Abandoned in East Prussia self-propelled guns "Sturmgeshyuts".

The new tactics, of course, did not cancel the traditional means of defense. These included, in particular, mobile reserves. However, East Prussia did not escape the general trend towards the withdrawal of tank formations to fight for Hungary. Since Christmas 1944, Hungary has become just the Fuhrer's "fixed idea". The 4th SS Panzer Corps Gille was sent there from Warsaw, and the 20th Panzer Division was withdrawn from the 3rd Panzer Army of Raus. At the same time, it should be noted that Routh exaggerates somewhat, assessing the capabilities of his troops. Thus, he states: "In East Prussia in January 1945, the 3rd Panzer Army had only 50 tanks and about 400 artillery pieces with a complete lack of air support." At 50 tanks, he estimates the number of vehicles transferred to him shortly before the start of the Soviet offensive by the 5th Panzer Division. In fact, on January 1, 1945, the 5th Panzer Division consisted of 32 Pz.IV (+1 in short-term repairs), 40 Pz.V "Panther" (+7), 25 Pz.Jag.IV (+7), 310 APC (+25) and 9 self-propelled anti-tank guns. The number of personnel of the division (more than 15 thousand people) almost completely corresponded to the state. The combat readiness of the 5th Panzer Division was rated at the highest score - "I". This meant that it was suitable for any offensive action, not to mention defense. Prior to that, it was in the reserve of the 4th Army, and it is not clear why its combat effectiveness should have noticeably decreased during the period of an obvious lull on the front in early January 1945. The 20th Panzer Division, previously listed in the Routh reserve, had a combat capability rating of "II / I ”, i.e. slightly below the newly arrived replacement.

Routh's groans about the "total absence" of air support are also not very convincing. The German 6th Air Fleet, responsible for East Prussia and Poland, had 822 combat-ready aircraft on January 10, 1945, more than any other air fleet on the Eastern Front. Directly in the strip of the 3rd tank army of Raus in Insterburg, the III group of the 51st fighter squadron "Melders" was stationed - 38 (29 combat-ready) Bf109G on January 10, 1945. Also in East Prussia in January, units of the 3rd squadron of attack aircraft SchG3 were based.

In general, the commander of the 3rd Panzer Army is very disingenuous in assessing the real defensive capabilities of his troops. In addition to the 5th Panzer Division, the 2nd Parachute Panzergrenadier Division "Hermann Goering" with 29 "Sturmgeshyuts" was subordinate to him. In general, in contrast to the beginning of the war, when the bulk of armored vehicles were concentrated in tank divisions, the final period of the war was characterized by its distribution among formations of all types. That is, tanks and self-propelled guns were distributed in 1945 among infantry, tank and motorized divisions, as well as individual units and formations. The “separate units and formations” primarily include the brigades of the Sturmgeshütz self-propelled guns (see table). These brigades were attached to infantry divisions operating in key areas of defense and offensive. Unlike the most common Soviet SU-76 self-propelled guns, the German Sturmgeshütz were a dangerous opponent for any Soviet tank. Basically, in 1945, in the ranks of the Shtug brigades and divisions, there were self-propelled guns with a 48-caliber 75-mm gun.

Table

NUMBER OF COMBAT-READY ACS "SHTURMGESHUTS" IN PARTS SUBJECTED TO THE 3rd TA

As we can see, accounting for assault gun brigades immediately gives us more than 100 armored units in the 3rd Panzer Army. In addition, since 1944, the Sturmgeshütz self-propelled guns were included in the Wehrmacht infantry divisions. So, in the 1st Infantry Division, which was in the direction of the main attack of the 3rd Belorussian Front, there were 9 combat-ready StuGIIIs and another self-propelled guns were under repair. In total, in the formations subordinate to Raus, 213 Sturmgenshütz self-propelled guns of all types (StuGIII, StuGIV and StuH) were listed as combat-ready on 12/30/44 or 01/15/45. In a word, the former commander of the 3rd Panzer Army frankly comes down when he talks about the means he had to counter the Soviet offensive. The defending German units had quite numerous, strong and hardly vulnerable to artillery anti-tank weapons.

2nd Belorussian Front, commanded by Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky, consisting of seven combined arms armies, one tank army, one mechanized, two tank and one cavalry corps and one air army, received the task by directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 220274 of November 28, 1944. - On the 11th day of the offensive, take control of the Myshinets, Willenberg, Naydenburg, Dzialdovo, Bezhun, Bielsk, Plock line and then advance in the general direction to Nowe Miasto, Marienburg.

The front delivered the main blow from the Rozhany bridgehead with the forces of four combined arms armies, one tank army, one tank and one mechanized corps in the general direction to Pshasnysh, Mlava, Lidzbark. The supply of the main forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front from the north was supposed to be carried out by the offensive of one combined arms army on Myshinets.

The front was to strike the second blow with the forces of two combined arms armies and one tank corps from the Serotsky bridgehead in the general direction of Naselsk, Belsk. In order to assist the 1st Belorussian Front in defeating the enemy's Warsaw grouping, the 2nd Belorussian Front was tasked with part of its forces to strike around Modlin from the west.

In eight armies and front-line units of the 2nd Belorussian Front, there were 665,340 people by the beginning of the operation. Taking into account the rear units and institutions, as well as the Air Force, the number of Rokossovsky's troops was 881,500 people. 1186 tanks and 789 self-propelled guns were subordinate to the front, including 257 tanks and 19 ° self-propelled guns in the 5th Guards Tank Army and 607 tanks and 151 self-propelled guns in tank, mechanized and cavalry corps of front subordination. The 2nd Belorussian Front had 6,051 guns of 76.2 mm and above, 2,088 anti-tank guns, 970 rocket artillery installations, and 5,911 mortars of 82 mm and 120 mm caliber.

The enemy of the 3rd Belorussian Front was the 2nd Army. Although it did not have the portly name "tank", its capabilities were quite comparable to the Routh army. Its mobile reserve was the 7th Panzer Division. It was not the strongest tank formation at that time. On January 1, it consisted of 27 PzIV, 28 Pz.V "Panther" and 249 armored personnel carriers. Also in the zone of the 2nd Army, the tank corps "Grossdeutschland" could be involved. His fate will be discussed below.

Traditionally for the Wehrmacht in 1945, a considerable amount of armored vehicles was concentrated in separate parts (see table).

Table

THE NUMBER OF COMBAT-READY SPG IN THE SUBJECTED 2nd ARMY BRIGADES OF ASSAULT GUN

In addition, Sturmgeshyuts self-propelled guns were in abundance in the composition of the infantry formations of the 2nd Army. So, in the direction of the main attack of the 2nd Belorussian Front, the 7th Infantry Division had 13 StuGIV. In total, the 2nd Army had 149 Sturmgeshuts self-propelled guns (in brigades and divisions of infantry divisions).

The operation began on January 13 with the offensive of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front. The next day, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front launched an offensive. Low cloud cover and dense fog in the first days of the operation did not allow the use of aircraft and reduced the effectiveness of artillery fire, which could not but affect the rate of penetration of the enemy's tactical defense zone. This was already almost commonplace for the operations of the Red Army in winter campaigns. With poor visibility, both the brilliant "Uranus" and the unsuccessful "Mars" began. However, in East Prussia the situation was almost the worst. According to the figurative expression of the commander of the 39th Army, I.I. Lyudnikov, then it was "nothing is visible beyond the gun barrel." The weather was favorable in only one respect - the frost-bound ground provided complete cross-country ability for tanks in almost any off-road terrain.

Breakthrough of the enemy defense in the zone of the 3rd Belorussian Front

The assault on East Prussia by Chernyakhovsky's troops was preceded by several days of war of nerves. Raus recalled: “From Lvov’s experience, I knew that strong nerves and cold calculation were required in order not to tire our small troops with premature retreats and not suffer heavy losses from artillery fire if such an order was late. On January 11, we noticed a clear decrease in Russian combat activity, and troop movements were noticeably reduced. The soldiers of the 3rd Panzer Army were nervous, waiting for the order to withdraw, which would save them from the furious fire of enemy artillery, but I did not give this order.

The next day, January 12, seemed even more peaceful and calm. The war of nerves has reached its climax. Raus later wrote: “Our observers did not notice any signs that would allow us to determine the day the Red Army offensive began. On the other hand, radio interception data and reports from night reconnaissance aircraft left no doubt that large columns of Russian troops were moving towards concentration points, artillery batteries had taken up their positions, and tank units had advanced to their starting lines. Therefore, I decided on January 12 at 20.00 to transmit the code order "Winter Solstice", according to which the retreat began. The evacuation of the first two lines went quietly, and our troops took up combat positions. After 3 hours, General Mautsky (commander of the XXVI Corps) informed me that the movement was completed, he was at the new command post and the communication system was working normally. Information about the upcoming offensive and the time of its start also came from several defectors from the Soviet side. It is difficult to say what motivated these people in January 1945, when they moved towards the German trenches, but there were indeed such cases.

Tanks T-34-85 on the street of one of the cities of East Prussia.

Being practically certain that the Soviet offensive was about to begin, the Germans also conducted artillery counter-preparation. It was one of the few cases of counter-training during the entire war. Raus recalled: "I immediately gave the order to the artillery of the 3rd Panzer Army at 05.30 to open fire, concentrating it on the two main collection areas of the Soviet infantry." Soviet sources confirm this event. Commander of the 11th Guards Army K.N. Galitsky recalled: “I hear the growing rumble of frequent artillery fire and the roar of close explosions. He looked at the dial - the fourth hour. Really preempted?! Some projectiles burst very close. This is guessed not only by the sounds, but also by the crimson flashes on the gray waves of fog. According to Galitsky, "as a result of a preemptive fire strike by the Germans, units of the 72nd Rifle Corps of the 5th Army suffered some losses in the area of ​​Schilleningken, Schvirgallen."

The experience of the war was tracked on both sides of the front. The Soviet command knew about the possible withdrawal of the Germans from the advanced positions. Therefore, the offensive of the first echelons of the rifle corps of the 39th and 5th armies was preceded by the actions of the forward battalions. The battle of the advanced battalions, which began at 6.00 am on January 13, managed to establish that only insignificant enemy forces occupied the first trench, and its main forces were withdrawn to the second and third trenches. This information made it possible to make some amendments to the artillery preparation plan.

At 11.00, after artillery preparation, the infantry and tanks of the shock group of the front went on the offensive. It immediately became clear that the artillery did not decide the course of the battle. A significant part of the enemy's firepower remained unsuppressed. They had to be knocked out by means of the advancing infantry. Therefore, the offensive of the shock group of the front on the first day of the operation developed extremely slowly. By the end of the day, the troops of the 39th and 5th armies had captured only the second and partly the third trenches, wedged into the enemy defenses for 2–3 km. The offensive developed more successfully in the zone of the 28th Army. By the end of the day, the troops of General Luchinsky advanced up to 7 km, and only the 54th Guards Rifle Division broke through the main line of defense, although it did not complete the task of the day. On the first day of the offensive, not a single formation of the front's shock group completed the tasks laid down in the operation plan.

In positional battles, the causes of failure are most often hidden at the tactical level, in the plane of action of small subunits. In this regard, it is interesting to consider the events of the first day of fighting, descending to the tactical level. The 144th Rifle Division of the 5th Army received a breakthrough section 2 km wide. The depth of the task of the day for the division was six times greater - 12 km. The total number of personnel of the division on January 13 was 6545 people. The divisions were assigned to the 81st Separate Heavy Tank Regiment (16 IS tanks) and the 953rd Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment (15 SU-76s). The division was also assigned a company of minesweeper tanks. The average density of artillery in the breakthrough areas reached 225 guns and mortars and 18 NPP tanks per 1 km of the front.

The offensive of the division began on the morning of 13 January. After artillery preparation, which lasted 1 hour and 40 minutes, the 81st tank and 953rd self-propelled artillery regiments began to attack from their original positions. With the approach of tanks and self-propelled guns to the advanced trenches, the 612th and 449th rifle regiments of the division went on the offensive. The 785th Rifle Regiment was in the second echelon.

At 11.00 battalions of the first echelon broke into the first trench on the move. Moving forward, parts of the division reached the second trench. It was covered from the front with barbed wire on low steel stakes, anti-tank and anti-personnel minefields. Here they met organized resistance from enemy infantry, as well as heavy artillery and mortar fire. The division's advance was delayed. During the battle, it was found that the enemy in the first trench had only cover (up to 1/3 of the forces), and on the night of January 13 he withdrew the main forces to the second trench. At the same time, it turned out that during the artillery preparation, manpower and firepower in the second trench were not sufficiently suppressed.

Raus wrote about these events: “Only at 10.00 (Berlin time) advanced enemy units approached the main combat position. All the guns of General Matzka fell upon them, as well as the Nebelwerfer brigade, and the Russian infantry lay down. Strictly speaking, "lay down" did not last long. The commander of the 144th division reported the situation to the corps commander and asked him to suppress enemy artillery in the zone and on the flanks of the division with the fire of the corps artillery group. Artillery was also ordered to unleash its power on enemy firing points in the second trench and the nearest depth. After artillery treatment of enemy firing points at the encountered enemy positions, the regiments of the first echelon resumed the offensive and broke into the second trench. Soon the third trench succumbed to the onslaught of the infantry. However, further artillery had to change positions and by 17.00 the advance stopped. The regiments of the first echelon of the 144th division, having prepared an attack in a limited time, after a 15-minute artillery preparation, attacked the second position of the enemy. However, they no longer had success, retreated to their original position and began to gain a foothold, conducting a firefight and reconnaissance of the enemy.

During the day, the 144th division managed to advance only 3 km in depth. The reason for the failure to complete the tasks was simple. The reconnaissance failed to reveal the withdrawal of the main enemy forces from the first trench, as a result of which the main efforts of the artillery were concentrated on the first trench. The commission of the headquarters of the 5th Army, which tested the effectiveness of artillery and mortar fire during the period of artillery preparation, established that the first trench of the enemy was subjected to the greatest fire impact. So, direct hits in the first trench fell through 50–70 m, and in the second trench they were noted as an exception - out of 14 targets to be destroyed (observation posts, dugouts, etc.), only four had one direct hit each.

From the very beginning, the operation plan provided for the continuation of hostilities at night. Long winter nights gave the Germans the opportunity to organize defense at a new frontier. In this regard, the corps commander ordered the commander of the 144th Infantry Division to capture the city of Kattenau during the night, located at a height dominating the surrounding area. This would set the stage for the second echelon of the corps to be brought into action the next morning. To capture Kattenau, the division commander decided to introduce his second echelon - the 785th rifle regiment. Preparations for a night attack were carried out in a hurry, tasks for units and subunits were set in the dark, mainly on the map. The interaction of infantry with artillery and neighbors was not clearly organized. The regiment of the second echelon did not reconnoiter the routes to the initial area for the attack in advance. The units of the regiment reached their starting positions late. Here they came under enemy artillery fire. Under fire, some commanders, including the regimental commander, were wounded and out of action. As a result, the attack of the 785th Infantry Regiment failed, and the regiment was withdrawn to the rear to be put in order. The division did not fulfill the task of capturing Kattenau.

Similar shortcomings were in other armies. The commander of the 39th Army, Lyudnikov, noted in his order: “Combat control in formations was organized according to a template, without taking into account the changed weather. In conditions of fog, instead of the maximum approach to the forward units, the controls broke away from them, there was no observation of the battlefield. Tanks and self-propelled artillery lagged behind the infantry and were not pushed through. Companies and battalions were not given the necessary amount of artillery for direct fire. As a result, firing points that interfered with movement were not suppressed.

Considering all this, the front commander demanded: “By the morning of January 14, 1945, to establish clear control at all levels and the interaction of all branches of the military. Command and observation posts of divisional and regimental commanders should be brought as close as possible to combat formations. Reinforce companies as much as possible with direct-fire escort guns. Have all sapper equipment in infantry combat formations and ensure proper guidance for them to quickly clear minefields.

Surrender of the remnants of the Allenstein garrison.

On the morning of January 14, the mobile reserve of the German 3rd Panzer Army, the 5th Panzer Division, pulled up from the depths. Its units launched a series of strong counterattacks. As a result, the shock grouping of the front resumed the offensive only at 12.30. The intensified enemy fire and frequent counterattacks delayed the advance of the infantry, which led to its lagging behind the tanks and the slow pace of the offensive. Therefore, during the day of January 14, the strike force of the front advanced only 1–2 km.

The slow advance deprived the Soviet troops of the main advantage of the side with the initiative - the uncertainty of its plans for the defender. Having determined the direction of the main attack of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, the German command began to withdraw its units from passive sectors and transfer them to the breakthrough sector. So, for example, units of the 56th Infantry Division were pulled up to the breakthrough site from the Schillenen area. During the preparation of the offensive, units of the 152nd UR covered themselves from it. Now the passivity of the UR allowed the Germans to freely withdraw troops from this area. From the Gumbinnen area, units of the 61st Infantry Division were brought up to the breakthrough site. In addition, brigades of assault guns and anti-tank artillery were traditionally transferred for the Germans.

Nevertheless, the superiority in forces and the experience gained by 1945 and the technique of warfare did their job. Overcoming enemy resistance, the front's strike force broke through the main line of defense by the end of January 15. During the three days of the offensive, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front only managed to break through the enemy's main line of defense and advance in depth from 6 to 10 km. At the same time, the enemy, at the expense of his reserves and units that had withdrawn from the main line of defense, managed to occupy the second line of defense (the Gumbinnen defensive line).

At 11.40 on January 16, the troops of the front resumed the offensive, but this time the enemy continued to put up stubborn resistance. The progress was extremely slow. Fierce battles ensued for every house, for every section of the trench and strong point. Only by 13.00 the troops of the 5th Army captured the first trench of the Gumbinnen defensive line, but again met stubborn enemy resistance in front of the second trench. The Soviet infantry and tanks, having suffered heavy losses in previous battles and repulsing counterattacks, hardly moved forward. There was a clear threat that the offensive might stop, despite the fact that the enemy defenses were already thoroughly shaken. A new strong push was required, which would ensure a breakthrough of the weakened, but still retaining the ability to resist defense and would allow the second echelon (11th Guards Army and 1st Tank Corps) to be brought into battle. Chernyakhovsky decided to use the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps of General A.S. Burdeyny. It was a strong connection with strong traditions, a veteran of Stalingrad, Kursk and Bagration. General Burdeyny received an order to strike in the zone of the 5th Army. However, the advancing tanks met strong fire resistance from the enemy and started protracted battles with him, while suffering heavy losses. By the end of the day, the tank brigades of the corps advanced only 1–1.5 km.

During the four days of the Soviet offensive, although the enemy's tactical defense zone was not broken through, the defenders suffered significant losses and exhausted their reserves. This circumstance forced the German command to decide on the withdrawal of the left wing of the XXVI Army Corps, which was defending the line south of the river. Neman. Thus, the length of the defensive line was reduced, and infantry units were released. They were supposed to be used against the shock group of the 3rd Belorussian Front. In addition, this section of the German defense was deeply outflanked by the penetration of the troops of the Soviet 39th Army.

The withdrawal of troops from a well-established line of defense is a complex maneuver that requires a lot of organizational work. Noticing the retreat of the enemy, the 39th Army immediately began to pursue. Also, the direction of introducing another reserve of Chernyakhovsky into battle was changed - the 1st tank corps of General V.V. Butkov. At first, they planned to throw him against the same line as Burdeiny's corps, that is, in the zone of the 5th army. Most likely, this would lead to senseless losses. Despite the often arising desire of commanders and commanders to bring into battle "one more battalion", after the impact of which the enemy's defense should collapse, most often these inputs resembled throwing fresh firewood into the stove. Instead, Butkov's tanks were brought into the flank and rear of the retreating XXVI German Corps in the zone of the 39th Army on the morning of January 18. The offensive developed successfully. A few hours later, the tanks crossed the Inster River and cut the Tilsit-Insterburg railway. On the night of January 19, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps was deployed in the same direction.

The 39th Army, using the success of the 1st Tank Corps, accelerated its advance on January 18th. Having fought up to 20 km, she also went out with her main forces to the river. Inter. The troops of the 5th and 28th armies on that day advanced to a depth of 3 to 8 km. Aviation played its role in undermining the enemy's defenses. Since January 16, the weather has improved significantly. This made it possible to actively use the aviation of the 1st Air Army, Colonel General of Aviation T.T. Khryukin, which made 3468 sorties on January 16 and 17. Routh noted with annoyance: “The threat became even more serious, as Russian aircraft appeared, and immediately in large quantities. They bombed cities, roads, command posts, artillery positions - in general, everything that only moved.

By the end of January 18, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, as a result of six days of intense fighting, broke through the enemy defenses in the Königsberg direction north of Gumbinnen to a depth of 20-30 km and along the front up to 65 km. This created the conditions for the entry into battle of the second echelon of the front - the 11th Guards Army and the development of an offensive on Königsberg. This result was achieved only on the sixth day of the operation, while according to the plan of the front, the withdrawal of troops on the river. Inster was envisaged on the third day of the offensive.

Breakthrough of the enemy defense in the zone of the 2nd Belorussian Front

The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front went on the offensive on January 14, a day later than their neighbor. Here the Germans could also use the above technique with a retreat to the second trench (position) described above. However, Rokossovsky had reason to believe that this would not happen. Later in his memoirs, he described the course of his thoughts as follows:

“It happened more than once before that the enemy, even before our artillery preparation, withdrew his troops into the depths so that we would use up ammunition in an empty place. Now he is unlikely to go for it. He has a strong position, replete with strongholds and permanent fortifications with forts, it is true, of the old type, but well adapted for defense. A voluntary withdrawal of the enemy from these positions would only make our task easier. And he, of course, will not dare to leave them. Well, we will pick out the Nazis from their concrete holes. We have enough strength."

However, the process of "picking out" was not easy. The reason for this, as on the 3rd Belorussian Front, was the fog brought from the Baltic. Front commander K.K. Rokossovsky recalled:

“On January 14, a few hours before the start of artillery preparation, I, members of the Military Council, commanders of artillery, armored forces, air army, and the head of the engineering troops of the front arrived at the observation post. It has already dawned, but nothing is visible: everything is hidden by a veil of fog and wet snow. The weather is disgusting, and the forecasters did not promise any improvement. And the time was approaching for the departure of bombers to strike at the enemy's defenses. After consulting with K.A. Vershinin (commander of the air army. - A.I.), I give the order to cancel all actions of aviation. Let the weather down! It’s good that we didn’t particularly count on it, although until the last hour we cherished the hope of using aviation.

At 10:00 a.m. artillery preparation began. Due to thick fog, which limited visibility to 150-200 m, the results of artillery fire were not observed, and the air preparation for the attack had to be abandoned. After a fifteen-minute fire raid on the forward edge and the most important objects in the tactical depth of the enemy's defense, the advanced battalions went on the attack. They quickly overcame the minefields and barbed wire of the enemy and broke into his first trench. By 1100 hours, the advanced battalions had captured the second line of trenches, and in some areas even the third.

At 11.25 am, the first-echelon rifle divisions, supported by artillery and in cooperation with tanks, went on the offensive. Due to poor observation conditions, a significant part of the enemy artillery and mortars was not suppressed. The advancing troops, overcoming the strong fire resistance of the enemy and suffering heavy losses, slowly moved forward. By the end of the day, the troops of the 3rd, 48th and 2nd shock armies, advancing from the Rozhany bridgehead, wedged into the enemy defenses to a depth of 3 to 6 km. The troops of the 65th and 70th armies, advancing from the Serotsky bridgehead, fought all day in the enemy's main line of defense. The advance of their troops into the depth of the enemy's defense did not exceed 3-5 km.

Unlike the Vistula bridgeheads, which were quickly "opened" on the same days by the troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts, East Prussia stubbornly resisted the onslaught of the Soviet troops. In the front line of Rokossovsky, the strike groups did not fulfill the tasks set on the first day of the offensive, just like in his neighbor Chernyakhovsky. Instead of the advance rate of 10–12 km planned on the first day of the operation, the troops advanced only to a depth of 3–6 km. The enemy's main line of defense was not broken through in any of the offensive sectors. The slow pace of the offensive, as in the 3rd Belorussian Front, was due to a number of subjective and objective reasons. First of all, due to poor meteorological conditions, the front could not use its advantage in aviation, which on that day was completely inactive. Meteorological conditions also significantly reduced the effectiveness of artillery fire. The strengthening of the German defense with heavy tanks also played a role. At the junction of the 2nd shock and 48th armies, the fresh 507th battalion of heavy tanks operated, numbering 51 combat-ready "tigers" by the start of the fighting (namely, "tiger", not "King Tiger"). Two companies of this battalion supported the 7th Infantry Division, another company supported the 299th Infantry Division. The tankers of the 507th "tiger" battalion announced the destruction of 66 Soviet tanks in the first two days of fighting, without their losses. Knowing about the presence of "tigers" in the defending 507th battalion, to read the words in Rokossovsky's memoirs "strongly helped her (infantry. - A.I.) SU-76 self-propelled guns”, frankly, creepy. Also in the zone of the Soviet offensive, three brigades of "Sturmgeshyutsev" (190, 276 and 209th) operated.

The SU-76 convoy enters the streets of Mühlhausen. Only a few kilometers are left to the Frisch Gaff Bay.

The not too high rate of penetration of the defense forced Rokossovsky to resort to a tried and tested method - "breaking through" the enemy's defense with tank formations. The question of whether or not to use the success development echelon to break the defense was discussed at a meeting of the command staff of the Red Army in December 1940. It caused a lively discussion. During the war, each commander decided what to do according to the situation. I.S. Konev. In January, Rokossovsky followed his path. In order to speed up the breakthrough of the tactical depth of the enemy’s defense, by order of the commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front, on January 15, the 8th Guards Tank Corps (in the offensive zone of the 2nd Shock Army) and the 1st Guards Tank Corps (in the offensive zone 65 th army). This was only the first step: from the morning of the next day, that is, on January 16, the 8th mechanized corps was brought into battle in the 48th Army zone. The corps were introduced into battle at a depth of about 5 km from the former front line in stripes up to 6 km wide.

The large mass of tanks was a strong argument. Overcoming enemy resistance, the 8th and 1st Guards Tank Corps, with their forward detachments, together with the infantry, completed the breakthrough of the enemy’s main line of defense on January 15, advancing to a depth of 5 to 8 km during the day of the battle.

However, by and large, the use of tank and mechanized corps was justified. The fact is that January 15 was also marked by the introduction of mobile defense reserves into battle. Fighting them only with close infantry support tanks would not be the best solution. More precisely, the German command launched its first reserve, the 7th Panzer Division, into counterattacks on January 14th. To the east of the city of Pshasnysh, on January 15, the German command used another of its mobile reserves - the tank-grenadier division "Grossdeutschland". It was an elite formation of the Wehrmacht, on January 10, the division consisted of 60 Panthers, 19 Tigers, 36 light and 189 medium armored personnel carriers. "Grossdeutschland" was also subordinated to a battalion of radio-controlled tankettes with 26 "Sturmgeshütz" as control vehicles. This division was the first of the Grossdeutschland Panzer Corps, the reserve of Army Group Centre. The introduction of other divisions of the corps could significantly complicate the conditions of the Soviet offensive.

However, the success of the 1st Belorussian Front still influenced its northern neighbor. The Chief of Staff of Army Group Center, General Otto Heidkemper, wrote in his diary:

"January 15. At 3:00 am, General Wenck, by telephone from the army headquarters in Zossen, ordered me to immediately send the Grossdeutschland Panzer Corps to Army Group A. I informed Wenck that the transfer of our last reserves would spell disaster. This means a breakthrough by the Russians of the defense of the 2nd Army, to which we will not be able to oppose anything. Wenk replied that a breakthrough had already taken place south of the Vistula and that this rapid release of reserves was more relevant there. I objected that in that case we should hold out here and the enemy would soon be bogged down in the south. But Wenck only became more restless and impatient. He said that there was no need to wake the commander (Army Group Center. - A.I. ), protests are meaningless, the movement is carried out on the personal orders of the Führer.

In the end, a compromise was made. As part of the Great Germany tank corps, two divisions went to the Lodz region to rescue the collapsed front. These were the Brandenburg Panzergrenadier Division (formed in the autumn of 1944) and the Hermann Goering Panzer Division. Already involved in the battle, the division "Grossdeutschland" remained in East Prussia. However, in any case, the withdrawal of two mobile formations from the defenders of East Prussia was a serious blow to the defensive capabilities of Army Group Center. The counterattack of the “Great Germany” that was left alone was not successful, and in the future the division retreated to the north, conducting containment battles. The counterattacks of the 7th Panzer Division in the Ciechanów area were also unsuccessful.

The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front achieved their greatest success during January 16. On this day, they advanced 10–25 km, completing the breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical defense zone. Moreover, the troops of the 2nd shock army captured a large enemy stronghold on the right bank of the river. Narew - the city of Pultusk, and the 65th Army captured the stronghold of Naselsk and cut the Ciechanow-Modlin railway.

The successful offensive of the ground forces on January 16 was facilitated by massive strikes by assault and bomber aircraft of the 4th Air Army of Colonel General of Aviation K.A. Vershinin. In connection with the improvement of the weather, the aviation of the front carried out more than 2,500 sorties that day and dropped about 1,800 tons of bombs.

Thus, as a result of three days of fighting, the troops of the front broke through the tactical defense zone of the enemy on the front of 60 km and advanced to a depth of 30 km. The nearest operational reserves of the enemy were destroyed. All this created favorable conditions for the introduction of a tank army into the breakthrough and the development of a tactical breakthrough into an operational one.

By the time the enemy's tactical defense zone was breached, the 5th Guards Tank Army concentrated in a waiting area north of Vyshkow, having made a 150-kilometer march in two nights (January 14 and 15). Prior to that, she was quite far from the front, on the Bialystok meridian. This both kept its very presence secret, and misled the enemy as to the direction of its use. On the afternoon of January 16, Rokossovsky ordered the commander of the tank army, Colonel General of the Tank Forces V.T. Volsky to be ready on the morning of January 17 to send troops into a breakthrough in the 48th Army zone. The task of Volsky's army was to develop the offensive in the general direction of Mlawa, Lidzbark approximately along the axis of the Warsaw-Marienburg railway. The main forces of the tank army were supposed to reach the Mlawa region by the morning of January 18, and by the morning of January 19 to capture Naidenburg, Dzialdov.

At 12.00 on January 17, the 5th Guards Tank Army began to enter the gap and at 15.00 at the turn of Zalese, Paluki passed the battle formations of the troops of the first echelon of the 48th Army. The entry of the tank army into the gap was provided by the assault aviation corps and artillery of the 48th army. From the point of view of the use of tank armies in the battles of the Great Patriotic War, this was an almost unprecedented move. Most often, tank armies were introduced not even into a breakthrough, but into battle. When entering the breakthrough, this happened on the second day of the operation at most. Here the 5th Guards Tank Army was introduced into the gap only on the fourth day of the offensive.

Self-propelled guns SU-85 on the shore of the Frisch-Gaff Bay in Tolkemite. East Prussia is cut off.

Late entry into battle at the same time gave undoubted advantages. By the time the tank army advanced to the line of entry into the breakthrough, the 8th mechanized corps captured the Grudusk road junction and entrenched itself on it. The 8th Guards Tank Corps captured a large road junction Ciechanow and, in cooperation with the aviation division supporting it, tied up the enemy's 7th tank division in battle. Combined-arms formations of the 48th and 3rd armies advancing behind the 8th mechanized corps tied up "Great Germany" in battle. All this provided very favorable conditions for the actions of the 5th Guards Tank Army, which, without encountering serious resistance, reached the Mlavsky fortified area by the end of the day, advancing up to 60 km in the first day.

The powerful tank fist naturally created the conditions for the rapid advance of the combined arms armies of the Rokossovsky shock group. Having traveled 15 km in a day of fighting, the troops of the front captured large enemy points - the cities of Ciechanow and Nowe Miasto (15 km northwest of Nasielsk).

On January 18, continuing to develop the offensive in the Mlava direction, the main grouping of the front bypassed the Mlava fortified area from the north and south, and by the morning of January 19, tank troops, in cooperation with formations of the 48th Army, captured the city of Mlava. It was a city whose name is associated with one of the first battles of World War II. Long before the events described, in the first days of September 1939, German tank units suffered heavy losses in battles with Polish units that had settled in the fortifications of the Mlavsky UR. The Germans failed to repeat this battle, turning it 180 degrees. Mlava was taken quickly enough, and the German 2nd Army failed to cling to its fortifications.

Thus, by the end of January 18, the strike groups of the 3rd and 2nd Belorussian Fronts completely broke through the tactical defense zone of the enemy and created conditions for the development of success in the directions of Königsberg and Marienburg. The troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front broke through the enemy defenses to a depth of 20 to 30 km and along the front up to 65 km, and the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front - to a depth of 30 to 60 km and along the front up to 110 km. The average rate of breaking through the enemy defenses was: for the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front - 3-5 km per day, and for the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front - from 6 to 12 km per day. As we can see, the difference in rates is quite noticeable.

The heavy cruiser Admiral Scheer fires a salvo with her main caliber.

The difficult conditions of the situation and the stubborn resistance of the enemy, who relied on heavily fortified terrain, caused relatively high losses among the advancing troops. So, for example, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front during the period of breaking through the tactical defense zone of the enemy lost over 37 thousand killed and wounded; troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front - more than 27,200 people. Absolute numbers should not be misleading. The average daily loss of people in the 2nd Belorussian Front reached almost 1.3% of the combat strength of the front. On the 3rd Belorussian Front, the situation was noticeably worse. Of the six combined arms armies, three armies (39th, 5th and 28th) advanced in the direction of the main attack. The average daily losses in these armies amounted to over 1.5% of their combat strength. The 5th Army suffered the greatest losses (12,769 men). Its average daily losses reached 2.2%.

Nevertheless, the defense of the German 2nd and 3rd tank armies was broken through. The enemy, having been defeated in the tactical defense zone in the directions of the main attacks of the 3rd and 2nd Belorussian Fronts and having committed all available reserves into battle, began to withdraw. The commanders of the 3rd and 2nd Belorussian fronts took measures to organize and pursue the enemy in the Koenigsberg and Marienburg directions. The second stage of the operation began. The flying weather that had settled since January 19 allowed the aviation of the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian fronts to launch more active combat operations.

The development of the offensive of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front to the Frisch-Gaff Bay and the river. Vistula

On the morning of January 19, the troops of the center and left wing of the 2nd Belorussian Front proceeded to pursue the defeated 2nd German Army. The tanks and motorized infantry of the 5th Guards Tank Army, rushing north, reached Neidenburg by the end of the day and thus crossed the border of East Prussia. The troops of the 48th and 2nd shock armies also successfully pursued the enemy. On this day, their main forces advanced up to 30 km and reached the line of Dzyaldovo, Bezhun.

The situation was so favorable that opportunities opened up not only for tanks, but also for cavalry. Rokossovsky decided to use the success in the 48th Army's zone and introduce Oslikovsky's 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps into the gap in this direction. Based on the plan of the operation and the current situation, the corps was given the task of reaching the line of Willenberg, Neidenburg by January 20 and subsequently advancing on Allenstein. On the morning of January 19, the corps was introduced into the breakthrough. At 17.00 he captured Yanov and led the attack on Allenstein. Breaking away from the advanced units of the 3rd and 48th armies by 20-25 km, the corps significantly contributed to the success of these armies.

The 4th Air Army provided great assistance to the ground forces. During January 19, she flew 1,820 bomber and attack aircraft sorties.

A particularly important role at this stage of operations was assigned to the 5th Guards Tank Army. She was to be the first to go to the Frisch-Gaff Bay in the Elbing area and cut off all land communications of the East Prussian enemy grouping.

Fulfilling the assigned tasks, on January 20, the troops of the front captured the junctions of the highways and railways of Niedenburg and Lidzbark. The 5th Guards Tank Army, after capturing Naidenburg, developed an offensive on Osterode. The troops of the left wing of the front advanced more than 40 km in a day, capturing the cities of Serpts, Belsk, Vyshogrud. The rapid advance of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front led to the loss of the last trump cards by the Germans. From the composition of the 507th battalion of "tigers" during the retreat, 19 tanks were lost or even simply blown up by the crews due to breakdowns or lack of fuel. By January 21, out of 51 "tigers" by the beginning of the Soviet offensive, 29 vehicles remained in service. Soon, they also melted away in the chaos of the retreat - on January 30, only 7 tanks remained in service. Most of the lost tanks were abandoned or blown up during the withdrawal by their own crews.

Aviation of the 2nd Belorussian Front on January 20 also successfully supported the troops, making 1744 sorties per day.

As a result of the rapid advance of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front in the Elbing, and the 3rd Belorussian Front in the Koenigsberg directions, a situation was created in which the German 4th Army, which had previously operated in the Masurian Lakes region, was deeply engulfed from the flanks. The position of the 4th Army caused a heated discussion between the command of Army Group Center and the High Command. The Chief of Staff of Army Group Center Geidkemper wrote in his diary:

"January 20th. The situation in which the 4th Army holds its forward position now looks completely absurd. At 8.30 pm the chief (commander of Army Group Center Georg Reinhardt. - A.I.) again explained to the Fuhrer the reasons that make the retreat of the 4th Army an urgent necessity. “My Fuhrer,” the chief began, “serious concern for East Prussia compels me to turn to you personally again. In my judgment, we must reckon with a large-scale attack on East Prussia. The captured map of the enemy shows that the Russian 5th Guards Tank Army with four tank corps is marching on Danzig. The forces of the 2nd Army that we can oppose to this are so weak that they cannot hold out. The second danger now is an enemy breakthrough in the zone of the 3rd Panzer Army. If the Russian Guards Tank Army breaks through, we will be attacked in the rear, where there are no troops at all. Hitler's reply was lightning fast: "It is a long discussion whether the waste of power is released or not." He stayed with his mind."

As a result, the withdrawal of the 4th Army was again prohibited. In compensation, Hitler promised the command of Army Group Center the 4th Panzer Division, transported by sea from Courland. It was difficult to object to such a proposal - the mobile formation was obviously better than the infantry divisions released as a result of the withdrawal of the 4th Army. Later that day, Reinhardt approached Guderian with the same question of recusal, but was again refused. On January 21, everything happened again. This time, only Guderian fought off Reinhardt's insistent requests, persuading the commander of Army Group Center to follow Hitler's orders. The promised 4th Panzer Division had not yet arrived. However, her arrival could not radically change the situation. Only on the morning of January 22, during another conversation with Hitler, did Reinhardt manage to snatch permission to withdraw the 4th Army. From the lips of the Fuhrer, finally, the words "I give permission to withdraw ..." sounded.

According to Soviet data, the withdrawal of the 4th Army from the line of Gumbinnen, Augustow, Lomzha began already on the night of January 22. Perhaps the army commander Hossbach began to withdraw on his own initiative. The retreat of the enemy in a northwestern direction was timely detected by the reconnaissance of the 50th Army of the 2nd Belorussian Front. Rokossovsky, with undisguised annoyance, wrote in his memoirs: “The command of the 50th Army did not notice this maneuver in time and continued to report to the front headquarters that the enemy was holding on tight. Only two days later, reconnaissance in force showed that there was an empty place in front of the army. The last small groups of Nazis hurriedly left to the north. Such an omission could not be forgiven the commander. The chief of staff, General F.P., took command of the 50th Army. Ozerov".

So he lost the post of commander I.V. Boldin, who in June 1941 was deputy commander of the Western Front. The exit from the Minsk "cauldron" made it a kind of "unsinkable" for a long time. Despite serious claims, in particular, from G.K. Zhukov, he retained his position. The omission with the withdrawal of Hossbach's army was the last straw. The untimely transition to persecution was not an empty formality. The stretching of the no longer existing front made Rokossovsky not use the 49th Army very rationally.

To ensure the withdrawal of the 4th Army, the enemy increased resistance on the offensive front of the Soviet 49th and 3rd armies. The troops of these two armies, overcoming the increased resistance of the enemy, advanced in a northerly direction. At the same time, on January 22, the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps captured the important Allenstein railway and highway junction. Rokossovsky wrote about this episode: “Our cavalry corps N.S. Oslikovsky, breaking ahead, flew into Allenstein (Olshtyn), where several echelons with tanks and artillery had just arrived. With a dashing attack (of course, not in cavalry formation!), Having stunned the enemy with the fire of guns and machine guns, the cavalrymen captured the echelons. It turns out that the German units were relocated from the east to close the gap made by our troops. Such use of the cavalry was possible due to the exit of the front's mobile formations from the web of the enemy's defensive positions into the operational space.

During January 23 and 24, the troops of the shock group of the 2nd Belorussian Front continued the rapid pursuit of the retreating enemy units. During these two days they moved forward 50–60 km. The 5th Guards Tank Army captured Mühlhausen and started fighting on the southwestern and southeastern outskirts of Elbing. Regarding the capture of the latter, Rokossovsky wrote in his memoirs: “The troops could not capture Elbing on the move. A unit of our tanks that broke into the city was surrounded. Failed to rescue him. Tankers fought to the last shell, to the last bullet. They all died heroically. I.I. Fedyuninsky had to organize an assault on the city according to all the rules of military art. The fighting lasted for several days, until the 2nd shock captured the city.

On January 25, the mobile formations of the strike group of the front approached the Frisch-Gaff Bay. On the left wing of the front, the troops of the 70th Army reached the eastern outskirts of the fortress city of Thorn. The enemy acting in front of the 70th Army began to withdraw his troops behind the Vistula.

With the withdrawal of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front to the Frisch-Gaff Bay, the main communications of Army Group Center (3rd Panzer Army, 4th Army and XX Army Corps of the 2nd Army) were cut. However, the enemy still had the opportunity to communicate with his troops, who had retreated beyond the river. Vistula, by sea - through the Danzig Bay and along the Frisch-Nerung Spit.

On January 26, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front cleared the coast of the Frisch-Gaff Bay from the enemy, occupied the city of Marienburg, and on the left wing, blocking Thorn, crossed the Vistula and captured a bridgehead on its western bank. On January 26, Army Group Center was reorganized into two groups: Army Group North, consisting of the 3rd Panzer Army and 4th Army, and Army Group Vistula, which included formations of the 2nd Army. Accordingly, Army Group North was renamed Army Group Courland. On the same day, January 26, both the commander of the newly minted Army Group North, Reinhardt, and his chief of staff Geidgemper, received their resignations. These positions were surrendered to Colonel General Lothar Rendulic and Major General Natzmer respectively. The Austrian Rendulich was one of the generals who enjoyed Hitler's unconditional confidence. The commander of the 4th Army, General of the Infantry Hossbach, was also removed, he was replaced by General of the Infantry Wilhelm Müller. He was destined to become the last commander of the 4th Army.

With the withdrawal of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front to the coast of the Baltic Sea, to the Vistula and the capture of the city of Marienburg, the task assigned to the troops of the front by the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 220274 of November 28, 1944 was completed. front advanced on the right wing by 50-60 km, in the center and on the left wing - by 150-170 km. In the direction of operations of the main grouping of the front, the average rate of advance per day reached 18–20 km.

The development of the offensive of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front

While the strike force of the 2nd Belorussian Front was developing an offensive to the northwest, to the Frisch-Gaff Bay and the river. Vistula, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front continued their offensive in the Koenigsberg direction. The troops of the 39th Army had the greatest advance during January 19. The depth of advance that day reached 12–25 km. The neighbors of the 39th Army in the strike force of the front were much less successful. The troops of the 5th Army, fighting heavy battles, moved forward by 6-7 km, and the troops of the 28th Army during the day managed to push the enemy by only 1-2 km.

Despite the fact that the plan of the operation went "peddling", the situation clearly required the entry into battle of the second echelon of the front - the 11th Guards Army K.N. Galitsky. It could be introduced according to the original plan of operation at the junction of the 5th and 28th armies and used to complete the breakthrough of the German defenses in the previously chosen direction. The second option was to use the success achieved on the left flank of the 39th Army. At first, the front commander was in favor of the first option, since Galitsky's army, in essence, had already concentrated on the previously chosen direction.

Galitsky later recalled his conversation with Chernyakhovsky:

“The situation has changed significantly over the four days of fighting,” I reported to the commander. - Where the introduction of our army was planned, the troops of the first echelon of the front achieved limited success. We'll have to break through the defense. I'm afraid we'll get bogged down, we'll waste our strength here, and the enemy, taking advantage of this, will bring up new troops and we will not achieve high rates of advance, as happened when the 28th Army was brought in last October.

I proposed to introduce the army into the breakthrough according to the second option, i.e., 20–25 km to the north, at the junction between the 5th and 39th armies, especially since there was a serious success on the left flank of the latter - the enemy began to withdraw troops from Lazden ledge.

- Exactly, from the ledge, which is dangerous for him, you can end up in the "cauldron", - Chernyakhovsky remarked. - Where does he take him?

- Of course, to pre-prepared positions at the turn of the river. Inter, I replied. “But, according to some reports, these positions are much weaker than those that we will be forced to break through if we leave the task unchanged.”

The downside of this decision was the need to transfer army formations up to 50 km to the north. However, the advantages of the solution proposed by Galitsky outweighed the loss of time for this maneuver. As a result, Chernyakhovsky decided to introduce the 11th Guards Army on the left flank of the offensive zone of the 39th Army, from the turn of the river. Inter. The 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps was also heading there. As a result, the task of the army of Galitsky became the coverage of the enemy’s still firmly held Insterburg grouping from the north and west, encirclement and destruction of it in cooperation with the rest of the forces of the front. It should be noted that at the same time, the 5th Panzer Division, which became the "reinforcement" of the German defense, was reinforced by the 505th "Tiger" battalion. It consisted of 36 combat-ready "Royal Tigers" on January 19. Their 88-mm long-barreled guns in the defense could cause a lot of trouble. On the contrary, bypassing and enveloping would cause the battalion to lose their monsters due to technical malfunctions.

The 11th Guards Army received the task of deploying to the west of the river by 0600 on January 19. Inster and by the end of January 20, take control of the Aulovenen, Neunishken line. In the future, the army had to develop an offensive on Velau.

The entry into battle of the 11th Guards Army began at 14.00 on January 20. Due to the fact that the enemy troops, shot down from the line of the river. Inster by the 2nd Guards Tank Corps, continued to withdraw, the divisions of the first echelon of the 11th Guards Army, without deploying their main forces, immediately began an energetic pursuit.

By the evening of January 21, the 11th Guards Army advanced up to 45 km and went out with left-flank formations to the near approaches to Insterburg, and with the troops of the right flank and center - to the Pregel River, covering the enemy's Insterburg grouping from the north and west. It should be noted that only part of the forces of Galitsky's army was deployed to Insterburg. The rest continued their advance to the west. At 23:00 on January 21, after twenty minutes of artillery preparation, the left flanks of the 11th Guards Army launched an assault on the city, and at 2:30 on January 22 broke into its streets. At the same time, the troops of the 5th Army also launched an offensive. At 04:00 they approached the city from the northeast, and then from the east, and at 06:00 on January 22, together with formations of the 11th Guards Army, captured Insterburg.

Having lost their well-established line of defense, the German command sought to delay the advance of the Soviet troops on the Daime and Alla rivers. To this end, the enemy began a general withdrawal of his forces in front of the troops of the left wing of the 3rd Belorussian Front. The 28th, 2nd Guards armies and the 31st army went into pursuit. However, the attempts of the 3rd Panzer Army to hold on to the Daime and Alla rivers were unsuccessful. On January 23, the troops of the 43rd and 39th armies crossed the river with part of the forces. Daime, captured bridgeheads on its western bank. It was not so difficult to do this - the river was ice-bound, and when bridgeheads were formed, the Soviet infantrymen simply ran across the Daime on the ice. It turned out to be more difficult to build bridges for heavy equipment. The muddy-bottomed creek proved to be a serious obstacle in itself. As the head of the engineering troops of the front, General Baranov, later reported: “When the first test tank was passed, the supports sat down due to the silty ground, although the seven-meter piles were driven to a depth of six meters.” As a temporary solution, they even had to blow up the ice and launch ferries from the pontoon park. Nevertheless, the river was forced, and the offensive continued. In the following days, the troops of the 11th Guards and 5th Armies crossed the river. Alla.

Having crossed these rivers, the troops of the right wing of the 3rd Belorussian Front launched an offensive directly on Königsberg. On January 26, they approached the outer defensive contour of the fortified city. In the following days, the troops of the front fought to complete the encirclement of the Königsberg grouping of the enemy and break through the outer defensive bypass of the Königsberg fortress, after overcoming which our troops advanced to the forts of the first position, and in the south even captured one of the forts. On January 30, the troops of the 11th Guards Army, bypassing Koenigsberg from the south, cut the highway leading to Elbing.

As a result of the withdrawal of troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front to the areas northwest and south of Königsberg, the East Prussian grouping was cut into three parts. The troops of the front pressed four enemy divisions to the sea on the Zemland Peninsula, about five divisions, fortress units and a large number of separate units and subunits were actually cut off from the main forces and blockaded in the Königsberg area, and, finally, the main forces of the East Prussian grouping in the Heilsberg fortified area south of Königsberg . The last grouping, which consisted mainly of units and formations of the 4th Army, is referred to in German sources as the Heilingibei "cauldron".

On January 28, the troops of the left wing of the 1st Baltic Front captured the city of Memel, a large naval base and port in the southern part of the Baltic Sea. This made it possible to relocate part of the light forces of the Baltic Fleet here and to intensify the actions of the fleet to blockade both the Courland and East Prussian enemy groupings from the sea. However, the light forces of the fleet and submarines were involved for this. As a result, the coastal flank of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front was periodically subjected to shelling from the sea. Moreover, with support from the sea, the Germans launched a counterattack to improve their position. Soviet air raids on the facilities of the Königsberg Sea Canal led to the fact that transport access to the harbor was impossible. Königsberg could only be supplied by sea through the port of Pillau on the Zemland Peninsula.

Accordingly, the German command attempted to restore communication between Pillau and Königsberg. To do this, a counterattack was launched in a south-western direction by the forces of the XXVIII Army Corps from the Kranz area. On January 29 and 30, the 2nd battle group of ships under the command of Vice Admiral A. Thiele was activated to support this counterattack. It included the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen, destroyers Z25 and Paul Jacobi, destroyers T23 and T33. From the area of ​​​​the Nidden lighthouse, the Thiele group fired on the troops of the 39th Army. At the same time, German floating batteries, including SAT 15 (Polaris) and Zhost, fired at the tanks of our advanced units from the Königsberg Sea Canal.

With the support of the fleet, the Germans also carried out a second counterattack, connecting Königsberg with the Heilingibeyl "cauldron". From the direction of Königsberg, the battle group of the 5th Panzer Division attacked. From the direction of Brandenburg, units of the "Grossdeutschland" division advanced towards them. On January 31, the attackers linked up in the Heide area of ​​Waldenburg. However, this German success was fleeting. By February 6, the troops of the 11th Guards and 5th armies again cut off Koenigsberg from the south, and the formations of the 43rd and 39th armies threw the enemy deep into the Zemland Peninsula.

Nevertheless, the Kriegsmarine (German Navy) maintained its relatively high activity off the coast of East Prussia. Non-flying weather contributed to impudence, bordering on impudence. So, on February 9, 1945, the heavy cruisers Lutzow and Admiral Scheer, escorted by destroyers Z34, Z38 and destroyers T8, T23, T28, T33, T35 and T36, fired at Soviet positions on the Zemland Peninsula. The limited space on which the German units pressed to the sea were squeezed made it possible to use the same ships in different directions. On February 9 and 10, 1945, the heavy cruiser Admiral Scheer, the destroyer Z34 and the destroyers T23, T28 and T36 also supported the defense of the remnants of the 4th Army in the Heilingibeyl "boiler" with fire.

It should not be thought that the Baltic Fleet was simply idle. However, the losses of submarines in 1941-1942. and the lack of their full-fledged construction in besieged Leningrad significantly limited the capabilities of the Soviet Navy. What could the KBF oppose to German surface ships? On January 22, 1945, submarines L-3 (3rd rank captain V.K. Konovalov) and K-51 left Khanko. The second went to the area of ​​the Pomeranian Bay, and its actions are of no interest for our narrative. On January 31, L-3 received an order to take up a position at Cape Brewsterort, from where enemy ships had been shelling Soviet troops since January 29. The mobility of submarines of those years, frankly, left much to be desired. L-3 entered the new area only on February 2, after successfully breaking through the corridor between Königsberg and Zemland. The next day, the boat found the heavy cruiser Admiral Scheer guarding the destroyer. However, shallow depths did not allow him to attack. Captain 3rd rank V.K. Konovalov decided to place mines on the probable withdrawal route of enemy ships, but only two mines came out of the mine tube. On February 4, the destroyers T28, T35 and T36 were discovered, which were firing along the coast. L-3 attacked them, but the fired torpedoes missed the target. Since the torpedoes were used up, the submarine headed for the base.

In fairness, it must be said that not all participants in the shelling from the sea could go unpunished. The floating battery "SAT 15" ("Polaris") was launched to the bottom by attack aircraft and bombers during a raid on February 5, 1945. A submarine, a patrol boat and a number of small ships were sunk by aviation in Pillau. It should also be noted that another submarine that was at sea at that time - S-13 of captain 3rd rank A.I. Marinesko - just on January 30, Wilhelm Gustlov successfully attacked. Of course, an attack by the Admiral Scheer in the Pillau area would have been more useful, but that was how fate turned out. The attention of the Soviet Navy was scattered between Danzig, Pillau and Liepaja (the main supply port for Army Group Courland).

Reflection of attempts by the Army Group "North" to break through to the southwest and fighting southwest of Koenigsberg

In the last days of January, German troops sharply increased resistance on the outskirts of Königsberg. At the same time, the German command decided to push back the Soviet troops from the Frisch-Gaff Bay with strong counterattacks and provide land communications for their East Prussian grouping. To this end, in the area between Frisch Gaff and Wormditt, the enemy created comparatively strong strike groups. On the night of January 27, they launched a series of counterattacks against the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front. Three infantry and one panzer divisions launched a counterattack from the area east of Wormditt. To be precise, it was not a full tank division that participated in the counterattack, but the so-called battle group "von Einem" from the 24th Panzer Division, in fact a reinforced motorized infantry regiment. The von Einem group included only 14 Pz.IVs, 10 Pz.V Panthers and 10 JgPzIVs. The main forces of the 24th Panzer Division were at that time in Hungary. Another counterattack was delivered by two infantry divisions from the area southeast of Brownsburg. In addition, about two divisions of the Germans counterattacked Soviet troops west and southwest of Melzak.

Tanks T-34-85 in the suburbs of Koenigsberg.

It should be noted that at first the enemy achieved very serious successes. His troops managed to break through the extended battle formations of the 48th Army and by the middle of the day on January 27, advance to a depth of 15 to 20 km.

In order to prevent further advance of enemy groupings and restore the situation, Rokossovsky decided to regroup the main forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 8th Mechanized Corps into the 48th Army zone. The 8th Guards Tank Corps was sent from the front reserve against the German group advancing in the Wormditt area. By the rapid advance of these forces into the zone of the 48th Army, it was possible at first to stop, and then to defeat the enemy strike groups. By January 31, enemy formations were thrown back to their original position.

At that time, Rokossovsky's 2nd Belorussian Front was divided into two groups. One of them was advancing on the front to the west, to Pomerania. The second occupied positions with the front to the east, forming the western face of the "cauldron" for Army Group North in East Prussia. Full control of the troops in two different, moreover, gradually moving away from each other, groupings was impossible.

In the current situation, on February 9, 1945, the elimination of enemy groupings in East Prussia was entrusted to the troops of the 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts. For ease of control, the 50th, 3rd, 48th combined-arms and 5th guards tank armies of the 2nd Belorussian Front, operating on the Heilsberg, Wormditt, Frauenburg fronts, were transferred to the 3rd Belorussian Front. In order not to turn the front into an uncontrollable monster, the 43rd, 39th and 11th Guards armies of the right wing of the 3rd Belorussian Front were included in the 1st Baltic Front. The task of defeating the German troops in the area southwest of Königsberg was assigned to the 3rd Belorussian Front, and the troops of the 1st Baltic Front destroyed the Königsberg and Zemland groupings of the enemy.

Despite the fact that the troops of the two fronts faced a long and intense struggle against the blocked, but not lost combat capability, enemy, the main task of the East Prussian operation was completed. As Marshal Vasilevsky wrote in his memoirs, "the Nazi command was almost completely deprived of the opportunity to strike from East Prussia against the Soviet troops advancing in the Berlin direction."

Destruction of enemy groupings in East Prussia (first stage)

The elimination of enemy groupings in East Prussia, taking into account operational pauses, lasted two and a half months. One of the main reasons for this was that the Soviet troops and the Baltic Fleet failed to deprive the enemy groupings of all communications. For manoeuvring, the enemy could use the Danzig Bay with its ports, the Frisch-Nerung Spit, and the seaside highway running from Königsberg to Braunsberg.

The exhaustion of the Soviet troops also had a serious impact on the delay in the liquidation of the enemy. During the previous intense battles, which lasted about a month, a large number of divisions had a significant shortage in men and military equipment. Thus, the rifle divisions of some armies lost up to half of their personnel. Tank troops lost an average of up to 50% of combat vehicles. To this should be added the fact that the beginning of the spring thaw and bad meteorological conditions made it extremely difficult to use tanks and aircraft.

Elimination of the enemy grouping south of Koenigsberg

The liquidation of the enemy groupings pressed to the sea by the Soviet troops was carried out sequentially: first, the largest enemy grouping, the Heilingibeyl “cauldron”, was defeated. This was followed by a blow to Königsberg itself. Finally, the enemy grouping on the Zemland Peninsula remained “for a snack”. The grouping of German troops, surrounded in the area to the south and southwest of Königsberg (Heilingibeyl "cauldron"), was the strongest. It consisted of fourteen infantry, two tank and one motorized divisions, two brigades, two divisional battle groups, two separate regiments, five separate battalions and several Volkssturm battalions.

To eliminate this grouping, the commander of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front decided first to cut off and destroy the enemy defending the ledge in the area of ​​Preussish Aylau, Bartenstein, Landsberg, and continue the offensive in the general direction of Heiligenbeil. In accordance with this decision, the 28th Army attacked from the northeast on Preussish Aylau with the task, together with units of the 2nd Guards Army, advancing from the east, to capture this stronghold. From the south, in the general direction of Landsberg, the 31st Army was advancing, which was supposed to capture this city and develop an attack on Kanditten. The 2nd Guards Army, advancing from the east, was to cut through the enemy forces located in the ledge, liquidate them together with the 28th and 31st armies, and then advance on Augam. The 5th Army received the task of striking in the general direction of Tsinten.

On the morning of February 11, Chernyakhovsky ordered the armies that had newly entered the front to continue the offensive, striking in the directions: the 50th Army - on Kildenen; 3rd Army - to Melzak; The 48th Army was to reach the Melzak line and to the west, the 5th Guards Tank Army was tasked with continuing the offensive in the general direction of Braunsberg, capturing this stronghold and reaching the river. Passarguet.

The combat operations of the troops of the front to liquidate the Heilingibeyl “cauldron”, which began on February 10, were extremely tense. The rate of advance varied from 1.5 to 5 km per day. All attempts by the Soviet troops in the following days to split the encircled grouping into pieces were unsuccessful. The significant forces of the 4th Army concentrated on a relatively small area allowed the German command to close the breakthrough areas in a timely manner. During the twelve days of the offensive, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front advanced on the right flank from 15 to 20 km and in the center up to 60 km.

Vasilevsky recalled: “On the night of February 18, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, after my report on the state of affairs in East Prussia, recommended that I go there to help the troops and command, emphasizing that the fastest liquidation of the enemy in East Prussia would allow us, at the expense of the troops of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian Fronts, firstly, to strengthen the main, Berlin, direction and, secondly, to release the necessary part of the troops to prepare them for their transfer to the Far East. As we can see, it was no longer about a possible counterattack by the Germans, but about the release of forces for the decisive battle for Berlin. East Prussia has become a kind of giant "festung". To be precise, there were even three such "festungs": on the Samland Peninsula, in Königsberg and in the Heiliginbeil "cauldron".

On February 18, on the battlefield in the Melzak region, he was mortally wounded and soon died the commander of the front troops, General of the Army I.D. Chernyakhovsky. On February 21, the command of the 3rd Belorussian Front was entrusted to Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky. In order to unify the command of all forces located in East Prussia, the 1st Baltic Front was renamed the Zemland Group on February 24, which became part of the 3rd Belorussian Front.

By this time, the Soviet troops operating in East Prussia, due to losses, had a large shortage, especially in people. So, for example, in the 5th Army, the strength of rifle divisions did not exceed 2,700 people, and in the 2nd Guards Army - 2,500 people. In this regard, Vasilevsky suspended the offensive in order to replenish the troops with people, equipment and ammunition, and after that proceed to the final destruction of the encircled enemy grouping.

To accomplish this task, the front commander decided, firmly covering himself with the forces of the 48th Army from the side of Braunsberg, to launch simultaneous strikes from the east and southeast in the direction of Bladiau and Heiligenbeil in order to split the enemy forces and then destroy them. To do this, the armies were given the following tasks: the 11th Guards Army to strike in the direction of Brandenburg, the 5th Army - to Wolittnikk, the 28th Army - to Bladiau, the 2nd Guards Army - to Lenhefen, the 31st Army - to Bilskhefen, 3rd Army - to Heiligenbeil.

The armies were reinforced with artillery and tanks: the 5th and 28th armies - with an artillery division and three artillery brigades, the 3rd army - with five artillery and mortar brigades and three artillery regiments. Of the 594 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts that the front had by that time, 361 armored units were concentrated in the offensive zone of the 5th and 28th armies, and 150 armored units in the 3rd army zone. This ensured the density in the penetration areas of these armies up to 36 tanks and self-propelled guns per 1 km of the front.

Both sides tried to use the period of relative calm to solve offensive tasks of a local nature. As early as February 17, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered the commander of the 1st Baltic Front, General of the Army I.Kh. Baghramyan to clear the Zemland Peninsula from the enemy. The offensive was supposed to start on February 20. However, the day before the planned offensive, the troops of the Zemland task force, which was reinforced by the 93rd Infantry Division deployed from Courland by sea, counterattacked: from the west - to Königsberg and from the east - towards Pillau. From the Königsberg area, the same 5th Panzer Division attacked, supported by 10 "tigers" of the 505th heavy tank battalion. The offensive of the German troops from the sea was supported by the heavy cruiser Admiral Scheer, destroyers Z38, Z43, destroyers T28, T35. They fired at the troops of the 39th Army in the areas of Paise and Gross-Heidekrug on the southern coast of the Zemland Peninsula. On February 20, destroyers fired from the Koenigsberg Sea Canal, on February 23, two destroyers and a destroyer fired again at the positions of the Soviet troops. The submarine K-52 I.V., which was at that moment on a military campaign, Travkina was quite far away - in the area of ​​​​the Danzig Bay. In addition, the bulky "Katyusha" was not very suitable for attacks in shallow water. Smaller boat, Shch-309 captain of the 3rd rank P.P. Vetchinkina, on the same days was on her way to a position in the Liepaja region. Also, mines were laid in the Pillau area, the 8th mine-torpedo air division set up 12 mines here. However, their victims were not artillery ships, but the submarine U-367 (presumably).

As a result of three days of fighting, the enemy managed to push back units of the 39th Army from the coast of the bay and restore land communication between Pillau and Königsberg.

Preparations for the new operation took about 20 days. The offensive began on 13 March. After a 40-minute artillery preparation for the attack, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front went on the offensive. Rains, fogs and the soil turned into mud greatly complicated the actions of all branches of the armed forces. Under these conditions, aviation could not operate, the possibilities for using artillery were extremely limited, and tanks could only advance along roads. And yet, despite the unfavorable conditions and fierce resistance of the enemy, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front broke through its defenses in all main directions and slowly but surely moved forward.

Taking advantage of some improvement in the weather, our aviation took to the air on March 18 and, having made more than 2,200 sorties in a day, greatly contributed to the success of the ground forces.

By March 19, the territory occupied by the enemy was reduced to 30 km along the front and 7-10 km in depth, and by March 24 it was 13 km along the front and 2-5 km in depth.

By the end of March 26, the coast of the Frisch-Gaff Bay was completely cleared of the enemy, and the largest center of resistance was eliminated. Only in the area of ​​​​Cape Kalholz did the remnants of the defeated German units linger, by March 29 they were liquidated by the troops of the 5th and 28th armies. During the February-March battles southwest of Königsberg, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front captured about 50 thousand people.

The consistent defeat of the encircled groupings also made it possible to consistently create a superiority in forces and means that guarantees success. Having completed the operation to eliminate the enemy's southern grouping, the Soviet command reinforced its troops operating near Koenigsberg and on the Zemland Peninsula with three armies (5th, 50th and 2nd Guards). With the concentration of the main efforts of the 3rd Belorussian Front against Koenigsberg and the Samland Peninsula, the need for the existence of the Zemland Group of Forces disappeared. The armies that were part of it were directly subordinate to the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front. The management of the group was transferred to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

After the elimination of the enemy grouping in the area southwest of Koenigsberg, large forces of Soviet troops were released to solve other problems. The 31st, 3rd and 28th armies were withdrawn to the reserve, which then took part in the Berlin operation. However, these armies, transferred after the battles in East Prussia, were by and large late for the battle for Berlin. In addition, the number of their rifle divisions was already quite low. The armies left to storm Königsberg did not take part in the battle for the German capital. The assault on this fortress city was accompanied by preparations for the Berlin operation.

Discussion

The success of the East Prussian operation had a positive impact on the course of other operations of the 1945 campaign in Europe. In particular, cutting off the main forces of the Army Group Center from the rest of the German forces ensured the right flank of the 1st Belorussian Front, advancing in the Poznan direction, and with the exit of Soviet troops to the river. The Vistula north of Thorn created conditions for the East Pomeranian operation.

One of the characteristic features of this operation was the protracted nature of the fighting to break through the enemy's tactical defense zone. So, for example, breaking through the tactical defense zone of the enemy took five days in the 3rd Belorussian Front and three days in the 2nd Belorussian Front. Such a long duration of the breakthrough was due to a number of reasons. One of the reasons was that the Soviet troops had to break through strong defenses with a significant number of long-term structures. It should also be noted that, due to unfavorable meteorological conditions, our troops could not use their quantitative and qualitative advantage during the period of breaking through the enemy defenses. So, for example, in the first days of the breakthrough, our aviation almost did not operate. Altogether, from January 13 to 16, the aviation of both fronts, instead of the planned 22,600 sorties, made only 6,900 sorties. Poor meteorological conditions significantly reduced the effectiveness of artillery fire.

This trend continued in the future. During the period of persecution, from January 19 to 26, only 12.5% ​​of aviation capabilities were used. Unlike the Bagration, meteorological conditions limited the actions of aviation also during the period of destruction of encircled enemy groupings. So, for example, in the first six days of fighting south of Koenigsberg, aviation operated only one day (March 18).

However, in addition to tactical reasons, the reason for the long struggle for East Prussia was a number of operational and strategic miscalculations of the Soviet command.

First of all, in the course of breaking through the tactical defense zone of the enemy and developing pursuit, the Soviet troops failed to encircle and destroy individual groupings of the 2nd, 4th and 3rd tank armies of the enemy. Neither in the region of Tilsit, nor in the region of Insterburg, nor in the region of the Masurian lakes were there any large "boilers". Moreover, the encirclement was not even provided for by the plans of the Soviet command that were available at the beginning of the operation. They focused on cutting off the main enemy forces in East Prussia from Pomerania. Aimed at Koenigsberg, the 3rd Belorussian Front actually carried out the task of tying down German reserves. This was a kind of legacy of the experience of failure in 1914. Rennekampf-Chernyakhovsky saved Samsonov-Rokossovsky from counterattacks. No maneuvering along the internal lines in 1945, unlike 1914, was really observed. However, such a strategy, which did not provide for a strike in converging directions, had one significant drawback. The main forces of the Army Group "Center" managed to retreat to the Zemland Peninsula, to the Königsberg area and to the Heilsberg fortified area (Heilingibeyl "cauldron"). Using pre-prepared defensive positions and lines in these areas, the enemy was able to offer prolonged resistance.

Secondly, enemy groupings, isolated from land, were not firmly blocked by the Soviet fleet from the sea. As a result, enemy troops continuously received ammunition, fuel and other materiel from Germany. In the opposite direction, there was a stream of wounded and refugees, which, of course, had a positive effect on the morale of the troops locked up in East Prussia. They, at least for the time being, received a meaningful purpose for their actions. A well-known role in the protracted struggle was also played by the fact that the enemy groupings operating on the Zemland Peninsula, in Königsberg and in the Heilingibeyl "cauldron" could communicate with each other for a long time along the highway that ran along the Frisch-Gaff Bay. This was also a consequence of the relatively low activity of the Baltic Fleet, which allowed the enemy to support the counterattacks of battered units with naval artillery.

Thirdly, in the course of a protracted breakthrough of the enemy's tactical defense zone and operations in the operational depth, the troops of both fronts suffered heavy losses in men and military equipment. So, for example, with the release of Soviet troops on the approaches to Königsberg, the average number of rifle divisions in the 5th Army did not exceed 2700 people, in the 2nd Guards Army - 2500 people, in the 48th Army - 3500 people. By the beginning of March, each of the divisions of these armies had lost from 43 to 58% of its personnel. The situation with military equipment was not the best either. For example, in the 48th Army there were 127 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations by the beginning of the operation, in the 5th Guards Tank Army - 345. In early February, only 85 combat vehicles remained in service in the 48th Army, and in the 5th guards tank army - 155. In addition, most of the tank fleet of units and formations of the fronts had completely used up their motor resources by February 10 or had them running out.

In general, the successful assault on East Prussia cost the Red Army quite dearly. So, in the period from January 13 to February 10, the sanitary losses of the 3rd Belorussian Front amounted to 22% of the payroll of the front's personnel, and the average daily losses reached 0.76%. For comparison: in "Bagration" the average daily losses of the 3rd Belorussian Front did not exceed 0.4%. The 5th Army (44%) and the 28th Army (37%) had the greatest losses. In the course of further hostilities, the losses remained the same large. The losses of the 2nd Belorussian Front from January 14 to February 10 amounted to 15.4% of the front's payroll, and the average daily losses reached 0.55%. The 3rd, 48th, 65th and 70th armies suffered the greatest losses (from 19.5 to 24.3%).

The losses of armored vehicles were also high. For example, during the period from January 13 to March 29, the 3rd Belorussian Front irretrievably lost 1,189 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations, which is over 93% of the presence of combat vehicles at the beginning of the operation. From January 17 to March 1, the 5th Guards Tank Army irretrievably lost about 60% of its combat vehicles.

At the same time, it must be said that the East Prussian operation can in no way be attributed to the successes achieved by "filling up with corpses." Artillery became the main tool for crushing the enemy. To some extent, this compensated for the low activity of aviation. Marshal Vasilevsky specifically noted this in his memoirs: “I will note in passing that the East Prussian operation for the consumption of ammunition was generally unparalleled among all operations in the history of wars. Two fronts received 13.3 million shells and mines, 620 million rounds of ammunition, 2.2 million hand grenades. Only on January 13-14, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front used up more than 1000 wagons of the main range of ammunition, and the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front only on January 14 - over 950 wagons. In total, both fronts used up more than 15 thousand wagons of ammunition. Another question is that in the conditions of the Second World War, artillery did not decide the outcome of the battle, but only created the conditions for the subsequent infantry battle.

In general, East Prussia became a kind of giant "festung", perhaps the largest in the history of the Second World War. Being surrounded and cut off from land communication with the rest of Germany, she nevertheless kept in isolation for a long time, chaining rather large forces of the Red Army to herself.

East Prussian operation 1945
	East Prussia, northern part of Poland, Baltic Sea
	Red Army victory
Commanders
K. K. Rokossovsky I. D. Chernyakhovsky A. M. Vasilevsky V. F. Tributs	G. Reinhardt, L. Rendulich
Side forces
1,670,000 men 25,426 guns and mortars 3,859 tanks 3,097 aircraft	At the beginning of the operation, 580,000 people, at least 200,000 Volkssturm, 8,200 guns and mortars, approx. 1000 tanks and assault guns 559 aircraft
584,778 (of which 126,646 were killed)	About 500 thousand (of which at least 150 thousand were killed and 220 thousand were taken prisoner)

East Prussian operation(January 13-April 25, 1945) - during the Great Patriotic War, Soviet troops of the 2nd (Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky) and 3rd (Army General I.D. Chernyakhovsky, from February 20 - Marshal of the Soviet Union A M. Vasilevsky) of the Belorussian Fronts, in cooperation with the Baltic Fleet (Admiral V. F. Tributs), broke through the powerful defenses of the German Army Group Center (Colonel-General G. Reinhardt, from January 26 - Army Group North, Colonel General L. Rendulich), went to the Baltic Sea and eliminated the main enemy forces (over 25 divisions), occupying East Prussia and liberating the northern part of Poland.

The German command attached great importance to the retention of East Prussia. For a long time there were powerful fortifications here, which were subsequently improved and supplemented. By the beginning of the winter offensive of the Red Army in 1945, the enemy had created a powerful defense system up to 200 km deep. The strongest fortifications were on the eastern approaches to Koenigsberg.

In the course of this strategic operation, the Insterburg, Mlavsko-Elbing, Hejlsberg, Koenigsberg and Zemland front-line offensive operations were carried out. The most important goal of the East Prussian strategic offensive operation was to cut off the enemy troops stationed there from the main forces of Nazi Germany, cut them up and destroy them. Three fronts took part in the operation: the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian and the 1st Baltic fronts, commanded by Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky, generals I.D. Chernyakhovsky and I.X. Bagramyan. They were assisted by the Baltic Fleet under the command of Admiral VF Tributs.

The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front were to defeat the enemy in northern Poland with strikes from bridgeheads on the Narew River. The 3rd Belorussian Front received the task of advancing on Koenigsberg from the east. In defeating the enemy in the Koenigsberg direction, he was assisted by the 43rd Army of the 1st Baltic Front.

The troops of Rokossovsky and Chernyakhovsky, together with the 43rd Army of the 1st Baltic Front, by the beginning of 1945, numbered 1669 thousand people, 25.4 thousand guns and mortars, about 4 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery installations and more than 3 thousand combat aircraft .

In East Prussia and Northern Poland, the troops of Army Group Center under the command of General G. Reinhardt defended. The group had 580 thousand soldiers and officers, more than 8 thousand guns and mortars, 560 combat aircraft.

Thus, the superiority of Soviet troops over the enemy in personnel and artillery was 2-3 times, and in tanks and aircraft - 4-5.5 times. However, the German troops had the opportunity to replenish their units, at the expense of the Volkssturm, the Todt organization (engineering and construction units that are not part of the Wehrmacht, but with basic military training) and simply the local population, bypassing the militia stage, which in 1945 was a common practice for the active army.

The 2nd Belorussian Front (commander - Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky, member of the Military Council - Lieutenant General N.E. Subbotin, chief of staff - Lieutenant General A.N. Bogolyubov) had the task of striking from the Ruzhansky bridgehead in general in the direction of Pshasnysh, Mlawa, Lidzbark, defeat the enemy’s Mlawa grouping, no later than 10-12 days of the operation, capture the Myshinets, Dzialdovo, Bezhun, Plock line and then advance in the general direction to Nowe Miasto, Marienburg. The front was supposed to strike the second blow from the Serotsky bridgehead in the general direction of Naselsk, Belsk. In addition, the front was supposed to assist the 1st Belorussian Front in defeating the enemy's Warsaw grouping: part of the left wing forces to strike around Modlin from the west.

Marshal Rokossovsky planned to strike from bridgeheads on the Narew River. It was planned to break through the enemy defenses in the main direction from the Ruzhansky bridgehead in a sector of 18 km by the forces of three armies. To develop success to the north, it was supposed to use first separate tank, mechanized and cavalry corps, and then a tank army. By concentrating such forces in the direction of the main attack, Rokossovsky sought to go to the sea and cut off the German troops in East Prussia. Another blow was planned by two armies in a 10 km section from the Serock bridgehead along the northern bank of the Vistula.

The 3rd Belorussian Front (commander - General of the Army I. D. Chernyakhovsky, member of the Military Council - Lieutenant General V. Ya. Makarov, chief of staff - Colonel General A. P. Pokrovsky) received the task of defeating the Tilsit-Insterburg enemy grouping and not later than 10-12 days of the offensive, capture the line of Nemonin, Norkitten, Darkemen, Goldap; further develop the offensive against Koenigsberg along both banks of the Pregel River, with the main forces on the southern bank of the river. The main blow to the front was ordered to be delivered from the area north of Stallupenen, Gumbinnen in the general direction to Wellau, and auxiliary ones - to Tilsit and Darkemen.

The general plan of General Chernyakhovsky was to launch a frontal attack on Koenigsberg, bypassing the powerful enemy fortifications north of the Masurian Lakes. The ultimate goal of the offensive of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front was to cover the main forces of the East Prussian grouping of Germans from the north and subsequently, together with the 2nd Belorussian Front, defeat them. Considering the difficulty of overcoming the powerful defense of the enemy, Chernyakhovsky decided to break through the defenses in the 24 km section with the forces of three armies, after which he would bring into battle two tank corps, a second-echelon army and develop success in depth to the Baltic Sea.

The Baltic Fleet (commander - Admiral V.F. Tributs, member of the Military Council - Vice Admiral N.K. Smirnov, chief of staff - Rear Admiral A.N. Petrov) received the task of assisting them with their artillery when the Soviet troops reached the sea coast and landings, as well as to cover the coastal flanks of the fronts.

Soviet troops were preparing to go on the offensive on February 8-10, 1945. However, on December 16, 1944, an unexpected German counter-offensive began in the Ardennes, as a result of which a strong group of troops of Army Group B, commanded by Field Marshal V. Model, broke through the weak defenses of American troops and began to quickly move deep into Belgium. Taken by surprise, the allies were defeated. To the place of the breakthrough, which exceeded 100 km, General D. Eisenhower hastily pulled up troops. Powerful Anglo-American aviation could provide quick assistance to the withdrawing troops, but its operations were hampered by non-flying weather. A critical situation has arisen.

The January offensive of the Red Army, launched earlier than scheduled at the request of the allies, forced the German command to stop offensive operations in the West. After the Soviet troops broke through the line on the Vistula, the 6th German Panzer Army - the main striking force of the Wehrmacht in the Ardennes - began to be transferred to the East. The command of the Wehrmacht finally abandoned plans for offensive operations against the American-British troops and on January 16 was forced to give the order to go over to the defensive in the West.

The powerful thrust of the Soviet troops from the Vistula to the Oder provided an opportunity for the Allied armies to recover from the blows of the German troops, and on February 8, after a six-week delay, they managed to launch an offensive.

To defeat the enemy in East Prussia, the 3rd Belorussian Front, which carried out the Insterburg-Koenigsberg operation, was the first to go on the offensive. The Germans were expecting a blow. Their artillery fired methodically at the combat formations of the infantry preparing for the attack. On January 13, the troops of the front began the operation. After making sure that the offensive had begun, the enemy at dawn conducted a powerful artillery counter-preparation. The fire concentrated on the strike force of Chernyakhovsky's troops testified that the Germans had discovered the direction of the main attack of the front and prepared to repel it. Their batteries were suppressed by artillery return fire and night bombers raised into the air, but surprise was not achieved.

After two hours of artillery preparation, the infantry and tanks attacked the enemy. By the end of the day, the 39th and 5th armies of generals I. I. Lyudnikov and N. I. Krylov wedged into the defense, but only 2-3 km. The 28th army of General A. A. Luchinsky advanced more successfully, but even she, having advanced 5-7 km, failed to break through the enemy’s defenses. Solid fog did not allow the use of aviation. The tanks advanced by touch and suffered heavy losses. No one fulfilled the tasks of the first day of the offensive.

In six days, the strike force of the 3rd Belorussian Front broke through to a depth of 45 km in a 60 km section. And although the pace of advance was 2 times slower than planned, the troops inflicted heavy losses on the German 3rd Panzer Army and created the conditions for continuing the offensive on Koenigsberg.

Due to bad weather, the commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front, Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky, twice postponed the start of the offensive and was forced to start it on January 14th. The first two days of the Mlavsko-Elbing operation, which was carried out by the front, things went badly: the shock groups advancing from the Ruzhansky and Serotsky bridgeheads advanced only 7-8 km.

The blows from both bridgeheads combined into a common breakthrough in the 60 km section. Having advanced 30 km in three days, the shock groups of the front created the conditions for the rapid development of success in depth. On January 17, the 5th Guards Tank Army of General V.T. Volsky was introduced into the gap. Pursuing the enemy, she quickly moved north and on January 18 blocked the Mlavsky fortified area.

The pace of advancement of the rest of the troops of the front also increased. The tankers of General Volsky, bypassing the German fortifications, continued on their way to the sea. The 65th and 70th armies advancing from the Serotsky bridgehead under the command of Generals P.I. Batov and B.C. Popova rushed along the northern bank of the Vistula to the west and captured the Modlin fortress.

On the sixth day, Rokossovsky's troops took the line, which was planned to reach on the 10-11th day. On January 21, the Headquarters specified the task of the 2nd Belorussian Front. He had to continue the offensive with the main forces to the north, and part of the forces - to the west, in order to capture the Elbing, Marienburg, Torun line on February 2-4. As a result, the troops went to the sea and cut off the enemy in East Prussia from Germany.

Troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front pursued the enemy. On the evening of January 23, the advance detachment of the 5th Guards Tank Army broke into the city of Elbing. Stunned by the sudden appearance of Soviet tanks, the garrison did not have time to prepare for battle. The detachment proceeded through the city and reached the Frisch-Gaff Bay. The enemy quickly organized the defense of Elbing and delayed the advance of the 29th Panzer Corps. Bypassing the city, the formations of the tank army, together with the 42nd rifle corps, went to the sea. Enemy communications were cut. The 2nd German Army under the command of General V. Weiss was thrown back to the west, beyond the Vistula.

Continuing the Insterburg-Koenigsberg operation, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front from January 19 to 26 broke through to the outer defensive bypass of Koenigsberg. To the south, they immediately overcame the line of the Masurian Lakes. Bypassing Koenigsberg from the north, the 39th Army reached the sea west of the city. The 43rd Army of General A.P. Beloborodov, the 11th Guards Army of General K.N. Galitsky broke through to the Frisch-Gaff Bay south of Koenigsberg. Pressed to the sea by the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Fronts, Army Group Center, renamed on January 26 into Army Group North, was cut by Chernyakhovsky’s troops into three unequal parts: four enemy divisions ended up in Zemland, about five in Koenigsberg and up to twenty divisions - in the Heilsberg area, southwest of Koenigsberg. On January 30, German formations launched a strong counterattack on the left flank of the 11th Guards from the direction of Brandenburg (Grossdeutschland tank division and one infantry division) and from Koenigsberg (5th Panzer Division, assault gun brigade and one infantry division). the army of General K. Galitsky and pushed back 5 kilometers from the Frisches-Haff Bay, the Soviet units that had broken through, thereby releasing Koenigsberg from the southwest and restoring the connection of the city garrison with the 4th German army in the Heilsberg-Heiligenbal area (the Germans held the corridor until mid-March ).

On February 8, Marshal Rokossovsky received the task of turning west, defeating the enemy in Pomerania and reaching the Oder. The 3rd Belorussian Front was to strike at the Heilsberg grouping, and the 1st Baltic Front under the command of I. Kh. Bagramyan - at the enemy in Zemland and Koenigsberg.

As a result of the Heilsberg operation of the 3rd Belorussian Front, which was extremely fierce in nature, the enemy was destroyed south of Koenigsberg. Weakened by heavy fighting, the troops of the front resumed the offensive on February 11, which proceeded slowly. During the day it was possible to advance no more than 2 km. In an effort to turn the tide of the operation, the front commander was almost continuously in the army. On the way from the 5th to the 3rd Army on February 18, he was mortally wounded by a fragment of an artillery shell. Twice Hero of the Soviet Union Army General I. D. Chernyakhovsky died. The Red Army lost a talented commander who was only 38 years old. The Stavka appointed Marshal A.M. to command the front. Vasilevsky.

The 1st Baltic Front was preparing to go on the offensive on February 20, having the task of clearing the Zemland Peninsula from the Germans within a week. However, a day earlier, the Germans themselves delivered converging strikes from Fischhausen and Koenigsberg (Operation West Wind) against units of the 39th Army of General I. Lyudnikov, as a result of which they restored land communications between Zemland and Koenigsberg and thwarted the Soviet offensive.

On February 24, the 1st Baltic Front, having transferred troops to the 3rd Belorussian Front, was abolished. Having taken command of the front, A. M. Vasilevsky ordered to stop the futile attacks, replenish supplies by March 10 and carefully prepare the final blows. Given the limited forces, the marshal decided to destroy the encircled groups sequentially, starting with the strongest - Hejlsberg.

Having created the necessary superiority, the troops resumed the offensive on March 13. Fogs and low clouds continued to limit the use of artillery and aviation. To these difficulties were added the spring thaw and high water. Despite the difficult conditions and the stubborn resistance of the Germans, on March 26, Soviet troops reached the Frisch-Gaff Bay. The German command began a hasty evacuation of troops to the Zemland Peninsula in advance. Of the 150,000 German soldiers and officers who defended southwest of Koenigsberg, 93,000 were destroyed and 46,000 were taken prisoner. On March 29, the remnants of the Hejlsberg group stopped fighting. After the completion of the Hejlsberg operation, six armies were liberated near the 3rd Belorussian Front: three of them were sent to Koenigsberg, the rest were withdrawn to the Headquarters reserve, starting to regroup in the Berlin direction.

During the destruction of the enemy pressed to the sea, the Baltic Fleet under the command of Admiral V.F. Tributs actively operated. The fleet attacked the enemy with aircraft, submarine and light surface forces. They violated the sea communications of the Germans. In February and March alone, the fleet destroyed 32 transports and 7 warships.

Outstanding success was achieved by the S-13 submarine under the command of Captain 3rd Rank A.I. Marinesko. On January 30, she sank the German liner Wilhelm Gustloff with a displacement of 25.5 thousand tons, on board of which more than 5 thousand people were evacuated, including 1.3 thousand submariners. On February 9, the Marinesko submarine achieved another success by sinking a German steamship with a displacement of 14.7 thousand tons. Not a single Soviet submariner achieved such brilliant results in one trip. For military merits, the S-13 boat was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

On April 6, the 3rd Belorussian Front began the Koenigsberg operation. After a powerful artillery preparation, the infantry and tanks attacked the positions of the Germans. Due to bad weather, aviation made only 274 sorties during the day. Having overcome the stubborn resistance of the enemy, the troops advanced 2-4 km and by the end of the day reached the outskirts of the city. The next two days were decisive, when flying weather settled. 516 heavy bombers of the 18th Air Army, commanded by Chief Marshal of Aviation A.E. Golovanov, only on the evening of April 7, within 45 minutes, dropped 3742 large-caliber bombs on the fortress. Other air armies, as well as fleet aviation, also participated in massive raids. It is necessary to note the worthy contribution of the pilots of the 4th Air Army, General K. A. Vershinin. In its composition, under the command of Major E. D. Bershanskaya, female pilots from the regiment of night bombers bravely fought. Their courage and heroism were highly appreciated by the Motherland: 23 female pilots were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. During the assault on the fortress alone, about 14,000 sorties were made (that's over 3,000 a day!). 2.1 thousand bombs of various calibers were dropped on the heads of the enemy. Together with the Soviet pilots, French pilots from the Normandie-Neman regiment bravely fought. For these battles, the regiment was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, and 24 pilots were awarded orders of the USSR.

These days, the personnel of the ISU-152 battery, commanded by Senior Lieutenant A. A. Kosmodemyansky, distinguished themselves. The battery supported units of the 319th Rifle Division, which stormed one of the forts of the fortress. Having fired a volley at the thick brick walls of the fort, self-propelled guns broke through them and burst into the fortification on the move. The fort's garrison of 350 capitulated. 9 tanks, 200 vehicles and a fuel depot were captured. The battery commander was presented with the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, which was awarded posthumously. The brother of the famous partisan Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya, who was hanged by the Germans in the Moscow region, Alexander died on April 13 during the fighting on the Zemland Peninsula.

The commandant of the Königsberg fortress, General O. Lash, seeing the futility of further resistance, asked the commander of the 4th Army, General Muller, to allow the remaining forces to break through to the Zemland Peninsula, but was refused. Müller tried to help the garrison of Koenigsberg with a strike from the peninsula to the west, but Soviet aviation thwarted these attacks. By evening, the remnants of the garrison were squeezed into the center of the city and in the morning found themselves under crushing artillery fire. Soldiers began to surrender by the thousands. On April 9, Lash ordered everyone to lay down their arms. Hitler regarded this decision as premature and sentenced the general to death by hanging. The reports of the officers, who testified to the courageous behavior of the general, did not affect the decision of the dictator.

On April 9, the garrison of Königsberg capitulated. Lash himself also surrendered, which saved him from Hitler's sentence. Together with Lash, 93,853 soldiers and officers were captured. About 42 thousand German soldiers of the fortress garrison died. General Müller was removed from the post of army commander, and Gauleiter of East Prussia Koch, who demanded that the troops on the Samland Peninsula fight to the last, fled by ship to Denmark.

Moscow celebrated the completion of the assault on Koenigsberg with a salute of the highest category - 24 artillery volleys from 324 guns. The medal "For the capture of Koenigsberg" was established, which was usually done only on the occasion of capturing the capitals of states. All participants in the assault received a medal.

The port of Pillau was the last point in East Prussia from which the population and troops could be evacuated. The city itself was a fortress that covered the naval base from the sea and land. The Germans defended the land approaches to the port with particular tenacity, aided by forests and bad weather.

The 2nd Guards Army of General P. G. Chanchibadze could not overcome the resistance of the enemy. Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky led the 11th Guards Army into battle. The defense was broken only on the third day. In fierce battles for the fortress and port, the 11th Guards Army captured Pillau on April 25.

This ended the East Prussian strategic operation. It lasted 103 days and was the longest operation of the last year of the war.

In East Prussia, Soviet troops suffered heavy losses. By the end of January, the rifle divisions of the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian fronts, which by the beginning of the offensive included 6-6.5 thousand soldiers and officers, left 2.5-3.5 thousand each. By the end of January, the Guards Tank Army had only half of the tanks available at the beginning of the operation. Even more were lost during the destruction of the encircled groups. Replenishment during the operation was almost non-existent. Moreover, significant forces were transferred to the Berlin direction, which was the main one in the 1945 campaign. The weakening of the 3rd Belorussian Front led to protracted and bloody battles in East Prussia.

The total losses of the Soviet fronts and fleet from January 13 to April 25 were enormous: 126.5 thousand soldiers and officers died and went missing, more than 458 thousand soldiers were injured or out of action due to illness. The troops lost 3,525 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts, 1,644 guns and mortars, and 1,450 combat aircraft.

In East Prussia, the Red Army destroyed 25 German divisions, the other 12 divisions lost from 50 to 70% of their composition. Soviet troops captured more than 220 thousand soldiers and officers. About 15 thousand guns and mortars, 1442 tanks and assault guns, 363 combat aircraft and many other military equipment became trophies. The loss of large forces and an important military-economic area hastened the defeat of Germany.

The defeat of German troops in East Prussia

The situation in the East Prussian direction by the beginning of 1945. Plans of the parties

An integral part of the general strategic offensive of the Soviet army, which began in January 1945, was the East Prussian operation, which ended with the defeat of the Nazi group in East Prussia and Northern Poland.

East Prussia has long served as an outpost from which the German aggressors carried out their plans to seize and enslave the peoples in the East. As a state, Prussia was formed at the beginning of the 17th century as a result of the merciless colonization of the Slavic and Lithuanian lands by the German "dog-knights". In the conquered territories, the Prussian Junkers quickly gained strength, which throughout the entire period of its existence served as a faithful support for the reactionary circles in Germany. Prussia was a militarized state, profiting from incessant predatory wars, which were for her a kind of craft. “The Prussian-German Junker caste,” wrote W. Ulbricht, a prominent figure in the international communist movement, “from the very moment of its inception has been a hotbed of unrest in Europe. For many centuries, the German knights and junkers, carrying out their "Drang nach Osten" [pressure to the East] , brought war, ruin and enslavement to the Slavic peoples" . Occupying a dominant position in the state apparatus and the army, the Prussian Junkers were a hotbed of predatory tendencies among the German population. The reactionary ideas of old Prussia spread throughout Germany. It is no coincidence that National Socialism found a favorable environment in East Prussia, and the fascist party found every possible help and support.

More than once East Prussia was used as a springboard for aggression against Poland and Russia. It was from here that the attack on the Baltic states and Poland was launched during the First World War, and then in 1918 the Kaiser hordes moved against revolutionary Petrograd. From here one of the main blows was dealt during the attack on Poland, which marked the beginning of a new world war, and two years later a treacherous invasion of the Soviet Union was carried out.

In the far-reaching plans of the fascist leadership to create a “Great Germany”, East Prussia was assigned a special role: it was to become the industrial center of the eastern possessions, which would stretch from the lower reaches of the Vistula River to the Ural Mountains. The Nazis began to implement these plans as early as 1939. Having captured part of the Klaipeda region of Lithuania and northern Poland, they included them in East Prussia. Within the new borders, it was divided into four districts, and E. Koch, close to Hitler, was appointed Gauleiter and Ober-President. The areas adjacent to the Lower Vistula were included in the newly created district of Danzig - West Prussia. The occupying administration established on the occupied lands took cruel repressive measures against the local population. Lithuanians and Poles were expelled and their land was confiscated. During the years of World War II, the Nazis created a whole network of concentration camps in East Prussia, where tens of thousands of innocent people languished in captivity.

By the beginning of 1945, the importance of East Prussia as a military-industrial region and the main food base of Germany had increased even more. Having lost previously occupied lands in a number of European countries, as well as many sources of strategic raw materials, the Nazi leaders tried at all costs to preserve East Prussia, since large enterprises of the military, shipbuilding and machine-building industries operated here, supplying the Wehrmacht with weapons and ammunition. In addition, East Prussia had significant manpower and food resources. The roads to Pomerania and Berlin, to the vital centers of Germany, passed through its territory. From a strategic point of view, it was important that the naval bases and ports of East Prussia on the Baltic Sea, advanced far to the east, allowed the fascist German command to base large fleet forces, as well as maintain contact with the divisions cut off in Courland.

The Nazis were well aware of the political, economic and strategic importance of East Prussia. Therefore, great work was carried out here to improve the system of field and long-term fortifications. Numerous hills, lakes, swamps, rivers, canals and forests contributed to the creation of a powerful defense. Of particular importance was the presence in the central part of East Prussia of the Masurian Lakes, which divided the troops advancing from the east into two groups - northern and southern, and complicated the interaction between them.

The construction of defensive structures in East Prussia began to be carried out long before the start of the war. All of them were covered by ditches, wooden, metal and reinforced concrete gouges for a considerable distance. The basis of only one Heilsberg fortified area was 911 long-term defensive structures. On the territory of East Prussia, in the region of Rastenburg, under the cover of the Masurian Lakes, from the moment of the attack on the USSR and until 1944, Hitler's headquarters was located in a deep dungeon.

Defeats on the Soviet-German front forced the Wehrmacht command to take additional defense measures. In the autumn of 1944, the General Staff of the Ground Forces approved a plan for the construction of facilities on the entire eastern front, including in East Prussia. In accordance with this plan, old fortifications were hastily modernized on its territory and in Northern Poland and field defenses were created, which included the Ilmenhorst, Letzen, Allenstein, Heilsberg, Mława and Torun fortified areas, as well as 13 ancient fortresses. During the construction of fortifications, advantageous natural boundaries, solid stone structures of numerous farms and large settlements, interconnected by a well-developed network of highways and railways, were used. Between the defensive strips there were a large number of cut-off positions and separate defense units. As a result, a heavily fortified defensive system was created, the depth of which reached 150-200 km. It was the most developed in terms of engineering to the north of the Masurian Lakes, in the offensive zone of the 3rd Belorussian Front, where there were nine fortified zones in the direction of Gumbinnen, Konigsberg.

The defense of East Prussia and Northern Poland was entrusted to Army Group Center under the command of General G. Reinhardt. It occupied the line from the mouth of the Neman to the mouth of the Western Bug and consisted of the 3rd tank, 4th and 2nd armies. In total, by the beginning of the offensive of the Soviet troops, the enemy grouping consisted of 35 infantry, 4 tank and 4 motorized divisions, a scooter brigade and 2 separate groups. The greatest density of forces and assets was created in the Insterburg and Mlava directions. In the reserve of the high command and armies were two infantry, four tank and three motorized divisions, a separate group and a scooter brigade, which accounted for almost a quarter of the total number of all formations. They were mainly located in the region of the Masurian Lakes, and partly in the Ilmenhorst and Mlavsky fortified regions. Such a grouping of reserves allowed the enemy to carry out maneuvers to launch counterattacks against the Soviet troops advancing north and south of the Masurian Lakes. In addition, various auxiliary and special units and subunits (fortress, reserve, training, police, naval, transport, security) were deployed on the territory of East Prussia, as well as parts of the Volkssturm and Hitler Youth detachments, which then took part in the conduct of defensive operations.

The ground forces supported the aircraft of the 6th air fleet, which had a sufficient number of equipped airfields. During the preparation of the Soviet troops for the offensive, enemy aviation was very active, making raids on their areas of concentration.

The ships of the Wehrmacht navy, based in the Baltic Sea, were intended for the defense of sea communications, artillery support for their troops in coastal areas, and also for their evacuation from isolated sections of the coast.

According to the plan developed by January 1945, Army Group Center had the task, relying on heavily fortified defenses, to stop the advance of Soviet troops deep into East Prussia and tie them down for a long time. The General Staff of the German Ground Forces also prepared an active version of the military operations of Army Group Center: inflicting a counterattack from East Prussia on the flank and rear of the central grouping of Soviet troops operating in the Berlin direction. This option was to come into force with the successful solution of the defensive tasks by Army Group Center and its possible strengthening at the expense of the Courland grouping. It was also planned to release a number of divisions as the front line was leveled by eliminating the ledges in the defense and withdrawing the troops of the 4th Army behind the line of the Masurian Lakes. However, due to the fact that according to this plan of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, it was supposed to leave part of the territory of East Prussia, the Supreme High Command rejected it.

German statesmen and military leaders, natives of East Prussia, who had extensive possessions there (G. Goering, E. Koch, V. Weiss, G. Guderian and others), insisted on strengthening Army Group Center even at the expense of weakening defenses in other areas front. In his appeal to the Volkssturm, Koch called for the defense of this area, arguing that with the loss of it, all of Germany would perish. In an attempt to strengthen the morale of the troops and the population, the fascist command launched a broad chauvinist propaganda. The entry of Soviet troops into East Prussia was used to intimidate the Germans, who, allegedly, from young to old, are expected to face imminent death. The entire population was called upon to stand up for the defense of their region, their home. Some units were staffed entirely from the inhabitants of one settlement, which they had to defend at any cost. In essence, everyone capable of carrying weapons was enrolled in the Volkssturm. Fascist ideologues continued to stubbornly assert that if the Germans showed high stamina, the Soviet troops would not be able to overcome the "impregnable fortifications of East Prussia." Thanks to the new weapons, which should go into service, “we will still win,” said the Minister of Propaganda I. Goebbels. “When and how is the Fuhrer’s business.” . With the help of social demagoguery, repression and other measures, the Nazis tried to force the entire population of Germany to fight to the last man. “Each bunker, every quarter of a German city and every German village,” emphasized Hitler’s order, “must turn into a fortress, in which the enemy will either bleed to death, or the garrison of this fortress will die in hand-to-hand combat under its ruins ... In this severe struggle even monuments of art and other cultural values ​​should not be spared for the existence of the German people. It must be carried through to the end."

Ideological indoctrination was accompanied by repressions of the military command. An order was announced in the troops on receipt, which demanded to keep East Prussia at all costs. To strengthen discipline and instill general fear in the army and rear, Hitler's directive on the death penalty "with the immediate execution of death sentences before the ranks" was carried out with particular cruelty. With these measures, the fascist leadership managed to force the soldiers to fight with the despair of the doomed.

What forces and what plans did the Soviet command have in this direction?

By the beginning of 1945, the troops of the left wing of the 1st Baltic Front were on the Neman River, from its mouth to the Sudarga. To the south, in the Gumbinnen direction, into East Prussia, the 3rd Belorussian Front jutted out in a wide ledge (up to 40 km deep), which occupied the line up to Avgustov. The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front entrenched along the Augustow Canal, the rivers Beaver, Narev and Western Bug, east of the city of Modlin. They held two important operational bridgeheads on the right bank of the Nareva - in the areas of the settlements of Ruzhan and Serotsk.

During the period of preparation for the offensive, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command replenished the fronts with personnel, weapons and military equipment, and carried out major regroupings of troops. As early as the end of 1944, the 2nd shock army was transferred to the 2nd Belorussian Front from its reserve, and the 65th and 70th armies along with their bands from the 1st Belorussian Front. The 3rd Belorussian Front was replenished at the expense of the 2nd Guards Army, which previously operated in the 1st Baltic Front. On January 8, 1945, the 5th Guards Tank Army was included in the 2nd Belorussian Front.

As a result, in the East Prussian direction, by the beginning of the operation, there were (taking into account the forces of the 43rd Army of the 1st Baltic Front) 14 combined arms, tank and 2 air armies, 4 tank, mechanized and cavalry separate corps. Such a concentration of forces and means ensured a general superiority over the enemy and allowed the Soviet army to carry out an operation with decisive goals.

The Soviet troops had to break through the enemy's defenses in depth and defeat him in difficult conditions of the lake-swampy terrain. Assessing the situation on the Soviet-German front in January 1945, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevsky, who was then Chief of the General Staff, wrote: front for operations in the main direction and removed the threat of a flank attack from East Prussia on the Soviet troops that had broken through in this direction. Thus, the successful conduct of the East Prussian operation was important not only for the general offensive of the Soviet troops in the winter of 1944-1945, but also for the speedy end of the war as a whole.

According to the plan of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the overall goal of the operation was to cut off the troops of Army Group Center from the rest of the forces, press them to the sea, dismember and destroy them in parts, completely clearing the territory of East Prussia and Northern Poland from the enemy. Cutting off Army Group Center from the main forces of the Nazi armies was assigned to the 2nd Belorussian Front, which was to deliver a deep blow from the lower reaches of the Narew River in the general direction of Marienburg. In the strip north of the Masurian Lakes, the 3rd Belorussian Front attacked Koenigsberg. He was assisted by the 43rd Army of the 1st Baltic Front. It was assumed that during the East Prussian operation, the 2nd Belorussian Front, in close cooperation with the 1st Belorussian Front, would be redirected for an offensive through East Pomerania to Stettin.

In accordance with the plan, back in November-December 1944, the Headquarters developed and brought to the troops of the 3rd and 2nd Belorussian Fronts directives for conducting offensive operations linked by unity of purpose and coordinated in time. Each front was to deliver a powerful blow to one of the flanks of Army Group Center.

The 3rd Belorussian Front was ordered to defeat the Tilsit-Insterburg grouping and, no later than the 10th-12th day of the operation, capture the Nemonien, Norkitten, Goldap line (depth 70-80 km). In the future, firmly securing the main grouping from the south, develop an offensive against Koenigsberg along both banks of the Pregel River, with the main forces on its left bank.

The 2nd Belorussian Front received the task of defeating the Pshasnysh-Mlava grouping of the enemy and, no later than the 10-11th day of the offensive, capture the Myshinets, Dzialdovo, Plock line (depth 85-90 km). In the future, advance in the general direction of Nowe Miasto, Marienburg. To assist the 1st Belorussian Front in defeating the Warsaw enemy grouping, the 2nd Belorussian Front was ordered to strike from the west, bypassing Modlin, with the aim of preventing the enemy from retreating beyond the Vistula and to be in readiness to cross the river west of Modlin.

The 1st Baltic Front was to advance along the left bank of the Neman with the forces of the 43rd Army and thereby assist the 3rd Belorussian Front in defeating the Tilsit grouping.

The Red Banner Baltic Fleet under the command of Admiral V.F. Tributs was supposed to disrupt the maritime communications of the Nazi troops from the Gulf of Riga to the Pomeranian Bay by active operations of bomber aircraft, submarines and torpedo boats, and by air strikes, naval and coastal artillery fire, landing troops on coastal flanks of the enemy to assist the ground forces advancing along the coast.

The military councils, in preparing and planning operations, creatively approached the fulfillment of the tasks determined by the Headquarters.

At the head of the 3rd Belorussian Front, which solved the difficult task of breaking through a long-term, deeply echeloned defense, was a young talented commander, General of the Army I. D. Chernyakhovsky. The front-line operation plan, which was developed under the leadership of the chief of staff, General A.P. Pokrovsky, consisted in inflicting a powerful frontal strike on the enemy grouping defending north of the Masurian Lakes, and in further developing the offensive on Koenigsberg in order to cover the main forces of the Army Group "Center" from the north and its subsequent defeat together with the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front. The front commander decided to strike the main blow north of Shtallupenen with the forces of four combined arms armies and two tank corps in the direction of Velau at the junction of the enemy's 3rd tank and 4th armies. This made it possible not only to separate their efforts at the very beginning of the operation, but also to bypass powerful centers of resistance from the north - Gumbinnen and Insterburg. It was planned to break through the enemy defenses with the forces of the 39th, 5th and 28th armies in a sector 24 km wide. On the very first day, these armies were to take possession of the enemy's second defense line, so that from the morning of the second day of the operation in the 5th Army's area, they would ensure the entry of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps into the breakthrough. In addition, to build up the strike, it was decided to have the 11th Guards Army in the second echelon and the 1st Tank Corps in reserve. The deployment of the second echelon of the front was planned to be carried out on the fourth day of the operation from the line of the Inster River on the adjacent flanks of the 5th and 28th armies. Ensuring the main grouping of the front from the north was assigned to the right-flank formations of the 39th Army, which was preparing an attack on Lazdenen. From the south, it was covered by the 2nd Guards Army, which was supposed to go on the offensive on the third day of the operation in the general direction of Darkemen. The 31st Army of the left wing of the front had the task of firmly defending the sector from Goldap to Avgustov.

Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky, a well-known commander who had extensive experience in operational and strategic leadership of troops, was appointed commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front. The plan of the front’s operation, developed under the leadership of the chief of staff, General A.N. Marienburg, go to the coast of the Baltic Sea, cut off the troops of Army Group Center from the rest of Germany and destroy them in cooperation with the 3rd Belorussian Front.

The front commander decided to strike the main blow from the Ruzhany bridgehead with the forces of three combined arms and tank armies, as well as three corps (mechanized, tank and cavalry); The 3rd, 48th and 2nd shock armies were to break through the enemy defenses in a sector of 18 km and advance on Mlava, Marienburg. It was this direction, in the opinion of the Military Council of the front, that provided a wider operational space for the deployment of large forces of mobile formations, made it possible to bypass the powerful Allenstein and Letzen fortified regions from the south. To expand the breakthrough to the north, the 3rd Army received the task of striking at Allenstein. In the same direction, it was supposed to introduce the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps, which was supposed to cut the enemy's main withdrawal routes to the west. The 49th Army had the task of going on the offensive with its main forces in the direction of Myshinets, using the breakthrough in the zone of the 3rd Army.

From the Serotsky bridgehead, the forces of the 65th, 70th armies under the command of generals P.I. Batov and V.S. Popov, as well as one tank corps, delivered a second blow. The armies were supposed to break through the enemy defenses on a 10-kilometer stretch and advance in the direction of Naselsk, Velsk. At the same time, the 70th Army was part of the forces to prevent the retreat of the Warsaw enemy group behind the Vistula and be ready to force it west of Modlin.

After the penetration of the main line of defense by the 48th, 2nd shock and 65th armies, in order to increase the strike force and develop success, it was planned to bring in the 8th mechanized, 8th and 1st guards tank corps. In the direction of the main attack, it was planned to introduce the 5th Guards Tank Army into the breakthrough to develop the offensive on Mlava, Lidzbark. The defense of the sector of the front from Augustow to Novogrudok was entrusted to the 50th Army.

The front commanders, taking into account the presence of powerful defensive fortifications on the front line of the enemy, concentrated forces and means on narrow sections of the breakthrough, which amounted to 14 percent in the 3rd Belorussian Front, and about 10 percent of the total width of the offensive zone in the 2nd Belorussian Front. As a result of the regrouping of troops and their massing, about 60 percent of rifle formations, 77-80 percent of guns and mortars, 80-89 percent of tanks and self-propelled artillery installations were concentrated in the breakthrough areas. Such a concentration of troops, armaments and military equipment ensured overwhelming superiority over the enemy in the direction of the main attacks.

The nature of the tasks assigned to the Soviet troops, the heavily fortified and densely occupied defense of the enemy demanded from the fronts a deep formation of troops. To build up efforts as part of the second echelons and mobile groups, the 3rd Belorussian Front had one combined arms army and two tank corps, and the 2nd Belorussian Front had a tank army, two tank, mechanized and cavalry corps. The battle formations of formations and units, as a rule, were built in two, less often in three echelons.

To break through the enemy's tactical defense zone, as well as to develop the offensive of infantry and tanks in the operational depth, great tasks were assigned to artillery. The following artillery densities were achieved: 160-220 guns and mortars per 1 km of the breakthrough area in the 3rd Belorussian Front and 180-300 in the 2nd Belorussian Front. Regimental, divisional and corps artillery groups, as well as groups of guns for direct fire and mortar groups, were created in units and formations. In the armies, mainly of the 2nd Belorussian Front, there were long-range, destruction and rocket artillery groups, and in the 3rd Belorussian Front there was also a long-range front-line artillery group led by General M. M. Barsukov, commander of the front artillery. It was intended for the destruction and suppression of reserves, headquarters, the destruction of road junctions and other objects located in the depths of the enemy's defense.

The artillery preparation of the attack was planned to last 120 minutes in the 3rd Belorussian and 85 minutes in the 2nd Belorussian fronts. The consumption of ammunition for its implementation was determined by 1.5-2 ammunition, which amounted to 50 percent of the total amount of ammunition available in the fronts at the beginning of the operation.

Much attention was paid to air defense. In addition to fighter aviation, the fronts had 1,844 anti-aircraft guns, which reliably covered strike groups and important front-line rear facilities.

Aviation of the 1st and 4th air armies of the fronts under the command of Generals T. T. Khryukin and K. A. Vershinin directed its main efforts to assist strike groups in breaking through enemy defenses and developing success in depth.

In the 3rd Belorussian Front, preliminary and direct aviation preparation was planned, as well as support for the attack and actions of the advancing troops in the depths of the enemy's defenses. The use of aviation in the 2nd Belorussian Front was planned to be divided into only two periods - preliminary aviation training and support for attacks and actions advancing in the depths of the enemy's defenses.

Preliminary aviation training in the 3rd and 2nd Belorussian fronts was planned to be carried out on the night before the offensive. For this purpose, it was planned to carry out 1,300 sorties in the zone of the 3rd Belorussian Front, and 1,400 in the zone of the 2nd Belorussian Front. Part of the aviation forces of the 3rd Air Army of the 1st Baltic Front and the 18th air army under the command of General N. F. Papivin and Chief Air Marshal A. E. Golovanov. Over the entire period of direct air preparation for the attack on the 3rd Belorussian Front, the bombers were to make 536 sorties, of which about 80 percent were to ensure the offensive of the 5th Army, which operated in the center of the front's strike force.

Aviation, intended to support the troops, was distributed as follows. In the 3rd Belorussian Front, on the first day of the operation, the 1st Air Army was supposed to support the 5th Army with the main forces. To support the 39th and 28th armies, one assault division was allocated. The 4th Air Army provided the main forces for the offensive of the 48th and 2nd shock armies. With the introduction of mobile formations into the breakthrough, attack aircraft were allocated to escort them, which, in the depths of the defense, was supposed to destroy the enemy’s approaching reserves, bomb his warehouses, bases and airfields. Fighter aviation received the task of reliably covering the advancing troops from the air.

The nature of the planned actions of the shock groupings of the fronts and the specifics of the enemy's defense determined the tasks of engineering support. For the engineering troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, it was important to ensure a breakthrough of heavily fortified zones of a long-term type, to equip routes for entering the battle of the second echelon and mobile formations. The main task of the engineering troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front was to ensure the breakthrough of the Narew defensive line, as well as the introduction of armored formations into the breakthrough and their actions in the depths of the enemy's defense. The plans for the engineering support of the troops provided for the creation of the necessary conditions for their concentration and regrouping, as well as the preparation of starting areas for the offensive. In the course of preparation, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front dug about 2.2 thousand km of trenches and communication passages, equipped about 2.1 thousand command and observation posts, more than 10.4 thousand dugouts and dugouts, prepared transport and evacuation routes . The volume of engineering work carried out by the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front was also very extensive. The measures taken provided the main groupings of the fronts with the secrecy of concentration in the initial position, and the command - the ability to control troops during the offensive.

A lot of work was done to equip the starting areas on the Ruzhansky and Serotsky bridgeheads. By the beginning of the operation, there were 25 bridges across the Narew River and 3 across the Western Bug. The sappers found and neutralized more than 159 thousand mines and unexploded shells on the bridgeheads. Engineer units and subunits were widely used to conduct engineering reconnaissance and ensure that the attackers overcome minefields, barriers, obstacles and water barriers. To solve these problems, the 3rd Belorussian Front attracted 10 engineer-sapper brigades, and the 2nd Belorussian - 13. Taking into account the corps and divisional engineer units, 254 engineer-sapper and 25 pontoon battalions operated in the fronts, that is, about a quarter of the entire composition such units and formations of the Soviet Army. Their main mass was concentrated on the directions of the main attacks, reaching a density of 3.5-4.5 engineer-sapper battalions per 1 km of the breakthrough front.

During the preparation period, special attention was paid to reconnaissance of the enemy. A whole network of observation posts was deployed, radio reconnaissance and night flights of reconnaissance aircraft were widely used. In the zone of the 3rd Belorussian Front, all defensive zones were photographed up to Koenigsberg. Aviation systematically monitored the movement of the enemy. The topographic units for the 2nd Byelorussian Front alone processed 14,000 reconnaissance aerial photographs, from which 210 different schemes with data about the enemy were compiled and reproduced.

In the fronts before the offensive, reconnaissance in force was envisaged. Significant work was carried out on disguise and disinformation. Much has been done to organize command and control: command and observation posts are as close as possible to the troops, and reliable communications have been created. Radio communication in the fronts and armies was organized both by radio directions and by radio networks.

The rear services of the 3rd and 2nd Belorussian Fronts, led by Generals S. Ya. Rozhkov and I. V. Safronov, delivered everything necessary for the successful solution of tasks to the troops. The large distance of the combat area from the main economic centers, a rare network of railways in the rear of the Soviet troops (one railway line leading to the front, in the lane of the 3rd Belorussian fronts and two in the lane of the 2nd Belorussian fronts), as well as insufficient capacity front and army military highways complicated the activities of the operational rear and the material support of the troops. A number of measures were taken to restore railways, increase their capacity, and ensure normal traffic on all highways and dirt roads. The total carrying capacity of front-line and army motor vehicles in both fronts by the beginning of the operation amounted to more than 20 thousand tons. This made it possible in a difficult situation to create stocks of materiel established by the plan, which in terms of ammunition for artillery and mortar weapons reached 2.3-6.2 ammunition in the 3rd and 3-5 ammunition in the 2nd Belorussian fronts, for motor gasoline and diesel fuel - 3.1-4.4 refueling, food - from 11 to 30 days and more .

In the period of preparation for the operation, much attention was paid to medical support. By the beginning of the offensive, each army of the 3rd Belorussian Front had 15-19 hospitals with 37.1 thousand beds. In addition, the military sanitary department of the front was in charge of 105 hospitals with 61.4 thousand beds. In the 2nd Belorussian Front, there were 135 army and 58 front-line hospitals, designed for 81.8 thousand beds. All this made it possible during the operation to reliably ensure the evacuation and treatment of the wounded and sick in the army and front-line rear.

Hard work was carried out on the combat training of the troops. Commanders and staffs of all levels thoroughly studied the organisation, armament and tactics of the enemy, the grouping of forces and means, the strengths and weaknesses of his troops, and prepared units and formations subordinate to them for the upcoming battles. With the personnel, the issues of organizing and conducting an offensive in winter conditions on very rugged terrain, equipped with powerful defensive structures along the entire front and to great depths, were worked out. In the rear areas of the fronts and armies, day and night, intensive combat training of troops was carried out on terrain similar in natural conditions and engineering fortifications to the one where they were to operate. With the commanders of units and subunits, classes were held to study the experience of breaking through the Mannerheim Line in 1939. In order to continuously conduct an offensive in each rifle division, at least one rifle battalion was specially trained for operations at night. All this then gave its positive results.

During the period of preparation for the offensive and during its course, the military councils of the fronts and armies, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, commanders, political bodies, party and Komsomol organizations carried out systematic party-political work, instilling in the soldiers a high offensive impulse, strengthening the morale of the personnel, improving discipline and vigilance. Soviet soldiers were to operate on the territory of the enemy and on the lands of friendly Poland. They explained that the goal of the Soviet army was the liberation of the Polish people from the invaders, and the German people from fascist tyranny. At the same time, it was pointed out that unnecessary damage to property, the destruction of various structures and industrial enterprises in occupied enemy territory is unacceptable.

Taking into account the important role of grassroots party organizations, the political agencies took measures to improve the placement of party and Komsomol cadres, to increase the size of the party and Komsomol organizations of combat units by strengthening them with communists and Komsomol members from the rear and reserve units. The ranks of party and Komsomol members were replenished with soldiers who distinguished themselves in battles. So, in the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front in January 1945, 2784 fighters were accepted as party members, and 2372 fighters were candidates. Most of them showed themselves well in battles and were awarded orders and medals. As of January 1, 1945, the 3rd and 2nd Belorussian fronts included about 11.1 thousand party and up to 9.5 thousand primary Komsomol, as well as more than 20.2 thousand party and up to 17.8 thousand Komsomol company and equal organizations, in which there were more than 425.7 thousand communists and more than 243.2 thousand Komsomol members, which accounted for about 41 percent of the total number of personnel of the fronts by that time.

Constant attention during the preparations was given to replenishment, especially those called up from the western regions of the Soviet Union, recently liberated from the enemy, whose population had been exposed to fascist propaganda for a long time. In their activities, the front-line and army political agencies were guided by the requirements of the Main Political Directorate set forth in the directive of March 22, 1944. All agitation and propaganda work, it was emphasized, should be directed to ensure that in the minds of the soldiers there was not even a trace of Hitler’s and bourgeois nationalist slander and provocative fabrications on the Soviet system. On the facts of German robbery, instill in them hatred for the German fascist monsters.

Before the offensive, on the initiative of the communists, the best fighters and commanders shared their combat experience of joint operations with tanks, overcoming wire obstacles, minefields, firing in trenches and in the depths of enemy defenses. Particular attention was paid to mutual assistance in battle. Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky recalled: "Attaching great importance to the initiative in battle, we sought to make examples of the resourcefulness and ingenuity of the heroes of past battles the property of every soldier." Everything was done in the troops in order to help commanders of all levels to deeply assimilate the instructions of military councils on breaking through fortified areas, storming fortresses, so that each of them knew well the schemes of the enemy’s defensive structures, the features of combat in large cities, methods of blocking and storming pillboxes, bunkers and forts.

The press was used to widely promote combat experience. The front-line newspapers and leaflets published materials about the best subunits, units and heroic soldiers, as well as about the experience of organizing party political work in the offensive. The pages of newspapers regularly reported on robberies, murders and violence committed by the fascist invaders. The letters of those who previously lived in the occupied territory, were forcibly driven into fascist slavery, who suffered the horrors of captivity and Nazi dungeons, as well as stories of conscripts who personally survived the occupation, were systematically published. Visits to fascist death camps on the territory of Lithuania and Poland left a deep imprint in the minds of the soldiers.

The political departments of the fronts did a great job of disintegrating the enemy troops. Leaflets were thrown into the rear, by radio and through powerful amplifiers installed at the forefront, broadcasts were broadcast in German, which spoke of the inevitable collapse of the fascist regime and the futility of further resistance.

On the night before the offensive, short rallies were held in all subunits and units, at which appeals from the military councils of the fronts and armies were read. “... At this decisive hour,” the appeal of the Military Council of the 2nd Belorussian Front said, “our great Soviet people, our Motherland, our native party ... call on you to fulfill your military duty with honor, to embody the full force of your hatred to the enemy in a single desire to defeat the German invaders" .

As a result of the purposeful and multifaceted activities of the military councils, political agencies, commanders and staffs, the moral and political state of the troops became even stronger, the offensive spirit increased and the combat readiness of the units increased.

Breakthrough of defense and dismemberment of the East Prussian grouping of the enemy

Military operations to defeat the East Prussian grouping were long and fierce. The troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front were the first to go on the offensive on January 13. Despite careful preparation, it was not possible to completely keep an event of such a large scale secret. The enemy, who became aware of the time of the front's offensive, on the night of January 13, hoping to prevent the planned development of further events, began heavy artillery shelling of the battle formations of the front's shock group. However, the artillery of the enemy was soon suppressed by retaliatory strikes by artillery and night bombers. As a result, the enemy was unable to prevent the troops of the front from taking their initial positions and going over to the offensive according to the plan.

At 6 o'clock in the morning the successful operations of the advanced battalions began. Breaking into the front line, they found that the first trench was occupied by only insignificant forces, the rest were diverted to the second and third trenches. This made it possible to make some adjustments to the artillery preparation plan, which lasted from 9 a.m. to 11 a.m.

Since there was thick fog over the battlefield, and the sky was covered with low clouds, the planes could not take off from the airfields. The entire burden of suppressing enemy defenses fell on the artillery. In two hours, Soviet troops used up a large amount of ammunition: more than 117,100 shells were fired in the 5th Army alone. But the increased consumption of ammunition did not provide a complete suppression of enemy defense.

After artillery preparation, the infantry and tanks, supported by artillery fire, went on the attack. The Nazis everywhere put up fierce resistance. In conditions of poor visibility, they let tanks approach at close range, and then widely used faustpatrons, anti-tank artillery and assault guns. Overcoming the stubborn resistance of the enemy and repelling his continuous counterattacks, the formations of the 39th and 5th armies, commanded by Generals I. I. Lyudnikov and N. I. Krylov, by the end of the day wedged into the enemy defenses for 2-3 km; the 28th Army of General A. A. Luchinsky advanced more successfully, advancing up to 7 km.

The fascist German command, trying at all costs to delay the offensive of the Soviet troops, during the 13th and on the night of January 14, transferred two infantry divisions from the non-attacked sectors to the breakthrough site, and pulled up a tank division from the reserve. Separate points and knots of resistance changed hands several times. Repelling counterattacks, the troops of the front persistently moved forward.

On January 14, the weather cleared up somewhat and the planes of the 1st Air Army made 490 sorties: they destroyed tanks, artillery and manpower of the enemy, conducted reconnaissance to the Ragnit, Rastenburg line. By the end of the next day, the troops of the shock group of the front, having broken through the main strip, wedged into the enemy defenses for 15 km.

In order to complete the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone and prevent the enemy from maneuvering divisions, it was necessary to intensify the actions of troops on the flanks of the strike force and bring new forces into battle. By decision of the front commander, on January 16, the 2nd Guards Army under the command of General P.G. Chanchibadze went on the offensive against Darkemen, and the 2nd Guards Tank Corps of General A.S. Burdeiny was brought into battle in the 5th Army zone. During the period when the corps was brought in, taking advantage of the improved weather, formations of the 1st Air Army launched several massive attacks on the enemy, making 1090 sorties. As part of the 303rd Fighter Aviation Division of the 1st Air Army, French pilots of the Normandie-Neman Fighter Aviation Regiment under the command of Major L. Delfino successfully operated. Supported by aviation and artillery from the front's shock group, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps, together with the right-flank formations of the 5th Army, broke through the enemy's second line of defense and captured the strongholds of Kussen and Radshen at night.

The penetration of Soviet troops into the enemy's defense created a threat of encirclement of his group, which was defending in the interfluve of the Neman and Inster. The commander of Army Group Center was forced to allow the commander of the 3rd Panzer Army, General E. Raus, to withdraw the 9th Army Corps from this area to the right bank of the Inster River. On the night of January 17, the formations of the 39th Army operating here, having established the beginning of the enemy's withdrawal, proceeded to pursue him. The troops of the main grouping of this army also stepped up the pressure. In the morning, with a strong blow, they completed the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone of the enemy and began to develop the offensive in a northwestern direction. At the same time, the advance of the troops of the 5th and 28th armies slowed down, since the fascist German command, striving to hold the second line of defense at any cost, continuously reinforced its units with tanks, assault guns and field artillery.

The commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, General I. D. Chernyakhovsky, taking into account the current situation, decided to immediately use the success of the 39th Army to enter the second echelon. At first, the 1st Tank Corps of General V.V. Butkov was advanced to this direction, and then the formations of the 11th Guards Army under the command of General K.N. Galitsky. A powerful blow to strongholds and concentrations of enemy infantry and tanks was inflicted by aviation, which on that day made 1422 sorties. .

On January 18, the 1st Panzer Corps entered the gap on the left flank of the 39th Army. Destroying disparate enemy groups on their way, the formations of the tank corps reached the Inster River and captured bridgeheads on its right bank. Using the success of the corps, the troops of the 39th Army advanced 20 km in a day. By the end of the day, its advanced units reached the Inster River.

By this time, the 5th and 28th armies, having resumed the offensive, had completed the breakthrough of the enemy's tactical defense zone. Due to continuous counterattacks, the rate of advance of the Soviet troops remained low. The enemy put up especially fierce resistance in the sector of the 28th Army, whose units on January 18 repulsed ten major counterattacks. In one of them, enemy infantry with tanks attacked the 664th rifle regiment of the 130th rifle division, at the spearhead of which the 6th company of the 2nd battalion operated. Instead of a seriously wounded commander, Captain S. I. Gusev, deputy battalion commander for political affairs, took over the company. Having correctly assessed the situation, at the most tense moment of the battle, he launched a company into the attack and dragged other units of the regiment along with him. The resistance of the enemy was broken, and he began to roll back. Pursuing the enemy, the fighters broke into one of the strongholds on the outskirts of Gumbinnen and captured it. Communist Gusev died in hand-to-hand combat. The brave officer was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and Gumbinnen was renamed the city of Gusev in his honor.

As a result of six days of continuous, fierce fighting, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front broke through the enemy defenses north of Gumbinnen in a sector over 60 km and advanced up to 45 km in depth. During the offensive, the Soviet troops inflicted a heavy defeat on the 3rd tank army of the enemy and created the conditions for a strike on Koenigsberg.

On January 14, the 2nd Belorussian Front went on the offensive from bridgeheads on the Narew River, north of Warsaw, in the Mlava direction. At 10 o'clock a powerful artillery preparation began. For 15 minutes, artillery fired with maximum tension along the front line and the nearest depth of the enemy’s defense, destroying his defensive structures and causing damage to manpower and equipment. The forward battalions of the divisions of the first echelon, deployed on the Ruzhany bridgehead, vigorously attacked the front line of the enemy's defense and broke into the first trench. Developing their success in depth, by 11 o'clock they captured the second and partially third trenches, which made it possible to reduce artillery preparation, and to begin the period of artillery support for the attack with a double barrage to the entire depth of the second position. The situation was somewhat different in the zones of the 65th and 70th armies, advancing from the Serotsky bridgehead, and in the zone of the 2nd shock army. Here the advanced battalions had less advance, and therefore artillery preparation was carried out in full. Unfavorable meteorological conditions that day reduced the effectiveness of artillery fire and ruled out the possibility of using aviation.

On the very first day, the troops of the 2nd shock army of General I.I. Fedyuninsky advanced 3-6 km, and the formations of the 3rd army under the command of General A.V. battles 5-6 km. The Nazis fiercely resisted and continuously went over to counterattacks. The commander of the 2nd German Army, General V. Weiss, ordered divisional and corps reserves, special units and cadet units of military schools to be brought into battle for the main defense line, and army reserves to be advanced to threatened areas. The density of enemy troops has increased significantly. In some sectors, the troops of the front continued the offensive at night. It was led by battalions specially trained for this. On the morning of January 15, the strike groups of the front resumed their offensive, but again met fierce resistance. Many strongholds have repeatedly passed from hand to hand. The command of Army Group Center moved the 7th Panzer Division, the Great Germany motorized division, as well as other units and subunits, from the reserve and into the battle in the Ruzhany direction. The pace of advancement of Soviet strike groups slowed down, and in some places it stopped altogether. The enemy, counting that the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front had already exhausted their offensive capabilities, began to hastily transfer the tank corps "Grossdeutschland" from East Prussia through Lodz to the Kielce region in order to stop the advance of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front. However, the calculations of the enemy did not materialize.

To increase the impact force, the front commander ordered the 8th and 1st Guards Tank Corps under the command of Generals A.F. Popov and M.F. Panov to be brought into battle in the bands of the 2nd shock and 65th armies, and the next day , January 16, in the strip of the 48th army - the 8th mechanized corps of General A. N. Firsovich. One assault aviation division was operationally subordinate to the commander of each corps introduced into the gap.

Having repulsed several strong enemy counterattacks, these corps broke his resistance and rushed forward. The success of the ground forces was greatly facilitated by aviation. Formations of the 4th Air Army, taking advantage of the improved weather, made 2,516 sorties that day.

In order to hold back the advance of the front, the Nazi command reinforced the 2nd Army with two infantry and motorized divisions and decided to transfer two infantry and tank divisions from Courland to East Prussia. However, this did not help either.

As a result of stubborn battles, the troops of the front broke through the tactical defense zone of the enemy in a 60-kilometer sector in three days and advanced to a depth of up to 30 km. They seized large strongholds and communications centers - the cities of Pultusk, Naselsk, cut the railway line Ciechanow - Modlin. The tactical and immediate operational reserves of the Nazis were destroyed. In the current situation, a powerful blow was required to finally break the resistance of the enemy. The front commander decided to bring a mobile group into battle.

In the second half of January 17, the 5th Guards Tank Army under the command of General V.T. Volsky successfully entered the gap in the 48th Army's zone. To ensure its operations, the front aviation intensified its strikes and in four hours made 1,000 sorties. During the introduction of the army into the gap, the enemy tried from the areas of Ciechanow and Pshasnysh to launch counterattacks with a tank and two motorized divisions on the flanks of the front strike group. But these attempts were thwarted by the energetic actions of the Soviet troops. With a surprise attack, the 8th Guards Tank Corps, together with the aviation supporting it, defeated the enemy tank division in the area of ​​​​its concentration and captured the Ciechanow station, and the 8th mechanized corps captured Grudusk. The motorized division "Grossdeutschland" came under attack from the formations of the 48th and 3rd armies and suffered heavy losses. The 18th motorized division, advancing to the Mlawa region, did not have time to take part in the implementation of the plan. Developing the offensive, the 5th Guards Tank Army broke away from the combined arms armies and reached the Mlavsky fortified area by the end of the day.

Following the tank formations, the combined arms armies also successfully advanced. Soviet soldiers, showing great enthusiasm, courage and courage, overcame several positions of the Mlavsky fortified area and on January 17-18 captured the strongholds of Ciechanow and Pshasnysh by storm. At this time, the 49th Army under the command of General I.T. Grishin was persistently advancing northward, securing the right flank of the strike force. The armies operating from the Serock bridgehead captured Modlin.

After stubborn five-day battles, the 2nd Belorussian Front broke through the enemy defenses in a 110 km wide zone and advanced up to 60 km in depth in the Mlava direction. Before the troops of the front, real opportunities opened up in a short time to reach the Baltic Sea and cut off the East Prussian grouping of the enemy from the central regions of Germany.

By this time, the troops of the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front had liberated Warsaw, advanced to the Bzura River and developed an attack on Poznan. However, the remnants of four infantry divisions of the defeated Warsaw group withdrew beyond the Vistula and reinforced the 2nd Army, which complicated the situation in front of the left wing of the 2nd Belorussian Front.

The advance of the shock groups of the 3rd and 2nd Belorussian Fronts in the Koenigsberg and Marienburg directions, which began after breaking through the defenses of the 3rd Panzer and 2nd German armies, endangered the flanks and rear of the 4th Army, which was defending the August salient. The commander of the Army Group "Center" saw the threat of encirclement of this army and repeatedly tried to obtain the sanction of the Supreme High Command for its withdrawal, but was forced to be satisfied with the promise of outside help. The hopes of the command of the Army Group "Center" to replenish their reserves by releasing the divisions of the 4th Army did not come true. Meanwhile, complete confusion reigned among the fascist command. Initially, it forbade the evacuation of the local population from the front line, believing that this would undermine the resistance of the troops. However, the decisive offensive of the Soviet fronts forced him to order the urgent evacuation of residents from East Prussia. . Goebbels' propaganda continued to whip up fear, emphasizing that the most severe measures would be applied to those who did not have time to leave their homes. General panic seized the population. Hundreds of thousands of refugees rushed to the Samland Peninsula, to Pillau and to the Frische-Nerung Spit, as well as beyond the Vistula to Danzig and Gdynia. Those who did not want to budge, including thousands of Soviet citizens who were forcibly deported to hard labor in Germany, were forced by force.

However, many residents, mostly old people and women with children, took refuge in hiding places and did not leave their homes. Subsequently, recalling the meeting with Soviet soldiers, they said: “We thought that we would meet poorly armed, ragged ... exhausted and angry soldiers and officers. But it turned out otherwise. Soldiers and officers of the Red Army are well dressed, young, healthy, cheerful and very fond of children. We were struck by the abundance of first-class weapons and equipment. .

In Northern Poland, the Nazis forcibly stole the population from the front line, motivating this by concern for saving the Poles from Russian aviation and extermination during hostilities. A few tens of kilometers from the front line, the intentions of the Nazi "saviors" became clear. All able-bodied men and women were sent to build fortifications, while the elderly and children were left out in the open to their fate. Only the rapid offensive of the Soviet troops saved many thousands of Poles from starvation, and the inhabitants of Ciechanow, Plonsk and other cities from deportation to Germany.

During the period of occupation, the Nazis falsely informed the Polish population about the events on the fronts of World War II, about the Soviet Union and its peoples, about the activities of the Polish National Liberation Committee and the creation of the Provisional Government. This lie had to be exposed. The political department of the 2nd Belorussian Front launched work among the inhabitants of the liberated regions. At rallies and meetings, in reports and lectures, the meaning and meaning of the main documents of the Polish-Soviet friendship and the liberation mission of the Soviet army were explained. Soviet films, accompanied by an narration in Polish, contributed to changing the Poles' misconceptions about the life of the Soviet people and their army, and the newspaper Wolna Pol'ska (Free Poland) regularly informed the population about the situation in the country and beyond its borders. Soviet commanders and political workers established close ties with members of the Polish Workers' Party and other representatives of the people and assisted them in normalizing the life of the urban and rural population of the liberated voivodships. The Poles gladly met the Soviet soldiers-liberators and tried to help them in every way they could.

On January 19, the 2nd Belorussian Front launched a rapid pursuit of the enemy, where mobile formations played a decisive role. In the zone of the 48th Army, the front commander brought in the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps of General N. S. Oslikovsky, who crossed the southern border of East Prussia and rushed to Allenstein. The 5th Guards Tank Army also developed the offensive. Together with the forward units of the 48th Army, she immediately took possession of Mlava, an important stronghold of the enemy, and in the Neidenburg region also entered the borders of East Prussia. The 4th Air Army provided great assistance to the ground forces. Having made 1880 sorties in a day, she struck at road junctions and retreating enemy columns. In six days, the troops of the front reached the line, which, according to the plan, they were supposed to master on the 10th-11th day of the offensive.

Despite the threat of encirclement, the enemy's 4th Army continued to defend itself in a ledge in the area of ​​Augustow. Taking this into account, the commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front decided to turn the main forces to the north, in the direction of the city of Elbing, reach the Frisches-Haff Bay by the shortest route, cut off the East Prussian grouping, and part of the forces on a wide front to reach the Vistula. Following the instructions of the commander, the troops rushed to the coast of the bay. The 5th Guards Tank Army was advancing especially quickly. On January 20, having captured the city of Neidenburg, a major junction of highways and railways, the tankers headed for Oster-rod, Elbing. The pace of pursuit of combined-arms armies has increased significantly. The formations of the left wing advanced more than 40 km in just one day on January 20, liberating the cities of Serpts, Velsk, Vyshogrud. They were strongly supported by aviation, which made 1749 sorties.

The high rate of advance of Soviet troops across the territory of Northern Poland often forced the enemy to turn into a disorderly flight. This deprived the Nazis of the opportunity to carry out robberies and violence, similar to those that they widely carried out during their retreat from Soviet soil.

On January 21, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front captured Tannenberg, near which, on July 15, 1410, the combined forces of Russian, Polish, Lithuanian and Czech troops utterly defeated the knights of the Teutonic Order, who were trying to capture the Slavic lands. This event went down in history under the name of the Battle of Grunwald (Tannenberg).

On the same day, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command demanded that the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front continue the offensive on Marienburg in order to capture the Elbing, Marienburg, Torun line no later than February 2-4, reach the Vistula in its lower reaches and cut off the enemy all the way to Central Germany . After reaching the Vistula, it was planned to capture bridgeheads on its left bank north of Torun. The troops of the right wing of the front were ordered to take control of the Johannesburg, Allenstein, Elbing line. In the future, it was planned to withdraw most of the forces of the front to the left bank of the Vistula for operations in the zone between Danzig and Stettin.

The position of the Army Group Center was getting worse, the threat of encirclement to the west of Augustow became clearer. Hitler's headquarters decided to withdraw the 4th field army behind the fortifications of the Letzensky fortified region to the line of the Masurian lakes. The commander of the 4th Army, General F. Gosbach, on the night of January 22, began the withdrawal of army formations along the entire front, hoping for secrecy and speed of its implementation. However, this maneuver was timely discovered by the reconnaissance of the 50th Army. Its commander, General I. V. Boldin, ordered the relentless pursuit of the enemy. In just one day, army formations advanced up to 25 km. The armies of the left wing of the 3rd Belorussian Front did not miss this moment either.

Unlike the 2nd Army, whose hasty retreat under the blows of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front often turned into a flight, the 4th Army retreated in a more organized manner, with stubborn rearguard battles. However, under the intensified onslaught of the Soviet troops and the impending threat of encirclement, its troops were forced to hasten their withdrawal. Gosbach decided to leave the defensive lines with the Letzen fortress and the Masurian lake system and break through to the west to join the 2nd Army in the southern part of the Heilsberg fortified area.

The commander of the 4th Army did not inform either the commander of Army Group Center or the Supreme High Command about the decision made. The formations of the army passed through the Letzensky fortified area and on January 24 occupied the long-term fortified position of Heilsberg, Deime. On the same day, Gauleiter Koch informed the supreme command of the abandonment of the line of the Masurian lakes and the Letzen fortress. “It is not surprising,” Guderian writes, “that the monstrous message about the loss of a heavily equipped fortress, built with the latest engineering achievements, was like a bomb explosion ...” Punishments followed immediately. On January 26, the commander of the Army Group Center, General Reinhardt, was removed from his post, and three days later a similar fate befell the army commander Gosbach. Generals L. Rendulich and F. Muller, who replaced them, were powerless to restore the lost position.

The fascist party and military leadership, disregarding the real events at the front and in the rear, continued to call on the people for new efforts, sacrifices and hardships in the name of an illusory victory. At the end of January 1945, the front-line press of the Wehrmacht in various variations repeated to the soldiers “The Fuehrer’s Appeal to You”, which emphasized: “... if we overcome the crisis in ourselves, become with firm determination the masters of the critical events around us, then the Fuhrer will turn the crisis nation in its victory." Strengthening punitive measures was supposed to force the soldiers and officers to continue to stand to the death. Goebbels' propaganda declared with frank cynicism: "Whoever fears an honorable death will die in disgrace." Barrage detachments on the spot repaired the court over everyone who did not show the necessary stamina in battle, faith in National Socialism and victory. But no threats and harsh measures of the Nazis could no longer save the situation.

The retreat of the formations of Army Group Center continued, although they clung to every advantageous line, hoping to hold back the onslaught of the attackers, to exhaust and bleed them with a stubborn defense. Overcoming enemy resistance, the Soviet troops captured Allenstein, and in the main direction, units of the 5th Guards Tank Army advanced non-stop towards the Frisches-Haff Bay, trying to complete the cut-off of the East Prussian grouping as soon as possible. The attack continued into the night. On January 24, the 10th Panzer Corps of this army, after a fleeting battle, captured Mühlhausen. On the outskirts of the city, the soldiers of the tank battalion, commanded by Captain F. A. Rudskoy, especially distinguished themselves. Having broken through to the Koenigsberg-Elbing highway north of Mühlhausen, the battalion defeated a large enemy column. At the same time, up to 500 fascists were destroyed, about 250 vehicles were captured or smashed. Enemy attempts to drive the battalion off the highway were unsuccessful. The tankers held out until the approach of the main forces of their brigade. For skillful command, heroism and courage, Captain Rudsky was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and the battalion personnel were awarded orders and medals.

Other formations of the 5th Guards Tank Army acted just as boldly and decisively. So, the advance detachment of the 31st brigade of the 29th tank corps, under the command of Captain G. L. Dyachenko, taking advantage of the darkness and short-term confusion of the Elbing garrison, slipped through the entire city on the evening of January 23 and the next day reached the coast of Frisches Huff Bay. Only after that the enemy organized the defense of Elbing and held the city for about a crescent.

Moving along the coast, the troops of the tank army, in cooperation with the formations of the 48th army, captured the city of Tolkemit on January 26. Thus, the cutting off of the entire East Prussian grouping from the rest of the Nazi forces was completed. In East Prussia, the 3rd Panzer and 4th Armies, as well as 6 infantry and 2 motorized divisions of the 2nd Army, were cut off; the remaining 14 infantry and tank divisions, 2 brigades and a group that were part of the 2nd Army, suffered heavy losses and were driven back beyond the Vistula.

By this time, the armies of the right wing of the 2nd Belorussian Front, pursuing the retreating enemy, advanced up to 100 km and basically overcame the system of the Masurian Lakes, and the armies of the left wing of the front reached the Vistula in the Marienburg-Torun sector. The 70th Army crossed the Vistula on the move, and part of the forces blocked the fortress of Torun. From January 14 to January 26, the troops of the front advanced 200-220 km. They defeated up to 15 enemy divisions, overcame the defenses in the southern part of the Letzensky fortified area, captured the Mlavsky and Allenstein fortified areas, and occupied part of East Prussia with an area of ​​​​up to 14 thousand square meters. km and liberated the territory of Northern Poland with an area of ​​​​up to 20 thousand square meters. km.

On January 26, Army Group Center, operating in East Prussia, was renamed Army Group North, and Army Group North was renamed Army Group Courland. The troops that were concentrated in Pomerania were combined into the Vistula Army Group, which included the 2nd Army.

After reaching the Frisches-Haff Bay, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front continued their offensive in order to destroy the cut-off enemy. The situation in the front line became more complicated. The armies of his right wing were stretched out and operated mainly in a northerly direction, while the armies of his left wing were aimed to the west. The troops had suffered losses and needed rest. Army rears lagged behind. Most of the airfields of the 4th Air Army were at a considerable distance from the troops, moreover, the onset of mud made it difficult to use them.

On the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, which had reached Frisches Huff Bay, the fascist German command decided to launch a strong counterattack. The Nazis hoped that the successful implementation of this plan would allow them to restore land communications with Central Germany and establish direct contact with the main forces of the Wehrmacht. To this end, four infantry, two motorized and tank divisions, as well as a brigade of assault guns were concentrated in the southern part of the Heilsberg fortified area. On the night of January 27, the troops of the 4th German Army suddenly went on the offensive in the direction of Liebstadt and Elbing. The enemy managed to break through the defenses of the 48th Army in a narrow sector and encircle the 17th Infantry Division southwest of Wormditt. The fighting continued for two days. The enemy took possession of Liebstadt and continued persistent attacks to the west of this city.

Given the difficult situation, the commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front reinforced the 48th Army with the 8th Guards Tank Corps and five anti-tank artillery brigades. The front to the east was deployed by the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 8th Mechanized Corps; The 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps prepared with the main forces to deliver a flank attack. The rifle corps of the 49th Army was transferred from the front reserve to the 48th Army. A quick regrouping of forces and means in the threatened direction made it possible to first stop the enemy, and then deliver a tangible blow to him. On January 30, he made the last attempt to break through, but was not successful. The troops allocated to repel the counterattack created a dense solid front, and then, resuming the offensive, released the 17th Infantry Division of Colonel A.F. Grebnev, who fought heroically in the encirclement, and threw the enemy formations back to their original position.

During the period of the struggle against the enemy's counterattack grouping, the 50th, 49th and 3rd armies of the 2nd Belorussian Front continued the offensive together with the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, squeezing the Heilsberg grouping. Its situation became extremely complicated on January 31, when the formations of the 31st Army under the command of General P.G. Shafranov stormed the stronghold of the defense of the central regions of East Prussia - the city of Heilsberg. The powerful defensive lines of the Hejlsberg fortified area remained in the rear of the attackers. The narrowing of the offensive lines of the armies as they moved in depth allowed the commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front to withdraw into his reserve, first two divisions of the 50th Army, and from January 31, the entire 49th Army.

At the end of the month, the 2nd shock, 65th and 70th armies of the 2nd Belorussian Front reached the Nogat and Vistula rivers in a wide area, from the Frisches Haff Bay to Bydgoszcz. At the same time, the 2nd Shock Army replaced units of the 5th Guards Tank Army near Elbing, completely taking over the blockade of the fortress. The 65th Army approached the Vistula and crossed it, capturing a bridgehead near the town of Svece. The 70th Army expanded its bridgehead on the Vistula north of Bydgoszcz.

Fierce and stubborn battles unfolded during the liquidation of the garrisons of the fortress cities of Torun and Elbing. As already mentioned, the 70th Army left only a small part of the forces and means (a weakened rifle division and regiment) for the blockade of Torun. This decision stemmed from an erroneous estimate of the actual size of the garrison. The army command believed that there were no more than 3-4 thousand people in the fortress, and in fact the garrison numbered about 30 thousand people.

On the night of January 31, the troops of the garrison broke through the weak front of the blockade with a sudden blow in a narrow section of the northwestern sector. To eliminate the enemy forces that had broken through, the commander of the 70th Army had to involve six rifle divisions, including two that had arrived from the front reserve, as well as part of the forces of the 1st Guards Tank Corps. South-east of Chełmno, the escaped grouping was first dismembered, and on February 8 it was defeated. Up to 12 thousand soldiers and officers were captured, over 270 serviceable guns were captured as trophies. Only a small part (about 3 thousand people) managed to break through to the other side of the Vistula . An important role in the successful defeat of the Torun garrison was played by the 4th Air Army, which prevented the systematic withdrawal of enemy troops with a series of assault strikes.

On February 10, the decisive actions of the troops of the 2nd Shock Army broke the resistance of the Elbing garrison - another major communication center and a powerful stronghold of the enemy defense on the way to the Danzig Bay.

Despite the bad weather, aviation continued to support the ground troops. For nine days, from January 31 to February 8, the 4th Air Army made 3450 sorties, destroying 38 enemy aircraft. During the same period, German aviation made only about 300 sorties.

Thus, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front completed cutting off the East Prussian enemy grouping and, having created a solid internal front from the southwest, completed their task.

The strike force of the 1st Belorussian Front reached the Oder in early February and captured bridgeheads on its left bank. Between it and the armies of the left wing of the 2nd Belorussian Front, located on the Vistula, a gap of up to 200 km was formed. In connection with the threat of a flank attack from the north, the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front was forced to deploy the armies of the right wing against Army Group Vistula. Taking into account the current situation, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, as outlined by the original plan, redirected the main forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front for an offensive west of the Vistula, into Eastern Pomerania. By her directive of February 8, she ordered the front with the center and left wing to go on the offensive west of the Vistula, further developing it to Stettin, seize the Danzig, Gdynia region and clear the Baltic Sea coast from the enemy up to the Pomeranian Bay. By the directive of the Headquarters, given the next day, the troops of the 50th, 3rd, 48th combined arms and 5th guards tank armies, along with the bands, were transferred to the 3rd Belorussian Front. This meant that the 2nd Belorussian Front was completely exempted from participating in the East Prussian operation and its command could focus all its attention on the fighting in Eastern Pomerania.

More difficult, but also successfully developed the offensive of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front in the Koenigsberg direction. On January 19, at the direction of the Headquarters, the 43rd Army under the command of General A.P. Beloborodov was included in its composition from the 1st Baltic Front. Army formations on the same day, together with the 39th Army, captured the city of Tilsit. At the same time, the 2nd Guards and 1st Tank Corps, having struck at the enemy in the zone of the 39th Army, advanced up to 20 km in a day and in the night battle captured the strong nodes of resistance Gross-Skaisgirren and Aulovenen. On January 20, from the line of the Inster River at the junction of the 39th and 5th armies, the 11th Guards Army was introduced into the battle. With two tank corps in front, she rushed in a south-westerly direction and by the end of January 21 came to the Pregel River northeast of Velau and to the approaches to Insterburg from the north. By this time, the troops of the 43rd and 39th armies approached the Kurishes-Haff Bay and the Deyme River. The Insterburg grouping of the enemy was deeply engulfed from the northwest. At the same time, the offensive of the 5th, 28th and 2nd Guards armies slowed down due to the stubborn resistance of the Nazi troops. Particularly fierce battles were fought on the outskirts of Gumbinnen. Only in the second half of January 21, the enemy's stubbornness was broken and the city of Gumbinnen was taken. Formations of the 5th Army captured Insterburg from the east. On the night of January 22, the 11th Guards Army, with the assistance of the 5th Army, began its assault. The enemy stubbornly resisted, but by morning the city was captured by Soviet troops.

The loss of Gumbinnen and Insterburg had a negative impact on the stability of the enemy's defense in the Koenigsberg direction. The threat of Soviet troops entering the near approaches to Koenigsberg became even more real. The Hitlerite command held one meeting after another, discussing how and by what means to delay the offensive in East Prussia. At the suggestion of Grand Admiral K. Doenitz, 22 army battalions were transferred from Denmark to the Soviet-German front, some of which arrived on the Zemland Peninsula. The defense was also strengthened along the rivers Deime and Alla, reserves, various units and subunits were additionally advanced here. The fascist German command pinned great hopes on holding the defense on these rivers. Captured officers from the defense headquarters of Koenigsberg later testified that from military history they knew about the “miracle” on the Marne, where in 1914 the French managed to stop the German armies, and now they dreamed of a “miracle” on Deim.

Continuing the offensive, the troops of the right wing of the front on January 23-25 ​​crossed the Deime, Pregel and Alle rivers on the move, overcame the long-term structures of the Heilsberg fortified area in the north and advanced towards Koenigsberg. On January 26, they approached the outer defensive contour of the city. The troops of the left wing of the front, pursuing formations of the 4th Army of the enemy, by the end of the day completely took possession of the structures of the Lettsensky fortified area and reached the line west of the Masurian Lakes.

Thus, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, despite the fierce resistance of the enemy, who relied on a deeply echeloned system of defensive lines and fortified areas, advanced up to 120 km. With the fall of the Ilmenhorst and Letzen fortified regions and the withdrawal of troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front to the coast of the Baltic Sea, the situation for the enemy deteriorated significantly, but he was still able to continue the fight.

As the Soviet troops successfully advanced in the Koenigsberg direction, the enemy's resistance increased. In the last days of January, the fascist German command made another attempt to reinforce its grouping on the outskirts of Koenigsberg by evacuating the divisions defending the bridgehead in the Klaipeda area. However, the troops of the 1st Baltic Front - Commander General I. Kh. Bagramyan, Chief of Staff General V. V. Kurasov - having timely revealed the enemy's preparations for evacuation, went on the offensive on January 27. The 4th shock army of General P.F. Malyshev crushed the opposing enemy units and the next day completely liberated Klaipeda. In these battles, considerable merit belongs to the soldiers of the 16th Lithuanian Rifle Division. The remnants of the Klaipeda garrison fled along the Kurishe-Nerung Spit to the Zemland Peninsula, where they joined the troops defending Koenigsberg. During the fighting for Klaipeda, the troops of the 4th shock army completed the liberation of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic from the Nazi invaders.

Carrying out an offensive along the entire front and directing strikes at Koenigsberg, the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front sought to isolate the Koenigsberg garrison as quickly as possible from the forces operating west and south of the city. Carrying out this task, on January 29, the 39th Army came close to Koenigsberg from the northeast and north, and two days later its formations reached the Frisches-Haff Bay west of the city, thus cutting off the garrison of the fortress from the troops on the Zemland Peninsula. At the same time, the aviation of the front and the fleet struck at the hydraulic structures of the Königsberg Sea Canal and partially disabled it. The entrance of transport ships to the harbor of Koenigsberg was blocked. In this regard, the need for land transportation to Pillau became especially acute for the Nazis. The troops of the 11th Guards Army, advancing along the left bank of the Pregel River, bypassed Koenigsberg from the south and reached the bay on January 30, cutting off the highway that leads to Elbing. As a result, Soviet troops not only cut off the East Prussian grouping, but also divided it into three isolated parts.

The decisive actions of the front troops to dismember Army Group North and isolate them caused confusion among the fascist leadership. The enemy retreated so hastily that they did not have time to render industrial enterprises and vehicles unusable, warehouses and arsenals remained intact. Taking advantage of the confusion in the camp of the enemy, the scouts connected the command posts of the 39th and 11th Guards armies to its electrical network, which for two days used electricity supplied from Koenigsberg.

The fascist German command made desperate efforts to release the blockade of Konigsberg and restore land communications with all groupings. Southwest of the city, in the area of ​​Brandenburg, it concentrated armored and motorized divisions and several infantry units, which they used on January 30 to strike along the Frisches Haff to the north. At the cost of heavy losses, the enemy managed to push back units of the 11th Guards Army and restore contact with Koenigsberg. However, this success was short-lived. By February 6, the troops of the 11th Guards and 5th armies again cut the highway, firmly isolating Koenigsberg from the south, and the troops of the 43rd and partially 39th armies in a bitter struggle pushed the enemy divisions from Koenigsberg deep into the Zemland Peninsula, forming an external front environment.

Thus, within four weeks, most of the territory of East Prussia and Northern Poland was cleared of Nazi troops, the defense in depth created here was crushed, and the enemy suffered serious damage in manpower and equipment. During the fighting, the enemy lost about 52 thousand soldiers and officers only as prisoners. Soviet troops captured as trophies more than 4.3 thousand guns and mortars, 569 tanks and assault guns, 335 armored vehicles and armored personnel carriers, over 13 thousand vehicles, 1704 military depots. The plans of the fascist German command to restore land communications between the groupings were frustrated and conditions were created for their destruction.

The defeat of the Nazi troops southwest of Koenigsberg

Under the blows of the Soviet troops, Army Group North, which included the Zemland task force and the 4th Army, was divided into three parts by February 10: Zemland, Koenigsberg and Heilsberg. In total, the East Prussian grouping consisted of 32 divisions, 2 separate groups and a brigade. Task Force Zemland (9 divisions) defended on the Zemland Peninsula and in the area of ​​Koenigsberg. The 4th Army entrenched itself on the coast of the Baltic Sea southwest of Koenigsberg on a bridgehead about 180 km along the front and 50 km in depth, relying on the Heilsberg fortified area. This most powerful grouping had 23 divisions, including a tank and 3 motorized divisions, 2 separate groups and a brigade, as well as a large number of special troops and Volkssturm battalions.

The Hitlerite command hoped by stubborn defense of the occupied lines to tie down the large forces of the Soviet army for as long as possible and prevent their transfer to the Berlin direction. The enemy strengthened the defense by consolidating the battle formations of withdrawn units and formations, as well as by reinforcements that were delivered by sea from the central regions of Germany. The ships of the fleet ensured the evacuation of the population and rear units of the 4th Army that had begun.

The destruction of disunited German groupings was associated with a number of difficulties, determined by the peculiarities of their situation. They were cut off in heavily fortified areas, had a large amount of artillery and convenient internal communications for maneuvering. The fighting took place in conditions of rugged terrain and spring thaw. In addition, the Soviet troops in previous battles suffered significant losses in people and equipment, and almost completely used up their stocks of materiel and ammunition.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command took into account the fact that the quickest liquidation of the enemy in East Prussia would have made it possible to strengthen the main, Berlin direction, due to the release of troops of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts. She decided to start the destruction of enemy groups with the strongest. On February 9, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front were ordered to complete the defeat of the 4th Army no later than February 20-25. On the eve of the operation, the Headquarters carried out some organizational measures. According to the decision of February 6, “a major redistribution of forces and means was carried out on the right wing of the Soviet-German front. For the convenience of command and control, the troops of the 1st (except for the 3rd Air Army) and the 2nd Baltic Fronts, blocking the Kurland Army Group from land, were united into one - the 2nd Baltic Front under the command of Marshal of the Soviet Union L. A. Govorov . The tasks of capturing Koenigsberg and completely clearing the Zemland Peninsula of the enemy were entrusted to the 1st Baltic Front with the transfer from the 3rd Belorussian 11th Guards, 39th and 43rd armies, as well as the 1st tank corps. The 5th, 28th, 31st and 2nd Guards Armies, the 1st Air Army, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps remained in the 3rd Belorussian Front, as well as the 50th, 3rd and 48th Combined Arms Armies transferred from the 2nd Belorussian Front and the 5th Guards Tank Army.

Guided by the directive of the Headquarters, the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, General I. D. Chernyakhovsky, decided first of all to eliminate the enemy troops defending the ledge in the Preussisch-Eylau area, then to develop an offensive on Heiligenbeil, that is, to dismember the Heilsberg grouping into parts and destroy them separately. The 5th Guards Tank Army was tasked with advancing along Frisches-1 Haff Bay in order to cut off the enemy's escape route to the coast and deprive him of the opportunity to evacuate to the Frische-Nerung Spit. The cover of the main grouping of the front from Brandenburg was provided by the forces of the 5th Combined Arms Army. Support for the advancing troops from the air was assigned to the 1st Air Army. Together with the aviation of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet and the 3rd Air Army of the 1st Baltic Front, it was supposed to destroy the encircled enemy troops, disrupt the supply and evacuation of them by sea.

The general offensive, which began on February 10 in the main direction, developed slowly despite intensive fire support from artillery. The 28th Army achieved the greatest success, which, by a detour from the north and south, with the assistance of the right-flank units of the 2nd Guards Army, captured a large stronghold and an important road junction - the city of Preussisch-Eylau.

The enemy, by regrouping forces and means, condensed the battle formations of formations and created reserves of infantry, tanks and artillery. A developed system of long-term and field structures allowed him, by secretly making a maneuver, to close the gaps in the defense. The average daily rate of advance of the Soviet troops did not exceed 1.5-2 km. Having overcome one defensive line, they ran into the next and were forced to re-prepare and carry out a breakthrough. The enemy put up especially stubborn resistance in the area of ​​the city of Mölsack, a major road junction and a powerful stronghold on the way to Heiligenbeil and Frisches Huff Bay, where the 3rd Army, weakened in previous battles, advanced. Fierce fighting continued here for three days. On February 17, Mölsack was taken. In extremely unfavorable meteorological conditions, which completely ruled out the use of aviation, the army divisions repulsed one enemy counterattack after another.

During these battles, the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, General of the Army I. D. Chernyakhovsky, showed exceptional energy and courage. A broad military outlook, a high general and professional culture, extraordinary capacity for work, and rich experience in training and commanding troops allowed him to quickly assess the situation and correctly determine the main thing necessary for making rational decisions. He often appeared where the situation was the most difficult. By his mere presence, Chernyakhovsky inspired courage and faith in success in the hearts of the soldiers, skillfully directed their enthusiasm to defeat the enemy.

So it was on February 18th. Having been in the troops of the 5th Army, I. D. Chernyakhovsky went to the command post of the 3rd Army. However, the front commander did not arrive at the appointed place. On the outskirts of Mölsack, he was mortally wounded by a shell fragment and soon died on the battlefield. At that time he was in his 39th year. “In the person of Comrade Chernyakhovsky,” the message of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR, the People’s Commissariat for Defense and the Central Committee of the Party said, “the state has lost one of the most talented young commanders who advanced during the Patriotic War” .

The famous Soviet commander was buried in Vilnius. The grateful Motherland paid the last military honor to the hero: 24 artillery volleys from 124 guns thundered over mourning Moscow. In memory of the deceased, the city of Insterburg was renamed Chernyakhovsk, and one of the central squares of the capital of the Lithuanian SSR was named after him.

Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevsky was appointed commander of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front. As Chief of the General Staff and Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, he was directly involved in the development of plans for the largest operations of the Great Patriotic War, including the East Prussian War. He took up his new duties on February 21. Instead of Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky, General A. I. Antonov was appointed Chief of the General Staff.

Due to the increased resistance of the enemy and the spring thaw, the offensive of the 3rd Belorussian Front was temporarily stopped. For twelve days (from February 10 to 21), the total advance of the Soviet troops amounted to 15 to 30 km. The enemy, who suffered heavy losses, found himself squeezed in a narrow coastal strip (50 km along the front and 15-25 km in depth). Nineteen of his divisions, including two armored and motorized, continued to hold this small area, but extremely saturated with various defensive structures.

Although the offensive of the ground forces was suspended, aviation continued to strike at the concentrations of enemy manpower and equipment, its long-term fortifications, airfields, seaports, transport and warships.

While the 3rd Belorussian Front was destroying the enemy's Heilsberg grouping, the troops of the 1st Baltic Front fought intense battles on the Zemland Peninsula and the approaches to Koenigsberg. In order not to scatter forces, on February 17, the Headquarters ordered the front commander to first clear the Zemland Peninsula of the enemy, leaving the necessary number of troops in the Konigsberg area for its solid blockade. The operation was scheduled to begin on 20 February.

However, the fascist German command preempted the offensive of the Soviet troops, strengthening the Zemland grouping at the expense of units transferred from Courland, and, having regrouped, ordered them to proceed to active operations. On February 19, the day before the planned offensive of the 1st Baltic Front, the enemy troops delivered two sudden counter attacks: from the west - to Koenigsberg and from the east - from the city. As a result of fierce three-day battles, the enemy managed to push the troops of the front from the coast of the bay and create a small corridor, restoring land communications along the bay. The Soviet command was faced with the task of uniting all forces in order to destroy enemy groups.

In order to coordinate the efforts of all the troops operating in East Prussia and achieve a unified leadership of them, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on February 25 abolished the 1st Baltic Front. On its basis, the Zemland Group of Forces was created under the command of General I. Kh. Bagramyan, which became part of the 3rd Belorussian Front. The commander of the group of troops was at the same time the deputy commander of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front.

From the end of February to mid-March, thorough preparations were made for a new offensive at the headquarters and troops of the front. Commanders and political workers were engaged in training subunits and units in how to break through defense lines, lines and positions of a fortified area and strongholds at night, force water barriers, navigate the terrain and in large settlements. Formations and units were replenished with personnel, weapons and military equipment. There was an accumulation of ammunition. At the same time, Army Group North was preparing to repel a possible offensive. By March 13, it included about 30 divisions, of which 11 were defending on the Zemland Peninsula and in Koenigsberg, and the rest - to the south and southwest of Koenigsberg.

Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky, taking into account these circumstances, first decided to destroy the enemy grouping, pressed against the Frisches-Haff Bay, temporarily stopping the offensive on the Zemland Peninsula. A double concentric strike from the east and southeast in the direction of Heiligenbeil was supposed to dismember the Heilsberg grouping into parts, isolate them, and then destroy them separately. The implementation of this plan was assigned to the 11th Guards, 5th, 28th, 2nd Guards, 31st, 3rd and 48th armies. The band of the 5th Guards Tank Army was also the last to be transferred, which, by decision of the Stavka, was redeployed to the Danzig direction.

Front-line reinforcements were distributed mainly between the 5th, 28th and 3rd armies, which were preparing an offensive in the direction of the main attack. Of the available 582 combat-ready tanks and self-propelled artillery installations, 513 units were concentrated in the offensive zones of these armies. In the interests of these armies, the 1st and 3rd air armies fought.

On March 17, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command approved the decision of the commander of the front, but demanded that the defeat of the enemy grouping, pressed against Frisches Haff Bay, be completed no later than March 22, and six days later to begin the defeat of the Koenigsberg grouping. The preparations for the assault on Koenigsberg and the subsequent defeat of the Nazi troops on the Samland Peninsula were directly involved at that time in the command and headquarters of the Samland Group.

The offensive in the area southwest of Koenigsberg resumed on March 13 after a 40-minute artillery preparation. Impenetrable mud made it extremely difficult for military operations of formations and off-road movement of wheeled vehicles, artillery systems, and even tanks. And yet, despite the stubborn resistance of the enemy, the troops of the front broke through his defenses in the main directions and persistently moved forward. Fog and constant rain made it difficult at first to use aviation. Only on March 18, when the weather cleared up a little, the 1st and 3rd air armies were able to actively support the attackers. On this day alone, 2520 sorties were made in the bands mainly of the 5th, 28th and 3rd armies. In the following days, the air armies not only supported the troops, together with part of the long-range aviation and navy forces, but also destroyed enemy transports and other means in the Frisches Haff, Danzig Bay and ports.

During the six days of the offensive, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front advanced 15-20 km, reducing the bridgehead of enemy troops to 30 km along the front and from 7 to 10 km in depth. The enemy found himself on a narrow coastal strip, shot through by artillery fire to the full depth.

On March 20, the fascist German command decided to evacuate the troops of the 4th Army by sea to the Pillau region, but the Soviet troops intensified their attacks and frustrated these calculations. Terrible orders and emergency measures to hold a bridgehead in East Prussia were in vain. Soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht on March 26 began to lay down their arms. The remnants of the Heilsberg group, compressed by the 5th Army on the Balga Peninsula, were finally liquidated on March 29. Only a few small units managed, with the help of improvised means, to cross over to the Frische-Nerung spit, from where they were later transferred to reinforce the Zemland task force. The entire southern coast of the Frisches Huff Bay became controlled by the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front.

For 48 days (from February 10 to March 29) the struggle against the Heilsberg grouping of the enemy continued. During this time, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front destroyed 220 thousand and captured about 60 thousand soldiers and officers, captured 650 tanks and assault guns, up to 5600 guns and mortars, over 8 thousand machine guns, more than 37 thousand vehicles, 128 aircraft . A great merit in the destruction of enemy troops and equipment on the battlefield, and especially watercraft in the Frisches Haff Bay, the Danzig Bay and the Pillau naval base, belongs to aviation. During the most intense period of the operation, from 13 to 27 March, the 1st and 3rd air armies made more than 20,000 sorties, 4,590 of them at night.

When the enemy was destroyed in the area southwest of Koenigsberg, torpedo boats, submarines and aircraft of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet attacked transports and warships, which made it difficult for the Courland and East Prussian groups to systematically evacuate.

Thus, as a result of fierce fighting, the most powerful of the three isolated units of Army Group North ceased to exist. In the course of the struggle, Soviet troops combined various techniques and methods of destroying the enemy: cutting off his troops in the ledges of the bridgehead, sequential compression of the encirclement front with massive use of artillery, as well as blockade operations, as a result of which aviation and fleet forces made it difficult for the enemy to supply and evacuate troops surrounded from land . After the liquidation of the enemy in the Heilsberg fortified area, the front command was able to release and regroup part of the forces and means near Koenigsberg, where another offensive operation was being prepared.

Storming of Koenigsberg. Elimination of the enemy grouping on the Zemland Peninsula

With the annihilation of the Nazi troops southwest of Koenigsberg, the situation on the right wing of the Soviet-German front improved significantly. In this regard, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command carried out a number of measures. On April 1, the 2nd Baltic Front was disbanded, part of its troops (4th shock, 22nd army and 19th tank corps) were put into reserve, and the front administration and the remaining formations were reassigned to the Leningrad Front. The 50th, 2nd Guards and 5th Armies of the 3rd Belorussian Front were transferred to the Zemland Peninsula to participate in the upcoming assault on Koenigsberg, and the 31st, 28th and 3rd armies were withdrawn to the Headquarters reserve. Some organizational changes were also made in command and control. On April 3, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command withdrew the administration and headquarters of the Zemland Group of Soviet Forces into reserve, and subordinated the forces and means to the command of the 3rd Belorussian Front. General I. Kh. Bagramyan was initially left as a deputy, and at the end of April he was appointed commander of the front.

The 3rd Belorussian Front received the task of defeating the Koenigsberg grouping and capturing the Koenigsberg fortress, and then clearing the entire Zemland Peninsula with the Pillau fortress and naval base. The Soviet troops operating against the fascist German armies in Courland were ordered to go over to a tough defense, and to keep strong reserves in combat readiness in the main axes, so that if the enemy defenses were weakened, they would immediately go on the offensive. In order to reveal the enemy's regroupings and his possible retreat, they had to conduct continuous reconnaissance and, by means of fire, keep him in constant tension. They were also entrusted with the task of preparing for an offensive in order to eliminate the Courland grouping. These measures were supposed to exclude the possibility of strengthening the Nazi troops at the expense of the Courland grouping in other directions.

By the beginning of April, the enemy grouping on the Samland Peninsula and in the fortress of Koenigsberg, although it had decreased, still posed a serious threat, since it relied on powerful defenses. Koenigsberg, which had been turned into a strong fortress long before the Second World War, was included in the Heilsberg fortified area. The entry of Soviet troops into the borders of East Prussia in October 1944 forced the Nazis to strengthen the defense of the city. It was singled out as an independent object of defense, the border of which passed along the outer contour of the fortress.

With the approach of the front to Konigsberg, the most important enterprises of the city and other military facilities were intensively buried in the ground. Field-type fortifications were erected in the fortress and on the approaches to it, which supplemented the long-term structures that existed here. In addition to the outer defensive bypass, which the Soviet troops partially overcame in the January battles, three defensive positions were prepared.

The outer contour and the first position had two or three trenches with communication passages and shelters for personnel. 6-8 km east of the fortress, they merged into one defensive line (six to seven trenches with numerous communication passages throughout the 15-kilometer section). At this position, there were 15 old forts with artillery pieces, machine guns and flamethrowers, connected by a single fire system. Each fort was prepared for all-round defense and was actually a small fortress with a garrison of 250-300 people. Between the forts there were 60 pillboxes and bunkers . On the outskirts of the city passed the second position, which included stone buildings, barricades, reinforced concrete firing points. The third position encircled the central part of the city, having fortifications of the old construction. The cellars of large brick buildings were connected by underground passages, and their ventilation windows were adapted for loopholes.

The fortress garrison consisted of four infantry divisions, several separate regiments, fortress and security formations, as well as Volkssturm battalions and numbered about 130 thousand people. It was armed with up to 4 thousand guns and mortars, 108 tanks and assault guns. From the air, this group was supported by 170 aircraft, which were based on the airfields of the Zemland Peninsula. In addition, the 5th Panzer Division was deployed to the west of the city, which took part in the defense of the city.

The 39th, 43rd, 50th and 11th Guards Armies, which had been in continuous heavy fighting for more than two months, were supposed to participate in the assault on Koenigsberg. The average staffing of rifle divisions in the armies by the beginning of April did not exceed 35-40 percent of the regular strength. In total, about 5.2 thousand guns and mortars, 125 tanks and 413 self-propelled artillery installations were involved in the offensive operation. To support the troops from the air, the 1st, 3rd and 18th air armies, part of the aviation forces of the Baltic Fleet, as well as the bomber corps from the 4th and 15th air armies, were allocated. In total, there were 2.4 thousand combat aircraft. The actions of these aviation associations and formations were coordinated by the representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, Air Chief Marshal A. A. Novikov. Thus, the troops of the front outnumbered the enemy in artillery - 1.3 times, in tanks and self-propelled artillery installations - 5 times, and in aircraft the advantage was overwhelming.

The commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky, decided to defeat the garrison of Koenigsberg by strikes of the 39th, 43rd and 50th armies from the north and the 11th guards army from the south and capture the city by the end of the third day of the operation. The offensive of the 2nd Guards and 5th Armies against the Zemland grouping of the enemy provided for the protection of the front troops from attacks from the northwest. In order to maximize the use of forces and means for the initial strike, the operational formation of the front and armies was planned to be in one echelon, and the battle formations of formations and units, as a rule, were built in two echelons. Strong assault groups and detachments were preparing for operations in the city in divisions. The specifics of the upcoming operation also affected the grouping of artillery. Thus, on the scale of the front, a front-line group of long-range artillery, an artillery blockade group of the Koenigsberg area and a group of railway artillery of the Baltic Fleet were created to influence communications and important objects behind enemy lines. In the rifle corps, strong destruction artillery corps groups were created, armed with 152-mm and 305-mm guns. A significant amount of artillery was allocated to support the combat operations of assault groups and detachments.

In the armies in the breakthrough areas, the density of artillery ranged from 150 to 250 guns and mortars per 1 km, and the density of tanks of direct support - from 18 to 23 units. This amounted to 72 percent of barrel and almost 100 percent of rocket artillery and more than 80 percent of armored vehicles. The main forces of the engineering troops of the front were also deployed here, a significant part of which was used as part of assault detachments and groups, where flamethrower units were also involved.

In the interests of the armies of the strike force, front-line and attached aviation was aimed. During the preparatory period, she was to make 5316 sorties, and on the first day of the offensive - 4124 sorties. It was envisaged that aviation would strike at defense facilities, artillery positions, places of concentration of manpower and military equipment, as well as at seaports and bases. The Red Banner Baltic Fleet also carefully prepared for the upcoming operation. Its aviation, submarines, torpedo boats, as well as armored boats transferred to the Pregel River by rail, and the 1st Guards Naval Railway Artillery Brigade, equipped with 130-mm 180-mm guns, were preparing to solve the problems of isolating the Koenigsberg garrison and interdicting its evacuation by sea.

Preparations for the assault on Koenigsberg began in March. It was carried out under the direct supervision of the command and staff of the Zemland Group of Soviet Forces. To work out the issues of interaction with the commanders of divisions, regiments and battalions, a detailed model of the city and its defense system made by the headquarters of the group was used. According to him, the commanders studied the plan for the upcoming assault in their bands. Before the start of the offensive, all officers, up to and including the platoon commander, were given a city plan with a single numbering of quarters and the most important objects, which greatly facilitated command and control of troops during the battle. After the abolition of the Zemland Group of Forces, the headquarters of the 3rd Belorussian Front began to direct the preparation of the operation. However, for the purpose of continuity, employees of the headquarters of the Zemland group were involved in command and control of the troops.

All the activities of the troops in preparation for the assault were permeated with purposeful party-political work, directed by the military councils of the 3rd Belorussian Front and the Zemland Group of Forces, whose members were Generals V.E. Makarov and M.V. Rudakov. The commanders and political workers took measures to strengthen the party and Komsomol organizations of the assault detachments with the best communists and Komsomol members. The front and army press widely covered the experience of the Soviet troops in street fighting in Stalingrad, in the capture of fortified areas in East Prussia. In all parts, conversations were held on the topic "What do the Stalingrad battles teach us." Newspapers and leaflets glorified the heroic actions of fighters and commanders who showed special courage and ingenuity during the assault on fortifications, published recommendations for conducting combat in a large city . Meetings were held between the heads of political agencies and deputy commanders for the political part of artillery and mortar formations and units, as well as tank and artillery-self-propelled regiments of the reserve of the Supreme High Command. These meetings contributed to the strengthening of party-political work to ensure interaction during the operation.

The direct assault on the fortress was preceded by a four-day period of destruction of the enemy's long-term engineering structures, and one day was spent on fire reconnaissance and identification of targets. Unfortunately, due to unfavorable weather, aviation was unable to act in accordance with the plan. On April 4 and 5, only 766 sorties were flown.

On April 6, at 12 o'clock, after a powerful artillery preparation, the infantry and tanks, following the barrage of fire, moved to storm the fortifications. The enemy offered stubborn resistance. Furious counterattacks were made at the slightest advance of the attackers. By the end of the day, the 43rd, 50th and 11th Guards Armies broke through the fortifications of the outer defenses of Koenigsberg, reached its outskirts and cleared a total of 102 quarters from enemy troops.

Formations of the 39th Army, having broken through the outer defensive line, reached the railway to Pillau and cut it west of Koenigsberg. The threat of isolation hung over the Königsberg garrison. To avoid this, the fascist German command committed the 5th Panzer Division, separate infantry and anti-tank units, to the west of the fortress. Meteorological conditions ruled out the participation in combat operations of bomber aircraft and a significant part of attack aircraft. Therefore, the air army of the front, having made only 274 sorties in the first two hours of the assault, was unable to prevent the advancement and commissioning of enemy reserves.

On April 7, the armies, having reinforced the battle formations of formations with tanks, direct fire guns and anti-tank weapons, continued the offensive. Taking advantage of the clearing weather, aviation began intensive combat operations at dawn. After three strikes by front-line aviation, 516 long-range bombers of the 18th Air Army made a massive raid on the fortress. Under the powerful cover of 232 fighters, they destroyed fortress defenses, artillery firing positions and destroyed enemy troops. The resistance of the besieged garrison then declined. The Pillau base, where warships and enemy transports were located, was also subjected to repeated massive raids by the fleet aviation and the 4th Air Army. In just one day of the battle, Soviet aviation made 4,758 sorties, dropping 1,658 tons of bombs.

Under the cover of artillery and aviation, infantry and tanks, with assault detachments and groups in front, persistently made their way to the city center. During the assault, they captured another 130 quarters, three forts, a marshalling yard and several industrial enterprises. The fierceness of the fighting did not weaken even with the onset of darkness. At night alone, Soviet pilots made 1,800 sorties, destroying many firing points and enemy units.

An unparalleled feat was accomplished by a unit of reconnaissance sappers, led by junior lieutenant A. M. Roditelev. The platoon was part of the assault groups of the 13th Guards Rifle Corps of General A. I. Lopatin. Having penetrated deep into the rear of the enemy, the sappers captured 15 anti-aircraft guns, destroyed their crews and, in an unequal battle, managed to hold their positions until the units of the 33rd Guards Rifle Division of Colonel N. I. Krasnov approached. For his heroism, Junior Lieutenant Roditelev was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and the soldiers of his unit were awarded military orders and medals.

On the morning of April 8, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front continued to storm the fortifications of the city. With the support of aviation and artillery, they broke the enemy's resistance in the northwestern and southern parts of the fortress. The left-flank formations of the 11th Guards Army reached the Pregel River, crossed it on the move and connected with units of the 43rd Army advancing from the north. The garrison of Koenigsberg was surrounded and dismembered, command and control of troops was disrupted. On that day alone, 15,000 people were taken prisoner.

Soviet air strikes reached their maximum force. In just the third day of the assault, 6,077 sorties were made, of which 1,818 were at night. Soviet pilots dropped 2,100 tons of bombs of various calibers on the fortifications and enemy troops in the area of ​​Koenigsberg and Pillau. An attempt by the Nazi command to organize a breakthrough of the encirclement front by strikes from within and from without failed.

On April 9, the fighting unfolded with renewed vigor. The fascist German troops were again subjected to artillery and air strikes. It became clear to many soldiers of the garrison that resistance was pointless. “The tactical situation in Koenigsberg,” General O. Lash, the commandant of the fortress, recalled this day, “was hopeless.” He ordered the subordinate units to capitulate. Thus ended the existence of another enemy grouping in East Prussia. Aviation played a huge role in its destruction, making 13,930 sorties in four days.

As a result of the operation, Soviet troops destroyed up to 42 thousand and captured about 92 thousand people, including 4 generals led by the commandant of the fortress and more than 1800 officers. As trophies, they got 3.7 thousand guns and mortars, 128 aircraft, as well as many other military equipment, weapons and property.

Moscow celebrated the feat of heroes with festive fireworks. 97 units and formations that directly stormed the main city of East Prussia were given the honorary name of Koenigsberg. All participants in the assault were awarded the medal "For the Capture of Koenigsberg", established by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in honor of this victory.

After the loss of Koenigsberg, the Nazi command was still trying to keep the Samland Peninsula. By April 13, eight infantry and tank divisions were defending here, as well as several separate regiments and battalions of the Volkssturm, which were part of the Zemland task force, which included about 65 thousand people, 1.2 thousand guns, 166 tanks and guns.

To eliminate enemy troops on the peninsula, the command of the 3rd Belorussian Front allocated the 2nd Guards, 5th, 39th, 43rd and 11th Guards armies. More than 111 thousand soldiers and officers, 5.2 thousand guns and mortars, 451 rocket artillery installations, 324 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations were involved in the operation. The main blow in the direction of Fischhausen was to be delivered by the 5th and 39th armies in order to cut the enemy troops into the northern and southern parts and subsequently destroy them by the joint efforts of all armies. “To provide a strike force from the flanks, the 2nd Guards and 43rd Armies were preparing for an offensive along the northern and southern coasts of the Zemland Peninsula, the 11th Guards Army was the second echelon. The Red Banner Baltic Fleet was given the task of securing the coastal flank of the 2nd Guards Army from possible enemy shelling and landings from the sea, assisting the offensive along the coast with naval and coastal artillery fire, and disrupting the evacuation of enemy troops and equipment by sea.

On the night before the offensive, the 1st and 3rd air armies delivered a series of massive strikes against the battle formations of the enemy troops, defensive structures, ports and communication centers.

On the morning of April 13, after a powerful one-hour artillery preparation, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, with the support of aviation, went on the offensive. The enemy, relying on a system of field engineering structures, offered unusually stubborn resistance. Numerous counterattacks by his infantry were supported not only by field artillery fire, but also by artillery from surface ships and self-propelled landing barges.

Slowly but steadily, the Soviet troops advanced westward. Despite the strong and continuous combat support of aviation, which made 6111 sorties on the first day of the operation, the main strike force managed to advance only 3-5 km. Heavy fighting continued into the next day. Especially stubborn was the resistance of the enemy in front of the center and the left wing of the front. However, fearing dismemberment, the Nazi command from April 14 began to gradually withdraw its units to Pillau.

Taking advantage of this, the Soviet troops attacked his positions along the entire front. The greatest success was achieved by the 2nd Guards Army.

On April 15, its formations cleared the entire northwestern part of the Zemland Peninsula from the enemy and rushed along the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea to the south. By the end of the day, under the powerful onslaught of Soviet troops, the defenses that blocked the path to the Pillau Spit collapsed. On the night of April 17, with a double blow from the north and east, formations of the 39th and 43rd armies captured the city and port of Fishhausen.

The remnants of the enemy grouping (15-20 thousand people) retreated to the northern part of the Pillau Spit, where they entrenched themselves on a pre-prepared defensive line. The 2nd Guards Army, weakened in previous battles, was unable to break through its defenses on the move and suspended the offensive.

The 1st and 3rd air armies conducted combat operations with great tension, making about 5 thousand sorties daily. The forces of the fleet covered the coastal flank of the advancing troops, disrupted the evacuation of enemy personnel and military equipment by sea, and sank several ships and transports, landing barges and submarines.

The front commander decided to bring the 11th Guards Army into battle. Replacing the troops of the 2nd Guards Army west of Fischhausen on the night of April 18, the formations of the 11th Guards Army conducted reconnaissance in force on the very first day, and on the morning of April 20, after artillery preparation, attacked the enemy. For six days there were battles on the outskirts of Pillau, one of the strongholds of East Prussia. The wooded area of ​​the spit, in combination with engineering structures, increased the stability of the enemy's defense, and the small width of the land (2-5 km), which completely excluded maneuver, forced the attackers to carry out frontal attacks. Only by the end of April 24, the 11th Guards Army broke through the 6-kilometer zone of defensive positions covering the approaches to Pillau from the north . On April 25, Soviet troops broke into its outskirts. By evening, a red flag was raised over the city. The last knot of enemy resistance in the southwestern part of the Zemland Peninsula was eliminated.

After the capture of Pillau, only the narrow Frische-Nerung spit remained in the hands of the Nazis. The front commander entrusted the 11th Guards Army with the support of the forces of the South-Western Marine Defense Region with the task of forcing the strait and liquidating these troops. On the night of April 26, advanced formations of the army, under the cover of artillery and aviation fire, crossed the strait. At the same time, the rifle regiment of the 83rd Guards Rifle Division of the 11th Guards Army, the combined regiment of the 43rd Army, together with the regiment of the 260th Marine Brigade, were landed by the fleet on the western and eastern coasts of the Frische-Nerung Spit. Together they captured the northern section of the spit. However, despite the active support of aviation and navy, the offensive to the south that day failed. The formations of the army entrenched themselves at the reached line. In the center and in the southern part of the Frische-Nerung spit, as well as at the mouth of the Vistula River, the remnants of the once strong Prussian grouping offered stubborn resistance. On May 9, more than 22,000 enemy soldiers and officers laid down their arms.

The defeat of the enemy on the Zemland Peninsula was the finale of the entire East Prussian operation.

A positive role in the development of events in East Prussia was played by the military operations of the Soviet troops in Courland. The fighting formations of the 1st and 2nd Baltic, and then the Leningrad fronts for a long time fettered a large enemy grouping here.

At the cost of great effort, they successively broke open the enemy's defenses in depth, destroyed his manpower and equipment, and prevented the transfer of his formations to other sectors of the Soviet-German front.

In January - February, the main hostilities were carried out in the Tukums and Liepaja directions. Having lost hope of uniting the Courland and East Prussian groupings, the enemy during this period began the transfer of a number of divisions from Courland. To prevent this, the 2nd Baltic Front - Commander General A.I. Eremenko, Chief of Staff General L.M. Sandalov - carried out an offensive operation. Initially, on February 16, an auxiliary strike was delivered on its right wing by the forces of the 1st Shock Army under the command of General V.N. Razuvaev and partly of the 22nd Army of General G.P. Korotkov. The formations of these armies successfully coped with the task of preventing the transfer of enemy units to the Saldus and Liepaja directions. Then, on February 20, the main grouping of the front, consisting of the 6th Guards Army of General I. M. Chistyakov and part of the forces of the 51st Army under the command of General Ya. G. Kreizer, went on the offensive. The blow was delivered in the direction of Liepaja with the immediate task of eliminating the enemy in the Priekule region - a large center of resistance in the Liepaja direction and capturing the line of the Vartava River. Only by bringing two infantry divisions into battle did the enemy manage on February 22 to temporarily delay the advancing units of the 6th Guards and 51st armies. However, on the morning of the next day, after a partial regrouping, these armies resumed the offensive and captured Priekule, and by the end of February 28 they reached the Vartava River. And although the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front failed to develop a tactical success into an operational one, that is, to reach Liepaja, the task of pinning down the Kurland Army Group was basically solved.

In March, in the conditions of the spring thaw, when the troops experienced great difficulties with the delivery and evacuation, the fighting on the outskirts of Liepaja and in other areas did not stop. On March 17, in the general direction of Saldus, the 10th Guards and 42nd Armies went on the offensive under the command of Generals M.I. Kazakov and V.P. Sviridov. The 42nd Army included the 130th Latvian and 8th Estonian rifle corps. Due to bad weather, the troops did not have air support, but, despite this, the Soviet soldiers stubbornly moved forward. Particularly heavy were the battles for the Blidene railway station, which was taken on March 19 by forces of the 130th Latvian and 8th Estonian rifle corps.

In accordance with the terms of surrender on May 8, from 11 p.m., the fascist German armies blockaded on the Courland Peninsula ceased resistance. The troops of the Leningrad Front disarmed and captured almost 200,000 enemy groupings. The Soviet soldiers, on the whole, successfully solved the important task of the Headquarters of fettering the Kurland Army Group. For more than five months, they, continuously conducting active operations, inflicted significant losses on the enemy and prevented the transfer of divisions to other sectors of the Soviet-German front.

The victory of the Soviet Armed Forces in East Prussia and Northern Poland was of great military and political significance. It led to the defeat of a large strategic grouping of Nazi troops. In total, during the fighting, the Soviet army completely destroyed more than 25 enemy divisions, and 12 divisions suffered losses from 50 to 75 percent. The destruction of the East Prussian grouping significantly weakened the forces of the Wehrmacht. The German fleet lost a number of important naval bases, seaports and harbors.

Fulfilling a noble mission, the Soviet army liberated the northern regions of Poland that they had torn away from the fascist invaders. At the Potsdam Conference of the leaders of the three allied powers - the USSR, the USA and Great Britain, held in July - August 1945, a historic decision was made to liquidate the East Prussian foothold of German militarism. Koenigsberg and the surrounding areas were transferred to the Soviet Union. On this territory in 1946 the Kaliningrad region of the RSFSR was formed. The rest of East Prussia became part of the Polish People's Republic.

The East Prussian operation was united by the general plan of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command with operations in other strategic directions. The cutting off and then the destruction of the German armies in East Prussia ensured the military operations of the Soviet army in the Berlin direction from the north. With the withdrawal of the forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front at the end of January to the Vistula in the Torun region and to the north, favorable conditions were created for the liquidation of the East Pomeranian grouping.

In terms of the scale of the tasks that the fronts had to solve, the variety of forms and methods of hostilities, as well as the final results, this is one of the instructive operations of the Soviet Armed Forces, carried out with decisive goals. The East Prussian operation was carried out by the troops of three fronts, long-range aviation (18th Army) and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. It is an example of the correct determination by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the directions of the main attacks of the fronts, which were chosen on the basis of a deep analysis of the situation, the allocation of appropriate forces and means, as well as the organization of clear interaction between the fronts, which delivered strikes in independent, far separated directions. It was necessary not only to create powerful strike groupings of the fronts, but also to allocate the necessary forces both to expand the offensive towards the flanks and to protect against possible attacks from the north and south.

The plans of the fascist German command to position their reserves in such a way as to launch counterattacks on the flanks of the advancing fronts, as was done by the Kaiser's troops in 1914, turned out to be unrealistic.

The idea of ​​inflicting deep strikes by the fronts and the need to build them up when overcoming the enemy's fortified and deeply echeloned defenses corresponded to the bold massing of their forces and means in narrow sectors, as well as the deep operational formation of fronts and armies.

In East Prussia, Soviet troops successfully solved the problem of breaking through a heavily fortified defense and developing an offensive. In the face of stubborn enemy resistance and adverse weather, the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone took on a protracted character: on the 2nd Belorussian Front it was broken through on the second or third, and on the 3rd Belorussian - on the fifth or sixth day of the operation. To complete its breakthrough, it was necessary to involve not only reserves and mobile army groups, but also a mobile front group (3rd Belorussian Front). However, the enemy also used all his reserves in the struggle for the tactical zone. This further ensured a faster advance of the fronts (over 15 km per day by rifle and 22-36 km by tank formations), which on the thirteenth - eighteenth day not only surrounded, but also dismembered the entire East Prussian grouping and completed their task. The timely use by the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front of success in the new direction, the introduction of two tank corps and the army of the second echelon of the front changed the situation and contributed to an increase in the pace of the offensive.

The acceleration of the offensive was also determined by the continuity of combat operations, which was achieved by special training of subunits and units for an offensive at night. So, after being introduced into the battle, the 11th Guards Army fought 110 km to Koenigsberg, overcoming most of them (60 km) at night.

The defeat of the East Prussian grouping was achieved in long and difficult battles. The operation lasted 103 days, with a particularly long time spent on the destruction of isolated groups. This was determined by the fact that the cut-off Nazi troops defended themselves in fortified areas, on the ground and in weather conditions unfavorable for an offensive, in a situation where the enemy was not completely blocked from the sea.

During the East Prussian operation, the troops had to repel strong counterattacks by the enemy, who was trying to restore land communication between the cut-off groups and the main forces of the Wehrmacht. However, by a quick maneuver with the forces and means of the troops of the fronts, they thwarted the plans of the fascist German command. Only west of Koenigsberg did he manage to create a small corridor along the bay.

To carry out the operation, large forces of Soviet aviation were involved, which ensured undivided air supremacy. The interaction of several air armies and aviation of the Navy was successfully carried out. Aviation, using the slightest improvement in the weather, made about 146 thousand sorties during the operation . She conducted reconnaissance, struck at the troops and defenses of the enemy, and played a huge role in crushing his fortifications, especially during the assault on Koenigsberg.

Significant assistance to the troops was provided by the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. In difficult conditions of basing and a mine situation, fleet aviation, submarines and torpedo boats acted on the enemy’s sea lanes in the Baltic Sea, disrupting its transportation, bombing and assault strikes by aviation, artillery fire from armored boats and railway batteries, landing tactical assault forces contributed to the offensive of ground forces on the seaside direction. However, the Baltic Fleet failed to block the groupings of enemy troops completely pressed to the sea due to the lack of the ship forces necessary for this.

The troops of the fronts have gained valuable experience in the struggle for large settlements and cities, which were usually captured on the move or after a short preparation. In the same places where the enemy managed to organize their defense, the garrisons were surrounded and destroyed in the course of a systematic assault. A significant role in this was played by assault detachments and groups, where the actions of sappers were especially effective.

Political work, systematically carried out by the military councils of the fronts and armies, political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations, ensured a high offensive impulse in the troops, the desire to overcome all difficulties and achieve combat missions. The operation is evidence of the maturity of the Soviet military leaders, their high art of leading troops. During the operation, the fighters and commanders showed the greatest courage and steadfastness in a difficult struggle. All this was done by the Soviet Armed Forces in the name of the liberation of mankind from fascist tyranny.

The motherland highly appreciated the feats of arms of its sons. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers were awarded orders and medals, those who especially distinguished themselves were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. For the skillful leadership of the troops, the Order of Victory was awarded for the second time to the front commander Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevsky. Commander of the Air Force of the Soviet Army Chief Marshal of Aviation A. A. Novikov became a Hero of the Soviet Union, and generals A. P. Beloborodov, P. K. Koshevoy, T. T. Khryukin, pilots V. A. Aleksenko, Amet Khan Sultan, L. I. Beda, A. Ya. Brandys, I. A. Vorobyov, M. G. Gareev, P. Ya. Golovachev, E. M. Kungurtsev, G. M. Mylnikov, V. I. Mykhlik, A. K. Nedbailo, G. M. Parshin, A. N. Prokhorov, N. I. Semeyko, A. S. Smirnov and M. T. Stepanishchev were twice Heroes of the Soviet Union.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR noted the courage of the pilots of the Normandie-Neman Aviation Regiment, who ended their combat career in East Prussia. During the war, the brave French patriots made more than 5 thousand sorties, conducted 869 air battles and shot down 273 enemy aircraft. The regiment was awarded the Orders of the Red Banner and Alexander Nevsky. 83 people, 24 of them in East Prussia, were awarded orders of the Soviet Union, and four brave pilots - M. Albert, R. de la Puap, J. Andre and M. Lefebvre (posthumously) - were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. After the war, 41 Yak-3 combat aircraft, on which French pilots fought, were handed over to them as a gift from the Soviet people. On them, the pilots of the regiment returned to their homeland.

The glorious victory in this operation went down in military history as an epic of valor, courage and heroism of Soviet soldiers, officers and generals. For exemplary performance of combat missions, over 1,000 formations and units were awarded orders, and 217 of them received the names of Insterburg, Mlavsky, Koenigsberg and others. Twenty-eight times Moscow saluted the valiant soldiers in honor of their victories in East Prussia.

Thus, as a result of the victorious completion of the offensive of the Soviet Armed Forces in East Prussia and Northern Poland, fascist Germany suffered irreparable damage. The loss of one of the most important military-economic regions had a negative impact on the general state of the country's military economy and significantly worsened the operational and strategic position of the Wehrmacht on the Soviet-German front.

Chapter five.
New plans, new tasks

After the end of the active hostilities of our troops at the end of October 1944, the formations of the 11th Guards Army, together with other armies of the 3rd Belorussian Front, went over to the defensive on the lines reached. We knew that defense was not an end in itself for us, not the main thing, that it was only an operational pause, a temporary respite.

The general military-political situation by the beginning of 1945 was developing in favor of the Soviet Union. The entire territory of our country, with the exception of Courland, was liberated from the enemy. The Red Army transferred hostilities to the territory of the countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. The workers of the Soviet rear increased the pace of military production every day - the army received a large amount of the latest military equipment for that time.

The position of Nazi Germany worsened. She lost almost all her allies - Finland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania. A national liberation movement developed in Italy, France, Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece, Poland, Czechoslovakia and other European countries. Protest against the war unleashed by the fascist clique was also growing in Germany itself. Heavy defeats at the front, which led to huge human and material losses, caused new "total" mobilizations both for the front and for the construction of defensive structures. The deterioration of the material situation of the working population, poor nutrition, and most importantly, the obvious hopelessness of the war - all this gave rise to decadent moods.

The Hitlerite clique, no longer relying on the effectiveness of its propaganda, intensified its punitive actions, trying to support the “victorious spirit” of the Germans with bloody terror. The fascist newspaper "Schwarze Kor" openly called for the drowning in blood of all those who "... whine, grumble, grumble and extol the views and principles of the enemy ..." (246)

However, despite the unfavorable situation for fascist Germany, it still possessed sufficiently powerful armed forces capable of stubbornly resisting in all the main directions of the Soviet-German front, including in East Prussia. Army Group Center, thrown back in the course of the fighting towards the Baltic Sea, moved to a strong defense on the front from the mouth of the Neman to the Vistula (north of Warsaw) with a length of 555 km.

Our troops in the northwestern direction reached the Gulf of Riga, blocked the main forces of Army Group North from land on the Courland Peninsula, and in the Gumbinnen area invaded East Prussia to a depth of 60 km, forming a wide ledge in its territory stretching up to 100 km.

North of the Masurian Lakes, on the front from Sudarga (on the Neman River) to Augustow with a total length of up to 170 km, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front operated, which by the beginning of 1945 had six armies - 39th, 5th, 28th and 31st combined arms , 2nd and 11th Guards. Five of them were in the first operational echelon of the front, and the 2nd Guards, which arrived from the 1st Baltic Front in the area south of Shtallupenen, was in reserve.

To the right, from the mouth of the Neman to the Sudarga, the troops of the 43rd Army of the 1st Baltic Front defended themselves, hanging over the northern flank of the East Prussian grouping of the enemy. To the left, from Augustow to Serock (30 km north of Warsaw), are the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front.

The troops of the 11th Guards Army after the Gumbinnen operation of 1944 put themselves in order, received replenishment in people and equipment, and engaged in intense combat training. At the same time, detailed reconnaissance of the enemy's defense was carried out, in particular, continuous aerial photography of fortified areas and defensive lines up to and including Königsberg.

The troops met the New Year of 1945 in an atmosphere of high political upsurge. Everyone understood that this year the fascist beast would be finished off. When exactly this will happen, we, of course, did not know. But one thing was extremely clear - the fascist army, even with all the "total" and "super-total" mobilizations, would not last long, although fierce battles were coming.

Army Group Center, to which the Nazi command entrusted the defense of East Prussia, consisted of one tank and two field armies (34 infantry, 3 tank, 4 motorized divisions and 1 brigade). It consisted of 580 thousand soldiers and officers, 200 thousand Volkssturm, 8200 guns and mortars, about 700 tanks and assault guns, 515 aircraft (247). The commander of the Army Group "Center" was Colonel-General G. Reinhardt.

These troops occupied the following sectors of the front: the 3rd Panzer Army defended along the left bank of the Neman from the sea to Sudarga and further south to Stallupenen, i.e., on the northeastern and eastern approaches to East Prussia; 4th field army - east of the Masurian lakes at the turn of Stallupenen - Novogrudok; 2nd Army - along the river. Narew and the mouth of the Western Bug, from Novogrudok to the Vistula. The reserve of Army Group Center consisted of the SS Panzer Corps Grossdeutschland (two motorized divisions), the SS Brandenburg Motorized Division, the 23rd Infantry Division and the 10th Scooter Fighter Brigade. The last three formations were located in the Letzen area.

The enemy had a dense network of highways in the rear, along which he could quickly transfer troops. But it was not this, in principle, important advantage of the Germans that presented the greatest difficulty for us. The main thing was that they relied on pre-prepared defensive lines and lines. The troops of the first echelon of our front had to break through one fortified position after another, without leaving the operational space. In other words, they had to overcome, as it were, a continuous defensive area, which made it impossible to maneuver forces.

The enemy had another advantage. His grouping was supported from the sea by significant naval forces based in close proximity to the area of ​​operations of the East Prussian grouping. During this period, large surface ships of our Red Banner Baltic Fleet, due to the difficult mine situation in the Gulf of Finland, were based in eastern ports and could not have a significant impact on the course of events. True, in the southern part of the sea, its submarines and the strike group of naval aviation were active, which delivered powerful blows to the enemy's navy. Thus, only in January, the pilots of two divisions destroyed 11 transport ships and several patrol boats (248).

However, with all these difficulties, the alignment of forces against the East Prussian grouping was undoubtedly in our favor by the new year. Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy in manpower by 2.8 times, in artillery by 3.4 times, in tanks by 4.7 times and in aviation by 5.8 times (249). Hitler's generals in their memoirs, quite reliably showing the numbers of our divisions, often "forget" at the same time to point out their quantitative difference from the German in manpower and equipment. Such force-counting tricks can easily be found in the memoirs of Guderian, Manstein, Blumentritt, Frisner, and others.

Directly in front of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, formations of the 3rd Panzer and part of the formations of the 4th Army were defending. In the tactical defense zone, the enemy had the 9th and 26th Army Corps, the Hermann Goering Paratrooper Tank Corps, and the 41st Tank Corps. They consisted of 13 infantry and one motorized division. In addition, the fascist German command had 6 brigades and 4 divisions of assault guns, 7 separate artillery regiments of the RGK, a brigade of six-barreled mortars, a rocket artillery regiment, a separate tank regiment and up to 30 separate battalions for various purposes (sapper, construction, security and etc.)(250) . The main enemy forces (8 out of 14 divisions) were located in front of the front of the 39th, 5th and 28th armies, which were supposed to deliver the main blow. In addition to the divisions of the first line, there were reserves of the 3rd Panzer and 4th Armies in this sector: the 5th Panzer Division in the Kraupishken area, the 1st Parachute-Panzer Division in the Gumbinnen area and the 18th Motorized Division in the Troiburg area (251 ) . The overall operational density of the German defense averaged one division per 12 km. The highest density was created in the Zilkallen-Gumbinnen section (the section of our breakthrough), where it reached one division per 6–7 km. In the same direction, the enemy kept a large number of reinforcement units.

However, the headquarters of the 3rd Belorussian Front, when planning the operation in the first decade of December 1944, had somewhat different information about the enemy. Based on intelligence data obtained during the period of preparation for the offensive, he believed that not 15 (including the reserve 5th tank division) were defending in the front line, but 24 divisions, including 7 tank, 5 tank brigades. 6 assault gun brigades and other reinforcement units. Of these, according to the headquarters of the front, in the first line there were 15 infantry, reinforced by artillery, tanks and assault guns, in the second - all tank divisions and brigades. According to rough estimates, there were up to 1000 tanks and 900 assault guns (252) in tank and assault formations.

Taking into account these data, a front-line operation plan was drawn up, presented on December 12, 1944 to the General Staff. The inflated information about the composition of the enemy forces obviously influenced the plan and decision of the front commander. Despite the latter's instructions from December 12 to December 31 "to clarify the numbering of formations in front of the front and find out the intentions of the German command," the armies of the first echelon and the intelligence department of the front could not do this.

The German defense in the Insterburg-Königsberg direction was highly developed in terms of engineering: powerful defensive zones, echeloned to a considerable depth and consisting of field defensive positions and a system of long-term fortified areas (253).

The leading edge of the main line of defense, which the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front were to break through, ran along the line west of Sudarga - Pilkallen - Walterkemen - Goldap. In the direction of the main attack, this strip had two fortified positions up to 10 km deep.

The Ilmenhorst fortified area was located 30-40 km from the main strip (its front line of defense ran along the Tilsit - Gumbinnen - Lissen line), covering the distant approaches to Koenigsberg. The area had three defensive lines of the field type. The nearest approaches to Koenigsberg from the east and southeast (at the turn of the river Daime - Tapiau - Friedland - Heilsberg) were protected by the long-term fortified position of the Heilsberg fortified area. It included an average of up to 5, and on the main directions up to 10-12 pillboxes per 1 km of the front.

After our offensive in October 1944, the fascist German command began to build and improve engineering defensive structures on the territory of East Prussia more intensively. Field engineering filling was created between pillboxes (trenches, communication passages, wire barriers), minefields were laid, anti-tank ditches were cleared and strengthened, and barriers (hedgehogs and gouges) were installed. On the Koenigsberg direction, the enemy created nine defensive lines, located 12–15 km from one another. Each frontier consisted of two or three lines of trenches (254). Gumbinnen and Insterburg were turned into powerful defense centers, which, in cooperation with the Tilsit and Darkemen nodes, formed the basis of defensive structures.

As General of the Infantry O. Lash, who was later taken prisoner, told us, “defensive construction was carried out at a feverish pace. Guderian (255) and the Gauleiters constantly intervened in the management of the work ... In December 1944, General Guderian instructed: “To transfer the main forces from the line on the Daima to the Koenigsberg area ...” The Gauleiters protested, as they believed that it was necessary to complete the construction on the outskirts of the city. Guderian was forced to agree... Nevertheless, it must be admitted, - Lash concluded, - that in the field of strengthening East Prussia, before January 1945, they managed to do a lot ”(256).

Thus, the fascist German command created a defense in depth in the Insterburg-Königsberg direction. The lull that came on this sector of the Soviet-German front at the end of October 1944 was used by Hitler's propaganda to inspire its troops with the idea that with their stamina the Red Army would not be able to overcome the impregnable fortifications of East Prussia, that huge forces were concentrated on the territory of the latter due to the creation of the Volkssturm, that new weapons are about to appear in parts. The message about the German offensive in the West (in the Ardennes), which German propaganda presented as a miracle that astonished the world, also had an encouraging effect on the soldiers.

The power of this propaganda should not be underestimated. A POW soldier of the 349th Infantry Division, Krauthoser, said on January 9: “Despite the talk of a possible Russian offensive, the mood of the soldiers was calm. Haven't heard panic talk yet. The officers in conversations with the soldiers constantly set the task of steadfastly holding the occupied lines and said that we had enough equipment to carry out this task. Most of the soldiers believed in a German victory. They said: “It doesn't matter that we stepped back - we still win. When and how is the Fuhrer's business" (257) .

It is important to note that the overwhelming majority of the personnel of the enemy troops defending here consisted of natives of East Prussia, mostly volunteers (258). It was impossible to discount the Germans' fear of severe retribution for the crimes committed in the Soviet Union: “... cruel repressions of the Gestapo command and organs, unrestrained chauvinistic propaganda - all this allowed the enemy to strengthen discipline and raise the morale of the troops. The bulk of the Nazi soldiers and officers were determined to fight resolutely for East Prussia" (259).

The calls of the Hitlerite leadership to defend East Prussia to the last strength proceeded from a common strategic task - to delay in every possible way the final collapse of the fascist military machine. The East Prussian grouping hung over the troops of the 2nd and 1st Belorussian fronts, creating a real threat to the plans of the Soviet command during decisive operations in the Berlin direction. The fascist German command planned to inflict a strong counterattack on the right flank of the 1st Belorussian Front in the event it went over to the offensive in the Warsaw-Berlin direction (260). Therefore, it sought to hold East Prussia to the last opportunity. The plan, developed by the command of Army Group Center, took into account the experience of the defense of East Prussia in 1914, and provided for the maximum use of the Masurian Lakes and powerful defensive fortifications. In an effort to clarify the forces and means of our strike force in the Insterburg direction and to unravel the direction of the main attack, the fascist German command stepped up its air and ground reconnaissance. At the beginning of January 1945, it launched a private offensive operation against the troops of the 39th Army with up to one infantry division with 50-60 tanks in the Pilkallen area, which ended unsuccessfully for it (261). Later, the enemy repeated an equally unsuccessful operation in the Filipuwa area on the front of the 31st Army.

But, like all other plans of the Nazis, the plan for the defense of East Prussia had significant flaws. First, he underestimated the ability of the Red Army to successfully advance simultaneously in the East Prussian and Warsaw-Berlin directions; secondly, he overestimated the fortifications of East Prussia and its geographical conditions - a vast lake-swampy region advanced to the east; thirdly, the plan did not take into account the great capabilities of our mobile formations advancing on fortified areas.

The preparation of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front for the offensive was no secret to the Nazi command. Thus, in the operational summary of the headquarters of the 3rd Panzer Army for January 11, 1945, it was noted that "the enemy will be ready for offensive operations in 2-3 days" (262) . The next report of this headquarters the next day stated that "the preparation of the enemy for an offensive in front of the front of the 3rd Panzer Army, apparently completed" (263). The fascist German command took urgent measures to repulse our attacks. To save manpower and military equipment from the initial strike, the combat formations of the troops were dispersed in depth, and firing positions were changed in artillery units.

Subsequently, this was confirmed by the prisoners. The commander of the infantry division at the interview said that on the evening of January 12, the commander of the 4th Army informed him of a possible Russian offensive on the night of January 13 and that you need to be ready to repel it. The commander of the 4th Army proposed to echelon the personnel in depth (264). A prisoner of the 6th company of the 1099th infantry regiment stated on January 13:

Knowing about your offensive, the battle formations of the company before the artillery preparation were reorganized. In the first trench, one platoon was left, as it were, in combat guards, the rest of the company was in the second line. The main resistance of the company was to be in the Kattenau area (265).

In the conditions of a lake-swampy region, such as the East Prussian bridgehead, it was not difficult for the fascist German command to determine the most probable directions of the main attacks of our troops. In terms of terrain conditions, the Insterburg direction was the most convenient for combat operations of all branches of the armed forces. Advancing here, bypassing the Masurian Lakes, from the north, it was possible to cut the Tilsit-Insterburg grouping into pieces. Therefore, it was from here that the fascist German command expected our main attack and already at the beginning of January began intensively throwing infantry and tanks onto the Pilkallen-Gumbinnen sector to replenish the divisions standing on the defensive (266). In the Darkemen direction and in the region of the Masurian Lakes, as the headquarters of the 3rd Belorussian Front had assumed, the enemy also created a strong grouping of infantry and tanks, intending to launch a powerful counterattack from the south in the event of a breakthrough of our units north of Gumbinnen.

The fascist German command deployed its forces and means in the zone of the 3rd Belorussian Front, taking into account the importance of directions and terrain conditions. So, in the Tilsit direction, in the area from the river. The Neman to Pilkallen, up to 40 km wide, was defended by three infantry divisions (one division per 13 km). In the Insterburg direction, on the Pilkallen-Goldap sector, 55 km wide, seven infantry divisions defended (one division per 8 km). In the Angerburg direction, on the Goldap-Augustov sector, 75 km wide, only four infantry divisions defended (an average of one division per 19 km) (267).

Thus, the enemy, at the expense of the Tilsit and Angerburg directions, created a denser grouping on the Insterburg. With a general average operational density - one division per 12 km in the Insterburg direction was 1.5 times less. The average tactical density per 1 km was 1.5–2 infantry battalions, up to 30 guns and mortars, and up to 50 machine guns. The main forces of tanks and assault guns were also concentrated in the central, Insterburg direction. Of the 367 tanks and assault guns (268) that were in the front line, 177 were concentrated in the area of ​​the upcoming breakthrough, which amounted to 7.4 armored units per 1 km of the front.

Knowing that at the beginning of the operation of the 3rd Belorussian Front, the 11th Guards Army would have to operate in the second operational echelon, we, taking into account the above information, drew the following conclusions. Our advancing troops will meet a strongly developed, deeply echeloned defense of the enemy, whose resistance, as they move forward, will increase significantly, since the enemy defends himself on his own territory. Therefore, it is necessary to prepare the troops for action with exceptional determination. Further. Due to the fact that the command of the Army Group "Center" and the army command, as we then believed, had significant reserves in the depths of the defense, one could expect strong counterattacks by tank formations and infantry from the most dangerous Insterburg and Darkemen directions no later than on the second day operations.

And the last. In order to achieve success, it was necessary to prevent the enemy from retreating in an organized manner to intermediate lines and gaining a foothold on them. In other words, it was necessary to advance at a high pace and continuously - day and night, bypassing settlements and individual reinforced concrete structures from the flanks and rear and forcing the enemy to fight in encirclement.

We all well understood that overcoming a defense in depth is possible only if there is a clear and continuous interaction between our army and the neighboring armies of the front and its tank corps, all branches of the army among themselves, as well as reliable fire support by artillery of all calibers of the advancing infantry and tanks.

Aviation played an important role in ensuring the successful offensive of the front troops. Its powerful air strikes were supposed to paralyze the enemy's reserves and artillery, disrupt his movement along highways and railways, disorganize command and control, and create conditions for the advancing troops to successfully overcome defensive lines. But will there be flying weather?

The decision of the Headquarters and the front commander

The general plan of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in the East Prussian operation was to cut off East Prussia from the central regions of Germany with a blow to Marienburg and at the same time to deliver a deep frontal blow to Koenigsberg from the east. Then it was supposed to dismember the East Prussian grouping into parts, surround them and destroy them.

To this end, the Headquarters planned two coordinated strikes from the regions north and south of the Masurian Lakes: the first - by the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front in the direction of Velau - Koenigsberg, the second - by the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front along the southern border, bypassing the Masurian Lakes and the most important fortifications of East Prussia on Mlawa - Marienburg.

Proceeding from this, the Supreme High Command, in its directive of December 3, 1944, set the 3rd Belorussian Front the task of defeating the enemy’s Tilsit-Insterburg grouping and, no later than the 10-12th day of the operation, to capture the Nemonin - Jargillen - Norkitten - Darkemen - Goldap line, after why develop an offensive against Koenigsberg on both banks of the river. Pregel, having the main forces on its southern coast. Deliver the main blow from the area north of the Stallupenen-Gumbinnen line in the general direction to Mallvisken, Velau with the forces of four combined arms armies and two tank corps. Break through the enemy defenses in one section 18-19 km long along the front with the troops of the 39th, 5th and 11th Guards Armies. To support them, attract three breakthrough artillery divisions. Create a density of artillery and mortars (from 76 mm and above) of at least 200 barrels per 1 km of the front.

The second echelon of the front - the 2nd Guards Army and the tank corps - was proposed to be used after the breakthrough to build up the strike in the main direction.

The actions of the main grouping of troops were provided from the north, from the side of the river. Neman, the defense of one rifle corps of the 39th Army and the offensive of its main forces on Tilsit, from the south - by the troops of the 28th Army, part of the forces advancing in the general direction on Darkemen. The 31st Army was ordered under all conditions to firmly defend its strip south of Goldap (269).

The neighbor on the right - "The 1st Baltic Front was ordered to assist the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front in defeating the enemy's Tilsit grouping, concentrating at least 4-5 divisions on the left wing of the 43rd Army for an offensive along the left bank of the Neman" (270) .

As can be seen from the directive, in order to defeat the Tilsit-Insterburg German grouping, the 3rd Belorussian Front was supposed to deliver a deep frontal strike in the Koenigsberg direction with the simultaneous expansion of the breakthrough front with supporting strikes on Tilsit and Darkemen. It was necessary not to allow the fascist German command to maneuver forces to counter the 2nd Belorussian Front.

During the offensive, the troops of the front had to overcome the strongest fortifications defended by a dense enemy grouping. Opportunities for operational maneuver in this direction were somewhat limited. The operation of the 2nd Belorussian Front was calculated to bypass the East Prussian fortifications from the south. Therefore, in addition to seven combined arms armies, it included such mobile formations and formations as a tank army, two tank corps, a mechanized and cavalry corps.

When the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, General of the Army I. D. Chernyakhovsky, acquainted us commanders with the instructions of the Headquarters and asked our opinion about the nature of the forthcoming actions, we made some proposals of a general and particular order.

I'll think about it, - said Ivan Danilovich and let us go to his armies, demanding to strengthen their combat training.

After consulting with the chief of staff of the front, Colonel General A.P. Pokrovsky and a member of the Military Council, Lieutenant General V.E. Makarov, he soon outlined his plan, which was somewhat different from the plan of the Headquarters. By the end of the war, I. V. Stalin gave more initiative to the front commanders, who knew the situation better, and did not reproach them for some changes in the balance of power. At first, the 11th, 5th and 39th armies were to advance in the first echelon. Having assessed the grouping of enemy troops and analyzed the directive of the Stavka, the command of the 3rd Belorussian Front decided to deliver the main blow with the forces of the 39th, 5th, 28th and 11th Guards armies (including the second echelon of the front), reinforced by two tank corps, and break through the enemy defenses on the section (claim.) Wiltauten - Kalpakin (24 km).

In this case, it was meant to break through the enemy defenses with one powerful blow in the very first days of the operation, to inflict such a defeat on him that would ensure the accomplishment of the assigned task by the troops of the front. The 39th, 5th and 28th armies were in the first echelon, and it was decided to use our 11th Guards as the most powerful and two tank corps in the second echelon (271) to build up the strike of the first echelon. On the second day of the operation, this was to be done from the Kussen-Radshen line by the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps in cooperation with the 5th Army, and on the fifth day - from the line of the river. Inster of the 11th Guards Army and the 1st Tank Corps, to which the center of efforts of the front's shock group was later transferred.

I think that ID Chernyakhovsky made the right decision. It saved the front from the complicated regrouping of two armies and the reassignment of a number of units and formations, which was highly undesirable before a serious operation. Such an operational formation corresponded to the previously outlined plan and combat training of the armies. And the most valuable thing in the decision of the front commander was that, having placed the 11th Guards Army in the second echelon, he retained its strike force for developing the success of the first echelon.

Chernyakhovsky aimed our army at the junction between the 5th and 28th armies, which also testified to his creative approach to solving the problem. Entering it in the Gumbinnen-Insterburg direction was impractical, primarily because there were very strong long-term fortifications on this sector of the front, which would undoubtedly slow down the pace of the offensive of our army, capable of making a deeper and faster breakthrough into the depths of the enemy’s defenses. In addition to the experience of previous battles, the army of the second echelon must be ready, if the situation requires it, to change the direction of the strike, to regroup its forces to a new sector for entering the battle. This feature is especially important when you have to break through several defensive lanes.

True, in the directive of the Stavka, the 2nd Guards Army was intended for the second echelon. But she was numerically somewhat weaker than ours. In addition, the process of transferring it from another front has not yet been completed. Chernyakhovsky did not know this army, but he knew our army well. Therefore, for me, his decision was clear. Stavka didn't mind either.

General Chernyakhovsky expanded the breakthrough front to 24 km instead of 18-19 km prescribed by the Headquarters. And this decision of the front commander was justified, since when the armies were reshuffled, the number of troops in the strike group increased and the density of battle formations, determined by the Headquarters, almost did not decrease.

When the plan of operation developed by the front command was approved by the Headquarters, Ivan Danilovich sequentially called each army commander and set the task. He began the conversation with me with a summary of the concept of the entire front-line operation.

The plan of the operation, he said, pointing to his working map, is to crush the enemy's Tilsit-Insterburg grouping. It is necessary at the first stage within five days to destroy the Tilsit group operating south of the river. Neman, and, having advanced 45–50 km, reach the line Tilsit - Insterburg. After the solution of this task, the right wing and the center of the shock grouping of the front will gain freedom of maneuver and should be ready within two days to complete the complete defeat of the Tilsit-Insterburg grouping and, having advanced up to 30 km, reach the line Nemonin - Norkitten - Darkemen (272). Thus, the total depth of the offensive will be 70-80 km with an average advance rate of up to 12 km per day, but the front headquarters is still planning the first stage of the operation in detail, for only five days. Then we will develop the offensive on Velau - Koenigsberg.

Having finished the presentation of the plan of the operation, General Chernyakhovsky continued:

We will break through the enemy defenses north of Gumbinnen in a sector 24 km wide with the forces of the 39th, 5th and 28th armies ... We will strike the main blow in the zone of the 5th army in the general direction of Mallvisken, Gross Skyisgirren. The immediate task of the army is to break through the enemy’s defenses in the Schaaren-Kishen sector (front 9 km), in cooperation with the troops of the 39th Army, to surround and destroy the enemy’s Tilsit grouping and further develop success on the Goldbach, which is on the river. Daime(273) .

On the right flank of the front, the 39th Army will advance in the general direction towards Pilkallen and Tilsit, with the main forces (six divisions) on its left flank. Its task is, in cooperation with the troops of the 5th Army, to defeat the enemy's Tilsit grouping and capture the city of Tilsit (274). To the south, the 5th - 28th Army strikes north of the Shtallupenen - Gumbinnen highway on Insterburg, with the main forces (six divisions) on its right flank. In cooperation with the 5th, it must defeat the Gumbinnen grouping of the Germans, after which, together with the 11th Guards Army, capture the city of Insterburg and develop an offensive in the direction of Gerdauen (275).

We plan to bring your army into battle from the second echelon from the morning of the fifth day of the front-line operation with the task of delivering a blow in the direction of Gross Ponnau - Velau in cooperation with the first tank corps. By the end of the fifth day, part of your army, in cooperation with the 28th, should capture Insterburg (276).

Ivan Danilovich informed me in more detail about some of the details of the operation plan, since the 11th Guards Army was to advance in the second echelon. He listed the forces that were supposed to support the advancing armies of the first echelon - the 1st and 2nd tank corps, the 1st air army and other formations of the front.

Then the chief of staff of the front, General A.P. Pokrovsky, acquainted me with the plan for the interaction of our army with its neighbors, both when entering the breakthrough, and especially when advancing it in the depths of enemy defenses. As already noted, the 5th and 28th armies were to break through the enemy defenses with a strong blow from their adjacent flanks and ensure the introduction of the second-echelon army into battle by a swift offensive in the directions assigned to them. The approach of the 11th Guards Army to the line of deployment and its subsequent combat operations should take place in close coordination with formations of the front's first echelon.

After capturing Tilsit, it was planned to withdraw the 39th army to the reserve of the front, and to the 43rd, which the front commander asked from the Headquarters (277) right now, in order to better coordinate its actions with the 39th, entrust the task of liberating the lower reaches of the Neman and the coast from the enemy the Baltic Sea.

Such a decision, in the opinion of the front headquarters, was determined by the presence of a strong and active enemy grouping in the offensive zone, as I have already said.

With access to the line Nemonin - Darkemen, it was meant, having regrouped the troops, to continue the offensive on Velau and further on Koenigsberg along both banks of the river. Pregel. Success could only be achieved if the troops of the left wing of the strike group (28th and 2nd Guards armies) not only repulsed possible enemy counterattacks, but also captured large centers of resistance - Gumbinnen, Insterburg, Darkemen (278).

When studying the plan of the operation, I had the idea that the front command, when planning it, apparently believed that if one deep frontal strike was delivered in the direction of Stallupenen - Insterburg - Wehlau, then with the development of the operation in depth, a real threat of powerful enemy counterattacks on both flanks of the advancing troops. Therefore, presumably, it was decided to smash the Tilsit-Insterburg group of Germans consistently. It seemed to me then that it would be more expedient to deliver one powerful deep cutting blow in the direction of Insterburg - Velau with a breakthrough in the enemy defenses in a more or less narrow section (18-19 km, as indicated by the Headquarters) with the subsequent development of the blow in the main direction. Having reached the Velau region and divided the enemy grouping, using the river lines of Pregel, Daime and Alle, it was necessary, in my opinion, to destroy it in parts, north and south of the river. Pregel.

When General Pokrovsky had finished his explanations, a member of the Front's Military Council, Lieutenant General Makarov, determined the direction of party political work. Vasily Yemelyanovich especially emphasized that it was necessary to convincingly propagate among the troops the international tasks of the Red Army, called upon to liberate the enslaved peoples of Europe from Hitler's tyranny.

We are already fighting on foreign territory,” he said in conclusion, “but we are fighting not with the German people, but with the fascist army. We have come here not to take revenge on the German working people for the atrocities of the Nazis on Soviet soil, but to finally crush fascism and give freedom to the peoples, including the working people of Germany.

Saying goodbye to me, the front commander warned that the task of the 11th Guards was not easy and required careful preparation. At the same time, Ivan Danilovich spoke approvingly of our army, but did not forget to recall the shortcomings in the October battles of 1944. He did not reproach, did not scold us, he spoke calmly and simply, but he built phrases in such a way that even praise was perceived by me with a big roll in side of criticism of shortcomings. Yes, General Chernyakhovsky knew how to speak with his subordinates in an unofficial language! Of course, I assured him that our army would fight like a guard, that everything would be done by us in accordance with the letter and spirit of his order. Ivan Danilovich smiled and shook my hand.

Until now, I am deeply convinced that the decision of the front commander was significantly influenced by inflated data on the forces of the enemy. Anyone in Chernyakhovsky's place, knowing that he was opposed by 7 tank divisions, 5 tank and 6 assault brigades, i.e., up to approximately 1000 tanks and 900 assault guns, would have made just such a decision. A talented and courageous commander, Ivan Danilovich was, among other things, a tanker and understood perfectly well what such a number of armored parts meant in the hands of an experienced enemy. Already after the war, according to captured documents, it was established that the 3rd German Panzer Army had 224 assault guns and 64 tanks, i.e., almost 6 times less than was assumed when developing the front-line operation plan (279).

The combat operations of the front were supported by the 1st Air Army under the command of Colonel General of Aviation T. T. Khryukin, which had 1416 combat aircraft (280). It was planned on the night before the offensive to make up to 1300 and during the first day 2575 sorties to bomb German positions, mainly in front of the front of the 5th Army (281). In total, 12,565 sorties were planned for the first four days of the operation, but the weather did not allow this.

By the beginning of the East Prussian operation, there were some changes in the leadership of the armies participating in it. Colonel-General N.I. Krylov returned to the 5th Army after an illness. Lieutenant General P. G. Shafranov took command of the 31st Army. The 2nd Guards Army, which arrived as part of the 3rd Belorussian Front, was commanded by Lieutenant General P. G. Chanchibadze.

Having received instructions at the front headquarters, I returned to my office in high spirits. We were given great reinforcements. We must now consider how it is more expedient to use them when bringing the army into battle, while taking into account the lessons of the Gumbinnen operation. It was also necessary to review all plans and programs for combat and political training in the light of the task received.

Arriving at the command post, I called my closest assistants and, without giving any timeframe, outlined to them the task of our army. In conclusion, I said that the 11th Guards must immediately surrender the defended sector of the 2nd Guards Army and concentrate in the initial area southeast of Stallupenen in order to prepare for an offensive in the second echelon of the front.

On December 28, 1944, the regrouping of troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front began. The redeployment of about half a million soldiers and officers with all their military equipment was far from an easy task.

By January 3, 1945, the armies of the shock group took the following starting position for the offensive: the 39th Army deployed with its main forces at the line of Wiltauten - Schaaren, having on the left flank a strike force of four rifle divisions in the first line and two in the second echelon of corps; The 113th rifle corps of this army was preparing for an offensive to the north, in the Shillenen-Wiltauten sector, and the 152nd UR (fortified area) was stretched on the right flank of the army on a wide front to the river. Neman; The 5th Army occupied its initial position at the Shaaren-Kishen line. In its first line there were five and in the second echelons of the corps four rifle divisions. The 28th Army, with two rifle corps, occupied its initial position on the Kishen-Kalpakin line, with a third corps to the south, on a broad front. He had to go on the offensive on his right flank with part of his forces, and in the rest of the sector to pin down the enemy with active actions. The strike force of the army consisted of three rifle divisions in the first line and two in the second echelons of the corps.

The 11th Guards Army was concentrating in the area of ​​Stallupenen - Vishtynets - Eidtkunen in readiness to develop the success of the armies of the first echelon of the front.

The 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps was located behind the battle formations of the 5th Army in the area northwest of Eidtkunen. The 1st Red Banner Tank Corps - behind the 28th Army in the area south of Stallupenen.

Such a decision by the front commander made it possible to achieve a significant density of troops, especially in the breakthrough sectors. On average, the division of the first line in the breakthrough sector accounted for up to 2 km, and in the 5th Army, which delivered the main blow, up to 1.5 km.

In total, 30 rifle divisions (out of 54), 2 tank corps, 3 separate tank brigades, 7 tank and 13 self-propelled artillery regiments were involved in the breakthrough, taking into account the armies of the second echelon. Of the 1598 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts (282) that the 3rd Belorussian Front had, 1238, 4805 field artillery guns and 567 PC(283) mounts were concentrated in the breakthrough area. There were from 160 to 290 guns and mortars per 1 km of the front. The operational density of tanks and self-propelled artillery units was 50 armored units (284). This is what the country has given us to defeat the enemy faster and end the war with victory. Behind these thousands of trunks stood the Motherland, its mighty working people, the gigantic organizational work of our Party, and the advantages of a socialist economy.

As a result of the regrouping, a powerful strike force was created. On the breakthrough site (24 km), which was only 14.1% of our front line (170 km), 55.6% of all rifle divisions, 80% of tanks and self-propelled artillery installations and 77% of artillery (285) were concentrated. Consequently, most of the front troops were involved in breaking through the German tactical defense zone in the main direction, of which a significant number were intended to build up the strike and develop success in operational depth (40% of rifle divisions). The rest of the troops were used to carry out supporting strikes in auxiliary directions - on Tilsit and Darkemen - and for defense on a wide front on the flanks.

The group created by General I. D. Chernyakhovsky provided superiority over the enemy in the breakthrough sector: in manpower by 5 times, in artillery by 8 times, in tanks and self-propelled guns by 7 times (286). It was art. But at the same time, the front commander was taking some risk, although justified. It was necessary to create a decisive superiority over the enemy in the breakthrough sector, especially since the enemy also kept most of his forces in the proposed breakthrough sector. This happened not because the Germans knew our intentions. Everything was much simpler: on the other side of the front, not stupid people were also sitting in the headquarters. From the relief and the general state of the terrain, it was not difficult to determine where we were going to strike the main blow. Yes, and the concentration of our troops gave a clear reference point. If, say, the 31st Army was stretched out over 72 km, and our 11th Guards, 28th and 5th Army occupied a front of only 56 km, then the fascist German command understood where we were thinking of attacking. Of course, even after the regrouping, the Germans did not have much difficulty in establishing the concentration of our troops. Reconnaissance in combat almost always made it possible to clarify who was opposing the leader of this battle. And both sides carried out a lot of such reconnaissance in battle. Even the very fact of the rapid liquidation by the troops of the front of the January private offensive operation in the sector of the 39th Army, which I have already spoken of, showed the fascist German command the superiority of our forces in this direction.

At the army headquarters

In early January, the headquarters of the 11th Guards Army received a directive from the front dated December 29, 1944 on the preparation and conduct of an offensive front operation. It contained the decision, already known to me from a conversation with General Chernyakhovsky, to advance in the second echelon behind the battle formations of the 5th and 28th armies in a strip about 20 km wide: on the right - Kussen, Varkau, Popelken; on the left - Gumbinnen, Georgenburg, Norkitten, Allenburg. By the end of the fourth day of the operation, deploy at the turn of the river. Inster and on the site Gaydzhen - Neunishken - Trakinnen (about 18 km) and in the morning of the fifth day, in cooperation with the 1st Red Banner Tank Corps, deliver a swift blow in the direction of Gross Ponnau - Velau. Part of the forces, together with the 28th Army, by the end of the same day, capture Insterburg (287).

Thus, the 11th Guards Army, having increased the strike from the depths, had to build on the success of the first echelon and a swift offensive along the river. Pregel to disunite the enemy's Tilsit-Insterburg grouping, and then, together with the neighbors, complete its defeat in parts.

The directive provided that by the end of the second day of the front-line operation, our army would be attached to the 2nd Guards Artillery Breakthrough Division, and the artillery of the 5th and 28th armies would ensure the army's entry into the battle.

With the beginning of the offensive of the 11th Guards Army, the 1st Red Banner Tank Corps was supposed to move behind its battle formations and by the end of the fourth day concentrate in the forest of Staats Forst Tpullkinen, with the expectation of being ready to rapidly advance in the direction of Neunishken - Taplakken (288).

Aviation support for entering the gap and support were assigned to the 1st Air Army. It is worth noting that the line of entry of the 11th Guards Army into the battle was chosen behind the main line of enemy defense, about 30–40 km from the front line. There were no major river barriers here, which made it possible to separate the Insterburg and Tilsit groups in the very first days of the operation. In addition, the line made it possible to use the second echelon of the front, depending on the situation: in the north - against the Tilsit grouping or in the south - against the main Insterburg group. We assumed that in the course of the offensive of the armies of the first echelon the integrity of the enemy's defense would be to a large extent violated and the enemy's resistance would be weakened. But so far this was only an assumption, although based on a real basis.

Yes, General Chernyakhovsky was right: the 11th Guards Army had a far from easy task to solve, especially in terms of the pace of the first day. In the morning we bring the army into battle, and by the end of the day, together with the troops of the 28th Army, we are already taking Insterburg - a heavily fortified knot in which everything is designed for long-term defense. But the order of the front commander is the law. Of course, we will take Insterburg, we have enough strength for this. But the pace!? After all, the very process of bringing an army through the battle formations of troops of other armies is far from a simple matter. It will take a certain amount of time - not minutes, hours! And it is unlikely that the front of the armies of the first echelon will advance so close to Insterburg that we immediately join in street battles. Well, if everything goes according to the optimal option. And if it will be necessary to break through the defense even more? In general, you need to be prepared for various input options.

Thinking over the task received, assessing the situation, consulting with members of the Military Council of the Army (289) and employees of the headquarters, I came to the conclusion that in the course of the upcoming operation we need to consistently solve two tasks: the nearest one is to destroy the enemy at the line of entry, destroy his suitable reserves, to seize the main defensive zone of the Ilmenhorst fortified region with the army units reaching the Popelken-Wirtkallen line by the end of the eighth-ninth day of the front-line operation, i.e., to a depth of 20–25 km; further - to rapidly pursue the retreating enemy, defeat his operational reserves, force the river. Pregel. On the 11th-12th day of the offensive, capture the long-term fortified position of the Heilsberg fortified area in the Tapiau-Velau sector, which was located 50-60 km from the line of entering the army into battle.

Based on these considerations, it was necessary to make a decision and develop a plan for an army offensive operation, to detail what was in general terms indicated in the directive of the front commander.

In making our decision, we proceeded from two options for bringing the army into battle, realizing that in the final analysis everything would depend on the success of the troops of the first echelon of the front's strike force, especially in the main direction. If they completely defeat the opposing units of the enemy, then on the move, directly from the starting areas, in marching or dismembered formations, we will lead the army into battle on the lines determined by the front headquarters. If the fascist German command, having pulled up reserves, will be able to create a solid front at the turn of the river. Inster or somewhat deeper, at the turn of Popelken - Insterburg, and will stubbornly resist the first echelon of the front's troops, then the entry of our army into the breakthrough will be possible only after its troops occupy the starting position and preliminary artillery and aviation preparation. In this case, it was supposed to change units of the first echelon of the front at the line of entry, then break through the defenses with a powerful frontal attack and, having defeated the opposing units, rapidly develop success by bringing the 1st Red Banner Tank Corps into battle, trying to reach the right flank on the line of the river. Daime - Tapiau - Velau.

The second option seemed to us then the most probable, therefore, when planning the introduction of formations into the breakthrough, we focused on it.

Thus, the introduction of the 11th Guards Army into the battle was envisaged with the calculation of a breakthrough in the depth of the organized defense of the enemy, with the main efforts on the right flank - in the general direction of Velau.

The experience of the army's combat operations in October 1944 showed that in the course of a developing front-line operation, various regroupings of the troops of the first echelon and redirection of the second echelon to where success was outlined are possible. Therefore, the troops of the army must be ready to regroup in the shortest possible time to a new direction.

We started planning the operation immediately after receiving the directive from the front and thoroughly studying it. Drawing up such a plan is a creative process. A relatively small group of army staff officers headed by Major General I. I. Lednev began to compile it. And I also needed to listen to the considerations of the closest assistants and corps commanders.

In the process of preparing a decision for an army operation, we carefully studied the enemy, clarifying and supplementing the data that we received from the front headquarters. Our difficulty was that the army no longer had direct contact with the enemy, so we had to use the data of the front headquarters and the formations of the first echelon. The intelligence agencies of our headquarters, having collected and summarized information about the enemy, established that in front of the front of the 39th Army (up to 40 km) the 9th Army Corps (561st, 56th and 69th Infantry Divisions) was defending with an average density of one division at 13 km. To the south, in front of the front of the 5th and the right flank of the 28th armies, at the line of Pilkallen - (claim.) Kishen (12 km), the 1st and 349th infantry divisions of the 26th army corps, reinforced 49, 88, 1038- m and the Insterburg reserve of the main command of artillery regiments, the 227th brigade, the 1061st and 118th assault gun divisions, the 2nd regiment of rocket launchers, the 60th and 1060th anti-tank divisions, seven battalions for various purposes (3rd assault, 11th penal, 644th serf, 62nd and 743rd sapper, 79th and 320th construction).

In the offensive zone of the 28th Army at the Kishen-Gertshen line (24 km), the 549th Infantry Division of the 26th Army Corps, the 61st Infantry Division, subordinate to the Hermann Goering Parachute and Tank Corps, and the 2nd Parachute motorized division of this corps. The density here reached one division per 8 km. These formations were reinforced by the 302nd assault gun brigade, 664th, 665th and 1065th anti-tank artillery battalions, a brigade of six-barreled mortars (18 installations), 27th assault, 13th, 268th, 68th and 548th engineer battalions . In addition, the 279th and 299th assault gun brigades (290) were located in the Gumbinnen area.

Thus, by the beginning of the offensive, we knew the opposing German grouping. It was much more difficult to obtain important information for us about enemy forces in the operational depth and about engineering defensive fortifications, especially about their saturation with weapons. Reconnaissance and aerial photography yielded meager results. Therefore, during the planning of the operation, much remained unclear to us. With the beginning of the offensive of the troops of the first echelon of the front, information about the enemy began to arrive more intensively, although they contained conflicting data. But in the end, by January 16-18, on the reporting maps of the formations and the army headquarters, such an enemy was identified as he really was. Therefore, when, due to the situation that had arisen, the army was redirected to another direction - to the junction of the 5th and 39th armies, the headquarters did not need much effort to obtain data on the enemy in the new zone.

In the second half of December 1944, commanders of all levels began to reconnoitre the routes of advance to new areas. Together with the chief of staff, the commander of artillery and a group of staff officers, we carried out a reconnaissance of the initial area of ​​​​the army’s location, as a result of which a final decision was made on the location of divisions before the start of the offensive, and the line for entering the army into battle was clarified. From December 25, 1944 to January 11, 1945, reconnaissance was carried out by the commanders of corps, divisions and regiments.

During the reconnaissance, the starting points for the advancement of formations and units, the routes of their movement, the order of the march, the places requiring restoration work were determined, the areas for the location of each battalion, regiment, division were outlined with the calculation of careful camouflage of personnel and vehicles, the locations of the logistics facilities were determined, ammunition and food depots.

In order to fully link our actions with the armies of the first echelon, Lieutenant General I. I. Semenov went to the headquarters of the 5th and 28th armies to clarify their plans and the operational formation of troops at the first stage of the operation - before entering our army into the breakthrough. The commanders of our corps also linked their actions with the corps of these armies. Before the start of hostilities, the commanders of the divisions that were in the first echelon of our army sent operational groups from officers of the operational and reconnaissance departments to the front divisions of the 5th and 28th armies to maintain communication and mutual information.

Operation plan

Starting planning, we primarily proceeded from the nature of the fortifications in the operational depth of the enemy's defense, the saturation of his defensive lines with long-term structures. The second factor that we took into account is the experience gained in the Gumbinnen operation in 1944.

Analyzing with General I. I. Semenov and our main assistants the initial draft of the operation plan drawn up by the operational department of the army headquarters, we drew attention to the fact that it provided for the actions of the troops in stages and in detail by day, i.e., as it is was planned in the Gumbinnen operation, when the 11th Guards advanced in the first echelon. But then the task of the army was different - it carried out a breakthrough, and therefore during the day at each stage of the battle it had to destroy a certain part of the enemy’s battle formation. In the upcoming operation, she had to increase her strike and develop success in depth, and this should have been taken into account by the planners:

General Semyonov looked reproachfully at the head of the operations department. But I immediately noticed that the army was carrying out such a task for the first time, and instructed to plan the operation so that the commanders and headquarters of the formations would not act according to a cheat sheet scheduled by day, but would fight based on the situation. Knowing the ultimate goal of the stage of the operation, they could show creative independence and initiative. When planning, it is not always possible to foresee in detail the course of an upcoming operation, changes in the situation and the development of hostilities for each of its days, just as it is unreasonable in these conditions to develop a plan of action in advance. Such a scheme is a template, and a template, as you know, limits the capabilities of command personnel and fetters their actions. It is most expedient to plan the operation in stages, determining the sequence in which the army's tasks will be carried out. In this case, the troops will act more purposefully and concentrated.

The army headquarters again began to develop an operation plan, which they decided to carry out in two stages. Starting work, the headquarters once again checked the latest data on the enemy, since they were very brief in the directive itself. Now a significant time - more than 20 days - we provided for preparation for the operation, dividing this preparatory stage into two periods. The first is combat training and regrouping of troops to a new direction, replenishment of all means of material and technical support for the troops. The second is the approach of troops to the line of entry and deployment on it. By this time, the division commanders with the commanders of the regiments and attached reinforcements, and later the commanders of the regiments with the commanders of the battalions had to go to the observation posts of the formations and units operating in front, from where to clarify their lanes and sectors on the ground, to outline the path of movement together with the commanders of the replaceable units. units to their original positions.

In order to hide from the Nazi command the direction of the army's entry into battle and thereby ensure the surprise of the strike, the area of ​​concentration of the 11th Guards was chosen southeast of the intended direction, 12-20 km from the front line of the German defense. Such a withdrawal under the conditions of 1945 allowed the troops not only to reach the entry line in time, but also to do so in a more relaxed environment. In addition, the chosen area of ​​concentration minimized the likelihood of a counterattack from the south, which the enemy could undertake to disrupt our offensive, given that the main grouping of the front was pushed forward by a ledge.

To advance the army to the line of entry into battle, a strip 14-18 km wide with six routes was assigned. This made it possible for each corps to have a 6-kilometer lane for movement and maneuver with at least two routes, which undoubtedly ensured the timely entry of troops to the line and their simultaneous deployment.

We envisaged a consistent approach to the entry line, consistent with the advance of the troops of the first echelon of the front, but at the same time in such a way that by the end of the fourth day of the front-line operation, change the formations of the first echelon and on the night of the fifth day begin to carry out the combat mission. The preparatory stage of the operation as a whole ended with the change of active units of the 5th and 28th armies.

During the first stage of the operation, the troops of the 11th Guards were to destroy the enemy at the line of entry and, using the success of the tank corps, begin to pursue the retreating enemy. Then they had to take possession of the defensive zone of the Ilmenhorst fortified area in the Popelken - Podraien - Georgenburg section and reach the Popelken - Wirtkallen line, i.e., to a depth of 20–25 km. Four days were allotted for all this (the fifth - eighth days of the front-line operation) at an advance rate of 5–10 km per day.

The plan also provided for another option: if the tank corps did not completely solve its problem, conduct artillery and air preparation for the offensive, break through the German defenses with combined arms formations, and then re-engage the tank corps (291) .

For the four days allotted by the plan for the second stage of the operation, the troops of the 11th Guards Army, as already mentioned above, were to defeat the reserves introduced by the enemy into battle, seize the long-term fortified position of the Heilsberg fortified area in the Tapiau-Velau sector and capture the crossings across the river. Pregel in the districts of Taplakken, Simonen, Norkitten. The depth of the offensive reached 50-60 km, the pace - 12-15 km per day.

Operational formation of army troops and tasks for corps

We outlined the operational formation of the army, taking into account the experience of the October battles of last year. All three corps (8th, 16th, 36th) were built into one operational echelon with a depth of 15–20 km. The battle order of the corps was built in two or three echelons. The second echelons of the corps were in depth at a distance of 4-6 km, the third - at 10-15 km. The main efforts were concentrated on the right flank in the bands of the 8th and 16th Guards Rifle Corps in the 7–8 km sector. When entering the army into battle, it was supposed to have four divisions in the first echelon (26th, 31st, 18th and 16th), in the second - three (5th, 11th and 84th), in the third - two (83rd and 1st). Rifle regiments, as a rule, were built in two echelons.

During operations in depth, the operational formation of the army's troops was meant to be left unchanged. When breaking through the defensive zone of the Ilmenhorst fortified area, it was planned to additionally push the 11th Guards Rifle Division into the first line of formations of the 16th Corps to build up the strike. When breaking through the long-term fortified position of the Hejlsberg fortified area on the Daim and at the boundaries of the Pregel and Alle rivers, push the divisions of the second echelon forward, and withdraw the divisions of the first echelon in their place.

What was the reason for such an operational formation of the troops of the 11th Guards Army?

We proceeded from the fact that the operational formation of troops of the army of the second echelon depends on the depth of the forthcoming operation, the width of the line of entry into battle, the nature of the enemy's defense and terrain, and also on the role and place of the army in a front-line operation. The deep formation of the corps in this case made it possible to continuously build up forces from the depths of battle formations both to break through a significant number of defensive zones, and to expand this breakthrough to the flanks and timely repulse enemy counterattacks. In the course of a battle, it often becomes necessary to maneuver forces and means, to change the direction of actions. And it is much easier to do this from the depth of battle formations than at the expense of the troops of the first echelon.

Each corps received its own offensive zone, the direction of the main attack and the timing of hostilities in certain areas.

On the right flank of the army, the 8th Guards Rifle Corps, led by Lieutenant General M.P. Zavadovsky, was to advance. By the end of the fifth day, he was to reach the line Waldfrieden - Jaquin. In the offensive zone of the corps, the introduction of the 1st Red Banner Tank Corps was envisaged, the formations of which, together with the advanced mobile detachments of rifle divisions, were to seize the strong stronghold of Popelken. On the sixth day, and with the unsuccessful actions of the tankers on the seventh or eighth day, the 8th Guards Corps had to continue the offensive in the general direction of Buchkhov, Lindenberg and reach the Paggarshvinnen area by the end of the eighth day (292). At the second stage, the task of this corps was to pursue the retreating enemy in the direction of Tapiau and on the 11-12th day of the operation after forcing the river. Daime mastery of the Tapiau region - (claim.) Velau.

At the center of the operational formation of the army was the 16th Guards Rifle Corps, commanded by Major General S. S. Guryev. His formations were to, bypassing the forest of Staats Forst Padroin from the south, continue the offensive in the general direction to Kamputschen, by the end of the fifth day, reach the Aukskallen-Kamputschen line with the main forces, and the advanced mobile detachment, together with units of the 1st Red Banner Tank Corps, capture the area of ​​Sprakten. After that, building on the success of the tank corps, the rifle divisions were to break through the line of the Ilmenhorst fortified area and on the sixth to eighth day of the operation reach the Paggarschvinnen-Wartenburg line. At the second stage of the operation - to pursue the retreating enemy and on the 11th-12th day, having crossed the river. Pregel, take possession of the Velau region, securing the crossing at Taplakken.

On the left flank of the army, an offensive was planned by the 36th Guards Rifle Corps, whose formations by the end of the fifth day of the operation were to reach the Georgenburg area. One division of the corps was to force the river. Pregel in the area of ​​the city. Nettinen and a strike from the west, together with a neighbor on the left, to capture Insterburg. On the sixth - eighth day of the operation, the 36th corps, like other corps of our army, was to continue the offensive in the general direction of Puzberskallen and capture the Virtkallen area. At the second stage, the formations of the corps were supposed to pursue the retreating enemy and, on the 10-11th day of the operation, reach the Shenvise-Simonen line, after which, securing the left flank of the army and holding the crossings over the river. Pregel at Simonen, Norkitten and Gross Bubainen, advance on Kline Hyp - Allenburg (293) .

The 36th Guards Rifle Corps was commanded by Lieutenant General Pyotr Kirillovich Koshevoy. He arrived in the army on January 6, that is, a week before the start of the operation. This circumstance worried the Military Council of the army. Will Koshevoi be able to master the corps in such a short time and prepare it for battles? But at the very first meetings, the general impressed me as an energetic commander. Indeed, in the shortest possible time, he was able to study the state of formations, parts and master the management of the corps. Strong-willed, resolute and brave, Pyotr Kirillovich showed himself in the operation to be well prepared in operational and tactical terms, a fully formed military leader.

In accordance with the directive of the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front and the plan of operation of the 11th Guards Army, the 1st Red Banner Tank Corps concentrated in the forest of Staats Forst Tpullkinen in readiness to enter the battle from the morning of the fifth Day on the site of the 8th Guards Rifle Corps. Interacting with parts of the latter, he had to attack the enemy, then break away from him and, rapidly moving forward, on the sixth day of the operation (i.e., on the second day after entering the battle), force the Daime and Pregel rivers and capture the cities of Tapiau and Velau. The rate of advance for the corps was envisaged at 25-30 km per day. The reader already knows that in case of failure, we provided for the withdrawal of the tank corps from the battle, the breakthrough of the Ilmenhorst fortified area with rifle formations and the re-entry of the corps in this direction with the same task.

When planning the operational formation of the 11th Guards Army and assigning tasks to the corps, we tried to avoid a template, but at the same time we took care of the correspondence of the formation to the general plan of the operation. Of course, we had in mind to bring in the army unexpectedly for the enemy, which we subsequently completely succeeded in doing. The Germans searched for the 11th Guards for a long time, after they brought it to the second echelon, and were only able to find it on the eighth day of the front-line operation, when it was brought into battle. The suddenness of our actions ensured a large preponderance of forces in the right direction.

Thus, the idea behind the concept of the operation of the 11th Guards Army and the operational formation of its troops was to, by entering a breakthrough in the main direction, create a preponderance of forces that would make it possible to turn a tactical breakthrough into an operational one. We understood that it was impossible to do this without achieving surprise. At the same time, the concentration and deployment of such large forces as the army, under the indispensable condition of maintaining surprise, required high skill from senior commanders (corps and divisions). The plan of the operation provided for marches only at night, the dispersal of troops along the front and in depth, and other measures.

The Military Council of the 3rd Belorussian Front, to which we presented our plan on January 5, 1945, approved it. General Chernyakhovsky noted at the same time the great and friendly work of the staff of the army headquarters. Yes, we thought we were on the right track.

Many years have passed since then, and, analyzing retrospectively past events, I cannot help but dwell on some of the shortcomings of the operation plan we developed.

The directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command provided for the defeat of the Tilsit-Insterburg enemy grouping to a depth of 70–80 km within 10–12 days (294), i.e., with an average advance rate of 7–8 km per day. The headquarters of the 3rd Belorussian Front planned a higher pace: for the troops of the first echelon of the front - 10-12 km (295) and for the 1st Red Banner Tank Corps - 25-30 km (296), which is more in line with the current situation.

If such a pace of operation was required of the troops of the front, then, naturally, the army of the second echelon, which interacted with the tank corps, should have determined higher rates. Meanwhile, with the total depth of the operation of the 11th Guards Army at 60-70 km, the plan developed by us outlined the accomplishment of the task within seven to eight days, that is, at a rate of 8-9 km per day. If such a pace met the requirements of the directive of the Headquarters, then it did not at all correspond to the decision of the front commander, not only for the second echelon, but even for the first.

What is the reason for this calculation? We, the authors of the plan and the participants in the operation, are posing this question to ourselves almost 25 years after it. And we answer: apparently, we somewhat overestimated the strength of the enemy, his defenses and fortifications, his moral and combat qualities. Thus, we underestimated the capabilities of our troops. After all, it is no coincidence that the plan provides for the most likely course of action in the event of failure of the first echelon of the army, as well as the 1st tank corps (297), i.e., in essence, the troops aimed at breaking through the enemy’s positional defense.

But this, I repeat, is a retrospective analysis. Then we thought differently.

Everyone is getting ready for surgery.

Regimental, divisional, corps and army artillery groups, as well as air defense artillery groups, were created to provide artillery support for the combat operations of the 11th Guards Army. In their composition (without means of strengthening the front) there were 825 guns and mortars, including in the artillery groups of the 8th Guards Rifle Corps - 235, the 16th Guards Rifle Corps - 215, the 36th Guards Rifle Corps - 270, in the army - 105 large-caliber guns. The main grouping of artillery was on the right flank and in the center, i.e., where the main blow was delivered. We also took into account that the artillery of the 5th and 28th armies was entrusted with ensuring the entry of our army into the breakthrough.

The 1st Red Banner Tank Corps was reinforced with howitzer, mortar and anti-aircraft artillery regiments. The following tasks were assigned to the artillery units.

With aimed fire and the method of successive concentration of fire, suppress manpower and destroy enemy firing points at the turn of the army's entry into the breakthrough. The fire of direct-fire guns, following in the combat formations of the infantry, to destroy the firing points, tanks, assault guns and armored personnel carriers of the Germans. Suppress active enemy artillery batteries. By the method of successive concentration of fire, suppress enemy fire weapons and manpower that hinder the advance in the movement zone of our infantry. By setting fire fringing on the flanks and consistently concentrating fire, suppress the firepower and manpower of the enemy and thereby ensure the entry of the 1st Panzer Corps into the gap and its operations in depth. Prevent the approach of reserves and counterattacks of German infantry and tanks, especially from the directions of Gillen, Aulovenon, Popelken and Insterburg. Cover the combat formations of infantry and tanks in the initial position and during the battle in depth from enemy aircraft.

Air support for the actions of the armies occupied a large place in the plan of the operation. The front headquarters outlined in the plan to allocate to us 12 air divisions for various purposes with a large resource of sorties and a significant bomb load. It was intended to carry out 1,200 night and 1,800 daytime sorties on the first day of the operation, during which 1,817 tons of bombs would be dropped (298). It was also envisaged to allocate the necessary resource for ground attack sorties in the interests of the 1st Tank Corps.

The engineering means that the army had at its disposal (and the 9th assault engineer-sapper brigade was additionally attached to it) were distributed by us in accordance with the tasks performed. So, the 16th and 36th guards corps received one engineer battalion each, and the 1st tank corps - two, since it was to operate in the band of the 8th guards rifle corps. For the construction of bridges for the second echelons, artillery and tanks, command and observation posts, for the restoration of hydraulic structures on the Inster, Daime, Pregel and Alla rivers, for strengthening the army anti-tank reserve and other work, parts of our army engineer brigade were allocated.

With special attention, we thought over the plan for the logistics of the operation in order to satisfy all the needs of the troops, including medical support, as well as correctly solve the problems of road service, transportation and evacuation, which are natural in this case. If in the Gumbinnen operation of 1944 the army’s communications, or, as they say, the “supply shoulder”, were shortened, now, in the conditions of a maneuver operation, they will increase, and this cannot but affect the nature of the work of all rear services. The army was based on the railway section Kozlova Ruda - Marijampol. Its main supply station and army base is Marijampol, the main unloading station is Verzhbolovo. After the army entered the gap and reached the Popelken-Virtkallen line, it was supposed to relocate the supply station and the main warehouses to Stallupenen, and deploy divisional exchange offices and medical battalions on the Kussen-Gumbinnen line.

By the beginning of the offensive, the divisional rears were pulled up to their original lines and placed in accordance with the requirements of the operational situation. Material and technical means were completely delivered to the divisional exchange offices.

To fully ensure the offensive operation with all types of material allowances, the troops and army depots had to accumulate 5.5 ammunition ammunition, 15 daily food dachas, 22 daily fodder dachas and 4 fuel refueling. All this was brought up, with the exception of some types of food, which were delivered during the operation. The fact that the hospitals had a 10-day supply of food for the regular number of beds ensured uninterrupted food for the wounded and the independence of the hospitals during their redeployment.

The sanitary service of the 11th Guards Army had 16 hospitals for various purposes, one automobile and two horse-sanitary companies. When planning the medical support for the operation, we provided for four hospitals in the first line, ten in the second echelon and two in reserve. By the beginning of the offensive, the medical and sanitary battalions were freed from the wounded and sick who were to be evacuated, and prepared to receive the wounded, all medical institutions were fully equipped with medical equipment, equipment, medicines and dressings. All those who had suffered frostbite in the past were first of all provided with felt boots as a preventive measure.

The presence in the army by the beginning of the operation of 85-90% (of the staff) of road transport generally met the needs of the troops. For the supply and evacuation, it was planned to equip the Gumbinnen-Insterburg highway as the main road and additionally one route for each building.

By the end of the Gumbinnen offensive, that is, at the beginning of November 1944, the rifle divisions of the 11th Guards Army numbered 5-6 thousand people each. The organizational structure of the units and subunits was significantly disrupted. Only four divisions retained 27 companies each, while the rest had 18–21 companies. In each company there were from 30 to 65 people. Therefore, the most important task of the army headquarters in the process of preparing the January offensive was the restoration of the main combat units - rifle, machine gun and mortar companies, artillery batteries, staffing them with personnel and weapons.

From November 1, 1944 to January 20, 1945, about 20 thousand marching reinforcements arrived in the army, including 40% were mobilized in the liberated territory of Western Ukraine and Belarus, 35% were conscripts, 15% were participants in the Great Patriotic War who returned from hospitals, and up to 10% - those liable for military service from the reserve. All of them, except for those who participated in the battles of this war, although they were in the spare parts of the military districts for three to four months, had insufficient training. They knew small arms, but they were poorly trained in actions as part of a platoon and company and, of course, had no combat experience. Much better prepared was the replenishment from the resources of the army and the front. These fighters had a well-known combat experience and good combat training. All this should be taken into account when completing the connections.

But even among those who were first drafted into the army, and among those who returned to service, having healed battle wounds, the political and moral state was high, their mood was cheerful. People rushed into battle, striving to finish off the fascist beast, liberate the peoples of Europe and, after victoriously ending the war, return to creative work.

By January 10, the strength of each Guards Rifle Division was 6,500–7,000 men. All rifle, machine-gun and mortar companies were restored in all regiments. In each rifle company there were 70-80 people.

In November and December, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front carried out defensive operations, active reconnaissance of all kinds. At the same time, they were engaged in intense combat training.

At first, we were preparing the formations of our army for a breakthrough. But when, in the first half of December 1944, Army General I. D. Chernyakhovsky orientated me on the nature of the use of our army in the upcoming operation, I had to change the direction of its combat training. We knew that operations in the operational depth are characterized by great maneuverability, the vagueness and variability of the prevailing situation, and a variety of forms. Under such conditions, speed and decisiveness, precision and coordination in the use of all branches of the armed forces, the ability to flexibly maneuver forces in order to create superiority over the enemy in the main directions are needed. All these requirements had to be brought to the attention of every commander and chief, to achieve a deep assimilation of the combat mission with all its features.

On December 13, at the next training gathering of corps and division commanders, analyzing the Gumbinnen operation, I carefully analyzed the battles carried out, the strengths and weaknesses in the actions of the troops. To some, this particular analysis was clearly unpleasant. But here nothing can be done - war requires harsh assessments of all shortcomings, otherwise they cannot be avoided in the future. In conclusion, the participants were assigned specific tasks for the combat training of formations in accordance with the plan of the upcoming operation.

The main efforts in the combat training of army troops were directed mainly to studying the types of combat in the tactical and operational depth of the enemy's defense. This was explained not only by the essence of the task ahead, but also by the fact that the troops of the army had much more experience in breaking through the enemy defenses than in exploiting success in tactical and operational depth. Previous operations showed that our units always managed to break through the enemy’s defenses, no matter how strong it was, but the actions of units and formations in the depths of the defense in a number of cases did not give the expected results. The rifle units, meeting the resistance of the approaching enemy reserves, sharply reduced the pace of the offensive, lingered at intermediate defensive lines, and eventually stopped. Therefore, rifle, tank and artillery units should be taught how to break through intermediate defensive lines on the move, the ability to conduct a meeting engagement and relentlessly, decisively and boldly pursue and destroy the retreating enemy, block and destroy long-term firing structures, skillfully and quickly consolidate the success achieved, repel tank counterattacks and infantry and other types of combat. It was necessary to teach the troops the ability to perform precisely those tasks that would arise during the operation.

I will not list the methods of study - they are well known. One has only to pay attention to such an important detail as a thorough study of the terrain of the upcoming hostilities. We trained the troops of the 11th Guards Army on terrain similar to the one on which they were to operate. The territory of the enemy was also studied in the most attentive way. In addition to maps, the troops had large-scale plans prepared by aerial photography. These plans, of course refined with the help of reconnaissance, were of great benefit for the correct organization of the battle.

In order to conduct an offensive continuously, both day and night, in order to prevent the enemy from organizing defense at intermediate defensive lines, advanced mobile detachments were specially trained in divisions, capable of waging night battle and pursuing the enemy. These detachments consisted of a rifle battalion on motor vehicles, an artillery battalion on a mechtyag and other special units. As a rule, such detachments were headed by deputy division commanders. The advanced mobile detachments were to some extent compensate for the insufficient mobility of the rifle units at that time.

About 40% of all tactical exercises were conducted at night or during the day with limited visibility. Bearing in mind that the troops would have to cover considerable distances to approach the starting area, we turned our attention to training units and formations to carry out marches, especially at night.

It goes without saying that we never for a moment forgot such an important issue as the organization and implementation of interaction between all branches of the military and aviation. Not a single tactical exercise was conducted without this.

Analyzing the practice of all types of past battles, we came to the conclusion that success in them was usually achieved both by the courage and training of the personnel of the units, and by the good training of officers. It should be said that there have always been many persistent and courageous people in our army, but as a rule, there were not enough good organizers of the battle - many of them were lost in battles. Such officers had to be trained systematically and persistently, sparing neither effort nor time. And we did it. A strong-willed, enterprising, courageous and resolute commander is especially needed in conditions of fighting in the depths of the enemy's defenses, when subunits will often operate in isolation from one another.

With the commanders of divisions and corps, chiefs of staff, commanders of military branches and chiefs of services, the army command conducted exercises on organizing and implementing the introduction of second echelons - large formations into battle. During these exercises, the nature of the combat operations of formations and units in the tactical and operational depth of the enemy's defense was discussed. As leaders of the classes, we also attracted the commander of the 1st Red Banner Tank Corps, Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces V. V. Butkov and the deputy commander of the 1st Air Army, Major General of Aviation E. M. Nikolaenko, who read reports on the use of tanks and aviation in the forthcoming operation and in group classes showed their possible actions.

We mainly taught the headquarters of units and formations the organization and management of combat when entering a breakthrough, in the course of an offensive, and especially in the depth of the enemy's defense. In view of the upcoming task, at the end of December 1944, the army command held a staff exercise with the headquarters of the corps.

I was also concerned about the idea of ​​training the army headquarters, commanders and headquarters of corps and divisions. At the same time, we would like to test our views on the methods of action of the army when it is brought into battle and combat operations in the operational defense of the enemy. Therefore, on January 3-5, an army three-stage command-staff exercise was held on the ground with communications equipment on the topic "Introducing the second-echelon army into the breakthrough and its actions to develop success." This kind of exercise in military conditions, directly at the front, is an unusual thing, nevertheless, we went for it, having, of course, received the permission of General Chernyakhovsky. We took the headquarters of the army, the headquarters of the corps and divisions (with the exception of the operational groups that remained in place) to the rear for 60–80 km, to the Alytus area.

The exercise was carried out against the backdrop of a specific operational situation that had developed by that time in front of the armies of the first echelon.

The exercise helped to clarify the Organization and some elements of the development of the operation, to work out the methods of command and control of troops, the organization of interaction, and material support. The headquarters of the corps and divisions drew up all the necessary documents for the march, the change of units of the first echelon, plans for interaction, plans for occupying the starting position, bringing formations into battle, developing success in the depths of the enemy defense, and others. But, unfortunately, it was not possible to finish the teaching. In the first days of January, the enemy sharply increased reconnaissance. On January 4, he dealt a short blow to the 31st Army in the Filippov direction. I had to return the headquarters to their areas.

Thus, intense study covered the entire 11th Guards Army, from the private to the commander. Despite being very busy, I carved out hours and minutes for personal preparation: I studied the offensive of the Russian troops in the Gumbinnen operational direction at the beginning of the 1914 war, deeply and critically analyzed my experience gained over almost four years of the war.

Of particular concern to all of us was the training of replacements who joined the army a month or two before the start of the offensive. Not only was some of it undertrained, many of the young soldiers did not experience the difficulties that the army had to overcome.

Thus, as a result of enhanced and purposeful combat training and organizational measures, the level of general combat readiness and combat capability of army units and formations has significantly increased.

Party political work

No one will object to the fact that the combat training of soldiers and sergeants, the military art of generals and officers play an important role in achieving success on the battlefield. But no victory is inconceivable without the high morale and fighting spirit of the troops, without their organization and conscious discipline. The high moral character of the Soviet soldier is his strongest weapon. Many memoirists, historians and military commentators of the capitalist world speak of him with respect. True, not all of them correctly understand the ideological origins of this weapon, but almost everyone recognizes its power.

The military council and the political department of the 11th Guards Army never forgot about the moral preparation of the troops. And in this case, they gave detailed instructions to the commanders and political workers on the organization of party political work in the troops during the preparation of the operation and during it. We did not forget that the formations and units of our army were to advance across the territory prepared for a long-term defense, defended mainly by Prussian volunteers gathered from all over Germany. Here, more than ever, the mobilization of all the forces and moral capabilities of the troops was required.

I would not like to repeat myself, describing the common forms and methods of party political work: rallies, meetings, meetings with veterans, conversations about the history of units, propaganda of military traditions, discussion of the appeal of the Military Council of the front and the army. These forms have not changed, but the content of the work has significantly expanded. We began to pay more attention to the international education of soldiers.

An hour before the start of artillery preparation in all units, an appeal was read from the Military Council of the 3rd Belorussian Front. “Today, the Motherland calls you to new feats of arms,” it said, “to storm the fascist lair, to decisive battles with the enemy ... Crush all resistance of the Nazi invaders! Don't give them a single moment of respite! Pursue, surround, exterminate the fascist scum without any mercy! ”(299) And then the appeal spoke about the concepts that are natural for our warrior - about the dignity of the Soviet person, about the humane attitude towards the civilian population of Germany, towards captured and wounded enemies, about the great liberation mission Soviet Union in Europe. And it should be noted that our Soviet soldiers and officers carried the banner of proletarian internationalism with honor.

During the preparatory period of the operation, our political agencies created full-blooded company party and Komsomol organizations, did a lot to improve internal party work, raise the ideological and political level of soldiers and commanders, and ensure a high level of combat training.

By January 1, 1945, there were 1132 company and equal party organizations (300) in the troops of the 11th Guards Army, which included 24261 communists (17254 members and 7007 party candidates) (301). In most rifle companies and artillery batteries, party organizations had 10–15 party members and candidates, Komsomol organizations had up to 25 Komsomol members (302). Thus, the party stratum in the combat units by the beginning of the offensive amounted to almost 15-20%, and together with the Komsomol members - up to 45% of the total number of personnel. It was a huge force, cementing the ranks of the army.

As always before an offensive, the communists gathered and discussed how best to fulfill the tasks of their formations, units, subunits in the operation. They demanded that all members of the party show in battle a personal example of carrying out the orders of commanders, military skill, courage, fearlessness, and most importantly, the strictest vigilance, an uncompromising struggle against carelessness and idleness, since hostilities were transferred to enemy territory.

Before the fighters, especially from the new replenishment, experienced warriors - fighters, sergeants and officers spoke. In the 97th regiment of the 31st Guards Rifle Division, for example, Private Shesterkin, who was awarded the Orders of the Red Banner and the Patriotic War and the medal "For Courage" (303), repeatedly spoke to Komsomol members.

We had another form of propaganda that justified itself, which helped a lot to rally the personnel. If it happened to appoint new commanders of rifle, machine-gun and mortar companies, the unit lined up and the new commander talked about himself and his combat life, about the soldiers he had previously commanded, called on the personnel to beat the enemy like a guard, until his complete destruction.

The commanders and political workers told the fighters about the violence, robberies and murders committed by the Nazis on our land. Only in one 252nd regiment of the 83rd Guards Rifle Division, the Nazis killed and tortured close relatives of 158 soldiers, drove the families of 56 military personnel to Germany, 152 soldiers' families were left homeless, the Nazis looted property and stole cattle from 293 people, etc. d.(304)

To everyone who came to serve in the 11th Guards Army, we told about the immortal feat of our guardsman, Hero of the Soviet Union, Private of the 77th Regiment of the 26th Guards Rifle Division Yuri Smirnov.

The military council invited the hero's mother, Maria Fedorovna Smirnova. She visited many parts, talked about her son, called for ruthless destruction of the Nazi troops in their lair, to avenge them for the atrocities on Soviet soil.

When the order to attack was received in the troops, rallies and meetings were held in all units and subunits, at which soldiers, sergeants and officers swore not to spare their lives in order to put an end to the fascist beast forever.

The party-political work carried out in the troops of the 11th Guards Army was of great importance in the mobilization of all personnel: the moral and political state of the troops became stronger, their consciousness and understanding of the tasks ahead rose even higher. But the attraction of soldiers to the Communist Party was especially pleasing to all of us, which strengthened the party organizations of the units. The closer the start date of the operation approached, the more the soldiers applied for admission to the party. Here is how it looked, for example, in the 31st Guards Rifle Division:

“I want to go into battle as a communist” - these words coming from the heart were repeated in hundreds of statements.

In the tenth of January, I reported to the Military Council of the 3rd Belorussian Front that the 11th Guards Army was ready for the operation.

The main political goal of the East Prussian operation was to eliminate the nest of reactionary Prussianism - the eastern foothold of German militarism - and to liberate the northern regions of Poland. Proceeding from this, the Supreme High Command set a strategic task for the Soviet troops: to defeat one of the largest enemy groupings - Army Group Center, go to the sea and capture East Prussia with the most important naval ports of Koenigsberg and Pillau. The solution of this problem was supposed to contribute to the successful offensive of the Soviet troops in other sectors of the front, and primarily in the Warsaw-Berlin direction.

Taking into account the situation, the goals set and the preliminary considerations of the front commanders, the Headquarters developed an operation plan that provided for the delivery of two powerful enveloping strikes from the areas south and north of the Masurian Lakes on the flanks of Army Group Center. The troops of the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian fronts were to break through the enemy defenses, crush his forces and, developing the offensive in the direction of Marienburg and Konigsberg, go to the sea in order to cut off the troops defending here from the main forces of the German army, dismember the encircled formations, liquidate them and occupy the entire territory of East Prussia.

In accordance with the plan of the operation, the Headquarters set specific tasks for the troops. She ordered the 2nd Belorussian Front to prepare and conduct an offensive operation in order to defeat the enemy’s Pshasnysh-Mlav grouping and, on the 10-11th day of the offensive, reach the line Myshinets - Naydenburg - Dzialdovo - Belsk - Plock, and then move towards Marienburg. The front was supposed to deliver the main blow with the forces of four combined arms armies, a tank army and one tank corps from the Ruzhany bridgehead to Pshasnysh - Mlava. The breakthrough of the defense was planned to be carried out on a sector 16-18 kilometers wide by the forces of three armies with the involvement of three artillery divisions, creating an artillery density of at least 220 guns and mortars per kilometer of the front. To develop success after a breakthrough in the main direction, it was ordered to use a tank army and most of the tank and mechanized corps. One army was allocated to the second echelon of the front to bring it into battle from the Ruzhany bridgehead after breaking through the enemy defenses. Advancing on Myshinets, it was supposed to roll up the Nazi defense in front of the right wing of the front and provide a shock group of Soviet troops from the north.

In addition to the main blow, it was ordered to deliver a second blow with the forces of two combined arms armies and one tank corps from the Serotsky bridgehead in the direction of Belsk. To break through the enemy defenses on a 9-kilometer-wide section, it was planned to attract two artillery divisions and create a density of at least 210 guns and mortars per kilometer of front. To assist the 1st Belorussian Front in defeating the Warsaw grouping, it was planned to strike the enemy with the forces of at least one army and one tank or mechanized corps, bypassing Modlin from the west in order to prevent the enemy from retreating from the Warsaw area beyond the Vistula. The mechanized and cavalry corps were allocated to the front reserve.

The 3rd Belorussian Front received the task of defeating the Tilsit-Insterburg grouping and on the 10th - 12th day of the operation to capture the Nemonien - Darkemen - Goldap line. In the future, the troops of the front were to develop an offensive against Koenigsberg along the Pregel River, with the main forces on the southern bank of the river. The Stavka ordered the main blow to be delivered by four armies and two tank corps from the area north of Gumbinnen in the direction of Velau. It was planned to break through the enemy defenses in the strip of 18-19 kilometers by the forces of three armies of the first echelon with the participation of three artillery divisions, creating an artillery density of 200 guns and mortars per kilometer of the front. The second-echelon army and tank corps were supposed to be used after breaking through the enemy defenses to build up the strike in the main direction. The actions of the main grouping were ensured by the strong defense of the troops on the flanks of the front and the offensive of part of the forces in secondary directions.

The 1st Baltic Front was ordered to assist the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front in defeating the enemy's Tilsit grouping, concentrating at least 4-5 divisions on the left wing of the 43rd Army for an offensive along the left bank of the Neman.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces ordered the Red Banner Baltic Fleet to block the enemy bridgehead on the Courland Peninsula. To this end, torpedo boats and submarines were to interrupt the enemy's sea communications with his grouping in Courland, and the fleet's bomber aircraft were to strike at the port of Liepaja. To accomplish the task, the fleet commander needed to speed up the relocation of light forces to the harbor of Sventoji and aviation to Palanga airfields.

The strategic support of the combat operations of the Soviet troops in East Prussia was carried out by the simultaneous transition to the offensive of the fronts throughout the space from the Baltic to the Carpathians according to a single plan and by the active actions of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. Concerted strikes against the enemy of the 1st Belorussian Front in Poland were of great importance for a successful offensive. In turn, the 3rd Belorussian Front was to partly strike at Tilsit, curtailing the enemy defenses in front of the 43rd Army of the 1st Baltic Front, and the 2nd Belorussian Front had the task of assisting the 1st Belorussian Front in defeating the Warsaw group.

In preparation for the offensive, major regroupings of formations were carried out. As early as the end of 1944, the 2nd shock army was transferred from the 3rd Baltic Front to the 2nd Belorussian Front, and the 2nd Guards Army from the 1st Baltic Front to the 3rd Belorussian Front. At the beginning of 1945, the 5th Guards Tank Army, formerly part of the 1st Baltic Front, joined the 2nd Belorussian Front. In addition, a significant number of breakthrough artillery formations and formations of other military branches from the Reserve of the Supreme High Command arrived in the area where the operation was being prepared.

When planning the East Prussian operation, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, based on the situation and the overall goal of the campaign, developed a clear plan of operation. At the same time, it did not bind the creative initiative of the front commanders in the preparation and planning of military operations of the troops, as was the case in some operations of the first and second periods of the Great Patriotic War.

However, there were also shortcomings in terms of the operation. They consisted primarily in the weak organization of strategic interaction between the Baltic fronts and the fronts operating in East Prussia: on January 13, when the East Prussian operation began, the troops of the 1st and 2nd Baltic fronts were ordered to go over to "hard defense". It should also be noted the untimely transfer of the 43rd Army of the 1st Baltic Front to the 3rd Belorussian Front, its belated entry into battle and the not entirely successful choice of the direction of its initial strike. Instead of delivering a decisive blow from the area north of Tilsit to the south along the railway to Insterburg in order to assist the 3rd Belorussian Front, surrounded by the Lazden enemy grouping, the army was supposed to deliver a frontal strike from the Sudarga area along the left bank of the Neman.

According to the general plan of the East Prussian operation, the commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front decided to break through the enemy defenses in the Mlava direction from the Ruzhany bridgehead in a section 18 kilometers wide with the forces of the 3rd, 48th and 2nd shock armies and develop an offensive on Mlava - Marienburg. To expand the breakthrough area to the right, the 3rd Army was given the task of delivering the main blow to Allenstein and the auxiliary one in the north direction; bridgehead, liquidate the Pultus grouping of the enemy. The 5th Guards Tank Army was intended to enter the gap in the 48th Army's zone in the direction of Mlawa - Lidzbark.

Mobile formations were given the task of being ready to enter the gap in the army zones and develop their success in the main direction: the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps was scheduled to enter the gap in the 3rd Army zone, the 8th mechanized corps - in the 48th Army zone and the 8th Guards Tank Corps - in the band of the 2nd Shock Army. To ensure the actions of the strike force of the front from the side of the Masurian Lakes and to expand the breakthrough sector, it was planned to bring the 49th Army into battle on the second day of the operation in the direction of Myshinets.

From the Serotsky bridgehead on a 10-kilometer section, the 65th and 70th armies were supposed to break through the enemy defenses. In the offensive zone of the 65th Army, it was planned to introduce the 1st Guards Tank Corps into the breakthrough. To expand the breakthrough area from the south and interact with the right-flank army of the 1st Belorussian Front, part of the forces of the 70th Army struck in a south-westerly direction, bypassing Modlin from the north, in order to then force the Vistula. The 50th Army, located on the right wing of the front, occupied a strong defense at the turn of the Augustow Canal and the Beaver River. Two rifle divisions and three anti-tank artillery brigades were allocated to the front reserve.

It was planned to break through the main line of enemy defense at a rate of advance of 10-12 kilometers, and in the future - up to 15 kilometers per day.

The 4th Air Army was given the task of covering the combat formations of its troops with fighter aircraft, on the night before the offensive, to carry out at least 1000 sorties in order to wear down the enemy’s manpower, destroy his firing points at the forefront, disrupt the work of headquarters, control unpaved and railways . On the first day of the operation, the aviation of the front was to concentrate its main efforts in the bands of the 48th and 2nd strike armies. With the introduction of mobile formations into the breakthrough, attack aircraft were allocated to accompany them.

Thus, the plan of the front's operation was to break through the enemy's defenses in two directions, crush the Pshasnysh-Mlav grouping and, delivering the main blow in a northwestern direction to Marienburg, bypass and cut off the entire East Prussian grouping from the central regions of Germany. This envisaged the encirclement of small enemy groupings: one - in the Pultusk area by the troops of the adjacent flanks of the 2nd shock and 65th armies, the other - in the area of ​​​​the Modlin fortress by the forces of the 70th army with the assistance of the 47th army of the 1st Belorussian Front.

It should be noted that the 2nd Belorussian Front had to advance in more favorable conditions than the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front. Here the troops had convenient operational bridgeheads on the right banks of the Narew and the Western Bug. In the zone of action of the front, the defense system and the grouping of German fascist troops were weaker than in the offensive zone of the 3rd Belorussian Front. The main fortified areas - Lettsensky and Allenshteinsky - troops could bypass from the south, and the Mlavsky fortified area, which was in the path of movement of the main grouping of Soviet troops, was not powerful enough. A large number of mobile formations (tank, mechanized and cavalry) made it easier for the troops to complete the task.

The commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front decided to defeat the enemy forces sequentially. First, the advancing troops were to destroy the Tilsit group operating on the left bank of the Neman, and reach the Tilsit-Insterburg line, and then defeat the Insterburg group and develop an offensive on Velau-Koenigsberg. It was assumed that this task could be solved only if the left wing of the front's shock grouping was in a stable position in the Darkemen area, from where it could be expected to launch a counterattack by enemy reserves located under the cover of the Masurian Lakes. It was planned to break through the enemy's defenses in a sector north of Gumbinnen with a length of 24 kilometers by the forces of the 39th, 5th and 28th armies. The 11th Guards Army was in the second echelon. She received the task of following the troops of the 5th and 28th armies and from the morning of the fifth day of the operation, in cooperation with the 1st tank corps, which was in the reserve of the front, enter the battle at the turn of the Inster River, delivering a swift blow to Velau, and part of the forces, in cooperation with the 28th Army, to capture Insterburg. The 2nd Guards Tank Corps was supposed to enter in the breakthrough on the morning of the second day of the operation in the offensive zone of the 5th Army. The 2nd Guards Army was to go on the offensive on the third day of the operation, using the breakthrough in the enemy's defenses made by the neighbor on the right - the 28th Army. The 31st Army, operating on the left flank of the front, east of the Masurian Lakes, had the task of taking up a solid defense and being ready to go over to the offensive in the event of a successful strike force. The average rate of advance in breaking through the enemy's defenses was planned to be 10 kilometers in tactical depth, and 12-15 kilometers per day in operational depth. The 1st Air Army was ordered to support the offensive of the 5th Army and to allocate one assault aviation division each to assist the 28th and 39th armies, and with the start of the offensive of the second echelon army, to support its actions. In the depths of the enemy defense, aviation was supposed to bomb warehouses, bases and airfield hubs. When enemy reserves appeared, the formations of the air army were supposed to destroy his manpower and equipment. Thus, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front were to deliver one deep frontal blow to Koenigsberg, overcome the Ilmenhorst and Heilsberg fortified areas, storm the fortress of Koenigsberg and, together with the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, complete the defeat of the East Prussian enemy grouping. At the same time, it was planned to encircle and defeat enemy groupings in the Tilsit area by the 43rd, 39th armies and part of the forces of the 5th army and in the Insterburg area - by formations of adjacent flanks of the 11th Guards and 28th armies.

The operational formation of the armies of both fronts, as a rule, was one-echelon. In the reserve of the commanders of the armies there was one rifle division each. However, rifle corps, divisions and regiments built their battle formation in two echelons. The 49th Army had an original operational formation, in which one corps was located in the first echelon on a wide front and two corps - in the second echelon on the left flank - closer to the breakthrough site. This formation of the army made it possible to use its main forces as the second echelon of the front. The deep formation of the troops fully corresponded to the prevailing situation and was supposed to ensure a breakthrough in the enemy's defenses and the development of the offensive in depth.

The preparation of the fronts for the upcoming offensive was carried out for a month and a half. During this time they regrouped their forces. The offensive zones of the armies of the shock groups were narrowed in order to increase the density of troops. To achieve the surprise of the offensive, the concentration and movement of troops was carried out at night and in cloudy weather with the use of various camouflage measures.

By the beginning of the offensive, powerful groupings were created in the directions of the main attacks. The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front in the breakthrough sectors outnumbered the Nazi armies in manpower by 5 times, in artillery by 7-8 and in tanks by 9 times. For a successful breakthrough of the enemy defenses, 88.7 percent of the tanks available in the front were concentrated here; average operational density of 70 armored units per kilometer of front. Separate tank and self-propelled artillery regiments moved into the combat formations of the infantry to directly support it. The troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front in the breakthrough sector outnumbered the enemy in manpower by 5 times, in artillery - by 8 and tanks - by 7 times. 50 percent of all rifle divisions of the front, 77 percent of artillery, 80 percent of tanks and self-propelled artillery installations were concentrated there. The operational density of tanks and self-propelled artillery units was 50 armored units per kilometer of the front. The density of artillery in the breakthrough areas in the 2nd Belorussian Front was from 180 to 300, and in the 3rd Belorussian from 160 to 290 guns and mortars per kilometer of the front. The main task of the artillery was to ensure a breakthrough in the tactical depth of the defense and to accompany the infantry throughout the entire operation. During the transition of the troops to the pursuit, it was planned to transfer heavy artillery to the army reserve for use in breaking through the subsequent fortified lines of the enemy defense.

To break through the enemy's main line of defense, artillery groups were created in units and formations: regimental, divisional and corps. In addition, there were army groups of long-range artillery, destruction artillery, rocket artillery. A front-line long-range artillery group was created in the 3rd Belorussian Front, which performed tasks in the interests of the entire strike group under the leadership of the front artillery commander. This group was supposed to destroy enemy reserves, conducting massive fire on the most important railway junctions, headquarters and other objects located in the depths.

Artillery preparation of the attack was planned in the 3rd Belorussian Front lasting 1 hour 45 minutes, in the 2nd - 85 minutes. 4-5 rounds of ammunition were allocated for the operation, which amounted to 9 million shells and mines of all calibers in both fronts, for the transportation of which it would take about 60 thousand one and a half ton vehicles. On the first day of the battle, 2 ammunition was assigned.

In conditions of breaking through the heavily fortified defenses of the enemy, aviation acquired great importance. It was supposed to destroy the enemy's reserves, disrupt the command and control of his troops, ensure the introduction of mobile troops into the breakthrough, reliably cover the advancing units from the air and conduct aerial reconnaissance. Aviation training was planned to be carried out on the night before the offensive with the involvement of formations of the 18th Air Army.

The engineering units were supposed to conduct engineering reconnaissance of the enemy's obstacles in order to ensure the passage of all types of troops through the minefields in front of the front line and in the depths of the defense, as well as the rapid overcoming of difficult areas by the troops and the crossing of rivers. To carry out these tasks, 254 engineer-sapper battalions were involved, not counting the pontoon-bridge units. The bulk of the engineering facilities were concentrated in the breakthrough areas.

The sappers conducted continuous observation of the enemy, hydrotechnical reconnaissance, made passages in minefields and other enemy obstacles. Parts of all branches of the armed forces equipped the starting areas for the offensive on the right bank of the Narew. Before the start of the operation, there were 25 bridges across this river and 3 bridges across the Western Bug. This allowed the timely concentration of troops on the bridgeheads for the offensive. In the 3rd Belorussian Front, 1,767 kilometers of trenches, 404 kilometers of communication passages were dug at all lines, 2,058 command and observation posts, 10,429 dugouts and dugouts were equipped, 283 kilometers of barbed wire were installed. and made it easier for them to break through the enemy defenses.

During the preparation of the operation, work was carried out to train the troops. In the combat training classes, the issues of attacking a prepared defense with forcing large rivers, breaking through fortified areas, and repelling enemy counterattacks were worked out. Particular attention was paid to the training of assault battalions designed to break through the positions of fortified areas and fortresses.

Significant work was carried out on the medical support of the upcoming operation. By mid-January, a large number of hospitals were created in the fronts and evacuation transport was prepared. Each army of the 3rd Belorussian Front had 15-19 hospitals with 37.1 thousand beds, and the military sanitary department of the front had 105 hospitals with 61.4 thousand beds. In the 2nd Belorussian Front there were 58 hospitals with 31.7 thousand regular beds, and in the armies - 135 hospitals with 50.1 thousand regular beds. The reserve of medical institutions in both fronts was insufficient.

The involvement of large forces for the operation, its spatial scope, the large distance of the combat area from the main economic centers of the country, the rare network of railways and roads located in the rear of the troops, complicated the work of the military rear and the organization of logistics. But despite this, by the beginning of the operation, the Soviet troops received a sufficient amount of ammunition, food, fodder, technical equipment and building materials. There was only a shortage of motor gasoline, diesel fuel and some types of food.

During the preparation of the operation, the commanders, political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations of the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Fronts and the Baltic Fleet widely launched party political work in order to foster a high offensive impulse, strengthen the political and moral state and discipline of the soldiers, as well as increase vigilance . The troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front were to operate on enemy territory, and the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front - first on the soil of our friendly Poland, and then in East Prussia. The commanders and political workers explained to the soldiers of the Red Army how to establish correct relations with the German and Polish population, how to tell the people about the goals of the Red Army, which had entered East Prussia and Poland. Taking into account the peculiarities of hostilities outside their homeland, political bodies, party and Komsomol organizations paid great attention to instilling Soviet patriotism and a sense of national pride in soldiers.

Before the offensive, the political bodies were reinforced with cadres. Under the political departments of divisions, corps and armies, the command created reserves of party workers. The best communists and Komsomol members from the rear units and the reserve were sent to the party and Komsomol organizations of combat units, especially rifle and machine-gun companies. For example, more than 300 communists were transferred from rear organizations to combat units of the 28th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front.

In the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian fronts, communists and Komsomol members made up almost half of the entire personnel. In the 28th Army, 6 weeks before the offensive, the number of Party and Komsomol organizations increased by 25-30 percent due to the entry of soldiers into the Party and the Komsomol. In the 372nd Rifle Division of the 2nd Shock Army of the 2nd Belorussian Front alone, within a month, 1,583 applications for admission to the party were received by party organizations. The chiefs of political departments of divisions and brigades handed out party cards in subdivisions, at the forefront.

During the period of preparation for the offensive, special attention was paid to the units, which were replenished. Political workers, party and Komsomol organizations, as well as experienced soldiers, sergeants and officers helped young soldiers to master the advanced experience of offensive operations, to study weapons and military equipment. When working with the new replenishment, the commanders and political workers met with great difficulties, since its composition was heterogeneous and differed sharply from the main contingent. In the 2nd Belorussian Front, for example, by the beginning of the operation there were 53 thousand people mobilized from the regions liberated from the Nazi occupation, more than 10 thousand released from captivity, 39 thousand discharged from hospitals and 20 thousand arrived from rear units and institutions. These fighters had to be rallied together and trained in military affairs, in each of them it was necessary to bring up high fighting and moral qualities.

One of the most important tasks of Party political work among the troops continued to be the inculcation of a burning hatred for the Nazi occupiers. The commanders and political workers were well aware that it was impossible to defeat the enemy without learning to hate him with all his heart. Leaflets and newspaper articles described the atrocities of the Nazi invaders on Soviet and Polish soil. Many servicemen's families suffered from the Nazi occupation. In the 252nd Guards Rifle Regiment of the 83rd Guards Rifle Division of the 11th Guards Army, the Nazis killed and tortured close relatives of 158 soldiers and officers, 56 families were driven away to hard labor in Germany, 162 were left homeless, 293 - the Nazis plundered household property and stole cattle. Anger and hatred were born in the hearts of soldiers when they visited the former Nazi death camps located on the territory of Lithuania, East Prussia and Poland, or listened to the stories of Soviet citizens liberated from fascist slavery.

Among the fighters, the immortal feat of the guards of the private 77th Guards Rifle Regiment of the 26th Guards Rifle Division of the 11th Guards Army Yuri Smirnov, who was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, was widely popularized. The soldiers and officers of the guards regiment, where Yuri Smirnov served, met with great honor the mother of the hero M.F. Smirnova, who arrived at the front. In honor of her arrival in the German city of Melkemen, a parade of regiment units was held. Addressing the guards, Maria Fedorovna said: “Having arrived at the front, to the comrades of my Yuri, I did not feel lonely. Every day, with every meeting, I was more and more imbued with the idea that a friendly soldier's family is my family and every soldier is my son ... I was on German soil and I curse this land and the Germans who crucified my son. I ask you, my sons, go ahead, drive, beat the Germans, take revenge on them for all the atrocities ... ". The presence of M. F. Smirnova at the front was reported in many Red Army newspapers.

The political organs of the formations also carried out active work to undermine the morale of the enemy troops. To do this, leaflets were thrown into the enemy’s location, which spoke of the futility of his further resistance. Through powerful sound installations located near the front line, programs were broadcast in German about the brilliant victories of the Red Army, about the inevitability of the defeat of Germany, and the futility of further resistance. Not only Soviet people were sent to the location of enemy troops, but also German anti-fascist prisoners of war.

On the night before the attack, short meetings of party organizers and Komsomol organizers of the units were held, where combat missions and methods for their fastest completion were explained.

Immediately before the battle, political workers read to the personnel of the troops the appeals of the military councils of the fronts and armies to all soldiers and officers. The appeal of the Military Council of the 2nd Belorussian Front stated:

“Dear comrades! Fighting friends! Faithful sons of the Soviet Motherland - Red Army soldiers, sergeants, officers, generals! ..

The time has come to fully pay off the worst enemy of our Motherland - the Nazi invaders for all their atrocities and atrocities, for the suffering and torment of our people, for the blood and tears of our fathers and mothers, wives and children, for the Soviet cities and villages destroyed and plundered by the enemy ... At this decisive hour, our great Soviet people, our Motherland, our native party ... call on you to fulfill your military duty with honor, to translate all the strength of your hatred for the enemy into a single desire to defeat the German invaders.

With a new powerful blow, let's hasten the death of the enemy! From now on, your battle cry should be only one: “Forward to defeat the enemy! Forward to Berlin!