5.1 Again the chief of staff. 228th Rifle Division Before leaving, I went to the topographic department to turn in my maps. An elderly captain-topographer, greeted me, turned to me with a request, on behalf of Lyuba and her mother, the mistress of the house, a member of the party and a worker

5.4 Retreat. 228th Rifle Division On July 15 or 16, I do not remember exactly, the 228th Rifle Division received an order, as, indeed, the entire front, to begin a retreat to the south, in the direction of Krasny Sulin - Shakhty. According to the “idea”, the troops were to use the nights to ensure stealth and

Chapter 8 89th Infantry Division. National Armenian division. Chief of Staff 8.1 Appointment to a new position. Acquaintance with the 89th Rifle Division General Zamertsev and I arrived in the city of Grozny late, and immediately went to the personnel department, which worked

Chapter 9 337 Infantry Division. My long road of war Reference 337 Lubensky Guards Rifle Division 2 formations

Reference 337 Lubensky Guards Rifle Division 2 formations The beginning of the formation of the 337th Rifle Division was determined by order of the troops of the Transcaucasian Front dated July 29, 1942, based on the Decree of the State Defense Committee No. 2114 dated July 28, 1942

Connection history:

Formed in September 1939 in Yelets (Orlovsky Military District) on the basis of a regiment of the 6th Infantry Division.

Participated in the Polish campaign of 1939 and the Soviet-Finnish war. At the end of the Winter War, the division continued to deploy in the Kandalaksha area.

After the end of the Soviet-Finnish conflict, in the period from the summer of 1940 to 1941, the entire personnel of the division, along with combat training, was engaged in the construction of housing, warehouses, office premises, at the same time, in the area of ​​​​the state border, they erected engineering structures and barriers in the Salsk fortified area. At the same time, the forces of separate parts of the division and the newly arrived division (104th) built the Kandalaksha-Alakurtti highway and continued the railway line to Cape Kairal. All these measures significantly improved communication and supply of division units, improved communication with the city of Kandalaksha. However, by June 1941, the construction of fortifications in the area of ​​the state border had not been completed.

On June 22, 1941, 122sd was part of 42SK 14A of the Northern Front, which was deployed to cover the city of Murmansk and the Kirov railway line in the Kandalaksha and Loukh directions. The division occupies positions along the state border west of Kandalaksha - the 715th Rifle Regiment is stationed in Kuolojärvi, the 596th Rifle Regiment in Vuorijärvi, the 420th Red Banner Rifle Regiment in Kayral, the 285th Artillery Regiment in Alakurtti.

On July 1, 1941, in the Kandalaksha direction, the 36th German corps attacked the Kuolojärvi positions. The 122nd division, which defended them, successfully repulsed the attacks.

Nevertheless, in the Kuolajärvi area, the enemy managed to cut off one of the rifle regiments from the main forces of the 122nd division. It happened on July 6th. The Nazis decided to destroy surrounded by artillery fire and air bombardment. Regiment commander Major V.G. Dubal, despite being wounded, skillfully organized a defense in which he used engineering structures and natural terrain folds. And when the enemy's fire weakened somewhat, he led the regiment's exit from the encirclement. The units made their way to their own with minimal losses. For personal courage and skillful leadership of subordinates in a difficult situation, Major V. G. Dubal was awarded the Order of Lenin.

The lack of troops did not allow the creation of a continuous front of defense. There were gaps between units in the 122nd division. On them, bypassing the flanks of our units, the enemy leaked in the direction of Kailar. The division found itself in a difficult position and, by order of the army commander, retreated to the second line of defense - to the line of lakes Kuolajärvi and Apayärvi.

The 169th German and 6th Finnish infantry divisions (this is perhaps the only case of joint actions of German and Finnish troops in the war) on July 9 launched a new offensive in the Kailar direction. With advanced units, they broke through the defenses of the division, but the approaching reserves were first stopped, and then surrounded and destroyed.

For more than a month, the 36th army corps of the enemy was replenished with people and equipment in order to once again try to break through to Kandalaksha. Only on August 19 he began the offensive. The defenders could not withstand strong pressure: all their reserves were involved. I had to retreat to a new line - east of Alakurtti. On September 18, the division occupied a new defensive line along the eastern banks of the Middle and Lower Verman rivers (exclusively) Lake Tolvand. This line, with the exception of individual changes, the division defends until September 1944.

The battle order of the division at first (September - October 1941) was built in one echelon (596th and 420th rifle regiments). The 715th Rifle Regiment was operationally subordinate to the 104th Rifle Division, and subsequently (from mid-October) became part of the division and formed the second echelon. The 104th Rifle Division was defending to the north at the turn of Mount Pogranichnaya - Lake Verkhniy Verman.

Battalion areas formed the basis of the main line of defense. When equipping the area, the main attention was paid to covering the main directions, and especially roads. Blockages, notches, anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles were widely used. During the engineering equipment of the terrain in winter conditions, it was taken into account that as a result of heavy snowfalls, the degree of effectiveness of fortifications decreases. In this regard, a higher landing of firing structures was envisaged, a wire net, slingshots, wire fences were arranged on long stakes. In a wooded area, bushes, trees were braided with wire along the edges, clearings and cutting areas, barriers, fences, blockages with wire fences with self-exploding land mines were created. Icing was used along the banks of rivers and lakes in winter. Using the nature of the terrain and the available improvised means, the units of the division learned to equip firing positions, observation posts, dugouts, and shelters from stone and wood.

Much attention was paid to the engineering support of the joints and flanks of units and subunits. A system of fortifications and barriers was created and subsequently improved, which made it possible to firmly hold the occupied lines, and at the same time skillfully use them for active defense. The personnel of the entire division stubbornly and successfully solved this problem, while showing creativity and initiative. Thus, for the period from the end of 1941 to September 1944, units of the division created a solid defense, which made it possible to hold the occupied lines, inflict losses on the enemy by active actions and prepare personnel for the offensive.

By September 1, 1944, the division took up defensive positions in the system of rivers and lakes of Verman. On the left division, stretching from east to west up to 50 kilometers and about 12 kilometers wide, lay Lake Tolvand. On the southern coast was Mount Toiva, on which a separate ski battalion of the division was located. All regiments were located in the first echelon of the division: on the right flank, the 420th Red Banner (Major Chernyshov), on the left - the 596th (Lieutenant Colonel Danilov), in the center - the 715th (Colonel Gromov).

September 1944, units of the division as part of the 19th Army go on the offensive. The task of the division included two rifle regiments (420th Red Banner and 596th) to keep the defense on the Verman line (more than 30 kilometers), and one regiment (715th), reinforced by the 1st and 2nd divisions of the 285th artillery regiment and the 88th Army Tank Regiment, launch an auxiliary attack on Vuorijärvi to cut off the enemy's escape route to the south and southwest. Consequently, at the first stage of the offensive operation, it was planned to complete the encirclement of the 36th German Army Corps and create conditions for its defeat. At the second stage - to dismember and defeat the 36th corps in the area east of Kuolojärvi.

Despite the wooded and swampy terrain, the offensive developed at a high pace. The situation became more complicated when the units of the division entered the road leading to Alakurtti - all the roads and the surrounding area turned out to be mined, and blockages were made by the enemy in the forest. It took incredible efforts to clear mines and blockade.

However, despite the fierce resistance of the enemy, the division stubbornly moves forward. The army troops were close to completing the encirclement of the Alakurta enemy grouping. The army command took vigorous measures to tighten the noose and crush the enemy grouping. But the final blow did not take place. Moreover, by the morning of September 13, the Kairala area was abandoned and, by order of the front commander, General of the Army K.A. Meretskov, Soviet troops retreated to the north, freeing the Alakurtti-Kuolojärvi road, which the enemy used to withdraw his units.

The reason for the termination of the planned operation to encircle and defeat the 36th Army Corps was that the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, having information about the impending withdrawal of the German 20th Army to Norway and preparing for decisive large-scale military operations on the central fronts, did not consider it possible to spend forces to conduct major operations in the north. In addition, on September 4, an armistice agreement was concluded with the Finns. One of its points stated that the Finns undertake to disarm all German soldiers and officers who remained after September 15 in Finland and transfer them as prisoners of war to the Soviet Union.

As a result of the offensive operation of the 19th Army, the main forces of the 163rd and 169th German infantry divisions were defeated. The 36th German Army Corps suffered heavy losses, but still its main forces managed to escape to Norway.

The German command used the opportunity that presented itself and by the end of September withdrew its troops from the Alakurtti region in a westerly direction. The persecution of the German units was carried out by Soviet reinforced forward detachments, inflicting fire strikes mainly with artillery, tanks and mortars.

On October 8, 1944, the division, leaving the 1st battalion of the 420th rifle regiment in the Onkamo area before the approach of the Finnish border guards, was withdrawn to the reserve of the commander of the 19th army, occupying the area of ​​Mount Sallotunturi, Lampela (exclusively), Kuolojärvi, where it began construction housing and road rehabilitation.

At dawn on October 15, reconnaissance established the enemy's withdrawal in the direction of Merkarvi. The reconnaissance of the division continued to operate on the territory of Finland, waiting for a meeting with suitable border units of the Finns. In the second half of October, units of the division reached the state border and began to prepare for a further offensive in the general direction of Kemijärvi, Rovaniemi to the Gulf of Bothnia. However, from the headquarters of the army received an order to stand still. Having organized direct all-round security and patrolling of the areas, parts of the division settled along the western slopes of Mount Sallotunturi.

The 122nd Rifle Division as part of the 19th Army took an active part in the liberation of 45 settlements, nine railway stations, and cleared highways and railways from the enemy. During these battles, the enemy lost at least 7,000 soldiers and officers killed and wounded. The soldiers of the division destroyed 28 enemy tanks, 51 guns, 33 mortars, 105 machine guns, 20 anti-tank rifles, 71 vehicles, 26 motorcycles. Hundreds of prisoners, 17 tanks, 22 guns, 17 mortars, 175 machine guns, a large number of rifles and pistols, 40 vehicles, one plane, bicycles, motorcycles, many warehouses with ammunition, food and other military equipment were captured.

In the second half of November, units of the 122nd Infantry Division began loading into echelons and began to depart southward, to Romania. At the end of November, trains arrive and unload at the Ploiesti station. Here the division became part of the 133rd Rifle Corps and received an order to concentrate south of Bucharest, 25–30 kilometers north of the city of Giurgiu on the Danube River.

For a month, all parts of the division and their headquarters were engaged in combat training. On January 4, 1945, the division begins loading into echelons and departs for the front line, in the area southwest of Budapest. At that time, heavy fighting was going on in surrounded Budapest, near the city of Szekesfehervar and further along the line of Lake Balaton, south of Lake Balaton, west of the city of Kaposvár and the Drava River.

After unloading, parts of the division were ordered to concentrate in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe settlement of Kishkuhlatszaza, and then make a march, cross the Danube River in the Aunafeltvar region and concentrate in the Sheregelesh region, which is 12-15 kilometers southeast of the city of Szekesfehervar.

By mid-January, the division concentrated in the Sheregelesh area and was in the reserve of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. The task of the division was to carry out reconnaissance of two directions: the first - on Bichka and the second - south of Szekesfehervar - and be ready to enter the battle.

On January 16, 1945, the enemy at the front of Lake Balaton, the city of Szekesfehervar launched a counterattack with the forces of five tank divisions with a large number of artillery, supported by aviation, in order to break through to the Danube River and organize a corridor to unlock Budapest.

In the second half of January 18, having received an order, parts of the division began to advance to the line of the Sharviz Canal, west of Sheregelesh and south of the city of Szekesfehervar. The 420th Red Banner Rifle Regiment was at the forefront. By darkness, the regiment approached the canal and began to deploy along its eastern bank. The 596th Rifle Regiment deployed to its right, and the 715th Rifle Regiment covered the left flank of the division with one battalion to its left. The main forces of the regiment were behind the left flank of the division. An artillery regiment (of two divisions) deployed behind the battle formations of the 420th Rifle Regiment.

On January 20, enemy tank divisions broke through the defenses of the neighboring rifle corps operating at the turn of the city of Szekesfehervar, Lake Balaton, and at dawn the tanks rushed to the positions hastily occupied by the 122nd division. Parts of the division, using only standard anti-tank weapons, fought to the death and beat off tank attacks until noon. There were also critical moments when the ammunition in the artillery regiment ran out, but by some miracle they were brought up, and personally the chief of staff of the artillery division, Lieutenant Colonel Kotov, took them to firing positions.

In the afternoon, there was a threat of a breakthrough on the right flank of the division, where the 596th rifle regiment of Lieutenant Colonel Danilov was defending. The situation was becoming critical. The breakthrough area is an unharvested corn field, expanse for German tanks, complete freedom of maneuver. Without counteraction, the tanks could have destroyed the defending rifle regiments in a few hours and posed a threat to the entire front.

A salvific decision was ripe for one person - divisional engineer N. Ogarkov (future Marshal of the Soviet Union, chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces), who had only become a lieutenant colonel the day before. At the observation post stood the world-famous military truck - one and a half. Several clear commands, and the soldiers of the sapper battalion with the battalion commander Major Kladov, loaded several dozen anti-tank mines into the back, settled next to them, and Ogarkov got into the cab. The lorry rushed to the breakthrough site. Mines were thrown according to a certain pattern on the field, without masking - they were well hidden by thickets of corn. Feverish, fleeting work was done at a distance of direct fire from enemy tank guns and machine guns.

N. Ogarkov with his group returns to the division's NP, and then the tanks begin to blow up one after another. Taking advantage of the confusion of the Germans, division commander Velichko puts forward a howitzer artillery battery for direct fire, because he has nothing else in reserve. The effect was stunning - a promising enemy attack on the right flank of the division bogged down.

Under the threat of being cut off from his units, the division commander decided to withdraw the command post to Sheregelesh. The 420th, 596th regiments, the headquarters and one division of the artillery regiment also retreated to the western outskirts of Sheregelesh; There was no communication with the 715th Infantry Regiment and the artillery division attached to it, and there was no communication with the corps commander. The column of wounded sent to the rear was defeated, and some of the lightly wounded, returning to the medical battalion, reported that enemy tanks were somewhere southeast of Sheregelesh. By 2400 on January 20, reconnaissance returned from the flanks and reported that the enemy was bypassing the division from the north along the southern shore of Lake Velenza and that the road south from Sheregelesh had been cut by enemy tanks. All these data showed that the units of the division were in a semi-encirclement and that the only road was free in the direction of the city of Adon on the western bank of the Danube River. In this difficult situation, the division commander decides to leave the encirclement at night and occupy the line of defense along the western outskirts of the city of Adon by dawn.

The battalion of the 420th Rifle Regiment was the first to start the withdrawal, followed by the rear of the division, then the command post of the division and, in the rear guard, the 546th Rifle Regiment. By the morning of January 21, units of the division were entrenched at the indicated line. During January 21 and 22, units of the division, together with the cavalry regiment of the corps, which had retreated in combat formations, offered stubborn resistance to the enemy at this line and by the end of January 22, they retreated to the north and entrenched themselves on the line south of the Erchi settlement, where, together with the 113th Infantry Division, 46 th army organized defense. By this time, the division had suffered significant losses, 150-200 people remained in the regiments.

The enemy continuously attacked with his tank units, trying at all costs to unblock the Budapest grouping of the Germans and the Hungarian army. However, every day his attacks became weaker and the initial blow lost its power.

In this situation, by decision of the front commander, the division was given the task of surrendering its sector of the front to the 113th Infantry Division, crossing the Danube River south of Budapest, making a march along the right bank, and then reaching the area north of Tsetse through the Dunafeltvar crossing, where it would be at the disposal of the commander of the 133rd th rifle corps, link up with the 715th rifle regiment and be ready for an offensive in the direction: Chartegardt, Abo, Chalonier.

By the end of January 26, the division concentrated in the indicated area and, on the morning of January 27, on the move, with two regiments - the 420th and 715th - struck in the indicated direction. Heavy bloody battles ensued with the participation of a large number of tanks, especially from the enemy. The enemy stubbornly resisted and suffered heavy losses; the fields between Chartegardt and Abo were strewn with wrecked tanks and armored personnel carriers. And yet, by the end of January, Soviet troops captured Abo and again went to the famous Sharviz canal east of the village of Chalonier. On the night of February 1, despite being tired, units of the division crossed the canal and started a battle for Chalonier in the morning.

The neighbor on the right was the 36th Guards Rifle Division and the cavalry regiment, with which communication was established and information was regularly sent to each other. Throughout February 1945, there were stubborn, bloody battles with varying success. The settlement of Chalonier repeatedly passed from hand to hand. By the end of February, enemy resistance in this area was broken, and then by March 1, 1945, the division was withdrawn to the second echelon of the 26th Army in the area of ​​​​the village of Sharkerestur, where it received reinforcements and put its units in order.

On March 4-5, the division received a new task - to concentrate in the area south of Lake Balaton and be placed at the disposal of the commander of the 57th Army. On March 7, the division is transferred to the area of ​​​​the city of Pec (a distance of about 150 km). The division received the task on the move, with a blow in the direction of Drava-Sobolch, to defeat the crossing units of the German army and push them back across the Drava River. The situation developed in such a way that parts of the division were forced to engage in battle sequentially as they unloaded in the Pech area. The battle began with the 1st battalion of the 715th rifle regiment, then the 596th rifle regiment deployed to the right. The enemy offered stubborn resistance, clinging to every house, every structure. The settlement of Drava-Sobolch is stretched by a narrow strip (width no more than one kilometer) from south to north for about three to three and a half kilometers. I had to literally smoke the enemy out of every house and basement. Parts suffered considerable losses.

As mentioned above, parts of the division were introduced into battle from the march, as the Nazis developed success along the Drava River, at the junction of the borders of Hungary and Yugoslavia, where separate parts of the Yugoslav and Bulgarian armies defended. On March 9, the 420th regiment was sent on the move to the area of ​​​​the city of Berimend. The fighters of the regiment, together with the Yugoslav partisan brigade, threw the enemy back to the Drava River. Together with the Germans, Vlasov units also fled.

But in the Drava-Sobolch area, the Germans managed to create a strong defense. The attacks of the 715th Infantry Regiment were unsuccessful. Having completed a long march, by the middle of March 9, the 596th rifle regiment approached. By the morning of March 11, this regiment, together with the 715th Infantry Regiment, received the task of capturing the town of Drava-Sobolch and pushing the enemy across the river. By evening, units of the 596th regiment broke into Drava-Sobolch and joined with units of the 715th.

On the morning of March 12, the Bulgarian 16th Infantry Division entered the battle on the right flank of the division. The task of the division is to ensure the 16th reaches the indicated line and organize interaction with two rifle regiments of the 122nd. For seven days, the division battered the German units, literally biting into the bridgehead on the banks of the Drava. By the end of March 18, the division, having overcome the stubborn resistance of the enemy, went directly to the Drava River, continuing to conduct a firefight. Small units of the Germans still held on to separate sections of the crushed bridgehead.

In these days of March, the division received the task of concentrating in the area of ​​​​the town of Berimend and, with a joint strike with the Yugoslav partisan brigade and the motorcycle regiment of the front, defeat the enemy in the main bridgehead and throw him back across the Drava River. However, the enemy on the eve, under the influence of units of the 420th Infantry Regiment and the Yugoslav army, retreated across the Drava River.

Within three days, the division put itself in order, replenished with personnel and materiel. For these battles and the battle southwest of Budapest, the division was awarded the Order of Kutuzov II degree, and all personnel received gratitude from the Supreme Commander.

In early April, the division takes part in the operation to capture the city of Nagykanizsa and the entire oil-producing region of Hungary. The operation was initially stressful. The enemy counterattacks followed one after another, and this is understandable, since the successful actions of the Soviet units and then their development led the Soviet troops to the rear of the Yugoslav German grouping.

At the beginning of the operation, the 122nd Rifle Division was in the second echelon of the 57th Army, but after noon on the first day of the operation, it was brought into battle, since the 212th Rifle Division, which was operating in front, somewhat slowed down the pace of the offensive. The division had two regiments in the first echelon (420th and 715th). Entered into battle on the move, they quickly overturned the opposing enemy and began to rapidly advance in the direction of the city of Nagykanizsa, to which 10-15 kilometers remained to be covered by nightfall.

At dawn, the regiments broke into the city, and by morning its center had already been captured. Parts went to the western outskirts, where the Germans began to offer fierce resistance along the border of the river, especially from the area of ​​​​the flour mill and meat processing plant.

By nightfall, the city was completely cleared of the enemy, and at dawn, parts of the division rapidly began to move towards the junction of three borders: Hungary, Yugoslavia and Austria. On April 4, parts of the division approached the border with Yugoslavia, which meant that all of Hungary was cleared of German troops.

Since April 9, the division, leaving cover at the reached line, is being crossed by all units across the Mur River 10-15 kilometers east of the village of Odrantsy. The 1st Bulgarian Army developed an offensive on the left wing of the 3rd Ukrainian Front in the direction: Ganovits, Maribor in the interfluve of the Yarava and Mur rivers. In connection with the slow advance of the army troops, the commander of the 57th army decided to commit the 122nd division into battle in the general direction of Maribor.

During the 13th, 14th, and then on April 15, stubborn bloody battles went on with varying success, since in this area between the Yarava and Mur rivers the enemy defended an important area that covered the city of Maribor. It was one of the shortest ways to connect with the British troops advancing from Northern Italy. In addition, the development of the Soviet offensive on Maribor threatened to cut off the Yugoslav fascist group.

In the twenties of April, the division received the task of surrendering the sector to the troops of the 1st Bulgarian Army, crossing to the northern bank of the Mur River and going on the defensive in a sector 20–25 kilometers long, with the front to the south, along the Mur River. In the course of this task, the enemy attacked units of the Bulgarian army and pressed them somewhat (by about 5–6 kilometers), but the Germans were stopped by the measures taken, and units of the Bulgarian army also went on the defensive in the interfluve of the Drava and Mur.

Having taken up defense along the Mur River and located the headquarters of the division in the medical center of Odranci (Yugoslavia), the units urgently set about the engineering equipment of the area. At dawn on May 7, the division received a combat mission: to surrender the defense sector to units of the 1st Bulgarian Army, make a march and concentrate in the area south of the city of Graz in readiness for the offensive. The area of ​​​​concentration of units after the surrender - to the south and southeast of the outskirts of the city of Murski Sobota by the morning of May 8. The 420th Red Banner Rifle Regiment was assigned to the vanguard, while the 596th and 715th Rifle Regiments moved along two parallel routes to Senotard.

On May 9, 1945, the division on the march met the news of the Victory, on May 10–11, 1945, an order was received to move parts of the division 45–50 kilometers southeast of the city of Graz. The transition was completed in a few days. The division is in this sector until May 28.

In mid-June 1945, instructions were received to start moving on foot in columns to the east - the division was returning to its homeland. The route with a total length of 1730 kilometers passed through the territory of Austria, Hungary and Romania. It was designed for 56 days with an average speed of 31 kilometers per day. By August 22, the division concentrated in the area of ​​the Zhmerinka railway junction. The division headquarters is located in the village of Tartak.

Soviet-Finnish war. The fighting of the 14th and 9th armies

By November 1939, the 14th Army was concentrated in the Murmansk region under the command of divisional commander V.A. Frolova. It included the 104th Mountain Rifle Division, the 13th and 52nd Rifle Divisions. The divisions were given the 290th and 158th artillery regiments, the 208th and 241st howitzer regiments (a total of 216 guns and howitzers). The divisions had two tank battalions (38 light tanks). The army was reinforced by the 33rd anti-aircraft artillery battalion and the 104th cannon artillery regiment.

On the Finnish side, these powerful forces were actually opposed by only two companies of the border guard corps, local squadron detachments and one artillery battery. However, the great advantage of these units over the enemy was their excellent knowledge of the terrain and living conditions in the tundra: the personnel of the Finnish troops in Lapland were recruited from local residents - the Sami, or from Finns and Swedes who had lived in the Arctic for a long time.

The Soviet command estimated the strength of the Finns much higher. So, according to the report of the acting head of the border troops of the NKVD, brigade commander Apollonov, dated November 13, 1939, “from the border companies stationed against the Murmansk and Karelian border districts, 12 battalions were formed to guard the border ... 18 ages were drafted into the Finnish army from 1920. birth. Officers are called up to the age of 50".

Was it necessary for the command of the Red Army to create in this region such a significant superiority over the enemy in personnel and materiel? The fact is that a significant part of the forces and means of the 14th Army was intended not to wage war with the Laplanders, but to repel a possible landing of the Anglo-French fleet. The 14th Army stood the whole war on the Murmansk coast, waiting for the landing. Only one of her regiments took part in the fighting. And the 104th artillery regiment, equipped with long-range 122-mm guns, was introduced into the coastal defense.

By the evening of November 30, 1939, units of the 14th Army occupied the western part of the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas and began to advance towards Petsamo and Linnahamari. The 104th Mountain Rifle Division was tasked with capturing the Luostari area from the Titovka River in cooperation with the 95th Rifle Regiment of the 14th Division and the 58th Rifle Regiment of the 52nd Division, advancing from the Rybachy Peninsula. The formations of the 14th Army were then to move south to assist the advance of the 9th Army and try to pincer the enemy.

At first, the 104th division, together with the border guards, without meeting resistance, moved west. The main Finnish forces in the Petsamo region, consisting of one reinforced battalion, until December 2 held two Soviet regiments on the isthmus that separated the Sredny Peninsula from the mainland. By the evening of December 2, the 58th and 95th rifle regiments occupied Petsamo, and the transfer of the 52nd rifle division from Murmansk began.

On December 3, 1939, Soviet troops took Luostari. To avoid encirclement, the Finns retreated. The 95th Rifle Regiment returned to the Rybachy Peninsula, and the 58th Regiment, whose artillery and heavy machine guns were still on the way to Petsamo, took up defense. In this situation, the command of the 104th Mountain Rifle Division ordered the preparation of a raid on enemy positions on the night of December 5. This order was not canceled even after information was received from the border guards, who knew the area well and were good skiers, that they would not be able to take part in the operation.

The operation started successfully. A company of the 273rd regiment managed to capture five vehicles and three guns, but the Finnish sentry, killed a moment later, managed to sound the alarm. In a night battle, the commander lost control of the company, which retreated during the enemy counterattack, firing indiscriminately. The Finns returned their guns and captured four heavy and four light machine guns. Losses in the company amounted to almost half of its regular strength: 33 killed and 32 wounded. The lieutenant - the company commander - was put on trial and shot.

On December 12, after the approach of all units of the 52nd Infantry Division, the offensive resumed. The Finns began to retreat along the highway to Rovaniemi, mining it and making blockages. On December 15, they left the village of Salmijärvi without a fight. On the evening of December 16, units of the 58th Infantry Regiment met stubborn resistance from the enemy, who was defending on the 95th kilometer of the highway. The Finns fought until the evening of December 17 and withdrew, seeing that the entire regiment was deploying against them, supported by a company of tanks and divisional artillery. The next day, the regiment occupied the village of Ptikiyarvi.

On December 13, the Main Headquarters of the Finnish Defense Forces decided to form a separate group "Lapland" from the units of the "Northern Finland" group of troops stationed in the Arctic. The Lapland group was reinforced by two infantry battalions. In addition, a marching infantry battalion of about 400 people was formed from local residents (mainly Sami).

The Finns, retreating, managed to evacuate the entire population. At the same time, they overtook about 200 thousand domestic deer to Sweden.

On December 19, the command of the 104th division received an order from the headquarters of the 14th army to go on the defensive. By that time, the 58th Rifle Regiment, which was the lead regiment, was on the 110th kilometer of the road, advancing somewhat southwest of Pitkijärvi.

The losses of all units and formations of the 14th Army during the month of hostilities, from November 30 to December 30, 1939, amounted to 64 people killed, 111 wounded, 2 missing and 19 dead as a result of accidents, mainly from fires. Only 196 people.

Then a lull settled in the Far North. Several small battles took place there only in the last two weeks of the war. On February 26 and 27, 1940, the 52nd Rifle Division fought with the aim of withdrawing the reconnaissance detachment of the 14th Army headquarters from the encirclement. 205 and a rifle regiment attacked the enemy on the 106th kilometer of the Potsamo-Rovaniemi highway, and part of the Finns (about a company) was forced to leave for Norway. On March 7, the same regiment, with the support of the 411th tank battalion, captured the village of Nautsi, while losing only two people killed and six wounded. It was the 52nd Rifle Division, which carried out a purely tactical task, that penetrated the most deeply into the territory of Finland: with the occupation of Nautsi, it reached the 150th kilometer of the Rovaniemskoe highway. Its losses were insignificant: during the entire war, 63 people died in the division (of which 6 were in fires in dugouts), 134 people were injured (of which 22 were burned in fires), 6 were shell-shocked and 133 were frostbite.

The entire 14th Army for the period from November 30, 1939 to March 13, 1940 lost 585 people: 181 people were killed, two were missing, 301 were wounded and 101 were frostbitten.

The 9th Army was to operate in the Ukhta, Rebolsk and Kandalaksha directions. Initially, it was commanded by commander M.P. Dukhanov, and from December 22, 1939 - commander V.I. Chuikov. The army included the 54th, 122nd, 163rd rifle divisions; in December it was replenished with the 44th and 88th rifle divisions. Most of the divisions were not equipped with artillery to the full state.

In addition, according to some reports, the 9th Army included the 273rd Mountain Rifle Regiment of the 104th Mountain Rifle Division, which was part of the 14th Army.

The 9th Army was reinforced by the 51st Corps Artillery Regiment (12 - 107 mm guns mod. 1910/30 and 12 - 152 mm ML-20 howitzer guns) and the 63rd anti-aircraft artillery battalion (12 - 76 -mm anti-aircraft guns). The 9th Army had 91 light tanks.

In the plans of the Soviet High Command, the 9th Army was assigned an important role. She was supposed to cut Finland in half, going to the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia. After all, it is in the Suomussalmi region that the strip of Finnish territory between the Soviet border and the Gulf of Bothnia is the narrowest. The 9th Army was to reach the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia in the Oulu-Kemi sector. This achieved the isolation of northern Finland from the rest of the country. The Finns were deprived of railway communication with Sweden. The actions of the Anglo-French expeditionary force would have been significantly hampered if it had landed in northern Norway.

At the beginning of December 1939, the 9th Army was supposed to operate on a 400-kilometer front, that is, the offensive front of each division formally reached 133 km. Naturally, in reality this could not be, so the actions of the 9th Army were divided into operations of the so-called groups.

The 122nd Rifle Division operated in the Kandalaksha direction. Its right flank was almost 250 km away from units of the 14th Army, its left flank was almost 250 km from units of the Ukhta grouping of the 9th Army.

The 163rd Rifle Division operated in the Ukhta direction, later the 44th Rifle Division joined it. The "neighbors" on the right were, as already mentioned, at a distance of 250 km, and the neighbors on the left (of the Rebol group) at 85 km.

The 54th Rifle Division operated in the Rebolsk direction. Its "neighbors" on the left at a distance of about 110 km were units of the 8th Army.

From November 30 to mid-December, the divisions of the 9th Army were opposed by only five Finnish battalions, which used maneuver defense tactics. The only big battle was fought by the 54th Mountain Rifle Division on December 12 in the defile of lakes Alasjarvi and Saunajärvi. Its 118th and 337th regiments did not waste time on fruitless frontal attacks and bypassed the Finnish units on the ice of the lakes. In order not to be surrounded, the Finns withdrew, having suffered heavy losses.

The 163rd Rifle Division advancing in the center in the first days of December had only one Finnish battalion against it. On December 6, another battalion approached, and the next day a Finnish infantry regiment arrived from the reserve. These units united into a brigade under the command of Colonel X. Siilasvuo. On December 22, this brigade was deployed to the 9th Infantry Division.

On December 17, the 163rd division captured the city of Suomusalmi. Prior to this, there were no large losses in the 9th Army. In the 122nd division, there were 76 people killed and 266 wounded; in the 163rd, respectively, 89 and 154; in the 54th - 79 and 286. However, the main battles were yet to come.

In the meantime, the Finns had completed the transfer to the north of Finland of parts of the future 9th Infantry Division, the 1st Infantry Brigade and several separate battalions. By December 17, the Finnish command formed the Lapland Group under the command of Major General K. Wallenius, which included the 9th Infantry Division, the 1st Infantry Brigade and several separate units.

On December 18, the 1st Finnish Infantry Brigade counterattacked the front of the regiments of the 54th Mountain Division, but, having received a rebuff, retreated to Nurmes. Then the Finns began to regroup in order to outflank the division and reach its communications. As a result, on December 20-22, after heavy fighting, the Makletsov and Alekseenko detachments operating on the flanks of the 54th division were forced to retreat to the main forces. On December 23, the 3rd Battalion of the 529th Rifle Regiment had to break out of the encirclement to the east, suffering heavy losses. When he went to the area of ​​​​the village of Lendery, only 132 people remained in the ranks.

In the Suomusalmi area, the forward detachments of the Finnish 9th Infantry Division pinned down units of the 163rd Infantry Division, which operated only along the roads and tried to shoot down the enemy with frontal attacks. The commander of the Finnish division, General H. Siilasvuo, later wrote: "It was incomprehensible and strange to me why the Russians did not have skis. Because of this, they could not break away from the roads and suffered heavy losses."

On December 18-20, the 163rd division fought heavy battles in the Suomusalmi area. Thunder struck on December 21, when the Finnish ski groups managed to reach the division's communications in the Vazhenvaara area, destroy part of the rear convoys and threaten the encirclement of its main forces. The efforts of units of the 44th division sent to help push the Finnish detachments off the road were not successful. Its battalions entered the battle separately, immediately upon arrival, without preparation. For several days, the 3rd battalion of the 305th rifle regiment, supported by regimental artillery and the 312th tank battalion, tried to break through the enemy defenses on the 25th kilometer of the road to Vazhenvaara, but to no avail. The entry into battle of the 1st battalion of the 25th rifle regiment did not help either. The losses of the division in three days of fighting amounted to 448 people killed, 810 wounded and 226 frostbitten.

Meanwhile, the Finnish ski detachments defeated several rear units of the 163rd division. The Finns began to disturb the rear of the 44th Infantry Division, blocking the road closer to the border.

The command of the 163rd Rifle Division was unable to organize a retreat in the current difficult situation, and if it were not for the heroism of the soldiers and commanders of the 81st Mountain Rifle Regiment, who covered the retreat of the main forces, the losses could have been even greater.

From December 20, 1939 to January 1, 1940, 353 people died, 486 were wounded, 107 were captured, 346 were missing, and 65 people were frostbitten. In total, since the beginning of hostilities, the losses amounted to: 890 people were killed, 1415 were wounded, almost 300 were frostbitten. 130 machine guns, two 37 mm, eight 45 mm and seven 76 mm guns, 140 vehicles were also lost. According to Finnish data, the losses of the 163rd division were much greater: over 5 thousand people were killed and 500 prisoners, 11 tanks and 27 guns.

The high command of the Red Army laid the blame for the failure on the commander of the 9th Army, M.P. Dukhanov and Chief of Staff of the Army Divisional Commander A.D. Sokolovsky. They were removed from their positions. At the end of December, the commander of the most affected 662nd Infantry Regiment, Sharov, and Commissar Podkhomutov, were arrested and brought to trial. They "frankly" confessed to wrecking and were shot.

The soldiers of the 162nd division, during the retreat, threw not only rifles, but also uniforms. At a meeting in the Central Committee in April 1940, one of the commanders remarked: "After all, the 163rd division came barefoot." Head of Supply of the Red Army Corps Commissar A.V. Khrulev confirmed this by reading out the resolution of the Military Council of the 9th Army, which listed the property abandoned by the division: “The Military Council establishes that the 163rd Division left on the battlefield ... summer shirts - 3028 pieces, underwear - 11849 pairs, wadded trousers - 4321 pieces, gloves - 6147, felt boots - 2250, leather shoes - 6908 pairs.

The number of clothes and shoes left behind turned out to be several times greater than could have been for all the dead and prisoners taken together. It remains a mystery: whether it was more convenient for the Red Army men to scuttle through the snow in the bitter cold without boots and felt boots, or they did not have time to distribute their property, or the quartermasters, as usual, wrote off part of what they themselves stole to the surrounded.

In early January 1940, the Finns also defeated the 44th division. Already at the end of December 1939, even before the start of the Finnish counter-offensive, things were going badly with supplies along the only road suitable for wheeled transport. On December 27, the military commissar of the division, regimental commissar Mizin, reported: “In parts of the division, a threatening situation has developed with the provision of food and fodder. Directly in the parts of food and fodder, 1 daily dacha. There is nothing at the divisional exchange office. The food company, sent to the army exchange office, stood for two days in the village of Bojnitsa and one day in the village of Voknavala, but did not receive food and fodder due to their absence at the army exchange point. In addition ... the division's field autobakery has not yet arrived. "

On January 1, 1940, parts of the Finnish 9th Infantry Division launched an operation that ended in their major victory. At 8 o'clock in the morning, the Finns launched an attack on the 146th Infantry Regiment of the 44th Division. It was only after all the regimental reserves were brought into battle that the attack was repelled with great difficulty. On the night of January 2, the Finns repeated the attack and this time surrounded the regiment, cutting off the Vazhenvaar road at the 21st and 23rd kilometers.

The Red Army soldiers of the division fought not only with the advancing Finns, but also with severe frost. The division was sent from Ternopil in autumn uniforms - overcoats and canvas boots. Winter uniforms (quilted jackets and felt boots) were promised to be delivered to the trains already on the way. But due to the sluggishness of the rear services, the fighters began to receive winter ammunition only at the Kem terminal station, and in the rush to be transferred to the front, not all fighters received felt boots and padded jackets.

The next day, January 3, the commander of the 44th Infantry Division, brigade commander A.I. Vinogradov with the operational group of the headquarters left for the location of the 25th Infantry Regiment. There he tried to organize the defeat of the Finnish units that had reached the rear communications, but all the attacks were repelled by the Finns. The approach of reinforcements to the front was hampered by the convoys accumulated on the road.

The Finns knew about the plans of the Soviet command, because, according to General Siilasvuo, on December 27 they captured a number of orders for the 44th division. Therefore, over the next day, the attacks of the Soviet units ended in failure. The Finns made two more blockages on the road - at the 19th and 20th kilometers. The units of the reconnaissance battalion and the 3rd border regiment, which went to the aid of the strike group, were met there by strong enemy machine-gun and mortar fire. The strike group was cut off from the rest of the division. The situation was aggravated by the fact that at about 6 pm the 2nd battalion of the 146th rifle regiment, whose soldiers had not received hot food for several days, arbitrarily left the front. As a result, the left flank of the division was exposed, which was used by the Finns, who arranged new blockages. By this time, some parts of the 44th division had not received food and ammunition for two or three days.

On January 2, Finnish ski detachments cut the only road along which the divisional column was moving. Crowded in a small area, people and equipment became an excellent target for Finnish artillery. The breakthrough attempts made on January 2-4 failed. The division was divided into separate detachments, deprived of ammunition and food. Division Commander Brigade Commander A.I. Vinogradov and the chief of staff of the division, Colonel O.I. Volkov lost control of the troops. On January 4, they asked the command of the 9th Army for permission to leave the encirclement without heavy weapons and equipment, since there was neither fuel nor horses. Some of the horses died of hunger, the rest were eaten by the surrounded fighters. Vinogradov reported to the headquarters of the 9th Army: “In connection with the displacement of the second battalion of the 146th rifle regiment from the defense area, the left flank remained open. , horses are dying, gasoline and ammunition are running out."

By that time, the Finnish grouping in the Vazhenvaara area included three infantry regiments and three separate battalions. IN AND. Chuikov did not hope to cope with this grouping and was inclined to withdraw the 44th division, which had neither ammunition, nor fodder, nor food to continue the offensive. But the commander could not personally resolve the issue of a breakthrough and requested Moscow's sanction. Chuikov reported to the People's Commissar of Defense: "I consider the situation of the 44th division very serious, and if by 4.00 on January 5 it will not be possible to clear the road, I ask permission to withdraw part of the 44th rifle division to a new line, east of the 19th km." However, the Stavka rejected this request.

On January 5, the Finns attacked at the junction of the 146th and 25th regiments in the area of ​​​​the 23rd kilometer. At the same time, units of the 44th division made another attempt to break out of the encirclement, but the artillery preparation was 3 hours late after the start of the attack.

General Siilasvuo later wrote: "On January 5, the bridge over the Purosjoki River was blown up ... The enemy artillery fire on the sector of his 25th Infantry Regiment was especially strong and well-aimed, and as a result, our units suffered heavy losses."

On January 5, Chuikov sent a strike group to help the division, which soon found itself blocked by the Finns. On January 6, Vinogradov, who was not at the command post of the division all the time, but in the 25th Infantry Regiment, asked permission to abandon the materiel, since the escape routes were cut by Finnish detachments, blocked by rubble and mined. He suggested that the surviving people be taken out by forests.

On January 5, at 11 p.m., the Military Council of the 9th Army ordered Vinogradov to make his way to the 19th kilometer, believing that this sector was occupied by Soviet troops. But the Finns were already there. The next day, the division continued to fight in the encirclement. Her command unsuccessfully tried to withdraw people and equipment.

On January 6, the chief of staff of the 44th division reported: "The 46th rifle regiment on the 23rd kilometer is fighting surrounded, suffering heavy losses. It openly conveys: give help, we are finished off, let's help - several times. There is a blockage between the cordon and the border The enemy is firing heavily between the 146th and 305th rifle regiments. there is no battalion of the 146th Rifle Regiment. The 25th Rifle Regiment is now surrounded. The materiel and the wounded cannot get out without help. It is possible that the infantry will be able to break through. Asks what to do with the materiel (Vinogradov). Contacts with 19-11 kilometers and with the border No. Shooting is heard at the cordon. The command post of the stadiva of the 44th Infantry Division took up defensive positions."

Late in the evening of January 6, permission came from the Stavka to withdraw parts of the division from encirclement, but with the indispensable preservation of heavy weapons and equipment. Then communication with the army headquarters was interrupted. Having received permission from the command of the 9th Army at 10 pm: "Act on your own initiative," Vinogradov gave the order to withdraw people from the north side of the road. On January 7, at his own peril and risk, he ordered "to destroy the materiel and retreat in scattered groups through the forests to the east to the Vazhenvaara region." By this time, a disorderly retreat had already begun, turning into a flight. Siilasvuo described this retreat as follows: "The panic of the surrounded grew, the enemy no longer had joint and organized actions, everyone tried to act independently in order to save his life. The forest was full of fleeing people."

The fighters threw not only cannons and machine guns, but also rifles. Many Red Army soldiers died, caught in a blizzard. Their bodies were found and buried in the spring, after the snow melted.

Siilasvuo wrote: “At noon on the 7th, the enemy began to surrender. Hungry and frozen people left the dugouts. we could not dream even in a dream.We got everything in perfect working order, the guns were new, still shining... Trophies amounted to 40 field and 29 anti-tank guns, 27 tanks, 6 armored cars, 20 tractors, 160 trucks, 32 field kitchens, 600 horses ".

By the evening of January 7, the first groups of fighters of the division, led by its commander and headquarters, arrived in Vazhenvaara. People left the encirclement for several days. According to the headquarters of the division, from January 1 to January 7, losses-compounds amounted to 1001 people killed, 1430 wounded, 2243 missing. The losses of weapons and equipment were more significant: 4340 rifles, 1235 revolvers and pistols, about 350 machine guns, 30 45-mm cannons, 40 76-mm cannons, 17 122-mm howitzers, 14 mortars and 37 tanks. According to Finnish data, 1,300 people were taken prisoner. The 44th division lost almost all weapons and military equipment. 40 percent of the fighters who came out of their entourage were even without rifles. In the end, the Finns got 97 guns, 37 tanks, 130 heavy and 150 light machine guns, 6 mortars, 150 brand new PPD assault rifles and many other military equipment.

On January 19, 1940, an order was issued by the Main Military Council, announced to all command personnel up to and including platoons:

"In the battles of January 6-7 on the front of the 9th Army in the area east of Suomusalmi, the 44th Infantry Division, despite its technical and numerical superiority, did not put up adequate resistance to the enemy, shamefully left on the battlefield most of the hand weapons, hand and easel machine guns, artillery, tanks and retreated in disarray to the border.The main reasons for such a shameful defeat for the 44th Infantry Division were:

1. The cowardice and shameful and treacherous behavior of the division command in the person of the division commander, brigade commander Vinogradov, the head of the political department of the division, regimental commissar Pakhomenko, and the division chief of staff, colonel Volkov, who, instead of showing the commander’s will and energy in leading units and perseverance in defense, instead of taking measures to the withdrawal of units, weapons and materiel, vilely abandoned the division in the most crucial period of the battle and were the first to go to the rear, saving their own skin.

2. The confusion of the senior and middle commanders of the division units, who, forgetting about the commander’s duty to the Motherland and the Army, lost control of their units and subunits and did not organize the proper withdrawal of units, did not try to save weapons, artillery, tanks.

3. Lack of military discipline, poor military training and low education of soldiers, due to which the division in its mass, forgetting its duty to the Motherland, violated the military oath, even threw their personal weapons on the battlefield - rifles, light machine guns - and retreated in a panic, completely defenseless.

The main perpetrators of this disgrace suffered the well-deserved punishment of the Soviet law. On January 11 and 12, the military tribunal considered the case of Vinogradov, Pakhomenko and Volkov, who pleaded guilty to vile selfishness, and sentenced them to death.

On the same day, the sentence was carried out before the formation of the division.

The shameful withdrawal of the 44th Rifle Division is a demonstration process that not in all parts of the Red Army the command staff has a developed sense of responsibility to the Motherland, that in a difficult, but far from hopeless situation, commanders sometimes forget their duty as a commander and selfish interests sometimes take precedence . The shameful withdrawal of the 44th Infantry Division further shows that the soldiers also do not have a developed sense of responsibility for the weapons entrusted to them by the Motherland, and they sometimes drop their weapons at the first serious pressure from the enemy, and from the soldiers of the Red Army, who are obliged to fight for the Motherland with weapons in the hands to the last breath, turn into an unarmed crowd of alarmists, dishonoring the honor of the Red Army.

The Main Military Council of the Red Army demands from the military councils of the districts and the entire mass of Red Army soldiers to learn a lesson from the sad experience of the shameful withdrawal of the 44th Infantry Division.

The Main Military Council of the Red Army demands from commanders, political workers, and all command personnel that they honestly and courageously fulfill their duty to the Motherland and the Army, be demanding of their subordinates, stopping laxity in units, eliminating familiarity in relation to subordinates and implanting iron military discipline as measures of education, as well as punitive measures.

In the second half of January 1940, the main forces of the Finnish Lapland group, having defeated the 44th and 163rd divisions, moved their forces to the 54th division of brigade commander Gusevsky.

The 54th division advanced on Kuhmoniemi and Korpisami. On December 6, she approached the important road junction Rusty, thereby threatening the communications linking the north and south of Finland. The Finnish command urgently formed a separate brigade under the command of Colonel A. Vuokko, consisting of five infantry battalions and one artillery battalion, and launched a counteroffensive. By December 25, the 54th division was pushed back to the border, and at the end of January it was surrounded. By February 1, the Finns managed to finally interrupt all communications of the 54th division. The Finns managed to cut the division's defense area into eight parts. Only the 337th Infantry Regiment escaped encirclement.

Until February 10, the Finns tried to defeat individual defensive areas, but, having met stubborn resistance, they switched to a siege. The command of the 54th division managed to stock up on food, which, together with the supplies dropped from the aircraft, was enough for the entire duration of the blockade. On February 13, Gusevsky transmitted a radiogram to the headquarters of the 9th Army: “The division has been fighting in encirclement for 15 days, having used all its internal capabilities to the end, there are hundreds of wounded, there is no food. We are doing everything in our power to save the division. Drop not kilograms, but tons of food into the garrisons, we are waiting for an answer."

At the end of February, the Finns switched to the tactics of suppressing individual besieged areas with artillery fire. On the night of March 3, after four days of artillery preparation, the enemy attacked the area where the 2nd company of the 118th mountain rifle regiment and the 7th battery of the 86th artillery regiment were located. Almost all the soldiers of these units were killed. Only 25 people survived.

Over the next two days, units of the 337th regiment, with the support of several tanks, tried to knock the Finns out of the defile that separated the eastern sector and the defense area of ​​​​the division command post. Having lost up to 50 people killed and one tank, the Soviet units returned to their original positions.

On March 6, the Finns began a fierce artillery and mortar shelling of the eastern sector of defense and occupied it on the night of March 7. At the same time, Soviet losses in killed and captured amounted to about 230 people. About 100 people were able to escape on the ice of Lake Saunajärvi and join the defenders of the division command post. On March 11 and 12, the Finns intensively fired at the positions of this area, most of the dugouts and dugouts were destroyed. On the morning of March 13, the Finns went on the attack, but it was repulsed.

More active actions of the Finns were prevented by the offensive of the Rebolsk operational group of the 9th army, launched by the forces of the 163rd rifle division transferred to this sector, the 593rd rifle regiment of the 131st division and several ski battalions. Although it was not possible to release the 54th division, the Finns had to throw part of their forces against the attackers and thereby weaken the onslaught on the encircled garrisons.

On February 11, a ski brigade under the command of Colonel Dolin, consisting of the 9th, 13th and 34th ski battalions, made another attempt to break through the blockade.

The losses of the ski battalions involved in these two operations were 1,274 killed, 903 wounded, 583 missing and 323 frostbitten. The losses of the 163rd division from February 29 to March 13 amounted to 993 people killed, 3295 wounded and 191 missing. The total losses of this formation amounted to 2274 people killed, 7670 wounded, 769 missing and 888 frostbitten, that is, almost 70% of the staff. In the 54th division itself, which withstood the 46-day blockade, 2118 people were killed, 3732 were wounded and 573 people were missing, which amounted to 60% of the regular strength of the mountain rifle division.

Of all the formations of the 9th Army, only the 122nd Rifle Division, which took part in the war from the first day, managed to avoid a heavy defeat. She arrived in the Kandalaksha region on the eve of the war from Belarus and crossed the border on November 30. At 3 p.m., the 596th Rifle Regiment and the 273rd Mountain Rifle Regiment attached to the division occupied the village of Alakurtti almost without resistance, which the Finns burned during their retreat. The next day passed without a fight - the Finns retreated, mining the roads behind them.

On December 2, the 1st battalion of the 596th regiment, which was marching in the head outpost, and the cavalry squadron of the 153rd reconnaissance battalion, when approaching heights 26 km west of Alakurtti, were met by machine-gun and mortar fire from well-camouflaged positions of the 22nd border Finnish battalion. Despite minor losses (6 people were wounded), the cavalry dismounted, leaving the horses under fire. The divisions turned around and lay down. After some time, two battalions of the 596th regiment and the 273rd regiment, as well as regimental artillery, approached. The second attack at 4 p.m. on December 3 forced the enemy to leave the heights. 10 corpses were found in the Finnish trenches, three more Finns were captured. The loss of parts of the division amounted to 24 people killed and 89 wounded.

On December 11, the Finns resisted near the village of Merkjärvi. But they did not have time to prepare defensive positions (there were only cells for prone firing) and were unable to change the Sall battalion, which suffered heavy losses, for Battalion "A" that arrived from the reserve. And for some reason they didn't blow up the bridge. All this cost the defenders dearly. Two tanks of the 100th separate tank battalion managed to slip across the bridge, broke through to the rear of the enemy and defeated his carts. The Finns hurriedly retreated, not having time to burn the village. As trophies, Soviet troops got 8 machine guns.

On December 14, the advanced battalion of the 420th rifle regiment with a company of a tank battalion occupied the village of Kursu. On the same day, at 8 pm, the ski units of the Finns, bypassing the flanks of the forward battalion, attacked the regimental artillery and the battery of the 285th artillery regiment. Artillerymen were forced to fire with buckshot and even from personal weapons. Many horses were killed, but the guns were hardly damaged. The 20th battalion of the 420th regiment arrived to help the artillerymen, after which the Finns retreated.

On the same day, the 596th Rifle Regiment, supported by the 9th Separate Tank Battalion, tried to capture the heights on the road 69 km west of Kuolajärvi. The attack failed, and the Finns destroyed three Soviet tanks with anti-tank guns.

By the evening of December 16, the 420th Infantry Regiment reached the eastern outskirts of the village of Joutsijärvi. December 17, he attacked the positions of the Finns, but unsuccessfully. On the same day, the 175th Infantry Regiment and the engineer battalion of the 122nd Division approached the front. Meanwhile, the 273rd mountain rifle regiment, together with the 153rd reconnaissance battalion and a company of the 596th rifle regiment, captured the crossing over the Kemijoki River near the village of Pelkosniemi, losing 20 people killed and 46 wounded, as well as three T-38 tanks.

On December 18, the 420th Rifle Regiment with a battalion of the 715th Rifle Regiment again unsuccessfully advanced on enemy positions. The battalion of the 715th regiment lost contact with the main forces, was counterattacked by the enemy and suffered heavy losses. The commander and commissar of the battalion were wounded. As a result of this failure, the 420th regiment had to be withdrawn to the rear for 2 km.

The soldiers of the 715th regiment, like other units of the 122nd division, were dressed in black jackets, which was not at all suitable for the polar winter. In addition, the black uniform unmasked the fighters on white snow, which is why they suffered heavy losses.

On December 19, the Finns counterattacked units of the 122nd Infantry Division, which crossed the Kemijoki. Soviet troops retreated 14 km to the north. Their losses were 27 killed and 73 wounded.

On the same day, two battalions of the 596th Rifle Regiment and the 715th Rifle Regiment again attacked the Finnish positions (four battalions) near Joutsijärvi. The 715th regiment advanced from the front, but to no avail. At this time, one battalion of the 596th regiment went to the northern outskirts of the village, and the second flank maneuver - to the second lane of the enemy defense, but instead of hitting the rear of the enemy, his commander began to wait for the right moment to hit the retreating cavalry. But he only waited for the Finns, having beaten off the offensive from the front, counterattacked and surrounded the battalion. Breaking through, the battalion suffered heavy losses in manpower and abandoned all their heavy machine guns.

After that, the command of the 9th Army gave the order to concentrate parts of the division northwest and southwest of Kuorlajärvi. It is not clear what prevented him later in time to give the order to withdraw the 163rd division.

On January 3, 1940, the Finnish units tried to take over the artillery positions, but were repulsed. On January 4, the Finns tried again, and with the same result. On January 13, the 122nd division received an order to withdraw to the Myarkyarvi area. After that, active operations in the sector of the 122nd division ceased. The sides exchanged fire from time to time and "exchanged" raids by skiers. Divisional artillery was withdrawn to the army reserve, and only regimental batteries provided fire support to the riflemen.

Even on February 19, three weeks before the end of the war, seven thousand pairs of skis were missing in the 122nd division. Designed to seal battle formations, the 88th Rifle Division never reached the front in full strength until the end of the war: its artillery regiment was without tractors, the 758th rifle regiment was without skis, and the tank battalion lacked 30 vehicles.