearmament of the army and the improvement of the organizational structure of the troops. But the equipping of the Red Army with new types of weapons and military equipment was largely hampered by the insufficient development of the country's industrial base. Despite the colossal efforts invested in the first five-year plans, economy The country remained archaic, full of disproportions and largely inefficient. Of course, the vast size of the country's territory and the underdevelopment of its infrastructure, which held back the development of industry, had an effect. Labor productivity continued to be low compared to the developed countries of Europe. Despite successes in eradicating illiteracy, the general level of education of the country's population remained low, which led to a low technical culture of the bulk of workers and employees, and hence the army personnel. The country in industrial development and the technological level of production still lagged behind Germany, whose military-industrial base was much more powerful than the Soviet one.

Already according to the plans of the first five-year plan, when creating the industrial base of the country, first of all, they built factories capable of producing military products. But even the existing opportunities of the economy were not always used purposefully and with a sufficient degree of efficiency. For example, on the development of the navy in the USSR in 1934-1937. more than 30% of all appropriations for military equipment were intended. Although it was clear that it would hardly be possible in the coming years to create a fleet capable of confronting potential adversaries on the seas on an equal footing. Enormous human, financial and material resources were spent on the construction of expensive battleships and heavy cruisers before the war. However, it was not possible to complete them, so these funds, in essence, turned out to be thrown to the wind.

The principle of forming priorities in the preparation of industrial orders was not always observed, shyness and unnecessary duplication were allowed. The military industry of the country was often overloaded not with what the troops needed in the first place. The main attention was paid to the production of the maximum number of basic types of military equipment, to the detriment of auxiliary ones (including equipping troops with communications equipment, mechanized traction and vehicles), without which it was impossible to achieve their effective use on the battlefield. As a result of the resulting significant shortage of weapons, military equipment and equipment, a large number of limited combat-ready, even non-combat-ready units and formations already in peacetime appeared in the troops. Numerous examples of this have been given in previous chapters.

Suffice it to say that by the beginning of the war, the defense industry, transport, aviation, automobile and other enterprises did not even have a mobilization plan approved by the government for 1941. This means that the needs of the mobilization deployment of the armed forces, the need for equipping with weapons, combat and auxiliary military equipment of newly formed formations and units. The plan to transfer industry to a war footing was adopted only in June 1941, just before the war. Because of this, production capabilities were not switched in a timely manner to an increase in the production of weapons, and especially ammunition. Excessive centralization of the management of everything and everything, the lack of initiative hindered work to strengthen the country's defense capability. Decisions on the most important issues of transferring industry to a military footing were repeatedly postponed, the deadlines for adopting new types of weapons were disrupted, and their quality often remained unacceptably low. Many proposals of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the State Planning Commission were not considered for a long time.

The pernicious influence of Stalin's personality cult was especially manifested in the implementation of personnel policy in the course of military construction and preparation of the army for war.

In an effort to strengthen personal power in the country, the leader paid special attention to the army. Stalin, who proclaimed the slogan "Cadres decide everything", in words more than once emphasized the need to take care of them. In particular, in public speeches, he hypocritically stated: "In order to manage all this new equipment - the new army needs command personnel who are perfectly aware of modern military art." But it was Stalin who unleashed a real terror, directed mainly against those who had not only experience, but also the courage to defend their point of view, who did not engage in sycophancy in front of big and small leaders.

The brutal repressions that continued right up to the very beginning of the war (suffice it to recall the cases of the “aviators” and “Spaniards”) pulled out the most experienced and capable commanders from the army. Immediately before the war, almost the entire leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense, the General Staff, the main and central directorates, the command of the troops of military districts and fleets was replaced. They were replaced by young, energetic, but, as a rule, insufficiently experienced officers and generals who did not have the necessary knowledge and skills to work in responsible positions. Meanwhile, the higher the level at which wrong decisions are made, the more severe the consequences they lead to. Germany managed to save its officer corps from the period of the First World War, which formed the backbone of its highest command cadres. The commanders of the Red Army opposing them were inferior to them in all these indicators.

Only narrow-minded or malicious people can argue that the repressions did not affect the combat effectiveness of the Armed Forces of the USSR, but on the contrary, they strengthened them. They usually refer to an insignificant proportion of those who were repressed relative to the total number of army and navy commanders, at the same time casting a shadow on the reputation of the destroyed military leaders. At the same time, they deliberately turn a blind eye to the fact that in the highest echelon of the Armed Forces of the USSR, the overwhelming majority of the commanding, commanding and political staff were subjected to repression. The moral side of the consequences of terror is also hushed up. Indeed, in quantitative terms, the resulting gap was closed, but the quality level of command personnel dropped sharply. Survivors of the repressions, with rare exceptions, were intimidated. They were afraid to make independent decisions, to take the slightest risk, they suppressed any initiative in themselves, because in case of failure they could be accused of deliberate sabotage. In this environment, careerists and demagogues were able to quickly advance in the service by eliminating their competitors with the help of denunciations. During the two years of the "Great Terror" at the end of the 30s, the competent authorities received approximately 5 million denunciations.

Especially bad was the situation with the leading cadres and their operational training. Its level, like the level of combat training of the troops, was far from meeting the requirements of modern warfare. Formations and units were often commanded by people who did not have sufficient qualifications, and even more so - combat experience. And, unfortunately, there were many such commanders on all levels of the career ladder. They had to master combat skills during the battles at the cost of large and sometimes unjustified losses. Soviet propagandists, in order to emphasize the adventurism of Hitler's plans, where necessary and not necessary, cited his words: "The Russian armed forces are a clay colossus without a head." But they, as usual, and for obvious reasons, cited only part of the phrase, which completely changed its meaning. Hitler literally said the following:

“Although the Russian armed forces are a clay colossus without a head, it is impossible to accurately predict their further development. Since Russia must be defeated in any case, it is better to do it now, when the Russian army is leaderless and ill-prepared, and when the Russians have to overcome great difficulties in the military industry created with outside help ”(emphasis added. - Auth.) .

It was not possible to eliminate the consequences of repression by the beginning of the war. In 1967, in a conversation with the writer K. Simonov, Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky said this about it:

“You say that without the thirty-seventh year there would have been no defeats for the forty-first, but I will say more. Without the thirty-seventh year, perhaps there would have been no war at all in the forty-first year. In the fact that Hitler decided to start a war in the forty-first year, an important role was played by the assessment of the degree of defeat of the military cadres that we had. What can I say, when in the thirty-ninth year I had to be on the commission during the transfer of the Leningrad Military District from Khozin to Meretskov, there were a number of divisions commanded by captains, because everyone who was higher was arrested without exception.

The main criterion for appointment to the highest positions was personal devotion to the leader and readiness to persistently and firmly implement his decisions. In this regard, the appointment of G.K. Zhukov to the most responsible post of Chief of the General Staff. And this is despite his complete lack of appropriate education, experience in staff work, and even open dislike for it. Apparently, Stalin believed that Zhukov would restore order there with a firm hand, achieve the elimination of numerous shortcomings revealed in the work of the military department when Voroshilov was removed from the post of People's Commissar of Defense. However, history shows that not every good and strong-willed military leader can head the general staff - this "brain of the army", in the figurative expression of the smartest B.M. Shaposhnikov, just like an experienced staff officer may not become a good commander.

The General Staff is the main governing body of the country's armed forces in peacetime and wartime. Only with the well-organized work of a team of highly professional specialists could the General Staff fulfill the complex tasks of strategic and operational planning for the use of the armed forces in war and operations, prepare theaters of military operations, improve the organizational structure of the troops, find the right decisions on issues of mobilization readiness, logistics of troops and etc. Their fulfillment should be closely linked with the work of the national economy, transport and communications, and the fulfillment by industry of orders for armaments and combat equipment. All this presupposes that the leader of such an important governing body, first of all, has a broad outlook, academic education, deep theoretical knowledge and high culture, knowledge of the features and capabilities of the types and branches of the military, the military industry serving the needs of the armed forces. The chief must have the ability to listen to the considerations of the closest assistants, to make the most efficient use of their knowledge and skills. Such qualities were very lacking in G.K. Zhukov.

According to K.K. Rokossovsky.

“‹…› Zhukov was a trained and very demanding commander. But this exactingness often developed into unreasonable severity and even rudeness. Such actions caused discontent among many of his subordinates. Complaints came to the division, and the command had to deal with them. Attempts to influence the brigade commander were unsuccessful. And we were forced ‹…› in order to improve the situation in the brigade, “push forward” G.K. Zhukov to the highest position in the inspection of the cavalry.

Pumping and rudeness made it difficult to achieve coherence in the work of a staff team of well-educated professionals. It is difficult for us to judge what Zhukov did and did not do over the past five decisive months in this important post. The sphere of activity of the General Staff is too closed, the funds of which are still in special custody in TsAMO. At least we never saw the work promised by the Academy of Military Sciences on Zhukov's creative contribution to military science. If during the described period he had done something similar, then the people who created the cult of the First Marshal of Victory would not have missed the opportunity to describe his merits. In any case, Zhukov's activities as Chief of the General Staff can hardly be called successful. It is no coincidence that SM. Shtemenko, who joined the staff of the General Staff in the autumn of 1940 and described in detail its work on the eve and during the war, did not say a word about Zhukov's work before the German attack.

Zhukov later admitted:

“It must be frankly said that neither the Commissar nor I had the necessary experience in preparing the armed forces for such a war that unfolded in 1941, and, as you know, experienced military personnel were exterminated in 1937–1939.” .

Leapfrog with the change of leadership in the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff did not contribute to the qualitative development of plans that are most appropriate to the current situation. At least two gross mistakes were made in pre-war operational and strategic planning. Firstly, our military leaders, unable to understand the essence of the German blitzkrieg strategy, incorrectly assessed the possible nature of military operations in the initial period of the war. The plans developed in the event of war were based on outdated views: it was believed that decisive military operations would unfold only after the completion of the concentration and deployment of the main forces of the parties. In any case, it was supposed to repel the first blow of the enemy and create conditions for going over to the offensive with decisive goals. The well-known maxim was confirmed: "Generals are always preparing for the last war." And those who at one time studied at the academy of the German General Staff and better understood the essence of the blitzkrieg concept were basically destroyed.

Already in the very operational formation of the troops of the border districts, which was mainly formed in the course of the Polish campaign, the prerequisites for defeat in the initial period of the war were laid. And this time, as in many other cases, political considerations prevailed over operational-strategic ones. From the very beginning, it was decided to hold the newly annexed territories as a springboard in case of war. The formations of the covering armies, stretched in a thread along the state border, in combination with field fortifications and fortified areas under construction, created only the illusion of its reliable defense. The troops of the first echelon of the border districts in such a formation could not repel the attack of large Wehrmacht forces and thereby ensure the mobilization and deployment of the main forces of the Red Army. It was not necessary to count on timely support by the forces of the second echelons and reserves of the districts due to their low mobility. The calculation was based on the fact that reconnaissance would be able to timely reveal the concentration of enemy strike groupings, after which mobilization and deployment could be carried out in a timely manner, before the main enemy forces were brought into battle. This calculation was not justified. Miscalculations were also made in basing the Air Force and material reserves, which were concentrated dangerously close to the state border.

In addition, when evaluating the enemy, they failed to reveal his plan, in particular, to correctly determine the direction of his main attack. The fatal decision to concentrate the main efforts in the southwestern strategic direction, taken in accordance with the desire of the leader and contrary to the opinion of more experienced military leaders, led to the weakening of our forces in the western direction, where the enemy delivered the main blow. This brought the Red Army to the brink of defeat. Already in the course of hostilities, it was necessary to carry out large-scale regroupings of Soviet troops, waste time and bring them into battle in parts almost from the wheels.

Zhukov, who at one time signed, together with the Chief Prosecutor, the decision to arrest the commander of the Western Front, retroactively spoke to him as follows: “‹…› having no idea about the enemy groups that had broken through, front commander D.G. Pavlov often made decisions that did not correspond to the situation. This reproach with good reason can be forwarded to the High Command. Without justifying Pavlov in the least, we note that he made decisions in accordance with directives No. 2 and 3, which did not at all correspond to the current situation. And next to Pavlov, almost from the very beginning of hostilities, there were two marshals - Shaposhnikov and Kulik, who were soon joined by another one - Voroshilov.

You can often hear that as a result of the treaty with Germany, the USSR won almost two years of peace, which gave it the opportunity to significantly strengthen its defense capability. So it was, although one can argue for a long time how effectively this time was used. Indeed, in the last months of peace, the main efforts were aimed at eliminating the identified shortcomings. The combat strength of the Red Army was increased, the organizational structure of the troops, their weapons and technical equipment were improved. But far from everything was done to use this gain in time. One thing is indisputable: at the same time, Germany was strengthening at a much faster pace and was able to radically change the balance of power between itself and its opponents.

As a result of ongoing continuous changes in deployment patterns and various kinds of inconsistencies between the General Staff, People's Commissariats of Industry, the People's Commissariat of Railways and local mob workers, the development of the MP-41 mobilization plan by June 1941 was never completed. In practice, the development of operational and mobilization plans in the armies and formations was also not completed, and they were not mastered by the troops. Apparently, this gave Zhukov reason to assert that the country entered the war without operational and mobilization plans completed and approved by the government.

The most serious mistake was the disbanding of tank corps after the Polish campaign. She was corrected, but too late. Problems with the staffing of tank units and formations of hastily formed mechanized corps with personnel, especially command, combat and auxiliary equipment, transport and communications, the issues of supplying them with fuel and ammunition by the beginning of the war had not been resolved. The tank units did not have enough barracks, parks, training grounds, tankodromes, training classes, teaching aids to improve the training of personnel. Things got to the point that almost at the last moment it was necessary to equip tank regiments that did not have tanks with 76-mm and 45-mm guns and machine guns in order to use them as anti-tank regiments and divisions. Many mechanized corps, formed only formally, quickly melted away in the fire of border battles, failing to inflict tangible damage on the Wehrmacht.

A lot has been said about the tense situation with the manning of all branches and types of troops with traction means and vehicles, especially special ones. They expected to make up for the shortage through mobilization, but the time for receiving equipment from the national economy and delivering it to the troops significantly exceeded the established terms for the units to be ready. The superiority of the Wehrmacht over the Red Army in mobility was combined with its undoubted superiority in tactical and operational art at all levels of command, as well as with an advantage in the organization, training and combat experience of the troops. All this allowed the Wehrmacht to achieve great success both in the border battle and later, when the newly mobilized reserves of the Red Army entered the battle.

In aviation, according to a note by Timoshenko and Zhukov to Stalin dated May 15, 115 air regiments were in the formation stage, that is, 34.5% of the total number of air units were not combat-ready. It was possible to count on bringing them to full readiness only by 01/01/42. In addition to the above problems, there were others: firstly, the subordination of air formations and units to combined arms armies, whose commanders were completely unprepared for their competent use, and secondly, such subordination ruled out rapid maneuver and massing of aviation in the most important directions. After all, Soviet aviation was not defeated on 06/22/41. The losses we suffered on the first day of the war were, of course, painful, but by no means provided the Germans with numerical superiority. They knocked out our aircraft during the first weeks of the war, and the main role here was played, first of all, by the low level of flight and tactical skills of the crews of the western border districts, the lack of proper management and material support.

Thus, the Red Army, in terms of its level of preparation for military operations, was inferior to the Wehrmacht in many quality parameters. It took a long time to eliminate major shortcomings in the training and equipment of troops and to carry out the planned reorganization of the armed forces and re-equip them with new equipment. Therefore, Stalin, soberly assessing the real state of the Red Army, did everything possible to delay the outbreak of war with Germany. He was most afraid of provoking Hitler to attack before the Red Army was ready to fight on equal terms with the Wehrmacht.

On May 4, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted the most important Decree "On strengthening the work of the Soviet central and local bodies", which was then formalized as a decision of the Plenum of the Central Committee. According to him, I.V. Stalin was approved as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR instead of V.M. Molotov, who became the first deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, while remaining in the post of people's commissar for foreign affairs. Thus, the combination of the highest party and state posts by Stalin was formally legalized. In the situation that had developed by the summer of 1941, this was a step in the right direction. But in the conditions of immoderate praise from the inner circle, the leader believed in his own genius and infallibility, and this time outwitted himself.

The most objective indicator of the growing threat of attack was the concentration of German troops near the Soviet borders. But Stalin mistakenly believed that Hitler would never decide on a big war in the East without first putting an end to England. It was possible to defeat this country not only by direct landing on its territory, the probability of success of which after the loss of the air "Battle of Britain" by Germany was vanishingly small. The vast British Empire had its own "Achilles' heel" - the Near and Middle East. In the last pre-war year of 1938, the British imported 11.85 million tons of oil and oil products into their country, and a large proportion of this vast flow came from there, mainly from Iran. The loss of Iranian sources of oil greatly undermined Britain's ability to continue the war. At the same time, if they were captured, Germany would completely solve its own chronic fuel problems. In addition to Iran, industrial oil production was then carried out in Saudi Arabia and Iraq, and a large oil field had already been discovered in Kuwait. In a word, the region of the Near and Middle East seemed to be an extremely tempting target for further German expansion.

Therefore, the episode described by Zhukov is quite understandable. When once again Zhukov tried, in his words, to obtain permission to bring the troops of the western military districts on alert, Stalin led him to the map and, pointing to the Middle East, said: “This is where they [the Germans] will go.” Stalin reasoned quite rationally, but Hitler had his own logic. He believed that it would not be difficult for him to quickly defeat the Russian armed forces and extract the oil, so necessary for Germany to wage a long war of attrition with England, in the Soviet Union. And not only oil... And Hitler expected to get to Iran through the Caucasus.

Undoubtedly, many of the strategic mistakes of the Soviet leadership were largely due to a well-organized targeted disinformation campaign by the Germans. It makes sense to dwell on this issue in more detail.

The Germans themselves were not deceived by the hope that they would be able to hide from the ubiquitous eyes of the communist underground the concentration of huge masses of people and military equipment on the territory of the hostile former Poland. Therefore, they constantly developed and purposefully carried out new measures to misinform the military and political leaders of the Soviet Union about the true goals of their actions. For this, the press, radio, the transmission of secret and encrypted telegrams with the expectation of their interception by intelligence and counterintelligence of certain countries, and the metered dissemination of false rumors through various channels, including diplomatic ones, were widely used. A number of major measures were envisaged for operational-strategic camouflage and political disinformation, united by a single plan with the leading role of the military command.

As early as February 15, 1941, Keitel issued an order that marked the beginning of a set of measures designed to hide the preparations for Operation Barbarossa from the Soviet leadership. There, in particular, it was said:

“‹…› In all informational and other activities related to misleading the enemy, be guided by the following instructions:

a) At the first stage:

to reinforce the already and now universally formed impression of the impending invasion of England. Use for this purpose data on new means of attack and vehicles;

exaggerate the significance of the secondary operations Marita and Sonnenblume, the actions of the 10th Aviation Corps, as well as inflate data on the number of forces involved in their implementation;

to explain the concentration of forces for Operation Barbarossa as the movement of troops associated with the mutual replacement of the garrisons of the west, the center of Germany and the east, as pulling up rear echelons for Operation Marita, and, finally, as defensive measures to cover the rear from a possible attack from Russia .

b) At the second stage:

spread the opinion about the concentration of troops for Operation Barbarossa as the largest diversionary maneuver in the history of troops, which allegedly serves to mask the last preparations for the invasion of England‹…›» .

In the same order, Keitel emphasized:

"Especially important for the misinformation of the enemy would be such information about the airborne corps, which could be interpreted as preparation for actions against England".

All these measures were designed, on the one hand, to hide the massive concentration of forces involved in Operation Barbarossa, and on the other hand, to mislead the enemy by giving him false information about his troops and intentions. This the Germans succeeded in many ways. For example, on May 15, 1941, the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army reported that the Luftwaffe had 8-10 parachute divisions, of which 1-2 were in Greece, 5-6 were on the northern coast of France and Belgium, and two more were in Germany. Thus, the Soviet leadership was given the wrong impression that the Germans were clearly aiming their strike formations at England.

The day of May 22, 1941 became the starting point for the final stage of the transfer of the Wehrmacht to the Soviet borders, when, along with a sharply increased rate of transportation of ground units, the relocation of aviation began. Exactly one month remained before the set date for the German attack. This was a critical moment in the entire operation to concentrate forces intended for the invasion of the USSR. It became critical because it was from that moment on that the Germans themselves no longer considered it possible to keep the entire operation a secret from the enemy. That is why they prepared in advance and began to implement the second phase of the campaign to disinform the Soviet leadership about their true intentions. Her plan was formulated in the instructions of the leadership of the OKW dated May 12, 1941:

"one. The second phase of disinformation of the enemy begins simultaneously with the introduction of the most compacted schedule for the movement of echelons on May 22. At this point, the efforts of the highest headquarters and other agencies involved in disinformation should be ‹…› aimed at presenting the concentration of forces for Operation Barbarossa as a broadly conceived maneuver to mislead the Western adversary ‹…›.

2. ‹…› among the formations located in the east, a rumor about a rear cover against Russia and a "distracting concentration of forces in the east" must circulate, and the troops located on the English Channel must believe in real preparations for an invasion of England ..

‹…› At the same time, it would be expedient ‹…› to give orders to the largest possible number of formations located in the east to be transferred to the west and thereby cause a new wave of rumors.

“‹…› First, Germany will present an ultimatum to the Soviet Union demanding greater exports to Germany and the abandonment of communist propaganda. As a guarantee of the fulfillment of these requirements, German commissars must be sent to the industrial and economic centers and enterprises of the Ukraine, and certain Ukrainian regions must be occupied by the German army. The presentation of an ultimatum will be preceded by a "war of nerves" in order to demoralize the Soviet Union".

Such stunning rumors quickly found grateful listeners and disseminators among diplomats, intelligence officers, analysts and media correspondents. They took on a life of their own, continually multiplied, expanded, and swelled. Even specific numbers of mythical agreements were exaggerated. Ultimately, they also reached Moscow through various channels. On June 4, the USSR plenipotentiary in Berlin, Dekanozov, wrote to Molotov: "Rumors about the lease of Ukraine for 5, 35 and 99 years are spread throughout Germany." Increasingly, it was asserted that secret negotiations between the USSR and Germany regarding German demands were either about to begin, or already underway, or even ended with the signing of the relevant agreements, which for some reason have not yet been advertised. Goebbels noted with undisguised satisfaction in his diary on May 25, 1941:

“The rumors we are spreading about the invasion of England are working. There is already extreme nervousness in England. As far as Russia is concerned, we have managed to organize an enormous flow of false reports. Newspaper "ducks" do not give abroad the opportunity to figure out where the truth is and where the lie is. This is the atmosphere we need.”

Soviet intelligence received confirmation of such widespread rumors not only from Berlin. On June 10, the German communist G. Kegel, who worked as deputy head of the economics department at the German embassy in Moscow, reported:

“The days before June 20 or 23 are, according to Shibera, decisive. Hitler invited Stalin to come to Germany. The answer must be given before June 12, 1941. If Stalin does not come to Berlin, then war is inevitable. Germany made demands on the USSR:

a) additional deliveries of 2.5 million tons of grain.

b) free transit to Persia and military occupation of Soviet grain warehouses for 4-5 million. tons.

Another topic of persistent rumors spread in Berlin on the personal instructions of Goebbels was the allegedly expected arrival of Stalin himself in the German capital. To increase the likelihood, even the mass sewing of red flags for his solemn meeting was mentioned. This was another hint at the desire of the Germans to discuss at the highest level some serious claims against the USSR. This opened up vast opportunities for conducting lengthy negotiations, and Stalin undoubtedly prepared very seriously for them. Moreover, the level of these negotiations was expected to be the highest, because, according to rumors, Hitler was going to personally meet with the Soviet leader.

The top Soviet leaders were no doubt greatly puzzled when all this information reached their ears. Still, the whole world is animatedly discussing their negotiations and agreements with Germany, but they have no idea about them! Meanwhile, German officials kept deathly silence on this issue. An attempt to test the waters was the well-known TASS report of June 13, 1941, published in Soviet newspapers the next day:

“Even before the arrival of the British ambassador to the USSR, Mr. Cripps, in London, and especially after his arrival, rumors began to be circulated in the English and foreign press in general about the “imminence of war between the USSR and Germany.” According to these rumors: 1) Germany allegedly made claims to the USSR of a territorial and economic nature, and now negotiations are underway between Germany and the USSR on the conclusion of a new, closer agreement between them; 2) the USSR allegedly rejected these claims, in connection with which Germany began to concentrate its troops near the borders of the USSR with the aim of attacking the USSR; 3) The Soviet Union, in turn, began to intensively prepare for a war with Germany and is concentrating troops near the borders of the latter. Despite the obvious senselessness of these rumors, responsible circles in Moscow nevertheless considered it necessary, in view of the stubborn exaggeration of these rumors, to authorize TASS to declare that these rumors are clumsily concocted propaganda of forces hostile to the USSR and Germany, interested in further expansion and outbreak of war.

TASS declares that: 1) Germany did not present any claims to the USSR and does not propose any new, closer agreement, which is why negotiations on this subject could not take place; 2) according to the USSR, Germany is just as steadfastly observing the terms of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact as the Soviet Union, which is why, in the opinion of Soviet circles, rumors about Germany's intention to break the pact and launch an attack on the USSR are devoid of any ground, and what is happening in recently, the transfer of German troops, freed from operations in the Balkans, to the eastern and northeastern regions of Germany is connected, presumably, with other motives that have nothing to do with Soviet-German relations; 3) the USSR, as follows from its peace policy, observed and intends to comply with the terms of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, which is why the rumors that the USSR is preparing for war with Germany are false and provocative; 4) The purpose of the Red Army’s current summer training camps and the upcoming maneuvers is nothing more than training the reserves and checking the operation of the railway apparatus, which, as you know, are carried out every year, which is why it is at least absurd to portray these Red Army measures as hostile to Germany. ».

This message was, in essence, nothing more than a desperate attempt to start at least some kind of dialogue with the Germans. In case of success - to receive from them the same assurances of intentions to steadfastly observe the non-aggression pact, at worst - at least to find out Hitler's further plans. But the Germans did not react in any way to the Soviet sounding, leaving the leadership of the USSR in complete ignorance of what was happening. Only Goebbels noted in his diary on June 15:

“The TASS denial turned out to be stronger than the first reports suggested. Obviously, Stalin wants, with the help of an emphasized friendly tone and statements that nothing is happening, to remove from himself all possible reasons for accusations of starting a war.

The massive disinformation attack, launched from all sides and confirmed by many independent sources, could confuse anyone. Agent reports were hopelessly drowning in it, which spoke of German preparations for war and the expected timing of its start. In addition, these reports often contradicted each other and were rarely confirmed in practice. Therefore, Stalin took for disinformation and truthful reports from reliable sources.

By the way, Stalin soon received quite plausible confirmation of the correctness of his analysis of the intentions of the Germans. It happened when another meticulously thought-out German disinformation "duck" successfully found its addressee. To give the greatest credibility to its creation and implementation, the Reich Minister of Propaganda Goebbels himself took a personal part. In agreement with Hitler, on June 13, his article "Crete as an example" was published in the central Nazi newspaper "Völkischer Beobachter". It was about the fact that the recent airborne landing on Crete was a dress rehearsal for an invasion of the British Isles that was being prepared from day to day. Shortly after going on sale, the entire surviving print run of the issue was hastily withdrawn and destroyed. Rumors spread everywhere in Berlin about the extreme displeasure that Hitler expressed to his Reich Minister for this article. Thus, a complete appearance was created that Goebbels inadvertently blurted out the secret military plans of the Germans. So Stalin was given yet another proof of his own foresight regarding Hitler's further plans.

But it was by no means the last. The Germans continued to confirm the rumors familiar to us to their allies already through official channels. On June 15, the very next day after the publication of the TASS message, Ribbentrop instructed the German ambassador in Hungary:

“I ask you to inform the Hungarian President of the following:

In view of the large concentration of Russian troops on the German eastern frontier, the Führer will probably be forced to clear up German-Russian relations at the latest at the beginning of July and to make certain demands in this regard. Since it is difficult to predict the outcome of these negotiations, the German government believes that Hungary needs to take steps to secure its borders.

This assignment is strictly confidential. I ask you to point out this fact to the Hungarian President.

Ribbentrop, of course, knew perfectly well that the start of the implementation of the Barbarossa plan was scheduled exactly in a week, but he tried in a roundabout way to send false information to Moscow again in order to impress Stalin that nothing would happen, at least until the beginning of July. And if it happens, it will not be a war at all, but only negotiations over some obscure German demands. Similar instructions were sent to the German ambassadors in Italy and Japan. The whole calculation was based on the fact that this information would reach Stalin's ears in one way or another. They, of course, reached and fell on fertile ground. Stalin received further confirmation of the correctness of his analysis of Hitler's intentions and recklessly decided that he still had enough time to properly respond to his further moves. Of course, Stalin was not going to obey all the demands of the Germans. His main goal was to play for time, because in a month or two it would have been too late to start a war in 1941: the autumn thaw and, moreover, the harsh Russian winter is not the best time to fight the USSR.

It is not for nothing that we have described in such detail the last pre-war German campaign of political disinformation directed against the Soviet Union. Knowing its essence and timing helps to better understand the motives for many of Stalin's actions in the last pre-war weeks. The leader could not possibly allow Hitler to speak to himself from a position of strength. For the upcoming difficult and important trades with the Germans, he could well have needed extra trump cards, the role of which was the best fit for the reserve armies of the High Command transferred to the Western theater of operations. If Hitler was concentrating his troops near the border, judging by the rumors, for psychological pressure on the USSR, then in order to successfully counteract his brute pressure from the Soviet side, it was necessary to put forward comparable forces. They didn’t even bother showing them to the Germans for warning, so they didn’t make any special secrets from the advancement of troops from the depths of the country to the west. In addition, Stalin, being a very prudent and cautious politician, preferred to play it safe once again. After all, the war, too, could not be completely ruled out in the event of a breakdown in hypothetical bargaining with Hitler. This means that it did not interfere with placing additional reserves closer to the zone of possible collision. With sufficient forces at his disposal, Stalin could not fear any unpleasant surprises.

Therefore, on the eve of the expected negotiations with the Germans, he allowed the military to start moving strategic reserves from the depths of the country precisely in May-June 1941. After all, it began about two weeks after the Germans began spreading rumors about the preparation of a number of exorbitant demands on the USSR. But Stalin did not see any particular need to rush then, believing that events would develop according to the usual scenario: first, the Germans would present some claims or demands, then negotiations on their merits. And only in case of their failure - an ultimatum, after which a declaration of war may follow. For such a variant of actions, according to his calculations, it was quite enough time.

At the same time, Stalin quite reasonably assumed that in order to justify his possible aggression, Hitler might try to artificially create some kind, even a far-fetched, pretext for starting a war. That is why the leader did everything in his power to not give Hitler the slightest reason for claims. All economic agreements with Germany were scrupulously carried out to the last point. The troops in the western districts were ordered not to succumb to any provocations in any case. They intended to mobilize and deploy the army only with a clearly expressed threat of attack or even immediately with the outbreak of hostilities, hoping that they would have time to carry them out before the offensive of the main enemy forces began. When there were clear signs of the preparation of a German attack, the measures taken were insufficient and, most importantly, belated. All the more impracticable was the proposal of the General Staff "to preempt the enemy in deployment and attack the German army at a time when it will be in the deployment stage and will not have time to organize the front and the interaction of the military branches." It remained only to hope for the genius of the leader, who would somehow manage to delay the start of the war.

To correctly determine the possible date for the start of German aggression was, frankly, not at all easy. Intelligence information on this subject was the most contradictory. At the same time, they were often mistaken for disinformation inspired by the British, aimed at undermining Soviet-German relations to their advantage. Most of all, Stalin feared the formation of a united front of the leading capitalist states against the USSR. Adding fuel to this fire was the sudden flight to Scotland of the Deputy Fuhrer for the party, Rudolf Hess, on May 10, 1941. It was clear that he intended to negotiate peace with the British. If they were successful, Germany would have received a solid rear in the West for the war with the USSR, and such a development of events did not suit the Soviet leadership in any way. However, very soon hostilities between the armed forces of England and Germany broke out with renewed vigor. So, in the early hours of May 19, the most powerful ship of the German fleet, the battleship Bismarck, began a raid in the Atlantic, which ended on May 27 with his death, which, however, cost the British dearly. And from May 20 to May 31, a bloody battle broke out for the most important stronghold of England in the Mediterranean - Crete. The Germans managed to capture this island at the cost of heavy losses. These events convincingly testified that Hess's mission had failed, but the confidence in the British in the Soviet Union, nevertheless, did not increase at all.

Particularly confused by the already puzzling situation was the postponement by the Germans of the start date for Barbarossa from May 15 to June 22 because of the need to conduct operations in the Balkans. After that, the sources that reported to Moscow the initially correct, but turned out to be erroneous date, largely lost Stalin's confidence. The success of the German disinformation campaign noted above was largely facilitated by the lack of reliable information from the top Soviet leadership about Hitler's true intentions. As a result of pre-war repressions, the central apparatus of foreign intelligence and almost all of its main foreign residencies suffered irreparable damage. The ability to collect accurate information in Europe has declined sharply. Military intelligence was also seriously affected by the repressions. Interestingly, if German intelligence invariably underestimated the number of Red Army troops, then Soviet intelligence, on the contrary, constantly exaggerated the strength of the Wehrmacht. It is possible that military intelligence officers deliberately, out of good intentions, somewhat overestimated the enemy's forces in order to push the leadership to take more decisive measures to strengthen two troops in the West. For example, according to their estimates, on March 1, 1941, there were 263 divisions in Germany, while in fact there were 184, or 43% less. Even further from reality were estimates of the number of German tanks (11-12 thousand according to intelligence data and 4604 in reality) and aircraft (20,700 intelligence reports and 5259 in reality).

On May 31, 1941, the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army sent out a special message about the grouping of German troops on June 1, 1941. Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Timoshenko, Beria, Kuznetsov, Zhdanov, Zhukov and Malenkov received it. The deployment of the Wehrmacht forces there was described in some detail, but also did not differ in particular accuracy. The total number of divisions was estimated at 286–296, of which 120–122 were supposed to be on the Soviet border, and 122–126 against England. The remaining 44–48 divisions were assigned to the reserves. Judging by these figures, the number of German divisions continued to be exaggerated in the same proportion, because in fact there were much fewer of them then - 208. But something else was much worse: the distribution of German forces according to this message did not allow us to estimate where the Wehrmacht would rush this time, to the west or to the east. Meanwhile, it was these data that formed the basis of intelligence report No. 5 of June 15, 1941, which was printed in a typographical way for familiarization to a wide range of people.

Finally, by June 20, according to intelligence data, the Germans had concentrated 129 Wehrmacht divisions directly at the borders of the USSR. In fact, as it became known later, there were 128 of them. It would seem that Soviet intelligence could only be congratulated on its great success: they accurately determined the composition of the enemy grouping concentrated near the Soviet border! However, a significant error in the calculation of the total number of German divisions and their distribution between West and East, this time again did not allow us to draw an unambiguous conclusion about who the Germans considered at that moment their primary goal.

In addition, having correctly determined the number of German formations assembled on the Soviet border on June 20, 1941, Soviet intelligence made a mistake with their distribution in directions. Quite accurately, only the number of German divisions in the GA "North" zone was established - 29, while there were 30 of them. But in the GA "Center" they counted only 30 divisions, but in fact there were 20.5 divisions more. On the other hand, another 20.5 were assigned to the 43.5 divisions located in the south. From this intelligence it followed that almost half of all Wehrmacht forces were deployed in a southerly direction. In this way, reconnaissance failed to reveal the direction of the main German attack, which they inflicted with the forces of the Center GA.

Serious omissions in the activities of Soviet military intelligence officers include the fact that they failed to reveal the presence of tank groups (armies) in the Wehrmacht, into which the Germans gathered all their mobile formations. Apparently they weren't looking. In Poland they were not at all. In France, one tank group was first created, only then the Germans formed a second one. At one time, Chief of the General Staff Zhukov was not interested in the intelligence report on the experience of using German tank groups, uniting two or even three motorized (tank) corps under a single command, moreover, depending on the situation, often reinforced by infantry. But in vain: based on the location and subordination of tank and motorized formations and the headquarters of tank formations, it was possible to draw a more definite conclusion about the direction of the enemy's main attack.

An exaggerated (for no particular reason) idea of ​​the total number of formations of the Wehrmacht led to an error in determining the timing of a possible attack by the Germans. The plan dated September 19, 1940 assumed that the Germans could throw their 173 divisions against the USSR. In March of the following year, the expected number of German divisions against our country was increased to 200. According to the latest Soviet estimate, set out in a note by Timoshenko and Zhukov dated May 15, 1941, this number was reduced to 180 divisions. Based on the above figures, on June 20 the leaders of the NPO and the General Staff came to the erroneous conclusion that the Germans were far from having completed the creation of the grouping of their forces necessary for an attack on the USSR. And the Red Army still has time for its own preparations. In fact, less than two days remained before the start of German aggression ...

On the morning of June 21, 1941, the General Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Comintern G.M. Dimitrov called People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov and, informing him of information about the impending German attack, received from China, asked him to transfer it to Stalin. Molotov was not in the least surprised, but calmly replied:

“The position is unclear. The big game is on. Not everything depends on us. I will have a talk with Iosif Vissarionovich. If there is something special, I will call!”

The words "a big game is being played" made such a strong impression on Dimitrov that he even underlined them when he wrote down the content of the conversation in his diary. It is not clear what big game Molotov could still talk about after attempts to clarify the situation through diplomatic channels failed. By this time, Stalin had already ceased to be an equal participant in the international political game, as he continued to consider himself. And the time allotted for this deadly game was already rapidly running out. Blind confidence in his own rightness prevented Stalin from seeing the obvious - Nazi aggression inevitably approaching the Soviet Union. Instead of passively waiting for imaginary German proposals, he should at last begin to act, and act as decisively as possible. He had every reason to do so. Here is what Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky, who, by virtue of his official position, was well aware of the situation at that time:

“‹…› although we were not yet quite ready for war, as I already wrote about, but if the time had really come to meet it, it was necessary to boldly step over the threshold. I.V. Stalin did not dare to do this, proceeding, of course, from the best of intentions. But as a result of the untimely bringing to combat readiness, the Armed Forces of the USSR entered into a battle with the aggressor in much less favorable conditions and were forced to retreat into the depths of the country with battles.

Later A.M. Vasilevsky was even more specific:

“There was enough evidence that Germany was prepared for a military attack on our country - in our age it is difficult to hide them. Fears that the West would raise a fuss about the supposedly aggressive aspirations of the USSR had to be discarded. By the will of circumstances beyond our control, we approached the Rubicon of War, and it was necessary to firmly take a step forward. This was demanded by the interests of our Motherland.

To do this, it was enough, with the sanction of the country's government (that is, Stalin), to transmit to the districts a signal or an encrypted telegram signed by the People's Commissar of Defense, a member of the Main Military Council and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army with the following content: "START TO IMPLEMENT THE COVER PLAN OF 1941"

But such a step has not been taken. Why? Why did our troops in the border districts find themselves exposed to a sudden attack by the enemy? Why were the fighters and commanders awakened at 4 am on June 22 by explosions of German shells and bombs? . Even the Germans were surprised by the carelessness of the Russians.

A natural question arises: did the political and military leadership of the country know about the specific date of the German attack? How did it regard the apparent increase in intelligence activities on their part? After all, the Germans acted extremely brazenly: on June 20–21, German aircraft violated the air border of the USSR 60 times. From June 1 to June 10, 1941, Soviet border guards detained 108 enemy spies and saboteurs. And there was a lot of such data coming from various sources and testifying to the obvious preparation of the Germans for an attack in the coming days, but it is difficult to establish when and to whom they were brought. Unfortunately, on many reports published in the collection of documents of the NKGB, not only are there no resolutions of the leading persons, but also no notes on their reading.

On June 21, it became known that the German ships, which were in the ports of the Soviet Union, on June 20-21 suddenly urgently went to the open sea. So, the day before in the port of Riga there were more than two dozen German ships. Some of them had just started unloading, others were under loading. Despite this, on June 21 they all weighed anchor. The head of the port of Riga, at his own peril and risk, forbade German ships to go to sea and telephoned the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade, asking for further instructions. This was immediately reported to Stalin. Fearing that Hitler might use the delay of German ships as a military provocation, Stalin immediately ordered that the ban on ships on the high seas be lifted.

In the latest edition of Zhukov's memoirs of 2002, where the banknotes made in the first of them are restored, the marshal states about the date of the attack:

“Now there are different versions about whether or not we knew the specific start date and plan of the war. To the General Staff on the day of the German attack it became known from the defector only on June 21(hereinafter it is highlighted by us. - Ed.), which we immediately reported to I.V. Stalin. He immediately agreed to put the troops on alert. Apparently, he had previously received such important information through other channels ‹…›» .

"With the arrival direct data from different sources On the attack on our country, the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff on the evening of June 21 suggested that Stalin send a directive to the districts to bring the troops to full combat readiness. The answer followed: “Prematurely”, and before the start of the war there were no more than 5 hours [aces].”

Thus, despite the clear and irrefutable evidence of the immediate readiness of the Germans to attack, Stalin did not dare to put into effect a plan to cover the state border. The fact is that, upon receipt of an order to this effect, formations and units, without waiting for special instructions, move from the areas of assembly on combat alert to the state border, to the areas assigned to them. Simultaneously with the rise of units on combat alert, their transfer to wartime states began, for which it was necessary to carry out mobilization measures. And, most importantly, the plan for covering the state border provided for air strikes against targets and facilities in the adjacent territory! Zhukov then could not tell everything about this in his memoirs for reasons of secrecy.

The option, however, in which it would be possible to occupy the cover zone with troops and bring the troops into combat readiness to repel a possible sudden attack by the enemy without mobilization and strikes on the adjacent territory, was not provided. No intermediate degree of readiness was established for the covering armies in order to have at least a part of the troops; capable of immediately embarking on combat missions. Thus, our military leaders became hostages of their own plan, which proceeded from outdated views on the initial period of the war, which provided for only one course of action when the aggressor unleashed a war. We had to improvise in order to remove the contradiction that had arisen: to bring the troops to the highest possible degree of combat readiness to repel a possible surprise attack by the enemy, while at the same time excluding the implementation of measures that could give the Germans a pretext for starting a war. According to Zhukov, he and Timoshenko insisted on bringing all the troops of the border districts to BATTLE READINESS. But Stalin rejected the proposed project, saying that perhaps the issue would still be settled peacefully. And he made some other amendments to the shorter text of the directive reported to him. Which one is not clear, since neither the original draft of the directive nor its shorter version before the amendments by the leader are known.

The inconsistency of the text of the directive signed by the military is striking: the troops BE IN FULL BATTLE READINESS, and the units BE IN BATTLE READINESS. Many researchers and historians are still arguing about this contradiction. In this regard, it makes sense to consider the content of the term "full combat readiness". Full combat readiness is now understood as the state of the highest degree of combat readiness of troops, in which they are able to immediately (or within the established time limits) begin to carry out combat missions. Unfortunately, in 1941, in the Red Army, in contrast to the Navy, a clear system of combat readiness as they were built up was not then established. And full combat readiness at that time was not provided for by any documents, and its content was not described anywhere. Apparently, the following degrees of readiness were distinguished in the Red Army at that time: mobilization, in which troops, manned according to peacetime states, serve according to the laws of this time and are ready for mobilization, and combat, the content of which was described in detail in the order of operations of the troops when lifting them on combat alert. At the same time, the combat alert was announced in two ways: without the withdrawal of all materiel and with the release of the unit in full force. In the latter case, formations (units) went to the areas of assembly (concentration) with the subsequent occupation of the designated area (subsection) of cover in readiness to perform combat missions only upon receipt of a cipher telegram (codegram): “To the commander of the corps (division) number. I declare an alarm with the opening of the "red" package. Signatures. But again, the commander of the army (corps commander) could give such an order ONLY upon receipt of the corresponding cipher telegram from the Military Council of the district on the commissioning of the cover plan.

The phrase given in the directive: “At the same time, the troops of the ‹…› districts should be in full combat readiness to meet a possible surprise attack by the Germans or their allies”, in our opinion, it only emphasized that commanders (commanders) and troops should be in maximum readiness (with the indicated restrictions) to MEET a possible sudden attack by the enemy - and nothing more. It did not speak of full combat readiness, as a well-defined degree of readiness of the troops. It is possible that the word "complete" was entered by Stalin, since Zhukov spoke everywhere about bringing units only to "combat readiness."

This is seen from the content of the following paragraphs. During the night of June 22, 1941, it was ordered only to covertly occupy the firing points of fortified areas on the state border. And further: “‹…› put all units on alert." But the formations of the covering armies are not allowed to enter the designated cover areas, since the directive specifically emphasized that “Do not carry out any other activities without special orders. Keep the troops dispersed and camouflaged". The easiest way was to disperse and disguise the units that were in the camps and at the training grounds. But there they had, as a rule, a limited amount of ammunition, sufficient only to carry out training tasks. The rest of the combat property, including the property of "NZ", was in points of permanent deployment. You can't envy the commanders of the armies: they had to solve this puzzle - how to prepare troops to repel a surprise attack of the enemy and not provoke the Germans. A wave of bewildered requests went to the headquarters of the districts and to Moscow.

If we agree that the directive mentioned above was approved and signed at a meeting with Stalin, which ended at 22.20, then it is not clear what caused the two-hour delay in its transmission? Has everything been done to ensure that the warning about the possibility of a surprise attack by the Germans is brought to the attention of the troops as soon as possible? It is impossible to understand this from Zhukov’s story: he evaded indicating the time - “in the evening” and nothing specific ... Zhukov only remarked: “We will see further on what came of this belated order.” We briefly talked about what happened at the beginning of the book. It is hardly appropriate to explain the delay by the uncoordinated work of the departments of the General Staff: there everything was ready to receive the text of the directive, encrypt it and transfer it to the troops. Zhukov's phrase is a direct allusion to Stalin, to his stubbornness. No wonder the "reviewers" from GlavPUR insisted on the exclusion of this phrase from the first edition of the memoirs.

The delay in the transmission of Directive No. 1 has been noted by many historians. Start the transmission of even such a controversial directive a couple of hours earlier, they would have managed to bring it to each connection. This would allow the troops of the border districts to meet the attack in a more organized manner and with fewer losses. After all, the mass decommissioning of wired communication lines began about two hours before the German invasion - at 2.00 on June 22. The directive arrived at the troops only at dawn. The headquarters of the ZapOVO received it at 01.45 and duplicated it in the army at 02.45 on June 22. But the wire communication was already disabled, and the headquarters of the 4th army, for example, received it at 03.30, the headquarters of the 10th - only at 16.20. And the headquarters of the 3rd army could not get acquainted with the contents of the directive at all, since communication with it was never restored. And most of the formations in the border zone did not have time to receive a warning about a possible German attack, not to mention the implementation of the prescribed measures.

Some researchers have suggested that Stalin could have ordered that the transmission of the already signed directive be postponed until further notice. The fact is that just at that time he was waiting for a message from Berlin from the Soviet ambassador Dekanozov, who was instructed to personally clarify the situation with Ribbentrop. There was a possibility that the text of the directive would have to be changed again depending on the expected information from Berlin. Only after receiving the news that Ribbentrop was clearly avoiding a meeting with our ambassador, Stalin compared this with the evasive position of the German ambassador Schulenburg during the meeting with Molotov and with other facts known to him and ordered that a directive be sent to the troops. But this assumption contradicts the above statement of an authoritative source that the decision on the report of the military was never taken. In addition, it does not explain some of the inconsistencies and inconsistencies in the marshal's memoirs.

First of all, it is not clear what defector Zhukov reported to Stalin on June 21? During June 21 and on the night of June 22, several Wehrmacht servicemen ran over to our side. At 21.00, the Bug swam across and Corporal A. Diskov was detained. His Soviet propagandists declared him the first German defector, for greater importance "assigning" him the title of sergeant major. During the arrest, he immediately declared: on June 22, at dawn, the Germans would cross the border. Thus, by the beginning of the meeting with Stalin (20.50), information about the defector A. Liskov could not have been received in Moscow. At the same time, it is difficult to admit that Zhukov reported to the leader about the testimony of the sergeant major, who was detained on June 18 (three days later?!). He, of course, was interrogated all this time to make sure that he was not a provocateur or a spy. This is the first, but not the last riddle.

Zhukov's story does not fit in with the now known information about the time of the meeting in Stalin's office. He's writing:

“I immediately reported to the Commissar and I.V. Stalin what M.A. Purkaev.

Come with the people's commissar in 45 minutes to the Kremlin, - said I.V. Stalin.

Having taken with him a draft directive to the troops, together with the People's Commissar and Lieutenant General N.F. Vatutin, we went to the Kremlin. On the way, we agreed at all costs to achieve a decision to put the troops on combat readiness.

But Timoshenko at that time was at the previous meeting with Stalin, which ended at 20.15. It, in particular, adopted an important draft resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the organization of the Northern and Southern fronts and the appointment of command personnel (see Appendix 13). And at 20.50 the people's commissar again appeared in the leader's office, already together with Zhukov. When could they draw up a draft directive to the troops, leave the people's commissariat together for the Kremlin, and agree on something else along the way? And one more "problem": N.F. Vatutin, whom Zhukov is talking about, was not in Stalin's office, but SM was. Budyonny. Zhukov does not mention him and his proposals regarding measures to prepare for repelling a possible attack by Hitler, including a proposal to announce mobilization.

In this regard, let's try to express a somewhat paradoxical thought: there was no delay in the transmission of Directive No. 1 to the headquarters of the districts. It was signed by the military later. This is directly indicated by the authors of the above-mentioned work, who directly worked with documents from the closed funds of various archives, including those that have not yet been declassified:

“The military-political leadership of the state only at 23.30 on June 21 made a decision aimed at partially bringing the five border military districts to combat readiness” .

In the light of the above assumption, events could develop as follows. At a meeting with Stalin, which began at 20.50, the proposal of the military to put the cover plan into effect did not pass. But the question of how to increase the combat readiness of troops to repel a possible German attack was undoubtedly discussed. After the meeting, Timoshenko and Zhukov probably intended to work on the development of a directive on bringing troops to combat readiness with restrictions that were supposed to exclude the very possibility of provoking the Germans. It cannot be ruled out that by this time Zhukov could have received a report from M.A. Purkaev about the defector.

An hour and a half after A. Liskov’s arrest, the essence of his statement about the German attack at dawn on June 22 (the border guards understood this without an interpreter), given its special importance (whether they believed him or not, but no one would have dared to conceal such important information), could reach Moscow through the line of military command.

In addition, Timoshenko learned through the intelligence department that secret documents were being destroyed at the stake in the German embassy. Already in the morning of June 21, G. Kegel, already mentioned by us, summoned the Soviet intelligence officer K. Leontiev to an emergency meeting and informed him that "the war will begin in the next 48 hours." At 7 p.m., G. Kegel, risking his life, once again called his curator to a meeting and conveyed the contents of the latest instructions from Berlin, which Ambassador Schulenburg announced at a meeting of the diplomatic staff of the mission. From these instructions it followed that on the night of June 21-22, fascist Germany would begin military operations against the USSR.

The embassy was instructed to destroy all secret documents. All employees are ordered to pack their belongings by the morning of June 22 and hand them over to the embassy. All embassy employees are ordered to stay in the embassy building ‹…›.

Saying goodbye to the scout, G. Kegel said again:

Everyone in the embassy believes that the coming night will start a war ...

At about 21.00, an urgent special message was prepared in the Intelligence Directorate, which stated that, according to a verified source, fascist Germany would make a perfidious attack on the Soviet Union on the night of June 21-22, 1941. It was immediately delivered to the secretariat of I.V. Stalin, Minister of Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov and Commissar of Defense Marshal S.K. Timoshenko. This message, according to the approved list, was also handed over to Beria and Zhukov.

Here the score went to minutes, and everything began to spin. This, apparently, was what G.K. Zhukov, when he wrote that about the defector " immediately was reported to I.V. Stalin, he right here agreed to send troops to combat readiness". But this phrase was excluded from the original text, and instead a description appeared of the meeting in Stalin's office, known from the memoirs of the marshal, where "members of the Politburo entered." But just in case, they decided not to indicate the time (didn't they know?).

At 23.00 the last visitors left the leader's office. It is known that the leader went to bed very late, and before that he used to invite close associates to a late dinner. A.I. recalls this. Mikoyan, whose opinion should not be neglected: he should have remembered such a meeting with the leader on the very eve of the war.

“On Saturday, June 21, 1941, in the evening, we, members of the Politburo, were at Stalin's apartment. We exchanged opinions. The situation was tense.

Stalin still thought that Hitler would not start a war. Then Timoshenko, Zhukov and Vatutin. They reported that information has just been received from a defector that on June 22 at 4 o'clock in the morning German troops will cross our border(highlighted by us. - Auth.).

Stalin, this time again, doubted the veracity of the information, saying: wasn’t the defector specifically transferred to provoke us?

Since we were all extremely alarmed and demanded that urgent measures be taken, Stalin agreed "just in case" to give a directive to the troops to put them on combat readiness. But at the same time, instructions were given that when German planes fly over our territory, do not shoot at them, so as not to provoke.

‹…› We parted at about three in the morning on June 22, 1941, and an hour later they woke me up: war!” .

By this time, Stalin, having compared all the information he received with the evasive position of Schulenburg during a meeting with Molotov that evening, finally realized that further delay was dangerous. The leader only demanded to reduce the directive reported to him, indicating in it that the attack could begin with provocative actions of the German units, to which the troops of the border districts should not succumb, so as not to cause complications. G.K. Zhukov With N.F. Vatutin went into another room. Here Zhukov quickly dictated a short text of the directive, to which the leader made amendments. After that, Vatutin, with the text of the directive signed by Timoshenko and Zhukov, immediately went to the communications center of the General Staff in order to immediately transfer it to the districts.

Interesting memories of the dramatic events of the evening of June 21 were left by N.G. Kuznetsov. In the book “On the Eve”, he wrote that at about 11 pm on June 21, Marshal S.K. Timoshenko called him, mentioning that very important information had been received. In the office of People's Commissar of Defense Timoshenko, walking around the room, dictated something, and General of the Army G.K. Zhukov wrote. In front of him lay several completed sheets of a large radiogram pad. It was evident that the people's commissar and the chief of the General Staff worked for quite a long time.

“Semyon Konstantinovich noticed us and stopped. Briefly, without naming sources, he said that a German attack on our country was considered possible. Zhukov got up and showed us the telegram he had prepared for the border districts. I remember it was lengthy - on three sheets(highlighted by us. - Auth.). It detailed what the troops should do in the event of an attack by Nazi Germany.

This telegram did not concern the fleets directly. After running through the text of the telegram, I asked:

Is it allowed to use weapons in the event of an attack?

Permitted (the people's commissar was sure that this time he would receive the leader's sanction to put the troops on alert. After Stalin's instructions, in no case should he succumb to possible provocations, he would hardly have decided to give Kuznetsov permission to use weapons so easily. - Auth.).

I turn to Rear Admiral Alafuzov:

Run to headquarters and immediately instruct the fleets about the actual complete readiness, that is, readiness number one. Run!" .

The most that could be done by the head of the operational department of the Main Naval Staff (GMSH), Rear Admiral V.A. Alafuzov, is to convey (but only with the sanction of the head of the Main Staff Admiral I.S. Isakov) the oral instruction of the people's commissar to begin the transfer of the fleet forces to actual readiness to open fire in the event of an attack. And Kuznetsov and Isakov began to call the headquarters of the fleets and flotillas.

Everything was done in such a hurry that they forgot to include tasks for the forces of the Navy in Directive No. 1. And only at 23.50 on June 21 (as soon as the sailors became aware of the decision to put the troops of the western districts on alert), the order was transmitted from the communications center of the People's Commissariat of the Navy to the military councils of the Northern, Baltic and Black Sea fleets, the commanders of the Pinsk and Danube flotillas: “Immediately move for operational readiness No. 1 ". This is another confirmation that the decision to transfer to combat readiness was made no earlier than 23.30.

Those who managed to see the original directive (unlike directives Nos. 2 and 3, it has not yet been published for some reason) confirm that it was indeed written by Vatutin's hand and has corrections made by Stalin. The time is set there - 23.45. What this mark means is anyone's guess. On the forms of telegrams, radiograms, etc. documents transmitted by a communication center, the time of receipt by signalmen, the time of transmission and the time of receipt by the addressee (the so-called receipt) are usually stamped. Most likely, the mark meant the time the text was handed over to the encryption department of the communications center of the General Staff (apparently, it took 30-35 minutes to encrypt). Much later, having received a copy of Directive No. 1, the People's Commissar of the Navy at 01.12 sent a more detailed order No. zn / 88:

“During 22.6-23.6, a sudden attack by the Germans is possible. The German attack may begin with provocative actions. Our task is not to succumb to any provocative actions that could cause major complications. At the same time, the fleets and flotillas should be in full combat readiness to meet a possible surprise attack by the Germans or their allies.

I order, having switched to operational readiness No. 1, carefully mask the increase in combat readiness. I categorically forbid reconnaissance in foreign territorial waters. Do not conduct any other activities without special orders..

If we agree with the above version (in our opinion, it basically eliminates the above inconsistencies in the published memoirs of G.K. Zhukov), then it turns out that there was no delay in the transfer of Directive No. 1 to the troops. The decision to transfer the troops to combat readiness was made at 23.30 on June 21, they began to transfer at 0.25 on June 22. This time is also confirmed by A.M. Vasilevsky, who on the night of June 22 was incessantly at his office: “At the first hour of the night on June 22, we were obliged to urgently transfer received from the Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov, signed by the People's Commissar of Defense and his directive ‹…›. At 00.30 on June 22, the directive was sent to the districts.

From 04/01/40 to 11/2/42, the troops of the Third Reich acted according to the summer Central European (Berlin) time, which differed from the world by 2 hours, and from Moscow by one.

Tukhachevsky Mikhail Nikolaevich (1893–1937). Member of the First World War, with the rank of lieutenant was taken prisoner (1915), fled to Russia (1917). In the Red Army since 1918, he worked in the Military Department of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, since May - Commissar of the Moscow Defense District, commanded the 1st, 8th and 5th armies of the Eastern and Southern Fronts. Having headed the Caucasian (1920), and then the Western (1920 - August 1921) front, he carried out a number of successful operations. He took an active part in the military reform of 1924-1925. From July 1925, Chief of Staff of the Red Army, from May 1928, commander of the LenVO, from 1931, deputy. People's Commissar of Defense and Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, Chief of Armaments of the Red Army, since 1934 Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and Head of the Combat Training Department, Marshal of the Soviet Union (1935). Shot in 1937, rehabilitated in 1956.

Zayonchkovsky and Andrei Medardovich (1862–1926). He graduated from the Academy of the General Staff (1888), in the Russo-Japanese War he commanded a regiment and brigade, in the First World War - a division and an army corps, an infantry general (1917). In the Red Army since 1919, Chief of Staff of the 13th Army, then was with the Chief of the Field Staff of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, Professor of the Military Academy of the Red Army. Author of fundamental works on the history of the Crimean 1853–1856. and the First World Wars.

Jomini Heinrich Veniaminovich (Antoine Henri Jomini (Jomini) (03/06/1779, Payerne, Switzerland - 03/24/1869, Paris), baron (1807), military theorist and historian. From 1798 he served in the Swiss army, during the revolutionary wars - battalion commander (1801), since 1804 - volunteer of the French army, colonel (1805), chief of staff of the corps, brigadier general (1813), in August 1813 in the Russian service, infantry general (1826). Alexander I. Under Nicholas I, he participated in the development of military projects, including the establishment of a higher military educational institution for officers to receive education - the General Staff, developed its charter (1832), in 1837 was appointed teacher of strategy to the heir. 1855 lived abroad.

"Marita" - German plan of operation against Greece.

"Sonnenblume" - a plan for the transfer of German troops to North Africa.

In fact, the Wehrmacht at that time had only one 7th airborne division, which was located in Greece. Another division, the 22nd Infantry, trained in transport and glider landings, was stationed in Holland.

"Mercury" is the code name for the operation to capture Crete.

His real name was Arvid Harnack, at that time an assistant to the Reichsministry of the German Economy. He was a member of the Red Chapel intelligence network. Executed 22 December 1942

Real name - Harro Schulze-Boysen, Oberleutnant, at that time an employee of the Foreign Relations Department of the Luftwaffe Headquarters. He was a member of the Red Chapel intelligence network. Executed 22 December 1942

Gerhard Kegel was one of the most valuable agents of the Intelligence Directorate since 1933. From June 1940 to June 1941, G. Kegel transmitted through the Soviet intelligence officer K. Leontiev, who was in touch with him, 20 reports that spoke about the plans of the German leadership for preparations for the war against the USSR on June 15, 1941, he informed K. Leontiev that the embassy was firmly convinced that Germany was “in front of an attack on the USSR within the next few days. According to Shiber's adviser, the attack will take place on June 23 or 24. There is an order that heavy artillery be transferred from Krakow to the borders of the USSR by June 19.

Shiber at that time worked as an adviser to the German embassy in Moscow.

Not 45% of the divisions (129 out of 286-296), but 62% of the Wehrmacht formations (128 out of 208) were concentrated at the Soviet borders.

For example, units assembled at the training ground near Brest for the exercises, after the Germans began shelling them, began to launch rockets, demanding a ceasefire, believing that their own artillery was conducting it according to the plan of the upcoming exercise.

Why and on whose initiative these lines were removed by the censor or editor from the text of the memoirs of the first editions of the book, one can only speculate. Perhaps because Zhukov's statement did not correspond to the facts, or because the editors (and censors) were more satisfied with Zhukov's story about the meeting at which Directive No. 1 was adopted.

There were three operational readiness in the fleet - No. 3, 2 and 1. In short: operational readiness No. 3 corresponds to the state of peacetime; No. 2 - vacations are prohibited (shore leave is allowed), measures are taken to ensure, if necessary, a quick transition to readiness No. 1 - full readiness, when everyone is in their places (posts), and the fleet forces are ready to go to sea and use weapons. Given Zhukov's well-known attitude towards sailors, the task of developing something similar in the Red Army was hardly set.

It only to some extent corresponded to constant readiness in the current sense of the term (it was checked, as a rule, by raising troops on a training alert), since in documents in a certain period, aviation, mechanized units and air defense units, unlike others, were prescribed to contain in constant combat readiness.

Perhaps the only mention of full combat readiness in the cover plans when they are put into action refers to fortified areas:

«‹…› 7) All military installations of the forward edge of the UR must be occupied by the full composition of the garrisons and provided with cannons and machine guns. The occupation and bringing the structures located on the front line to full combat readiness must be completed no later than 2-3 hours after the announcement of the alarm, and for parts of the UR in 45 minutes "...

This phrase was restored more than 30 years after the publication of the first edition.

The official interrogation of the defector A.L. Skov began at one in the morning on June 22, after he was taken to the headquarters of the commandant's office and an interpreter was called. The report on his testimony was transmitted by telephone to the People's Commissariat of the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR at 3:10 am on June 22 by the NKGB Department for the Lvov Region.

The testimony of this defector, indicating his name, surname and position, is certainly recorded in the relevant documents. His fate is still unknown. Most likely, he was shot after interrogation with prejudice.

Stalin's words "in 45 minutes" were also removed from the text of the first editions of the marshal's memoirs.

Moreover, Budyonny's proposal (if there was one) on mobilization could not pass, at the announcement of which the cover plan was put into effect in full automatically.

This means that around 2300 the military did not yet have the SHORT text of the directive corrected by Stalin.

Thus, the Baltic Fleet, which had been on operational readiness M-2 (high readiness) since June 19, from 23:37 on June 21, 1941, began the transfer of forces to operational readiness M-1 (full combat readiness).

Throughout the work on the book, the co-authors had a rare mutual understanding and unity of views on all key issues. However, they seriously disagreed about the version presented above, proposed by L. Lopukhovsky.

Due to the lack of reliable data on when and how the fateful decision was worked out, on which the condition in which our troops would meet the sudden attack of the enemy depended, other versions can be put forward. The truth can be learned not from memoirs, but from declassified documents of the General Staff, including its encryption department and communications center.

Read an excerpt from the memoirs of Marshal V.I. Chuikov. What kind of war and battle are we talking about? What title did V.I. Chuikov and what military unit he headed

“... Despite the huge losses, the invaders climbed ahead. Columns of infantry in cars and tanks broke into the city. Apparently, the Nazis believed that his fate was sealed, and each of them sought to reach the Volga, the city center as quickly as possible and profit from trophies there ... Our soldiers ... crawled out from under German tanks, most often wounded, to the next line, where they accepted, combined into units, supplied mainly with ammunition, and again thrown into battle.

Answer: In this passage we are talking about the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945), the Battle of Stalingrad 07/17/1942 - 02/02/1943

Rationale for the answer: The described fragment of the event undoubtedly refers to the period of the Great Patriotic War. The Battle of Stalingrad is one of the central events of World War II.

On September 12, two days after the 62nd Army was cut off from the rest of the Soviet troops, General Chuikov was appointed commander of this army.

Questions on knowledge of historical processes

Indicate the two main reasons for the formation of the Old Russian state.

Kievan Rus is one of the largest states of the Middle Ages of the IX-XII centuries. Unlike the Eastern and Western countries, the process of statehood formation had its own specific features - spatial and geopolitical. In the course of its formation, Russia acquired the features of both Eastern and Western state formations, since it occupied a median position between Europe and Asia and did not have pronounced natural geographical boundaries within the vast plains. The need for constant protection from external enemies of a large territory forced peoples with different types of development, religion, culture, language to unite, to create a strong state power.

Statehood among the Slavs begins to take shape from the 6th century, when there is a transition from a tribal and tribal community to a neighboring community, property inequality is formed. There are many reasons for the formation of the Old Russian state, here are the main ones:

• 1. Social division of labor. The sources from which people drew their livelihoods became more diverse; thus, military booty began to play a large role in the life of the clan. Over time, professional artisans and warriors appeared. Frequent relocations of clans, the emergence and disintegration of inter-clan and inter-tribal unions, the separation of groups of seekers of military prey (brigades) from the clan - all these processes forced us to deviate from traditions based on custom, old solutions did not always work in previously unknown conflict situations.
• 2. The interest of society in the emergence of the state. The state arose because the overwhelming majority of members of society were interested in its appearance. It was convenient and beneficial for the farmer-community that the prince and combatants with weapons in their hands protect him and save him from burdensome and dangerous military affairs. From the very beginning, the state solved not only military, but also judicial tasks, especially those related to inter-clan disputes. The princes and their warriors were relatively objective mediators in conflicts between representatives of different clans; the elders, who from time immemorial had to take care of the interests of their kind, their community, were not suitable for the role of impartial arbiters. The resolution of intercommunal disputes by force of arms was too burdensome for society; as the general usefulness of power, standing above private and generic interest, was realized, conditions were created for the transfer of the most important judicial powers historically.

Quest Source: Decision 3448. Unified State Examination 2017. Russian language. I.P. Tsybulko. 36 options.

Task 13. Determine the sentence in which both underlined words are spelled ONE. Open the brackets and write out these two words.

Leaving the house, we (AT) THE BEGINNING follow the country road, and (FOR) THAT along the paved highway.

While the road was near the swamps, (IN) VIEW of a pine forest, we (FOR) FREQUENTLY scared away whole broods of ducks sheltering here.

(WHILE) THROUGHOUT the whole journey we made long stops by the water, (NOT) DESPITE the enormous loss of time.

The side, (APPOINTING) was deaf: everywhere you could see the forest, but there were still no fields and villages.

In vain we peered (AT) FAR horizon: (AT) THE MEETING us the fog rose.

Solution.

We consider each sentence, determining the part of speech of the selected words and applying the rule for their spelling.

Leaving the house, we (AT) THE BEGINNING (adverb AT THE BEGINNING) follow the country road, and (FOR) THAT (adverb THEN) along the paved highway.

While the road was near the swamps, (IN) VIEW (noun with the preposition IN SIGHT) of a pine forest, we (FOR) FREQUENTLY (adverb FREQUENTLY) scared away whole broods of ducks sheltering here.

(WHILE) THROUGH (preposition WHILE) all the way we made long stops by the water, (NOT) DESPITE (preposition DESPITE) a huge loss of time.

The side, (PO) VISIBLY (introductory word VISIBLE), was deaf: a forest was visible everywhere, but fields and villages were still SO (SAME) (an adverb with a particle SAME) was not.

In vain we peered (AT) FAR (noun with the preposition IN THE FAR) of the horizon: (AT) MEETING (preposition TOGETHER) fog rose to us.

Option 1

Part 1

1. Read an excerpt from the order of the German command and determine which operation the text refers to:

“The goal of the offensive is to encircle the enemy forces located in the Kursk region and destroy them with a concentrated offensive ... It is necessary ... to concentrate the offensive forces as best as possible on a narrow sector of the front in order to use the superiority in certain points of all offensive means (tanks, assault guns, artillery, smoke mortars, etc.) and with one blow, before the connection of both advancing armies, break through the enemy’s front and surround him ... "

1) "Typhoon"; 2) "Citadel"; 3) "Uranus"; 4) "Bagration".

2. The initial stage of the Great Patriotic War includes:

1) Smolensk battle; 2) Battle of Stalingrad;

3) the battle on the Kursk Bulge; 4) Berlin operation.

3. The offensive of the troops of the South-Western Front to Kharkov in the spring of 1942. ended:

1) The defeat of the German group; 2) Liberation of the North Caucasus;

3) The encirclement of two Soviet armies; 4) The encirclement of the German armies.

4. The beginning of the blockade of Leningrad:

1) July 10, 1941; 2) September 8, 1941; 3) August 30, 1941; 4) September 15, 1941

5. The offensive operation of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad was called:

1) "Bagration"; 2) "Citadel"; 3) "Uranus"; 4) "Typhoon".

6. Establish a correspondence between the names of the battles on the Soviet-German front and the years when they took place.

BATTLE NAMES		YEARS
	Kursk		1941
	Berlin		1942-1943
	Moscow		1943
	Stalingradskaya		1944
			1945

7. Read an excerpt from the memoirs of Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky and indicate the preparation for which offensive operation in question.

“The Soviet command was faced with a dilemma: to attack or defend? All possibilities were carefully analyzed, all options for action were studied. The only correct decision was made by the collective mind, the creative work of experienced military leaders and headquarters, wise after two years of war... Analyzing intelligence data on the preparation of the enemy for the offensive, the fronts, the General Staff and the Headquarters gradually leaned towards the idea of ​​​​transition to deliberate defense ... "

1) Stalingrad 2) Berlin3) Moscow 4) Kursk

8. Read an excerpt from the directive of the German command and write the name of the plan of the German command, to the implementation of which this directive was directed.

9. Read an excerpt from the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov and indicate which operation of the Great Patriotic War is referred to in the passage.

“Our aviation went over the battlefield in waves ... However, the enemy, having come to his senses, began to resist from the Seelow Heights with his artillery, mortars ... a group of bombers appeared ... And the closer our troops approached the Seelow Heights, the stronger the resistance of the enemy increased...

10. Read the excerpt from the remembrance contract and indicate the year it was signed.

what

11. Read an excerpt from the memoirs of a military leader and indicate what event of the Great Patriotic War is in question.

“On that day, the Supreme Commander called me at the command post of the Bryansk Front and ordered me to urgently fly to the Prokhorovka region and take over the coordination of the actions of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts ... There were clouds of dust and smoke over the battlefield. It was a turning point in the battle in the Belgorod direction. The Nazi troops, drained of blood and having lost in victory, gradually switched to defensive actions.

12. Read an excerpt from the work of a modern historian and indicate the battle for which city it refers to

"The battle for _____ was the decisive event of the first year of the war and the first major defeat of the Nazis in World War II. In addition, the myth of the invincibility of the German army was finally dispelled, and the Germans had to abandon the "blitzkrieg" plan.

13. Read an excerpt from the memoirs of Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky and indicate the name of the city, the battle for which is discussed in the document.

"There were 22 divisions in the ring ... The Nazi command doomed hundreds of thousands of its soldiers to death. For several months it forced them to fight without any hope of salvation. In essence, these people, by the will of the Hitlerite clique, were doomed to complete annihilation .. "Among the prisoners were 24 generals led by Field Marshal Paulus. Yesterday's enemies stood before us unarmed, suppressed..."

14. Read an excerpt from the memoirs and indicate the name of the authority of the period of the Great Patriotic War in question.

"_____ led all the military operations of the armed forces on land, at sea and in the air, carried out an increase in strategic efforts in the course of the struggle at the expense of reserves and the use of the forces of the partisan movement. The General Staff was its working body."

15. Read an excerpt from a Soviet military report and determine the name of the German commander mentioned in it.

"From the morning of January 31, 1943, Field Marshal ____ was in the house of the executive committee (the central part of Stalingrad) with members of his headquarters and strong guards. During the battle, the building was surrounded by units of the 38th motorized rifle ... During the negotiations, Field Marshal ___ was presented the demand is to give an order to the troops of the northern group to stop resistance.

1) Manstein 2) Keitel 3) Rommel 4) Paulus

Part 2

1. Below are two points of view on the main reasons for the victory of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War:

1. The victory was achieved only due to the careless attitude towards human lives on the part of the Soviet command ("the Germans were filled with corpses"), and the Soviet army, until the end of the war, was lower in its combat qualities than the German one.

2. Victory in the war was achieved due to the superiority of the Soviet system, the patriotic upsurge and the high military potential of the Soviet army.

2. Name at least three results of the Second World War 1941-1945. and at least three operations of the final stage of the war.

"The Great Patriotic War"

Option 2

Part 1

1. Battle of Smolensk during the Great Patriotic War

1) suspended the German attack on Moscow for a month;

2) prevented the complete blocking of Leningrad by the Germans;

3) delayed the entry of the German armies into Kyiv;

4) ended with the first "cauldron" for the German army.

1) Kalinin; 2) Molotov; 3) Zhukov; 4) Stalin.

3. After which battle of the Second World War ended the radical change:

1) Moscow; 2) Stalingrad; 3) Kursk; 4) Berlin.

4. Which battle does not belong to the "10 Stalinist blows":

1) Lifting the blockade of Leningrad; 2) Liberation of Crimea and Odessa;

3) Korsun-Shevchenko operation; 4) Kursk Bulge.

5. Order No. 227 "Not a step back!" released during the battle:

1) Moscow; 2) Stalingrad; 3) Kursk; 4) Defense of Leningrad.

6. Which of the Soviet commanders led the capture of Berlin

1) Stalin; 2) Zhukov; 3) Rokossovsky; four). Vasilevsky.

7. Correlate the name of military operations and their goals:

NAMES OF OPERATIONS		GOALS
	Bagration		Capture of Moscow
	Barbarossa		Advance at Stalingrad
	Typhoon		Liberation of Belarus
	Uranus		Invasion of the USSR

8. Read an excerpt from the work of the modern historian N. Werth and indicate the title of the document. “The agreement was accompanied by a secret protocol, a photocopy of which was later discovered in Germany, but the existence of which was nevertheless denied in the USSR until the summer of 1989. The protocol demarcated the spheres of influence of the parties in Eastern Europe ...”

3) act of surrender of Germany 4) Munich agreement

9. Read an excerpt from the memoirs of Marshal V.I. Chuikov and write the name of the battle that it refers to.

“...Despite the huge losses, the invaders went ahead. Columns of infantry in cars and tanks broke into the city. Apparently, the Nazis believed that his fate was sealed, and each of them sought to reach the city center as soon as possible and profit from trophies there ... Our soldiers ... crawled out from under German tanks, most often wounded, to the next line, where they were received, united in units, supplied mainly with ammunition, and again thrown into battle.

10. Read an excerpt from the work of a modern historian and indicate the name of the city that is missing in it.

“Fierce defensive battles were fought near Odessa. By order of the Headquarters, the Odessa defensive region was created. The fighting went on until October 16, after which the Odessa garrison was evacuated to the Crimea. Defensive battles in the Crimea began in September-October 1941. The longest was the defense of ____, it lasted 250 days. The Black Sea sailors held out to the last.

1) Kerch 2) Sevastopol 3) Leningrad 4) Novorossiysk

11. Read a passage from a modern historian's work and indicate the name of the army missing in the passage.

“Soviet troops liberated a number of ports in North Korea and the Kuril Islands. The Red Army, together with the ships of the Navy, dealt a crushing blow to the Japanese, defeating a powerful

army, which provided effective assistance to the peoples of China and Korea.

1) Beijing 2) Kwantung 3) Kuril 4) Tsushima

12. Read an excerpt from the memoirs of a military leader and indicate the name of the city in question.

"The building is illuminated by the fire of conflagrations. On the stairs, past the statue of Bismarck, we rush to the second floor ... Jumping over two or three steps at once, we break out jumping up immediately. A few more turns - and the dome of the Reichstag opens to our eyes - the dome we reach so dreamed and on the way to which they lost their comrades.

13. Read an excerpt from the work of a modern historian and indicate the name of the city with which the events described in the document are connected.

"In harsh conditions from January 22 to April 15, 1942, more than half a million people and a huge amount of industrial equipment and historical valuables were taken out of _______ over ice .... the lake."

14. Read an excerpt from the memoirs and indicate the event of the Great Patriotic War in question.

"On August 23, 1943 ... this largest battle of the Great Patriotic War ended ... The greatest battle of our troops with the Nazi troops continued for fifty days. It ended with the victory of the Red Army, which defeated 30 selected German divisions, including 7 tank .. "The fascist leadership could no longer make up for such losses with any total measures. Hitler's attempt to wrest the strategic initiative from the hands of the Soviet command ended in complete failure, and from then until the end of the war, the German troops were forced tofight only defensive battles.

Part 2

1. Below are two points of view on the meaning of the Non-Aggression Pact between the USSR and Germany, called the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact:

1. The signing of the non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany and the secret protocol to it was a diplomatic success of the USSR.
2. The signing of the pact was a mistake that had grave consequences for the USSR.

Please indicate which of these points of view you prefer. Give at least three facts, provisions that can serve as arguments confirming your chosen point of view.

2. Specify the reasons for the failures of the Red Army at the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War. List at least three reasons. Name at least three battles during the summer-autumn of 1941.

"The Great Patriotic War"

Option 3

Part 1

1. A radical change during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. was achieved as a result of the defeat of the fascist troops

1) near Stalingrad and on the Kursk Bulge 2) near Moscow

3) in East Prussia 4) on the Vistula and Oder

2. The 62nd Army fought heroically in the Battle of Stalingrad under the command of General

1) V.I. Chuikov 2) V.K. Blucher 3) G.K. Zhukov 4) M.V. Frunze

3. Outstanding commanders of the Great Patriotic War were

1) A.A. Brusilov, D.F. Ustinov 2) A.N. Kosygin, A.A. Gromyko

3) I.V. Stalin, S.M. Budyonny 4) I.S. Konev, K.K. Rokossovsky

4. During the Great Patriotic War, an event occurred

1) the signing of the Munich Treaty 2) the Iasi-Kishinev operation

3) battle near Kunersdorf 4) defense of Tsaritsyn

5. Read an extract from a modern historian's work and indicate which international conference's decisions are referred to in it.

“... The conference was held after the surrender of Germany... The structure of Germany on a democratic basis was proclaimed. The conference determined that the Allies should pursue a common policy in their occupation zones in order to turn Germany into a single peace-loving state.

1) Yalta 3) Tehran

2) Potsdam 4) Paris

6. During the Great Patriotic War, an event occurred during Operation Bagration

1) defense of the Brest Fortress 2) Tehran conference

3) liberation of Belarus 4) forcing the Dnieper

7. Read the excerpt from the plan of the military command and indicate the name of the plan.

“The ultimate goal of the operation is to create a protective barrier against Asian Russia along the Volga-Arkhangelsk line. Thus, if necessary, the last Russian industrial area in the Ural Mountains can be destroyed by air forces.

1) "Ost" 2) "Citadel" 3) "Typhoon" 4) "Barbarossa"

8. The Nazis attached particular importance to the capture of Stalingrad, because

1) sought to cut off transport routes for the delivery of oil from Baku

2) sought to implement the "blitzkrieg" plan

3) feared the opening of a second front in 1941.

4) the defense of the city was personally commanded by I.V. Stalin

9. Read an excerpt from a German military report and determine what events it refers to.

"June 26, 1941 . East Fort remained the nest of resistance. You can't get here with money.. infantry, as excellent rifle and machine-gun fire from deep trenches and from a horseshoe-shaped courtyard mowed down every approacher.

27th of June . From one prisoner we learned that about 20 commanders and 370 fighters were defending in the Eastern Fort with enough ammunition and food. Water is not enough, but it is taken from dug holes. There are also women and children in the fort. The soul of the resistance is supposedly one major and one commissar.

1) defense of Leningrad 2) defense of the Brest Fortress

3) the battle for Kyiv 4) the battle near Smolensk

10. Read an excerpt from the memoirs of a Soviet military leader and write the name of the battle, the beginning of which is discussed in the document.

“From the early morning of April 17, fierce battles flared up in all sectors of the front, the enemy desperately resisted. However, by evening, unable to withstand the blow of the tank armies introduced the day before, which, in cooperation with the combined arms armies, broke through the defenses on the Seelow Heights in a number of sectors, the enemy began to retreat. On the morning of April 18, the Seelow Heights were taken ... "

11. Read an excerpt from the memoirs and write about the situation of the inhabitants of which city during the Great Patriotic War it says.

“How many delights there were when they added bread. They shouted “Hurrah” in the bakeries. This increase cannot restore the destroyed forces. The point is clear. The people are falling ... But it brought with it hope: it will be better!

Everyone mentions Lake Ladoga. Ice road. Ice track. Road to Life."

12. Match the name of military operations and their goals:

	Bagration		Capture of Moscow
	Barbarossa		Advance at Stalingrad
	Typhoon		Liberation of Belarus
	Uranus		Invasion of the USSR
			German offensive on the Kursk Bulge

13. Read a fragment from the memoirs of the chief marshal of the armored forces P.A. Rotmistrov and determine at the entrance of which of the battles the described battle took place.

"From the very first minutes of the battle, two powerful avalanches of tanks in deep formation, raising clouds of dust and smoke, moved towards each other ...

The battle lasted until late in the evening. Clutched into one giant tangle, the tanks could no longer disperse. Frontal attacks were accompanied by ramming into the side, fire duels of cannons and machine guns. The ground groaned from the burst of shells and the steel roar. Tanks and self-propelled guns were burning all around.

It was a terrible, unprecedented tank battle. "

14. Read an excerpt from the order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and write what name this order received.

"... To the Military Councils of the armies and, above all, to the commanders of the armies: ... to form within the army 3-5 well-armed barrage detachments (up to 200 people each), place them in the immediate rear of unstable divisions and oblige them in case of panic and disorderly the withdrawal of parts of the division to shoot alarmists and cowards on the spot and thereby help the honest fighters of the divisions to fulfill their duty to the Motherland.

15. Read an excerpt from the directive of the German command and write the name of the plan of the German command, to the implementation of which this directive was directed.

“The German armed forces must be ready to defeat Soviet Russia through a fleeting military operation even before the end of the war with England. Particular attention should be paid to ensuring that the intention to carry out an attack is not guessed ... General goal: the military masses of the Russian army located in the western part of Russia must be destroyed in bold operations with deep advancement of tank units. The retreat of combat-ready units into the expanses of Russian territory should be prevented ... "

Part 2

1) From the memoirs of Marshal G.K. Zhukov.
“Thousands of multi-colored rockets shot up into the air. At this signal, 140 searchlights flashed, located every 200 meters. More than 100 billion candles illuminated the battlefield, blinding the enemy and snatching objects of attack from the darkness for our tanks and infantry. It was a picture of great impressive power...
Hitler's troops were literally sunk in a continuous sea of ​​fire and metal. A solid wall of dust and smoke hung in the air, and in places even the powerful beams of anti-aircraft searchlights could not penetrate it.
Our aircraft flew over the battlefield in waves ... However, the enemy, having come to his senses, began to resist from the Seelow Heights with his artillery, mortars ... a group of bombers appeared ... And the closer our troops approached the Seelow Heights, the more enemy resistance...
On April 20, on the fifth day of the operation, long-range artillery opened fire ... A historic assault began ... "

C1. What battle are you talking about?

C2. Using the text and knowledge from the course of history, name at least two distinctive features of this battle.
SZ. What was the significance of the described battle for the general course of the war? What events followed it (name at least two events).

"The Great Patriotic War"

Option 4

Part 1

1. What was the reason for the retreat of the Red Army at the beginning of the war?

1) miscalculations of the Soviet leadership in determining the timing of the start of the war

2) Hitler's "appeasement policy" pursued by Western countries

3) the concentration of German forces in the central direction

4) the refusal of the Soviet leadership to announce a general mobilization

2. What was the name of the emergency body of the highest military administration, which carried out the strategic leadership of the troops during the war years?

1) NKVD 2) Revolutionary Military Council

3) Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense 4) Headquarters of the Supreme High Command

3. What event happened during the Great Patriotic War during the Battle of Moscow?

1) defense of the Brest Fortress 2) creation of an anti-Hitler coalition

3) the creation of the Road of Life 4) the encirclement of Soviet troops near Vyazma

4. Which direction of the strike of the German troops in the spring and summer of 1942 was the main

1) central direction 2) young direction

3) northern direction 4) Leningrad direction

5. What event happened during the Great Patriotic War during Operation Uranus

1) defense of the Brest Fortress 2) Tageran Conference

3) forcing the Dnieper 4) the encirclement of German troops in Stalingrad

6. What event happened during the Battle of Kursk

1) creation of the Road of Life 2) breaking through the blockade of Leningrad

3) the largest tank battle 4) the surrender of the army of Field Marshal Paulus

7. What is the largest military operation referred to in the message of the Sovinformburo dated November 5, 1943

"The Red Army crossed the largest water barrier ... and liberated ... the most important industrial centers in the south of our country ... Thus, our troops broke into the entire enemy defenses from Zaporozhye to the Sea of ​​\u200b\u200bAzov ..."

8. Read an excerpt from the memoirs of a military leader and indicate what event of the Great Patriotic War is in question.

"The German General Westphal, describing the Typhoon operation, was forced to admit "that the German army, previously considered invincible, was on the verge of annihilation."

What is true is true ... The Red Army for the first time in six months of the war inflicted the largest defeat on the main grouping of Nazi troops. This was our first strategic victory over the Wehrmacht."

9. Read an excerpt from the work of a historian and determine which city it refers to the battle for.

"The difficult conditions of street fighting with a stubbornly defending enemy were more favorable to the Russians, although they were also in a difficult situation. In the current situation, they had to transport reinforcements and ammunition on ferries and barges across the Volga under artillery fire. This limited the size of the forces that the Russians could hold and provide supplies on the western bank of the river for the defense of the city."

10. Read an excerpt from the memoirs and indicate the name of the authority of the period of the Great Patriotic War in question

"On June 30, 1941, an emergency body was created - headed by I.V. Stalin. It became an authoritative body for leading the country's defense, concentrating all power in its hands. Civil, party, Soviet organizations were obliged to comply with all its decisions and orders. .. "

1) Revolutionary Military Council 2) Headquarters of the Supreme High Command

3) State Defense Committee 4) Evacuation Council

11. Read an excerpt from the memoirs and indicate which battle of the Great Patriotic War is in question.

“The result of a defensive battle, in my opinion, should be considered the defeat of the enemy’s tank formations, as a result of which a particularly favorable balance of forces for us in this important branch of service arose. To a large extent, our victory in a major oncoming battle south of Prokhorovka contributed to this ... I happened to be witness this truly titanic duel of two steel armadas (up to 1200 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts) on July 12."

12. Establish a correspondence between the names of the battles on the Soviet-German front and the years when they took place.

BATTLE NAMES		YEARS
	Stalingradskaya		1941
	Berlin		1942-1943
	Kursk		1943
	Moscow		1944
			1945

13. Read an excerpt from the memoirs and indicate the year to which the described events of the Great Patriotic War refer.

“The situation at that time remained very difficult for our country. Under the heel of the fascist invaders were the Baltic states and Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, the western and southern regions of the Russian Federation. The enemy continued blockade of Leningrad, kept large forces of troops not far from Moscow. The strategic reserves accumulated with great effort were used up in the battles near Moscow. Despite the fact that by the summer the efforts of the Party and the entire Soviet people had achieved considerable results in the development of the national economy, it so far provided the army with only the minimum necessary means for organizing a rebuff to the enemy hordes. The situation was aggravated, as mentioned earlier, by the unsuccessful outcome of the hostilities for our troops near Leningrad, Kharkov and in the Crimea.

1) 1941 2) 1942 3) 1943 4) 1944

14. Read an excerpt from a historian's book and indicate the battle of the Great Patriotic War described in it.

“The counteroffensive of the Red Army and the defeat of the Germans is the main event of the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War. This was the first major defeat of Germany, which showed that the idea of ​​​​the invincibility of her armies was a myth. For some time, the Red Army managed to seize the strategic initiative. The prerequisites for the formation of an anti-Hitler coalition were formed.

15. Read the excerpt from the treaty of remembrance and indicate the year it was signed.

"Stalin made a pact with Germany in order to push Hitler to attack Poland, knowing full well what England and France will take her side. After the alleged victory of Germany over Poland, Russia, firstly, will regain important areas lost in the victorious war; and secondly, it will calmly watch how Germany, fighting with the Western powers, exhausts its forces, so that at the right moment to throw all the power of the Red Army to the further Bolshevization of Europe.

1) 1933 2) 1937 3) 1939 4) 1941

Part 2

“The offensive began on July 5 with a maneuver long known to the Russians from numerous previous operations, and therefore unraveled by them in advance. Hitler wanted to destroy the positions of the Russians advanced in the form of an arc with a double envelopment ... and thereby seize the initiative on the Eastern Front again in his own hands.

From July 10 to 15, I visited both advancing fronts ... and on the spot, in conversations with tank commanders, I clarified the course of events, the shortcomings of our offensive methods in an offensive battle and the negative aspects of our technology. My fears about the insufficient preparedness of the Panther tanks for combat operations at the front were confirmed. 90 tanks ... of the Porsche [Ferdinand] company ... also showed that they did not meet the requirements of close combat; these tanks, as it turned out, were not even adequately supplied with ammunition. The situation was aggravated by the fact that they did not have machine guns ... They failed to either destroy or suppress the [Russian] infantry firing points in order to enable the ... [German] infantry to advance. After advancing 10 km, [General] Model's troops were stopped. True, success was greater in the south, but it was not enough to block the Russian arc or lower its resistance. On July 15, the Russian offensive began on Orel ... On August 4, the city had to be abandoned. Belgorod fell on the same day.

As a result of the failure of the Citadel Offensive, we suffered a decisive defeat. The armored forces, replenished with such great difficulty, were put out of action for a long time due to heavy losses in people and equipment ... Needless to say, the Russians hurried to use their success. And already on the Eastern Front there were no quiet days. The initiative has completely passed to the enemy.

C1. What battle of the Great Patriotic War is mentioned in the memoirs of Heinz Guderian? Name it, date (year).

C2. What tasks did the German command set for its troops in Operation Citadel? Name at least two problems.

SZ. What was the significance of the described battle for the general course of the war?

2. Below are two points of view on the question of the role of the Western and Eastern fronts in World War II:

Answers

Option 1

6- A-3, B-5, V-1, G-2

8-Barbarossa

9-Berlin operation

10-3

11-Kursk battle

12-Moscow

13-Stalingrad

14-2

15-4

part 2

1 ) Below are two points of view on the main reasons for the victory of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War:

1. Victory in the war was achieved due to the superiority of the Soviet system, the high military potential of the Soviet Army, the art of military leaders, patriotic enthusiasm and mass heroism.
2. The victory was achieved at the expense of colossal human losses, and the Soviet Army, until the end of the war, was lower in its fighting qualities than the German one.

Indicate which of the above points of view seems to you more preferable and convincing. Give at least three facts, provisions that can serve as arguments confirming your chosen point of view.

the huge losses of the USSR were caused by the unsuccessful start of the war - the suddenness and perfidy of the German attack; Soviet industry was able to very quickly establish the production of military equipment and surpass German industry in almost all respects, which ensured a radical turning point in the war; the military art of Soviet commanders (G.K. Zhukov, K.K. Rokossovsky, etc.) was even recognized as an enemy; the best examples of Soviet military equipment were not inferior to German ones, and often even surpassed them; during the war, Soviet soldiers and officers, like the entire population of the country, showed mass heroism, a patriotic upsurge played a large role in the victory.

the Soviet military command was beheaded as a result of Stalinist repressions, and new inexperienced commanders often could not fight without heavy losses in personnel; by the beginning of the war with the USSR, the German army had extensive military experience, and the Soviet troops showed their low combat readiness during the war with Finland; The USSR suffered gigantic human losses during the war; at the first stage of the war, Soviet soldiers had to fight practically without the support of equipment, and it was possible to survive only at the expense of huge human losses; The Soviet Army was much larger in number than the German one, but a radical turning point in the war was achieved only in the second year of the war.

2) Name at least three outcomes of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Specify at least three operations of the final stage of the war.

Answer:

1. The following results of the Great Patriotic War can be indicated:

1. the victory of the anti-Hitler coalition, the USSR defended its state independence despite huge material and human losses, the statehood of the peoples of Europe occupied by Germany was restored;
2. fascist Germany and Japan suffered a military-political defeat, the anti-democratic regimes in these countries, as well as in Italy, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and others, fell;
3. the prestige of the USSR grew, its international influence increased, a system of socialist states under its direct control began to form in Central and South-Eastern Europe;
4. some territorial changes took place in Europe and the Far East (in particular, Poland received Silesia, the USSR received East Prussia, all of Sakhalin, the Kuril Islands);
5. a powerful impetus was given to the national liberation movement, the destruction of the colonial system began;
6. fascism and Nazism were condemned as an ideology of aggression, violence, racial superiority.

1. The following operations of the final stage of the war can be indicated:

1. lifting the blockade of Leningrad; liberation of Odessa; liberation of Belarus (operation "Bagration"); Lvov-Sandomierz operation; Vistula-Oder operation; Berlin

Option 2

7- A-3, B-4, C-1, G-2

9-Stalingradskaya

10-2

11-2

12-Berlin

13-Leningrad

14-Kursk

15-Battle for Moscow

part 2

1 ) Below are two points of view on the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact:

The signing of the non-aggression pact with fascist Germany and the secret protocol to it was a diplomatic success of the USSR.

The signing of the pact was a mistake that had grave consequences for the USSR.

Please indicate which of these points of view you prefer. Give at least three facts, provisions that can serve as arguments confirming your chosen point of view.

When choosing the first subtle point of view:

the signing of the pact became necessary as a result of the failure of negotiations with England and France

by signing a pact with Germany, the USSR directed fascist aggression to the West

the time needed to prepare for war was won

the union of the USSR and Germany forced Japan to reorient itself towards a war with the USA, and the USSR avoided a war on two fronts

the signing of the pact and the secret protocol to it allowed the USSR to include in its composition new territories that remained with it after the war

When choosing the second point of view:

the pact unleashed the hands of Germany to conquer half of Europe, which led to an increase in the military and economic potential of German fascism

The USSR discredited itself by signing an agreement with the Nazis and acting as an aggressor against Poland, the Baltic states, Finland and Romania. This slowed down the creation of the anti-Hitler coalition

the Soviet leadership was unable to take advantage of the time gained from the signing of the treaty

the signing of the treaty disorientated the Soviet people, the army, who could not decide on their attitude towards Germany as an ally or enemy, which harmed the country's defense

the signing of the pact and the secret protocol to it led to the forcible annexation of territories to the USSR, part of the population of which later supported the Nazi troops in the fight against the Soviet army.

2) Specify the reasons for the failures of the Red Army at the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War. List at least three reasons. Name at least three battles during the summer-autumn of 1941.
The reasons:large-scale repressions in the Red Army;

1. the conviction that the treaties of 1939 would be respected in Germany;
2. distrust of intelligence reports;
3. as a result of the annexation of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, the new borders of the USSR were not strengthened;
4. Soviet military doctrine was based on the premise that the Red Army, in the event of an enemy attack, would wage war on foreign territory, and, consequently, did not provide for defensive tactics.

Battles - Leningrad defensive operation, Battle of Smolensk, Defense of Kyiv

Option 3

10-Berlinskaya

11-Leningrad

12-A-3, B-4, V-1, G-2

Kursk

13-Kursk

14-"Not one step back"

15-Barbarossa

part 2

1 ) From the memoirs of Marshal G.K. Zhukov.

1) Berlin offensive operation

2) The use of searchlights, the offensive was carried out by the forces of 3 fronts and the troops of the Kingdom of Poland

3) The battle led to the capture of Berlin and the end of the Second World War

2. Name at least three signs of a radical fracture during the Second World War. Name at least three battles and military operations of this period.

Answer:

The following signs of a radical change during the Great Patriotic War can be named:

transfer of strategic initiative to the Red Army;

the achievement by the USSR of military-technical superiority in supplying the army with the latest types of weapons;

ensuring the reliable superiority of the Soviet defense industry and the rear economy over the economy of the enemy (Germany);

qualitative changes in the balance of forces in the international arena in favor of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition.

The following battles can be specified:

Battle of Stalingrad;

battle on the Oryol-Kursk Bulge;

forcing the Dnieper, liberation of the Left-bank Ukraine, Donbass, Kyiv;

offensive operations in the Caucasus;

breaking the blockade of Leningrad.

Option 4

7-Dnepr

8-Battle for Moscow

9-Stalingrad

10-3

11-Kursk

12-A-2, B-5, V-3, G-1

13-2

14-Battle for Moscow

15-3

part 2

1. Read an extract from a historical source and briefly answer the questions

An excerpt from the memoirs of General G. Guderian.

1) Kursk Bulge, 1943

2) destroy the positions of the Russians advanced in the form of an arc with a double encirclement ... and thereby seize the initiative on the Eastern Front again into their own hands.

3) There was a radical change in the course of the war, the strategic initiative passed to the Soviet command, the cities of Orel, Belgorod, Kursk were liberated, favorable conditions were created for the opening of a second front

2) Below are two points of view on the question of the role of the Western and Eastern fronts in World War II:

1. The victory over fascism was won primarily thanks to the Western countries (USA and Great Britain), thanks to their victories in North Africa and Western Europe.

2. The main contribution to the victory over fascism was made by the USSR.

Please indicate which of these points of view you prefer. Give at least three facts, provisions that can serve as arguments confirming your chosen point of view.

When choosing the first point of view:

When choosing the second point of view:

more than 2/3 of the ground forces of Germany were concentrated on the Soviet-German front (until 1944 -70 -75%); on the Eastern Front, the Wehrmacht lost more than ¾ of its personnel, tanks, artillery, and aviation; Soviet troops defeated the largest and most efficient Japanese Kwantung Army; most of the decisive battles of World War II took place on the Soviet-German front (Moscow offensive operation, the Battle of Stalingrad, the Battle of Kursk, the Berlin operation, etc.).

Anglo-American allied troops defeated the main forces of fascist Italy; the landing of the allies in Normandy significantly brought the end of the war closer; Anglo-American troops bore the brunt of the war in the Pacific.