The offensive operation of the German troops in the 2nd World War, carried out on the Western Front in the Ardennes region (in the southeast of Belgium) in December 1944 - January 1945. The purpose of the operation (code name "Watch on the Rhine" - "Wacht am Rhein") was strike with the forces of 25 divisions (including 7 tank divisions) through the Ardennes to Antwerp, defeat the Anglo-American troops in Belgium and the Netherlands, thereby changing the course of the war in the West in favor of Germany, and free up Wehrmacht forces to fight against the USSR. Hitler's calculations for a turning point in the war stemmed from the hope of a split in the anti-Hitler coalition.

The offensive began on December 16 with the forces of the 6th SS Panzer Army, the 5th Panzer Army and the 7th Field Army, united in Army Group B (Field Marshal V. Model). The 4 American divisions of General O. Bradley, who were defending on a front of 115 km, were taken by surprise and, having suffered heavy losses, retreated in panic. By December 26, German troops advanced to a depth of 90 km. Having brought up reinforcements, the Allied command delivered a successful counterattack by the forces of the 3rd American Army and aviation on Bastogne. Although the advance of the German troops was stopped, the situation on the Western Front remained tense in early January. On January 6, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill turned to Stalin for help. Faithful to its allied obligations, the USSR came to the aid of England and the USA. On January 12, Soviet troops went on the offensive in East Prussia and Poland 8 days ahead of schedule.

The German command was forced to abandon further attempts to attack in the west and begin the transfer of troops from there to the Soviet-German front. The losses (killed, wounded and missing) of the allies as a result of the Ardennes operation amounted to about 77 thousand people, the losses of the Germans - about 93 thousand people.

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THE ARDENNE OPERATION 1944-45

come. German-Fash operation Army Group "B" in the West. front, in the Ardennes region (Belgium), in Dec. 1944 - Jan. 1945 in the 2nd World War. A. o. was intended to break through the defenses of the Amer. troops in the Ardennes (see diagram) and force the river. Maas with a further hit the tank. armies on Antwerp. Further, it was planned to cut off and defeat the Amer.-Eng. troops in Belgium and Holland, thwart plans for the Allied offensive in 1945, and by transferring large forces from west to east to strengthen resistance to the offensive of the Soviets. Army. At dawn on 16 Dec. In 1944, the offensive of the 6th SS and the 5th tank and 7th field armies began (25 divisions in total, including 7 tank). In the Ardennes, on a front of 115 km, only 4 divisions of the 1st Amer. army. Taken by surprise, they did not have the organization. resistance and, having suffered heavy losses, retreated in a panic. By 26 Dec. German-Fash. troops advanced to a depth of 90 km. Amer.-English the command (D. Eisenhower, B. Montgomery) quickly transferred large forces to the breakthrough site and put powerful aviation into action. Holding the city of Bastogne (southwest of Houffalize), surrounded by the enemy, the Amer. divisions delivered a successful counterattack to the south. breakout area. Having failed in A. O., German-Fash. command 1 Jan. 1945 launched an offensive in the Strasbourg region in order to force the enemy to disperse his forces and worry about all sectors of the front. The offensive of the German-fascist. armies was suspended, but in early January. position of Anglo-Amer. forces on the Zap. front remained tense. Jan 6 British Prime Minister W. Churchill turned to the Soviets for help. pr-wu. Faithful to allied obligations, Sov. pr-in came to the aid of the United States and England. Jan 12 1945, 8 days ahead of schedule, Sov. troops went on the offensive throughout the Sov.-German. front. German-Fash. the command was forced to abandon attempts to attack in the West and begin the transfer of forces from there to the Sov.-German. front. From 12 to 31 Jan. 7 German-fascists were transferred. divisions. By the end of January, the allied forces restored the situation in the West. front. Lit .: Falsifiers of history (historical reference), M., 1952; The Second World War. 1939-45, M., 1958; Westphal Z. (et al.), Fatal decisions, trans. from English, M., 1958; Merriam R. E., Dark December Sprint, Cop., 1947. I. E. Zaitsev. Moscow. -***-***-***- Arden operation December 16, 1944 - January 12, 1945

On January 1, 1945, the German troops of Army Group G went on the offensive in Alsace near Strasbourg. It was a diversionary strike, in which insignificant forces participated. However, the German command lost the strategic initiative irretrievably. German troops in the Ardennes retreated in all areas.
On January 1, 1945, Germany had 313 divisions and 32 brigades. On the Western Front and in Italy there were 108 divisions and 7 brigades. On the Eastern Front, Germany concentrated 185 divisions and 21 brigades, of which 15 divisions and 1 brigade were Hungarian.
By the end of the German offensive in the Ardennes, the Allied forces were in a critical position. As early as December 21, the commander of the allied forces, General D. Eisenhower, insistently asked the governments of the United States and Britain to turn to the Soviet Union for military assistance. On January 6, 1945, Prime Minister W. Churchill wrote to I. V. Stalin and asked him to launch an offensive on the Soviet-German front, to which he received a quick response with a promise to speed up the preparations for a large Soviet offensive.
Soviet troops launched a general offensive on January 12, 1945, 8 days ahead of schedule. The 6th SS Panzer Army was urgently sent to Hungary near Budapest and Lake Balaton to stop the Soviet offensive.
The chief of staff of the Western Front during the operation “Watch (guard) on the Rhine” (Wacht am Rhein), General Westphal wrote: “On January 12-13, the Russians launched their big offensive from the Baranuv bridgehead. His influence immediately affected the Western Front. We have long been anxiously awaiting the transfer of our troops to the East, and now it was carried out with the utmost speed. The 6th SS Panzer Army was transferred there with separate units of army subordination, two corps headquarters and four SS Panzer divisions, the Führerbegleit brigade and the grenadier brigade, as well as all their artillery and crossing facilities.
By January 15, 1945, the formations of the 1st and 3rd American armies advancing from the north and south connected north of Bastogne in the area of ​​​​the cities of Houffalize and Noville. Half of the Ardennes ledge was recaptured. The 101st Airborne Division was transferred near Colmar to the 6th Army Group. On the night of January 18, the 12th Corps of the 3rd American Army, unexpectedly for the enemy, crossed the Sur River.
On January 22, the British Chiefs of Staff Committee stated: “The new Russian offensive has dramatically changed the situation. According to the most likely assumptions, the end of the war can be expected in mid-April.
On January 23, troops of the 1st American Army liberated the city of Saint-Vith. The 12th Army Group began preparations to storm the Siegfried Line.
The offensive of the Soviet troops, which began on January 12, inflicted a crushing defeat on the main forces of the Wehrmacht. Almost all German mobile formations were transferred to the Eastern Front. Only a few battered infantry divisions remained on the Western Front. During the 21 days of the Soviet offensive during the Vistula-Oder operation, Soviet troops passed from the Vistula to the Oder and captured several bridgeheads on its left bank. In early February, there were only 60 kilometers from the bridgeheads on the Oder to Berlin. At the same time, Soviet troops were advancing in East Prussia, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. German troops lost up to half a million people, while German losses in the Ardennes operation amounted to less than 100 thousand people.
By January 28, the Allied forces completely eliminated the Ardennes ledge, formed by the German offensive in the Ardennes. On January 29, the Allied forces launched an invasion of Germany and moved towards the Rhine.
Operation Watch (Guard) on the Rhine (Wacht am Rhein) ended in a crushing defeat and became the last major German offensive in World War II. The Ardennes operation delayed the Allied invasion of Germany for several weeks, but the German troops wasted military resources, especially armored vehicles, aircraft (including jets) and fuel, which could have been used to effectively defend the Siegfried Line. Thanks to the German offensive in the Ardennes, the American-British troops suffered fewer losses: the main German forces were defeated outside the defensive fortifications of the Siegfried Line, where a victory over the enemy would have cost the Allied forces much greater losses.
After the defeat in the Ardennes offensive, the German armed forces were no longer able to organize any offensive operation, limited to small counterattacks that could no longer affect the situation in Central Europe (counterattacks in Alsace in January 1945 and on Lake Balaton in March 1945 G.). The strategic initiative finally passed to the allies.

"Run, save yourself, the Germans are advancing!" - shouted to them people in the form of the US Army, rushing to the rear in American jeeps. “By the way, it is forbidden to blow up this bridge during the retreat - an order from the headquarters!”

So for the first time against the Anglo-Americans, the "Führer's secret weapon" was used - saboteurs from the "Vulture" detachment. bad memory Obersturm-Bannführer (Lieutenant Colonel) SS Otto Skorzeny two months before that, he recruited English-speaking soldiers in all parts of the Wehrmacht. American intelligence knew about this, but decided that we were talking about translators for working with prisoners ... The AiF told about the details of the Ardennes operation Miroslav Morozov, military historian.

Tanks in the snow

From the very moment of the landing in Normandy in the summer of 1944, the allies of the USSR in the anti-Hitler coalition, the USA and Great Britain, significantly outnumbered the Germans in the number of soldiers and military equipment. The advantage was so great that the Allied staffers forgot to think that the Wehrmacht was still capable of something other than defense and retreats. But in vain. On December 16, the Nazis on the Western Front conducted their first strategic offensive operation since 1940. True, she also became the last.

German armored vehicles during the Ardennes offensive. Photo: wikipedia.org The Ardennes is a mountainous forest on the border of Belgium, Luxembourg and Germany, which is still considered the “lungs of Europe”. In 1944 there were even fewer roads than now, and there were even more natural barriers to advance. The defense of the allies in the Ardennes was held by 4 American divisions (about 80 thousand people), two of which had no combat experience, and two had previously suffered heavy losses and were withdrawn to a "calm area" to recuperate. They were opposed by 20 divisions of the Wehrmacht and the SS, including 7 tank divisions, later 7 more were added! In total, the Germans gathered 300 thousand people, more than 1000 tanks and assault guns.

Hitler's idea, which initially smacked of a gamble, was to arrange bloodletting for the Allies and thereby force them to sit down with the Germans at the negotiating table. After that, as he believed, it would be possible to transfer all forces to the Eastern Front and stop the Russian offensive ...

German soldiers passing by abandoned American equipment. Photo: wikipedia.org

In the early days, the Germans had a threefold advantage over the Americans. Because of this, and also because of the low cloud cover that pinned the Allied aircraft to the ground, the Nazis were at first successful. The offensive was so unexpected that news of it reached Dwight Eisenhower, Supreme Commander, Expeditionary Forces Europe, only in the evening. Columns of American prisoners were pulled into the German rear.

And what about Stalin?

The offensive of the Nazis was stopped only after 10 days, having transferred 30 divisions from other sectors of the front. On January 3, the Allies went on the offensive and by January 25 they had regained all the territories captured by the Wehrmacht during the "Watch on the Rhine" - this is how the Germans called their operation. Both sides lost about 100 thousand people, for the US troops this operation became the bloodiest in the entire war. But while the soldiers fought, the politicians stepped in.

January 6, 1945 British Prime Minister Churchill(his troops took minimal part in the Ardennes operation) wrote a letter to Stalin: “Very heavy fighting is going on in the West ... I will be grateful if you can tell me if we can count on a major Russian offensive on the Vistula front or somewhere in elsewhere..."

January 1945 Fight in the Ardennes forests. Photo: wikipedia.org

Stalin replied the next day: “The weather is now not favorable for our offensive. However, given the position of our allies on the western front, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to finish the preparations at an accelerated pace and, regardless of the weather, open wide offensive operations against the Germans along the entire central front no later than the second half of January ... "

Some domestic researchers, on the basis of this correspondence, conclude that Churchill asked Stalin to speed up the start of the Soviet offensive, which was done. Here, however, it is worth paying attention to the dates: the Prime Minister's letter was written 10 days after the danger had passed, and 3 days after the Allies went on the offensive in the Ardennes. On the eve of Churchill visited Eisenhower's headquarters and could not help but know the real state of affairs.

Fortunately, the "Watch on the Rhine" did not cost the life of any Soviet soldier and officer, and the Vistula-Oder operation began as soon as the weather allowed, on January 12, 1945. Churchill's letter can only be explained by one thing - under the pretext of the already past crisis in the Ardennes he tried to get acquainted with the plans of the Soviet offensive. Probably, even then he was planning a rivalry with a Russian ally.

They say that once at a time it is not necessary and history speaks of the correctness of this expression. In the winter of 1944, Dolph Hitler decided to repeat the "feat" of the German armed forces that hit the Allies in 1940 from the Ardennes direction.

Operation preparation

On September 16, 1944, Hitler issued an order demanding "fanatical determination" from all troops in the West. The Americans approached the German border, and south of Aachen even crossed it. “From our side, any large-scale operations cannot be carried out. The only thing left for us is to hold our positions or die.”

It seemed that the Fuhrer was calling only for the defense of the fatherland, but this was a ploy to mislead the enemy, who, as Hitler feared, had a spy in his headquarters. After the meeting, the Fuhrer invited Keitel, Jodl and the Luftwaffe representative, General Kreipe, to his office.

While they were wondering what surprise the Fuhrer was preparing for them, the owner of the office entered - stooped, pale, visibly passed after the third mini-heart attack. His eyes were watery and cloudy, his jaw dropped.

Jodl briefly reported on the situation: Germany has no reliable allies - some have defected, others are going to do it. Although there are over 9 million under arms in the Wehrmacht, over the past three months the losses have amounted to 1.2 million, almost half of them on the Western Front. There was a relative calm in the East.

The Soviet offensive appears to have fizzled out. " But in the West we are going through a serious test in the Ardennes,” Jodl concluded. It was a hilly region in Belgium and Luxembourg, the path taken by German troops to victory in World War I.

At the word "Ardennes" Hitler started up, raised his hand and shouted: "Stop!" There was silence. Finally he spoke:

“I have made an important decision. I'm going on the offensive. Here in the Ardennes!” The Fuhrer struck the map with his fist. "Across the river Meuse and further - to Antwerp!"

Everyone stared at him in amazement. Hitler's shoulders straightened, his eyes sparkled, signs of anxiety and illness disappeared. It was the dynamic Hitler of 1940.

In the next few days, he was a model of the former energy, insisted on preparing a plan for a decisive counteroffensive. He issued orders for the creation of a new tank army and outlined ways to deliver 250,000 troops and a thousand tanks to the Ardennes in absolute secrecy.

On October 8, a new meeting was held at Hitler's headquarters. The conversation was about how to force the Western allies to conclude a separate peace with Germany.

The successes of the Russians, Hitler declared, alarmed the British and Americans, for it was not in their interests to rejoice at these successes. Consequently, their potential desire for a separate peace with the Reich is not in doubt - it only needs to be strengthened. When asked how to do this, Hitler replied that a successful counter-offensive of German troops in the West could solve this problem ...

On October 11, Hitler demanded from the chief of staff of the operational leadership, Jodl, to ensure, above all, the suddenness of the planned actions. On October 12, Rundstedt (since September 1944 he again commanded the Wehrmacht troops in the West) was ordered to concentrate new reserves to repel the Allied offensive in the direction of the Rhine. And the secret plan was attached to the order under the code name "Watch on the Rhine."

It specifically emphasized the defensive nature of the planned actions, allegedly aimed at preventing the Allies from advancing towards the Rhine in the Ruhr direction. Why "supposedly"? D

but because the plan "Watch on the Rhine" was intended to strategically deceive the Allies. Giving Allied intelligence the opportunity to get acquainted with the "secret plan", Hitler hoped to mislead the Allied command about his real intentions.
On November 10, Hitler signed the directive for the offensive. It said:
"Achieving the goal of the operation - the destruction of enemy forces north of the line Antwerp, Brussels, Luxembourg - would mark a turning point in the war in the West, and thus, perhaps, in the war as a whole."
In early December, at a meeting of the commanders of the troops that were part of the shock group, Hitler drew attention to the special significance of the offensive: success should be tantamount to the events at Dunkirk.

And he expressed his confidence in the implementation of a new and this time fatal for the allies of Dunkirk. The stake was placed on turning the course of the war in favor of Germany.

A well-known German specialist in sabotage, Otto Skorzeny, was called to Hitler.

In the presence of Keitel and Jodl, he gave Skorzeny a special task: to lead a special detachment of saboteurs from the personnel of the 150th SS Panzer Brigade, dressed in the uniform of the Allied troops (2 thousand people), and in the course of the offensive, penetrate behind enemy lines in captured vehicles, call there panic, destroy headquarters and communication centers, capture and hold bridges across the Meuse River until the main forces approach.

On the prepared plan of the counteroffensive, Hitler wrote: "Unchangeable".

What was the situation on the Western Front at that time?

By mid-December 1944, German troops occupied the "Siegfried Line" with three army groups. On the right wing of the front, Army Group X was defending: (25th field and 1st parachute armies). Army Group B deployed in the center of the front: the 15th and 7th field armies, the 6th SS Panzer Army and the 5th Panzer Army.

On the left wing of the front, Army Group G (1st Army) and Army Group Upper Rhine (19th Army) were on the defensive. In total, the Wehrmacht had 73 divisions on the Western Front, including 11 tank divisions, 29 divisions of the Volkssturm - the people's militia and 3 tank brigades.

The Anglo-American troops at the "Siegfried Line" were located in the following order. On the right wing of the front, in a strip 280 km wide, the 6th Army Group operated: the American 7th and the French 1st armies. The troops of the French 1st Army north of Strasbourg were the first to reach the Rhine on November 19. At the end of November, 75 thousand members of the French Resistance fought as part of this army.

In the center of the front, in a strip 370 km wide, the American 12th Army Group defended: 3rd, 1st and 9th armies. In the Ardennes, in a strip 115 km wide, the 8th Army Corps of the American 1st Army (three infantry divisions) was on the defensive. There was an armored division in the reserve of the corps.
On the left wing of the front, in a strip 220 km wide, the British 21st Army Group deployed: the Canadian 1st and the British 2nd armies.

In total, the British and Americans had 63 divisions in Western Europe: 40 American, 15 Canadian and British, and 8 French, including 15 armored divisions and 10 armored brigades (4,000 tanks) and almost 8,000 aircraft.
Of the German divisions, "many had no combat experience or were understrength." In terms of the number of personnel, the German infantry division was no less than two times inferior to the allied divisions.
Subsequently, assessing the combat capability of the strike force created by the command of the Wehrmacht, Rundstadt said:

"With a high proportion of tank divisions, there were few tanks in them - they existed mainly on paper."

General Manteuffel, who commanded the 5th Panzer Army, which was part of the shock group, claimed after the war that in reality there were no more than 800 tanks in both tank armies.

The idea of ​​the German high command was as follows: taking advantage of the lull on the Western Front, deliver a crushing blow in the direction of Liege, at the junction of the Anglo-American armies, defeat the American 1st Army, cross the Meuse, go to the Antwerp area, press the American 9th Army to the sea. 1st, British 2nd and Canadian 1st armies - to arrange a second Dunkirk for the Anglo-American allies, but unlike in 1940, do not give them the opportunity to evacuate to England, and in the end - force the allies to conclude a separate peace with Germany.

“If several strong blows follow, then at any moment it may happen that this artificially supported front will collapse with a tremendous crash.”

The main blow was planned to be delivered in the Ardennes region - at the weakest point in the defense of the American troops. This direction led to the dismemberment of the Anglo-American troops and their defeat in parts. Confidence in success was based on the fact that the Allied command clearly underestimated the enemy, believing that “the German army is in a state of complete decline.

Walter Model

The following should be kept in mind.

In the history of the world there has not yet been a coalition of such foreign elements pursuing such different goals as our opponents have created... Anyone who closely follows the development of events cannot but see that the contradictions between our enemies are growing stronger every day.

If we now inflict several powerful blows on them, then at any moment it may happen that this "single", artificially supported front will suddenly collapse with a deafening roar, like thunder.

balance of power

The surprise of the attack often compensates for the lack of forces and means. This happened in the West in December 1944.

It was the carelessness of the allies that helped the German high command achieve surprise.
They did not expect that the Germans would conduct an offensive in the Ardennes in the winter. It is believed that Eisenhower least of all feared for the Ardennes sector, believing that advancing through difficult terrain is extremely difficult, especially in winter.

But he himself recalled something else:

“Although when comparing the forces involved on both sides in the Battle of the Ardennes and Kasserine, the latter seems to be just a skirmish, nevertheless, there are some similarities between them.

Here and there it was the advance of the desperate; here and there the enemy took advantage of heavily fortified defensive positions to concentrate forces to attack the Allied communications in the hope of forcing them to abandon their plans for continuous offensive operations.

No matter how sudden the time and force of this blow were for us, we were not mistaken either about the place of its delivery, or about the inevitability of such a step on the part of the enemy. Moreover, with regard to the overall response to these actions of the enemy, then in this case, Bradley and I had a long agreed plan of response.

Therefore, the security of this site was much lower, General Omar Bradley wrote:

“If someone goes on the offensive, he does so with the aim of either destroying the enemy’s troops or capturing the terrain. In the latter case, he either wants to use the advantageous terrain himself, or to prevent the enemy from using it.

None of these goals could be achieved in the Ardennes. Nowhere were our troops so stretched out as on this wooded sector of the front; nowhere on the Allied front was there another area devoid of industrial resources, communications and natural boundaries worthy of attention to the extent of the Ardennes ... "

The puncture was that the Anglo-American generals underestimated the German arrogance.

For an offensive with limited goals, which Bradley is talking about, the Ardennes section was completely unsuitable, but the Germans’ idea was grander - Rundstedt planned to split the Allied strategic front in the Ardennes region and go to the Belgian port of Antwerp, hoping thereby to catch two birds with one stone - cut off and encircle the troops of the 21st British Army Group and deprive the allies of the port through which the main flows of cargo went.

In the highest headquarters, they did not believe at all in the possibility of any German offensive. Therefore, there was no prepared defense in the Ardennes.

This was used by the command of the Wehrmacht.

German intelligence established that the Anglo-American allies did not have large reserves in the Ardennes direction. The wooded rugged terrain of the Ardennes region made it possible to covertly concentrate the strike force.
All orders were given only through liaison officers. False regroupings were made in order to create the impression that troops were being concentrated north of the Ardennes to cover the Ruhr.

This goal has been achieved. Throughout November, Eisenhower's staff "stubbornly held the erroneous view that the Germans were preparing to repel an Allied attack in the direction of the Ruhr."

American reconnaissance maps showed only 4 German infantry and 2 panzer divisions in the Ardennes, and they were also marked as moving north. In reality, in the Ardennes, by the beginning of the offensive, a strike force consisting of 21 divisions, up to 970 tanks and assault guns and 800 aircraft, was concentrated

The combat composition as a whole looked like this

On December 16, 1944, the German armies participating in the offensive had the following composition (from north to south):

6.SS-Panzerarmee (total 9 divisions, including 4 tank divisions)
LXVII.AK (272.VD, 326.VD)
I.SS-PzK (277.VD, 12.SS-PzD, 1.SS-PzD, 3.FjD, 12.VD)
II.SS-PzK (2.SS-PzD, 9.SS-PzD)
5.Panzerarmee (total 7 divisions, including 3 tank divisions)
LXVI.AK (18.VD, 62.VD)
LVIII.PzK (116.PzD, 560.VD)
XXXXVII.PzK (2.PzD, 26.VD, PzLehr-D)
7.Armee (four divisions in total; LII Corps did not participate in the offensive)
LXXXV.AK (5.FjD, 352.VD)
LXXX.AK (276.VD, 212.VD)
A total of 20 divisions, including 7 tank divisions. From December 16, 1944 to January 2, 1945, the following were transferred from the OKW Reserve and from the neighboring 15th Army to the advancing group:

December 16 Führer-Begleit-Brig.
December 20-22 15.PzGrD, 79.VD, F?hrer-Gren-Brig.
December 24 9.PzD
by December 27 9.VD, 167.VD, 3.PzGrD
Total - six divisions and two brigades. In total, from December 16 to January 2, the Germans used 27 calculated divisions in the offensive, including 10 tank and motorized divisions.

On December 15, the 12th American Army Group had the following composition (the corps and divisions involved in repelling the German attack were highlighted):

94th ID, 11th ArmD
9th Army (total 7 divisions, including 2 armored)
30th ID
XIII Corps (84th ID, 102nd ID, 7th ArmD)
XIX Corps (29th ID, 2nd ArmD)
XVI Corps (75th ID)
1st Army (total 14 divisions, including 3 armored)
VII Corps (1st ID, 9th ID, 83rd ID, 104th ID, 3rd ArmD, 5th ArmD)
V Corps (2nd ID, 8th ID, 78th ID, 99th ID)
VIII Corps (4th ID, 28th ID, 106th ID, 9th ArmD)
3rd Army (total 11 divisions, including 3 armored)
42nd ID
III Corps (26th ID, 6th ArmD)
XX Corps (5th ID, 90th ID, 95th ID, 10th ArmD)
XII Corps (35th ID, 80th ID, 87thID, 4th ArmD)
Total 34 divisions, including 9 armored.

On the American side, the sector of the German offensive was defended by the VIII Army Corps as part of the 106th ID, 28th ID, 9th ArmD, 4th ID. During the fighting, the Americans reinforced their grouping with seven tank divisions (2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th, 10th, 11th), thirteen infantry divisions (1st, 2nd, 5th, 9th, 26th, 30th, 35th, 75th, 80th, 83rd, 84th, 87th, 99th) and two airborne divisions (82nd & 101st).

In total, 26 divisions, including eight armored ones, took part in repulsing the German offensive. True, some of the American divisions during the fighting were withdrawn to the rear or transferred to inactive sectors of the front. On December 26, the 10th Panzer was transferred to the XX Corps, in the Saar region, on December 31, the 9th Panzer was withdrawn to the reserve of the main command.

Explanation of abbreviated names of compounds:

ID Infantry Division
ArmD Armored Division armored division

PzD Panzer-Division tank division
PzGrenD Panzer-Grenadier-Division tank-grenadier (=motorized) division
FjD Fallschirmj?ger-Division parachute division
VD Volksgrenadier-Division Volksgrenadier Division
PzLehrD Panzer-Lehr-Division "training" tank division

Führer-Begleit-Brigade Führer Escort Brigade (Panzer)
Führer-Grenadier-Brigade Fuhrer Grenadier Brigade (tanks and I)

Arden offensive of the Wehrmacht

The German offensive began on December 16 with the forces of the 6th SS Panzer Army, the 5th Panzer Army and the 7th Field Army, united in Army Group B (commanded by Field Marshal V. Model).

Caught by surprise, the American troops were completely confused and could not put up serious resistance in the first days. A disorderly retreat began, turning into a stampede in a number of sectors.

Eisenhower wrote:

"General Bradley arrived at my headquarters on December 16, 1944, to discuss the possibilities of overcoming the severe shortage of infantry replacements.

As soon as he entered my office, a staff officer appeared to report a slight penetration of the enemy into our defenses on the front of the 8th Corps of General Middleton and on the right flank of the 5th Corps of General Gerow in the Ardennes. The officer plotted these areas on my operational map, and Bradley and I began to analyze the possible consequences of enemy activity.

I was convinced that this offensive was not of a local nature; it would be illogical for the enemy to attempt a small offensive in the Ardennes, unless, of course, it was his diversion to draw our attention to this area while he would strike a strong blow somewhere else.

We ruled out such a possibility. In other sectors of the front, either we were so strong that the Germans could not hope for the success of their offensive, or there were not enough important objects that he would want to take possession of.

In addition, we have learned that in recent days the number of German troops in the Ardennes has been gradually increasing. It was through this area that the Germans launched a major offensive in 1940, as a result of which the British troops were expelled from the continent, and France was withdrawn from the war. Then the offensive was led by the same von Rundstedt, who this time was the commander here.

It is possible that he hoped to repeat the success he had achieved here more than four years earlier. We always thought that before admitting their final defeat in the West, the Germans would try to launch a desperate counter-offensive there. It seemed entirely possible to me and Bradley that this was the kind of operation they had started here."

" On the morning of December 17, 1944, it became clear that the Germans had launched a major offensive.

They broke through our defenses on the front of the 106th and 28th divisions. Contradictory reports began to arrive at the headquarters, but it was obvious that the enemy, using a significant number of tank formations, was rapidly advancing westward. All our intelligence services continued to work tirelessly, and we soon had a fairly complete picture of the strength of the German strike.

For the offensive, von Rundstedt concentrated three armies - the 5th and 6th tank and 7th combined arms - they included ten tank and motorized infantry divisions, and in general the enemy group consisted of twenty-four divisions with support.

We received some of this information a little later in the course of the battle, but by the evening of December 17, our reconnaissance discovered seventeen divisions. Thus, it is likely that at least twenty divisions participated in the operation.

In two important respects, the enemy achieved a certain amount of surprise. The first of these was the timing of the offensive. Considering the heavy defeats we inflicted on the enemy in the late summer and autumn of 1944, and the extraordinary measures he had to take to form new formations, we believed that he could not prepare for a major offensive in such a short time.

The second surprise for us was the strength with which he launched the offensive. The mobile reserve was the 6th Panzer Army, a fresh and powerful formation recently arrived at the front from Germany, the trace of which we had lost some time ago; however, we have already pretty battered the 7th and 5th tank armies in previous battles.

The Allies decided to immediately pull up their reserves. Among those Allied reserves that could be used almost immediately was the 18th Airborne Corps, under the command of General Ridgway, stationed near Reims.

American tankers watch from their M4 Sherman tank overflying C-47 Skytrain transport aircraft.

The corps included the 82nd and 101st airborne divisions, units already tested in battle.
Shortly before this, they had fought heavy battles in Holland and had not yet fully recovered. By order of Eisenhower, the 18th Corps was immediately redeployed to the Ardennes.

Eisenhower wrote:

“Recently, the US 11th Armored Division had arrived in theater and the 17th Airborne Division was in the United Kingdom ready to go to the continent, the 87th Infantry Division could also be delivered to the threatened area within an acceptable time frame. In the English sector, far to the north, Montgomery was preparing for a new offensive.

By this time, he had one full-strength corps not involved in operations. We were confident that with such reserves, any offensive undertaken by the Germans, we could eventually respond effectively.

The 101st Airborne Division held the defense in the city of Bastogne - the German 5th Panzer Army repeatedly attacked from different directions, but could not take Bastogne. The defense of this city seriously hampered the advance of the Germans, since seven main roads in the Ardennes, which were necessary for the supply of the Germans, intersected there.

The 7th American Panzer Division held the city of Saint-Vith for 5 days near the Belgian-German border on the northern section of the Ardennes salient. This small town was also the crossroads of important roads in the Ardennes - according to the plan, the Germans expected to take it at 18:00 on the evening of December 17, but this was only possible on December 21.

Such delays for the Germans were unacceptable. The American troops retreated and left the city, but the defense of the city of Saint-Vith also greatly slowed down the German advance. But the allies held Bastogne. The defense of both cities slowed down the pace of the German offensive, and made it possible for the Allies to transfer additional troops to the Ardennes.

Eisenhower wrote:

"The courageous actions of the 7th Armored Division near St. Vith deserve special attention. When this division moved south, the situation was still far from clear. It went with the goal of supporting the left flank of the 8th Corps and ultimately ended up in a semicircle encirclement at Saint-Vit, about fifteen miles south of Monschau.

St. Vith was an important nodal point in this area, and the enemy advanced units, trying to break out to the west, sought to capture it at any cost. Here, the remnants of the 106th and 28th divisions joined the 7th armored division, and together they stubbornly repelled the incessant enemy attacks. The actions of this division not only frustrated the German efforts in the north, but also prevented a quick encirclement of our positions at Monschau.

As a result, the continuous and strong pressure of the Germans on the 7th division began to threaten it with complete encirclement. The German offensive by several divisions forced her to retreat west on December 20, to the area north of Saint-Vit. The next day, the 7th Armored Division was ordered to withdraw some further distance, in order, together with other units, to take up defensive positions, which were now erected on the north side of the resulting salient.

However, the stubborn defense of this division in the previous days not only seriously disrupted the advance plan of the enemy advance units, but also provided exceptional assistance to the 2nd division in an important sector at Monschau, until the 1st division under the command of Brigadier General Clift Addrus and Major General Louis Craig's 9th Division. When these three battle-tested divisions took up the defense there, the security of our troops on the north side of the salient was practically assured.

View of the ruins of the Belgian town of St. Vith during the Ardennes operation.

On December 19, 1944, General Eisenhower called a meeting at Verdun to discuss the circumstances resulting from the German counteroffensive.

A week before these events, on December 12, General Patton discussed the possibility of a German breakthrough from the left flank of his army in the sector of the First Army, as a result of which a plan was developed for the 3rd Army counteroffensive in case of such an enemy action.

But the Germans did not have enough resources.

Otto Skorzeny wrote:

"Unusual chaos reigned on the roads. I Panzer Corps, which was in front, received no support, and by December 18 it ran out of fuel. There was no question of reaching the bridges across the Meuse."

"In order for all of us to receive information important for coordinating our efforts, I want to instruct General Eisenhower to send a fully competent officer from his headquarters to Moscow to discuss with you the state of affairs with Eisenhower on the western front and the question of cooperation with the eastern front.

We will maintain complete secrecy. I hope that you will meet with this officer on General Eisenhower's staff and arrange for an exchange of information with him that will be mutually beneficial. The situation in Belgium is not bad, but we have entered a period where we need to talk about the next phase.

Please respond promptly to this proposal due to the extreme urgency of the matter."

"Churchill-Stalin

I do not consider the situation in the West to be bad, but it is quite obvious that Eisenhower cannot solve his problem without knowing what your plans are. President Roosevelt, with whom I have already exchanged opinions, has made a proposal to send you a fully competent staff officer to get acquainted with your considerations, which we need for guidance.

Of course, it is very important for us to know the main outlines and terms of your operations. Our confidence in the offensives to be undertaken by the Russian army is such that we have never asked you a single question before, and we are now convinced that the answer will be reassuring; but we think, for reasons of secrecy, that you will be more inclined to inform a completely reliable officer than to report it in any other way."

The German offensive began to stall.

The offensive of the Wehrmacht bogged down near the Belgian city of Celles on the morning of December 25, 1944, just 6 km from the Meuse River and the bridge in the city of Dinan. Ironically, this was the last settlement on the way to the Meuse. Here was the "point" of the Ardennes ledge, that is, the westernmost point of the German offensive in the Ardennes.

Here the German 2nd Panzer Division, advancing in the vanguard of the 5th Panzer Army, was surrounded near the town of Sell. The 2nd German Panzer Division was surrounded by the 2nd American and 11th British Panzer Divisions.

It was a rare case in history that two enemy divisions with the same numbers clashed in battle.

By December 25, 1944, as a strategic operation, the German offensive in the Ardennes ended in complete failure. They did not even fulfill tactical tasks - they could not capture the bridges over the Meuse River, and did not even reach the river itself. This was mainly due to the problems of supplying German troops with fuel and ammunition.

Despite Hitler's orders to continue the offensive, the German troops began to withdraw.

Eisenhower wrote:

"The scope of the fighting did not decrease until December 26, and from all the intelligence reports that came in it was clear that the Germans were going to make at least one more major effort to break through our defenses in this area.

In the south, Bradley launched his counteroffensive on the morning of 22 December. His troops advanced extremely slowly, and their maneuver was hampered by heavy snowdrifts. The initial strike was carried out by the forces of the 3rd Corps, consisting of the 4th Armored, 80th and 26th Infantry Divisions. The fighting took on a protracted character, which was clearly not to the liking of General Patton.

The slow pace of advance did not give any chance of a sudden breakthrough of the enemy defenses. General Patton called me several times to express his disappointment with the course of the fighting. At a meeting at Verdun on the morning of December 19, he hinted at a quick success and even predicted that he would enter Bastogne on the move. I answered him that as long as his troops were advancing, I was quite satisfied. I expected that due to bad weather, the fighting would turn out that way and that Patton would meet only with the defending divisions of the German 7th Army.

On December 23, the weather suddenly improved, and we had the opportunity to use aircraft over the areas [of hostilities. From that day on, the battle-tested aircraft crews of our tactical air force began again bombing the most vulnerable places in the German system of lines of communication, striking enemy columns on the roads, seeking out and reporting to us every significant movement of enemy forces.

The Germans, taken prisoner after the start of the air action, spoke with horror of the destruction caused by the Allied bombing, and invariably complained bitterly about the helplessness of the Luftwaffe.

On December 26, Patton finally managed to break through to Bastogne, but he did it in a narrow area with the forces of the left flank, which provided us with a very unreliable connection with the besieged garrison. However, after December 26, really heavy fighting unfolded around this city both for the garrison itself and for the troops that broke through to his rescue.

On December 26, not reaching six kilometers to the place of Rommel's historic crossing over the Meuse, the last advancing division of the Wehrmacht, the 2nd Panzer, was stopped in a fierce tank battle.

In case it had not stopped, the western coast of Mass was defended by four divisions of the 30th English Corps, transferred here shortly before. After the 26th, the Germans began to slowly evacuate the Ardennes salient. The crisis of the operation is over.

Already on December 22, the Americans were conducting private offensive operations in the south of the salient, and on January 3, a general offensive of the allies began from the north and from the south in the general direction of Houffalize. The Germans defended stubbornly. It took the Anglo-Americans three weeks to finally push them back to their original positions. The losses of both sides were, in terms of the scale of the second front, quite noticeable.

Third offensive and dispute at Allied headquarters

On the night of January 1, 1945, the forces of the 1st and 19th armies launched the third German offensive, the North Wind operation, but now - in order to regain the factor of surprise - already in Northern Alsace. During the three days of the offensive, the shock group of the 1st Army advanced up to 30 km.
On January 1, 1945, more than 900 German bombers made a massive raid on Allied airfields in Western Europe (Northern France, Belgium and Holland). 200 aircraft were destroyed on the ground. The Germans lost 93 aircraft in the process.
In addition, their aircraft from the fire of their own anti-aircraft artillery lost another 200 aircraft when they mistakenly flew over the V-2 launch pads.

This raid further complicated the strategic situation for the allied forces. On the same day, Eisenhower ordered the troops to leave Northern Alsace and Strasbourg. The commander of the French 1st Army learned about this important decision only after 30 hours, since the withdrawal was kept secret even from the French signal group.

The commander of the 1st French Army, de Lattre de Tassigny, decided, contrary to the order, not to withdraw the left flank of his army and take over the defense of Strasbourg. The head of the provisional government of France, de Gaulle, approved this initiative and on January 2 sent him an appropriate order. At a meeting at Versailles on January 3, Eisenhower was forced to yield to French pressure.

While a fierce battle was taking place in the Ardennes, no less heated battles were going on in the highest headquarters of the combined expeditionary forces. The tension between Eisenhower and Montgomery since the start of Operation Overlord had been growing ever stronger and now reached its climax. Eisenhower believed that the German divisions that had broken through the Allied front and were advancing in the emerging salient suffered considerable losses, and their communications were stretched out. He intended to deal them a swift and powerful blow.

He believed that the simultaneous offensive of the American 3rd Army from the southern flank and the American 1st Army, which was then under the command of Montgomery, from the northern flank would create the possibility of encircling the German tank armies that had broken through and destroying them in the resulting Ardennes ledge.

However, Montgomery, at a meeting with Eisenhower on December 28, stated that the Germans were still able to carry out a fairly strong counteroffensive on the northern border of the salient.

He proposed "to meet this possible strike with a prepared defense, to weaken the advancing enemy grouping, and then to defeat it with the counteroffensive of the American 1st Army."

His idea was to push the enemy back behind the Siegfried Line, while Eisenhower was in favor of encircling the German divisions that had broken through and destroying them.

Montgomery promised to launch an offensive with the American 1st Army on January 1. However, on December 30, Montgomery's chief of staff, General Guinan, arrived at Eisenhower's headquarters at Versailles. He said that his boss had decided to start the offensive no earlier than January 3rd. This frustrated all the plans of the Supreme Commander.

Eisenhower promptly wrote a scathing letter to Montgomery.

It stated that if the commander of the 21st Army Group did not comply with the decision agreed on December 28, he would be fired. But Monty persisted. On New Year's Eve, Guinan flew back to Versailles. He reported that Montgomery would not launch an offensive until he had repulsed the German attack he expected against the northern flank of the Allies.

Upon receiving this letter, Montgomery arrogantly asked: "And who will replace me?" “This has already been discussed,” General Guinan replied. They want Alex.

He was referring to the English Field Marshal Alexander, commander of the allied forces in Italy. Montgomery turned pale; he had forgotten about Alexander.

"What should I do?" - he asked. In response, the general handed him the text of the telegram: "Sign this."

Montgomery read the text and signed it. In this telegram to Eisenhower, he asked him to tear up his previous letter. Following the telegram, he sent a letter to Versailles. He wrote: “You can rely not on me and on all the forces entrusted to me one hundred percent. We will carry out your plan."

General Bradley, in accordance with Eisenhower's orders, had already launched the 3rd Army offensive in the zone of the 12th Army Group. Montgomery was inactive.

Moreover, he wrote a letter to Eisenhower, in which he demanded that the leadership of all ground operations be handed over to him, and that all efforts of the combined Allied forces be concentrated in the northern direction. He even prepared a draft directive for Eisenhower to sign.

On January 3, 1945, the Anglo-American troops moved from small counter-attacks to a full-scale offensive against German positions. Nevertheless, by the end of the German offensive in the Ardennes, the Allied forces continued to be in a critical situation.

German soldiers fire a 20mm Flak 30 anti-aircraft gun at a ground target. Western front, Ardennes operation.

American pilot Captain Lowell Smith (Lowell Smith) thanks the anti-aircraft gun crew during the Ardennes operation.

"Churchill-Stalin

I still remain of the opinion that the strength and equipment of the allied armies, including the air force, will make von Rundstedt regret his bold and well-organized attempt to split our front and, if possible, capture the port of Antwerp, which is now of vital importance ...

“Very heavy fighting is going on in the West, and at any time big decisions may be required from the High Command. You yourself know from your own experience how disturbing the situation is when a very wide front has to be defended after a temporary loss of initiative.

It is highly desirable and necessary for General Eisenhower to know in general terms what you intend to do, since this, of course, will affect all of his and our most important decisions. According to the message received, our emissary Air Chief Marshal Tedder was in Cairo last night, weather-bound.

I consider the matter urgent."

Help from the USSR

As early as December 21, the commander of the allied forces, General D. Eisenhower, insistently asked the governments of the United States and Britain to turn to the Soviet Union for military assistance.

January 6, 1945 Winston Churchill addressed the Supreme Commander of the USSR Armed Forces Joseph Stalin

"Churchill-Stalin

…3. I have just returned from visiting General Eisenhower's headquarters and Field Marshal Montgomery's headquarters separately. The battle in Belgium is very difficult, but they believe that we are masters of the situation. The diversionary offensive that the Germans are undertaking in Alsace also causes difficulties in relations with the French and tends to pin down American forces.

I still remain of the opinion that the size and equipment of the allied armies, including the air force, will make von Rundstedt regret his bold and well-organized attempt to split our front and, if possible, capture the port of Antwerp, which is now of vital importance ... "

“Very heavy fighting is going on in the West, and at any time big decisions may be required from the High Command. You yourself know from your own experience how disturbing it is to defend a very wide front after a temporary loss of initiative. General Eisenhower is very desirable and necessary know in general terms what you intend to do, as this will of course affect all his and our most important decisions According to the message received, our emissary, Air Chief Marshal Tedder, was in Cairo last night, being weather-bound.

His trip was greatly delayed through no fault of yours. If he has not yet arrived to you, I shall be grateful if you can let me know if we can count on a major Russian offensive on the Vistula front or somewhere else during January and at any other points that you may you wish to mention. I will not pass on this highly classified information to anyone, with the exception of Field Marshal Brooke and General Eisenhower, and only on condition that it is kept in the strictest confidence.

I consider the matter urgent."

"Stalin-Churchill

Received on the evening of January 7 your message of January 6, 1945. Unfortunately, Air Chief Marshal Tedder has not yet arrived in Moscow.

It is very important to use our superiority against the Germans in artillery and aviation. In these types, clear weather is required for aviation and the absence of low fogs that prevent artillery from conducting aimed fire. We are preparing to advance, but the weather is not favorable for our advance. However, taking into account the position of our allies on the western front, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to complete the preparations at an accelerated pace and, regardless of the weather, open wide offensive operations against the Germans along the entire central front no later than the second half of January. You can be sure that we will do everything possible to do in order to assist our glorious allied forces.

"Churchill-Stalin

1. I am very grateful to you for your exciting message. I forwarded it to General Eisenhower for his personal information only. May your noble undertaking be full of good luck!

2. The battle in the West is not going so badly. It is quite possible that the Huns will be driven out of their salient with very heavy losses. This is a battle primarily fought by the Americans; and their troops fought splendidly, suffering heavy losses in the process.

We and the Americans are throwing everything we can into the fight. The news you have given me will greatly encourage General Eisenhower, as it will give him the confidence that the Germans will have to divide their reserves between our two flaming fronts. There will be no break in the battle in the West, according to the statements of the generals leading it."

January 12, 1945, 8 days ahead of schedule, the Soviet troops went on the offensive on the entire Soviet-German front.

The German command was forced to finally abandon further attempts to attack in the West and begin the transfer of forces from there to the Soviet-German front. In the second half of January - early February 1945, 13 of the most combat-ready divisions were transferred to the Soviet-German front, including 6 tank and motorized (6th SS Panzer Army), 800 tanks and assault guns and other military equipment.

"Today I had a conversation with Marshal Tedder and the generals accompanying him. It seems to me that the mutual information turned out to be quite complete, which Marshal Tedder will probably report to you about. I must say that Marshal Tedder made a very good impression on me. Despite the unfavorable weather , the offensive of the Soviet troops is developing according to the planned plan. The troops of the entire central front have been set in motion - from the Carpathians to the Baltic Sea. The Germans are madly resisting, but forced to retreat. I hope that this circumstance will facilitate and accelerate the offensive planned by General Eisenhower on the western front. "

And Roosevelt:

“Today, January 15, I had a conversation with Marshal Tedder and the generals accompanying him. It seems to me that mutual information turned out to be quite complete. Comprehensive answers were given on both sides to the questions posed. I must say that Marshal Tedder makes the most favorable impression.

After four days of offensive operations on the Soviet-German front, I now have the opportunity to inform you that, despite the unfavorable weather, the offensive of the Soviet troops is developing satisfactorily. \
The entire central front, from the Carpathians to the Baltic Sea, is in motion to the west. Although the Germans resist fiercely, they are still forced to retreat. I have no doubt that the Germans will have to scatter their reserves between the two fronts, as a result of which they will be forced to abandon the offensive on the western front. I am glad that this circumstance will ease the position of the Allied forces in the west and speed up preparations for the offensive planned by General Eisenhower.

As for the Soviet troops, you can be sure that, despite the existing difficulties, they will do everything possible to ensure that the blow they have taken against the Germans is as effective as possible.

"I am very grateful to you for your message, and I am very glad that Air Marshal Tedder made such a favorable impression on you. On behalf of His Majesty's Government and from the bottom of my heart, I want to express our gratitude and congratulations to you on the occasion of that gigantic offensive that You started on the eastern front.

You no doubt now know General Eisenhower's plans and to what extent they were delayed by Rundstedt's preventive offensive. I am sure that on our entire front the battles will go on uninterruptedly. The British 21st Army Group under Field Marshal Montgomery launched an offensive today in the area south of Roermond."

Roosevelt-Stalin

“I am very grateful for your encouraging message of January 15 about your conversation with Air Marshal Tedder and about the offensive of your troops on the Soviet-German front. The exploits performed by your heroic soldiers before, and the effectiveness they have already demonstrated in this offensive, give every reason hope for the speedy success of our troops on both fronts.The time needed to force the capitulation of our barbaric opponents will be sharply reduced by the skillful coordination of our joint efforts.

America, as you know, is making great efforts in the Pacific Ocean, seven thousand miles away, and I hope that the early collapse of Germany will allow sufficient forces to be transferred to the Pacific Ocean to quickly eliminate the Japanese threat to all our allies.

New Allied offensive

By January 15, 1945, parts of the 1st and 3rd American armies joined north of Bastogne in the area of ​​​​the cities of Houffalize and Noville, thereby eliminating more than half of the Ardennes ledge. The 12th Corps of the 3rd Army made a breakthrough across the Syur River at 03.30 am on January 18 without artillery preparation and caught the enemy by surprise. The 101st Airborne Division was transferred to the 6th Army Group.

They were needed to continue the attack on the Colmar pocket.

On January 23, the 1st Army liberated the city of Saint-Vith. The further offensive plan of the 12th Army Group assumed the assault on the Siegfried Line. On January 24, the remaining German units, totaling about 300,000 people, were completely surrounded in Belgium, but continued to resist.

Operation results

By January 29, the Allies completely eliminated the Ardennes "ledge" and began the invasion of Germany. German counteroffensive ended in failure

The Wehrmacht lost in battles more than a third of armored vehicles and almost all of the aircraft involved in the offensive operation, a large amount of resources, used up fuel and ammunition, which the Wehrmacht lacked at the end of the war. All this could be needed to defend the western borders of Germany, or could be used by the German command on other fronts.

Despite the fact that the German command did not achieve the set results, the Ardennes operation delayed the offensive of the Anglo-American troops on the Rhine for 6 weeks: the Allies planned the offensive for December 18, 1944, but had to postpone it to January 29, 1945.

Chapter 29

THE BATTLE OF THE ARDENNE (July 21, 1944 - January 17, 1945)

On September 16, Hitler issued an order demanding "fanatical determination" from all troops in the West. The Americans approached the German border, and south of Aachen even crossed it. “From our side, any large-scale operations cannot be carried out. The only thing left for us is to hold our positions or die.” It seemed that the Fuhrer was calling only for the defense of the fatherland, but this was a ploy to mislead the enemy, who, as Hitler feared, had a spy in his headquarters. After the meeting, the Fuhrer invited Keitel, Jodl and the Luftwaffe representative, General Kreipe, to his office. While they were wondering what surprise the Fuhrer was preparing for them, the owner of the office entered - stooped, pale, visibly passed after the third mini-heart attack. His eyes were watery and cloudy, his jaw dropped.

Jodl briefly reported on the situation: Germany has no reliable allies - some have defected, others are going to do it. Although there are over 9 million under arms in the Wehrmacht, over the past three months the losses have amounted to 1.2 million, almost half of them on the Western Front. There was a relative calm in the East. The Soviet offensive appears to have fizzled out. “But in the West we are going through a serious test in the Ardennes,” Jodl concluded. It was a hilly region in Belgium and Luxembourg, the path taken by German troops to victory in World War I.

At the word "Ardennes" Hitler started up, raised his hand and shouted: "Stop!" There was silence. Finally he spoke, “I have made an important decision. I'm going on the offensive. Here in the Ardennes!” The Fuhrer struck the map with his fist. "Across the river Meuse and further - to Antwerp!" Everyone stared at him in amazement. Hitler's shoulders straightened, his eyes sparkled, signs of anxiety and illness disappeared. It was the dynamic Hitler of 1940. In the next few days, he was a model of the former energy, insisted on preparing a plan for a decisive counteroffensive. He issued orders for the creation of a new tank army and outlined ways to deliver 250,000 troops and a thousand tanks to the Ardennes in absolute secrecy.

Only then did he keep his promise to do an X-ray of his head. By the evening of September 19, he was taken to the field hospital in Rastenburg and taken to the X-ray room, which had previously been carefully examined for explosives. Then the Fuhrer visited his wounded officers and shed tears at the sight of the dying General Schmundt. At the exit, she was greeted with shouts of “Sieg heil!” an enthusiastic crowd of townspeople and convalescing soldiers. This delight at the sight of the Fuhrer was understandable, but Giesing was struck by the fact that sincere enthusiasm was even in the eyes of the crippled and seriously wounded.

In the morning Giesing studied the three photographs. Then every day I went to the bunker to examine the patient. The doctor noticed that under artificial lighting, Hitler's face takes on a strange reddish hue. Subsequently, the Fuhrer's stomach pains intensified, and he demanded six "little black pills" prescribed by Morel. Surprised by such a dose, Giesing began to cautiously wonder what kind of pills they were. Linge showed him the vial. The label said: anti-gas pills. This was followed by their composition, having studied which, Giesing was horrified: it included strychnine and atropine, although in small quantities. But given the fact that Hitler took these pills for a long time and in large quantities, it could be assumed that he was poisoning himself. Perhaps that was the explanation for the seizures, the growing weakness, irritability, aversion to light, the hoarse voice and that strange reddish skin tone. Cardiograms inspired fears.

On September 25, Giesing accidentally saw the patient in natural light - on the street. This time his skin had a yellowish tint, and there was yellowness in his eyes. It was obvious jaundice. Hitler did not get up in the morning. Secretaries, adjutants and attendants were in alarm. No one could remember the Fuhrer staying in bed, no matter how sick he was.

He did not want to see anyone, did not want to eat, was indifferent to everything. He was not even interested in the critical situation on the Eastern Front. Morel advised the patient to stay in bed. Concerned Giesing, after another examination, furtively took a vial of Morel's black pills and showed it to Hasselbach. He, too, was amazed, but advised Giesing to remain silent until they spoke with Brandt.

Meanwhile, Morel ordered that no other doctors be allowed to see the Fuhrer. Both Giesing and van Eyken were turned down. Morel believed that the Fuhrer had no jaundice. Nevertheless, in a few days, Hitler lost almost one and a half kilograms in weight and lay writhing in pain.

Physical pain was not the only cause of Hitler's depression. Another bundle of documents was found in the safe of the army headquarters in Zossen, testifying to the involvement of a significant part of the army leadership in the conspiracy. The Fuhrer was in shock, and many believed that this was what undermined his spirit.

September 29 Brandt managed to get to Hitler. He tried to prove to the Fuhrer that Morel was a charlatan. At first, he took Brandt's words seriously, but Morel managed to convince Hitler that he was absolutely innocent. If the Führer suffers side effects from the use of drugs, it is because he himself increases the doses. Frustrated, Brandt waved his hand at everything. Then Hasselbach went to Bormann. But he did not take into account that Bormann had long wanted to get rid of Brandt, because he was Speer's man, whose "dangerous" influence on the Fuhrer Bormann wanted to reduce at any cost. The "grey eminence" listened to Hasselbach's story with feigned indignation, and then went to Hitler and warned him that Brandt, Hasselbach and Giesing conspired to defame Morel for their own selfish purposes. From now on, no doctor, except Morel, was allowed to see Hitler. It seemed that Bormann had won.

But on October 1, Giesing called Linge and said that the Fuhrer had a severe headache, and he asked the doctor to come to him immediately. The Fuhrer was lying on his Spartan bed in his nightgown. He lifted his head slightly to greet the doctor, and immediately dropped it on the pillow. The Fuhrer's eyes were empty, indifferent to everything. When Giesing sat down on his bed, Hitler suddenly asked:

– Doctor, how did you find out about antigas pills? Giesing said. Hitler frowned.

Why didn't you come to me right away? Didn't you know that I trust you completely?

Giesing's skin was chilled. He explained that he was not allowed to see the Fuhrer. Hitler shrugged.

“You have greatly frightened Morel. He even turned pale and nervous. But I calmed him down. I myself have always thought that these are simple tablets for absorbing gases in the stomach, and they helped me.

Giesing countered that the sense of relief was illusory.

“What you are saying probably has some basis,” Hitler interrupted him, “but this thing has never harmed me. I often experienced stomach cramps due to constant nervous tension, especially in the last month.

Giesing suggested that Hitler had jaundice, but he expressed doubts about this. Nevertheless, the Fuhrer asked him to examine. For the first time, Giesing subjected his patient to a complete physical examination. He checked his neuralgic reflexes and at the same time made sure that the rumors about the underdevelopment of the Fuhrer's genitals were not true.

As Linge and Giesing helped him put on his dressing gown, Hitler said:

– You see, doctor, I have a generally healthy body and, I hope, I will be healthy soon.

He thanked Giesing for everything and asked for another dose of "that cocaine drug." But suddenly a deathly pallor spread over the Fuhrer's face. Giesing checked his pulse: it was fast and weak. Hitler lost consciousness.

The doctor looked around - he was alone. The orderly left when someone knocked on the door. The Fuhrer was completely in the hands of Giesing. The doctor saw a tyrant in front of him. Some inner voice prompted him to stick a tampon stick into a bottle of cocaine - the second dose could be fatal, and he quickly began to treat Hitler's left nostril with the medicine. He was almost finished when Linge's voice was heard:

– How much more time do you need? Giesing replied as calmly as possible that not much. Hitler still did not regain consciousness.

“The Führer has spasms again,” the orderly remarked. - Let him rest.

With difficulty restraining his excitement, Giesing said goodbye to Linge and rode his bicycle to his hospital. One thought haunted him: Will Hitler still live? Frightened, he called Hasselbach, telling him what had happened, and took a day off on the pretext that he had to go to Berlin, since his house had been bombed.

The next day, Giesing called from the capital and learned that the Fuhrer was alive. No one suspected that he had received a double dose of cocaine.

When Hitler felt better, he was given materials about the involvement in the conspiracy of Field Marshal Rommel. The Fuhrer decided: Rommel must commit suicide. On October 14, on behalf of the Fuhrer, two generals visited the castle in the vicinity of Ulm, where Rommel was recovering from his wound. An hour later they left the castle, and an agitated Rommel told his wife that he was accused of involvement in the conspiracy, and Hitler gave him a choice - either poison, or "people's court." Saying goodbye to his wife and son, the field marshal took the adjutant aside and said to him: "Aldinger, this is the end." He was supposed to go with two generals to Ulm and take poison along the way, and half an hour later they would report the death of the field marshal as a result of an accident. He will be buried with all honors, his family will not be persecuted. The adjutant advised Rommel not to surrender, but he replied that this was impossible: the area was surrounded by SS men, and the line of communication with the troops was cut off.

At 13.05, in the leather jacket of the commander of the "Afrika Korps" and with a field marshal's baton in his hand, Rommel left with his companions for the hospital in Ulm and swallowed poison along the way. According to the official medical report, death was the result of blockage of blood vessels caused by damage to the skull during the wound. The face of the deceased, according to relatives, expressed "cold contempt."

Otto Skorzeny, an active participant in the Ardennes operation

By the end of September, Hitler had lost three allies - Finland, Romania and Bulgaria. In October, another defector appeared: Horthy, a Hungarian admiral without a fleet, ruler of a kingdom without a king, sent his representatives to Moscow to conclude a truce. Soviet troops were 150 kilometers from the Hungarian capital. Since any secrets in Budapest were usually discussed loudly in cafes, Hitler was aware of the negotiations. While the Hungarian delegation was negotiating favorable terms in Moscow, the Fuhrer sent his favorite Otto Skorzeny to Hungary with the task of returning its leaders to the right path. He did this with minimal bloodshed as a result of an operation called "Mickey Mouse". Skorzeny kidnapped Horthy's son, wrapped him in a carpet and took him to the airport. Then he captured the fortress where the Hungarian dictator lived and ruled, while managing with one airborne battalion. The operation was carried out in half an hour, the losses amounted to seven people.

A week later, the Fuhrer enthusiastically welcomed his favorite in the Wolf's Lair. He was amused by the story of the kidnapping of young Horthy. When Skorzeny got up to leave, Hitler stopped him: "Now I want to give you the most important task." He announced the upcoming offensive in the Ardennes. Skorzeny, he said, will have to play a leading role: to train saboteurs in American uniforms. They will seize bridges across strategically important water barriers, sow panic, give false orders.

By this time, Jodl had presented Hitler with a plan of attack, code-named Watch on the Rhine. It provided for the introduction of three armies, consisting of 12 tank and 18 infantry divisions. "Watch on the Rhine" was based on two prerequisites: complete surprise and inclement weather, excluding the use of allied aircraft. The purpose of the operation was to defeat more than thirty American and British divisions. It was assumed that as a result of such a stunning defeat, the West would ask for a separate peace. After its conclusion, all German troops will be able to unite their actions against the Red Army.

Strict measures were taken to ensure secrecy: the name of the operation changed every two weeks, it was forbidden to talk about it on the phone, all documents were sent by couriers, from whom they took a non-disclosure subscription.

The leadership of the operation was entrusted to Field Marshal Model. Rundstedt proposed his plan, which boiled down to a massive attack with twenty divisions on a front of 65 kilometers. Hitler responded by giving a whole lecture about Frederick the Great, who smashed the enemy, twice the size of his troops. "Why don't you study history?" - the Fuhrer addressed his generals in a mocking tone. His eyes shone, it was the Hitler of the old days, full of self-confidence. As a result of this offensive, he assured, "an unpredictable historical event will occur: the alliance of the enemies of the Reich will fall apart"!

On November 10, Hitler signed an order to prepare for an offensive in the Ardennes. He made it clear that this operation was the last stake in the big game in which the fate of Germany was decided. The tone of his directive provoked objections from some military leaders. Upon learning of this, the Fuhrer decided to go to the front. But suddenly all his illnesses became aggravated. His voice was hoarse, and on examination by Professor van Eyken, a polyp was found on his right vocal cord. Hitler became grumpy and depressed, received visitors in bed, looked pale and haggard. Morel was forced to give him numerous injections.

Hitler was advised to take a short vacation before making the tiring and dangerous trip to the Western Front. But the Fuhrer was obsessed with the idea of ​​inspiring people who were about to go through a difficult test. On November 20, he left the headquarters with a large group of escorts. Hitler apparently realized that he would never return to the Wolf's Lair, but he instructed to continue construction work. The train left at dawn to arrive in Berlin at nightfall. Hitler sat for a long time in his compartment with curtained windows. It was time for dinner, and he went into the dining car. Traudl Junge had never seen the Fuhrer so distracted. He spoke in a whisper, looked only at the plate, or stared at the stain on the tablecloth with exaggerated attention. He said that Professor van Eiken insisted on an operation to remove the throat polyp.

For several days after the operation, Hitler did not appear in public. Then he showed up for breakfast, clearly in need of company. Everyone put out their cigarettes and opened the windows. He spoke in a whisper, explaining that this was the doctor's prescription. Others involuntarily also switched to a whisper. “My ears are good, and there is no need to spare them,” the Fuhrer said softly, and everyone laughed.

Hitler enthusiastically got to work. On December 7, he approved the final plan for the Ardennes offensive, which almost coincided with his original version. False rumors were spread in beer halls and restaurants to misinform enemy agents.

Lieutenant Colonel Otto Skorzeny, who had more power than some colonel generals, prepared his "Americans". Volunteers took a course in army slang, learned to operate behind enemy lines.

On December 11, preparations for the operation ended. The railway services of the Reich performed a miracle - they secretly transported troops and equipment to the area of ​​​​concentration. On this day, Hitler moved his headquarters to the vicinity of the medieval Ziegenberg castle. It was the "Eagle's Nest", where the command post for command and control was located during the invasion of the West in 1940. The Fuhrer and his associates settled down in deep underground bunkers. On the same day, Hitler held a meeting to which the commanders of military formations were invited. Upon arrival, the generals handed over their personal weapons and briefcases to the Gestapo.

The Fuhrer, Keitel, Jodl, Model, Rundstedt and Lieutenant General von Manteuffel sat at a narrow table. The latter was the German pentathlon champion, he was to command the most powerful of the three armies. For more than an hour, Hitler lectured sixty generals on Frederick the Great, German history and National Socialism, and then announced the political motives for the decision to launch a general offensive. "Autumn Fog"—that was its final codename—was scheduled to begin on December 15 at 5:30. The divisional commanders listened to Hitler in reverent silence, amazed by the grandiosity of the idea and the energy of the Fuhrer. However, Manteuffel, who was sitting almost next to him, could not help but pay attention to the unhealthy complexion and trembling hands of the Fuhrer. In conclusion, Hitler declared: “The battle will have to be fought with all cruelty, the resistance of the enemy must be broken. In this most serious hour for the fatherland, I demand courage from each of my soldiers and once again courage. The enemy must be defeated - now or never! Germany will live!

The next day, December 12, he repeated the same calls to another group of combat commanders. The offensive was postponed for another day - December 16th. This, Hitler said, was the final date, provided that the weather did not allow enemy aircraft to take off.

In the Ardennes, the night of December 15-16 was cold and calm. The front, 150 kilometers long, was held by six American divisions, three of which were fresh and three were badly battered in previous battles. It was the so-called “ghost front”, where nothing happened for more than two months. That night, no one expected a German attack. In the evening, British Field Marshal Montgomery categorically stated that the Germans “cannot organize a major offensive operation,” and even asked the commander of the Allied forces, the American General Eisenhower, if he had any objections if he went to England next week.

Three German armies - 250 thousand people and thousands of vehicles - were secretly advanced to their starting lines. The clang of caterpillars was muffled by low-flying planes. By midnight everything was ready for the start of the offensive. The soldiers were shivering from the cold, but listened with enthusiasm to the message of Field Marshal von Rundstedt, the meaning of which boiled down to one thing: "Forward to victory!"

At 5.30, fire and smoke began to erupt throughout the “ghost front”. Mines exploded, rockets hissed, Junkers-88s roared, hundreds of tanks rumbled, and heavy guns mounted on railway platforms unleashed a flurry of artillery fire on the American positions.

An hour later there was an ominous silence. Then, like ghosts, figures dressed in white, almost invisible in the snow, appeared in front of the Americans ... Airplanes appeared from the east, flying at incredible speed. These were the first German jet-powered fighters - the same “wonder weapon” that Hitler had already mentioned more than once.

A powerful attack caught the allies by surprise. The Germans achieved particular success in the north, breaking through the American front. Troops moved through the gap, supported by tanks, self-propelled artillery and armored cars. However, the commander of the American army, General Omar Bradley, assured Eisenhower that this was just a "local attack." Eisenhower, however, disagreed, believing that "it is unlikely that the Germans would launch a local attack on our weakest point," and ordered Bradley to send two panzer divisions to the aid of the surprise troops.

Hitler was delighted with this development. Late in the evening, he telephoned General Balck, commander of Army Group B, south of the Ardennes, and informed him of the brilliant success. “From now on, not a step back, today we only go forward!” The weather was as if to order: fog, haze, frost. The Germans built on the success achieved as a result of a sudden blow. On December 18, at the Eagle's Nest, Hitler learned that Manteuffel's troops had opened the road to Bastogne. He felt so good that he took a short walk in the fresh air and became so invigorated that he decided to do it every day.

Over the course of two days, the Allies suffered a series of catastrophic setbacks. On the snow-covered heights, at least 8,000 Americans got into the "bag". After the Philippines, this was the largest surrender of Americans in history.

Only seven "jeeps" with Skorzeny's sabotage groups managed to break through to the rear of the allies, but they did a great job. The commander of one group sent an entire American regiment along the wrong route, his people changed signs and cut telephone wires. Another team feigned a terrible panic and infected the column of Americans with it, who turned into a disorderly flight. A third team cut the line of communication between Bradley's headquarters and his second-in-command, General Hodges.

But the greatest damage to the allied forces was caused by saboteurs captured. When they told an American intelligence officer about their task, a radio message was broadcast that thousands of German saboteurs dressed in American uniforms were operating in the rear. On December 20, half a million Americans throughout the Ardennes interrogated each other on lonely roads, in pine forests and in abandoned villages. Neither passwords nor soldiers' books were taken into account. An American was considered only one who could without hesitation name the capital of the state of Pennsylvania and how many goals the “king” of baseball Babe Ruth scored.

In Paris, the panic reached its peak. Rumor has it that German paratroopers have landed, disguised as priests and nuns. According to the "confession" of the captured saboteur, they were given the task of kidnapping Eisenhower. The American security service believed this fake. The building of the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Forces was surrounded by barbed wire and the security was quadrupled. Tanks stood at the gates, passes were carefully checked and rechecked... Skorzeny's twenty-eight saboteurs, who caused such a commotion behind enemy lines, became the heroes of the operation.

By the morning of December 21, the mobile front line took the shape of a gigantic ledge. In its middle, near the Belgian city of Bastogne, American troops under the command of Brigadier General Anthony McAuliffe were completely surrounded. To the proposal of the German envoy to capitulate, he casually replied: "Nuts." (American slang word for "Are you nuts?") This brief reply helped lift the weakening Allied morale. The run is over. The “Hitler weather” is also over. The next morning the sun shone brightly in the Ardennes, and by noon large transport planes were already dropping supplies to the encircled allied forces in Bastogne.

The tide could be replaced by low tide, but Hitler did not think about it. Manteuffel's tanks passed the encircled Bastogne and were on their way to the river Meuse. But Manteuffel himself was alarmed: the infantry was far behind. On December 24, he called the Fuhrer's headquarters and informed Jodl that his left flank was exposed. He could not go to the Meuse and take Bastogne at the same time, and therefore he proposed to turn north along the Meuse and set up a trap for the Americans on the east bank of the river. But Hitler rejected this plan, insisting on forcing the Meuse and advancing towards Antwerp.

The Fuhrer was sure of victory and on Christmas surprised his loved ones by drinking a glass of wine. At the end of the day, he rejected another request from Manteuffel to stop the attacks on Bastogne, although the tank division that had pulled ahead was cut off by the Americans and suffered heavy losses. There were arguments in the Eagle's Nest. Jodl urged Hitler to face reality: “We cannot cross the Meuse, the 2nd Panzer Division is in danger of complete annihilation. Patton's army opened a corridor to Bastogne from the south for the Americans. The attack has been stopped." Hitler issued a new order: Manteuffel turn to the northeast and outflank the Americans in the upper half of the salient. “I need to transfer three fresh divisions and at least 25,000 reinforcements to the Ardennes,” the Fuhrer announced. Since the enemy could not be wiped out with one powerful blow, as planned, Autumn Mist can still be turned into a successful battle of attrition. And this will bring Germany an important political victory.”

These orders were intercepted by the Allied radio intelligence service and relayed to Eisenhower. He realized that Hitler's offensive had run out of steam. But counterintelligence did not know that a violent quarrel had taken place between the Fuhrer and his appointed successor. Goering declared that the war was lost and a truce must be sought. To this end, he offered to make contact with the nephew of the Swedish king, Count Bernadotte, who might agree to act as an intermediary. Hitler's reaction was violent. He accused Goering of cowardice and betrayal and declared that he forbade him to take any steps in this direction. “If you violate my order, I will shoot you,” the enraged Fuhrer threatened. The dejected Reichsmarschall told his wife about this. “This is the final break,” Goering observed gloomily. “It makes no sense for me to go to the daily meetings anymore. He doesn't trust me anymore."

The Germans called this battle the Ardennes Offensive, for the Americans it was the "battle for the ledge." On December 28, its third and final phase began. At a conference with the military leaders that day, Hitler admitted that the situation was desperate, but he did not recognize the word "surrender" and would steadily move towards his goal. The Führer declared that he would fight "until the scales tilted in our favor", and therefore, on January 1, he launched a new offensive, code-named "North Wind".

The concentration of German troops south of the Ardennes was carried out so covertly that the enemy did not even send reconnaissance aircraft to this area. Hitler sarcastically remarked about this: “Perhaps some people object to themselves, they doubt whether the offensive will succeed. Gentlemen, I heard the same objections in 1939. I was told in writing and orally that it was impossible. Even in the winter of 1940, I was warned that we should not do this, it would be better to stay behind the Western Wall. What would happen if we did so? Now we are in a similar situation.”

Field Marshal Rundstedt had the imprudence to advise Hitler to cancel Operation Autumn Mist and retreat before the enemy launched a counteroffensive. The Fuhrer flared up. As soon as the "North Wind" begins, the offensive in the Ardennes will resume, he said. The Fuhrer's impassioned speech made an impression on the listeners, although everyone noticed his trembling left hand and a sickly look. "In the meantime, Model will consolidate his position and regroup his forces for a new attempt," continued Hitler. “He will also make another powerful attack on Bastogne. First of all, we must take Bastogne." By midnight, several tank and infantry divisions pulled up to the city.

“Military qualities are not exercises on a box of sand,” Hitler said the next day to the inspector general of the armored forces, General Thomale. - Ultimately, they manifest themselves in the ability to hold on, in perseverance and determination. This is the decisive factor in any victory. Genius is an abstract concept unless it is based on perseverance and fanatical determination. This is the most important thing in a person." World history, he continued, can only be made by a man possessed. “No one lives forever. The question is who will last longer. The one who puts everything on the line must last longer. If America gives in, nothing will happen to it. New York will remain New York. But if we say today: that's enough, we've had enough, Germany will cease to exist. Therefore, so stubbornly Hitler continued the war, which in essence was already lost. For this gambler, it was necessary to keep fighting, even if the chance of success was one in a thousand. What to another person would have seemed pure madness, for the Fuhrer, with his obsession, was completely logical.

His chief propagandist was not so optimistic, at least in his own circle. At the New Year's party, where the famous pilot Hans Ulrich Rudel was also present, Joseph Goebbels mockingly remarked that his post - the Reich's commissioner to mobilize efforts for total war - was completely unnecessary. “Now there is nothing to mobilize,” said the Reich Minister of Propaganda, “everything, including flower shops, is closed by British bombers.” Goebbels turned to Heinz Ruck, who had warned in the first year of Hitler's rule that many storm troopers were dissatisfied with the Fuhrer's compromise with the chauvinists and such a compromise would lead to the death of National Socialism. At the time, Goebbels indignantly denied this. This time he melancholy said to Rook: "Then, in 1933, I should have taken your words more seriously." Almost everyone agreed that the end was near. Only Rudel claimed that Hitler's new secret weapon would bring victory to Germany.

At midnight, Operation North Wind began. Eight German divisions attacked the positions of the 7th American Army, which stood near the borders of Northern Alsace. In the north, in the Ardennes, the defensive lines of the allies covered the fiery shaft.

Photo from the German Federal Archives

Five minutes after the start of a new German offensive, Hitler's speech was broadcast over the radio throughout Germany. Germany, he declared, would rise like a Phoenix and win. The Fuhrer had to celebrate the last New Year in his life in the bunker, where his inner circle also gathered. Champagne created a relaxed atmosphere, but there was a lot of animation. The Fuhrer was the most excited. He predicted great German successes in 1945. Gradually everyone was infected by his enthusiasm...

At 0435 Hitler left the company to find out the first results of the new winter offensive. It began successfully, but the British radio interception service urgently transmitted the information received to the headquarters of the allied forces. Eisenhower retaliated, and the Germans managed to advance only 25 kilometers.

In the Ardennes, the Allies launched a counteroffensive on January 3, 1945, hoping to dismember the huge ledge formed by the enemy wedged into their defenses with massive attacks from the north and south. The Germans fought desperately and the Americans advanced slowly. Thick fog precluded the use of aviation and limited the effectiveness of artillery. On ice-covered roads, tanks and self-propelled guns skidded and often collided with each other.

Churchill flew in from England to oversee the course of the counteroffensive. On January 6, he met with Eisenhower. Both were concerned about the slow progress of the operation. Wouldn't it be possible, Eisenhower asked, to ask the Russians for help to distract the Germans? Churchill wrote to Stalin the same day. The answer from Moscow came quickly. A large-scale offensive, Stalin wrote, would begin no later than the second half of January.

At the same time, Allied attacks from the north and south were gaining momentum, and on 8 January, with a heavy heart, Hitler agreed to a withdrawal from the western half of the salient. This was the end of the Führer's great dream. It was now only about how to avoid another Stalingrad.

On January 9, Guderian visited the Eagle's Nest and once again warned Hitler that the Red Army was preparing a massive offensive. The chief of staff of the Wehrmacht brought with him maps and documents prepared by Gehlen's intelligence service with a recommendation to immediately withdraw troops from East Prussia, otherwise Berlin would be in danger. After reviewing the materials, Hitler called them "absolutely stupid" and ordered Goodsrian to send their author to an insane asylum. Guderian did not hold back. “Their author is General Gehlen, one of the best on my staff,” he said. “If you want to send General Gehlen to a lunatic asylum, do the same to me!” Hitler calmed down and assured Guderian that there were sufficient reserves on the Eastern Front. But Guderian was of a different opinion. “The Eastern Front is a house of cards,” he said. “If the front is broken in one place, everything else will collapse, because twelve and a half divisions is too small a reserve for such a long front.” But Hitler was adamant. He refused to transfer reserves from the Ardennes, where, in his opinion, there was still hope for success. “The Eastern Front,” said the Fuhrer in conclusion, “must make do with available forces.” Guderian left in a gloomy mood. He knew that in the event of a major Soviet offensive, the weakened front would be broken through.

Three days later, Stalin kept his word. Nearly 3 million Soviet troops attacked 750,000 poorly armed Germans on a 650-kilometer front from the Baltic to the middle of Poland. Supported by a large amount of artillery and a seemingly inexhaustible stream of Stalin and T-34 tanks, hordes of Red infantrymen began to storm Guderian's weak defense system. Although the weather did not allow the attackers to use aircraft, by the end of the day the Russians had advanced 20 kilometers. Germany was squeezed from the east and west. On the same day, an important victory was achieved in the Ardennes: American troops joined up, advancing from the north and south.

In mid-January, Hitler left the Eagle's Nest for his new headquarters in Berlin. Outwardly, he did not seem depressed, he even laughed along with others when someone joked that Berlin is now the most convenient place to bet, since you can take the metro to both the Western and Eastern fronts.

In the Ardennes ledge, by January 16, a 20,000-strong German group was surrounded. True, the Allied victory was overshadowed by a quarrel between the Americans and the British, caused by the statement of Field Marshal Montgomery that the Americans were saved by British troops. The Americans, of course, were outraged, especially since it was their troops who bore the brunt of the Battle of the Bulge. Upon learning of this, Hitler was delighted: his dream was coming true to drive a wedge between the allies...

On January 17, a general withdrawal of Manteuffel's army began. The retreating columns suffered heavy losses from air strikes and artillery fire. The Battle of the Bulge ended, leaving behind two devastated countries, destroyed homes and farms, and more than 75,000 corpses. Few of the survivors now believed in the possibility of a German victory.