Loss.ru

Chapter 11

................................................. ........... CONCLUSIONS From the above, it should be concluded that the fire superiority of the Red Army over the German army. Moreover, this fire superiority cannot be explained by quantitative superiority in gun barrels. Moreover, as a result of poor transport equipment, the Red Army made little use of its mortar weapons at the battalion and regimental level. After all, an 82 mm mine weighs 3 kg, and 30 pieces are fired per minute. For 10 minutes of shooting, you need 900 kg of ammunition for a mortar. Of course, the transport was provided primarily by artillery, not mortars. It turned out that a maneuverable, light artillery weapon was tied to ammunition points, and could not work in the interests of the battalions. The problem was solved by mixing mortars into mortar regiments, where they could be supplied with ammunition centrally. But as a result, the battalion, regimental and even divisional level turned out to be weaker than the German one, because mortars made up half of the trunks in the division in the pre-war states. The anti-tank artillery of the Soviet rifle divisions was weaker than the German one. As a result, three-inch light artillery regiments rolled out for direct fire. There were not enough air defense systems. We had to divert heavy machine guns and anti-tank rifles from the first line for these purposes. Due to what was fire superiority achieved from the first days of the war? Fire superiority by the Red Army was achieved through skill and courage. This is confirmed not only by the calculations of personnel losses, but also by the losses of military equipment, property, and transport.

Here is Halder's entry dated 11/18/41 says that out of 0.5 million cars that were in the German army on 06/22/41, 150 thousand were irretrievably lost and 275 thousand needed repair, and 300 thousand were needed for this repair. tons of spare parts. That is, about 1.1 tons of spare parts are needed to repair one car. What condition are these cars in? From them, only the frames remained! If we add to them those cars from which there are not even frames left, it turns out that all cars produced by German car factories in a year burn out in Russia in less than six months. So Hitler was worried about this circumstance, so Halder was forced to discuss these issues with General Bule.

But cars are not fighting in the first line of troops. What happened in the first line? Hell is hell! Now we need to compare all this with the losses of auto-tractor equipment in the Red Army. With the outbreak of war, the production of cars and tractors was sharply reduced in favor of tanks, and the production of artillery tractors ceased altogether. Nevertheless, by the autumn of 1942, the Soviet Union had lost only half of the pre-war fleet of artillery tractors, mainly in encirclement, and then, until the very victory, used the remaining half, with practically no losses in them. If the Germans in the first six months of the war lost almost all the vehicles that they had in the army at the beginning of the war, then the Soviet army lost 33% of the available and received vehicles over the same period. And for the whole of 1942, 14%. And by the end of the war, car losses were reduced to 3-5%.

But these losses repeat, according to the form of the loss graph, the irretrievable losses of the personnel of the Red Army, with the only difference that the average monthly loss of cars is 10-15 times less. But after all, the number of cars at the front was just as many times less. It can be assumed that the loss of vehicles from enemy fire in 1941 in the Red Army was no more than 5-10%, and 23-28% of losses were due to maneuvering actions of German troops, encirclement. That is, the loss of vehicles can also serve to characterize the loss of personnel. Because they also reflect the fire capabilities of the parties. That is, if the fascist troops lose 90% of vehicles in 1941, then almost all of these losses are losses from the fire of the Soviet troops, and this is 15% of losses per month. It can be seen that the Soviet army is at least 1.5-3 times more effective than the German army.

In an entry dated December 9, 1941, Halder writes about the irretrievable average daily loss of 1,100 horses. Considering that horses were not put in the battle line and that horses at the front are 10 times less than people, the figure of 9465 people of average daily irretrievable losses for December 1941 from table 6 receives additional confirmation.

German losses in tanks can be estimated based on their availability at the beginning and end of the period of interest. As of June 1941, the Germans had about 5,000 of their own and Czechoslovak vehicles. In addition, in Halder's entry of December 23, 1940, the figure is 4930 captured vehicles, mostly French. There are about 10,000 cars in total. At the end of 1941, the German tank troops were equipped with tanks by 20-30%, that is, about 3000 vehicles remained in stock, of which about 500-600 captured French, which were then transferred from the front to protect the rear areas. Halder also writes about this. Even without taking into account the tanks produced by the German industry in six months, without taking into account Soviet captured tanks used by the Germans, Soviet troops irretrievably destroyed about 7,000 German vehicles, not counting armored cars and armored personnel carriers, in the first 6 months of the war. In four years, this will amount to 56,000 vehicles destroyed by the Red Army. If we add here 3,800 tanks produced by the German industry in 1941 and 1,300 captured Soviet tanks captured by the Germans at storage bases, we get more than 12,000 destroyed German vehicles in the first six months of the war. During the war years, Germany produced about 50,000 vehicles, and the Germans had 10,000 vehicles before the war, as we calculated. The allies of the USSR could destroy 4-5 thousand tanks or so. Soviet troops lost about 100,000 tanks and self-propelled guns during the war, but it must be understood that the operational life of Soviet tanks was significantly less. Here there is a different approach to life, to technology, to war. Different ways to use tanks. Different tank ideology. The Soviet principles of tank building are well described in the trilogy by Mikhail Svirin under the general title "The History of the Soviet Tank 1919-1955", Moscow, "Yauza", "Eksmo", ("The armor is strong, 1919-1937", "Stalin's armor shield, 1937-1943 "," Stalin's Steel Fist, 1943-1955"). Soviet wartime tanks were calculated for one operation, had a resource of 100-200 km at the beginning of the war, up to 500 km by the end of the war, which reflected views on the operational use of tanks and the military economy. After the war, the resource of tanks had to be increased by a number of measures to 10-15 years of service, based on the needs of the peacetime economy and the new concept of the accumulation of weapons. Thus, tanks were initially conceived not to be spared. This is a weapon, why spare it, they need to fight. That is, the losses in the tanks of the USSR are 1.5-2 times higher, and the losses of people are 1.5-2 times lower.

In this case, it should be borne in mind that the Germans could restore up to 70% of the wrecked tanks within a week, according to Guderian. This means that if out of a hundred German tanks that entered the battle at the beginning of the month, 20 vehicles remained by the end of the month, then with irretrievable losses of 80 vehicles, the number of hits may exceed 250. And such a figure will appear in the reports of the Soviet troops. However, the Soviet General Staff, more or less accurately, corrected the reports of the troops, taking into account this circumstance. Therefore, in the operational report for December 16, 1941, announced by the Soviet Information Bureau, it is said that the Germans lost 15,000 tanks, 19,000 guns, about 13,000 aircraft and 6,000,000 people killed, wounded and captured in the first five months of the war. These figures are quite consistent with my calculations and quite accurately reflect the real losses of the German troops. If they are overpriced, then not very much, given the then situation. In any case, the Soviet General Staff assessed the situation much more realistically than the German General Staff even in 1941. In the future, the estimates became even more accurate.

The losses of aircraft by the German side are considered in the book by Kornyukhin G.V. "Air War over the USSR. 1941", LLC "Publishing House "Veche", 2008. There is a table of calculations of the losses of German aviation without taking into account training machines.

Table 18:

War years	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945
Number of aircraft produced in Germany	10247	12401	15409	24807	40593	7539
The same without training aircraft	8377	11280	14331	22533	36900	7221
Number of aircraft at the beginning of next year	4471 (30.9.40)	5178 (31.12.41)	6107 (30.3.43)	6642 (30.4.44)	8365 (1.2.45)	1000*
Theoretical loss	8056	10573	13402	21998	35177	14586
Losses in battles with allies according to their (allies) data	8056	1300	2100	6650	17050	5700
Theoretical losses on the "Eastern Front"	-	9273	11302	15348	18127	8886
Losses on the "Eastern Front" according to Soviet data**	-	4200	11550	15200	17500	4400
The same according to modern Russian sources ***	-	2213	4348	3940	4525	****

* The number of aircraft surrendered after the surrender
** According to the reference book "Soviet Aviation in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 in Figures"
*** An attempt to calculate the "squeeze" from the documents of the quartermaster general of the Luftwaffe, carried out by R. Larintsev and A. Zabolotsky.
**** For 1945, the Quartermaster General's papers could not be found, apparently he was tired of preparing propaganda opuses. It is unlikely that the Quartermaster General quit his job and went on vacation, rather, he quit the secondary work that the Ministry of Propaganda entrusted to him.

Table 18 shows that modern ideas about German losses in aviation are completely untrue. It can also be seen that the Soviet data differ significantly from the theoretically calculated values ​​only in 1945 and 1941. In 1945, the discrepancies are due to the fact that half of the German aviation refused to fly, and was abandoned by the Germans at the airfields. In 1941, the discrepancy was formed from the poorly organized by the Soviet side accounting for downed German aircraft in the first two or three months of the war. And in the post-war history, the estimated figures from the time of the war, voiced by the Soviet Information Bureau, were ashamed to enter. Thus, 62936 German aircraft destroyed by the Soviet side are clearly visible. The combat losses of the Soviet Air Force amounted to 43,100 combat vehicles during the war. However, non-combat losses of combat vehicles of the Soviet Air Force are practically the same as combat ones. Here again the difference in the quality of technology and the attitude towards it is visible. This difference was fully recognized by the Soviet leadership; the USSR could compete with united Europe in the volume of military production only if it had a completely different view of the quality, nature and use of these products. Soviet vehicles, especially fighters, wore out very quickly in wartime conditions. Nevertheless, plywood-linen aircraft with engine life for several flights successfully resisted all-duralumin aviation with German-quality engines.

Hitler not for nothing believed that the Soviet industry would not be able to make up for the loss of weapons, and could not, if it had strived for a symmetrical response to the German challenge. Having 3-4 times fewer workers, the Soviet Union could produce 3-4 times less labor costs.

At the same time, one should not draw a conclusion about the mass death of Soviet pilots or tankers from the imperfection of technology. Such a conclusion will not find confirmation either in memoirs, or in reports, or in statistical studies. Because he is unfaithful. It's just that in the USSR there was a technical culture different from European, a different technogenic civilization. The book cites the losses of Soviet military equipment, including decommissioned equipment that has used up its resource, which is irreparable due to a lack of spare parts and a weak repair base. It should be remembered that in terms of the development of production, the USSR had a base of only two, albeit heroic, five-year plans. Therefore, the response to European technical equipment was not symmetrical. Soviet technology was designed for a shorter, but more intensive period of operation. Rather, it was not even calculated, but it turned out like this by itself. Lendliz cars did not last long in Soviet conditions either. To produce repair forces means to tear people away from production, from war, and to produce spare parts means to occupy those capacities that can produce finished machines. Of course, all this is necessary, the question is the balance of opportunities and needs. Taking into account the fact that in battle all this work can burn out in a minute, and all produced spare parts and repair shops will remain out of work. Therefore, when, for example, Shirokorad in the book "Three Wars of Great Finland" complains about the unsuitability of Budenovka or about differences in the quality of the uniforms of soldiers and commanders of the Red Army, the question begs, did he think well? In order to pursue European quality, one must have a European industry, such was Germany, and not the USSR. Budyonovka or bogatyrka is a mobilization version of a headdress, they were invented at the end of the First World War, just because production was weak. As soon as the opportunity arose, they were replaced with normal hats. Who is to blame that such an opportunity appeared only in 1940? Honorary saint and honorary pope of our kingdom, Tsar Nicholas the bloody and his satraps. Democrats from the Kerensky gang. As well as the now sung white bandits. At the same time, the Germans wore winter caps. When Shirokorad in the book "The March on Vienna" complains that the gun turrets on armored boats were installed from tanks, and were not specially designed, he does not take into account that tank turrets were mass-produced at tank factories, and specially designed turrets should have been produced in a medium series at factories shipbuilding. Does a specialist in the history of technology not see the difference? Rather, he is looking for cheap sensations where there are none. And so it is with everything. Aircraft were produced at furniture factories, and cartridges at tobacco factories. Armored cars were produced at the crushing equipment plant in Vyksa, and PPS wherever there was a cold stamping press. The anecdote about the vertical take-off harvester, famous in Soviet times, is more suitable for Stalin's time than for later times.

The labor heroism of the Soviet people played a decisive role, but we must not forget about the merits of the Soviet government, personally Stalin, who correctly set priorities in the scientific, technical, industrial and military spheres. Now it is fashionable to complain that there were few walkie-talkies and a lot of tanks, but would it be better if there were fewer tanks and more walkie-talkies? The radios don't fire. Although they are needed, but where to get the funds for everything? Where necessary, there were walkie-talkies.

In this regard, I want to focus on a key moment in the history of the war, on the preparation of pre-war industry for mobilization in wartime. Special samples and modifications of all weapons were developed for release in wartime. Special technologies were developed for implementation in non-core industries, specialists were trained to implement these technologies. Since 1937, the army began to receive modern, domestic weapons, to replace the alterations and modifications of pre-revolutionary and licensed samples. Artillery and automatic rifles were the first to be introduced. Then priority was given to tanks and combat aircraft. Their production began to unfold only in 1940. New machine guns and automatic cannons were introduced during the course of the war. It was not possible to develop the automotive and radio industries to the required extent before the war. But they set up a lot of steam locomotives and wagons, and this is much more important. The capacity of specialized factories was sorely lacking, and the mobilization of non-core enterprises, prepared even before the war, gives the right to assert that Stalin deserved the title of generalissimo even before the war, even if he had done nothing more to win. And he did a lot more!

On the anniversary of the start of the war, the Soviet Information Bureau published operational reports summarizing the results of hostilities since the start of the war on an accrual basis. It is interesting to summarize these data in a table that will give an idea of ​​the views of the Soviet command, of course, adjusted for some, forced, propaganda element in relation to their own casualties. But the nature of Soviet propaganda of that period is interesting in itself, because now it can be compared with the published data of the work.

Table 19:

Date of the operational summary of the Sovinformburo	Germany (23.6.42)	USSR (23.6.42)	Germany (21.6.43)	USSR (21.6.43)	Germany (21.6.44)	USSR (21.6.44)
Losses since the beginning of the war	10,000,000 total casualties (of which 3,000,000 killed)	4.5 million people total losses	6,400,000 killed and captured	4,200,000 killed and missing	7,800,000 killed and captured	5,300,000 killed and missing
Losses of guns over 75 mm since the beginning of the war	30500	22000	56500	35000	90000	48000
Losses of tanks since the beginning of the war	24000	15000	42400	30000	70000	49000
Aircraft losses since the beginning of the war	20000	9000	43000	23000	60000	30128

Table 19 shows that the Soviet government concealed from the Soviet people only one figure - the loss of the missing in the encirclement. During the entire war, the losses of the USSR as missing and captured amounted to about 4 million people, of which less than 2 million people returned from captivity after the war. These figures were hidden in order to reduce the fears of the unstable part of the population before the German advance, to reduce the fear of encirclement among the unstable part of the military. And after the war, the Soviet government considered itself guilty before the people, for being unable to foresee and avoid such a development of events. Therefore, after the war, these figures were not advertised, although they were no longer hidden. After all, Konev quite openly declared after the war about more than 10,000,000 irretrievable losses of Soviet troops. He said it once, and there was nothing more to repeat, to reopen wounds.

The rest of the numbers are generally correct. During the entire war, the USSR lost 61,500 field artillery barrels, 96,500 tanks and self-propelled guns, but no more than 65,000 of them for combat reasons, 88,300 combat aircraft, but only 43,100 of them for combat reasons. About 6.7 million Soviet soldiers died in battle (including non-combat losses, but excluding those who died in captivity) during the entire war.

The losses of the enemy are also indicated correctly. Enemy personnel losses have been greatly underestimated since 1942, and in 1941 they are correctly indicated at 6,000,000 total losses. Only the losses of German tanks are perhaps slightly overestimated, by about 1.5 times. This is naturally related to the difficulty of accounting for the number of repaired and reused machines. In addition, in the reports of the troops, along with damaged tanks and self-propelled guns, other armored vehicles could also be indicated. The Germans had a lot of different combat vehicles on both half-track and wheeled chassis, which can be called self-propelled guns. Then the losses of the Germans in armored vehicles are also indicated correctly. A slight overestimation of the number of downed German aircraft is not significant. The loss of guns and mortars of all calibers and purposes for the Red Army amounted to 317,500 pieces during the war, and for Germany and its allies, the loss of 289,200 pieces is indicated in the work. But in the 12th volume of the "History of the Second World War", in table 11, it is said that Germany alone produced and lost 319900 pieces of guns, and the same Germany produced mortars and lost 78800 pieces. In total, the loss of guns and mortars in Germany alone will amount to 398,700 barrels, and it is not known whether rocket systems are included here, most likely they are not. In addition, this figure definitely does not include guns and mortars produced before 1939.

Since the summer of 1942, there has been a tendency in the Soviet General Staff to underestimate the number of Germans killed. Soviet military leaders began to assess the situation more carefully, fearing to underestimate the enemy at the final stage of the war. In any case, one can speak of special, propaganda loss figures published by the Sovinformburo only in relation to the number of captured and missing Soviet servicemen. Otherwise, the same figures were published that the Soviet General Staff used in their calculations.

The course and outcome of the war cannot be understood if we exclude from consideration the European fascist atrocities in relation to the peaceful Soviet population and prisoners of war. These atrocities constituted the purpose and meaning of the war for the German side and all of Germany's allies. The fighting was only a tool to ensure the unhindered implementation of these atrocities. The only goal of Europe united by the Nazis in World War II was to conquer the entire European part of the USSR, and to destroy most of the population in the most brutal way, in order to intimidate the rest and enslave them. These crimes are described in Alexander Dyukov's book "For what the Soviet people fought", Moscow, "Yauza", "Eksmo", 2007. 12-15 million Soviet civilians, including prisoners of war, became victims of these atrocities throughout the war, but we must remember that only during the first war winter, the Nazis planned to kill more than 30 million peaceful Soviet citizens in the occupied territories of the USSR. Thus, we can talk about the salvation by the Soviet army and partisans, the Soviet government and Stalin of more than 15 million lives of Soviet people planned for destruction in the first year of the occupation, and about 20 million planned for destruction in the future, not counting those saved from fascist slavery, which often was worse than death. Despite numerous sources, this point is extremely poorly covered by historical science. Historians simply avoid this topic, limiting themselves to rare and common phrases, and yet these crimes exceed in the number of victims all other crimes in history combined.

In a note dated November 24, 1941, Halder writes about the report of Colonel-General Fromm. The general military-economic situation is represented as a falling curve. Fromm believes that a truce is necessary. My conclusions confirm Fromm's conclusions.

It also indicates that the loss of personnel at the front is 180,000 people. If this is a loss of combat strength, then it is easily covered by recalling vacationers from vacation. Not to mention the conscription of the contingent born in 1922. Where is the falling curve here? Why, then, in the entry dated November 30, it says that 50-60 people remained in the companies? To make ends meet, Halder claims that 340,000 men make up half of the combat strength of the infantry. But this is ridiculous, the combat strength of the infantry is less than a tenth of the army. In fact, it should be read that the loss of troops at the front is 1.8 million people on 11/24/41 in combat strength and 3.4 million in the total number of troops of the "Eastern Front" on 11/30/41, and the regular number of troops " Eastern Front "6.8 million people. This is probably the right thing to do.

Perhaps someone will not believe my calculations about German losses, especially in 1941, when, according to modern ideas, the Red Army was completely defeated and supposedly the German army did not suffer losses in some cunning way. That's bullshit. You can't forge victory out of defeats and losses. From the very beginning, the German army suffered defeat, but the Reich leadership hoped that the USSR was having an even worse situation. Hitler spoke directly about this in the same diary of Halder.

The situation of the border battle was best conveyed by Dmitry Egorov in the book "June 41st. Defeat of the Western Front.", Moscow, "Yauza", "Eksmo", 2008.

Of course, the summer of 1941 was terribly difficult for the Soviet troops. Endless battles with no visible positive results. Endless environments where the choice was often between death and captivity. And many chose captivity. Maybe even the majority. But it must be borne in mind that mass surrenders began after one or two weeks of intense struggle in the environment, when the fighters ran out of ammunition even for small arms. The commanders, desperate to win, gave up command of the troops, sometimes even on a front-line scale, fled from their fighters and in small groups either tried to surrender or go to their east. The fighters fled from their units, dressed in civilian clothes or, left without leadership, huddled in crowds of thousands, hoping to surrender to the German detachments clearing the area. And yet the Germans were beaten. There were people who chose a more reliable position for themselves, stocked up on weapons and accepted their last battle, knowing in advance how it would end. Or they organized disorderly crowds of encircled people into combat detachments, attacked German cordons and broke through to their own. Sometimes it worked. There were commanders who kept control of their troops in the most difficult situations. There were divisions, corps and entire armies that attacked the enemy, inflicted defeats on the enemy, staunchly defended themselves, evaded German attacks and beat themselves. Yes, they beat me so much that it was 1.5-2 times more painful. Each blow was answered with a double blow.

This was the reason for the defeat of the fascist hordes. The irretrievable demographic losses of the German army amounted to about 15 million people. The irretrievable demographic losses of other Axis armies amounted to 4 million people. And in total, up to 19 million enemies of different nationalities and states had to be killed to win.

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Comment

Calculation of the losses of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War remains one of the scientific problems unsolved by historians. Official statistics - 26.6 million dead, including 8.7 million military personnel - underestimate the losses among those who were at the front. Contrary to popular belief, the bulk of the dead were military personnel (up to 13.6 million), and not the civilian population of the Soviet Union.

There is a lot of literature on this problem, and maybe someone gets the impression that it has been studied enough. Yes, indeed, there is a lot of literature, but there are still many questions and doubts. Too much here is unclear, controversial and clearly unreliable. Even the reliability of the current official data on the loss of life of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War (about 27 million people) raises serious doubts.

History of calculation and official state recognition of losses

The official figure for the demographic losses of the Soviet Union has changed several times. In February 1946, the loss figure of 7 million people was published in the Bolshevik magazine. In March 1946, Stalin, in an interview with the Pravda newspaper, stated that the USSR had lost 7 million people during the war years: “As a result of the German invasion, the Soviet Union irretrievably lost in battles with the Germans, and also thanks to the German occupation and seven million people." The report “The Military Economy of the USSR during the Patriotic War” published in 1947 by the chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR Voznesensky did not indicate human losses.

In 1959, the first post-war census of the population of the USSR was carried out. In 1961, Khrushchev, in a letter to the Prime Minister of Sweden, reported 20 million dead: “How can we sit back and wait for a repeat of 1941, when the German militarists unleashed a war against the Soviet Union, which claimed two tens of millions of lives of Soviet people?” In 1965, Brezhnev, on the 20th anniversary of the Victory, announced more than 20 million dead.

In 1988–1993 A team of military historians led by Colonel General G. F. Krivosheev conducted a statistical study of archival documents and other materials containing information about casualties in the army and navy, border and internal troops of the NKVD. The result of the work was the figure of 8,668,400 people lost by the power structures of the USSR during the war.

Since March 1989, on behalf of the Central Committee of the CPSU, a state commission has been working to study the number of human losses in the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. The commission included representatives of the State Statistics Committee, the Academy of Sciences, the Ministry of Defense, the Main Archival Administration under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the Committee of War Veterans, the Union of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. The commission did not calculate losses, but estimated the difference between the estimated population of the USSR at the end of the war and the estimated population that would have lived in the USSR if there had been no war. The commission first made public its demographic loss figure of 26.6 million people at a solemn meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on May 8, 1990.

On May 5, 2008, the President of the Russian Federation signed a decree "On the publication of the fundamental multi-volume work" The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 "". On October 23, 2009, the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation signed an order "On the Interdepartmental Commission for Calculating Losses During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945". The commission included representatives of the Ministry of Defense, the FSB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Rosstat, Rosarkhiv. In December 2011, a commission representative announced the country's overall demographic losses during the war period. 26.6 million people, of which losses of active armed forces 8668400 people.

military personnel

According to the Russian Ministry of Defense irretrievable losses during the fighting on the Soviet-German front from June 22, 1941 to May 9, 1945, they amounted to 8,860,400 Soviet military personnel. The source was data declassified in 1993 and data obtained during the search work of the Memory Watch and in historical archives.

According to declassified data from 1993: killed, died from wounds and diseases, non-combat losses - 6 885 100 people, including

• Killed - 5,226,800 people.
• Died from inflicted wounds - 1,102,800 people.
• Died from various causes and accidents, shot - 555,500 people.

On May 5, 2010, Major General A. Kirilin, head of the RF Ministry of Defense Directorate for perpetuating the memory of those who died defending the Fatherland, told RIA Novosti that the figures for military casualties - 8 668 400 , will be reported to the leadership of the country, so that they are announced on May 9, the day of the 65th anniversary of the Victory.

According to the data of G. F. Krivosheev, during the Great Patriotic War, 3,396,400 military personnel were missing and captured (about 1,162,600 more were attributed to unaccounted for combat losses in the first months of the war, when combat units did not provide any reports), that is, all

• missing, captured and unaccounted for combat losses - 4,559,000;
• 1,836,000 military personnel returned from captivity, did not return (died, emigrated) - 1,783,300, (that is, the total number of prisoners - 3,619,300, which is more than together with the missing);
• previously considered missing and were called up again from the liberated territories - 939,700.

So the official irretrievable losses(6,885,100 dead, according to declassified data from 1993, and 1,783,300 who did not return from captivity) amounted to 8,668,400 military personnel. But from them you need to subtract 939,700 re-conscripts who were considered missing. We get 7,728,700.

The mistake was pointed out, in particular, by Leonid Radzikhovsky. The correct calculation is as follows: the number 1,783,300 is the number of those who did not return from captivity and went missing (and not just those who did not return from captivity). Then official irretrievable losses (dead 6,885,100, according to declassified data of 1993, and those who did not return from captivity and went missing 1,783,300) amounted to 8 668 400 military personnel.

According to M.V. Filimoshin, during the Great Patriotic War, 4,559,000 Soviet servicemen and 500,000 conscripts called up for mobilization, but not included in the lists of troops, were captured and went missing. From this figure, the calculation gives the same result: if 1,836,000 returned from captivity and 939,700 were re-conscripted from those who were considered unknown, then 1,783,300 military personnel were missing and did not return from captivity. So the official irretrievable losses (6,885,100 died, according to declassified data from 1993, and 1,783,300 went missing and did not return from captivity) are 8 668 400 military personnel.

Additional information

Civilian population

A group of researchers led by G. F. Krivosheev estimated the losses of the civilian population of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War at approximately 13.7 million people.

The final number is 13,684,692 people. consists of the following components:

• were exterminated in the occupied territory and died as a result of hostilities (from bombing, shelling, etc.) - 7,420,379 people.
• died as a result of a humanitarian catastrophe (hunger, infectious diseases, lack of medical care, etc.) - 4,100,000 people.
• died in forced labor in Germany - 2,164,313 people. (another 451,100 people did not return for various reasons and became emigrants).

According to S. Maksudov, about 7 million people died in the occupied territories and in besieged Leningrad (1 million of them in besieged Leningrad, 3 million were Jews, victims of the Holocaust), and about 7 million people died as a result of increased mortality in non-occupied territories.

The total losses of the USSR (together with the civilian population) amounted to 40–41 million people. These estimates are confirmed by comparing the data of the 1939 and 1959 censuses, since there is reason to believe that in 1939 there was a very significant undercount of the male draft contingents.

In general, the Red Army during the Second World War lost 13 million 534 thousand 398 soldiers and commanders in the dead, missing, dead from wounds, diseases and in captivity.

Finally, we note another new trend in the study of the demographic results of World War II. Before the collapse of the USSR, there was no need to assess the human losses for individual republics or nationalities. And only at the end of the twentieth century, L. Rybakovsky tried to calculate the approximate value of the human losses of the RSFSR within its then borders. According to his estimates, it amounted to approximately 13 million people - slightly less than half of the total losses of the USSR.

Nationalitydead soldiers	Number of casualties (thousand people)	% of total irretrievable losses
Russians	5 756.0	66.402
Ukrainians	1 377.4	15.890
Belarusians	252.9	2.917
Tatars	187.7	2.165
Jews	142.5	1.644
Kazakhs	125.5	1.448
Uzbeks	117.9	1.360
Armenians	83.7	0.966
Georgians	79.5	0.917
Mordva	63.3	0.730
Chuvash	63.3	0.730
Yakuts	37.9	0.437
Azerbaijanis	58.4	0.673
Moldovans	53.9	0.621
Bashkirs	31.7	0.366
Kyrgyz	26.6	0.307
Udmurts	23.2	0.268
Tajiks	22.9	0.264
Turkmens	21.3	0.246
Estonians	21.2	0.245
Mari	20.9	0.241
Buryats	13.0	0.150
Komi	11.6	0.134
Latvians	11.6	0.134
Lithuanians	11.6	0.134
Peoples of Dagestan	11.1	0.128
Ossetians	10.7	0.123
Poles	10.1	0.117
Karely	9.5	0.110
Kalmyks	4.0	0.046
Kabardians and Balkars	3.4	0.039
Greeks	2.4	0.028
Chechens and Ingush	2.3	0.026
Finns	1.6	0.018
Bulgarians	1.1	0.013
Czechs and Slovaks	0.4	0.005
Chinese	0.4	0.005
Assyrians	0,2	0,002
Yugoslavs	0.1	0.001

The greatest losses on the battlefields of the Second World War were suffered by Russians and Ukrainians. Many Jews were killed. But the most tragic was the fate of the Belarusian people. In the first months of the war, the entire territory of Belarus was occupied by the Germans. During the war, the Byelorussian SSR lost up to 30% of its population. In the occupied territory of the BSSR, the Nazis killed 2.2 million people. (The data of recent studies on Belarus are as follows: the Nazis destroyed civilians - 1,409,225 people, destroyed prisoners in German death camps - 810,091 people, driven into German slavery - 377,776 people). It is also known that in percentage terms - the number of dead soldiers / population, among the Soviet republics, Georgia suffered great damage. Almost 300,000 out of 700,000 Georgians called to the front did not return.

Losses of the Wehrmacht and SS troops

To date, there are no sufficiently reliable figures for the losses of the German army, obtained by direct statistical calculation. This is explained by the absence, for various reasons, of reliable source statistics on German losses. The picture is more or less clear regarding the number of Wehrmacht prisoners of war on the Soviet-German front. According to Russian sources, 3,172,300 Wehrmacht soldiers were captured by Soviet troops, of which 2,388,443 were Germans in the NKVD camps. According to estimates by German historians, there were about 3.1 million German servicemen in Soviet prisoner of war camps alone.

The discrepancy is approximately 0.7 million people. This discrepancy is explained by differences in the estimate of the number of Germans who died in captivity: according to Russian archival documents, 356,700 Germans died in Soviet captivity, and according to German researchers, approximately 1.1 million people. It seems that the Russian figure of the Germans who died in captivity is more reliable, and the missing 0.7 million Germans who went missing and did not return from captivity actually died not in captivity, but on the battlefield.

There is another statistics of losses - the statistics of burials of Wehrmacht soldiers. According to the appendix to the law of the Federal Republic of Germany "On the preservation of burial places", the total number of German soldiers who are in recorded burials in the territory of the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries is 3 million 226 thousand people. (on the territory of the USSR alone - 2,330,000 burials). This figure can be taken as the starting point for calculating the demographic losses of the Wehrmacht, but it also needs to be adjusted.

1. Firstly, this figure takes into account only the burial places of Germans, and a large number of soldiers of other nationalities fought in the Wehrmacht: Austrians (of which 270 thousand people died), Sudeten Germans and Alsatians (230 thousand people died) and representatives of other nationalities and states (357 thousand people died). Of the total number of dead Wehrmacht soldiers of non-German nationality, the Soviet-German front accounts for 75-80%, i.e. 0.6-0.7 million people.
2. Secondly, this figure refers to the beginning of the 90s of the last century. Since then, the search for German graves in Russia, the CIS countries and Eastern Europe has continued. And the messages that appeared on this topic were not informative enough. For example, the Russian Association of War Memorials, established in 1992, reported that over the 10 years of its existence, it had transferred information about the burial places of 400,000 Wehrmacht soldiers to the German Union for the Care of War Graves. However, whether these were newly discovered burials or whether they have already been taken into account in the figure of 3 million 226 thousand is unclear. Unfortunately, no generalized statistics of the newly discovered graves of Wehrmacht soldiers could be found. Tentatively, it can be assumed that the number of newly discovered graves of Wehrmacht soldiers over the past 10 years is in the range of 0.2–0.4 million people.
3. Thirdly, many burial places of the dead soldiers of the Wehrmacht on Soviet soil disappeared or were deliberately destroyed. Approximately 0.4–0.6 million Wehrmacht soldiers could be buried in such disappeared and nameless graves.
4. Fourthly, these data do not include burials of German soldiers killed in battles with Soviet troops in Germany and Western European countries. According to R. Overmans, only in the last three spring months of the war, about 1 million people died. (minimum estimate 700 thousand) In general, on German soil and in Western European countries, approximately 1.2–1.5 million Wehrmacht soldiers died in battles with the Red Army.
5. Finally, fifthly, the Wehrmacht soldiers who died of “natural” death (0.1–0.2 million people) were also among the buried.

An approximate procedure for calculating the total human losses of Germany

1. The population in 1939 was 70.2 million people.
2. Population in 1946 - 65.93 million people.
3. Natural mortality 2.8 million people.
4. Natural increase (birth rate) 3.5 million people.
5. Emigration inflow of 7.25 million people.
6. Total losses ((70.2 - 65.93 - 2.8) + 3.5 + 7.25 = 12.22) 12.15 million people.

conclusions

Recall that disputes about the number of deaths are ongoing to this day.

Almost 27 million citizens of the USSR died during the war (the exact number is 26.6 million). This amount included:

• military personnel killed and died from wounds;
• who died from diseases;
• executed by firing squad (according to the results of various denunciations);
• missing and captured;
• representatives of the civilian population, both in the occupied territories of the USSR and in other regions of the country, in which, due to hostilities in the state, there was an increased mortality from hunger and disease.

This also includes those who emigrated from the USSR during the war and did not return to their homeland after the victory. The vast majority of the dead were men (about 20 million). Modern researchers argue that by the end of the war, of the men born in 1923. (i.e. those who were 18 years old in 1941 and could be drafted into the army) about 3% survived. By 1945, there were twice as many women as men in the USSR (data for people aged 20 to 29).

In addition to the actual deaths, a sharp drop in the birth rate can also be attributed to human losses. So, according to official estimates, if the birth rate in the state remained at least at the same level, the population of the Union by the end of 1945 should have been 35-36 million people more than it was in reality. Despite numerous studies and calculations, the exact number of those who died during the war is unlikely to ever be named.

World War II in facts and figures

Ernest Hemingway from the preface to A Farewell to Arms!

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Having left the city, still halfway to the headquarters of the front, we immediately heard and saw desperate firing all over the horizon with tracer bullets and shells. And they realized that the war was over. It couldn't mean anything else. I suddenly felt bad. I was ashamed in front of my comrades, but in the end I had to stop the Jeep and get out. I started having some spasms in my throat and esophagus, I began to vomit with saliva, bitterness, bile. I don't know why. Probably from a nervous discharge, which was expressed in such an absurd way. All these four years of the war, in various circumstances, I tried very hard to be a restrained person and, it seems, I really was. And here, at the moment when I suddenly realized that the war was over, something happened - my nerves gave out. The comrades did not laugh or joke, they were silent.

Konstantin Simonov. "Different days of the war. Writer's diary"

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Japanese surrender

The terms of Japan's surrender were put forward in the Potsdam Declaration, signed on July 26, 1945 by the governments of Great Britain, the United States and China. However, the Japanese government refused to accept them.

The situation changed after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as the USSR's entry into the war against Japan (August 9, 1945).

But, even so, the members of the Supreme Military Council of Japan were not inclined to accept the terms of surrender. Some of them believed that the continuation of hostilities would lead to significant losses of Soviet and American troops, which would make it possible to conclude a truce on favorable terms for Japan.

On August 9, 1945, Japanese Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki and a number of members of the Japanese government asked the emperor to intervene in the situation in order to quickly accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. On the night of August 10, Emperor Hirohito, who shared the Japanese government's fear of the complete annihilation of the Japanese nation, ordered the Supreme Military Council to agree to unconditional surrender. On August 14, the emperor's speech was recorded, in which he announced the unconditional surrender of Japan and the end of the war.

On the night of August 15, a number of officers of the Ministry of the Army and employees of the Imperial Guard made an attempt to seize the imperial palace, place the emperor under house arrest and destroy the recording of his speech in order to prevent the surrender of Japan. The rebellion was put down.

At noon on August 15, Hirohito's speech was broadcast over the radio. This was the first appeal of the emperor of Japan to ordinary people.

Japan's surrender was signed on September 2, 1945 aboard the USS Missouri. This put an end to the bloodiest war of the 20th century.

LOSSES OF THE PARTIES

Allies

USSR

From June 22, 1941 to September 2, 1945, about 26.6 million people died. General material losses - $2 trillion 569 billion (about 30% of all national wealth); military spending - $ 192 billion in 1945 prices. 1,710 cities and towns, 70 thousand villages and villages, 32 thousand industrial enterprises were destroyed.

China

From September 1, 1939 to September 2, 1945, from 3 million to 3.75 million military personnel and about 10 million civilians died in the war against Japan. In total, during the years of the war with Japan (from 1931 to 1945), China's losses amounted, according to official Chinese statistics, to more than 35 million military and civilians.

Poland

From September 1, 1939 to May 8, 1945, about 240 thousand military personnel and about 6 million civilians were killed. The territory of the country was occupied by Germany, resistance forces acted.

Yugoslavia

From April 6, 1941 to May 8, 1945, according to various sources, from 300 thousand to 446 thousand military personnel and from 581 thousand to 1.4 million civilians died. The country was occupied by Germany, resistance units were operating.

France

From September 3, 1939 to May 8, 1945, 201,568 servicemen and about 400,000 civilians were killed. The country was occupied by Germany, there was a resistance movement. Material losses - 21 billion US dollars in 1945 prices.

Great Britain

From September 3, 1939 to September 2, 1945, 382,600 military personnel and 67,100 civilians died. Material losses - about 120 billion US dollars in 1945 prices.

USA

From December 7, 1941 to September 2, 1945, 407,316 servicemen and about 6,000 civilians were killed. The cost of military operations is about 341 billion US dollars in 1945 prices.

Greece

From October 28, 1940 to May 8, 1945, about 35 thousand military personnel and from 300 to 600 thousand civilians were killed.

Czechoslovakia

From September 1, 1939 to May 11, 1945, according to various estimates, from 35 thousand to 46 thousand military personnel and from 294 thousand to 320 thousand civilians died. The country was occupied by Germany. Volunteer units fought as part of the Allied armed forces.

India

From September 3, 1939 to September 2, 1945, about 87 thousand military personnel were killed. The civilian population did not suffer direct losses, but a number of researchers consider the death of 1.5 to 2.5 million Indians during the famine of 1943 (it was caused by an increase in food supplies to the British army) as a direct consequence of the war.

Canada

From September 10, 1939 to September 2, 1945, 42 thousand military personnel and about 1 thousand 600 sailors of the merchant fleet were killed. Material losses amounted to about 45 billion US dollars in 1945 prices.

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I saw women crying for the dead. They cried because we lied too much. You know how the survivors return from the war, how much space they occupy, how loudly they boast of their exploits, how terrible death is portrayed. Still would! They might not come back either.

Antoine de Saint-Exupery. "Citadel"

Hitler's coalition (Axis countries)

Germany

From September 1, 1939 to May 8, 1945, according to various sources, from 3.2 to 4.7 million military personnel were killed, civilian losses ranged from 1.4 million to 3.6 million people. The cost of military operations is about 272 billion US dollars in 1945 prices.

Japan

From December 7, 1941 to September 2, 1945, 1.27 million servicemen were killed, 620 thousand non-combat losses, 140 thousand were injured, 85 thousand people were missing; losses of the civilian population - 380 thousand people. Military spending - US$56 billion in 1945 prices

Italy

From June 10, 1940 to May 8, 1945, according to various sources, from 150 thousand to 400 thousand military personnel were killed, 131 thousand went missing. Losses of the civilian population - from 60 thousand to 152 thousand people. Military spending - about 94 billion US dollars in 1945 prices.

Hungary

From June 27, 1941 to May 8, 1945, according to various sources, from 120 thousand to 200 thousand military personnel died. Losses of the civilian population - about 450 thousand people.

Romania

From June 22, 1941 to May 7, 1945, according to various sources, from 300 thousand to 520 thousand military personnel and from 200 thousand to 460 thousand civilians died. Romania was originally on the side of the Axis countries, on August 25, 1944 it declared war on Germany.

Finland

From June 26, 1941 to May 7, 1945, about 83 thousand military personnel and about 2 thousand civilians were killed. On March 4, 1945, the country declared war on Germany.

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Until now, it is not possible to reliably assess the material losses suffered by the countries on whose territory the war was fought.

For six years, many large cities were subjected to total destruction, including some capitals of states. The scale of destruction was such that after the end of the war, these cities were built almost anew. Many cultural values ​​were irretrievably lost.

RESULTS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, US President Franklin Roosevelt and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin (left to right) at the Yalta (Crimea) Conference (TASS photo chronicle)

The allies in the anti-Hitler coalition began to discuss the post-war structure of the world even in the midst of hostilities.

August 14, 1941 on board a warship in the Atlantic Ocean near about. Newfoundland (Canada), US President Franklin Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill signed the so-called. "Atlantic Charter"- a document declaring the goals of the two countries in the war against Nazi Germany and its allies, as well as their vision of the post-war world order.

On January 1, 1942, Roosevelt, Churchill, as well as Soviet Ambassador to the United States Maxim Litvinov and Chinese representative Sun Tzu-wen signed a document that later became known as "Declaration of the United Nations". The next day, the declaration was signed by representatives of 22 other states. Commitments were made to make every effort to achieve victory and not to conclude a separate peace. It is from this date that the United Nations has its chronicle, although the final agreement on the creation of this organization was reached only in 1945 in Yalta during a meeting of the leaders of the three countries of the anti-Hitler coalition - Joseph Stalin, Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill. It was agreed that the UN would be based on the principle of unanimity among the great powers - permanent members of the Security Council with the right of veto.

In total, three summit meetings took place during the war.

The first one took place in Tehran November 28 - December 1, 1943. The main issue was the opening of a second front in Western Europe. It was also decided to involve Turkey in the anti-Hitler coalition. Stalin agreed to declare war on Japan after the end of hostilities in Europe.

Recently, parliamentary hearings “Patriotic Education of Russian Citizens: “The Immortal Regiment”” were held in the Duma. They were attended by deputies, senators, representatives of the legislative and supreme executive bodies of state power of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, the Ministries of Education and Science, Defense, Foreign Affairs, Culture, members of public associations, organizations of foreign compatriots ... True, there were no those who came up with - ​journalists from Tomsk TV-2, no one even remembered them. And, in general, there was really no need to remember. The "Immortal Regiment", which, by definition, did not provide for any staffing, no commanders and political officers, has already completely transformed into a sovereign "box" of parade crew, and its main task today is to learn to step in step and keep alignment in the ranks.

“What is a people, a nation? First of all, it is respect for victories,” Vyacheslav Nikonov, chairman of the parliamentary committee, admonished the participants when opening the hearings. “Today, when a new war is going on, which someone calls “hybrid”, our Victory becomes one of the main targets for attacks on historical memory. There are waves of falsification of history that should make us believe that it was not us, but someone else who won, and still make us apologize ... "For some reason, the Nikonovs are seriously sure that it was they, long before their own birth, who won the Great A victory for which, moreover, someone is trying to make them apologize. But they weren't attacked! And the aching note of the nationwide misfortune that has not passed, the phantom pain for the third generation of the descendants of the soldiers of the Great Patriotic War is drowned out by a cheerful, thoughtless cry: “We can repeat it!”

Really, can we?

It was at these hearings that a terrible figure was named in between times, which for some reason was not noticed by anyone, which did not make us stop in horror on the run in order to understand WHAT we were told after all. Why this was done now, I do not know.

At the hearings, the co-chairman of the Immortal Regiment of Russia movement, State Duma deputy Nikolai Zemtsov, presented the report “The Documentary Basis of the People’s Project “Establishing the Fates of the Missing Defenders of the Fatherland”, within the framework of which studies of the population decline were carried out, which changed the idea of ​​the scale of the losses of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War.

“The total decline in the population of the USSR in 1941-1945 was more than 52 million 812 thousand people,” Zemtsov said, citing declassified data from the USSR State Planning Committee. - Of these, irretrievable losses as a result of the action of war factors - more than 19 million military personnel and about 23 million civilians. The total natural mortality of military personnel and the civilian population during this period could have amounted to more than 10 million 833 thousand people (including 5 million 760 thousand - ​deceased children under the age of four). The irretrievable losses of the population of the USSR as a result of the action of war factors amounted to almost 42 million people.

Can we… do it again?!

Back in the 60s of the last century, the then young poet Vadim Kovda wrote a short poem in four lines: “ If only in my front door / there are three elderly disabled people / then how many of them were injured? / And killed?

Now these elderly people with disabilities due to natural causes are less and less visible. But Kovda imagined the scale of losses quite correctly, it was enough just to multiply the number of front doors.

Stalin, proceeding from considerations inaccessible to a normal person, personally determined the losses of the USSR at 7 million people - a little less than the losses of Germany. Khrushchev - 20 million. Under Gorbachev, a book was published, prepared by the Ministry of Defense under the editorship of General Krivosheev, "The Classification Mark Removed", in which the authors named and in every possible way justified this very figure - 27 million. Now it turns out that she was wrong.

The Second World War, which involved four-fifths of the world's population, became the bloodiest in the history of mankind. Through the fault of the imperialists, mass extermination of people took place for six years in various regions of the globe.

More than 110 million people were mobilized into the armed forces. Many tens of millions were killed, injured, left disabled. Civilian casualties increased sharply. They accounted for almost half of the total losses, while in the First World War - 5 percent.

It is extremely difficult to accurately determine the number of dead military personnel and civilians for a number of countries, since in many of them there are no statistics on population losses for the war as a whole, or these data do not reflect the actual situation. In addition, the fascists tried in every possible way to hide their atrocities, and after the war their ideological advocates deliberately distorted the indicators of the casualties of individual countries. All this was the reason for significant discrepancies in the estimate of the number of deaths. The most authoritative studies show that more than 50 million people died during the Second World War.

In addition to direct human losses, many warring states also suffered large indirect losses. The mobilization of a significant part of the male population into the armed forces, the accelerated involvement of women in the system of socially organized labor, material and domestic difficulties, etc., dramatically changed the mode of population reproduction, lowered birth rates and increased mortality.

The states of Europe suffered the largest direct and indirect population losses. About 40 million people died here, that is, significantly more than on other continents combined. During the war years, in almost all European countries, the conditions for the existence and development of the population deteriorated for a long time.

In 1938, the population of European countries was 390.6 million people, and in 1945 - 380.9 million. If not for the war, with the same birth and death rates, it would have increased over the years by about 12 million people . The war seriously deformed the age, gender, family and marriage structure of the population of the continent. The quality and, in many countries, the level of general education and vocational training have declined significantly.

Half of the human losses in Europe are in the USSR. They amounted to over 20 million people, a significant part of them - the civilian population who died in the Nazi death camps, as a result of fascist repression, disease and hunger, from enemy air raids. The losses of the USSR significantly exceed the human losses of its Western allies. The country has lost a large part of the population of the most able-bodied and productive ages, with labor experience and professional training. The great losses of the Soviet Union were due primarily to the fact that it took upon itself the main blow of Nazi Germany and for a long time alone opposed the fascist bloc in Europe. They are explained by the particularly cruel policy of mass extermination of Soviet people, which was pursued by the aggressor.

A difficult demographic situation developed after the Second World War in Poland and Yugoslavia, which lost a significant part of their population: Poland - 6 million, Yugoslavia - 1.7 million people.

The fascist leadership set as its goal to change the demographic process in Europe, and subsequently throughout the world. This provided for the mass physical destruction of the conquered peoples, as well as forcible birth control. Along with this, the Nazis sought to stimulate the growth of the "chosen" nations in order to gain a foothold in the occupied territories. However, the war led to great losses in Germany itself - over 13 million people were killed, wounded, captured, missing. Fascist Italy lost 500,000 dead.

The population losses of countries such as France (600 thousand) and Great Britain (370 thousand) are less than the losses of a number of other states participating in the war, but they also had a negative impact on their post-war development.

The peoples of Asia suffered considerable human losses during the war years. The number of dead and wounded in China amounted to over 5 million people. Japan lost 2.5 million people - mostly military personnel. Of the 350,000 civilians who died in Japan, most - over 270,000 people - were victims of the atomic bombings of the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Compared to Europe and Asia, other continents suffered significantly less human losses. In general, they amounted to 400 thousand people. The United States lost about 300 thousand people dead, Australia and New Zealand - over 40 thousand, Africa - 10 thousand people (206).

Large differences in human losses in relation to individual countries, groups of states, regions of the world are due, on the one hand, to the nature and degree of their participation directly in the armed struggle, and on the other hand, to the class and political goals pursued by the warring countries. The latter determined their different attitude towards the prisoners of war and the civilian population of the enemy, as well as towards the fate of the population of the allied states and the world as a whole.

Many hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war and millions of civilians were destroyed in the territories occupied by the Nazi and Japanese invaders. With particular ferocity, the Nazis applied their carefully developed policy of the physical destruction of the Soviet people. The Nazis carried out mass deportation of the civilian population to Germany, where they ended up either in hard labor or in concentration camps. Executions, poisoning in gas chambers, beatings, torture, monstrous medical experiments, forced to overwork - all this led to the mass destruction of people. Thus, out of 18 million European citizens who ended up in Nazi concentration camps, more than 11 million people were killed.

The aggressors themselves, although their armed forces were defeated and forced to unconditional surrender, suffered comparatively smaller losses, which was evidence of the humane attitude towards prisoners of war and the civilian population of the defeated countries on the part of the victors, primarily the USSR.

The war had a great impact not only on the natural reproduction of the population in all countries of the world, but also on its interstate and internal migration. Already the coming of the fascists to power and the preparation of aggression they began caused the population to flee from Germany and other European states to the countries of Africa, North and Latin America. The offensive of the fascist armies led to the displacement of the population in almost all countries of Europe. In addition, the Nazis resorted to mass forcible export of labor force from the occupied regions to Germany. War-induced internal migration, accompanied by great hardship and hardship, contributed to an increase in mortality and a decrease in the birth rate. Similar processes took place in Asia.

Thus, the Second World War brought about major changes in the structure of population throughout the world. For a number of countries, including socialist ones, the demographic consequences of the war have become one of the most unfavorable factors.

The Second World War confirmed the conclusions of Marxism-Leninism about the enormous impact of the economic factor on the outbreak of wars, the methods of their conduct, their course and results. In the Second World War, the most bloody and fierce, the interconnection and interdependence of economic, scientific, social, moral-political and military factors intensified. The results of the actions of the armed forces, along with other factors, were determined by the degree of their economic support. The volume and qualitative structure of the material needs of the armed forces have sharply expanded, and the importance of the timing of the main military-economic measures has increased. The influence of the social system of states on the military economy, its ability to meet the needs of the front, manifested itself with particular force.

One of the important lessons of the Second World War is the strengthening of its reverse impact on the economy. The degree of subordination of the national economy to the needs of the war increased sharply. Almost all branches of the economy worked for her to some extent. The credit and financial system of states, money circulation, domestic and foreign trade underwent a deep restructuring.

In terms of the number of human and material losses, in terms of their immediate and long-term consequences, the Second World War has no equal in history. It far surpassed the First World War in terms of human casualties, expended material resources, the volume of production of military equipment, the intensity of economic efforts and the hardships that most of its participants had to endure.

The experience of the Second World War reminds us that not only the war itself and its consequences, but also the preparations for it, the arms race lead to a serious aggravation of population problems and to undermining the economy. Only a lasting democratic peace creates the necessary conditions for the development of economic and demographic processes in directions that meet the interests of social progress.