Field Marshal E Manstein Lost Victories Crimean Campaign. Memoirs of Field Marshal of the Wehrmacht

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Erich von Manstein
Lost victories

From the publisher 1
This fb2 is compiled from several editions. This section is the introductory part of the edition [E. von Manstein. Lost victories./ Comp. S. Pereslegin, R. Ismailov. – M.: ACT; SPb.: Terra Fantastica, 1999. - 896 p.], presented in digitized form (html) at http://militera.lib.ru/memo/german/manstein/index.html
The layout of the text part of this fb2 was made by Alex (AVB) based on the mentioned material from Militera, and he was given a cover from another publication: http://www.ozon.ru/context/detail/id/3460770/
On "Militer" there are no applications mentioned in this introduction: "The applications have not yet been made due to the abundance of tables." In the edition available to me, there are no applications at all (Rostov-on-Don: "Phoenix"; http://www.ozon.ru/context/detail/id/941231/). I added illustrations to fb2 Alex "and replaced the cover (my digitization). - Approx. InkSpot.

Before you is a book, the Russian edition of which was destined for a strange fate: during the “Khrushchev thaw”, when military treatises and memoirs of “enemies” are translated and published in abundance, the work of E. Manstein 2
Here and more. Considering that the author of the memoirs is a nobleman, one should write not “Manstein”, but “von Manstein” - Note. ink spot.

Barely having time to get out, it was seized and brought to the special guard. The compilers of the current edition leave the analysis of this biography of the book to the reader's judgment. Let us only note that, in comparison with other works of German military leaders, Manstein's memoirs are distinguished by the emphasized subjectivity of the author's position. This is the story of a soldier and a general, a theorist and practitioner of war, a man whose strategic talent was unparalleled in the German Reich. But was this talent fully appreciated and used by the Reich?

Before you is the first book in the Military Historical Library series. Together with her, we prepared for publication B. Tuckman's "August Cannons", F. Sherman's "American Aircraft Carriers in the Pacific War" and B. Liddell-Gart's book "Strategy of Indirect Actions".

Starting work on the series, the team of project creators formulated the following rule: the publication or reprint of each book " should be provided with an extensive reference apparatus so that a professional reader, a lover of military history, as well as a schoolboy who has chosen an appropriate topic for an essay, receive not only a scientific and artistic text that tells about events in compliance with the “historical truth”, but also all the necessary statistical, military , technical, biographical information related to the events described in the memoirs».

Among all the books mentioned, the memoirs of E. Manstein demanded, of course, the most responsible and hard work from commentators and compilers of appendices. This is primarily due to the vastness of materials devoted to the events of the Second World War. 3
Here and more. World War II, World War I. So in the original. According to the handbook "Capital or Lowercase" (D. E. Rosenthal), these terms should be written "second world war" and "first world war." - Approx. ink spot.

and, in particular, its Eastern Front, serious discrepancies in figures and facts, inconsistency of memoirs and even archival documents, an abundance of mutually exclusive interpretations. Creating memoirs, E. Manstein - whose fate was determined by movements between headquarters and fronts - may not have outlived the influence of some kind of resentment against the Fuhrer, on the one hand, and on "these stupid Russians" - on the other. Analyzing the lack of strategic talent among our commanders, showing the inconsistency of their operations and the destruction of operational and strategic plans, he failed (or did not want to) admit that by 1943 Russian headquarters had learned to plan, and Russian commanders to fight. It is not easy to maintain objectivity when talking about one's own defeats, and E. Manstein's memoirs contain fantastic figures about the composition of those opposing him in 1943-1944. Russian troops and even more implausible reports of their losses.

Here, E. Manstein did not go far from the Soviet generals, who in their writings indicate an incredible number of tanks in the same E. Manstein in the Crimea, where for the most part they were not at all, or in the spring of 1943 near Kharkov after exhausting battles in the absence of reinforcements. Fear has large eyes, the real vision of the situation is also distorted by resentment, ambition, etc. (However, the remarkable German analyst K. Tippelskirch did not fall into the trap of subjectivism, for example.)

The compilers of the Appendixes provide the reader with information in figures and facts collected from the "Russian" and "German" side.

APPENDIX 1. "Chronology of the Second World War".

In this chronology, events are selected that had a direct impact on the course and outcome of the Second World War. Many dates and events were not mentioned (for example, three wars that took place in 1918-1933).

APPENDIX 2. "Operational documents".

APPENDIX 3. "German Armed Forces".

Consists of two articles: "The structure of the German army 1939-1943." and "The German Air Force and its Opponents". These materials are included in the text to give the reader a more complete picture of the functioning of the German military machine, including those parts of it that E. Manstein paid the least attention to.

APPENDIX 4. "The Art of Strategy".

This application is a tribute to the strategic talent of E. Manstein. It includes four analytical articles written during the work on this edition under the direct influence of the personality of E. Manstein and his text.

APPENDIX 5. "Operational art in the battles for the Crimea."

Dedicated to one of the most controversial and difficult moments in the historiography of the Second World War.

The biographical index, as in all other books in the series, contains reference material on the "roles" and "characters" of War and Peace 1941-1945. or individuals directly or indirectly connected with the events of this time.

The bibliographic index, as always, contains a list of references intended for the initial acquaintance of readers with the problems raised in the book by E. Manstein or the editorial Supplements. The bibliography of the Second World War has thousands of titles. For almost every campaign or battle, you can find more than one monograph and more than a dozen descriptions. However, according to the compilers of the book, most of the publications devoted to the war are unsystematic, superficial and reflect the position of the country represented by the author of the work. Therefore, of the mass of books devoted to the topic of the war in Europe, we can today recommend only a few.

Editorial comments on E. Manstein's text are not quite common. Of course, we considered it necessary to draw the reader's attention to those moments when the author makes a formal mistake (for example, he places the Soviet army near Leningrad, which at that moment was near Kyiv) or takes a position that seems to us ethically unacceptable or, worse, internally contradictory. In some cases, we wanted to take part in E. Manstein's discussion of various options for deploying operations on the Western or Eastern Front - E. Manstein writes sincerely and enthusiastically, he lives these events, and his involvement involuntarily invites discussion.

However, the main volume of comments is occupied by the presentation of the events described by E. Manstein by historians and generals located "on the other side" of the front line. This is not due to the subjectivism of E. Manstein - the Field Marshal General is subjective no more and no less than any other memoirist - but with the desire of the editors to create a stereoscopic representation of the object from two sometimes polar pictures of the same event. Whether we succeeded is for the reader to judge.

Victories and defeats of Manstein

No literary genre gives such a complete picture of the era as memoirs, especially if these are the memories of people who, by the will of fate, found themselves in the thick of events that shook the world.

With the publication of the Russian edition of the book "Lost Victories", which followed the recent publication of "Memoirs of a Soldier" by G. Guderian, the niche that was formed in connection with the unilateral approach to the events of the Second World War cultivated in our country for many years can be considered to a large extent filled.

Friedrich von Lewinsky (the real name and surname of the author of the book) was born on November 24, 1887 in Berlin into a general's family, and after the death of his parents was adopted by a large landowner Georg von Manstein. He received an excellent education. His crowning achievement was the diploma of the Military Academy, with which the graduate of 1914 stepped into the trenches of the First World War. Already here his brilliant abilities were manifested, but the peak falls on the years of Nazism. Rapid promotion led Erich from the post of Chief of the Operations Directorate and the First Chief Quartermaster of the General Staff of the Ground Forces (1935-1938) to the posts of Chief of Staff of Army Groups "South", "A", commander of Army Groups "Don" and "South" .

Manstein was never deprived of the attention of either contemporaries or descendants. He is one of the brightest figures in the military elite of the Third Reich, "perhaps the most brilliant strategist of the Wehrmacht" 4
Toland D. Adolf Hitler. M., 1993. T. 2. S. 93.

And according to the English military historian, Liddell Hart is the most dangerous enemy of the Allies, a man who combined modern views on the maneuverable nature of hostilities with classical ideas about the art of maneuvering, a detailed knowledge of military equipment with great art of a commander.

Colleagues also pay tribute to his exceptional military talents, even those to whom he himself treated with restraint. Commenting on the coolly received Wehrmacht appointment of Wilhelm Keitel as Chief of Staff of the Supreme High Command of the German Armed Forces (OKW), Manstein observes: 5
Chief of the German General Staff in 1891-1905 - Approx. author.

Necessary for any commander 6
Keitel V. Reflections before execution. M., 1998. S. 75.

Keitel himself, in his memoirs written in the Nuremberg prison, shortly before his execution, admits: “I was very well aware that for my role ... the chief of the general staff of all the armed forces of the Reich, I lack not only abilities, but also relevant education. They were called upon to become the best professional from the ground forces, and such, if necessary, was always at hand ... I myself advised Hitler three times to replace me with von Manstein: the first time in the autumn of 1939, before the French campaign; the second - in December 1941, when Brauchitsch left, and the third - in September 1942, when the Fuhrer had a conflict with Jodl and with me. Despite the frequent recognition of Manstein's outstanding abilities, Hitler was clearly afraid of such a step and constantly rejected his candidacy. 7
There. pp. 75, 102.

The latter is confirmed by other German military leaders. Heinz Guderian laments that “Hitler was unable to bear close to him such a capable military personality as Manstein. Both were too different natures: on the one hand, the masterful Hitler with his military amateurism and indomitable imagination, on the other hand, Manstein with his outstanding military abilities and hardening received by the German General Staff, sober and cold-blooded judgments - our best operational mind " 8
Guderian G. Memoirs of a soldier. Rostov n/a. 1998, p. 321.

Like some other representatives of the German high command, who changed the battlefields to a prison cell after the war, and the field marshal's baton to the pen of a memoirist 9
Being sentenced to 18 years in prison by a British military tribunal in 1950, he was released in 1953 and lived happily for another 30 years. - Approx. author.

Manstein emphasizes that his book is the notes of a soldier who is alien to politics and deliberately refused to consider political problems and events not directly related to military operations. 10
Manstein E. von. Verlorene Siege. Bonn, 1955. S. 17.

He writes with indignation, hardly sincere, about the order of the Design Bureau received by the troops, which ordered the immediate execution of all captured Red Army commissars as carriers of the Bolshevik ideology (“order on commissars”).

At the same time, one cannot but agree with the opinion of the German historian M. Messerschmidt that "this war, to a lesser extent than any other, was only the work of soldiers, and therefore it is impossible to derive any professional tradition from it" 11
Quote from: Messerschmidt M. Wehrmacht, Eastern Campaign and Tradition. - In the book: World War II. M., 1997. S. 251.

The order of the same Manstein, signed by him in November 1941, stated: “The European-Bolshevik system must be eradicated once and for all. It should never again invade our European living space. The task of the German soldier is therefore not only to defeat the military might of this system. He also acts as a bearer of the people's idea and an avenger for all the atrocities that were inflicted on him and the German people ... The soldier must understand for himself the need to redeem the Jews, the spiritual bearers of the Bolshevik terror. This redemption is also necessary in order to nip in the bud all attempts at rebellion, which in most cases are inspired by the Jews. 12
There.

Despite friction with Hitler, the latter repeatedly sends Manstein to the most critical sectors of the front. He develops a plan for the offensive of German tanks through the Ardennes in 1940, the implementation of which led to the rapid defeat of the Anglo-French troops on the continent, commanded the 2nd army during the capture of the Crimea and the siege of Sevastopol, from November 1942 to February 1943 at the head of Army Group "Don" led the unsuccessful operation to deblockade the Paulus group surrounded near Stalingrad.

Speaking of "lost victories," Manstein actually places the blame for the defeats on the Fuehrer, whose intuition could not compensate for the lack of experience-based military knowledge. “I never had the feeling,” he writes, “that the fate of the army deeply touches him (Hitler - Auth.). Losses for him were only numbers, indicating a decrease in combat capability ... Who could have imagined that for the sake of the name "Stalingrad" he would come to terms with the loss of an entire army. The Allies, primarily the British, are also being blamed for their "uncompromising hatred of Hitler and his regime," which shielded them from a more serious danger in the face of the Soviet Union, devoted to the idea of a world revolution.

However, every memoirist has the right to an appropriate interpretation of the events he describes. One can hardly demand from Manstein to look at them through the eyes of the opponents of Germany.

In addition to a detailed account of the hostilities, the book contains many interesting observations, apt descriptions of both the leaders of the Nazi state and people from Manstein's immediate environment: from slight irony about Field Marshal von Rundstedt's passion for reading detective novels, which he vainly concealed from his subordinates , to sarcastic remarks about Goering, whose overdressed appearance became "the talk of the town."

One thing is certain, no matter what views the reader holds, he will be able to appreciate the brilliant literary language of the author, which is very far from the dry style of military reports. Perhaps this will eventually become the only "victory" that Manstein managed to win in Russia.

E. A. Palamarchuk,

Candidate of Historical Sciences, Associate Professor

From a West German publisher

The name of Field Marshal von Manstein is associated with the "sickle strike" called by Churchill the offensive of tanks through the Ardennes, carried out by the German army in 1940 and ensuring the rapid and complete defeat of the Western powers on the continent. During the Russian campaign, Manstein conquered the Crimea and took the fortress of Sevastopol. After the Stalingrad tragedy, as a result of the blows inflicted on the Donets and near Kharkov, he managed to thwart the Russian attempts to cut off the entire southern wing of the German army and once again wrest the initiative from their hands. When the last major offensive carried out on the Eastern Front, Operation Citadel, was interrupted due to the situation on other fronts, the thankless task fell to Manstein to lead defensive battles with an enemy who had multiple superiority in forces. Although the instructions given by Hitler for political and economic reasons, Manstein was strongly bound in his actions, he still managed to withdraw his army group behind the Dnieper and through the Ukraine, resisting the onslaught of the enemy.

In his work, Manstein publishes hitherto unknown documents related to the plan of the offensive of the German army in 1940, for which he fought for a long time with the command of the ground forces (OKH), until Hitler decided in his favor. Based on strategic considerations, the author examines the question of how military operations should have been conducted after the defeat of France, and also what explains the fact that Hitler did not launch, as everyone expected, an offensive against England, but opposed the Soviet Union without inflicting a final defeat Great Britain. The author gives a lively and exciting picture of the fighting in the East. Repeatedly the author shows what high achievements the German troops achieved. At the same time, it is emphasized that the command of the army group (front) was constantly forced, overcoming Hitler's stubborn resistance, to achieve the implementation of the measures necessary in operational terms. This struggle reached its climax when finally the 1st Panzer Army was threatened with encirclement. At this moment, Manstein once again manages to defend his point of view before Hitler and prevent the encirclement of the army. A few days later, he is removed from his post.

“Thus ended the military career of the most dangerous enemy of the Allies, a man who combined modern views on the maneuverable nature of hostilities with classical ideas about the art of maneuvering, a detailed knowledge of military equipment with great art of the commander” (Liddell Hart).

Manstein's book is one of the most important works on the history of the Second World War.

Ateneum publishing house, Bonn

List of abbreviations

ADD- long-range aviation

ARGC- RGK artillery

VGK- Supreme High Command

dos- long-term defensive structures

KP- command post

MO- sea hunter

NOR– Novorossiysk defensive area

OKB- High Command of the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht)

OKL- High Command of the Air Force (Luftwaffe)

OKM- Headquarters of the Naval Forces

OKH- Headquarters of the Army

OOP– Odessa defensive area

VET- anti-tank guns

RVGK- Reserve of the Supreme High Command

RGK- reserve of the main command

ACS- self-propelled artillery mount

NWF– North-Western Front

SOP– Sevastopol defensive area

SF– Northern Front

TVD- theater of war

Black Sea Fleet- Black Sea Fleet

SWF– Southwestern Front

bt- basic minesweeper

Guards- Guards

ptr- anti-tank rifle

fur– mechanized

mot- motorized

pp- infantry regiment

cn- infantry regiment

tp- tank regiment

pd- infantry division

td- armored division

cd- cavalry division

motd- motorized division

md- mechanized division

GSD- mountain division

gpd- mountain infantry division

sd- infantry division

lpd- light infantry division

hell- artillery division

upd- airfield division

shd- assault division

sk- rifle corps

ak- army corps

tk- tank corps

mk- mechanized body

skein- motorized body

gk- mountain corps

kk- cavalry corps

Author's Preface

This book is the notes of a soldier. I deliberately refrained from discussing in it political problems or events that are not directly related to military operations. We should recall the words of the English military writer Liddell Hart:

“The German generals who participated in this war were, compared with all previous periods, the most successful product of their profession. They could only win if they had a wider horizon and if they understood the course of events more deeply. But if they became philosophers, they could no longer be soldiers.”

I sought to convey what I myself experienced, changed my mind and decided, not after additional consideration, but as I saw it at the time. The word is taken not by a historian-researcher, but by a direct participant in the events. Although I tried to objectively see the events that took place, the people and the decisions they made, the judgment of the participant in the events themselves always remains subjective. Despite this, I hope that my notes will not be without interest for the historian. After all, he will not be able to establish the truth only on the basis of protocols and documents. The most important thing - the characters, with their actions, thoughts and judgments - is rarely and, of course, not fully reflected in documents or combat logs.

In describing the emergence of the plan for the German offensive in the West in 1940, I did not follow the instructions of Colonel-General von Seeckt: "Officers of the General Staff have no name."

I believed that I had the right to do this, since this issue - without my participation - had long been a subject of discussion. None other than my former commander, Field Marshal von Rundstedt, as well as our chief of operations, General Blumentritt, told the story of this plan to Liddell Hart (I myself, unfortunately, was not familiar with Liddell Hart).

If I have included personal experiences in the presentation of military problems and events, it is only because the fate of a person takes its place in war. There are no personal reminiscences in the last parts of the book; this is due to the fact that at that time the care and burden of responsibility overshadowed everything.

In connection with my activities during the Second World War, events are mainly considered from the point of view of the high command. However, I hope that the description of events will always make it possible to conclude that self-sacrifice, courage, loyalty, the sense of duty of the German soldier and the consciousness of responsibility, as well as the skill of commanders of all degrees, were of decisive importance. It is to them that we owe all our victories. Only they allowed us to confront the enemies, who had overwhelming numerical superiority.

At the same time, with my book, I would like to express my gratitude to my commander in the first period of the war, Field Marshal von Rundstedt, for his constant confidence in me, the commanders and soldiers of all ranks that I commanded, my assistants, especially the chiefs of staff and officers of staff, - my support and my advisers.

In conclusion, I also want to thank those who helped me in recording my memoirs: my former chief of staff, General Busse, and our staff officers: von Blumreder, Eismann and Annus, then Herrhardt Günther, on whose advice I began to write down my memoirs, Mr. Fred Hildebrandt, who gave me valuable assistance in drawing up the notes, and Mr. Mathernet, the engineer, who drew up the diagrams with great knowledge of the matter.

Protected by the legislation of the Russian Federation on the protection of intellectual rights.

Reproduction of the entire book or any part of it is prohibited without the written permission of the publisher.

Any attempt to break the law will be prosecuted.

* * *

Dedicated to our fallen son Gero von Manstein and to all the comrades who died for Germany

Author's Preface

This book is the personal notes of a soldier, in which I deliberately refrained from discussing political issues and subtleties not directly related to the events that took place on the battlefield. Perhaps in this regard it would be appropriate to recall the words of Captain B.Kh. Liddell-Hart: “The German generals of this war were the pinnacle of excellence in their profession – anywhere. They could be even better if they had a broader worldview and a deeper understanding of events. But if they became philosophers, they would no longer be soldiers.”

I have tried not to revise my experiences, thoughts, and decisions retroactively, but to state them as they appeared to me at the time. In other words, I am not acting as a researcher-historian, but as an active participant in the events that I am about to tell. However, although I have tried to give an objective account of the events that took place, of those who participated in them and made decisions, my opinion as a participant will inevitably remain subjective. Nevertheless, I still hope that my story will be useful to historians, because even historians are unable to establish the truth on the basis of papers and documents alone. The most important thing is what their main characters thought and how they responded to the events, and documents and combat logs rarely provide an answer to this question, and, of course, far from complete.

In describing how the plan for the German offensive in the west arose in 1940, I failed to comply with Colonel-General von Seekt's instructions that General Staff officers should not be called by name. It seems to me that I have the right to do this now, when - although not by my will - this topic has long been the subject of general discussion. In fact, my former commander, Field Marshal von Rundstedt, and our chief of operations, General Blumentritt, told Liddell Hart the story of this plan (at that time I had not yet had the pleasure of knowing him).

In my story about military problems and events, I sometimes included some personal experiences, believing that even in war there is a place for human experiences. If these personal reminiscences are absent from the last chapters of the book, it is only because during that period the worries and the burden of duties overshadowed everything else.

Due to my activities in the Second World War, I am forced to consider events mainly from the point of view of the high command. However, I hope that I have been able to consistently and clearly show that self-sacrifice, valor and devotion to the duty of the German soldier, combined with the ability and readiness of commanders at all levels to take responsibility, were decisive throughout the war. It is these qualities that have brought us all our victories. Only they gave us the opportunity to confront the enemy, who had overwhelming superiority.

At the same time, with my book, I would like to express my gratitude to Field Marshal von Rundstedt, Commander-in-Chief at the first stage of the war, for his unwavering confidence in me, commanders and soldiers of all ranks who served under my command, as well as staff officers, especially my chiefs of staff and officers of the General Staff, who constantly supported me and gave me advice.

In conclusion, I thank those who helped me in the preparation of these memoirs: my former chief of staff, General Busse, and our staff officers Bloomreder, Eismann and Annus, as well as Herr Gerhard Günther, who prompted me to put the memoirs on paper, Herr Fred Hildenbrandt, who provided me with invaluable help in compiling them, and Herr the engineer Matern, who prepared diagrams and maps with great knowledge of the matter.

Erich von Manstein

Part one
Polish campaign

1. Before the assault

I observed the political development of events following the annexation of Austria far from the center of military affairs.

In early February 1938, after I assumed the second most important post on the General Staff of the German Army - the post of First Quartermaster, otherwise Deputy Chief of Staff, my career on the General Staff was suddenly interrupted. When Colonel-General Baron von Fritsch was removed from the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces as a result of a diabolical party intrigue, a number of his closest employees, including myself, were removed from the High Command of the Ground Forces (OKH). Since then, after being appointed commander of the 18th division, I, of course, was no longer aware of the issues that were within the competence of the high command.

From the very beginning of April 1938, I was able to devote myself entirely to work as a division commander. My duties gave me special satisfaction, and at that time more than ever, but at the same time they demanded full dedication of forces, since the task of increasing the numerical strength of the army was still far from being completed. New units were constantly being created, which required constant reorganization of the already formed ones, and the pace of rearmament and the associated growth in the number of both officer and non-commissioned officer corps made the highest demands on commanders at all levels if we wanted to achieve our goal and create internally cohesive, well-trained troops that could ensure the security of the state. All the more gratifying was the success of these labors, especially for me when, after many years spent in Berlin, I again had the pleasant opportunity to come into direct contact with the fighting troops. Therefore, I recall with great gratitude those last one and a half peaceful years and, in particular, the Silesians, of whom the 18th division mainly consisted. Silesia has supplied good soldiers since time immemorial, so military training and training of new units was a rewarding task.

It is true that the brief interlude of the "flower war" - the occupation of the Sudetenland - found me in the post of chief of staff of the army under the command of Colonel-General Ritter von Leeb. In this capacity, I learned about the conflict that broke out between the Chief of the General Staff of the Land Forces, General Beck, and Hitler over the Czech question and ended, to my great regret, in the resignation of the Chief of Staff, whom I deeply respected. Moreover, his resignation cut the last thread that connected me with the OKH.

Thus, it was not until the summer of 1939 that I learned of Operation White Plan, the first deployment plan for the attack on Poland, prepared on Hitler's orders. Until the spring of 1939, no such plan existed. On the contrary, all the preparatory military measures on our eastern frontier were of a defensive nature.

By the same directive, I was appointed chief of staff of Army Group South, whose commander-in-chief was to be Colonel-General von Rundstedt, who by that time had already retired. The Army Group was supposed to be deployed in Silesia, East Moravia and parts of Slovakia according to the detailed plan we were to work out.

Since there was no army group headquarters in peacetime and a deployment plan was to be formed only in the event of a general mobilization, a small working group was created to work on it. On August 12, 1939, they gathered in the Neuhammer training area in Silesia. At the head of the working group was Colonel Blumentritt, an officer of the General Staff, who, when the mobilization was announced, was to take the post of Chief of Operations (Ia) of the Army Group Staff. This turned out to be an unexpected success for me, since with this extraordinarily talented person I was bound by the closest ties of mutual trust that arose between us during our joint service at the headquarters of von Leeb's army during the Sudeten crisis, and I considered the opportunity to work in such times extremely valuable. with someone you can rely on. It's often the little things that attract us to people, and what I've always admired about Blumentritt is his dedication to the telephone. He already worked with incredible speed, but with a telephone receiver in his hand he easily resolved an avalanche of questions, always maintaining an unflappable good nature.

In mid-August, the future commander of Army Group South, Colonel General von Rundstedt, arrived in Neuhammer. We all knew him. He was a brilliant tactician and a talented military leader, able to grasp the essence of any problem in an instant. In essence, he dealt only with important issues, being completely indifferent to trifles. Besides, he was an old school man - I'm afraid, people of this type are on the verge of extinction, although they once gave life the charm of diversity. Even Hitler could not resist the charm of the colonel-general. Hitler seemed to have a sincere affection for him, which, surprisingly, he partially retained even after twice sending von Rundstedt into disgrace. Apparently, Hitler was attracted to him by the fact that the general made some kind of vague impression of a man of the past - a past that Hitler did not understand and whose atmosphere he could never join.

By the way, when our working group met in Neuhammer, my 18th division was also in the training area for the annual regimental and divisional exercises.

It need hardly be said that all of us, troubled by the extraordinary events that Germany has experienced since 1933, have wondered what they are leading to. At that time, all our thoughts and conversations were occupied by the signs of an impending storm, surrounding the horizon from all sides. We understood that Hitler was fanatically determined to do away with Germany's territorial problems inherited under the Treaty of Versailles. We knew that as early as the autumn of 1938, he had entered into negotiations with Poland with the aim of finally resolving the question of the Polish-German border, although nothing was said about the results of these negotiations, if they achieved any results at all. At the same time, we knew that Great Britain gave Poland certain guarantees. And I can say with confidence that there was not a person in the army so presumptuous, careless or short-sighted who did not see in these guarantees an eminently serious warning. This circumstance alone - although by no means the only one - convinced our Neuhammer workers' headquarters that there would be no war in the end. Even if the deployment plan that we were developing at that time came to fruition, this, as it seemed to us, did not yet mean war. Until the last moment, we watched closely how Germany teetered dangerously on a knife edge, and we were more and more amazed at the incredible luck of Hitler, who achieved all his overt and covert political goals, and so far without resorting to arms. The man seemed to have an almost unerring instinct. Success followed success, and there was no end to it—provided one could even call success the brilliant series of events that eventually led to Germany's collapse. All successes were achieved without unleashing a war. Why should it be different this time? we asked ourselves. Take Czechoslovakia, for example. Although in 1938 Hitler raised impressive troops against her, the war never began. And yet we could not get out of our heads the old saying about the jug that got into the habit of walking on water and broke its head, because at that time the situation was much more difficult, and the game that Hitler was apparently going to play seemed much more dangerous. After all, now we would have to oppose the British guarantees given to Poland. But we recalled Hitler's assertion that he was not so insane as to unleash a war on two fronts, as the German leadership did in 1914. From this, at least one could conclude that Hitler was a reasonable person, even if he had no human feelings left. Breaking into a hoarse cry, he unequivocally assured the military advisers that he had not yet lost his mind to get involved in a world war for the sake of the Danzig, or Polish, corridor.

General Staff and the Polish Question

When Poland took advantage of the Treaty of Versailles imposed on Germany to annex German territories, to which it was not entitled either from the point of view of historical justice or from the point of view of self-determination, it became an unhealed wound for us. In those years when Germany was weak, Poland remained a constant source of irritation. Every time we looked at the map, we remembered our dubious position. Groundless demarcation of the border! Mutilation inflicted on the Fatherland! The corridor that separated East Prussia and gave us every reason to fear for this beautiful land! But, in spite of everything, the army did not even dream of starting a war with Poland and putting an end to this situation by force. Among other things, there was a very simple military reason for refusing to act violently: an attack on Poland, one way or another, would plunge the Reich into a war on two fronts, or even more, and Germany did not have the strength for this at all. During the period of weakness dictated to us by the Treaty of Versailles, the cauchemar des coalitions did not leave us for a moment - fear disturbed us more and more, since large sections of the Polish population still harbored a poorly concealed desire to seize German territories. And although we had no desire to unleash a war of aggression, one could hardly hope, with an unbiased attitude towards the mood of Poland, that we would be able to sit down with the Poles at the peace negotiating table in order to revise these senseless borders. In addition, we believed that one day nothing would prevent Poland from taking the initiative in its own hands and trying to solve the border issue by force. Since 1918 we have had the opportunity to gain some experience in this regard, and while Germany was weak, we should have prepared for such a variant. As soon as the voice of Marshal Pilsudski was silenced and certain national circles got the decisive vote, the invasion of Poland into East Prussia or Upper Silesia became as likely an event as a sortie of the Poles into Vilna. However, in this case, the reflections of the military found a political answer. If Poland acts as an aggressor and we manage to repel her blow, Germany will probably have the opportunity to reconsider the unfortunate border issue in the wake of political reaction.

One way or another, not a single military leader harbored unnecessary illusions on this issue. In the book "Zekt. From my life," General von Rabenau quotes the words of the Colonel General that "the existence of Poland is unbearable and incompatible with the most important needs of Germany: it must disappear because of its own internal weakness and through Russia ... with our help", and in fact developments in the political and military spheres have already taken this turn. We were quite aware of the growing military power of the Soviet Union, in addition, France, a country under the spell of which it is so easy to fall, looked at us with the same hostility. France would never stop looking for allies behind Germany's back. But if the Polish state disappears, then the mighty Soviet Union could become a much more dangerous ally of France than a buffer state like Poland. Removing the buffer of Poland (and Lithuania) between Germany and the Soviet Union could very easily lead to disagreements between the two powerful powers. Although the revision of the borders with Poland could be mutually beneficial, the complete elimination of her as a state would hardly have given Germany an advantage due to the completely changed situation that had basically prevailed by that time.

Thus, it would be better for us to leave Poland between ourselves and the Soviet Union, regardless of our attitude towards it. As depressing as the senseless and explosive demarcation line to the east may have been for us soldiers, Poland was still not as dangerous a neighbor as the Soviet Union. Of course, along with the rest of the Germans, we hoped that someday the borders would be revised and areas with a predominantly German population would return to the Reich by the natural right of the local inhabitants. At the same time, from a military point of view, it would be extremely undesirable for the population of Poland to increase. As regards the German demand for the union of East Prussia with the Reich, it could be linked to the Polish claim to access to the sea. It was this point of view on the Polish problem, and no other, that was held by the majority of the German military in the days of the Reichswehr - say, from the late 1920s onwards - if the question of armed conflict arose.

Then the wheel of fate turned again. Adolf Hitler took the stage. Everything has changed, including the basis of our relations with Poland. Germany has concluded a non-aggression pact and a treaty of friendship with our eastern neighbor. We got rid of the fear of a possible attack by the Poles. At the same time, relations between Germany and the Soviet Union cooled, because our new leader, speaking to the public, too frankly proclaimed his hatred of the Bolshevik system. In this new environment, Poland could not help but feel freer in the political sense, but for us it no longer posed a danger. The rearmament of Germany and a number of achievements of Hitler in the field of foreign policy deprived her of the opportunity to use the newfound freedom of action against the Reich. And since it turned out that Poland was impatient to take part in the division of Czechoslovakia, then we could very likely discuss the border issue with her.

Until the spring of 1939, the high command of the German ground forces did not have any plan for an offensive against Poland. Prior to this, all our military activities in the east were purely defensive in nature.

War or bluff?

Will it be real this time - in the autumn of 1939? Is it true that Hitler wants war, or will he push to the last, by military or other means, as in the case of Czechoslovakia in 1938, to settle the issues over Danzig and the Polish Corridor?

War or bluff? This question haunted everyone who could not unravel the very essence of political events, mainly the intentions of Hitler himself. And, as a matter of fact, who in general was awarded the opportunity to penetrate into the essence of these intentions?

In any case, it was quite clear that the military measures adopted in August 1939 - despite the White Plan directive - were aimed at increasing political pressure on Poland. By order of Hitler, starting in the summer, the Eastern Wall, the equivalent of the Siegfried Line, was being built at a feverish pace. Entire divisions, including the 18th, were transferred to the Polish border to build fortifications week after week without interruption. Why were these works, if Hitler was planning an attack on Poland? Even if, contrary to all his statements, he considered the possibility of waging a war on two fronts, the Eastern Wall still did not make much sense, since in the then situation the only sure way for Germany was to first invade Poland and take possession of it, at the same time while on the defensive in the west. It was out of the question to do the opposite - to attack in the west and defend in the east - given the existing alignment of forces, especially since the offensive in the west was by no means planned or prepared. Therefore, if the construction of the Eastern Wall made any sense in the current situation, then, of course, it consisted only in concentrating troops on the Polish border in order to put pressure on Poland. Even the deployment of infantry divisions on the eastern bank of the Oder in the last ten days of August and the transfer of armored and motorized divisions to the areas of concentration in the western direction did not necessarily mean preparation for an attack: they could well be used for political pressure.

Be that as it may, for the time being, as usual, training under the peacetime program continued. On August 13 and 14, at Neuhammer, I conducted the last divisional exercises, ending in a parade hosted by Colonel-General von Rundstedt. On August 15, a large artillery exercise took place in cooperation with the Luftwaffe. They were marked by a tragic accident. An entire squadron of dive-bombers, which apparently received incorrect data on the height of the cloud cover, could not get out of the dive in time and crashed directly into the forest. Another regimental exercise was scheduled the next day, and then the units of the division returned to their garrisons, although in just a few days they were to go back to the border of Silesia.

On August 19, von Rundstedt and I received orders to report to the Obersalzberg for a conference scheduled for the 21st of the same month. On August 20 we left Liegnitz for my brother-in-law's estate near Linz and spent the night there, and the next morning we arrived in Berchtesgaden. All the commanders of the armies and army groups with their chiefs of staff, as well as the commanders of the corresponding formations of the naval and air forces, were called to Hitler.

The meeting - or rather Hitler's speech, for he did not allow it to take the form of an open discussion after what had taken place during his last year's meeting with the Chiefs of Staff before the Czech crisis - was held in the great hall of the Berghof, whose windows overlooked Salzburg . Shortly before the advent of Hitler, Goering appeared. His appearance was out of the ordinary. Until that moment, I believed that we were gathered with serious intentions, but Goering, apparently, mistook the meeting for a masquerade. He wore a turn-down collar shirt and a green leather waistcoat with large yellow leather buttons. To all this, he put on gray shorts and long gray silk stockings that showed off his massive calves. The elegance of golf was offset by massive boots. The attire was completed by a lavishly gold-embroidered harness made of red leather, girdling a fat belly, on which hung a decorative dagger in a wide scabbard of the same material.

I could not resist and whispered to my neighbor General von Salmuth:

- It seems that our fat man decided to play the role of a bouncer?

Hitler's speech at that time was later the subject of various accusatory "documents" during the Nuremberg Trials. One of them claimed that Hitler had resorted to the harshest language, and Göring, ecstatic about the upcoming war, jumped on the table and shouted: "Sieg heil!" All this is not true. It is also not true that Hitler said at that time: “I am afraid of only one thing: that at the last moment some beast will come to me with an offer to think again.” Although the tone of his speech clearly indicated that he had made a firm decision, Hitler was too good a psychologist to think that angry tirades and swearing could impress the audience.

The gist of his speech is faithfully conveyed in Greiner's book The High Command of the German Armed Forces 1939-1943. Greiner is basing himself on Colonel Warlimont's oral presentation for the war diary and on Admiral Canaris' verbatim notes. Some information about the speech can also be gleaned from the diary of Colonel General Halder - although it seems to me that something that they heard from Hitler on other occasions could have got into the diary, as well as into the presentation of Warlimont and Canaris.

For those of us who were not in senior management, the impression was something like this.

This time Hitler was determined to finally deal with the Polish question, even at the cost of war. However, if the Poles yielded to German pressure, which almost culminated in the deployment, albeit disguised, of German armies, a peaceful solution was not out of the question, and Hitler was sure that at the critical moment the Western powers would not take up arms again. He made a special effort to develop the latter thesis, and his main arguments were as follows: the backwardness of Great Britain and France in the field of armaments, in particular with regard to aviation and air defense; the practical inability of the Western powers to provide Poland with effective assistance, apart from an attack on the Siegfried Line - a step that none of these powers would dare to take because it would entail great bloodshed; the international situation, in particular the tension in the Mediterranean region, which significantly limited the freedom of action of Great Britain; internal situation in France; and last but not least, the personalities of the leaders. Neither Chamberlain nor Daladier, Hitler argued, would take responsibility for the decision to declare war.

Although Hitler's assessment of the position of the Western Powers seemed in the main logical and convincing, I still do not think that his speech completely convinced the listeners. Of course, the only real obstacle to the implementation of his plans were British guarantees to Poland, but how weighty!

In my opinion, what Hitler said about a possible war with Poland could not be understood as a policy of total annihilation, although the accusers at the Nuremberg trials gave his words exactly this meaning. When Hitler demanded the quick and merciless annihilation of the Polish army, in military language this meant only the goal that underlies any large-scale offensive operation. One way or another, not a single word of his made us understand how he was going to act later in Poland.

It is quite natural that the most unexpected, as well as striking news for us was the news of the forthcoming conclusion of a pact with the Soviet Union. On the way to Berchtesgaden, we had already read in the papers about the conclusion of a trade agreement, which in itself was already a sensation. Now we have learned that Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, who was present at the meeting, and who bade farewell to Hitler in front of everyone, is flying to Moscow to sign a non-aggression pact with Stalin. Hitler declared that by this move he was depriving the Western powers of their main trump card, because from now on even the blockade of Germany would not give a result. Hitler hinted that in order to create favorable conditions for the signing of the pact, he had already made great concessions to the Soviet Union in the Baltic states and regarding Poland's eastern borders, but one could not conclude from his words about the complete division of Poland. Indeed, as it became known later, even after the start of the Polish campaign, he was still considering the option of maintaining Poland as a puppet state.

After listening to Hitler's speech, neither von Rundstedt nor I myself, nor, apparently, any of the other generals, came to the conclusion that the outbreak of war was imminent. Two factors in particular convinced us that at the last minute, as in Munich, a peace agreement would be reached.

First, the consideration that after the conclusion of the pact with the Soviet Union, Poland's position would become completely hopeless. It is quite probable that Britain, which has literally had its weapons of the blockade snatched from it, and in order to help Poland, it only has a bloody path of advance in the west, will advise Warsaw to surrender under pressure from the French. Thus, Poland had to understand that the British guarantees from now on have no practical meaning. Moreover, if it comes to war with Germany, she will have to reckon with the fact that the Russians will begin to operate behind her lines in order to fulfill their ancient claims to her eastern lands. What else will Warsaw do in such a situation, if not retreat?

The second factor was the very fact of the meeting we had just attended. What was his purpose? Militarily, up to now the intention to attack Poland has been disguised in every conceivable way. The transfer of divisions to the eastern regions was explained by the construction of the Eastern Wall; and in order to hide the purpose of the redeployment of troops to East Prussia, they staged a grandiose celebration of the anniversary of the Battle of Grunwald. Until the last minute, preparations for large-scale maneuvers of motorized formations continued. The mobilization was not officially announced. Although Poland could not help but pay attention to these events, clearly intended for political pressure, they were nevertheless shrouded in the strictest secrecy and accompanied by all kinds of disguises. And now, in the midst of the crisis, Hitler is calling all of his senior military leadership to Obersalzberg - such an event was impossible to hide. It seemed to us the pinnacle of the policy of deliberate bluff. In other words, does not Hitler strive for a compromise, in spite of all his militant speeches? Was this conference itself not intended to put the last pressure on Poland?

With such thoughts, Colonel-General von Rundstedt and I left Berchtesgaden. While he moved on to our headquarters in Nysa, I stopped at Liegnitz to spend the day with my family. This fact alone shows how little I believed in the imminent outbreak of war.

At noon on August 24, Colonel-General von Rundstedt took command of the army group. On August 25 at 15.25 we received the following encrypted message from the command of the ground forces: "Operation White Plan: D-Day 26.08, Time H 4.30".

So, the decision to enter the war - a decision we did not want to believe was possible - apparently was taken.

Colonel-General von Rundstedt and I were having lunch at our headquarters in the Monastery of the Holy Cross in Nysa, when the following order came by telephone from the command of the ground forces: “Do not start, I repeat, do not start hostilities. Stop troop movements. Continue mobilization. Deployment according to the "White Plan" and "West" to continue as planned.

Any soldier can understand what such a cancellation of an order made at the last minute means. Within a few hours, three armies had to be stopped advancing towards the border through the area from Lower Silesia to the eastern regions of Slovakia, bearing in mind that all headquarters down to the divisional level were also on the march and that, for reasons of secrecy, radio transmissions were still prohibited. Despite all the difficulties, we still managed to notify the troops of the order in time - first-class work by signalmen and operational personnel. True, one motorized regiment in Eastern Slovakia was stopped only due to the fact that at night the Fieseler-Storch plane with an officer on board landed right at the head of the column.

Erich von Manstein

Lost victories

FROM THE PUBLISHER

Before you is a book, the Russian edition of which was destined for a strange fate: during the “Khrushchev thaw”, when military treatises and memoirs of the “enemies” are translated and published in abundance, the work of E. Manstein, barely having time to come out, was withdrawn and entered into a special depository. The compilers of the current edition leave the analysis of this biography of the book to the reader's judgment. Let us only note that, in comparison with other works of German military leaders, Manstein's memoirs are distinguished by the emphasized subjectivity of the author's position. This is the story of a soldier and a general, a theorist and practitioner of war, a man whose strategic talent was unparalleled in the German Reich. But was this talent fully appreciated and used by the Reich?

Among all the books mentioned, the memoirs of E. Manstein demanded, of course, the most responsible and hard work from commentators and compilers of appendices. This is primarily due to the vastness of materials on the events of the Second World War and, in particular, its Eastern Front, serious discrepancies in figures and facts, contradictory memoirs and even archival documents, and an abundance of mutually exclusive interpretations. Creating memoirs, E. Manstein - whose fate was determined by movements between headquarters and fronts - may not have outlived the influence of some kind of resentment against the Fuhrer, on the one hand, and on "these stupid Russians" - on the other. Analyzing the lack of strategic talent among our commanders, showing the inconsistency of their operations and the destruction of operational and strategic plans, he failed (or did not want to) admit that by 1943 Russian headquarters had learned to plan, and Russian commanders to fight. It is not easy to maintain objectivity when talking about one's own defeats, and E. Manstein's memoirs contain fantastic figures about the composition of those opposing him in 1943-1944. Russian troops and even more implausible reports of their losses.

The compilers of the Appendixes provide the reader with information in figures and facts collected from the "Russian" and "German" side.

APPENDIX 1. "Chronology of the Second World War".

APPENDIX 2. "Operational documents".

APPENDIX 3. "German Armed Forces".

APPENDIX 4. "The Art of Strategy".

Erich Manstein: "Lost
th victories"

Erich Manstein
Lost victories

“Manstein E. Lost victories / Comp. S. Pereslegin, R. Ismailov.”: AS
T, AST Moscow, Keeper; Moscow; 2007
ISBN 978-5-17-033260-1, 978-5-9713-5351-5, 978-5-9762-0584-0

annotation

Field Marshal E. Manstein, confessed
given by friends and enemies, allies and opponents, the best strategist
Third Reich, in his memoirs created a living fabric of the narrative of the military
m action and military thought. Global analysis, subtle vision of "moments
truth" in battles, a consistent description of optimal plans and not
optimal actions C all this makes E. Manstein's book a textbook
tags. Personal involvement in events, interest, patriotism and
awareness of the inevitability of defeat give it a historical and psychological
credibility.

Von Manstein Erich
Lost victories

From the publisher

Erich Manstein: "Lost
th victories"

Erich Manstein
Lost victories

“Manstein E. Lost victories / Comp. S. Pereslegin, R. Ismailov.”: AS
T, AST Moscow, Keeper; Moscow; 2007
ISBN 978-5-17-033260-1, 978-5-9713-5351-5, 978-5-9762-0584-0

annotation

Von Manstein Erich
Lost victories

From the publisher

Before you is a book, the Russian edition of which was destined for a strange fate
ba: during the "Khrushchev warming", when in abundance translated and published
military treatises and memoirs of "enemies", the work of E. Manstein, are scarcely successful
to get out, was seized and placed in a special depository. Compilers of the current edition
I leave the analysis of this biography of the book to the reader. Note
only that, in comparison with other works of German military leaders, the memoir
Manstein is distinguished by the emphasized subjectivity of the author's position. This is "R
the story of a soldier and a general, theorist and practice of war, a man whose art
strategic talent was unparalleled in the German Reich. But was this
Alant is fully appreciated and used by the Reich?
Before you is the first book in the Military Historical Library series. Vme
we have prepared for the publication of “August Cannons” by B. Takman, “Am
American aircraft carriers in the Pacific War" by F. Sherman and the book by B. Liddell
-Gart "Strategy of indirect actions".
Starting to work on the series, the team of project creators formulated
the following rule: the publication or reprint of each book "should
but be provided with an extensive reference apparatus so that professional
th reader, a lover of military history, as well as a schoolboy who chose himself
e corresponding topic of the abstract, received not only scientific and artistic
a text that tells about events in compliance with the "historical truth"
but also all the necessary statistical, military, technical, biographical
th information related to the events described in the memoirs
».
Among all the books mentioned, the memoirs of E. Manstein demanded, of course,
, the most responsible and hard work from commentators and compilers
applications. This is primarily due to the vastness of the materials devoted to
th events of the Second World War and, in particular, its Eastern Front, ser
serious discrepancies in figures and facts, inconsistency
and even archival documents, an abundance of mutually exclusive interpretations. pops
giving memoirs, E. Manstein Ts whose fate was determined by movements
and between headquarters and fronts, C may not have outlived the influence of some kind of resentment on
Fuhrer, on the one hand, and on "these stupid Russians" Ts, on the other. I analyze
I am the lack of strategic talent among our commanders, showing no
the coherence of their operations and the destruction of operational and strategic
plans, he never managed (or did not want to) admit that by 1943 the Russians
the headquarters learned to plan, and the Russian commanders learned to fight. Save
objectivity, talking about their own defeats, is not easy, and in a memoir
ah E. Manstein, fantastic figures appear about the composition of the opposing
them to him in 1943-1944. Russian troops and even more implausible reports about their
lost.
Here, E. Manstein did not go far from the Soviet generals, who, in their
constructions indicate an incredible number of tanks from the same E. Manstein
and in the Crimea, where for the most part they were not at all, or in the spring of 1943 near Kharko
pow after grueling fighting in the absence of reinforcements. The eyes are
the faces of fear, the real vision of the situation are also distorted by resentment, ambition and
etc. (However, the remarkable
German analyst K. Tippelskirch.)
The compilers of the Appendixes provide the reader with information in numbers and functions.
acts collected from the "Russian" and "German" side.
APPENDIX 1. "Chronology of the Second World War".
In this chronology, events are selected that had a direct impact on
on the course and outcome of the Second World War. Many dates and events turned out to be
not mentioned (for example, three wars that took place in 1918-1933).
APPENDIX 2. "Operational documents".
Contains directives, letters, orders published as Appendix
iya in the 1958 West German edition
APPENDIX 3. "German Armed Forces".
Consists of two articles: "The structure of the German army 1939-1943." and Air Force German
AI and its opponents. These materials are included in the text to create
for a more complete picture of the functioning of the German military machine, while
including those parts of it that E. Manstein paid the least attention to.
APPENDIX 4. "The Art of Strategy".
This application is a tribute to the strategic talent of E. Manstein. It includes
There are four analytical articles written while working on this
m edition under the direct influence of the personality of E. Manstein and his
about text.
APPENDIX 5. "Operational art in the battles for the Crimea."
Dedicated to one of the most controversial and difficult moments in the historiography
fii of the Second World War.
The biographical index, as in all other books in the series, contains
reference material on the "roles" and "characters" of War and Peace 1941-1945. or lich
news, directly or indirectly related to the events of this time.
The bibliographic index, as always, contains a list of references, etc.
intended for initial familiarization of readers with the affected
mi in the book of E. Manstein or editorial Applications problems. bibliogist
The raffia of the Second World War has thousands of names. Practically according to
each campaign or battle you can find more than one monograph and more than one de
bunch of descriptions. However, according to the compilers of the book, most of the publications
th dedicated to the war, haphazardly, superficially and reflects the positions of countries
s, which is represented by the author of the work. Therefore, from the mass of books on
topic of the war in Europe, we can today recommend only a few.
Editorial comments on E. Manstein's text are not quite common. Of course
, we considered it necessary to draw the reader's attention to those moments when a
the second makes a formal mistake (for example, he places an owl near Leningrad
Russian army, which was at that moment near Kyiv) or takes a position, to
which seems to us ethically unacceptable or, worse, internally opposed
talkative. In some cases, we wanted to take part in the discussion
and E. Manstein of different options for deploying operations in the Western or
On the Eastern Front, Ts E. Manstein writes sincerely and enthusiastically, he lives by this
and events, and his involvement involuntarily invites discussion.
However, the main volume of comments is occupied by the presentation of the described by E. Man
matte of events by historians and generals who are "on the other side
well, the front lines. This is not due to the subjectivism of E. Manstein. General
-Field Marshal is subjective no more and no less than any other memoir
ist, tsa with the desire of the editors to create one out of two sometimes polar paintings
of the same event, a stereoscopic representation of the object. L
and this is for us to judge the reader.
Victories and defeats of Manstein
No literary genre gives such a complete picture of the era,
as memoirs, especially if these are the memoirs of people who found themselves by the will of
in the midst of events that shook the world.
With the publication of the Russian edition of the book "Lost Victories", the successor
behind the recent publication of "Memoirs of a Soldier" by G. Guderian, a niche
, which was formed in connection with cultivated for many years in our
country with a unilateral approach to the events of the Second World War, one can
to be largely filled.
Friedrich von Lewinsky (such are the real name and surname of the author of the book) gave birth to
Xia November 24, 1887 in Berlin in the general's family, and after the death of the parent
He was adopted by a large landowner Georg von Manstein. Get
l brilliant education. His crowning achievement was the diploma of the Military Academy, with which
Eye graduate of 1914 stepped into the trenches of the First World War. Already manifested here
his brilliant abilities continued, but the peak falls on the years of Nazism.
The rapid promotion led Erich from the post of chief
ika of the Operational Directorate and the First Chief Quartermaster of the General Staff with
field troops (1935-1938) to the posts of chief of staff of army groups "South", "A", to
commanding the army groups "Don" and "South".
Manstein was never deprived of the attention of either contemporaries or descendants.
. He is one of the most prominent figures in the military elite of the Third Reich, "possibly
you can, the most brilliant strategist of the Wehrmacht" 1
1
Toland D. Adolf Hitler. M., 1993. T. 2. S. 93.
, and according to the English military historian Liddell Hart, Ts most about
a dangerous opponent of the allies, a man who combined modern views on
maneuverable nature of hostilities with classical representations
about the art of maneuvering, a detailed knowledge of military equipment from a large
m the art of the commander.
Colleagues also pay tribute to his exceptional military talents, even those who
he himself treated with restraint. Commenting on the coolly received verm
Ahtom appointment of Wilhelm Keitel as Chief of Staff of the Supreme
command of the armed forces of Germany (OKW), Manstein remarks: “N
someone Ts for sure and Keitel Ts himself did not expect him to possess at least a drop
th of that balm, which according to Schlieffen 2
2
Chief of the German General Staff in 1891 - 1905 C Note. author.
, is necessary for any commander" 3
3
Keitel V. Reflections before execution. M., 1998. S. 75.
. Keitel himself, in his memoirs written in the Nuremberg prison,
long before the execution, he admits: “I was very well aware that m
enya for the role ... chief of the general staff of all armed forces of the Reich
lack not only the ability, but also the appropriate education. Them
was called to become the best professional of the ground forces, and taco
howl, if necessary, was always at hand ... I myself thrice advice
al to Hitler to replace me with von Manstein: the first time C in the autumn of 1939, before F
French campaign; the second C in December 1941, when Brauchitsch left, and the third
y Z in September 1942, when the Fuhrer had a conflict with Jodl and with me. Nesm
rejecting the frequent recognition of Manstein's outstanding abilities, Hitler clearly
o was afraid of such a step and constantly rejected his candidacy" 4
4
There. pp. 75, 102.
.
The latter is confirmed by other German military leaders. Heinz G
uderian laments that "Hitler was unable to endure close
such a capable military personality as Manstein. Both were too
known natures: on the one hand, the masterful Hitler with his military
letantism and indomitable fantasy, on the other hand, Ts Manstein with his you
given by military abilities and with the hardening received by the German g
general headquarters, sober and cold-blooded judgments Ts our very ray
our operational mind" 5
5
Guderian G. Memoirs of a soldier. Rostov n/a. 1998, p. 321.
.
Like some other representatives of the German high command
nia, who changed the battlefields to a prison cell after the war, and the field march
al wand on memoirist's pen 6
6
Being sentenced in 1950 by a British military tribunal to 18 years
am prison, already in 1953 he received his freedom and lived happily for another 30 years. C Note.
author.
, Manstein emphasizes that his book is a note
a soldier who is alien to politics and deliberately refused to consider
political problems and events not directly related to combat
actions 7 7
Manstein E. von. Verlorene Siege. Bonn, 1955. S. 17.
. He writes with indignation, hardly sincere, about what he received in
yskakh order of the Design Bureau, which ordered the immediate execution of all those who fell into
captivity of the commissars of the Red Army as carriers of the Bolshevik ideology (
"Order on Commissars").
At the same time, one cannot but agree with the opinion of the German historian M. Messe
rschmidt that "this war, to a lesser extent than any other, was tol
what a soldier's business, and therefore it is impossible to derive some kind of profession from it
ionic tradition" 8
8
Quote from: Messerschmidt M. Wehrmacht, Eastern Campaign and Tradition. C
In: World War II. M., 1997. S. 251.
. In the order of the same Manstein, signed by him in November 1941, it was said
b: "The European-Bolshevik system must be eradicated once and for all
always. It must never again interfere with our European life.
oh space. The German soldier is therefore faced with the task of not only
defeat the military power of this system. He also acts as a carrier for
native idea and avenger for all those atrocities that were inflicted on him and not
the German people ... The soldier must understand for himself the need for redemption
reys, the spiritual bearers of the Bolshevik terror. This redemption is necessary
odimo also in order to nip in the bud all attempts at rebellion, to
which in most cases are inspired by Jews 9
9
There.
.
Despite friction with Hitler, the latter repeatedly directs Mansht
eyna to the most critical sectors of the front. He develops a plan for
the march of German tanks through the Ardennes in 1940, the implementation of which
o led to the rapid defeat of the Anglo-French troops on the continent, which
commanded the 2nd army during the capture of the Crimea and the siege of Sevastopol, from November 1942 to February
al 1943 at the head of the army group "Don" led the unsuccessful op
ation on the deblockade of the Paulus group surrounded near Stalingrad.

Speaking of "lost victories", Manstein actually blames
of the Fuhrer, whose intuition could not compensate for the lack
to experiential military knowledge. "I never had a feeling
property, he writes, that the fate of the army deeply touches him (Hitler C
Auth.). Losses were for him only numbers, testifying
about a decrease in combat effectiveness ... Who could have imagined that for the sake of the name "
Stalingrad "he will come to terms with the loss of an entire army."

Portal for the student. Self-training

Erich von Manstein Lost victories

Victories and defeats of Manstein

From a West German publisher

List of abbreviations

Author's Preface

* * *

Author's Preface

Part one Polish campaign

1. Before the assault

General Staff and the Polish Question

War or bluff?

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Part one
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