Specificity of scientific knowledge. rumor phenomenon

What rumors are, intuitively seems clear, although in reality this concept causes a lot of confusion. Encyclopedic and explanatory (non-specialized) dictionaries associate it with unreliability, falsity or unverified information. Approximately so it is interpreted in ordinary consciousness. Something similar can be found in the specialized literature. The phenomenon of rumors has not only been known since ancient times, but has long been used for the purposes of ideological and political struggle. The systematic study of the phenomenon of rumors began in the USA and Germany only after the First World War.

Undoubtedly, rumors may contain false information, as well as official reports. In the early days of World War II, post offices across the country unconditionally accepted parcels to cities already occupied by the Nazis in order to refute "harmful rumors." After the Chernobyl disaster, authorities sought to expose rumors of dangerous radiation. Therefore, contrary to popular usage, the degree of certainty has nothing to do with whether we qualify some information as hearsay. It is important that this information transmitted over interpersonal networks.

Of course, not all interpersonal contact, even the most confidential, involves the transmission of rumors. If you report your attitude or assessment of a mutual friend (like - dislike) or expound a scientific (philosophical, religious, etc.) concept, all these are not rumors. Hearing circulation occurs when you accompany assessments, opinions, attitudes, plans and doctrines unknown to the interlocutor. information about the subject facts from the biography of that very acquaintance, something read in a magazine, etc.

Thus, two criteria are necessary and sufficient for the initial definition - availability of subject information and the channel through which it is communicated. Rumor is transfer of subject information through channels of interpersonal communication.

Why is so much effort and money spent on studying this phenomenon? This work is important for three reasons:

First, the rumors valid source of information about public opinion, political moods, attitudes towards the leadership, the state system, the media, etc. The role of this source especially increases when other methods of collecting information are difficult. Even in the most liberal and favorable environment, the analysis of rumors circulating in society significantly complements the picture emerging on the basis of more traditional and, as a rule, more indirect methods, because people are not always inclined and ready to openly share their opinions and are not always clearly aware of their mood and attitude. to political events.

Secondly, rumors are often serve as a catalyst for socio-political sentiments and events, therefore, taking them into account helps to predict the processes in society and enriches the advanced model of the situation.

Thirdly, the circulating rumors are an active factor in the formation of moods, opinions, and, accordingly, the behavior of people and the political events caused by it.

Thus, operating on rumors is an additional tool of political influence.

Rumor circulation process

Long-term observations, studies and experiments have revealed three characteristic trends in the transformation of the plot in the process of spreading rumor:

1. Smoothing. The trend is that details that are insignificant in the eyes of this audience disappear, the plot becomes shorter and more functional.

2. Sharpening. The preserved details are brought to the fore, highlighted more prominently; their scale and social significance are increasing. The plot can acquire new details that were originally absent, which contribute to its "functionalization". In the most elementary examples, the colors and brands of colliding cars may disappear (smoothing), but in place of one injured passenger, a “mountain of corpses” is formed (sharpening); the appearance and attire of the fighters will be forgotten, but a fight with two participants will “virtually” grow into a mass brawl, etc. These rough examples, however, need a decisive clarification, since it is in the details, as always, that the main meaning is hidden.

Which particular details of the initial event will be smoothed out, and which ones, on the contrary, will be sharpened, is determined by the stereotypes and attitudes of the audience. For example, in some African cultures with a highly developed color symbolism, it is the color of the colliding cars that often becomes the most important detail and is sharpened rather than smoothed out: the color of the sea wave turns to blue, burgundy to red, etc .; the symbolic meaning of the incident depends on this. However, even in the Soviet Union, where the black color of a car usually meant its official status, the accident of a black Volga, and even more so a Chaika, was sometimes raised by rumor to a state event.

The appearance and clothing of the participants in the conflict, as mentioned, may remain beyond the threshold of attention and memorization, but if such details demonstrate belonging to various racial, ethnic, religious or class groups, and relations between these groups are tense during this period, then the color of the skin, eyes, hair, the quality of the costumes, the make of cars, and so on, will overshadow everything else. Whatever the reason for the conflict, it will be interpreted by the mass consciousness as national, confessional or class, and this can already give impetus to the corresponding continuations; the plot of the circulating rumor will be embodied in the actions of people.

3. Fixture. The trend is as follows: a separate detail of the plot is adjusted to stereotypes and attitudes without pronounced signs of smoothing or sharpening, but in such a way that this decisively changes the psychological content of the information.

American psychologists managed to simulate this phenomenon in experimental conditions. To participate in the experiment, groups of subjects were invited - white citizens of the southern states of the United States. The first of those who entered the room was presented with a photo frame in which two young men fought - white and black, and the white man had an open razor in his hand. The frame was exposed on the screen for three seconds and did not appear again. The subject, who saw the photograph, recounted its content to the next person, after which he left the room, the second recounted what he had heard to the third, etc. During the broadcast, the fight, the number and color of the skin of its participants, and the razor remained unchanged. There was no smoothing or sharpening: the fight did not turn into a conversation, the racial difference was not eliminated, there was no mass carnage, and not even once, for example, a revolver appeared instead of a razor. But stably (the experiment was carried out repeatedly), the same effect worked: the razor was in the hands of only the black opponent, thereby spreading information about the aggressiveness of the African American. The effect, which was regularly repeated in adults, did not occur in experiments with children.

The attitude towards the phenomenon of rumors as such essentially depends on the type of political power.

AT democratic system rumors are considered a normal part of social life. An optimal ratio of certainty and uncertainty is allowed, which makes the system more amorphous, but at the same time, internally diverse, and therefore flexible and adaptive. Accordingly, in a democratic society, the task of eliminating rumors in general as a social phenomenon is never set. Practical tasks are limited to building a hearing-resistant environment within separate relatively closed groups (military unit, expedition, political party, enterprise, firm, etc.), during election and other campaigns, as well as counteracting a specific circulating rumor. At the same time, preventive (warning) and operational measures are distinguished.

In the eighth chapter of "Dead Souls" it is brilliantly, very realistically described how rumors, one more ridiculous than the other, began to arise and spread throughout the city, as soon as it became clear that the main character was engaged in some incomprehensible machinations. It got to the point that Chichikov is actually a captive Napoleon, whom the British sent incognito to Russia. And then the townspeople began to discover an outward resemblance between him and the deposed French emperor, "especially in profile."
Boredom creates fertile ground for rumors. N.V. Gogol, talking about the reason for such violent passions around the person of Chichikov, emphasized that three months before that there had been no events, news, or even gossip, which, “as you know, for the city is the same as the timely delivery of food ".

Circulating rumors saturate the life of the society with virtual pseudo-events, which are able to partially compensate for event rarefaction and lack of emotional excitement. However, this form of psychological compensation (other forms - alcohol abuse, etc.), for its part, entails the danger of unpredictable actions and loss of control, often becomes the first sign of group decay. Experienced officers know how harmful it is to leave soldiers idle for a long time, that this is fraught with the loss of the unit's capacity.

Preventive work with rumors is a creative process, there are no simple and unambiguous instructions for all occasions. To take effective measures, it is necessary to adequately assess the communicative environment, first of all, such a parameter as trust in the source.

When there is confidence that a given source of information (political, administrative, trade union leader, journalist, newspaper, radio or TV channel, etc.) enjoys high confidence in a given audience, a “frontal attack” is appropriate. At the same time, the plot of the rumor is bluntly retold, its cause and reason are self-critically explained, and an alternative or more acceptable version is presented.

Another effective tool for quickly countering rumors is humor: a funny well-timed joke for rumors is sometimes more deadly than a whole series of events. It goes without saying that it is also necessary to pay utmost attention to trifles, mindful of the inertia of perception.

To develop preventive measures, it is necessary to evaluate the factors that cause rumors. Hearing immunity of the environment requires:

high efficiency and regularity of official communications;

consistently high reliability of messages;

systematic and well-established feedback between the source of information and the audience for timely and, if possible, anticipatory response to the dynamics of interest in the message (hearing);

optimal emotional saturation of life, the distribution of roles and functions according to individual abilities and inclinations, excluding situations of eventlessness and dissatisfaction with personal status.

For example, with a competent organization of a political campaign, advisory support consists of three closely related and complementary functional units - a research team (research team), a promotion or reinforcement team (reinforcement team), and a conversion team (conversionteam). According to the analogy, the first provides reconnaissance of the terrain and the situation, the second - offensive operations (strengthening the positive features of the image), the third - covering the flanks and rear (correction of the negative features of the image, preventing enemy attacks on vulnerable points).

The last of these functions is the most exciting and requires special psychological preparation. Converters are responsible for ensuring that there are no unpleasant surprises during the campaign, that the personality traits and biography of the client that are unfavorable in the eyes of this audience do not become the cause of failure and that any possible attacks from opponents turn against them. The complex of these tasks includes, of course, the prevention and elimination of harmful rumors.

To successfully complete tasks, the converter must track down and know in advance all those gaps in which rumor could arise, and anticipate unscrupulous tricks that competitors could use (the potential variety of such tricks is not as great as it seems to an inexperienced observer). If the strategy is built psychologically correctly, the information gaps are filled in a timely and functional manner, and an operational response is prepared for each possible "collision" of the enemy, there is confidence that the result of the campaign will be the maximum possible. In this case, it is advisable for opponents to refrain from attacks, since all this will turn into a boomerang effect for them, and engage in their own way.

Yuri Petrovich Platonov, Doctor of Psychology, Professor of St. Petersburg State University, Rector of the St. Petersburg State Institute of Psychology and Social Work, Honored Worker of Higher Education of the Russian Federation.

Introduction

1. Science as a specific type of knowledge

2. Extra-scientific types of knowledge

3. Science as a social institution

Conclusion

List of used literature

Introduction

Scientific knowledge, like all forms of spiritual production, is ultimately necessary in order to regulate human activity. Different types of cognition fulfill this role in different ways, and the analysis of this difference is the first and necessary condition for identifying the features of scientific cognition.

1. Science as a specific type of knowledge

Science as a specific type of knowledge is explored by the logic and methodology of science. The main problem here is the identification and explication of those features that are necessary and sufficient to distinguish scientific knowledge from the results of other types of knowledge (various forms of extrascientific knowledge). The latter include everyday knowledge, art (including fiction), religion (including religious texts), philosophy (to a large extent), intuitive-mystical experience, existential experiences, etc. In general, if by “knowledge” we understand even only textual (discourse) information, then it is obvious that scientific texts (even in the modern era of “big science”) make up only a part (and, moreover, a smaller one) of the total volume of discourse that modern humanity uses in its adaptive survival. Despite the great efforts of philosophers of science (especially representatives of logical positivism and analytical philosophy) to clearly define and explicate the criteria of scientificity, this problem is still far from an unambiguous solution. Usually such criterial signs of scientific knowledge are called: objectivity, unambiguity, certainty, accuracy, consistency, logical evidence, testability, theoretical and empirical validity, instrumental usefulness (practical applicability). The observance of these properties should guarantee the objective truth of scientific knowledge, therefore often "scientific knowledge" is identified with "objectively true knowledge".

Of course, if we talk about "scientific knowledge" as a certain theoretical designer of the methodology of science, then one can hardly object to the criteria of scientificity listed above. But the question is precisely how this “scientific ideal” is adequate, realizable and universal in relation to the “everyday” scientific knowledge, the real history of science and its modern diverse being. Unfortunately, as an analysis of the vast literature of the positivist and postpositivist schools of philosophy, methodology, and the history of science in the second half of the 20th century and their critics shows, the answer to this question is generally negative. Actual science in its functioning does not at all obey (does not implement) uniform and “pure” methodological standards. Abstraction within the framework of the methodology of science, from the social and psychological context of its functioning does not bring us closer, but moves us away from an adequate vision of real science. The ideal of logical evidence (in its strictest, syntactic sense) is not realizable even in the simplest logical and mathematical theories. It is obvious that in relation to the mathematical, natural-science and social-humanitarian theories richer in content, the requirement of their logical evidence is all the more unrealizable to any significant extent. The same, with certain reservations, can be said about the possibility of any complete implementation of all other "ideal" criteria of scientific character, in particular, the absolute empirical testability or validity of scientific theories in the natural sciences, technical sciences, social sciences and the humanities. Everywhere there is a context that has not been clarified to the end, the organic element of which is always a specific scientific text; everywhere - reliance on fundamentally irremovable implicit collective and personal knowledge, always - making cognitive decisions in conditions of incomplete certainty, scientific communications with the hope of adequate understanding, expert opinions and scientific consensus. However, if the scientific ideal of knowledge is unattainable, should it be abandoned? No, because the purpose of any ideal is to indicate the desired direction of movement, moving along which we have a greater probability of achieving success than following in the opposite or random direction. Ideals make it possible to understand, evaluate and structure reality in accordance with the accepted system of goals, needs and interests. Obviously, they are a necessary and most important regulatory element in ensuring the adaptive existence of a person in any sphere of his activity.

Intuitively, it seems clear how science differs from other forms of human cognitive activity. However, a clear definition of the specific features of science in the form of signs and definitions turns out to be a rather difficult task. This is evidenced by the diversity of science, the ongoing debate on the problem of the connection between it and other forms of knowledge.

An activity can be considered as a complexly organized network of various acts of transformation of objects, when the products of one activity pass into another and become its components. For example, iron ore, as a product of mining, becomes an object that is transformed into the activity of a steelmaker; machine tools produced at the plant from the steel mined by the steelmaker become the means of activity in another production. Even the subjects of activity - people who carry out these transformations of objects in accordance with the goals set, can to a certain extent be presented as the results of the activities of training and education, which ensure the assimilation by the subject of the necessary patterns of actions, knowledge and skills of using certain means in the activity.

Means and actions can be attributed to both objective and subjective structures, since they can be considered in two ways. On the one hand, the means can be presented as artificial organs of human activity. On the other hand, they can be considered as natural objects that interact with other objects. Similarly, operations can be presented in different ways, both as human actions and as natural interactions of objects.

Activities are always governed by certain values and goals. Value answers the question: why do we need this or that activity? The goal is to answer the question: what should be obtained in the activity? The goal is the ideal image of the product. It is embodied, objectifying in the product, which is the result of the transformation of the subject of activity.

Since activity is universal, the functions of its objects can be not only fragments of nature that are transformed in practice, but also people whose “properties” change when they are included in various social subsystems, as well as these subsystems themselves, interacting within society as an integral organism. Then, in the first case, we are dealing with the “objective side” of human change in nature, and in the second case, with the “objective side” of practice aimed at changing social objects. A person, from the point of view, can act both as a subject and as an object of practical action.

At the early stage of the development of society, the subjective and objective aspects of practical activity are not dissected in cognition, but are taken as a single whole. Cognition reflects the ways of practical change of objects, including in the characteristics of the latter the goals, abilities and actions of a person. This idea of the objects of activity is transferred to the whole nature, which is viewed through the prism of the practice being carried out.

It is known, for example, that in the myths of ancient peoples, the forces of nature are always likened to human forces, and its processes are always likened to human actions. Primitive thinking, in explaining the phenomena of the external world, invariably resorts to their comparison with human actions and motives. Only in the process of the long evolution of society does knowledge begin to exclude anthropomorphic factors from the characterization of objective relations. An important role in this process was played by the historical development of practice, and, above all, the improvement of means and tools of labor.

As the tools became more complex, those operations that were previously directly performed by a person began to “reify”, acting as a consistent impact of one tool on another and only then on the object being transformed. Thus, the properties and states of objects that arise due to these operations ceased to seem caused by the direct efforts of man, but more and more acted as the result of the interaction of the natural objects themselves. So, if in the early stages of civilization the movement of goods required muscular effort, then with the invention of the lever and block, and then the simplest machines, it was possible to replace these efforts with mechanical ones. For example, using a block system, it was possible to balance a large load with a small one, and by adding a small weight to a small load, raise a large load to the desired height. Here, to lift a heavy body, no human effort is needed: one load independently moves the other.

This transfer of human functions to mechanisms leads to a new understanding of the forces of nature. Previously, forces were understood only by analogy with the physical efforts of a person, but now they are beginning to be considered as mechanical forces. The above example can serve as an analogue of the process of "objectification" of the objective relations of practice, which, apparently, began already in the era of the first urban civilizations of antiquity. During this period, knowledge begins to gradually separate the objective side of practice from subjective factors and consider this side as a special, independent reality. Such consideration of practice is one of the necessary conditions for the emergence of scientific research.

Science sets itself the ultimate goal of foreseeing the process of transforming objects of practical activity (an object in its initial state) into corresponding products (an object in its final state). This transformation is always determined by the essential connections, laws of change and development of objects, and the activity itself can be successful only when it is consistent with these laws. Therefore, the main task of science is to reveal the laws in accordance with which objects change and develop.

With regard to the processes of transformation of nature, this function is performed by the natural and technical sciences. The processes of change in social objects are studied by the social sciences. Since a variety of objects can be transformed in activity - objects of nature, a person (and the state of his consciousness), subsystems of society, iconic objects functioning as cultural phenomena, etc. - all of them can become subjects of scientific research.

The orientation of science towards the study of objects that can be included in activity (either actually or potentially as possible objects of its future transformation), and their study as obeying the objective laws of functioning and development, constitute the first main feature of scientific knowledge.

This feature distinguishes it from other forms of human cognitive activity. Thus, for example, in the process of artistic assimilation of reality, objects included in human activity are not separated from subjective factors, but are taken in a kind of "gluing" with them. Any reflection of objects of the objective world in art at the same time expresses the value attitude of a person to an object. An artistic image is such a reflection of an object that contains the imprint of a human personality, its value of orientation, which are fused into the characteristics of the reflected reality. To exclude this interpenetration means to destroy the artistic image. In science, the features of the life activity of a person who creates knowledge, its value judgments are not directly part of the generated knowledge (Newton's laws do not allow one to judge what and what Newton hated, while, for example, Rembrandt's portraits depict the personality of Rembrandt himself, his worldview and his personal attitude to the depicted social phenomena; a portrait painted by a great artist always acts as a self-portrait).

Science is focused on the subject and objective study of reality. The foregoing, of course, does not mean that the personal moments and value orientations of a scientist do not play a role in scientific creativity and do not affect its results.

The process of scientific knowledge is determined not only by the characteristics of the object under study, but also by numerous factors of a sociocultural nature.

Considering science in its historical development, it can be found that as the type of culture changes, the standards for presenting scientific knowledge, the ways of seeing reality in science, and the styles of thinking that are formed in the context of culture and are affected by its most diverse phenomena change. This impact can be represented as the inclusion of various socio-cultural factors in the process of generating proper scientific knowledge. However, the statement of the connections between the objective and the subjective in any cognitive process and the need for a comprehensive study of science in its interaction with other forms of human spiritual activity do not remove the question of the difference between science and these forms (ordinary knowledge, artistic thinking, etc.). The first and necessary characteristic of such a difference is the sign of objectivity and objectivity of scientific knowledge.

Science in human activity singles out only its objective structure and examines everything through the prism of this structure. Like King Midas from the famous ancient legend - whatever he touched, everything turned into gold, - so science, whatever it touches, is everything for it an object that lives, functions and develops according to objective laws.

Here the question immediately arises: well, what then to be with the subject of activity, with his goals, values, states of his consciousness? All this belongs to the components of the subjective structure of activity, but science is capable of investigating these components too, because there are no prohibitions for it to study any really existing phenomena. The answer to these questions is quite simple: yes, science can explore any phenomena of human life and consciousness, it can explore activity, the human psyche, and culture, but only from one point of view - as special objects that obey objective laws. Science also studies the subjective structure of activity, but as a special object. And where science cannot construct an object and present its "natural life" determined by its essential connections, then its claims end. Thus, science can study everything in the human world, but from a special perspective and from a special point of view. This special perspective of objectivity expresses both the infinity and limitations of science, since a person as an independent, conscious being has free will, and he is not only an object, he is also a subject of activity. And in this his subjective being, not all states can be exhausted by scientific knowledge, even if we assume that such a comprehensive scientific knowledge about a person, his life activity can be obtained.

There is no anti-scientism in this statement about the limits of science. It is simply a statement of the indisputable fact that science cannot replace all forms of knowledge of the world, of all culture. And everything that escapes her field of vision is compensated by other forms of spiritual comprehension of the world - art, religion, morality, philosophy.

The purpose of science is to foresee possible future changes in objects, including those that would correspond to future types and forms of practical change in the world.

As an expression of these goals in science, not only research is formed that serves today's practice, but also layers of research, the results of which can only find application in the practice of the future. The movement of cognition in these layers is already determined not so much by the direct demands of today's practice as by cognitive interests through which the needs of society are manifested in predicting future methods and forms of practical development of the world. For example, the formulation of intrascientific problems and their solution within the framework of fundamental theoretical research in physics led to the discovery of the laws of the electromagnetic field and the prediction of electromagnetic waves, to the discovery of the laws of fission of atomic nuclei, the quantum laws of radiation of atoms during the transition of electrons from one energy level to another, etc. All these theoretical discoveries laid the foundation for future methods of mass practical development of nature in production. A few decades later, they became the basis for applied engineering research and development, the introduction of which into production, in turn, revolutionized equipment and technology - radio-electronic equipment, nuclear power plants, laser installations, etc. appeared.

Great scientists, creators of new, original directions and discoveries, have always paid attention to this ability of theories to potentially contain entire constellations of future new technologies and unexpected practical applications.

K.A. Timiryazev wrote about this: “Despite the absence of a narrowly utilitarian direction in modern science, it was in its free development, independent of the pointers of worldly sages and moralists, that it became, more than ever, a source of practical, everyday applications. That astonishing development of technology, by which superficial observers are blinded, who are ready to recognize it as the most outstanding feature of the 19th century, is only the result of the development of science, which is not visible to everyone, unprecedented in history, free from any utilitarian oppression. Striking evidence of this is the development of chemistry: it was both alchemy and iatrochemistry, in the service of both mining and pharmacy, and only in the 19th century, the "century of science", becoming simply chemistry, i.e. pure science, it was the source of innumerable applications in medicine, and in technology, and in mining, it shed light both on physics and even astronomy, which are higher in the scientific hierarchy, and on younger branches of knowledge, such as physiology, say, developed only during this century.

Similar thoughts were expressed by one of the founders of quantum mechanics, the French physicist Louis de Broglie. “Great discoveries,” he wrote, “even those made by researchers who did not have any practical application in mind and were engaged exclusively in theoretical problem solving, then quickly found application in the technical field. Of course, Planck, when he first wrote the formula that now bears his name, did not think at all about lighting technology. But he had no doubt that the enormous efforts of thought expended by him would allow us to understand and foresee a large number of phenomena that would quickly and in ever-increasing numbers be used by lighting technology. Something similar happened to me. I was extremely surprised when I saw that the concepts developed by me very quickly find specific applications in the technique of electron diffraction and electron microscopy.

The focus of science on the study of not only objects that are transformed in today's practice, but also those objects that can become the subject of mass practical development in the future, is the second distinguishing feature of scientific knowledge. This feature makes it possible to distinguish between scientific and everyday, spontaneous-empirical knowledge and to derive a number of specific definitions that characterize the nature of science. It allows us to understand why theoretical research is a defining characteristic of developed science.

2. Extra-scientific types of knowledge

Cognition is not limited to the sphere of science, knowledge in one form or another exists outside of science. The advent of scientific knowledge did not abolish or make other forms of knowledge useless. Each form of social consciousness: science, philosophy, mythology, politics, religion, etc., corresponds to specific forms of knowledge. There are also forms of knowledge that have a conceptual, symbolic or artistic-figurative basis. Unlike all the diverse forms of knowledge, scientific knowledge is the process of obtaining objective, true knowledge, aimed at reflecting the laws of reality. Scientific knowledge has a threefold task and is associated with the description, explanation and prediction of the processes and phenomena of reality.

When one distinguishes between scientific, based on rationality, and extra-scientific knowledge, it is important to understand that the latter is not someone's invention or fiction. It is produced in certain intellectual communities, in accordance with other (other than rationalistic) norms, standards, has its own sources and conceptual means. Obviously, many forms of extra-scientific knowledge are older than knowledge recognized as scientific, for example, astrology is older than astronomy, alchemy is older than chemistry. In the history of culture, diverse forms of knowledge that differ from the classical scientific model and standard are assigned to the department of extra-scientific knowledge. There are the following forms of extra-scientific knowledge:

Parascientific as incompatible with existing epistemological standards. A wide class of parascientific knowledge includes teachings or reflections on phenomena, the explanations of which are not convincing from the point of view of scientific criteria;

Pseudo-scientific as consciously exploiting conjectures and prejudices. Pseudo-scientific knowledge often presents science as the work of outsiders. Sometimes it is associated with the pathological activity of the author's psyche, who is commonly called a "maniac", "crazy". As symptoms of pseudoscience, illiterate pathos, fundamental intolerance of refuting arguments, as well as pretentiousness are distinguished. Pseudo-scientific knowledge is very sensitive to the topic of the day, sensation. Its peculiarity is that it cannot be united by a paradigm, cannot be systematic, universal. Pseudo-scientific knowledge coexists with scientific knowledge in patches and inclusions. It is believed that the pseudo-scientific reveals itself and develops through the quasi-scientific;

Quasi-scientific knowledge is looking for supporters and adherents, relying on the methods of violence and coercion. As a rule, it flourishes in conditions of strictly hierarchical science, where criticism of those in power is impossible, where the ideological regime is brutally manifested. In the history of our country, the period of the “triumph of quasi-science” is well known: Lysenkoism, fixism as a quasi-science in Soviet geology of the 1950s, defamation of cybernetics, etc.;

Anti-scientific knowledge as utopian and deliberately distorting ideas about reality. The prefix "anti" draws attention to the fact that the subject and methods of research are opposite to science. It's like an "opposite sign" approach. It is associated with the age-old need to find a common, easily accessible "cure for all diseases." Particular interest and craving for anti-science arises during periods of social instability. But although this phenomenon is quite dangerous, there can be no fundamental deliverance from anti-science;

Pseudo-scientific knowledge is an intellectual activity that speculates on a set of popular theories, for example, stories about ancient astronauts, Bigfoot, Loch Ness monster.

Even at the early stages of human history, there was ordinary practical knowledge that provided elementary information about nature and the surrounding reality. Its basis was the experience of everyday life, which, however, has a fragmented, non-systematic character, which is a simple collection of information. People, as a rule, have at their disposal a large amount of everyday knowledge, which is produced daily and is the initial layer of any inquiry. Sometimes the axioms of sanity contradict scientific principles, impede the development of science, get used to the human consciousness so firmly that they become prejudices and barriers to progress. Sometimes, on the contrary, science, by a long and difficult path of proofs and refutations, comes to the formulation of those provisions that have long established themselves in the environment of ordinary knowledge.

Ordinary knowledge includes common sense, and signs, and edifications, and recipes, and personal experience, and traditions. Although it captures the truth, it does so not systematically and unprovenly. Its peculiarity is that it is used by a person almost unconsciously and does not require preliminary systems of evidence in its application. Sometimes the knowledge of everyday experience even skips the stage of articulation, but simply and silently directs the actions of the subject.

Another feature of it is its fundamentally unwritten character. Those proverbs and sayings that the folklore of each ethnic community has only fix this fact, but in no way prescribe the theory of everyday knowledge. Let us note that a scientist, using a highly specialized arsenal of scientific concepts and theories for a given specific sphere of reality, is also always introduced into the sphere of non-specialized everyday experience, which has a universal character. For a scientist, while remaining a scientist, does not cease to be just a man.

Ordinary knowledge is sometimes defined by referring to common sense concepts or non-specialized everyday experiences that provide a preliminary tentative perception and understanding of the world.

The historically first forms of human knowledge include game cognition, which is built on the basis of conditionally accepted rules and goals. It provides an opportunity to rise above everyday life, not to care about practical benefits and to behave in accordance with freely accepted game norms. In game cognition, it is possible to hide the truth, deceive a partner. It has a teaching and developmental character, reveals the qualities and capabilities of a person, allows you to expand the psychological boundaries of communication.

A special kind of knowledge, which is the property of an individual, is personal knowledge. It is made dependent on the abilities of a particular subject and on the characteristics of his intellectual cognitive activity. Collective knowledge is generally significant or over personal and presupposes the existence of a system of concepts, methods, techniques and rules for building knowledge that is necessary and common to all. Personal knowledge, in which a person shows his individuality and creative abilities, is recognized as a necessary and really existing component of knowledge. It emphasizes the obvious fact that science is made by people and that art or cognitive activity cannot be learned from a textbook, it is achieved only in communication with a master.

A special form of non-scientific and non-rational knowledge is the so-called folk science, which has now become the work of separate groups or individual subjects: healers, healers, psychics, and earlier shamans, priests, elders of the clan. At its inception, folk science revealed itself as a phenomenon of collective consciousness and acted as ethnoscience. In the era of the dominance of classical science, it lost the status of intersubjectivity and firmly settled on the periphery, far from the center of official experimental and theoretical research. As a rule, folk science exists and is transmitted in an unwritten form from mentor to student. Sometimes it is possible to single out its condensate in the form of covenants, signs, instructions, rituals, etc. Despite the fact that people see her great insight in folk science, she is often accused of unfounded claims to possess the truth.

It is noteworthy that the phenomenon of folk science is a subject of special study for ethnologists, who call it "ethnoscience", preserving forms of social memory in ethnic rites and rituals. Very often, the deformation of the spatio-temporal conditions for the existence of an ethnos leads to the disappearance of folk sciences, which are usually not restored. They are rigidly connected with the prescription and routine, unwritten knowledge of healers, healers, soothsayers, etc., transmitted from generation to generation. A fundamental modification of the worldview blocks the entire prescription-routine complex of information that fills folk science. From its developed form at the disposal of subsequent generations, in this case, only some relic traces of it can remain. M. Polanyi is right when he notes that an art that is not practiced during the life of one generation remains irretrievably lost. There are hundreds of examples of this; such losses are usually irreplaceable.

In the picture of the world offered by folk science, the circulation of the powerful elements of being is of great importance. Nature acts as a "house of man", man, in turn, as an organic part of him, through which the lines of force of the world cycle constantly pass. It is believed that folk sciences are addressed, on the one hand, to the most elementary and, on the other hand, to the most vital spheres of human activity, such as: health, agriculture, cattle breeding, construction.

Since the diverse set of non-rational knowledge does not lend itself to a strict and exhaustive classification, one can come across the following three types of cognitive technologies: paranormal knowledge, pseudoscience and deviant science. Moreover, a certain evolution is recorded from paranormal knowledge to the category of more respectable pseudoscience and from it to deviant knowledge. This indirectly testifies to the development of extrascientific knowledge.

A broad class of paranormal knowledge includes teachings about secret natural and psychic forces and relationships behind ordinary phenomena. Mysticism and spiritualism are considered the brightest representatives of paranormal knowledge. To describe ways of obtaining information that goes beyond the scope of science, in addition to the term "paranormality", the term "non-sensory perception" is used - VSP or "parasensitivity", "psy-phenomena". It involves the ability to receive information or influence without resorting to direct physical means. Science cannot yet explain the mechanisms involved in this case, nor can it ignore such phenomena. Distinguish extrasensory perception (ESP) and psychokinesis. ESP is divided into telepathy and clairvoyance. Telepathy involves the exchange of information between two or more individuals in paranormal ways. Clairvoyance means the ability to receive information on some inanimate object (cloth, wallet, photograph, etc.). Psychokinesis is the ability to influence external systems that are outside the scope of our motor activity, to move objects in a non-physical way.

It is noteworthy that at present, research on paranormal effects is being put on the conveyor of science, which, after a series of various experiments, comes to the following conclusions:

With the help of ESP, meaningful information can be obtained;

The distance separating the subject and the perceived object does not affect the accuracy of perception;

The use of electromagnetic screens does not reduce the quality and accuracy of the information received, and the previously existing hypothesis about ESP electromagnetic channels can be called into question. We can assume the presence of some other, for example, psychophysical channel, the nature of which is not clear.

At the same time, the sphere of paranormal knowledge has features that contradict a purely scientific approach:

First, the results of psychic research and experimentation are generally not reproducible;

Secondly, they cannot be predicted and predicted. The modern philosopher of science K. Popper highly valued pseudoscience, noting that science can make mistakes, and pseudoscience "can accidentally stumble upon the truth." He has another significant conclusion: if some theory turns out to be unscientific, this does not mean that it is not important.

Pseudo-scientific knowledge is characterized by sensational themes, recognition of secrets and mysteries, "skillful processing of facts." To all these a priori conditions is added the property of investigation through interpretation. Material is involved that contains statements, hints or confirmations of the expressed views and can be interpreted in their favor. In form, pseudoscience is, first of all, a story or a story about certain events. This typical way of presenting the material is called “explaining through the script”. Another hallmark is infallibility. It is pointless to hope for a correction of pseudo-scientific views; for critical arguments do not affect the essence of the interpretation of the story told.

The term "deviant" means cognitive activity that deviates from accepted and established standards. Moreover, the comparison takes place not with a focus on the standard and sample, but in comparison with the norms shared by the majority of members of the scientific community. A distinctive feature of deviant knowledge is that, as a rule, people who have scientific training are engaged in it, but for one reason or another, they choose methods and objects of research that are very divergent from generally accepted ideas. Representatives of deviant knowledge usually work alone or in small groups. The results of their activities, as well as the direction itself, have a rather short period of existence.

Sometimes the term abnormal knowledge is encountered, which does not mean anything other than that the method of obtaining knowledge or knowledge itself does not correspond to the norms that are considered generally accepted in science at this historical stage. Abnormal knowledge can be divided into three types.

The first type arises as a result of the discrepancy between the common sense regulators and the norms established by science. This type is quite common and introduced into the real life of people. It does not repel with its anomaly, but attracts attention to itself in a situation where the acting individual, having a professional education and special scientific knowledge, fixes the problem of a discrepancy between the norms of the ordinary world relation and the scientific one (for example, in education, in situations of communication with an infant.).

The second type arises when the norms of one paradigm are compared with the norms of another.

The third type is found when combining norms and ideals from fundamentally different forms of human activity.

For a long time, extra-scientific knowledge has not been considered only as a delusion. And since there are diverse forms of it, therefore, they meet some kind of initially existing need in them. It can be said that the conclusion, which is shared by modern-minded scientists who understand the limitations of rationalism, boils down to the following. It is impossible to prohibit the development of non-scientific forms of knowledge, just as it is impossible to cultivate purely and exclusively pseudoscience, it is also inappropriate to deny credit to the interesting ideas that have matured in their depths, no matter how doubtful they may initially seem. Even if unexpected analogies, mysteries and stories turn out to be just a “foreign fund” of ideas, both the intellectual elite and the large army of scientists are in dire need of it.

Quite often there is a statement that traditional science, having relied on rationalism, has led humanity into a dead end, the way out of which can be suggested by extrascientific knowledge. Extra-scientific disciplines include those whose practice is based on non-rational or irrational grounds - on mystical rites and rituals, mythological and religious ideas. Of interest is the position of modern philosophers of science and, in particular, K. Feyerabend, who is sure that elements of the non-rational have the right to exist within science itself.

The development of such a position can be associated with the names of T. Rozzak and J. Holton. The latter came to the conclusion that at the end of the last century a movement arose and began to spread in Europe, proclaiming the bankruptcy of science. It included four of the most odious currents of the overthrowers of scientific reason:

Currents in modern philosophy, asserting that the status of science is not higher than any functional myth;

A small but culturally influential group of alienated marginal intellectuals, such as A. Koestler;

The mood of the scientific community, connected by the desire to find a correspondence between the thinking of the "New Age" and Eastern mysticism, to find a way out of the intellectual anarchism of our days to "crystal-clear power";

The radical wing of the scientific direction, prone to statements that belittle the importance of scientific knowledge, such as "today's physics is just a primitive model of the true physical."

The opinion that it is scientific knowledge that has a greater information capacity is also disputed by supporters of this point of view. Science can “know less” compared to the variety of extra-scientific knowledge, since everything that science offers must withstand a rigorous test for reliability, facts, hypotheses and explanations. Knowledge that does not stand up to this test is discarded, and even potentially true information may be outside of science.

Sometimes extra-scientific knowledge refers to itself as "His Majesty", another way of true knowledge. And since interest in the diversity of its forms in recent years has increased everywhere and significantly, and the prestige of the profession of engineer and scientist has significantly decreased, the tension associated with the tendency to blur science has increased. Religious knowledge, which is based on faith and rushes beyond the rational into the sphere of comprehension of the supernatural, claims a special attitude. Religious knowledge, being one of the earliest forms of knowledge, includes mechanisms for regulating and regulating the life of society. Its attributes are a temple, an icon, texts of the Holy Scriptures, prayers, various religious symbols. Faith is not only the basic concept of religion, but also the most important component of the inner spiritual world of a person, a mental act and an element of cognitive activity.

Faith, in contrast to knowledge, is the conscious recognition of something as true on the basis of the predominance of subjective significance. Religious knowledge based on faith reveals itself in the direct acceptance of certain provisions, norms, and truths that does not require proof. As a psychological act, faith manifests itself in a state of conviction, associated with a feeling of approval or disapproval. As an internal spiritual state, it requires a person to comply with those principles and moral prescriptions in which he believes, for example, in justice, in moral purity, in world order, in goodness.

The concept of faith can completely coincide with the concept of religion and act as a religious faith, opposite to rational knowledge. Therefore, the ratio of knowledge (reason) and faith cannot be decided in favor of one or the other component. Just as knowledge cannot replace faith, so faith cannot replace knowledge. It is impossible to solve the problems of physics, chemistry, economics by faith. However, faith as a pre-intellectual act, the pre-conscious connection of the subject with the world, preceded the emergence of knowledge. It was connected not with concepts, logic and reason, but with a sensuously imaginative fantastic perception of the world. Religious knowledge presupposes not proof, but revelation, and is based on the authority of dogmas. Revelation is interpreted as a gift and as a result of intense self-deepening and comprehension of the truth.

3. Science as a social institution

The functioning of the scientific community, the effective regulation of relations between its members, as well as between science, society and the state, is carried out with the help of a specific system of internal values inherent in this social structure of the scientific and technical policy of society and the state, as well as the corresponding system of legislative norms (patent law, economic law, civil law, etc.) The set of internal values of the scientific community, which have the status of moral norms, is called "scientific ethos". One of the explications of the norms of scientific ethos was proposed in the 1930s by R. Merton, the founder of the sociological study of science. He believed that science, as a special social structure, relies in its functioning on four value imperatives: universalism, collectivism, disinterestedness, and organized skepticism. Later B. Barber added two more imperatives: rationalism and emotional neutrality.

The imperative of universalism affirms the impersonal, objective character of scientific knowledge. The reliability of new scientific knowledge is determined only by its correspondence to observations and previously certified scientific knowledge. Universalism determines the international and democratic nature of science. The imperative of collectivism says that the fruits of scientific knowledge belong to the entire scientific community and society as a whole. They are always the result of collective scientific co-creation, since any scientist always relies on some ideas (knowledge) of his predecessors and contemporaries. The right of private ownership of knowledge in science should not exist, although scientists who make the most significant personal contribution have the right to demand from colleagues and society fair material and moral encouragement, adequate professional recognition. Such recognition is the most important stimulus for scientific activity. The imperative of disinterestedness means that the main goal of the activities of scientists should be the service of Truth. The latter should never be in science a means to achieve various benefits, but only a socially significant goal. The imperative of organized skepticism presupposes not only a ban on the dogmatic assertion of Truth in science, but, on the contrary, makes it a professional obligation for a scientist to criticize the views of his colleagues, if there is the slightest reason for this. Accordingly, it is necessary to regard criticism as a necessary condition for the development of science. A true scientist is a skeptic by nature and vocation. Skepticism and doubt are just as necessary, important and subtle tools of a scientist's activity as a scalpel and a needle in the hands of a surgeon. The value of rationalism asserts that science strives not just for objective truth, but for a proven, logically organized discourse, the supreme arbiter of the truth of which is the scientific mind. The imperative of emotional neutrality forbids people of science to use emotions, personal sympathies, antipathies, etc., in solving scientific problems. resources of the sensual sphere of consciousness.

It must be emphasized right away that the presented approach to scientific ethos is purely theoretical, and not empirical, because here science is described as a certain theoretical object, constructed from the point of view of its proper (“ideal”) existence, and not from the position of being. Merton himself understood this very well, as well as the fact that it is impossible to distinguish science as a social structure from other social phenomena (politics, economics, religion) in a different way (outside the value dimension). Already the closest students and followers of Merton, having conducted a wide sociological study of the behavior of members of the scientific community, were convinced that it existed ambivalently, that in their daily professional activities scientists are constantly in a state of choice between polar behavioral imperatives. So, the scientist must:

Communicate your results to the scientific community as soon as possible, but not obliged to rush publications, beingware of their "immaturity" or unfair use;

Be receptive to new ideas, but not succumb to intellectual "fashion";

Strive to acquire such knowledge that will be highly appreciated by colleagues, but at the same time work without paying attention to the assessments of others;

Defend new ideas, but do not support rash conclusions;

Make every effort to know the work related to his field, but at the same time remember that erudition sometimes inhibits creativity;

Be extremely careful in wording and details, but not be a pedant, for this is at the expense of content;

Always remember that knowledge is international, but do not forget that any scientific discovery does honor to the national science whose representative it is made;

To educate a new generation of scientists, but not to give too much time and attention to teaching; learn from a great master and imitate him, but not be like him.

It is clear that the choice in favor of one or another imperative is always situational, contextual and determined by a significant number of cognitive, social and even psychological factors that are “integrated” by specific individuals.

One of the most important discoveries in the study of science as a social institution was the realization that science is not some kind of monolithic, unified system, but rather a granular competitive environment, consisting of many small and medium-sized scientific communities, whose interests are often not only do not coincide, but often contradict each other. Modern science is a complex network of collectives, organizations and institutions interacting with each other - from laboratories and departments to state institutions and academies, from "invisible" colleges to large organizations with all the attributes of a legal entity, from scientific incubators to scientific investment corporations, from disciplined communities to national scientific communities and international associations. All of them are connected by a myriad of communication links both among themselves and with other powerful subsystems of society and the state (economy, education, politics, culture). That is why effective management and self-management of modern science is impossible today without constant sociological, economic, legal and organizational monitoring of its diverse subsystems and cells. Modern science is a powerful self-organizing system, the two main controlling parameters of which are economic (material and financial) nourishment and freedom of scientific research. Maintaining these parameters at the proper level is one of the primary concerns of modern developed countries. An effective scientific and technological policy is the main guarantor of ensuring the adaptive, sustainable, competitive existence and development of science in every major state and human society as a whole. This conclusion is an inevitable consequence of the philosophical analysis of the universal dimensions of the concept of "science".

Thus, science can be defined as a special, professionally organized cognitive activity aimed at obtaining new knowledge with the following properties: objective objectivity (empirical or theoretical), general validity, validity (empirical or theoretical), certainty, accuracy, testability (empirical or logical), reproducibility of the subject of knowledge (potentially infinite), objective truth, utility (practical or theoretical). In various fields of science, these general criteria for the scientific nature of knowledge receive a certain concretization, due to the specific subjects of these areas, as well as the nature of the scientific problems being solved.

Conclusion

Science, having numerous definitions, appears in three main hypostases. It is understood either as a form of activity, or as a system or set of disciplinary knowledge, or as a social institution. Understanding science as a sociocultural phenomenon indicates its dependence on the diverse forces, currents and influences operating in society, that science determines its priorities in the social context, tends to compromise and largely determines social life itself. Thus, a twofold kind of dependence and interdependence of science and society is fixed: as a sociocultural phenomenon, science arose in response to a certain need of mankind in the production and receipt of true, adequate knowledge about the world, and exists, in turn, having a very noticeable impact on the development of all spheres of public life. life. Science is regarded as a sociocultural phenomenon because, when it comes to the study of its origins, the boundaries of what we today call science expand to the boundaries of culture. And on the other hand, science claims to be the only stable and "genuine" foundation of culture as a whole, in its primary - activity and technological understanding.

List of used literature

Erakhtin A.V. Concepts of modern natural science: Method. Materials for self-study. Works. – Ivanovo, 2006

· Kokhanovsky V.B., Leshkevich T.G., Matyash T.P., Fakhti T.B. Fundamentals of Philosophy of Science: Textbook for Postgraduate Students. – Rostov/D: Phoenix, 2004, 608 p.

· Science: Possibilities and Limits (Ed. E.A. Mamchur). – M.: Nauka, 2003, 293 p.

· Philosophy of science / ed. S.A. Lebedeva: Textbook for universities. 3rd ed., revised. and additional – M.: Academic project, 2006, 736 p.

Stepin V.S. theoretical knowledge. M.: "Progress-Tradition", 2000, 744 p.

· Poincaré A. About science: Per. from fr. / Ed. L.S. Pontryagin. - 2nd ed. Ster. – M.: Science. Ch. ed. Phys.-Math. lit., 1990, 736 p.

A delusional mind? Variety of extra-scientific knowledge / Ed. ed. and comp. I.T. Kasavin. – M.: Politizdat, 1990, 464 p.

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Introduction

Science as a specific type of knowledge
Extra-scientific types of knowledge
Science as a social institution

Conclusion

List of used literature

Introduction

1. Science as a specific type of knowledge

Science as a specific type of knowledge is explored by the logic and methodology of science. The main problem here is the identification and explication of those features that are necessary and sufficient to distinguish scientific knowledge from the results of other types of knowledge (various forms of extrascientific knowledge). The latter include everyday knowledge, art (including fiction), religion (including religious texts), philosophy (to a large extent), intuitive-mystical experience, existential experiences, etc. In general, if by knowledge we understand even only textual (discourse) information, then it is obvious that scientific texts (even in the modern era of big science) make up only a part (and, moreover, a smaller part) of the total volume of discourse that modern humanity uses in its adaptive survival. Despite the great efforts of philosophers of science (especially representatives of logical positivism and analytical philosophy) to clearly define and explicate the criteria of scientificity, this problem is still far from an unambiguous solution. Usually such criterial signs of scientific knowledge are called: objectivity, unambiguity, certainty, accuracy, consistency, logical evidence, testability, theoretical and empirical validity, instrumental usefulness (practical applicability). Observance of these properties should guarantee the objective truth of scientific knowledge, therefore, scientific knowledge is often identified with objectively true knowledge.

Of course, if we talk about scientific knowledge as a certain theoretical designer of the methodology of science, then one can hardly object to the criteria of scientificity listed above. But the question is precisely how this ideal of scientificity is adequate, realizable and universal in relation to the everyday life of scientific knowledge, the real history of science and its modern diverse being. Unfortunately, as an analysis of the vast literature of the positivist and postpositivist schools of philosophy, methodology, and the history of science in the second half of the 20th century and their critics shows, the answer to this question is generally negative. Real science in its functioning does not at all obey (does not implement) uniform and pure methodological standards. Abstraction within the framework of the methodology of science, from the social and psychological context of its functioning does not bring us closer, but moves us away from an adequate vision of real science. The ideal of logical evidence (in its strictest, syntactic sense) is not realizable even in the simplest logical and mathematical theories. It is obvious that in relation to the mathematical, natural-science and social-humanitarian theories richer in content, the requirement of their logical evidence is all the more unrealizable to any significant extent. The same, with certain reservations, can be said about the possibility of any complete implementation of all other ideal criteria of scientific character, in particular, the absolute empirical testability or validity of scientific theories in the natural sciences, technical sciences, social sciences and the humanities. Everywhere there is a context that has not been clarified to the end, the organic element of which is always a specific scientific text; everywhere reliance on fundamentally irremovable implicit collective and personal knowledge, always making cognitive decisions in conditions of incomplete certainty, scientific communications with the hope of adequate understanding, expert opinions and scientific consensus. However, if on

How to Non-Verbally Distinguish Sensing from Intuition

The main difference between sensory (S) and intuitive (I) is the extent to which they are present in the world of real objects. The sensory type is always present in the real world, and regardless of anything, his consciousness fixes everything that concerns objects or his sensations. The intuitive usually resides in some other world, and his consciousness, accordingly, is only partially present in the real world. In general, it is very easy to distinguish the intuitive from the sensory just by this absence. The intuitive perception of the real world of objects and things is extremely schematic. The intuitive, entering the room, may notice that somewhere there is a table. At the same time, a certain abstract table, without shape, size, color, etc., will be fixed in his mind. (naturally, if someone for some reason does not specifically pay attention to the intuitive on this table and its corresponding characteristics, in the future, I will not repeat this every time) Accordingly, in the future, such an abstract perception of objects manifests itself in the fact that that the intuitive, going somewhere, immersed in his thoughts, can easily enter this very table or stumble out of nowhere, a chair that has come from nowhere or other furnishings that are not in the abstract scheme of the intuitive or not at all. The intuitive tends to overlook objects. The intuitive can take off his clothes and immediately forget about it, especially if something distracted his attention, switching his consciousness to his usual intuitive state. An intuitive person can pass by a person and not remember either how he looks or what he was wearing (again, the fact of the presence of a person, the fact that a person has clothes is fixed - all other insignificant and insignificant details, such as color, firm, type of clothing, hairstyle, etc. details are omitted, passing by consciousness) The intuitive may not notice changes in the situation in his apartment or the apartment of his friends (once he has already fixed the scheme, plus, he knows that the situation usually does not change, respectively , attention is not drawn to this) Naturally, this manifests itself in the fact that the intuitive easily touches objects, knocking them down with his hands, feet, hitting his head against them, and producing other destruction.

Sensory, of course, this is not typical. Even if the sensory one forgets some details, his consciousness nevertheless captures everything perfectly, and will not allow the body to crash into tables and chairs, will not allow not to notice the appearance of new objects in the environment. Unlike the intuitive one, in which only an abstract picture is fixed in the mind, in which only the names are fixed, the sensory picture is just filled with details, often so detailed and detailed that they make it easy to restore everything to the smallest detail.

Now, in fact, about non-verbal manifestations:

Gait.
The sensory gait is a glance. Sensory foot movements at every moment of time, at every point of the trajectory is filled. If the intuitive gait is exactly as abstract as everything else, i.e. a certain program is set - now the leg is at point A, it is necessary to move it to point B. What will happen there along the way is already unknown. Accordingly, the leg along the trajectory, as it were, is not controlled at all, which outwardly may look like some kind of uncertainty: it is not clear what will happen to the leg in the next moment. The leg is, as it were, suspended in the air, and something pulls it, even against its will. The sensory control by the consciousness of this very leg goes on constantly. The gait is usually confident, the impression that the leg does not know where it will stand or what will happen to it in the next moment, of course, does not arise. Sensory gaits suggest that there is some kind of core in their body, intuitive gaits resemble as if a clothes hanger is moving. In sensory gaits, the whole body is always involved, both arms and legs move, and the body participates in movement, while all this is harmonious, seamless, in a single movement, which, again, does not create doubts that it is completely controlled. The gaits of the intuitive may resemble either something that is dragged forward by the legs. The arms and legs may move uncoordinated. Hands can just hang out like that, as if suspended. The body can lag behind or vice versa, ahead of the legs. An extreme case of sensory gait is the gait of fashion models on the catwalk. An extreme case of the intuitive gait is the Pierre Richard gait. Try to pay attention to how your friends move in space, and perhaps it will become clearer (easier to show than explain)

Landings.
The intuitive, sitting down, fixes only the fact that under him there is something that you can sit on. It can easily be mistaken with an estimate of the height, this is something, and as a result, flop down without calculating (even sit by). Sitting intuitive, you definitely need to support your body somehow. In general, the body, as it were, is not under the roof, and it must somehow be attached so that it does not interfere. At the same time, it is precisely this impression from the side of the sensory landing that they produce, as if the sack was laid on a chair or placed in an armchair. And somehow this something fell apart in the place where they put it. Landing touch, again, is completely controllable. This is a movement in which there can be no mistake. Sitting down, the sensory continues to control his body, he knows exactly where to sit and how to position himself in a chair or chair. No cool impression. The sensory chair, as it were, fills the chair with itself, and unlike the intuitive one, the landing of which resembles as if something was somehow plopped down, not really caring how it will lie there, there will be no doubt in the landing of the sensory one that the sensory one has chosen such position that is most comfortable for him.

Rack.
Similarly, when the intuitive is standing, there may be a feeling that he will fall at all, or at any moment the support may disappear from under him. His body may resemble, as if something hanging, or vice versa, something very unstable, which is held only by the legs. The touch pad is extremely stable. Again, the whole body is one. The feeling that something is placed on the legs in no case arises, on the contrary, it is clear that the whole body is a single whole. The intuitive always strives to lean on something, sit down, lean against something. Sensory (especially some kind of Zhukov) can give the impression of a monolith that has been dug into the ground. It is curious how sensory and intuitive are located in space, especially in a group. Intuitives can somehow huddle together, start pushing, it is not clear to them how best to place themselves. Sensory ones control the space around them very well. If you put 10 people in a row, it is very likely that 3 sensory people will take up as much space as 7 intuitive ones. Intuitives do not seem to control their space, in terms of placing themselves in it. They easily sacrifice it, or even feel uncomfortable if there is too much of it around them when everyone else is crowded. The intuitives also have such strange problems as where to put their hands, where to stand, etc.

Handling of objects.
Touchscreens are very confident with objects. They can easily take a chair and put it where they see fit. Move things on the table (not even your own), straighten the collar of someone you don't know, pat on the shoulder, etc. The Intuitive handles objects with extreme care. Most likely, the intuitive will sit on a chair where this very chair stands, or will not sit at all, leaning on something. The intuitive may experience some inner reluctance to do anything with the things on the table, believing that it should be left as it is. The intuitive is unlikely to pat on the shoulder of his acquaintances, as well as straighten their clothes. If the sensory behavior demonstrates, as it were, power over objects, and the freedom to manifest oneself towards these objects, then the intuitive one, on the contrary, even demonstrates some uncertainty and lack of freedom to manifest oneself towards objects. The intuitive prefers not to change anything about what an object is, leaving it as it is and sacrificing its own convenience rather than doing anything to the object. The touch does not experience any fear of things. When buying, for example, clothes, he will not just take it and measure it, but examine it from all sides, try to turn up the sleeves, I don’t know, do something with it and see how it will look. It is clear that sensory ones know how and love to work with objects, things, giving them the state that they consider necessary (repair something, disassemble, and then assemble, hem clothes, sew, etc.) Intuitive, again, they do so in a very insecure and reluctant manner.

In summary: it is usually very easy to tell if a person is intuitive or sensory just by looking at how they walk, how they stand, how they sit. The main thing to pay attention to is how a person controls his body, whether it is under his control, or whether his consciousness is somewhere out there, in incomprehensible distances, where the intuitives spend most of their time, leaving the body to itself. In general, intuitiveness is non-verbally manifested in the absence of sensory.

The main distinguishing features of science

Intuitively, it seems clear how science differs from other forms of human cognitive activity. However, a clear explication of the specific features of science in the form of signs and definitions turns out to be a rather difficult task. This is evidenced by the variety of definitions of science, the ongoing discussions on the problem of demarcation between it and other forms of knowledge.

An activity can be considered as a complexly organized network of various acts of transformation of objects, when the products of one activity pass into another and become its components. For example, iron ore as a product of mining production becomes an object that is transformed into the activities of a steelmaker, machine tools produced at a plant from steel mined by a steelmaker become means of activity in another production. Even the subjects of activity - people who transform objects in accordance with the goals set, can to a certain extent be represented as the results of training and education, which ensures that the subject acquires the necessary patterns of actions, knowledge and skills of using certain means in the activity.

Structural characteristics of an elementary act of activity can be represented as the following scheme:

The right side of this scheme depicts the subject structure of activity - the interaction of funds with the subject of activity and its transformation into a product due to the implementation of certain operations. The left part represents the subject structure, which includes the subject of activity (with its goals, values, knowledge of operations and skills) that performs expedient actions and uses certain means of activity for this purpose. Means and actions can be attributed to both objective and subjective structures, since they can be considered in two ways. On the one hand, the means can be presented as artificial organs of human activity. On the other hand, they can be considered as natural objects that interact with other objects. In a similar way, operations can be presented in various ways both as human actions and as natural interactions of objects.

Activities are always governed by certain values and goals. Value answers the question: "what is this or that activity for?" The goal is to answer the question: "what should be obtained in the activity." The goal is the ideal image of the product. It is embodied, objectified in the product, which is the result of the transformation of the subject of activity.

Since activity is universal, the function of its objects can be not only fragments of nature that are transformed in practice, but also people whose “properties” change when they are included in various social subsystems, as well as these subsystems themselves, interacting within society as an integral organism. Then, in the first case, we are dealing with the "objective side" of man's change in nature, and in the second case, with the "objective side" of practice aimed at changing social objects. From this point of view, a person can act both as a subject and as an object of practical action.

At the early stages of the development of society, the subjective and objective aspects of practical activity are not dissected in cognition, but are taken as a single whole. Cognition reflects the ways of practical change of objects, including in the characteristics of the latter the goals, abilities and actions of a person. Such an idea of the objects of activity is transferred to the whole nature, which is viewed through the prism of the practice being carried out.

It is known, for example, that in the myths of ancient peoples, the forces of nature are always likened to human forces, and its processes - to human actions. Primitive thinking, in explaining the phenomena of the external world, invariably resorts to their comparison with human actions and motives. Only in the process of the long evolution of society does knowledge begin to exclude anthropomorphic factors from the characterization of objective relations. An important role in this process was played by the historical development of practice, and above all by the improvement of means and tools of labor.

As the tools became more complex, those operations that were previously directly performed by man began to "reify", acting as a sequential action of one tool on another and only then on the object being transformed. Thus, the properties and states of objects that arise due to these operations ceased to seem caused by the direct efforts of man, but more and more acted as the result of the interaction of the natural objects themselves. So, if in the early stages of civilization the movement of goods required muscular effort, then with the invention of the lever and block, and then the simplest machines, it was possible to replace these efforts with mechanical ones. For example, using a block system, it was possible to balance a large load with a small one, and by adding a small weight to a small load, raise a large load to the desired height. Here, to lift a heavy body, no human effort is needed: one load independently moves the other.

With regard to the processes of transformation of nature, this function is performed by the natural and technical sciences. The processes of change in social objects are studied by the social sciences. Since a variety of objects can be transformed in activity - objects of nature, a person (and the state of his consciousness), subsystems of society, iconic objects that function as cultural phenomena, etc. - all of them can become subjects of scientific research.

The orientation of science towards the study of objects that can be included in activity (either actual or potentially as possible objects of its future transformation), and their study as obeying the objective laws of functioning and development, constitutes the first main feature of scientific knowledge.

This feature distinguishes it from other forms of human cognitive activity. Thus, for example, in the process of artistic assimilation of reality, objects included in human activity are not separated from subjective factors, but are taken in a kind of "gluing" with them. Any reflection of objects of the objective world in art at the same time expresses the value attitude of a person to an object. An artistic image is such a reflection of an object that contains the imprint of a human personality, its value orientations, which are fused into the characteristics of the reflected reality. To exclude this interpenetration means to destroy the artistic image. In science, the features of the life of a person who creates knowledge, its value judgments are not directly part of the generated knowledge (Newton's laws do not allow one to judge what Newton loved and hated, while, for example, Rembrandt's personality is depicted in Rembrandt's portraits, his worldview and his personal attitude to the depicted social phenomena; a portrait painted by a great artist always acts as a self-portrait).

The process of scientific knowledge is determined not only by the characteristics of the object under study, but also by numerous factors of a sociocultural nature.

Science in human activity singles out only its objective structure and examines everything through the prism of this structure. As King Midas from the famous ancient legend - whatever he touched, everything turned into gold - so science, whatever it touches, is for it an object that lives, functions and develops according to objective laws.

Here the question immediately arises: well, what then to be with the subject of activity, with his goals, values, states of his consciousness? All this belongs to the components of the subjective structure of activity, but science is capable of investigating these components too, because there are no prohibitions for it to study any really existing phenomena. The answer to these questions is quite simple: yes, science can explore any phenomena of human life and consciousness, it can explore activity, the human psyche, and culture, but only from one point of view - as special objects that obey objective laws. Science also studies the subjective structure of activity, but as a special object. And where science cannot construct an object and represent its "natural life" determined by its essential connections, then its claims end. Thus, science can study everything in the human world, but from a special angle and from a special point of view. This special perspective of objectivity expresses both the infinity and limitations of science, since a person as an independent, conscious being has free will, and he is not only an object, he is also a subject of activity. And in this his subjective being, not all states can be exhausted by scientific knowledge, even if we assume that such a comprehensive scientific knowledge about a person, his life activity can be obtained.

Studying objects that are transformed into activities, science is not limited to the knowledge of only those subject relations that can be mastered within the framework of the types of activities that have historically developed at a given stage in the development of society. The purpose of science is to foresee possible future changes in objects, including those that would correspond to future types and forms of practical change in the world.

The focus of science on the study of not only objects that are transformed in today's practice, but also those that can become the subject of mass practical development in the future, is the second distinguishing feature of scientific knowledge. This feature makes it possible to distinguish between scientific and everyday, spontaneous-empirical knowledge and to derive a number of specific definitions that characterize the nature of science.

Scientific and everyday knowledge

The desire to study the objects of the real world and, on this basis, to foresee the results of its practical transformation is characteristic not only of science, but also of ordinary knowledge, which is woven into practice and develops on its basis. As the development of practice objectifies human functions in tools and creates conditions for the elimination of subjective and anthropomorphic layers in the study of external objects, certain types of knowledge about reality appear in ordinary cognition, in general, similar to those that characterize science.

The embryonic forms of scientific knowledge arose in the depths and on the basis of these types of ordinary knowledge, and then spun off from it (the science of the era of the first urban civilizations of antiquity). With the development of science and its transformation into one of the most important values of civilization, its way of thinking begins to exert an ever more active influence on everyday consciousness. This influence develops the elements of an objectively objective reflection of the world contained in everyday, spontaneous-empirical knowledge.

The ability of spontaneous-empirical knowledge to generate substantive and objective knowledge about the world raises the question of the difference between it and scientific research. The characteristics that distinguish science from ordinary knowledge can be conveniently classified according to the categorical scheme in which the structure of activity is characterized (tracing the difference between science and ordinary knowledge in terms of subject, means, product, methods and subject of activity).

The fact that science provides ultra-long-term forecasting of practice, going beyond the existing stereotypes of production and ordinary experience, means that it deals with a special set of objects of reality that are not reducible to objects of ordinary experience. If everyday knowledge reflects only those objects that, in principle, can be transformed in the available historically established methods and types of practical action, then science is also capable of studying such fragments of reality that can become the subject of development only in the practice of the distant future. It constantly goes beyond the subject structures of existing types and methods of practical development of the world and opens up new objective worlds for humanity of its possible future activity.

These features of the objects of science make the means that are used in everyday knowledge insufficient for their development. Although science uses natural language, it cannot describe and study its objects only on its basis. Firstly, ordinary language is adapted to describe and foresee the objects woven into the actual practice of man (science goes beyond its scope); secondly, the concepts of ordinary language are fuzzy and ambiguous, their exact meaning is most often found only in the context of linguistic communication controlled by everyday experience. Science, on the other hand, cannot rely on such control, since it mainly deals with objects that are not mastered in everyday practical activity. To describe the phenomena under study, it seeks to fix its concepts and definitions as clearly as possible.

The development by science of a special language suitable for describing objects that are unusual from the point of view of common sense is a necessary condition for scientific research. The language of science is constantly evolving as it penetrates into ever new areas of the objective world. Moreover, it has the opposite effect on everyday, natural language. For example, the terms "electricity", "refrigerator" were once specific scientific concepts, and then entered everyday language.

Along with an artificial, specialized language, scientific research needs a special system of special tools that, by directly influencing the object under study, make it possible to identify its possible states under conditions controlled by the subject. The tools used in production and everyday life are, as a rule, unsuitable for this purpose, since the objects studied by science and the objects transformed in production and everyday practice most often differ in their nature. Hence the need for special scientific equipment (measuring instruments, instrumental installations), which allow science to experimentally study new types of objects.

Scientific equipment and the language of science act as an expression of already acquired knowledge. But just as in practice its products turn into means of new types of practical activity, so in scientific research its products - scientific knowledge, expressed in language or embodied in devices, become a means of further research.

Thus, from the peculiarities of the subject of science, we obtained, as a kind of consequence, differences in the means of scientific and everyday knowledge.

The specifics of the objects of scientific research can further explain the main differences between scientific knowledge as a product of scientific activity and knowledge obtained in the sphere of ordinary, spontaneous-empirical knowledge. The latter are most often not systematized; rather, it is a conglomerate of information, prescriptions, recipes for activity and behavior accumulated over the course of the historical development of everyday experience. Their reliability is established due to the direct application in cash situations of production and everyday practice. As for scientific knowledge, its reliability can no longer be substantiated only in this way, since in science, objects that have not yet been mastered in production are predominantly investigated. Therefore, specific ways of substantiating the truth of knowledge are needed. They are experimental control over the acquired knowledge and the derivation of some knowledge from others, the truth of which has already been proven. In turn, derivability procedures ensure the transfer of truth from one fragment of knowledge to another, due to which they become interconnected, organized into a system.

Thus, we obtain the characteristics of consistency and validity of scientific knowledge, which distinguish it from the products of everyday cognitive activity of people.

From the main characteristic of scientific research, one can also deduce such a distinctive feature of science when compared with ordinary knowledge, as a feature of the method of cognitive activity. The objects to which everyday knowledge is directed are formed in everyday practice. The devices by which each such object is singled out and fixed as an object of knowledge are woven into everyday experience. The totality of such techniques, as a rule, is not recognized by the subject as a method of cognition. The situation is different in scientific research. Here, the very discovery of the object, the properties of which are subject to further study, is a very laborious task. For example, in order to detect short-lived particles - resonances, modern physics performs experiments on the scattering of particle beams and then applies complex calculations. Ordinary particles leave traces-tracks in photographic emulsions or in a cloud chamber, but resonances do not leave such tracks. They live for a very short time (10-22 s) and during this period of time they cover a distance smaller than the size of an atom. Because of this, resonance cannot cause ionization of photoemulsion molecules (or gas in a cloud chamber) and leave an observed trace. However, when the resonance decays, the resulting particles are capable of leaving traces of the indicated type. In the photograph, they look like a set of rays-dashes emanating from one center. By the nature of these rays, using mathematical calculations, the physicist determines the presence of resonance. Thus, in order to deal with the same type of resonances, the researcher needs to know the conditions under which the corresponding object appears. He must clearly define the method by which a particle can be detected in an experiment. Outside of the method, he will not at all single out the object under study from the numerous connections and relations of objects of nature. To fix an object, a scientist must know the methods of such fixation. Therefore, in science, the study of objects, the identification of their properties and relationships is always accompanied by an awareness of the method by which the object is studied. Objects are always given to a person in the system of certain techniques and methods of his activity. But these techniques in science are no longer obvious, they are not repeatedly repeated techniques in everyday practice. And the further science moves away from the usual things of everyday experience, delving into the study of "unusual" objects, the more clearly and distinctly the need for the creation and development of special methods is manifested, in the system of which science can study objects. Along with knowledge about objects, science forms knowledge about methods. The need to expand and systematize knowledge of the second type leads at the highest stages of the development of science to the formation of methodology as a special branch of scientific research, designed to purposefully direct scientific research.

Finally, the desire of science to study objects relatively independently of their assimilation in the available forms of production and everyday experience presupposes specific characteristics of the subject of scientific activity. Engaging in science requires special training of the cognizing subject, during which he masters the historically established means of scientific research, learns the techniques and methods of operating with these means. For everyday knowledge, such training is not necessary, or rather, it is carried out automatically, in the process of socialization of the individual, when his thinking is formed and develops in the process of communicating with culture and including the individual in various fields of activity. The pursuit of science implies, along with the mastery of means and methods, the assimilation of a certain system of value orientations and goals specific to scientific knowledge. These orientations should stimulate scientific research aimed at studying more and more new objects, regardless of the current practical effect of the knowledge gained. Otherwise, science will not fulfill its main function - to go beyond the subject structures of the practice of its era, expanding the horizons of the possibilities of mastering the objective world by man.

Two basic attitudes of science provide the desire for such a search: the intrinsic value of truth and the value of novelty.

Any scientist accepts the search for truth as one of the main principles of scientific activity, perceiving truth as the highest value of science. This attitude is embodied in a number of ideals and norms of scientific knowledge, expressing its specificity: in certain ideals of the organization of knowledge (for example, the requirement of logical consistency of the theory and its experimental confirmation), in the search for an explanation of phenomena based on laws and principles that reflect the essential connections of the objects under study, etc.

An equally important role in scientific research is played by the focus on the constant growth of knowledge and the special value of novelty in science. This attitude is expressed in the system of ideals and normative principles of scientific creativity (for example, the prohibition of plagiarism, the permissibility of a critical review of the foundations of scientific research as a condition for the development of ever new types of objects, etc.).

The value orientations of science form the foundation of its ethos, which a scientist must master in order to successfully engage in research. Great scientists left a significant mark on culture not only because of the discoveries they made, but also because their work was a model of innovation and service to the truth for many generations of people. Any deviation from the truth for the sake of personal, selfish goals, any manifestation of unscrupulousness in science met with an unquestioning rebuff from them.

In science, the principle is proclaimed as an ideal that in the face of truth all researchers are equal, that no past merit is taken into account when it comes to scientific evidence.

At the beginning of the century, a little-known employee of the patent bureau A. Einstein discussed with the famous scientist G. Lorentz, proving the validity of his interpretation of the transformations introduced by Lorentz. Ultimately, it was Einstein who won the argument. But Lorentz and his colleagues never resorted in this discussion to the methods widely used in the disputes of everyday life - they did not argue, for example, that it was unacceptable to criticize Lorentz's theory on the grounds that his status at that time was incommensurable with the status not yet known to the scientific community. young physicist Einstein.

An equally important principle of scientific ethos is the requirement of scientific honesty in the presentation of research results. A scientist can make mistakes, but has no right to rig results, he can repeat a discovery already made, but has no right to plagiarize. The institution of references, as a prerequisite for the design of a scientific monograph and article, is intended not only to fix the authorship of certain ideas and scientific texts. It provides a clear selection of already known in science and new results. Outside of this selection, there would be no incentive to intense search for the new, endless repetitions of the past would arise in science, and, ultimately, its main quality would be undermined - to constantly generate the growth of new knowledge, going beyond the usual and already known ideas about the world.

Of course, the requirement of the inadmissibility of falsifications and plagiarism acts as a kind of presumption of science, which in real life can be violated. Different scientific communities may impose different severity of sanctions for violating the ethical principles of science.

Consider one example from the life of modern science, which can serve as an example of the intransigence of the community to violations of these principles.

In the mid-1970s, the so-called case of Gallis, a young and promising biochemist who worked on the problem of intracerebral morphine in the early 1970s, gained notoriety among biochemists and neurophysiologists. He put forward an original hypothesis that plant-derived morphines and intracerebral morphines have the same effect on nervous tissue. Gallis conducted a series of laborious experiments, but was unable to convincingly confirm this hypothesis, although indirect evidence testified to its promise. Fearing that other researchers would overtake him and make this discovery, Gallis decided to falsify. He published fictitious experimental data, allegedly confirming the hypothesis.

Gallis' "discovery" aroused great interest in the community of neurophysiologists and biochemists. However, no one could confirm his results by reproducing experiments according to the method he published. Then the young and already well-known scientist was invited to publicly conduct experiments at a special symposium in 1977 in Munich, under the supervision of his colleagues. Gallis was eventually forced to confess to the falsification. The scientific community reacted to this recognition with a hard boycott. Colleagues of Gallis ceased to maintain scientific contacts with him, all of his co-authors publicly refused to joint articles with him, and as a result, Gallis published a letter in which he apologized to his colleagues and announced that he was stopping his studies in science.

Ideally, the scientific community should always reject researchers who are found to be intentionally plagiarizing or deliberately falsifying scientific results for the sake of some worldly good. The communities of mathematicians and natural scientists are closest to this ideal, but for the humanities, for example, since they are under much greater pressure from ideological and political structures, the sanctions for researchers who deviate from the ideals of scientific integrity are significantly relaxed.

It is indicative that for everyday consciousness the observance of the basic principles of scientific ethos is not at all necessary, and sometimes even undesirable. A person who told a political joke in an unfamiliar company does not have to refer to the source of information, especially if he lives in a totalitarian society.

In everyday life, people exchange a wide variety of knowledge, share everyday experience, but references to the author of this experience in most situations are simply impossible, because this experience is anonymous and often broadcast in culture for centuries.

The presence of science-specific norms and goals of cognitive activity, as well as specific means and methods that ensure the comprehension of ever new objects, requires the purposeful formation of scientific specialists. This need leads to the emergence of an "academic component of science" - special organizations and institutions that provide training for scientific personnel.

In the process of such training, future researchers should learn not only special knowledge, techniques and methods of scientific work, but also the main value orientations of science, its ethical norms and principles.

So, when elucidating the nature of scientific knowledge, one can single out a system of distinguishing features of science, among which the main ones are: a) setting for the study of the laws of transformation of objects and realizing this setting, the objectivity and objectivity of scientific knowledge; b) science going beyond the subject structures of production and everyday experience and studying objects relatively independently of today's possibilities for their production development (scientific knowledge always refers to a wide class of practical situations of the present and future, which is never predetermined). All other necessary features that distinguish science from other forms of cognitive activity can be represented as depending on these main characteristics and due to them.

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