Military confrontation between the USSR and Germany during the Second World War: socio-economic aspect. Archive: military science

The prerequisites for the emergence of military scientific bodies in Russia appear with the formation of the General Staff in the Russian army on January 30, 1763. In fact, Empress Catherine II created a military body capable of carrying out a unified, centralized control of the armed forces of the state.

Under him, the first military libraries and archives appeared. They kept historical documents - descriptions of the course of battles, plans and maps with the disposition of troops. Based on these materials, instructions and articles were developed for training troops for operations on the battlefield.

In the future, the formation of the Military Ministry of Russia on September 8, 1802, was of great importance for the creation of military scientific bodies. Just 10 years later, on January 27, 1812, for the first time in the military history of our country, a Military Scientific Committee (VUK) was created under this department. It consisted of six permanent members (two in quartermaster, two in artillery and two more in engineering), as well as honorary and corresponding members from Russia and other countries.

According to the Charter, the first VUK performed the following tasks:

-collected "all new published best works on military art and various units belonging to it", appointed "the best and most useful of them for translation into Russian";

-considered "projects and proposals for a scientific military unit and presented his opinions about them to the Minister of War";

—published the Military Journal, conducted examinations for all officials "joining the academic corps of the Military Department";

-participated in the supervision of all "scientific institutions in the Quartermaster, Engineering and Artillery parts ...".

The purpose of the establishment of the VUK was to "improve the scientific part of military art and disseminate military scientific information among the troops." We can say that it is still relevant today. In its history, the Committee has repeatedly changed its name and structure, but the direction of its activity - scientific - has remained unchanged.

In the second half of the 19th century, the VUK, created by Catherine, ceased to exist. It was replaced by the Advisory Committee, which was later renamed the Military Scientific Committee of the General Staff. The area of responsibility of this body included the scientific activities of the General Staff, the corps of military topographers, as well as education in the army and military archives.

In addition, the Committee dealt with the distribution of monetary subsidies for the publication of military history works. For example, the Military Scientific Committee published such major military-theoretical works as “The Northern War. Documents of 1705-1708”, “Letters and papers of A.V. Suvorov, G.A. Potemkin and P.A. Rumyantsev 1787-1789. Peter the Great's military heritage, the Swedish wars, and the war of 1812 were deeply studied.

In 1900 VUK was disbanded. At the beginning of the 20th century, its functions were performed by the Committee of the General Staff, the Committee for the Education of Troops, and the Committee of the General Staff. These bodies had broad powers and were able to direct the development of fundamental works on military strategy, tactics and military history. Prominent Russian military scientists worked in them, who created numerous military-theoretical and military-historical works that are relevant to this day.

Later, during the Great Patriotic War, on the basis of the operational training department of the General Staff, a Department for the use of war experience was created. Its tasks included the study and generalization of combat experience; development of combined arms manuals and instructions for conducting combat; preparation of orders, directives of NGOs and the General Staff on the use of war experience; description of the operations of the Great Patriotic War for the "Collection of materials for the study of the experience of the war."

After the Victory, the research of historical experience and the development of military-theoretical problems at the General Staff were carried out by the Directorate for the Use of War Experience, the Military History Department, the Archive of the General Staff and the Archive of the Red Army.

It was these bodies that formed the basis for the formation in 1953 of the Military Scientific Directorate of the General Staff. It existed for a quarter of a century, was disbanded and re-created already in 1985. Over the 70 years of its history (1925-1995), military scientific bodies have undergone about 40 changes.

On October 25, 1999, the Military Scientific Committee of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation was formed. Exactly 10 years later, by directive of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation of September 8, 2009, the Military Scientific Committee of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation was created on its basis.

At the moment, the All-Russian Commissariat of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is a military science management body that is directly subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation.

The Military Scientific Committee (VSC) of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is designed to solve the problems of scientific substantiation of promising areas of construction, development, training, use and support of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in real and predictable conditions of the military-political, economic and demographic situation.

Main goals:

advancing the development of the theory of development, training and use of the Armed Forces, the study of conditions and the development of recommendations for improving their structure, improving the forms and methods of combat use of groupings of troops, developing weapons and military equipment, and studying other most pressing issues;
improving the system for planning scientific research and coordinating the activities of research organizations and universities of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, scientific organizations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, other ministries and departments conducting research on defense topics;
improvement of the military-scientific complex of the Armed Forces, its composition, structure and staffing, taking into account existing needs, strengthening the regulatory legal framework that determines the conditions and procedure for the functioning of the complex;
development of a modeling and laboratory-experimental base, further automation of research processes, including information support systems;
management of military-historical work, scientific information and publishing activities in the Armed Forces;
organization and coordination of military-scientific cooperation with foreign states.

MILITARY THOUGHT No. 7/2008, pp. 26-31

Military science at the present stage

Retired Major GeneralI.N. VOROBYEV ,

doctor of military sciences

ColonelV.A. KISELYOV ,

doctor of military sciences

IN RECENT years, the journal Voennaya Mysl has published a number of articles devoted to questions of military science. Noteworthy is the conclusion made by Professor Major General S.A. Tyushkevich, that "the state of our military science does not fully meet modern requirements ...". The military philosopher G.P. Belokonev in the article "Philosophy and military science". Unfortunately, the authors did not adequately substantiate their thesis, and most importantly, they did not put forward constructive proposals for solving this problem. While agreeing in principle with the opinion of the authors, we would like to express our opinions on this issue.

The main reason that Russian military science began to decline and lose its prestige as the most advanced military science in the world starting from the 90s of the last century was the fact that military development in the country, military service, military history, as well as methodological the basis of military science - dialectical materialism - were subjected to the most acute ideological obstruction, and in a number of cases - falsification. The centuries-old traditions of the Russian state at the end of the 20th century were simply ignored during the implementation of military reform in our country. The negative consequences of such a policy immediately affected the combat capability of the Armed Forces, which dropped sharply.

Now there is an acute issue of reviving military science, increasing its role and place in the system of other social sciences, clearly defining tasks in ensuring the military security of the state, preparing the Armed Forces for armed struggle, and developing new forms and methods of conducting it.

It is important to pay attention to the fact that recently the country's military leadership has been striving to raise the status of military science, to intensify the research, theoretical activities of scientific organizations of the Ministry of Defense and to ensure proactive scientific and practical study of the most important problems in the field of military policy in the interests of strengthening the state's defense capability.

Former Minister of Defense, now First Deputy Prime Minister of the Government of the Russian Federation Security Council. Ivanov, speaking on January 24, 2004 at the military-scientific conference of the Academy of Military Sciences, emphasized that "the further development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the creation of a professional army of the 21st century is impossible without military science, standing at the height of the most modern requirements."

It is positive that at present military science is becoming one of the state priorities. At the same time, it is important that this be backed up by the necessary funding of the military-industrial complex, conducting promising research projects, training military scientists and publishing works on general theoretical and methodological problems of military science, including foreign publications on military topics.

At the present stage, military science faces ever more complex tasks. This is due to the fact that the main object of her research - war, like a chameleon, constantly changes its appearance, becomes difficult to predict. Recently, the term "wrong" wars has even flashed in the press, as opposed to the established views on "classical" wars. Yes, indeed, if we take the two wars against Iraq (1991 and 2003), then by their nature, methods of waging, types of weapons used, they do not fit into the prevailing stereotypes. It turns out that military practice has begun to outstrip military theory, and military science is beginning to lose its main function as a "searchlight" for military events, which, of course, cannot be reconciled with.

Life and the practice of military construction urgently demand from military science accurate and well-founded forecasts for 15-20 years and more ahead. Now it is extremely important to know: what an armed struggle, an operation, a battle can be technologically; how the content of military-political, military-economic and military-technical factors, their influence on the forms and methods of military operations will change; what requirements must be met by the composition, organization and technical equipment of the Armed Forces, the forms and methods of command and control of troops in peacetime and wartime; how to prepare the population and mobilization resources for war.

Military historical experience has shown that military science could rise in its development to a qualitatively new level, develop correct long-term guidelines for military development, military doctrine, and not only keep pace with scientific and technological progress, but also outstrip it when it relied on time-tested philosophical and methodological basis - dialectical materialism. Here it is appropriate to cite the judgment of A.A. Svechina: "Dialectics cannot be expelled from the everyday life of strategic thought, since it constitutes its essence."

Relying precisely on dialectical principles, the system of known laws and regularities inherent in war, military science is able to "look" far ahead, to play the role of a "seer" in military organizational development. Now, when more and more new concepts of so-called non-contact, remote, robotic, aerospace, situational, transcontinental wars are emerging, the creative function of military science is especially important. The emergence of new views on the nature of the armed struggle of the future at the present stage is natural and inevitable, just as on the eve of the Second World War, new theories of air warfare (D. Duet), mechanized wars by small professional armies (D. Fuller, W. Mitchell, S. de Gaulle), which, although not suddenly justified, foreshadowed the coming changes in the methods of warfare. In part, they were "taken into service" by the Nazi army.

Assessing how various technological discoveries will affect the development of forms and methods of military operations is the primary task of futurological forecasts.

Extrapolating the directions of the development of armed struggle, the following leading trends can be distinguished: further integration of the combat use of the types of armed forces in all spatial spheres - on continents, seas, oceans, under water, in the ether, near-Earth airspace, near, middle and far space; complication of conditions, methods of unleashing and waging both large-scale and local wars and armed conflicts with unlimited strategic possibilities; the likelihood of conducting fleeting, but extremely tense, decisive and dynamic military operations; strengthening the role of information confrontation; further aggravation of the contradictions between the means of attack and defense; transformation of power and non-power forms of struggle with the transfer of the center of gravity to non-traditional types using the strategy of "indirect actions".

The military science of the 21st century should be a science of divination, unacceptable to dogma, immutable canons, and at the same time relying on the experience acquired by previous generations, developed methodological principles, such as the purposefulness and non-stereotyping of the search; logical sequence of research; consistency; perspective; reasoning of the received results; objectivity of conclusions; historicity.

In general terms, the goal of predictive research is to determine the fundamental guidelines for transformative military-theoretical and practical activities, the formation of an asymmetric military policy, the planning of advanced military development, and the development of new concepts for the use of armed forces based on new high technologies. The transition from the mechanized wars of the industrial society to the intellectual, information wars of the technological era implies the need to develop a new strategy, new operational art and new tactics of the future using electromagnetic, acoustic, gravitational and other types of weapons, including those based on new physical principles. The effectiveness of forecasting the armed struggle of the technological era depends on the depth of revealing its new patterns, the ability to use them correctly, to model them, on the completeness of the disclosure of new factors influencing the forms and methods of conducting non-contact, remote warfare, identifying their relationship, extrapolating trends, applying correlative analysis.

The gradual evolutionary process of the technologization of armed struggle, characteristic of the past, is now giving way not just to a rapid, but to an abrupt renewal of its material basis. But if the base is modernized cardinally and in the shortest possible time, then the superstructure must also undergo corresponding transformations - the forms and methods of military operations. In practice, this means the possibility of the emergence of non-standard wars - gravitational, robotic, cybernetic, space, etc.

The use of third-generation combat orbital systems capable of hitting objects not only in space, but also from space using the entire arsenal of "star wars" - from combat space stations (platforms) to aerospace aircraft and reusable spaceships - gives reason expect in the future space operations to be carried out in near-Earth airspace to destroy means of nuclear attack in flight, to block outer space, to destroy orbital and ground-based space constellations, to seize and hold important areas of near-Earth space, and to suppress the radio engineering systems of orbital ground-based constellations.

The ability of space weapons to hit basic military targets anywhere on the planet will give the armed confrontation a volume-global character. This means that there will be no inaccessible places for space and other means of destruction in the location of the warring parties, which means that the concepts of "front" and "rear", "operational lines" and "flanks" will lose their former meaning.

It follows logically from what has been considered that to create a model of an operation of the future means to create a physical, mental or combined analogue of such an operation that would reflect the experience of the past and new patterns of military operations, taking into account the development of weapons and military equipment.

Nowadays, more and more attention is being paid to the study of information warfare, which is expected to develop into an independent form of struggle along with economic, political, ideological, diplomatic, armed and other forms of struggle. Based on the experience of local wars, since the 1980s, the United States has been making intensive efforts to improve information technology.

The principles of conducting information warfare are: secrecy, sophistication, systematic, active, variety of techniques, plausibility, selectivity, knowledge of the opponent's psychology, reflective control of his behavior; preemption of the enemy. The components of such a struggle can be: information blockade, counterintelligence activities, electronic suppression of enemy combat control systems; conducting an electronic fire information and strike operation; a combination of fire, electronic and massive information and psychological impact on the enemy.

In the United States, information confrontation is considered as one of the methods of conducting the so-called "controlled war" (R. Kann), when the strongest side, through informational influence, dictates its will to the enemy without the use of weapons. Forceful actions in such a confrontation are envisaged at the final phase of actions, if the political, diplomatic and other possibilities of "bloodless crushing" of the enemy state are exhausted. What is new in conducting a complex information-strike operation, according to the experience of local wars, is that the massive use of the latest radio-electronic means, setting up radio curtains, radio interference, creating a false radio-electronic situation, imitation of false radio networks, radio blockade of enemy information collection and processing channels are combined with air- ground operation.

The predictability of military science largely depends on the improvement of research methods that make it possible to extract, systematize and analyze knowledge, make generalizations, conclusions, conclusions and verify their truth. However, it should be noted that the methods developed to date impose fundamental limitations on the possibility of forecasting both in the time range and in the range of forecasting objects. The point is that not all factors influencing armed struggle lend themselves to predictive assessments. Hence, the maximum possible lead time for a forecast of a given accuracy in armed combat is still small, and the magnitude of the deviation of the forecast from the actual state of the object can be quite significant. Based on this, it is important to improve the methodology of military scientific research, which would ensure the interconnection and subordination of forecasts of various levels of the hierarchy of the forecasting object (wars, operations, battles, battles), the continuity of the research process, the consistency of various types of forecasts, and the identification of emerging contradictions and ways to resolve them. , correction of the obtained forecast results.

The arsenal of modern methods for studying military science is vast. These are, first of all, general scientific methods: intuitive-logical, logical, historical, heuristic, extrapolation, system analysis, mathematical modeling, empirical, probability theory, factor analysis, the "tree of goals" method, etc. The peculiarity of human intelligence, as noted by N. Wiener, is that the human brain has the ability to operate with vaguely defined concepts. This gives him the opportunity to solve logical problems of various complexity, to create, to foresee, to discover something new. Great hopes at one time were placed on the use of cybernetic and mathematical modeling methods, the use of electronic computers for collecting, processing and analyzing information in the process of forecasting. However, these hopes were only partially realized.

Despite certain prognostic shifts, the "barrier of uncertainty" in military affairs could not be overcome with the help of new methods. The greatest advances in forecasting have been made in those areas that are relatively easy to quantify (development of weapons systems, determination of the combat potential of troop groupings, military-economic capabilities of the parties, calculation of the correlation of forces, etc.). But where it is necessary to rely on qualitative indicators and concepts, which constitute the core of warfare forecasting, the "far-sightedness" of military theory is still limited.

Such specific methods of studying military science as research and experimental military, aviation and naval exercises, research command and staff exercises, war games and maneuvers, which are carried out to solve problems of strategy, operational art and tactics, questions of building the Armed Forces, improving combat and mobilization readiness, organizational structure, development and use of weapons and military equipment. Scientific and methodological improvement of ongoing exercises and military games using computer technology is one of the important areas of predictive research.

The sharp deterioration of the geostrategic position of Russia after the collapse of the USSR, the unsettled land border in many directions and, at the same time, the reduction to a minimum of the Armed Forces, especially the Ground Forces, require the development of new approaches in determining the organizational structure of formations, formations and units, the system of arrangement and methods of manning, organization and services, creating the necessary stocks of material resources. We believe that the system of building the Armed Forces should be based on the principles of strategic mobility, their ability to respond flexibly to emerging crises by quickly maneuvering forces and means to threatened areas.

Solving the problems of military science is also inextricably linked with the development of theories of military training and indoctrination, military economics, armaments, command and control of the Armed Forces, the theory of types and logistics of the Armed Forces, in which many unresolved issues related to changes in the ideology and policy of the state have accumulated.

Russia, perhaps like no other country in the world, has a rich military history. The unprecedented exploits of our ancestors, who throughout the thousand-year history of Russia had to fight for the preservation and establishment of their statehood, are now hushed up, and even distorted in history textbooks in secondary schools.

Today, military science is faced with the task of protecting our military history from falsifications and unfounded attacks. There are many ill-wishers who seek to discredit the holy of holies - the feat of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War, to debunk the military activities of Soviet military leaders.

It is striking that on the ideological front, our state is now taking a defensive position, it seems to be justifying itself for the fact that the Soviet Armed Forces in World War II had to liberate the peoples of Eastern Europe and the Baltic States from the fascist yoke, and after the war to fight Bandera in Western Ukraine , "forest brothers" in the Baltic.

One of the authors of the article had to start his military service in the pre-war period as a cadet of the newly established Tallinn Military Infantry School in 1940 in Estonia, and subsequently, during the war, participate in military operations to liberate the Baltic states in 1944-1945 from fascist invaders. I testify that we, Soviet soldiers, treated the local population - Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians with great warmth and goodwill during the war. Therefore, today it becomes especially insulting when we see with what black ingratitude the leadership of the Baltic states responds to the soldiers-liberators, calling them occupiers and equating them with fascist executioners - SS men. The actions of the Estonian authorities in relation to the monument in Tallinn - the “bronze Soviet soldier” cannot be called anything other than a desecration of the fallen Soviet soldiers.

In conclusion, I would like to note the sad fact that for more than a decade military-theoretical works, textbooks and teaching aids on tactics, so necessary for military students and cadets of military educational institutions, students of civilian universities, students of general education schools, have not been published for more than a decade. ROSTO organizations. The experience of combat and operational training does not even become the property of military academies and military schools, since, as in the old days, combat training information bulletins are not published. For many years, the works of military classics and modern foreign military scientists have not been published.

Military Thought. 2000. No. 3. S. 68.

Military Thought. 2002. No. 5. S. 67.

Military Thought. 2004. No. 5. S. 53.

Svech and N A. Strategy: 2nd ed. M., 1927. S. 246.

It would seem that the young Soviet branch of science could in no way compete with the German industrial institutions, which had a powerful material base, excellent scientists and strong traditions. German concerns have long maintained large research institutions. Here they well remembered the statement of Professor P. Thyssen: “Research is the foundation of technical superiority over the enemy. Research is the basis for worldwide competition." However, it is not enough to have power - you still need to use it correctly.

The People's Commissariat of the tank industry of the USSR was able to fully utilize its modest scientific resources. All research institutions and organizations that could bring at least some benefit were involved in solving the pressing problems of tank building.

It should be noted that this was facilitated by the entire system of Soviet applied science, originally created to serve the interests of not individual firms and factories, but at least the industry. By the way, such a system does not necessarily stem from the socialist system: the first industry-wide scientific structure appeared in Sweden in 1747 as part of the so-called Iron Office. By the way, it still operates today under the name "Association of Steel Producers of the Scandinavian Countries."

Departmental institutions of the NKTP

The People's Commissariat of the tank industry of the war years consisted of two main research institutions: the "armor" institute TsNII-48 and the design and technology institute 8GSPI.

NII-48 (director - A. S. Zavyalov) became part of the newly formed NKTP in the fall of 1941 and was immediately evacuated to Sverdlovsk, closer to the new tank factories. In accordance with the regulations approved on July 15, 1942, it became officially known as the State Central Research Institute of the NKTP of the USSR (TsNII-48). His list of tasks included:

"a) development and introduction into production of new types of armor and armor, structural and tool steel grades, non-ferrous and various special alloys in order to reduce the scarce or potentially scarce alloying elements contained in them, improve the quality of products manufactured by NKTP plants, and increase productivity the latter;

b) development and implementation of rational wartime metallurgical technology in the industries existing at the NKTP factories and armored factories of other people's commissariats, in order to maximize the output of products, improve their quality, increase the productivity of factories and reduce the consumption rates of metal, raw materials and materials;

Collage by Andrey Sedykh

c) technological assistance to factories in mastering new technologies or equipment for them, as well as working methods in order to overcome bottlenecks and production difficulties that arise at factories;

d) assistance in improving the technical qualifications of workers at NKTP plants by transferring to them the theoretical and practical experience accumulated in the USSR and abroad in armor production and other industries of the profile of NKTP plants;

e) organization of interfactory exchange of advanced technical experience of factories;

f) development of the theory and new ways of using armor protection for the armament of the Red Army;

g) coordination of all research work carried out in the NKTP system on issues of armor, metal science, metallurgy, hot working and welding of metals and alloys;

h) comprehensive technical assistance to design bureaus and other organizations and enterprises of other people's commissariats on all issues of armored production.

A clear idea of the scope of NII-48's activities is provided by its annual reports. So, in 1943 alone, proposals were developed and partially implemented in practice to reduce the number of consumed rolled profile sizes by 2.5 times. The technical processes for forging and stamping parts of the T-34 tank were also unified for all plants, the technical conditions for their heat treatment were revised, the processes for welding T-34 armored hulls and steel casting were unified, a chemical-thermal method for sharpening cutters was created, casting of tank turrets into a chill mold was introduced at UZTM, new grades of armor steel: 68L for cast parts T-34, an improved version of 8C for rolled armor, I-3 - steel with high hardness in a highly tempered state. At the Ural Tank Plant, employees of NII-48 worked out and introduced into production an improved brand of high-speed steel I-323. To this it is necessary to add surveys of defeats of domestic and enemy armored vehicles, which have become regular, both at repair plants and directly on the battlefield. The received reports and recommendations were immediately brought to the attention of all the chief designers of combat vehicles.

Or, for example, information of a different kind: during January-October 1944, at meetings of the Technical Council of the NKTP (where representatives of all factories were invited), the following reports of TsNII-48 were discussed:

"Unified technological processes for the manufacture of castings from iron, steel and non-ferrous metals."

"Documentation on the technology of forging - stamping".

"Influence of strain rate on metal penetration resistance".

"Modern Types of Anti-tank Artillery and the Development of Tank Armor".

"High-tempered armor of high hardness".

"Technological properties of low-alloyed high-speed steel P823 and the results of its implementation in the production of plant No. 183".

"Improving the strength of steel due to intensifiers (boron-containing additives, zirconium, etc.)".

"Improving the strength of steel for heavily loaded gears".

"Improving the fatigue strength of crankshafts made from steel grade 18KhNMA".

"Normals of chemical composition and mechanical properties of steel grades used in tank building".

And so - throughout the war years. The workload and pace are unbelievable, given that at the end of 1943, TsNII-48 had only 236 employees, including janitors and technicians. True, among them were 2 academicians, 1 corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, 4 doctors and 10 candidates of sciences.

The 8th State Union Design Institute of the Tank Industry (director - A. I. Solin) was evacuated to Chelyabinsk at the end of 1941. In the first period of the war, all the forces of the 8GSPI were directed to fulfill the tasks of the People's Commissariat for the deployment and commissioning of evacuated tank and engine factories, as well as the development of simplified wartime technologies.

By the middle of 1942, other tasks came to the fore: the unification of technological processes (primarily machining and assembly) and the provision of various scientific and technical assistance to enterprises. So, at the Ural Tank Plant, a team of scientists and designers 8GSPI in summer and autumn was engaged in a comprehensive calculation of the plant's capacity, theoretical calculations of the tank's transmission, reduction in the range of ferrous metals used, improvement in the design and manufacturing technology of 26 machine parts, unification of cutting tools. The Central Bureau of Standardization, which operated as part of the 8GSPI, created and implemented directly at enterprises standards in the field of drawing facilities, parts and assemblies of tanks, organization of control and measuring facilities, unification of tools, fixtures, dies, and technological documentation. Thanks to the help of the bureau, the thirty-four manufacturing plants managed to achieve complete interchangeability in terms of components: final drive, final clutch, gearbox, main clutch, drive wheel, road wheels with external and internal shock absorption, sloth. The introduction of the developments of the bureau made it possible, according to estimates in 1944, to reduce the labor intensity in the industry by 0.5 million machine hours per year. The quality of Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns was largely predetermined by technical control standards, also drawn up by employees of the 8GSPI.

A separate and important area of work of the 8GSPI is the creation of documentation for the army repairmen and repair plants of the NKTP for the restoration of tanks and engines of all types, including captured ones and those supplied by the Allies. During 1942 alone, technical conditions appeared for the overhaul and military repairs of the KV, T-34, T-60 and T-70 tanks and the V-2-34, V-2KV and GAZ-202 engines, as well as albums of drawings of devices for dismantling and installation of T-34 and KV units in the field.

Involved technological research institutes and laboratories

In addition to the main institutions, scientists from many design and technological institutions that previously operated in other sectors of the national economy worked for the tank industry.

It is known that the main part of the staff of the central laboratory of plant No. 183 was made up of employees of the Kharkov Institute of Metals, which was evacuated along with the enterprise in 1941. At one time, in 1928, this scientific institution was established as a branch of the Leningrad All-Union Institute of Metals of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR. The latter led its history from 1914 and was originally called the Central Scientific and Technical Laboratory of the Military Department. In September 1930, the Kharkov Institute of Metals became independent, but retained its former research topics: heat power engineering of metallurgical furnaces, foundry technology, hot and cold working and welding, physical and mechanical properties of metals.

The State Allied Research Laboratory of Cutting Tools and Electric Welding named after Ignatiev (LARIG) was located on the site of plant No. 183 in accordance with the order of the NKTP dated December 26, 1941, and retained the status of an independent institution. The duties of the laboratory included the provision of technical assistance to all enterprises in the industry in the design, manufacture and repair of cutting tools, as well as the development of electric welding machines.

The first major result of the work of LARIG was obtained in July 1942: at plant No. 183, the introduction of boring multi-cutter blocks developed in the laboratory began. At the end of the year, scientists, using new cutters of their own design and changing their modes of operation, achieved a significant increase in the productivity of carousel machines that processed the drive wheels of the tank. Thus, the "bottleneck" that limited the tank conveyor was eliminated.

During the same 1942, LARIG completed the work begun before the war on the introduction of cast cutter holders instead of the generally accepted forged ones. This reduced the cost of the tool and unloaded the forging industry. It turned out that cast holders, although inferior in mechanical strength to forged ones, served no worse than the latter. By the end of the year, the laboratory introduced shortened taps into production. This project also began before the war, and together with the 8GSPI Institute.

At another NKTP enterprise, Uralmashzavod, ENIMS operated during the war years, that is, the Experimental Scientific Institute of Metal-cutting Machine Tools. Its employees developed, and UZTM manufactured a number of unique machine tools and entire automatic lines used throughout the people's commissariat.

So, in the spring of 1942, at the Ural Tank Plant No. 183, the ENIMS brigade “set up” the production of rollers with internal shock absorption. She created the technological process and working drawings for three fixtures and 14 positions of cutting and auxiliary tools. In addition, projects for a multi-spindle drilling head and modernization of the ZHOR rotary machine were completed. An additional task for ENIMS was the development and manufacture of eight special machines for turning wheels.

The same thing happened in the processing of balancers. The ENIMS team was engaged in both the technological process as a whole and the creation of a special tool. In addition, the institute took over the design and manufacture of two modular boring machines: one multi-spindle and one multi-position. By the end of 1942, both were made.

Academic and university science

The most famous academic institution that worked for the tank industry is the Kyiv Institute of Electric Welding of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, headed by Academician E. O. Paton. During 1942–1943, the institute, together with employees of the armored hull department of plant No. 183, created a whole range of machine guns of various types and purposes. In 1945, UTZ used the following auto-welding machines:

universal type for welding straight longitudinal seams;
universal self-propelled carts;
simplified specialized carts;
installations for welding of circular seams at a motionless product;
installations with a carousel for rotating the product when welding circular seams;
self-propelled plants with a common drive for feeding the electrode wire and moving the head for welding seams on bulky structures.

In 1945, automatic weapons accounted for 23 percent of the welding work (by weight of weld metal) on the hull and 30 percent on the turret of the T-34 tank. The use of automatic machines made it possible already in 1942 at only one plant No. 183 to release 60 qualified welders, and in 1945 - 140. A very important circumstance: the high quality of the seam in automatic welding eliminated the negative consequences of refusing to machine the edges of armor parts. Throughout the war, as the instruction for the operation of automatic welding machines at the enterprises of the industry, the “Guidelines for Automatic Welding of Armored Structures” compiled by employees of the Institute of Electric Welding of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR in 1942 were used.

The activities of the institute were not limited to automatic welding. Its employees introduced a method of repairing cracks in tank tracks using welding with austenite electrodes, a device for cutting round holes in armor plates. The scientists also developed a scheme for the in-line production of high-quality MD electrodes and a technology for drying them on a conveyor.

Much less known are the results of work at the NKTP of the Leningrad Institute of Physics and Technology. Throughout the war, he continued to study the problems of the interaction of the projectile and armor, created various options for constructive armor barriers and multilayer armor. It is known that prototypes were manufactured and fired at Uralmash.

A very interesting story is connected with Bauman Moscow State Technical University. At the beginning of 1942, the leadership of the NKTP became interested in a cutting tool with rational sharpening angles, created in the course of many years of work by scientists from this famous Russian university. It was known that such a tool had already been used at the factories of the People's Commissariat of Arms.

To begin with, an attempt was made to obtain information about the innovation directly from the People's Commissariat of Armaments, but, apparently, without much success. As a result, scientists from the Department of Theory of Machining and Tools of the Moscow State Technical University headed by Professor I.M. In the summer and autumn of 1943, quite successful experiments were carried out, and on November 12, an order was issued by the NKTP for the widespread introduction of such a tool and the dispatch of MVTU employees to factories No. 183 and No. tool with rational geometry.

The project turned out to be more than successful: cutters, drills and milling cutters had 1.6-5 times longer durability and allowed to increase machine productivity by 25-30 percent. Simultaneously with rational geometry, MVTU scientists proposed a system of chip breakers for cutters. With their help, plant No. 183 at least partially solved the problems with cleaning and further disposal of chips.

By the end of the war, scientists of the cutting department of the Moscow State Technical University. Bauman compiled a special manual called "Guidelines on the geometry of the cutting tool." By order of the People's Commissariat, they were approved "... as mandatory in the design of special cutting tools at the NKTP factories and in the further development of new 8GPI normals" and sent to all enterprises and institutions of the industry.

Another interesting technology - surface hardening of steel parts using high-frequency currents - was introduced at the enterprises of the tank industry by employees of the laboratory of electrothermy of the Leningrad Electrotechnical Institute, headed by Professor V.P. Vologdin. At the beginning of 1942, the laboratory staff consisted of only 19 people, and 9 of them operated at the Chelyabinsk Kirov Plant. The most massive parts were chosen as the object of processing - final drive gears, cylinder liners and piston pins of the V-2 diesel engine. Once mastered, the new technology freed up to 70 percent of CHKZ thermal furnaces, and the operation time decreased from tens of hours to tens of minutes.

At Tagil Plant No. 183, HDTV hardening technology was introduced in 1944. At first, three parts were subjected to surface hardening - the trunnion of the gun, the main friction clutch and the axle of the drive wheel roller.

The list of research institutes and laboratories that created technologies for the tank industry of the USSR is not exhausted by the examples given. But what has been said is enough to understand: during the war years, the NKTP turned into the largest scientific and production association in our country.

Swan, crayfish and pike in the German version

In contrast to the USSR, German industrial science was divided into cramped corporate cells and cut off from university science by an iron curtain. In any case, this is what a large group of scientific and technical leaders of the former Third Reich claims in the review “The Rise and Decline of German Science” compiled after the end of the war. Let us quote a rather extensive quotation: “The research organization of industry was independent, did not need the help of any ministry, state research council or other departments ... This organization worked for itself and at the same time behind closed doors. The consequence was that the researcher from any higher educational institution not only knew nothing, but did not even suspect about those discoveries and improvements that were being made in industrial laboratories. This happened because it was beneficial for any concern, for reasons of competition, to keep the inventions of their scientists secret. As a result, knowledge did not flow into a large common cauldron and could only bring partial success for a common cause. The Minister of Armaments and Military Production A. Speer tried to unite industrialists in the system of branch "committees" and "centers", to establish technological interaction between factories, but he could not completely solve the problem. Corporate interests were above all.

If branch institutes worked for concerns, then German university science in the first period of the Second World War was generally out of work. Based on the strategy of lightning war, the leadership of the Reich considered it possible to complete it with the weapon with which the troops entered the battle. Consequently, all studies that did not promise results in the shortest possible time (no more than a year) were declared unnecessary and curtailed. We read further the review “The Rise and Decline of German Science”: “Scientists were assigned to the category of human resources from which replenishment for the front was scooped ... As a result, despite the objections of the arms department and various other authorities, several thousand highly qualified scientists from universities, higher technical educational institutions and various research institutes, including indispensable specialists in research in the field of high frequencies, nuclear physics, chemistry, engine building, etc., were drafted into the army at the beginning of the war and were used in lower positions and even as a soldier." Major defeats and the appearance on the battlefield of new types of weapons (Soviet T-34 tanks, British radars, American long-range bombers, etc.) forced Hitler and his entourage to moderate their rejection of intellectuals: 10 thousand scientists, engineers and technicians were withdrawn from the front . Among them were even 100 humanitarians. J. Goebbels had to issue a special directive on the prohibition of attacks against scientists in the press, on radio, in cinema and theater.

But it was too late: due to the loss of pace, the results of research and new developments, sometimes promising, did not have time to get into the troops. Let us give the general conclusion of the same review “The Rise and Decline of German Science”: “Science and technology are incompatible with improvisation. A state that wants to receive the real fruits of science and technology must not only act with great foresight and skill, but also be able to patiently wait for these fruits.

The state should not only act with great foresight, but also be able to wait patiently

Departmental institutions of the NKTP

The People's Commissariat of the tank industry of the war years consisted of two main research institutions: the "armor" institute TsNII-48 and the design and technology institute 8GSPI.

Collage by Andrey Sedykh

e) organization of interfactory exchange of advanced technical experience of factories;

f) development of the theory and new ways of using armor protection for the armament of the Red Army;

g) coordination of all research work carried out in the NKTP system on issues of armor, metal science, metallurgy, hot working and welding of metals and alloys;

h) comprehensive technical assistance to design bureaus and other organizations and enterprises of other people's commissariats on all issues of armored production.

"Unified technological processes for the manufacture of castings from iron, steel and non-ferrous metals."

"Documentation on the technology of forging - stamping".

"Influence of strain rate on metal penetration resistance".

"Modern Types of Anti-tank Artillery and the Development of Tank Armor".

"High-tempered armor of high hardness".

"Technological properties of low-alloyed high-speed steel P823 and the results of its implementation in the production of plant No. 183".

"Improving the strength of steel due to intensifiers (boron-containing additives, zirconium, etc.)".

"Improving the strength of steel for heavily loaded gears".

"Improving the fatigue strength of crankshafts made from steel grade 18KhNMA".

"Normals of chemical composition and mechanical properties of steel grades used in tank building".

Involved technological research institutes and laboratories

In addition to the main institutions, scientists from many design and technological institutions that previously operated in other sectors of the national economy worked for the tank industry.

It is known that the main part of the staff of the central laboratory of plant No. 183 was made up of employees of the Kharkov Institute of Metals, which was evacuated along with the enterprise in 1941. At one time, in 1928, this scientific institution was established as a branch of the Leningrad All-Union Institute of Metals of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR. The latter has been conducting its own since 1914 and was originally called the Central Scientific and Technical Laboratory of the Military Department. In September 1930, the Kharkov Institute of Metals became independent, but retained its former research topics: heat power engineering of metallurgical furnaces, foundry technology, hot and cold working and welding, physical and mechanical properties of metals.

Academic and university science

Universal type for welding straight longitudinal seams;
- universal self-propelled carts;
-simplified specialized carts;
- installations for welding of circular seams at a motionless product;
- installations with a carousel for product rotation when welding circular seams;
- self-propelled units with a common drive for feeding the electrode wire and moving the head for welding seams on bulky structures.

Swan, crayfish and pike in the German version

If branch institutes worked for concerns, then German university science in the first period of the Second World War was generally out of work. Based on the strategy of a lightning war, the leadership of the Reich considered it possible to complete it with the one with which the troops entered the battle. Consequently, all studies that did not promise results in the shortest possible time (no more than a year) were declared unnecessary and curtailed. We read further the review “The Rise and Decline of German Science”: “Scientists were assigned to the category of human resources from which replenishment for the front was scooped ... As a result, despite the objections of the arms department and various other authorities, several thousand highly qualified scientists from universities, higher technical educational institutions and various research institutes, including indispensable specialists in research in the field of high frequencies, nuclear physics, chemistry, engine building, etc., were drafted into the army at the beginning of the war and were used in lower positions and even as a soldier." Major defeats and the appearance on the battlefield of new types of weapons (Soviet T-34 tanks, British radars, American long-range bombers, etc.) forced Hitler and his entourage to moderate their rejection of intellectuals: 10 thousand scientists, engineers and technicians were withdrawn from the front . Among them were even 100 humanitarians. J. Goebbels had to issue a special directive on the prohibition of attacks against scientists in the press, on radio, in cinema and theater.

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military science

a system of knowledge about the preparation and conduct of war by states, coalitions of states or classes to achieve political goals. Soviet V. n. explores the nature of possible wars, the laws of war and the methods of its conduct. It develops the theoretical foundations and practical recommendations on the organizational development of the Armed Forces, their preparation for war, determines the principles of military art, the most effective forms and methods of conducting military operations by groupings of the Armed Forces, as well as their comprehensive support. Based on political goals, assessments of a potential adversary and one's own forces, scientific and technological achievements and the economic capabilities of the state and its allies, V. n. in unity with practice, determines ways to improve existing and create new means of armed struggle. The constituent parts of modern Soviet V. n. are: the theory of military art (See Military art) (strategy, operational art and tactics), which develops provisions and recommendations for the preparation and conduct of military operations; the theory of organizational development of the Armed Forces, which studies the issues of their organization, technical equipment, recruitment and mobilization; theory of military training and education of personnel of the Armed Forces; theory of party-political work in the Armed Forces; the theory of military economy, which studies the use of material, technical and financial means to ensure the activities of the Armed Forces; military geography (see military geography); Military History, studying the history of wars and the art of war; military-technical sciences, with the help of which various types of weapons, military equipment and means of material support for the Armed Forces are developed. Soviet V. n. serves the interests of the armed defense of the Soviet socialist state. It is based on Marxist-Leninist theory and relies on the progressive Soviet state and social system, the leading and guiding force of which is the CPSU.

The fundamental difference between bourgeois V. n. from Soviet V. n. lies in its reactionary ideological basis and class essence. Bourgeois V. n. serves both the aggressive foreign and reactionary domestic policies of the ruling exploiting classes of the capitalist states; is in the service of an aggressive imperialist policy directed chiefly against the socialist countries and the national liberation movement of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The modern scientific and technological revolution causes intensive differentiation and integration of scientific knowledge, which leads to the emergence of new branches, directions and disciplines in most sciences. A similar process is natural for V. n. V.'s development n. occurs on the basis of a generalization of the historical experience of waging wars, an analysis of all types of practical activities of troops in peacetime, foresight of the development of new means of war and probable forms and methods of waging it in the future, a comprehensive study of a potential adversary, as well as trends in the development of international relations.

V. n. formed and developed over a long historical period. Its elements originated in antiquity, when during the period of the slave-owning society in Egypt, Persia, China, Greece and Rome, generals and military theorists raised and resolved some issues related to strategy, tactics, military geographical conditions, organization and education of troops, as well as analyzed and summarized the experience of battles and campaigns. V. n. continued to develop in the Middle Ages. As the productive forces of society grew, weapons and military equipment improved, command and control of troops and military art in general became more complicated, and military historical experience accumulated. All this ultimately led to the design of V. n. as a certain system of knowledge.

The formation of bourgeois V. n. modern military researchers attribute it to the 18th and early 19th centuries, when the rapid development of the political, economic, and natural sciences began on the basis of the developing capitalist mode of production. At this time, military theory was further developed in various countries. One of the first representatives of foreign bourgeois V. n. in the 18th century was the English General G. Lloyd. He outlined some of the general foundations of the theory of war, pointed out the connections between war and politics, and emphasized the importance of the moral and political factor. However, he believed that V. n. applicable only to prepare the army for war. The course and outcome of the war, in his opinion, entirely depend on the genius of the commander, since this area has no regularities and, therefore, has nothing to do with military science.

Serious progress in the development of Russian V. n. at the beginning of the 18th century. associated with the name of the statesman and commander Peter I, who carried out military reforms, created a regular army and navy. Peter I was the creator of the new "Military Regulations", which outlined the generalized experience of the battles and battles conducted, issues of military administration and education of the personnel of the troops. He laid the foundation for an independent Russian national military school. Great contribution to V. n. introduced by major military leaders of Russia in the second half of the 18th century. P. A. Rumyantsev, A. V. Suvorov and F. F. Ushakov. Rumyantsev paid much attention to improving the organization of the Russian army, increasing its mobility and improving the combat training of troops. He introduced the principle of decisive battle as the main way to achieve victory. Rumyantsev's work "Rite of Service" (1770) was adopted as the charter of the Russian army, and his "Memorandum to Catherine II on the organization of the army" (1777) formed the basis for further improvement in the organization of the army. Suvorov had a great influence on the formation of the military art of the Russian army, on improving the training and education of troops. He sharply opposed the cordon strategy and linear tactics that dominated the West. In his "The Science of Victory" (1795-96), Suvorov developed a number of important rules on military training, indoctrination and combat operations. Ushakov developed and put into practice new forms and methods of military operations at sea, which proved the advantages of maneuverable offensive tactics over linear tactics that dominated foreign fleets.

The experience of wars in defense of the Great French Revolution had a decisive influence on military theory. V. I. Lenin pointed out: “Just as inside the country the French revolutionary people then for the first time showed a maximum of revolutionary energy unprecedented for centuries, so in the war of the end of the 18th century they showed the same gigantic revolutionary creativity, recreating the entire system of strategy, breaking all the old laws and the customs of war and creating, instead of the old troops, a new, revolutionary, people's army and a new conduct of the war ”(Poln. sobr. soch., 5th ed., vol. 32, pp. 79-80). A significant contribution to the theory and practice of military art was made by the French commander Napoleon I. He gave a more harmonious organization to divisions and corps, sharply reduced the convoys, thanks to which the army acquired greater mobility. The main goal of military operations, Napoleon I set the defeat of the enemy's manpower in one pitched battle, constantly sought to destroy the enemy in parts, achieving maximum superiority of forces in the direction of the main attack.

In the development of Russian V. n. The military skill of M. I. Kutuzov, who managed to defeat one of the first-class armies of the early 19th century, was of great importance. - the army of Napoleon I. Among the military theorists of the 18th - early 19th centuries. in Germany, a prominent place was occupied by G. D. Bulow, who made an attempt to theoretically generalize everything new that was created in the era of the Great French Revolution. He correctly believed that military strategy is subject to politics and fulfills its requirements, but he did not understand the class content of politics. V. n. he divided into strategy and tactics and thus reduced it to only the art of war.

The development of bourgeois V. n. 1st half of the 19th century is closely connected with the names of A. Jomini (a Swiss by birth) and K. Clausewitz (a German theorist), who served in the Russian army for a considerable time and made full use of its experience in their historical and theoretical works. Jomini believed that military art could and should have its own scientific theory, but at the same time he recognized the dominance in military art of the “eternal principles” inherent in wars of all times, and thus deprived the theory he created of a genuine scientific basis. He erroneously argued that the influence of politics on strategy is limited only to the moment of making a decision, and that in the course of a war, strategy allegedly does not depend on politics. The theoretical provisions of Jomini, his ideas, which emphasized the importance of military theory, found followers in various armies of the world. The merit of Clausewitz lies in the fact that he deeply revealed the connection between war and politics and many phenomena of war (the nature and essence of war, armed forces, offensive, defense, war plan, etc.). He attached great importance to the material, geographical and moral factors in the war, as well as the role of the commander. Being a bourgeois military thinker, Clausewitz could not reveal the class content of politics, defined it as an expression of the interests of the whole society and did not connect it with classes and class struggle.

The question of the subject and content of V. n. constantly attracted the attention of Russian military theorists. Back in 1819, Major General I. G. Burtsev, in his article “Thoughts on the Theory of Military Knowledge” (see Military Journal, book 2, 1819, pp. 55, 63), pointed out the connection between politics and war, believed that V. n. cannot be limited to the framework of military art and must include in its subject the study of regularities in military affairs. Major-General A. I. Astafiev in his work “On Modern Military Art” (part 1, 1856) also believed that the subject of military science was wider than martial arts. Astafiev criticized Lloyd, Bulow and other foreign military theorists for their desire to turn the art of war into a code of immutable rules. Prominent Russian military theorists of the second half of the 19th century who influenced the development of military science were Minister of War D. A. Milyutin, Admiral G. I. Butakov, generals G. A. Leer, M. I. Dragomirov, Rear Admiral S. O. Makarov. Under the leadership of Milyutin, military reforms of the 1860-70s were carried out in Russia. aimed at overcoming backwardness and routine in the army. In the work "The First Experiences of Military Statistics" (1847-48), Milyutin was the first in V. n. outlined the basics of military statistics (military geography). Butakov in his work "New Foundations of Steamship Tactics" (1863) summarized the experience of combat operations of ships of the steam fleet and proposed rules for their restructuring in a squadron for naval combat. These rules have received recognition in all fleets of the world. Leer recognized the unity of politics and strategy with the leading role of the former. In the works Notes of Strategy (1867), Method of Military Sciences (1894), Applied Tactics (1877-80), Leer critically summarized the most common views on solving many issues of strategy and tactics and developed a military theory based on a generalization of military historical experience. Dragomirov widely covered issues of tactics, education and training of troops. His Textbook of Tactics (1879) served as the main textbook at the Academy of the General Staff for 20 years. Makarov's work had a significant impact on the development of domestic and foreign naval thought. Makarov's book Discourses on Naval Tactics (1897) was the first major work on the naval tactics of a steam-powered armored fleet. At the end of the 19th - beginning of the 20th centuries. definition of the subject V. n. given in Russian encyclopedias - "Encyclopedia of Military and Naval Sciences" (vol. 2, 1885) and "Military Encyclopedia" (vol. 6, 1912); the latter defines that “military science is engaged in a comprehensive study of wars. It studies: 1) phenomena in the life of society and 2) forces, means and methods for waging a struggle" (p. 476).

In the second half of the 19th - early 20th centuries. With the further development of technology, means of communication, means of communication, with the advent of more advanced weapons for the ground forces and the armored steam navy, the strategy, tactics of the ground forces, and naval art are intensively developed. The complication of command and control required the creation of general staffs, which began to determine the general direction of development of military-theoretical views, military science. generally. Assessing the military capabilities of both their own and other states, they to a certain extent influenced the policy of their states.

Along with the development of bourgeois V. n. in the 2nd half of the 19th century. the foundations of VN began to be laid, which considered phenomena from a dialectical-materialist point of view. The discovery by Marx and Engels of the materialistic understanding of history produced a revolutionary revolution in the social sciences, including the military one. For the first time, the dependence of the methods of waging war, the organization of the army, its weapons, strategy and tactics on the nature of the economic system of society and its political superstructure was scientifically revealed. F. Engels was one of the first Marxist military theorists; his works are devoted to the development of the doctrine of war and the army, their origin and class essence, questions of military science. and the history of military art. The manuscript "Possibilities and preconditions for the war of the Holy Alliance against France in 1852" outlines the theoretical provisions on the development of military art in various socio-economic formations, and especially in the period of the proletarian revolution and classless society. The proletarian revolution, as Marx and Engels showed, requires the destruction of the old, bourgeois state apparatus and the creation of a new, and consequently new, socialist military organization in the interests of the armed defense of the dictatorship of the proletariat. For the New American Encyclopedia, Engels for the first time gave a materialistic coverage of the history of military theory and practice, showed the dependence of the development of military art on the growth of productive forces, the development of social relations and on major revolutionary upheavals in society. In contrast to the then prevailing theory of the "free role of the commander," Engels formulated the law: "... the entire organization of armies and the methods of combat used by them, and along with this victory and human material and from weapons, therefore - from the quality and quantity of the population and from technology ”(Marx K. and Engels F., Soch., 2nd ed., vol. 20, p. 175).

Great influence on the development of bourgeois V. n. had the 1st World War 1914-18. In the course of this war, military-technical means of combat continued to be improved, new types of troops appeared (aviation, tank, chemical troops); rich experience was gained in the field of organization of wars, operational art and tactics. After the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the main task of bourgeois V. n. began the development of methods of waging war, ensuring the rapid defeat of the Soviet state and the revolutionary movement in their countries.

In the 20-30s. 20th century theories of warfare were created, which took into account the possibility of equipping the armies with qualitatively new, more effective military equipment and replacing man with machine. The bourgeois military theories of the "small army" (J. Fuller, Liddell Hart - in Great Britain, H. Seeckt - in Germany) and "air warfare" (J. Douhet - in Italy, Mitchell - in the USA) were widely known at that time. . Fuller first laid out his views in Tanks in the Great War 1914-1918. (1923). It overestimates the role of technology and underestimates the role of man. The theory of "air warfare" assigned the decisive role in the war to the air fleet. It was believed that the achievement of victory in the war could be ensured only by gaining air supremacy, after which the air fleet should quickly crush the resistance of the enemy country with broad offensive operations. The ground forces were assigned only occupying functions in a country that had been destroyed by aviation.

V. n. Nazi Germany was aimed mainly at developing the theory of "blitzkrieg", which provided for a surprise attack and the rapid advance of tank groups with the support of aviation in order to "blitzkrieg" defeat the enemy. The plans of German imperialism, calculated to win world domination, were based on the theory of "total war", previously developed by the military ideologist of German imperialism, E. Ludendorff. He believed that such a war would be of a lightning-fast nature, but in its scope would cover the entire territory of the warring states, and in order to achieve victory, it was necessary to participate in the war not only of the armed forces, but of the entire people. In French V. n. the concept of “positional warfare” dominated: defense was considered more effective than offensive. Great hopes were placed on the long-term structures of the Maginot Line and the Belgian fortified areas. The basis of warfare was considered a continuous front, based on a developed system of fortification. In the United States and Great Britain, the theory of "sea power" was most widely used, according to which the main attention was paid to the fleet as the most important branch of the armed forces.

After the Great October Socialist Revolution, Soviet military science began to take shape. It was based on the provisions of Marxism-Leninism on war and the army, developed by Lenin in relation to the new conditions of the era of imperialism. He revealed the economic basis of wars and gave their classification. Lenin pointed out that “... there are wars, just and unjust, progressive and reactionary, wars of advanced classes and wars of backward classes, wars that serve to consolidate class oppression, and wars that serve to overthrow it” (Poln. sobr. soch., 5 ed., vol. 38, p. 337).

Based on a generalization of the experience of armed uprisings of the proletariat and wars of the era of imperialism, Lenin developed many questions of Marxist military theory: on the decisive role of the masses of the people, economic and moral-political factors in modern war, on the connection of military organization and military art with the social and state system, state and the development of military technology, the patterns, methods and forms of military operations, the unity of political and military leadership in war. He created a coherent and coherent doctrine of a new type of army and the defense of the socialist Fatherland, pointed out specific ways of building the Soviet Armed Forces, developed the principles of training and education of soldiers in the army and navy, unity of the army and people, front and rear, leadership of the Communist Party of the Armed Forces, centralism, unity of command and collective leadership, efficiency in command and control of troops, control over execution, selection and placement of personnel, and conscious military discipline. Lenin taught us to take a creative approach to solving problems of protecting the socialist Fatherland, to take into account the real balance of our forces and the forces of potential opponents, economic and socio-political factors, and the state of the Armed Forces. In developing the theoretical foundations of military development, Lenin wrote that "... without science, a modern army cannot be built..." (ibid., vol. 40, p. 183). During the Civil War, Lenin was directly involved in directing military operations. During these years, the formation and development of Soviet V. n. The works of V. I. Lenin, as well as his practical activities, are of inestimable importance for the development of Soviet military science. The Marxist-Leninist principles of purposefulness, activity, determination, courage, combined with the high art of conducting military operations, were of great importance in all the military victories of the Soviet people.

A great contribution to the development of Soviet V. n. made by prominent military figures of the Soviet state: M. V. Frunze, M. N. Tukhachevsky, B. M. Shaposhnikov, as well as N. E. Varfolomeev, V. K. Triandafillov, V. A. Alafuzov, I. S. Isakov and others. An advanced Soviet military-theoretical school gradually took shape. A special role belongs to Frunze's works The Unified Military Doctrine and the Red Army, The Front and the Rear in the War of the Future, and others. the basics of training and education of personnel of the Armed Forces, etc. In his three-volume work "The Brain of the Army" (vols. 1-3, 1927-29), B. M. Shaposhnikov analyzed a large historical material, showed the role and functions of the General Staff, put forward valuable proposals on the theory of military strategy, the development of war plans and strategic leadership. In 1929, V. K. Triandafillov’s work “The Character of the Operations of Modern Armies” was published, in which the author made a deep scientific analysis of the state and development prospects of the armies of that time, revealed the patterns of their technical equipment and organization. Triandafillov noted the increased role of tanks and considered them one of the most powerful offensive means of a future war. He studied the offensive and defensive capabilities of a division, corps, army, army group, the approach of troops to the battlefield, the initiation and conduct of the battle, the duration and depth of the operation. In 1930-37, M. N. Tukhachevsky published military-theoretical articles on the nature of a future war, on the foundations of strategy and operational art, both in theory and in practice. Tukhachevsky proved that new forms of deep battle were emerging. He defended the provisions on the inseparable connection of military art with the social system of the country and its production base, studied the initial period of the future war.

An outstanding achievement of Soviet V. n. was the development of the theory of a deep offensive operation, the foundations of which were set forth in the Instructions for Conducting a Deep Battle (1932). This theory contributed to the way out of the positional impasse created during the First World War. Soviet military theory received concrete expression in the Provisional Field Manual of the Red Army (1936). The charter emphasized the decisive nature of Soviet military art: creating superiority over the enemy in the main direction, the interaction of all branches of the military, surprise and speed of action, skillful maneuvering. In recommendations for the development of the Armed Forces, Soviet military-theoretical thought proceeded from the likelihood of a war with fascist Germany and its allies. A deep analysis of the state and prospects for the development of the Armed Forces of a potential adversary allowed Soviet military science. it is reasonable to assume that the war will be tense and prolonged and will require the mobilization of the efforts of the entire people, the country as a whole. The main type of strategic actions was considered to be an offensive, ensuring a decisive defeat of the enemy on his territory. The defense was assigned a subordinate role as a forced and temporary phenomenon, ensuring the subsequent transition to the offensive.

In the views on the initial period of the war, Soviet V. n. proceeded from the fact that wars are not declared in the modern era and that aggressive states tend to surprise attacks on the enemy. Under these conditions, military operations from the very beginning will take the form of decisive operations and will be predominantly maneuverable. However, positional forms of struggle in some theaters of military operations and strategic directions were not excluded. Soviet V. n. an important place was given to the development of the theory of the use in operations of the air force, mechanized formations and methods of conducting modern warfare at sea.

The Great Patriotic War of 1941-45 showed that the Soviet military science developed by the views on the nature and methods of military operations were basically correct. From the beginning of the war, it became necessary to further develop such important problems of the theory of Soviet military art and practice of conducting operations as the leadership of the Armed Forces in the situation of the initial period of the war, in the context of general mobilization, the deployment of groupings of the Armed Forces and the transfer of the national economy to a war footing, as the centralization of control groupings of the Armed Forces operating in various theaters of military operations (directions), and coordination of their efforts. The war enriched the Soviet Armed Forces with vast combat experience. In the course of it, the following problems were comprehensively developed: the choice of the direction of the main attack, taking into account not only the provisions of the theory of military art, but also the requirements of politics and economics; organizing and conducting a strategic offensive and strategic defense; breaking through the enemy's strategic front; strategic use of the branches of the Armed Forces and coordination of their efforts to jointly solve important strategic tasks; covert creation, use and restoration of strategic reserves; use of the factor of strategic surprise; organizing and conducting operations to encircle and destroy large enemy groupings; leadership of the partisan movement, etc. The high level of Soviet military art was especially clearly manifested in the battles near Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk, in operations in the Right-Bank Ukraine and in Belarus, Iasi-Kishinev and Vistula-Oder, Berlin and Manchuria.

The American and British armed forces during the years of the 2nd World War gained experience in strategic bombing, large-scale air operations and combat operations at sea; conducting operations by field armies and army groups in cooperation with large aviation forces, mainly in conditions of overwhelming superiority over the enemy. V. n. questions were developed: conducting large-scale amphibious landing operations with the participation of ground forces, the navy, aviation and airborne assault forces; organization of strategic coalition leadership of troops; planning and ensuring operations, etc.

Postwar development of Soviet V. n. relied on a generalization of the experience of World War II and proceeded along the line of further improvement of the theory of military art, taking into account the development of armaments, combat equipment, and the organization of the Armed Forces. A great contribution to the development of the theoretical foundations of V. n. and in the practice of military art during the war years and in the post-war period, Soviet military leaders, commanders and naval commanders, advanced during the war, theoretical scientists, generals, admirals and officers of the General Staff, the Main Staffs of the branches of the Armed Forces and the headquarters of the armed forces, military educational institutions , military scientific bodies, headquarters of formations and units of the army, aviation and navy.

V.'s development n. in the most developed countries is characterized by research on a wide range of problems associated with the emergence in the 50s. 20th century nuclear weapons, which caused a change in the nature of war, methods and forms of warfare, new methods of training and education of personnel. The role of the psychological preparation of soldiers and officers for war, the development of methods of propaganda and counter-propaganda in the conditions of "psychological warfare", etc., has increased (see Military psychology).

In various capitalist countries V. n. develops differently. The most extensive development in the 2nd half of the 20th century. it received in such capitalist powers as the USA, Great Britain, France. Other capitalist countries in the area of V. n. borrow a lot from them.

Soviet V. n. in the post-war years, it developed new theoretical views on the nature of a future war, on the role and significance of the branches of the Armed Forces and means of armed struggle, on methods of conducting battles and operations. It became obvious that the war, if it could not be prevented, would be waged by qualitatively new means. Beneficial influence on the development of Soviet V. n. provided the provisions of the Program of the CPSU, decisions and documents of party congresses and plenums of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The role and significance of economic, socio-political and moral-psychological factors in achieving victory in modern warfare have been deeply studied. Soviet V. n. revealed and substantiated the nature of a possible future world war and created a theoretical basis for the formation of a modern military doctrine of the state.

The aggressive policy of the imperialist states, their preparation for a new war against the countries of socialism, and the unrestrained arms race demand from Soviet military science. further development of effective ways to ensure the constant high readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces to defeat any aggressor.

Lit.: K. Marx, The Civil War in France, K. Marx and F. Engels, Soch., 2nd ed., vol. 17; Engels F., Chosen. military works, M., 1958, pp. 3-29, 195-305, 623-49; Lenin V.I., The Fall of Port Arthur, Poln. coll. soch., 5th ed., v. 9; his, Revolutionary Army and Revolutionary Government, ibid., vol. 10; his, Lessons of the Moscow uprising, ibid., vol. 13; his, Military Program of the Proletarian Revolution, ibid., vol. 30; his own, Impending catastrophe and how to deal with it, ibid., vol. 34; his, the Seventh Emergency Congress of the RCP (b), ibid., vol. 36; his own, vol. 38, p. 139; v. 39, p. 45-46; v. 41, p. 81; Program of the CPSU, M., 1967, part 2, sec. 3; Marxism-Leninism about the war and the army, 5th ed., M., 1968, p. 262-80, 288-300; Methodological problems of military theory and practice, M., 1966; Malinovsky R. Ya., On guard of the Motherland, M., 1962; 50 years of the Armed Forces of the USSR, M., 1968, p. 520-27; Frunze M.V., Unified military doctrine and the Red Army, M., 1965; Tukhachevsky M.N., Izbr. Prod., vol. 2, 1964, p. 3-8, 180-198; Zakharov M. V., On the scientific approach to the leadership of troops, M., 1967; Milstein M.A., Slobodenko A.K., On bourgeois military science, 2nd ed., M., 1961. See also lit. to articles

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