The territory of the Caucasus, located between the Black, Azov and Caspian Seas, covered with alpine massifs and inhabited by numerous peoples, has attracted the attention of various conquerors since ancient times. The Romans were the first to penetrate there back in the second century BC, and after the collapse of the Roman Empire, the Byzantines came. It was they who spread Christianity among some peoples of the Caucasus.

By the beginning of the eighth century, Transcaucasia was occupied by the Arabs, who brought Islam to its population and began to oust Christianity. The presence of two hostile religions sharply exacerbated centuries of pre-existing tribal strife, caused numerous wars and conflicts. In a fierce bloody battle, at the behest of foreign politicians, some states appeared on the territory of the Caucasus and others disappeared, cities and villages were built and destroyed, gardens and vineyards were planted and cut down, people were born and died ...

In the thirteenth century, the Caucasus was subjected to a devastating invasion of the Mongol-Tatars, whose dominion in its northern part was established for centuries. Three centuries later, Transcaucasia became the scene of a fierce struggle between Turkey and Persia, which lasted for three hundred years.

Since the second half of the 16th century, interest in the Caucasus has also been shown by Russia. This was facilitated by the spontaneous advance of the Russians to the south in the steppe, which marked the beginning of the formation of the Don and Terek Cossacks, the entry of a part of the Cossacks into the Moscow frontier and city service. According to available data, already in the first half of the 16th century, the first Cossack villages appeared on the Don and in the upper reaches of the Sunzha, the Cossacks participated in the protection and defense of the southern borders of the Muscovite state.

The Livonian War at the end of the 16th century and the Time of Troubles and other events of the 17th century diverted the attention of the Moscow government from the Caucasus. However, the conquest of the Astrakhan Khanate by Russia and the creation of a large military-administrative center in the lower reaches of the Volga in the middle of the 17th century contributed to the creation of a springboard for the Russian offensive in the Caucasus along the coast of the Caspian Sea, where the main "silk" routes from the North to the Middle East and India passed.

During the Caspian campaign of Peter I in 1722, Russian troops captured the entire Dagestan coast, including the city of Derbent. True, Russia failed to keep these territories in the following decades.

At the end of the 18th century, first the rulers of Kabarda, and then the Georgian king, turned to Russia for help and with a proposal to take their possessions under their protection. In many respects, this was facilitated by the skillful actions of the Russian troops on the coast of the Caspian Sea, their capture of Anapa in 1791, the annexation of the Crimea and the victory of the Russian army over the Turks in the second half of the 18th century.

In general, several stages can be distinguished in the process of Russia's conquest of the Caucasus.

1 First stage

At the first stage, from the end of the 16th century to the end of the 18th century, there was a process of creating bridgeheads for Russia's offensive in the Caucasus. The beginning of this process was laid by the formation and strengthening of the Terek Cossack army, its acceptance into military service by the Russian Empire. But already within the framework of this process, large-scale armed conflicts took place between the Cossacks and Chechens in the North Caucasus. So, on the eve of the Bulavin uprising in 1707, there was a big Chechen uprising associated with the then unfolding anti-government movement in Bashkiria. Characteristically, the Terek Cossacks-schismatics then joined the Chechens.

The rebels took and burned the city of Terki, and then were defeated by the Astrakhan governor Apraksin. The next time the Chechens revolted in 1785 under the leadership of Sheikh Mansur. Extremely characteristic of these two actions of the Chechens is a pronounced religious coloring of the movement. The uprisings unfold under the slogan of ghazavat (holy war against the infidels). A feature during the second uprising of the Chechens was also an association with the Kumyks and Kabardians, and in Kabarda, princes also opposed Russia at that time. The Kumikh nobility, on the other hand, took a vacillating position and was ready to join the one who turned out to be stronger. The beginning of the strengthening of Russia in Kabarda was laid by the foundation in 1780 of the fortifications of the Azov-Mozdok line (Konstantinovsky fortification in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bpresent Pyatigorsk and Kislovodsk fortifications).

2 Second stage

At the second stage, from the end of the 18th century to the first decade of the 19th century, Russia conquered part of the lands in Transcaucasia. This conquest is carried out in the form of campaigns on the territory of the Caucasian state formations and the Russian-Persian (1804-1813) and Russian-Turkish (1806-1812) wars. In 1801 Georgia was annexed to Russia. Then the accession of the southern and eastern khanates began. In 1803, the rulers of Mingrelia, Imeretia and Guria took the oath of allegiance to Russia. In parallel with the conquest of new lands, a struggle was waged aimed at suppressing the anti-Russian actions of their peoples.

3 Third stage

At the third stage, which lasted from 1816 to 1829, an attempt was made by the Russian administration to conquer all the tribes of the Caucasus, to subordinate them to the power of the Russian governor. One of the governors of the Caucasus of this period, General Alexei Yermolov, said: “The Caucasus is a huge fortress, defended by a half-million garrison. We must storm it or take possession of the trenches. He himself spoke in favor of a siege, which he combined with an offensive. This period is characterized by the emergence of a strong anti-Russian movement (muridism) among the peoples of the North Caucasus and Dagestan and the emergence of leaders of this movement (sheikhs). In addition, the events in the Caucasus unfolded within the framework of the Russian-Persian war (1826-1928) and the Russian-Turkish war (1828-1829)

4 Fourth stage

At the fourth stage, from 1830 to 1859, the main efforts of Russia were concentrated in the North Caucasus to fight against Muridism and the Imamate. This period can be conditionally considered the heyday of the military art of the Russian troops in the special conditions of the mountainous terrain. They ended with the victory of Russian weapons and Russian diplomacy. In 1859, the powerful Imam of Chechnya and Dagestan, Shamil, ceased resistance and surrendered to the Russian commander. The Eastern (Crimean) War of 1853-1855 was an essential background for the events of this period.

5 Fifth stage

At the fifth stage, from 1859 to 1864, the conquest of the Western Caucasus by the Russian Empire was carried out. At that time, the mass migration of highlanders from the mountains to the plains and the forced relocation of highlanders to Turkey were practiced. The captured lands were settled by the Kuban and Black Sea Cossacks.

6 Stage six

At the sixth stage, which lasted from 1864 to 1917, the government of the Russian Empire tried by all means to normalize the situation in the Caucasus, to make this region an ordinary province of a huge state. All levers of pressure were put into play: political, economic, religious, military, police, legal, subjective, and others. In general, these activities have yielded positive results. At the same time, the Russian-Turkish war of 1877–1878. revealed great hidden contradictions between the Russian authorities and the mountain peoples of the North Caucasus, which sometimes resulted in open military resistance.

Thus, the Caucasian problem was for more than a hundred years one of the most urgent problems of the Russian Empire. The government tried to solve it through diplomatic and economic means, but these ways often turned out to be ineffective. More effectively, the problem of conquering and pacifying the Caucasus was solved with the help of military force. But even this path brought most often only temporary successes.

7 Seventh stage

The seventh was the period of the First World War, when the south of the Caucasus for the umpteenth time turned into a zone of active military and diplomatic game between Russia, Turkey and Persia. As a result of this struggle, Russia emerged victorious, but she could no longer take advantage of the fruits of this victory.

8 Stage eight

The eighth stage was associated with the events of the Civil War of 1918–1922. The collapse of the Russian Caucasian front in late 1917 - early 1918. turned into a tragedy not only for the Russian army, but also for the local population. In a short time, Transcaucasia was occupied by the Turks and turned into an arena of terrible genocide against the indigenous population. The civil war in the North Caucasus was also extremely cruel and protracted.

The establishment of Soviet power in the Caucasus did not solve the problems of the region, especially the North Caucasus. Therefore, it is legitimate to consider the period of the Great Patriotic War as the ninth stage in the history of the Caucasus, when the fighting reached the foothills of the Greater Caucasus Range. For political reasons, the Soviet government in 1943 evicted a number of Caucasian peoples to other regions of the country. This only angered the Muslim highlanders, which affected the Russian population after their return during the Khrushchev “thaw”.

The collapse of the Soviet Union gave impetus to new actions of the peoples of the Caucasus and opened the tenth page of its history. Three independent states were formed in Transcaucasia, which get along little with each other. In the North Caucasus, which remained under the jurisdiction of Russia, active actions began against Moscow. This led to the beginning of the First Chechen War, and then the Second Chechen War. In 2008, a new armed conflict arose on the territory of South Ossetia.

Experts believe that Caucasian history has deep and branched roots, which are very difficult to identify and trace. The Caucasus has always been in the sphere of interests of big international politics and domestic politics of the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation. Separate Caucasian state formations (republics) and their rulers have always sought to play their own personal political game. As a result, the Caucasus turned into a huge intricate labyrinth, from which it turned out to be very difficult to find a way out.

For many years Russia tried to solve the Caucasian problem in its own way. She tried to study this region, its people, customs. But this turned out to be very difficult. The peoples of the Caucasus have never been united. Often, villages located several kilometers apart, but separated by a ridge, gorge or mountain river, did not communicate with each other for decades, adhering to their own laws and customs.

Researchers and historians know that without knowing and taking into account all the factors and features, it is impossible to correctly understand the past, evaluate the present, and predict the future. But instead of identifying, studying and analyzing all the accompanying factors in the formation of the history of the Caucasus region, first by the Russian Empire, then the USSR and finally the Russian Federation, attempts were often made to cut down the roots of what seemed to be a weed. These attempts in practice were very painful, bloody and not always successful.

Russian politicians also approached the solution of the Caucasian problem with an "axe" in the 90s of the XX century. Ignoring the centuries-old historical experience, relying only on strength, they did not take into account many objective factors, as a result of which they opened one of the most painful wounds on the body of the state, quite dangerous for the life of the whole organism. And only after taking such a rash step, they began to talk about other ways to solve the problem ...

For more than fifteen years, the “Caucasian syndrome” has existed in the minds of the Russian people, considering this once beautiful region as a theater of endless military operations, and its population as potential enemies and criminals, many of whose representatives live in all cities of Russia. Hundreds of thousands of "refugees" from the once fertile land flooded our cities, "privatized" industrial facilities, retail outlets, markets ... It's no secret that today in Russia the vast majority of people from the Caucasus live much better than the Russians themselves, and high in the mountains and deaf villages, new generations of people are growing up who are hostile in Russia.

The Caucasian labyrinth has not been completed to the end even today. There is no way out of it in a war that only brings ruin and sets people against each other. There is no way out in interethnic hostility, which turns people into ferocious animals, acting not on the basis of reason, but obeying instincts. It is impossible to solve the Caucasian problem in the same way as it was solved in 1943, when many peoples were forcibly evicted from their native places to a foreign land.

Some researchers believe that the main reason for the bleeding wound in the Caucasus lies in the virus that is deeply embedded in the brains of some politicians, and the name of this virus is power and money. Combining these two terrible forces, you can always put pressure on a sore spot in the form of economic, territorial, religious, cultural or other problems of any region. As long as this virus is alive, it will not be possible to heal the wound; as long as this wound is open, the virus will always find a favorable environment for itself, which means that a way out of the Caucasian labyrinth will not be found for a long time.

Historians can't agree on a start date Caucasian wars just as politicians cannot agree on an end date. The name itself Caucasian war "is so wide that it allows you to make shocking statements about its allegedly 400-year-old or one and a half century history. It is even surprising that the starting point from Svyatoslav's campaigns against the Yases and Kasogs in the 10th century or from Russian naval raids on Derbent has not yet been adopted. in the ninth century (1) However, even if we discard all these apparently ideological attempts at "periodization", the number of opinions is very large. That is why many historians now say that there were actually several Caucasian wars . They were conducted in different years, in different regions of the North Caucasus: in Chechnya, Dagestan, Kabarda, Adygea, etc. (2). It is difficult to call them Russian-Caucasian, since the highlanders participated from both sides. However, the point of view that has become traditional for the period from 1817 (the beginning of an active aggressive policy in the North Caucasus sent there by General A.P. Yermolov) to 1864 (the capitulation of the mountain tribes of the North-Western Caucasus) retains its right to exist hostilities that engulfed most of the North Caucasus. It was then that the question of the actual, and not just the formal entry of the North Caucasus into the Russian Empire was decided. Perhaps, for a better understanding, it is worth speaking of this period as the Great Caucasian war .

Geopolitical situation

Two rivers - running to the west, to the Black Sea, Kuban and striving to the east, to the Caspian, Terek - like two arches of surprised eyebrows over the mountain ranges of the North Caucasus. Along these rivers at the end of the 18th century there was a border line Russia . It was guarded by the Cossacks who settled here since the 16th century. (according to other sources from the XIII-XIV centuries. Approx. RUSFACT .RU), reinforced by several fortresses (such as Kizlyar - from 1735, Mozdok - from 1763) and fortifications. The established border (the so-called Caucasian ) the line did not much resemble at that time the lines of impassable "control and trace strips" familiar to everyday consciousness. It was much more like a "frontier" between Indians and settlers in North America. Modern historians call such a border a "contact zone" because it did not so much separate as it connected two different civilizations. Cultural contacts, including the emerging family ties, created over the centuries not a gap, but rather a seam between cultures and civilizations. But in addition to social history, there was also a political situation that affected the interests of powerful states: the Ottoman Empire, Persia and, especially since the 18th century, the Russian Empire.
Several peace treaties that crowned the Russian-Turkish and Russian-Persian wars late 18th - early 19th centuries clarify the international legal situation in the region. According to the Gulistan peace treaty of 1813, which settled Russian-Persian relations, "the shah forever recognized Russia Dagestan, Georgia, the khanates of Karabakh, Ganzhinsk (Elisavetpol province), Sheki, Shirvan, Derbent, Cuban, Baku,: a significant part of the Talyshinsky khanate "(3). Moreover, by this time the rulers of the North-Eastern Caucasus themselves recognized the dominion Russia . Most recently, for the first time in 183 years, documents were published on the entry into citizenship in 1807 Russia and Chechens (4) (some Chechen societies began to accept Russian citizenship as early as the 18th century) (5). The last Russian-Persian war 1826-1828 did not lead to a change in the international status of the North-Eastern Caucasus. The rulers of Dagestan received Russian military ranks (up to generals) and a financial allowance from the emperor (up to several thousand rubles a year). It was understood that their service would consist not only in participation in hostilities Russia but also in maintaining law and order in the territories subject to them.
The Ottoman Empire dominated the Northwestern Caucasus for a long time. arrangement Russia and Turkey, concluded at the end of the 18th century, implied the obligation of the Sultan of Turkey "to use all the power and means to curb and restrain the peoples on the left bank of the Kuban River, living at its borders, so that they do not repair raids on the borders of the All-Russian Empire" (6). The peace of Adrianople in 1829 transferred the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus (south of the mouth of the Kuban) to the dominion of the Russian emperor. This meant the legal accession of the peoples of the North-Western Caucasus to the Russian Empire. We can say that by 1829 there was a formal annexation of the North Caucasus to the Russian Empire. However, at the same time, it is necessary to emphasize the word formal, bearing in mind the characteristic situation of "mutual misunderstanding" that existed then between the Russian government and the highlanders. When accepting any obligations regarding Russia mountain rulers were guided not by the principles of European international law ("pacta sunt servanda" - "treaties must be respected"), but by the principles of Muslim law. Its norms were that "any international treaty concluded with an infidel state may be violated by the ruler of a Muslim state if this violation benefits that state" and that "an oath against an infidel is not binding on a Muslim" (7). In addition, many highlanders and mountain communities did not feel like subjects of their feudal rulers and recognized their supremacy "by the right of the strong." For them, it was generally not clear why they needed to change their way of life in connection with someone else's contracts. The subordination of Circassia to the Russian Tsar was explained by the highlanders according to the logic they understood. “It’s strange,” they reasoned, “why should the Russians need our mountains, in our small land? They probably have nowhere to live:” (8) As the historian general N.F. the peculiarities of the life of the highlanders "led to many mistakes that had adverse and serious consequences" (9).
Dmitry OLEINIKOV, Candidate of Historical Sciences
http://www.istrodina.com/rodina_articul.php3?id=111&n=7

Caucasus under Yermolov (1816-1827)

Lieutenant General Alexei Petrovich Ermolov

At the beginning of the 19th century part Russia included Georgia (1801-1810) and Northern Azerbaijan (1803-1813). But Transcaucasia was separated from the main territory Russia Caucasian mountains inhabited by warlike mountain peoples who raided the lands that recognized the power Russia , and interfered with relations with Transcaucasia. After graduation wars with Napoleonic France, the government of Alexander I Pavlovich was able to intensify its actions in the Caucasus, concentrating significant military resources there. In 1816 commander in chief Caucasian General A.P. Ermolov was appointed by forces - resolute, cruel towards the enemy and popular among the troops.

He proposed a plan for the conquest of the mountainous Caucasus, which provided for the abandonment of the tactics of punitive expeditions in favor of a regular siege of mountainous regions by cutting wide clearings in the forests, laying roads and creating defensive lines from outposts and fortresses. The villages of recalcitrant peoples were to be destroyed, burned to the ground, and the population was to be resettled on the plain under the supervision of Russian troops. There were two centers of resistance to the power of the Russian tsar in the Caucasus: in the east - Chechnya and Mountainous Dagestan, in the west - Abkhazians and Circassians. In the center Caucasian mountains lived loyal Russia peoples - Ossetians and Ingush.

In 1817, the advance of the left flank began. Caucasian line from the Terek to the Sunzha, in the middle reaches of which the fortress Barrier Stan was founded in October 1817 - this event was actually the beginning Caucasian wars . In 1818, the Groznaya fortress was founded in the lower reaches of the Sunzha. The fortresses Vnepnaya (1819) and Burnaya (1821) became a continuation of the Sunzhenskaya line. In 1819, the Separate Georgian Corps was reinforced to 50 thousand people and renamed the Separate Caucasian frame; the 40,000th Black Sea Cossack army, which defended Caucasian line from the mouth of the Kuban to the river Laba.

In 1819 a number of hostile Russia Chechen and Dagestan tribes attacked the Sunzha line. A stubborn struggle continued until 1821. The highlanders were defeated; part of the possessions of the mountain feudal lords was liquidated, part was divided among the vassals Russia . The resistance of the mountain peoples, most of whom professed Islam, tried to use Muslim Persia and Turkey, who fought with Russia in 1826-1828 and in 1828-1829, but were defeated. As a result of these wars Russia strengthened its position in Transcaucasia, Turkey recognized the right Russia on the Black Sea coast from the mouth of the Kuban to the fortress of St. Nicholas - the northern border of Adjara. The largest uprising in Chechnya during these years was the uprising in Chechnya, which broke out in July 1825. The highlanders, led by Bei Bulat, captured the post of Amaradzhiyurt, tried to take the fortresses of Gerzel and Groznaya. However, in 1826 the Bey-Bulat uprising was crushed. The construction of the Sukhum Military Road led to the annexation of the Karachaev region in 1828. By the end of the 1820s, Yermolov managed to pacify and subjugate almost the entire Caucasus, with the exception of the most inaccessible areas.

Formation of the Imamate (1827-1834)

With the accession of Nicholas I, Yermolov, popular among the troops, was taken under secret supervision and in March 1827 was replaced by General I.F. Paskevich. New Commander of the Separate Caucasian corps abandoned Yermolov's strategy of systematic advance deep into the mountains with the consolidation of occupied territories and returned to the tactics of punitive campaigns. Nevertheless, it was under Paskevich in 1830 that the Lezghin line was created, covering North-Eastern Georgia from the raids of the highlanders.

In the late 1820s, among the peoples of Dagestan and the Chechens, the religious doctrine of muridism became widespread, which called for the creation of a theocratic state - the imamate. An integral part of Muridism was jihad - the sacred war against the infidels. Muridism caused expansion Caucasian wars , although not all caucasian peoples joined this movement: some because of their Christianization (Ossetians), others because of the weak influence of Islam (Kumyks, Kabardians). Some mountaineers occupied pro-Russian positions (Ingush, Avars) and were hostile to the Murids.

In December 1828, Gazi-Magomed (Kazi-mullah) was proclaimed an imam - the first head of a military-theocratic state. He put forward the idea of ​​uniting the peoples of Chechnya and Dagestan in order to fight the infidels. Some of the Dagestan rulers (Khan of Avar, Shamkhal of Tarkovsky) did not recognize the power of the imam. During the hostilities of 1831-1832, Gazi-Magomed, with close murids, was surrounded in the village of Gimrakh, where he died on October 17, 1832, when the village was taken by Russian troops (commander-in-chief since September 1831 - General G.V. Rosen).

The second imam, Gamzat-bek, after a series of military successes, attracted all the peoples of Mountainous Dagestan, even part of the Avars, under his banner, but the ruler of Avaria, Khansha Pahu-bike, remained faithful Russia . In August 1834, Gamzat-bek took Khunzakh, the capital of Avaria, and slaughtered the entire family of the Avar khans. But Gamzat-bek himself fell victim to the conspiracy of his henchmen on September 19, 1834.

Fight with Shamil (1834-1853)

Shamil was proclaimed the third imam in 1834. The beginning of his reign began with the defeat of the Russian troops in Avaria. Believing that the Murid movement was suppressed, Rosen did not take any active steps for two years. During this time, Shamil, having settled in the village of Akhulgo, subjugated some of the elders and rulers of Chechnya and Dagestan to his power.

The expedition of General K. K. Fezi against Shamil ended in failure: due to heavy losses and lack of food, on July 3, 1837, he had to conclude a truce with Shamil. This truce and the withdrawal of troops from Mountainous Dagestan inspired the mountain peoples and raised Shamil's authority. Strengthening his power, he mercilessly cracked down on the recalcitrant. In 1837-1839, the Russians laid a whole series of new fortifications in the Caucasus. Hostilities resumed in 1839. General P. Kh. Grabbe captured Akhulgo after an 80-day siege, but the wounded Shamil escaped to Chechnya.

The commander of the troops in the Caucasus (since March 1839), General E. A. Golovin, partly returned to Yermolov’s tactics: he built fortifications and laid lines (the Black Sea Coastal, Labinsk), but military operations under him went with varying success. In February-April 1840, an uprising broke out among the Circassians, who captured the fortifications of the Black Sea coastline.

("... The events associated with the foundation and protection of the strongholds of the Black Sea coastline are perhaps the most dramatic in the history of the Caucasian wars . There is no land road along the entire coast yet. The supply of food, ammunition and other things was carried out only by sea, and in the autumn-winter period, during storms and storms, it is practically non-existent. The garrisons, from the Black Sea line battalions, remained in the same places throughout the entire existence of the "line", in fact, without a change and, as it were, on the islands. On the one hand the sea, on the other - the highlanders on the surrounding heights. It was not the Russian army that held back the highlanders, but they, the highlanders, kept the garrisons of fortifications under siege. Yet the biggest scourge was the damp Black Sea climate, diseases and, above all, malaria. Here is just one fact: in 1845, 18 people were killed along the entire "line", and 2427 died of diseases.

At the beginning of 1840, a terrible famine broke out in the mountains, forcing the mountaineers to look for food in Russian fortifications. In February-March, they raid a number of forts and capture them, completely destroying the few garrisons. Almost 11 thousand people took part in the assault on Fort Mikhailovsky. Private of the Tenginsky Regiment Arkhip Osipov blows up a powder magazine and dies himself, dragging another 3,000 Circassians with him. On the Black Sea coast, near Gelendzhik, there is now a resort town - Arkhipovoosipovka ... "http://www.ricolor.org/history/voen/bitv/xix/26_11_09/)

In the Eastern Caucasus, an attempt by the Russian administration to disarm the Chechens sparked a new uprising that engulfed Chechnya and part of Dagestan. At the cost of enormous efforts, the Russians managed to defeat the Chechens in the battle on the Valerik River on July 11, 1840 (described by M. Yu. Lermontov). Russian troops occupied Chechnya, pushing the rebels back to Northwestern Dagestan, where they joined Shamil's detachments. In the battles of 1840-1843, military happiness leaned in favor of Shamil: he occupied Avaria, doubled the territory subject to him and increased the number of his detachments to 20 thousand people.

The new Russian commander, General M. S. Vorontsov, having received significant reinforcements, in 1845 managed to capture the village of Dargo - the residence of Shamil. But the highlanders surrounded Vorontsov's detachment, which barely managed to escape - he lost up to a third of his personnel, convoy and artillery. Having been defeated, Vorontsov switched to Yermolov's siege tactics: firmly securing the occupied territories with a system of fortresses and outposts, he carefully advanced higher and higher into the mountains. Shamil undertook separate offensive operations, but they were not successful. In 1851, an uprising of the Circassians led by Mohammed-Emin, Shamil's governor, was suppressed in the Northwestern Caucasus. In the spring of 1853, Shamil was forced to leave Chechnya for Mountainous Dagestan, his situation became extremely difficult.

Crimean war and the defeat of Shamil (1853-1859)

With the beginning of the Crimean wars the jihad of the Muslim highlanders received a new impetus. In the west of the Caucasus, the activity of the Circassians increased. Although they refused to recognize themselves as subjects of the Sultan, they constantly attacked the Russian fortifications. In 1854 the Turks tried to go on the offensive against Tiflis. At the same time, the murids of Shamil (15 thousand people) broke through the Lezgin line and occupied the village of Tsinandali, 60 km northeast of Tiflis. Only with the help of the Georgian militia did the Russians succeed in driving Shamil back to Dagestan. The defeat of the Turkish army in Transcaucasia in 1854-1855 deprived the Murids of hopes for outside support.

By this time, the crisis of the imamate, which began in the late 1840s, deepened. The despotic power of the naibs (deputies of the imam) aroused the indignation of the highlanders, an increasing number of whom were burdened by the need to lead a long and fruitless war . The weakening of the imamate was facilitated by the ruin of the mountainous regions, large human and economic losses. The new commander and governor of the Caucasus, General N. N. Muravyov, offered the mountaineers the terms of a truce: independence under a protectorate Russia and a trade agreement - and in 1855 hostilities practically ceased.

The conclusion of the Peace of Paris in 1856 allowed Alexander II to transfer additional forces to the Caucasus. Separate Caucasian the corps was transformed into an army of 200 thousand people. Its commander, General A. I. Baryatinsky, continued to tighten the blockade ring against the imamate. In 1857, the Russians began operations to oust the Murids from Chechnya. In February 1858, a detachment of General N. I. Evdokimov besieged the center of resistance of the highlanders in Chechnya, the village of Vedeno, and on April 1, 1858 captured it. Shamil with 400 murids fled to Dagestan. But as a result of the concentric offensive of three Russian detachments, the Dagestan village of Gunib, the last residence of Shamil, was surrounded. On August 25, 1859, Gunib was taken by storm, almost all the Murids were killed, and Shamil himself surrendered.

Conquest of the Circassians and Abkhazians (1859-1864)

After the pacification of Chechnya and Dagestan, the highlanders of the North-Western Caucasus continued to resist the Russians. But already in November 1859, the main forces of the Circassians (up to 2 thousand people) capitulated, led by Mohammed-Emin. The lands of the Circassians were cut by the Belorechenskaya line with the Maykop fortress. During 1859-1861, the construction of clearings, roads and the settlement of lands taken from the highlanders were carried out here.

In the middle of 1862 the resistance of the Circassians intensified. For the final occupation of the territory remaining with the highlanders with a population of about 200 thousand people, 60 thousand soldiers were concentrated under the command of General N. I. Evdokimov. Pushed back to the sea or driven into the mountains, the Circassians and Abkhazians were forced to move to the plains under the supervision of the Russian authorities or emigrate to Turkey. In total, up to half a million Circassians and Abkhazians left the Caucasus.

By 1864, the Russian authorities had established firm control over Abkhazia, and on April 21, 1864, a detachment of General Evdokimov occupied the last center of resistance of the Circassian Ubykh tribe - the Kbaadu tract (now Krasnaya Polyana) in the upper reaches of the Mzymta River. This day is considered to be the last day

You should not think that the North Caucasus independently decided to ask Russia for citizenship, and without any problems became part of it. The cause and effect of the fact that today Chechnya, Dagestan and others belong to the Russian Federation was the Caucasian War of 1817, which lasted about 50 years and was completed only in 1864.

The main causes of the Caucasian war

Many modern historians call the desire of the Russian Emperor Alexander I to annex the Caucasus to the territory of the country as the main prerequisite for the start of the war. However, if you look at the situation more deeply, this intention was caused by fears for the future of the southern borders of the Russian Empire.

After all, for many centuries such strong rivals as Persia and Turkey looked with envy at the Caucasus. To allow them to extend their influence over and seize it meant a constant threat to their own country. That is why military confrontation was the only way to solve the problem.

Akhulgo in translation from the Avar language means "Nabatnaya mountain". There were two villages on the mountain - Old and New Akhulgo. The siege by Russian troops, led by General Grabbe, continued for a long 80 days (from June 12 to August 22, 1839). The purpose of this military operation was to blockade and take the headquarters of the imam. The village was stormed 5 times, after the third assault conditions of surrender were offered, but Shamil did not agree to them. After the fifth assault, the village fell, but people did not want to give up, they fought to the last drop of blood.

The battle was terrible, women took an active part in it with weapons in their hands, children threw stones at the attackers, they had no thought of mercy, they preferred death to captivity. Huge losses were suffered by both sides. Only a few dozen companions, led by the imam, managed to escape from the village.

Shamil was wounded, in this battle he lost one of his wives and their infant son, and the eldest son was taken hostage. Akhulgo was completely destroyed and to this day the village has not been rebuilt. After this battle, the highlanders briefly began to doubt the victory of Imam Shamil, since the aul was considered an unshakable fortress, but despite its fall, the resistance continued for about 20 more years.

From the second half of the 1850s, Petersburg intensified its actions in an effort to break the resistance, generals Baryatinsky and Muravyov managed to encircle Shamil with his army. Finally, in September 1859, the imam surrendered. In St. Petersburg, he met with Emperor Alexander II, and then was settled in Kaluga. In 1866, Shamil, already an elderly man, accepted Russian citizenship there and received hereditary nobility.

Results and results of the campaign of 1817-1864

The conquest of the southern territories by Russia took about 50 years. It was one of the most protracted wars in the country. The history of the Caucasian war of 1817-1864 was long, researchers are still studying documents, collecting information and compiling a chronicle of hostilities.

Despite the duration, it ended in victory for Russia. The Caucasus accepted Russian citizenship, and Turkey and Persia were no longer able to influence local rulers and incite them to confusion. Results of the Caucasian War of 1817-1864. well known. It:

• consolidation of Russia in the Caucasus;
• strengthening of the southern borders;
• elimination of mountain raids on Slavic settlements;
• opportunity to influence Middle East politics.

Another important result can be considered a gradual merging of the Caucasian and Slavic cultures. Despite the fact that each of them has its own characteristics, today the Caucasian spiritual heritage has firmly entered the general cultural environment of Russia. And today Russian people live peacefully side by side with the indigenous population of the Caucasus.

Accession of the Caucasus to Russia

The beginning of Russia's movement towards the Caucasus dates back to the early period of the history of the Russian state, by the time of the reign of Svyatoslav, that is, by the end of the 10th century. Having defeated the Khazars, whose possessions at that time extended to many parts of the Caucasus and the southeastern steppes of the present-day European part of Russia, Svyatoslav reached the yases and slopes that lived along the foothills of the Caucasus east of the Sea of ​​Azov, defeated them and, thus, brought the Russian border to the Kuban itself, where the Russian principality of Tmutarakan later appears. But then, in the specific period, Russia was far removed from the shores of the Sea of ​​\u200b\u200bAzov. The beginning of Russia's relations with the Caucasus dates back to the end of the 15th century.

Random photos of the Caucasus

For the first time, active action on the part of Russia in relation to the Caucasus manifested itself under Peter I. In an effort to open a trade route to India, for which it was necessary to become the owner of the Caspian Sea, Peter undertook a campaign in 1722-1723. and conquered the Caspian provinces. However, Russia's attack on the mountainous Caucasus caused the formation of a movement of murids, fighters for the faith, among the mountaineers-Muslims. Under the leadership of the leader - the imam - the murids waged a holy war against the infidels (Christians) - ghazavat. In 1834, Shamil was proclaimed imam, who created a strong theocratic state in Dagestan and Chechnya. In 1830-1840. Shamil managed to win a number of victories over the Russian troops. However, the severity of the internal order in the state of Shamil, the cruel oppression of the close associates of the imam gradually decomposed the imamate from the inside. In 1859, Shamil's troops were finally defeated, and he himself was taken prisoner. The main stages of Russia's advance to the Caucasus.

The first stage, which began in the middle of the 16th century, continued until the end of the 17th century and was a period of peaceful colonization of the region. It is characterized by vassal-allied forms of relations between the Moscow tsars and the elders of the Chechen communities. Moscow tried to expand its influence in the region, mainly through political and trade and economic means. This policy was successful and the Chechen communities voluntarily (through the conclusion of agreements) declared their recognition of the supreme power of the Moscow state.

The second stage, which lasted almost the entire 18th century, marks the beginning of Russia's open military expansion into the North Caucasus. In the era of the reign of Peter I, and then Catherine II, the doctrine of military colonization of mountain lands dominates. And although in 1781 the voluntary submission of the Chechen communities of Russia bordering with Russian fortresses was formalized by oaths, in 1785 a powerful national movement began in Chechnya under the leadership of Sheikh Mansur. From this moment the armed struggle of the Chechen people for freedom and independence begins. From here originates the Chechen national movement. From the end of the XVIII century. Sheikh Mansur was the first to attempt to unite the North Caucasian peoples under the banner of Islam into a single state. However, Sheikh Mansour failed to fully realize this idea.

The anti-colonial movement of the highlanders, which began in Chechnya, also covered some other regions of the North Caucasus. It was attended mainly by the social ranks of the highlanders. The wealthy strata of the mountain peoples at first tried to use the anti-colonial movement of the peasants in the interests of consolidating their power in the mountain communities, as well as to restore the lost positions of freedom of choice in relations with Moscow. But soon, frightened by the growth of the anti-feudal orientation of Sheikh Mansur's movement, the highlanders not only moved away from him, but in a number of cases, together with the Russian troops, took part in pacifying the rebellious peasants. The first imam of the highlanders of the North Caucasus waged war with the tsarist troops for about six years, but was defeated. Sheikh Mansur was captured in 1791 and died in the Shlisselburg fortress.

The third stage falls on the first half of the nineteenth century. With the appointment of General A.P. Yermolov (1816-1827) as commander of the Russian army in the Caucasus, the systematic advance of Russian troops deep into the territory of Chechnya begins, military pressure intensifies. In response, a national movement is growing in Chechnya. For more than 30 years it has been headed by Beibulat Teimiev. He managed to unite the majority of Chechen societies for the first time. He also tried to unite the mountain peoples by concluding an alliance of free Chechnya with the feudal principalities of the North Caucasus. Beybulat Teimiev was a supporter of the peaceful resolution of the conflict and sought to avoid a major war with Russia. His treacherous assassination contributed to the escalation of hostilities.

Imam Shamil managed in 1834 to complete what Sheikh Mansur had begun: to unite part of the mountaineers of the North Caucasus in the struggle against Tsarist Russia and create an imamate - a secular-religious state that was able to resist the then strongest military power in the world for 27 years.

In 1859, Shamil was defeated and became an honorary prisoner of Emperor Alexander II. He and his relatives were favored by the king and renounced the ideals of the Caucasian war. Chechnya was in the grip of the tsarist military administration. Instead of the promised autonomy in internal affairs, the Chechens received a colonial regime. They were pushed back to the foothills and mountainous regions. By agreement with Turkey, tsarism began the voluntary-compulsory resettlement of Chechens to the Ottoman Empire. As a result, the tsarist authorities got rid of a significant part of the population. The Chechens responded to the policy of seizures, deportations, violence with uprisings. Tsarism tried to solve the problem by force. However, the violence only provoked new uprisings. And then the so-called military-people's administration was introduced in Chechnya, in other words, the military-occupation regime.

Analyzing the causes of the Caucasian War, it should be noted that it was the result not only of the military expansion of tsarism, but also of internal strife in the Caucasus, the struggle of local elites for power and influence in mountain societies. Aggressive ethno-nationalism and religious extremism in Chechnya have always been opposed by pro-Russian forces that supported the idea of ​​creating a secular, democratic state and traditional Islam. In addition, the national movements, uprisings, revolutions and wars in the Caucasus were based on socio-economic reasons: the backwardness and poverty of the majority of the population of the region, given to the persecution of the corrupt colonial administration and local bureaucracy.

In general, the history of Russian-Caucasian relations during this period testifies not to a war of peoples and their cultures, but to a confrontation at the level of elite interests, which did not always coincide with the interests of the nation. Undoubtedly, there was an element of intercivilizational conflict at the heart of the confrontation between Chechnya and Russia, but it was not dominant. The Chechen national movement often had a religious shell. However, the idea of ​​preserving and developing an ethnic group has always prevailed over the idea of ​​religious wars. Violence, gross interference in the traditional way of life of the highlanders - that's what pushed them to war with Russia. The same thing happened in the modern Chechen war. By launching large-scale military operations against the civilian population, Moscow provoked mass resistance of the Chechens to the federal troops and gave rise to aggressive separatism (nationalism). But this time, only part of the Chechen population took part in the armed struggle. Most Chechens were against the war with Russia. Just as at one time there were Chechen communities that fought against Imam Shamil, so now there were those who deliberately opposed Dudayev. But it was during the Caucasian War that the ideology of Chechen militant ethno-nationalism was born. Modern Chechen separatists rely on it, rejecting the idea of ​​an alliance between Chechnya and democratic Russia, deleting peaceful constructive periods of development of Russian-Chechen relations from history.

Fourth stage. During the period when Chechnya was a part of Russia (the second half of the 19th century), tsarism pursued a policy of carrots and sticks. State-minded representatives of the tsarist administration realized that the problem of the highlanders could not be solved by violence. In the 70-90s. there is a weakening of the police regime, a pro-Russian Chechen elite is being formed. The first Russian schools for highlanders are being created. The region is gradually drawn into the economic system of Russian capitalism. Oil production and refining began in Grozny, a railway was being laid, and a national bourgeoisie was being formed. It was during this period (the years of the reign of the reformer Tsar Alexander II) that Chechnya nominated such spiritual leaders as Kunta-Khadzhi, Soltsa-Khadzhi, Deni-Sheikh Arsanov, Bammat-Girey Mitaev, Ali Mitaev, Sugaip-Mulla - carriers of the ideas traditional for Chechnya ( Sufi) Islam. During this period, favorable conditions developed for the peaceful resolution of national problems within the framework of the liberalization of the Russian political system towards the formation of a constitutional monarchy. The elite layers of the Chechen society, despite the relapses of ethnocide against the Chechens and Ingush, tried to fit into Russian society and thereby enable their people to enjoy the fruits of Russian culture. It is noteworthy that Chechnya, after joining Russia, took an active part in almost all of its wars. And this despite the fact that the Chechens were exempted from military service. Chechen and Ingush volunteer soldiers became famous in the Russian-Turkish (1877-1878), Russian-Japanese, Russian-German wars. In this regard, the assessment by the Russian Emperor Nicholas II of the actions of the Ingush and Chechen regiments during the period of the Brusilov breakthrough on the Russian-German front (1915) is interesting. In a telegram to the Governor-General of the Terek region, Nicholas II wrote: Like a mountain avalanche, the Ingush regiment fell on the German Iron Division. He was immediately supported by a Chechen regiment. In the history of the Russian fatherland, including our Preobrazhensky regiment, there was no case of an attack by cavalry of an enemy unit armed with heavy artillery: 4.5 thousand killed, 3.5 thousand captured, 2.5 thousand wounded, in less than an hour and a half it stopped to exist an iron division, with which the best military units of our allies were afraid to come into contact. On my behalf, on behalf of the royal court, on behalf of the entire Russian army, fraternal cordial greetings to the fathers, mothers, sisters, wives and brides of these brave eagles of the Caucasus, who put an end to the German hordes with their fearless feat. Russia will never forget this feat, honor and praise to them. With brotherly greetings, Nicholas II. August 25, 1915. The Chechen regiment was part of the so-called Wild Division, created on the initiative of the younger brother of Nicholas II - Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich. During the First World War, the regiment fought on the South-Eastern Front of the Russian army, commanded by General Alexei Brusilov. The Chechens distinguished themselves not only in the famous "Brusilov breakthrough" of the Austro-German defense, but also in battles in Galicia and the Carpathians, in crossings across the Dniester and Prut, in battles near Polyanchik, Rybnya, Tyshkovets, Stanislavov, in the area of ​​the Lomnice River and other operations. The desperate sorties and heroic attacks of the “eagles of the Caucasus” were duly appreciated by the command of the Russian army - monthly from 40 to 150 officers and horsemen of the Chechen regiment were awarded military orders, medals, honorary weapons, received new titles for bravery in battles. On the awards that were presented to non-Christian subjects, the images of Christian saints (St. George, St. Vladimir, St. Anna, etc.) were replaced by the state emblem of the Russian Empire - a double-headed eagle.

Since the beginning of the 20th century, tsarism has been relying on violence in relations with the mountain peoples. In response, the national movement of the Chechens takes on the form of abrechestvo. (abrek - robber, public defender). During the period of three Russian revolutions, Russian social democracy had a noticeable influence on Chechen society. Soon socialism becomes an ideology competing with Islam among part of the intelligentsia. Public figures - T. Eldarkhanov, A. Sheripov, and others were engaged in educational work, the rise of national consciousness. The fifth stage of relations covers the Soviet era. During the years of revolutions and civil war (1917 to 1925), anarchy and anarchy dominated in Chechnya. The national movement split and failed to consolidate society. It identified three areas: state nationalism, focused on the Soviets (communists); ethnically oriented democratic nationalism oriented towards the West; radical nationalism oriented towards Islam and pan-Turkism. An attempt to create a theocratic state (the emirate of Sheikh Uzun-Haji) was not crowned with success. Ultimately, most of the population made a choice in favor of the Soviet government, which promised freedom, equality, land, and statehood.

During the class clashes of the 1920s, Grozny repeatedly changed hands. In March 1918 The Terek Soviet Republic was created. The Mountain ASSR was proclaimed in January 1921. Since November 1922, the Chechen Autonomous Region of the RSFSR existed for some time. And on January 15, 1934, the Chechen and Ingush Autonomous Regions were transformed into the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. The years of the Civil War left in Chechen history names that are kept by the grateful people's memory: participants in the hundred-day defense of Grozny, defenders of the village of Goity ... And a monument on Friendship of Peoples Square in Grozny - Chechen Aslanbek Sheripov, Russian Nikolai Gikalo, Ingush Gapur Akhriev - they fought together. According to the five-year plans before the Great Patriotic War, a lot was done for the reconstruction of Chechnya's industry and the development of culture. Thus, literacy rose from 0.8% in 1920 to 85% in 1940. The history of all scientific institutions also began during this period: the GrozNII was founded in 1928, the Institute of History, Sociology and Philology in 1926.

The industry of the CHI ASSR and all the people of the republic worked with great effort during the war years for the needs of the front. Chechens fought both in the army and in partisan detachments. Thousands of them were awarded orders and medals. 36 people became Heroes of the Soviet Union. The Transcaucasian Federation is a Soviet form, a state form of the union of the peoples of Transcaucasia in 1922-36. Domestic and foreign policy of Azerbaijan, SSR, Armenia, Georgia. SSR after the civil war and military intervention in 1918-20. dictated the need for their economic and military-political unification in the struggle against the hostile actions of the imperialists and the remnants of custom-made counterrevolution, for the restoration of the economy, the elimination of interethnic distrust and enmity, became clear as a result of the 3-year rule of the Musavatists, Dashnaks and Georgians.

The idea of ​​unification was put forward by V. I. Lenin on March 12, 1922. in Tbilisi, a plenipotentiary conference of representatives of the CEC of Azerbaijan. SSR, the Central Executive Committee approved the agreement on the creation of the Federative Union of the Socialist Soviet Republics of Transcaucasia. [FSSSRZ] its highest authority was recognized by the Plenipotentiary Conference of representatives elected in equal numbers by the governments of the republics, and the Union Council elected by the conference as the united executive bodies. On December 13, 1922, the first Transcaucasian Congress of Soviets in (Baku) transformed the FSSSR into a single Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic [TSFSR], while maintaining the independence of its constituent republics. The congress approved the Constitution of the TSFSR, formed the Transcaucasian Central Executive Committee and was responsible to the united Council of People's Commissars of the TSFSR. The creation of the Transcaucasian Federation was opposed by the Georgians, the national deviationists. Their position did not receive support from the working people and were condemned by communist organizations. Transcaucasia On December 30, 1922, the TSFSR united with the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR and the BSSR to form the Union of the SSR. According to the USSR constitution of 1936, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia became part of the USSR as an independent union republic.

In the history of the peoples of the USSR. The imamat is the state of the Murids in Dagestan and Chechnya, which arose in the late 20s of the 19th century during the struggle of the peoples of the Caucasus against the colonial policy of tsarism. The Imamat received a particularly vivid expression during the reign of Shamil (1834-1859). The Imamat of Shamil was a state that covered its purely secular goals with religion under the shell of muridism: strengthening the class domination of the Dagestan and Chechen feudal lords who led the fight against the tsarist troops. The imamat relied on militarized murids - the closest environment of the imamate and the apparatus of power on the locals. By the beginning of the 1950s, the internal crisis of the Imamat deepened and the contradiction between the peasants, who began to move away from Shamil's movement, escalated.

Accession of the Caucasus to Russia

The accession of the Caucasus to Russia had a variety of meanings. First, there was the elimination of the military-strategic danger, the liquidation of bridgeheads from which incursions into Russian territory proper were made or could be made at any moment. Secondly, these wars had a clear shade of revenge for the suffering and destruction once caused by the horde, which created a favorable psychological climate in the Russian troops. Thirdly, very tempting lands for colonization were included in the state. And fourthly, the need to ensure the security of Russia's Asian trade. Already at the beginning of the XIX century. Russia's top leadership began to show its political, economic and military-strategic interests in the Caucasus more and more clearly. Large and tempting prospects were opened by the possession of the Caucasian coast of the Black and Caspian Seas. Having such rivals as Iran and Turkey, encouraged by England and France, and behind its back - recalcitrant and warlike Caucasian highlanders, the Russian government was forced to act in Transcaucasia with great caution . Territorial acquisitions here were the result not only of military operations, but also of the voluntary transfer of local rulers to Russian citizenship.

In 1801-1804. East Georgia, Mingrelia, Guria and Imeretia voluntarily joined Russia. At the same time, most of the possessions located on the Caucasian coast of Dagestan and Transcaucasia were annexed to Russia by peaceful means: the Sheki, Karabakh, Shirvan khanates and the Shuragel sultanate. At the beginning of 1806 Russian troops entered Baku.

The Iranian Khan Abbas-Mirza made an attempt to stop the advance of the Russians in the Caucasus region, but was defeated on the Araks River in October 1812. According to the peace treaty signed in October 1813, the entry into Russia of Dagestan, Georgia, Imereti, Guria was finally secured , Mingrelia and Abkhazia, as well as Karabakh, Der-bent, Cuban, Baku and a number of other khanates. Russia has achieved the exclusive right to have a navy in the Caspian Sea. Russian merchants were now free to trade in Iran. A year earlier, Turkey, under the Bukhara Peace Treaty, recognized the right of Russia to all the Caucasian lands that voluntarily became part of it. In 1826-1827. Iranian Khan Abbas-Mirza again tried to stop the advance of the Russians in the Caucasus, but was again defeated. According to the Turkmanchay peace treaty (February 1828), the Erivan and Nakhichevan khanates of Armenia became part of Russia. The Turkmanchay (Russia-Iran, 1828) and Adrianople (Russia-Turkey, 1829) peace treaties finally secured the annexation of Transcaucasia to Russia.

The military actions of the Russian troops in the North Caucasus in 1817-1864 were aimed at joining these territories to the Russian Empire, received the name "Caucasian War" in historiography. According to the plan approved by Emperor Alexander I, General A.P. Yermolov, the gradual advance of Russian troops to the south of the Caucasus and the suppression of the resistance of the mountaineers was supposed. The first step on this path was the transfer of the fortified line from the Terek River to the Sunzha River. In 1817, the construction of the Sunzhinsk line of defense began.

The plan was based on the tactics of building strategic points through which it was possible to enter the fertile valleys. The highlanders were pushed back to areas where without arable land and winter pastures it was impossible to maintain an economy and provide the population with food. The government resettled the highlanders from high-mountain villages to the valleys, mobilized the population for the construction of roads and bridges. During this period, the fortresses Groznaya (1818), Vnezapnaya (1819), Burnaya (1821) were built, which became the main strongholds of Russian troops in Dagestan. In response to the actions of the Russian command, the Dagestan and Chechen rulers attacked the Sunzhinskaya line, but were defeated (1819-1821). Their lands were confiscated and transferred to the pro-Russian nobility, many Chechen and Dagestan villages were devastated. An attempt to suppress the liberation movement that had begun by military force caused a powerful surge of uprisings in Kabarda (1821-1826), Adygea (1821-1826) and Chechnya (1825-1826).

They were suppressed by special punitive detachments. Soon, disparate clashes escalated into a war that engulfed the Northwestern Caucasus, Dagestan, Chechnya and lasted almost 50 years. The freedom movement was complex. It intertwined general dissatisfaction with the arbitrariness of the tsarist administration, the infringed national pride of the highlanders, the struggle of the political elite for power, the fear of the Muslim clergy of religious oppression by the Christian government of Russia, and other motives. The government of Nicholas I chose a more flexible tactic for conquering the Caucasus. General I.F. Paskevich, who replaced Yermolov in 1827, abandoned the idea of ​​a “quick war” and concentrated his efforts on strengthening Russian positions in the Caucasus. In 1828, the Sukhum Military Road was built, linking Kabarda and Abkhazia, in 1830, the Lezgin fortified line was built, separating Kakhetia from Dagestan. At the same time, fortified points were erected on the Black Sea coast.

In the course of the Caucasian War, several stages can be distinguished: 1817 - the beginning of the 1820s, when Russian troops met the resistance of individual detachments of the highlanders and easily suppressed them; from the 20s there is a unification of mountain Muslims into a single state under the banner of "muridism". Muridism (or obedience) preached the spiritual perfection of Muslims. He demanded from the novices the complete submission of the will to the spiritual mentor. Under the conditions of the national-religious war (ghazavat), this resulted in the unquestioning obedience of the murids to the imam.

In the late 1820s - early 1830s. in Chechnya and Mountainous Dagestan, a single military-theocratic state was formed - the imamat. All administrative, military, judicial and spiritual power in it was concentrated in the hands of the imam. The only law that ruled the murids was Sharia law - a set of religious and ethical prescriptions. Arabic was recognized as the state language.

In 1828, Gazi-Magomed became the first imam to lead the "holy war". He proclaimed the unification of the Muslim peoples of Chechnya and Dagestan in the face of Christian expansion. However, Gazi-Magomed failed to subdue all the leaders of the mountain detachments. So, the Avar Khan refused to recognize his authority. In 1830, the imam besieged the capital of Avaria, Khunzakh, but did not succeed.

After that, the main actions of the imam focused on the elimination of Russian detachments and fortresses. In 1831, Gazi-Magomed with a 10,000-strong army took Tarki, laid siege to the fortresses of Burnaya and Vnepnaya, then the fighting unfolded on the outskirts of the fortresses of Vladikavkaz and Groznaya. The Russian troops succeeded in pushing the Imam's troops back to Mountain Dagestan. In 1832, a punitive expedition led by General G.V. Rosen was launched against Gazi-Magomed. She managed to surround the imam in the village of Gimry. Gazi-Magomed himself died in battle. His successor, Gamzat-bek, continued Ghazavat. He completed the defeat of the Avar khans. In 1834, he managed to capture Khunzakh and destroy the khan's family. But he himself fell victim to bloody revenge.

Shamil (1799-1871) was proclaimed the new imam in the same year. He was a well-educated man. Under him, the struggle of the highlanders gained the widest scope. However, the Muslim nobility did not immediately recognize the power of the new imam. It took several years to strengthen Shamil's positions, to eliminate rivals "For 25 years he ruled over the highlanders of Dagestan and Chechnya. Under him, the Imamat was divided into districts, headed by naibs. A disciplined, trained army of 10-15 thousand people was created.

With them, Shamil left the accident deep into Dagestan. In the center of the mountain range of the North-Eastern Caucasus in the village of Akhulgo, the residence of the imam was arranged. The Russian command decided that the movement of the highlanders was basically suppressed and limited to separate punitive expeditions. Shamil, on the other hand, used the respite to consolidate his power and rally the highlanders for further struggle. In 1836 rebel groups of Dagestanis and Chechens joined him. At the same time, the imam made an attempt to establish contact with foreign powers and obtain financial and diplomatic support from them.

At first, England actively responded to the proposal, trying to control the situation in the Caucasus. But in 1836, the Russian government intercepted an English schooner with weapons on board off the Black Sea coast, and London hastened to extinguish the political scandal with a promise not to interfere in the Caucasian conflict. Military operations in the Caucasus resumed in 1837. But the offensive of Russian troops against Dagestan was not successful. Therefore, after the armistice (during which Shamil accepted Russian citizenship and handed over the hostages), the tsarist government returned to the tried and tested tactics of building fortified fortresses, mountain roads, and resettling mountain villages.

However, a year later, in 1839, Shamil raised an uprising. To suppress it, two detachments were sent: one to South Dagestan, the second under the command of General P.Kh. Grabbe was able to capture and destroy the fortified village of Akhulgo. The wounded Shamil with a small detachment broke into Chechnya. The attack of the aul cost the Russians heavy losses. The development of the Caucasian war led to new and new victims. Official Russia considered it a duty of honor for the Russian army to suppress the resistance of the "wild" highlanders, and did not recognize the national war as just. Moreover, the administration insisted on the rapid suppression of resistance by force of arms, regardless of the casualties.

Meanwhile, the Caucasian War was becoming increasingly unpopular in Russian and European society. Doubts about the fidelity of government actions were expressed by many officers from the highest command of the army. So, General N.N. Raevsky believed that the national feelings of the highlanders should be taken into account and the population of the Caucasus should be integrated into the empire by peaceful means, and not by suppression. Similar thoughts were expressed by General D.A. Milyutin, Colonel Tchaikovsky, as well as cultural figures, writers, scientists (A.S. Griboyedov, L.N. Tolstoy and others). 1840s became the period of Shamil's greatest military successes. He managed to deliver a number of sensitive blows to the detachments of the Caucasian Corps: the fortifications of the Black Sea coastline were captured, Avaria was occupied, power over Dagestan was reasserted. At this time, the territory of the imamate more than doubled, the size of the rebel army increased to 20 thousand people. It was an impressive force to counter the tsarist government.

Alarmed by the situation in the Caucasus, Emperor Nicholas I appointed General M.S. Vorontsov as vicegerent and commander-in-chief of the troops, granting him emergency powers (1844). In May 1845, the new governor made another attempt. At the cost of numerous casualties, he took the residence of Shamil, the village of Dargo, but then his detachment was surrounded, from which few soldiers came out. As a result of the Dargin expedition, more than 3 thousand Russian soldiers died.

In 1846, Vorontsov returned to Yermolov's plan: he began to compress the imamate with a ring of fortifications. This turned out to be more effective, since the balance of power was in favor of the Russian Corps, and besides, the dissatisfaction of ordinary murids with the despotism of the naibs began to grow in the imamate. In the late 1840s - early 1850s. Shamil's imamate began to decline. Its borders narrowed. Naibs and representatives of state bodies of the imamat turned into peasant owners, which aggravated social contradictions. A part of the aul elite also began to go over to the side of the tsarist government. Shamil, losing support, intensified repressions against unfaithful supporters.

In 1853, his detachments were pushed back to the mountainous Dagestan, where they were in dire need of food. On the eve of the Crimean War, Shamil managed to agree with the Turkish command on joint actions in the Caucasus. In the course of them, the imam managed in the summer of 1854 to break through the Lezgin line and capture Tsinandali (Kakheti). But this was Shamil's last military success. Outraged by the arrogant tone of the Turkish command towards the highlanders, the imam broke off contact with him and withdrew the troops to Dagestan.

Appointed in November 1854 as commander of the Caucasian district and viceroy, General N.N. Muravyov recognized the right of the mountain peoples to independence. In 1855, he concluded an agreement on trade relations with Shamil, which established a relative truce. However, the peaceful tactics of the Russian command was changed after the conclusion of the Peace of Paris in 1856. It made it possible to draw significant military forces into the Caucasus region, and General A.I. Baryatinsky, who replaced N.N. occupied territories. The Caucasian Corps was transformed into an army. A massive advance into the mountainous regions of the North Caucasus began.

As a result, in 1857-1858. Chechnya was occupied, an offensive was launched on Dagestan. In February-March 1859, a detachment of General N.I. Evdokimov besieged the temporary residence of Shamil - the village of Vedeno Imam with 400 murids was forced to leave him and hid in the village of Gunib on August 25, 1859. Shamil surrendered. In November 1859, the main forces of the Adyghes surrendered. The Belorechenskaya fortified line with the Maykop fortress passed through the Adyghe lands. Zakubanye began to be populated by Russian Cossacks. At the final stage of the Caucasian War, Russian troops under the command of Evdokimov occupied the entire North Caucasus. Pushed back to the sea or driven into the mountains, the Adyghes were forced to either move to the Kuban steppes or emigrate to Turkey. In May 1864, the last hotbed of mountaineer resistance, the Kbaada tract, was suppressed. This day is considered the date of the end of the Caucasian War, although military operations continued in some regions of the North Caucasus until the end of 1864.

The essence of the Caucasian Won, in my opinion, is as follows, with the formation in the 15th century. Moscow centralized state, Russian tsarism launched a military-colonial expansion, including in the direction of the Caucasus. Its motives were connected with geostrategic and, to a lesser extent, ideological considerations. In the era of Catherine II, the advance of Russia to the south became especially intense. Using purely forceful or flexible diplomatic methods in the North Caucasus, tsarism relied on local feudal, clerical and tribal elites that needed external support. The military-colonial and class-exploiting policy of Russia provoked a protest of the mountain social "lower classes" against alien and "own" oppressors. Since the 80s XVII century on the territory of Chechnya and Dagestan, such structures find a way out in anti-colonial and anti-feudal uprisings under a religious flag. The social base of the war is considered to be the Chechen and Dagestan community members (bridle), the main goal is liberation from the tsarist colonialists and the mountain feudal-exploiting elite, the ideological catalyst is the ideas of muridism (a kind of Islam) and the slogans of ghazavat (holy war against the infidels). In this clash, the highlanders were led by outstanding leaders, the most striking of which was Imam Shamil, a deep connoisseur of the Koran, a strategist and organizer, devoted to the ideals of national independence with social justice. During the war, he managed to unite disparate and hostile communities, for the first time creating a military-theocratic state-imamate on the territory of mountainous Chechnya and Dagestan. Thanks to mass support and his outstanding qualities as a leader, Shamil for many years secured strategic advantages over the Russian army and a moral and political advantage over the influence of Russian tsarism in the Northeast Caucasus. This was largely facilitated by both the objective, natural and geographical conditions (highlands) and the subjective military-strategic mistakes of St. Petersburg.

Shamil died in battle, did not throw himself at the enemy bayonets in a fanatical impulse, did not commit suicide in order to avoid the shameful capture of infidels, but deliberately and voluntarily laid down his arms in front of the victorious enemy in an absolutely hopeless situation. The enemy, in turn, responded in a very unusual way. Shamil was not executed, was not thrown into prison, was not exiled to Siberia, shackled, was not even arrested in the usual sense of the word for that time. He was treated with the reverence due to a great personality. They saw him as an outstanding commander and politician who lost with dignity and courage. Shamil was sent to St. Petersburg, where he was honored as a hero, to the complete amazement of the imam himself, who considered himself a prisoner. Regarding the general “shamilmania”, the metropolitan Felstonists joked: who actually won the Caucasian War.

It is also worth noting such an award as the Cross “For Service in the Caucasus. Cross "For Service in the Caucasus" - is a four-pointed cross with broadened ends, in the center of which is a round shield with the image of the state emblem of the Russian Empire (two-headed eagle). The shield is crossed by two swords crossed with hilts down. At the ends of the cross there are inscriptions: on the left - "FOR SERVICE", on the right, as a continuation of the inscription, - "TO THE CAUCASUS?". On the upper end of the cross is placed the cypher of Emperor Alexander II, on the lower end is the date - "1864", meaning the year of the end of hostilities in the Caucasus.

In total, four varieties of the cross “For Service in the Caucasus” were minted, three of which (gold, silver and light bronze) were of the same size (48x48 mm), and the fourth variety was a reduced light bronze cross (34x34 mm). All four crosses differ from each other only in the quality of execution. For example, gold and silver crosses are made with false swords, a rosette and inscriptions, on the reverse side of which there are pins for attaching to clothes. A bronze cross was minted from a single billet and had a simple pin on the back.

Crosses "For service in the Caucasus", which were worn on the left side of the chest, below all orders, were awarded to all ranks of the Russian army, who took an active part in the war against the highlanders from 1859 to 1864. The awarding of one or another type of cross was carried out depending on the rank and services to the fatherland. Officers were awarded the silver cross. All lower military ranks (including the Caucasian militia) and numerous volunteers who took part in various battles, as well as all government officials, priests and doctors who performed their functional duties during military operations, were awarded the bronze cross. Subsequently, the shape of the cross "For Service in the Caucasus" migrated to the regimental insignia of several military units of the tsarist army, which distinguished themselves in battles with the highlanders in the Caucasus, and became their background, and in some cases even an integral part of the overhead elements.

The end of the Caucasian War allowed Russia to firmly establish itself in the North Caucasus, which, while retaining its bright originality, gradually became an integral administrative, political and economic part of the empire. The Caucasian war had huge geopolitical consequences. Reliable communications have been established between Russia and its Transcaucasian periphery. Russia has finally managed to firmly establish itself in the most vulnerable and strategically very important sector of the Black Sea - on the northeast coast. The same is with the northwestern part of the Caspian Sea, where St. Petersburg before that did not feel quite confident. The Caucasus took shape as a single territorial and geopolitical complex within the imperial "supersystem" - the logical result of Russia's southern expansion. Now it could serve as a secured rear and a real springboard for advancing to the southeast, to Central Asia, which was also of great importance for the development of the imperial periphery. In other words, the causes, course and results of the Caucasian War organically fit into the broader process of the geopolitical expansion of the Russian Empire, which had not yet reached the “naturally necessary” limits of territorial saturation and had the corresponding military-economic and civilizational potential.

Taking all this as a basis for comparison, let's move on to the Chechen war of 1994-1996. It is hardly worth arguing that the obvious fact that it took place in a completely different environment. Leaving aside the hypothetical question of its predestination or chance, that the Chechen tragedy was provoked by a whole complex of objective and subjective causes of global, regional and local origin. In the most general form, they boil down to the following: the crisis of the Soviet system, the collapse of the USSR, the revolutionary shock, feverish reformation of Russia "from above" (including national relations), devoid of qualified intellectual support and common sense. Admirers of the “scientific” method of total typology of historical and contemporary events, apparently, are not particularly curious about the “inconvenient” fact for them that in the vast expanse of multinational Russia, stricken with standard post-Soviet ailments, the separatist movement flared up only and precisely in Chechnya . Often the causes of the Chechen war are deliberately established a priori - with the help of the textbook "who benefits from it." And they immediately point to "certain forces" in Moscow and Grozny. However, such an approach, however effective it may seem, explains little. The "objective" interest of some people in the war does not mean at all that it was unleashed by them. And vice versa, the “objective” disinterest of other persons by no means provides them with an absolute alibi, because in politics events sometimes happen against the will and desire of people, outside of rational motivation. "Certain forces" can be the same conditional and mobile concept as those for whom "it is unprofitable."

Many authors, considering the Chechen war an inevitable and natural product of the previous crisis, connect it with the internal state of Chechnya, wittingly or unwittingly borrowing the method of historians who use the same approach in studying the origins of the Caucasian war of the 19th century. Following this example, it is easy to find that, despite all the features, Chechnya at the turn of the 80-90s. 20th century in terms of the level of general, so to speak, formational development and the level of integration into the Russian socio-economic, political and cultural system, it cannot be compared with the isolated patriarchal Chechen communities of the times of Sheikh Mansur and Shamil. Since the Chechen (as well as the Caucasian) war is usually regarded as an inevitable derivative product of global patterns, the role of the personal factor in it is often relegated to the background. The main characters of this tragedy, with their passions, complexes, prejudices and other human weaknesses, appear almost as victims of the fatal course of history, on which little depends. Specific people who made specific decisions under the influence of specific ideas become prisoners of the ideas of an “objective” environment that deprives them of choice. The question of responsibility, of course, loses its relevance. However, this is not about the moral or legal side of the matter - a very important topic, but in this case, not directly related to the subject of the conversation. We are talking about the fundamental significance of the "subjective" beginning in the genesis of the Chechen war.

Indeed, from the point of view of real historical conditions, Chechnya in the period of the mid-1980s. Until December 1994, it was an almost unchanged substance in terms of the level of instability and the severity of internal problems. It is hardly accidental that, under "other things being equal," the war broke out not before but after new people came to power in Moscow and Grozny. And although they all came out of the party-Soviet "overcoat" and were to one degree or another its flesh, they were already worried about other values, which they defended more authoritarianly and more aggressively than their predecessors. Grozdy decided to test the doctrine of national sovereignty with a dictatorial-theocratic bias. In response, Moscow risked testing the concept of forceful “democratic centralism” at the “Chechen training ground”. And if Dudayev, having become a hostage to his own radicalism, essentially already asked for help from the Kremlin in exchange for serious concessions on his part, then Yeltsin, it is not so important under whose decision, took an ultimatum tone. Thus, it is possible that he hoped to hasten the fall of his opponent, but he achieved the exact opposite. The mutual personal enmity of the two politically similar leaders, fueled by the capital's "experts" on the Caucasus, brought the denouement closer. If Yeltsin had behaved more subtly, or had he been in his place a person with a different mindset and character, everything could have turned out differently. Recognizing the absolute speculation of such a hypothesis (because it refers to what has already happened), we nevertheless perfectly understand those authors who insist on the existence of a real alternative to the Chechen war.

It is really hard to resist this proposal, knowing how much depended on specific, empowered persons, and not on the "clockwork" of history. Despite the hopelessness of the arguments in favor of the unrealized version of the development of past events, posing the problem of a historical alternative is still not entirely useless, at least as a lesson for the future. “The situation of choice” can be created by circumstances, but a person finds a way out of it. By the way, the “personal” factor is underestimated in the context of the origin of not only the Chechen, but also the Caucasian war. As is clear from numerous sources, Shamil and his predecessors, starting with Sheikh Mansur, acted, in principle, under the same domestic and foreign policy conditions. However, only under the third imam did events acquire that new qualitative content and that unprecedented scope that made the Caucasian war “Caucasian”. Almost throughout its entire length, Shamil, as well as his Russian counterpart Nicholas I, had alternatives that could stop the bloodshed. And every time preference on both sides was consciously and voluntarily given to war. The prerequisites for the Chechen war also determined its corresponding content, in which it also differs from the war in the Caucasus. There is almost nothing anti-colonial or popular liberation in it in the sense in which these categories are applicable (when they are applicable) to the first half of the 19th century. especially anti-feudal. By its uniqueness, the Chechen conflict does not fit into any clear typology, forming a peculiar, so to speak, separatist variety of civil war within a single country with a single state-political, economic and social structure.

In terms of time duration and internal essence, the Caucasian war was a historical epoch; The Chechen war is rather a historical event. A century and a half ago, in view of the social one-sidedness of Chechnya, the scale of its involvement in Shamil's movement was enormous. In modern, deeply hierarchized Chechen society, there is no longer the patriarchal former unity of interests, including in the question of attitude towards Moscow.

For two centuries, the role of the religious factor has noticeably changed - not in external manifestations, but in essence. The main characters of the Caucasian War - pious and dedicated people - often put the ideas of Islam at the forefront as the basis for fundamental social transformations. Sheikh Mansur, Kazi-mullah. Shamil demanded from the highlanders, first of all, the adoption of Sharia, and then the destruction of the wicked infidels (and not only Russians, but also their fellow tribesmen). For transgressions against the faith, people were subjected to cruel punishments much more often than for loyalty to Russia. The popular notion of muridism, which prevails to this day, is only an “ideological shell” or a propaganda tool for creating an “enemy image” far from corresponding to the real significance of this religious doctrine in the history of the Caucasian war.

Leaders of Chechnya in the 1990s 20th century with their completely secular natures, Shamil's "fundamentalism" is on the whole alien. They readily take an oath on the Koran (sometimes, by the way, in Russian), observe Muslim rituals and surround themselves with the necessary paraphernalia. However, they do not seem to be the fanatics they are sometimes portrayed to be. And where did they, the generation that grew up under "developed socialism", come from? In contrast to Shamil, they do not persecute folk, traditional culture, they do not try to oust it with Sharia. For them, Islam is rather a part of this culture, although they cannot be denied the ability to use religion for political and ideological purposes.

Things are different with the current leaders of the Chechen resistance movement. In many ways, they act not of their own free will, but in response to a situation that they did not create. Despite their courage, determination and seeming freedom of choice, these are, in essence, figures driven by circumstances and other people. Their creative potential is severely limited by the need to take into account the official and public opinion of Russia, various interests and moods. The behavior of the Chechen military-political elite sometimes surprisingly coincides with what the Kremlin is counting on. Perhaps the observers who believe that the Chechen crisis is being controlled from Moscow are not so far from the truth.

Compared with the same Shamil, the leaders of Ichkeria, for objective and subjective reasons, are much more dependent on their society, which they are not able to control. If the imam (and this is his merit) turned the patriarchal "chaos" into Islamic order, then the current Chechen reformers (and this is not only their fault) turned the Soviet "order" into Islamic chaos.

Much poorer is Moscow's "personal" support for the Chechen war. Here, in general, there are imperceptibly prominent figures comparable to Yermolov, Vorontsov, Baryatinsky, Milyutin ... and even with Nicholas I. Of course, not because potentially such personalities cannot exist in the modern Russian army and in Russian politics. The point is different. In the first half of the XIX century. for purely technical reasons (the lack of a fast connection between St. Petersburg and Tiflis), the Caucasian governors were given fairly broad powers that stimulated the initiative and flexible, strategic thinking. Today, when distances are abolished, the executor is deprived of his former advantages and remains only the executor of alien (alien) orders, often inconsistent and simply stupid.

The factor of moral readiness for action, confidence in the rightness of one's cause is of great importance. For soldiers and generals of the Russian army in the Caucasus in the first half of the nineteenth century. There was no such problem. They perceived their mission as a kind of natural, sovereign necessity, excluding moral torment. The attitude of ordinary Russian soldiers and commanders to the Chechen war is different. No political educational robot is able to give it a fair, patriotic meaning, to convince people that this is not a fatal mistake. Deep doubts on this score are also inherent in Russian public opinion. At the time of the entry of troops into Grozny (December 1994), it was obvious that the situation, at least in one respect, did not resemble the first half of the 19th century: Chechnya and Russia were in a single state-civilizational space. Perhaps they did not have tender, "historical" love for each other, but in politics this is not the most important thing. “Whatever it is-its own” - approximately such a formula determined their mutual feelings. The "action to restore constitutional order" dealt severe damage to this stereotype. Russia won the Caucasian War. To determine the nominal (“technical”) winner in the Chechen war, which was suspended, as it had begun, on orders from Moscow, but is much more difficult to stop. And what does it basically give? If it confirms the idea of ​​the insolvency of the Russian armed forces (which journalists write about with glee, worthy of better use), then it is permissible to ask: what enemy, in this case, revealed this “insolvency” - Chechens with guns and daggers from the time of Shamil: Or is the wife the same the Russian army with modern weapons, combat training, high-class officer cadres, and even with excellent knowledge of the area: Truly "Zarnitsa", if not so much blood and grief.

Until the consequences of the Chechen war manifest themselves in their entirety, it is probably too early to compare them with the results of the Caucasian war. But at least one preliminary conclusion seems relevant. The defeat of Shamil marked the end of the Caucasian period stretching for a whole era in the southern expansion of the Russian Empire, the resolution of major geopolitical tasks and the beginning of a new stage - the state development of Chechnya and Dagestan in order to integrate them into the imperial structure. In the Chechen war, unlike the Caucasian war, there are no winners, no matter how much they say the opposite. In it, everyone is defeated. It, being the result of a systemic crisis in Russia and in the minds of its leaders, led to a further weakening of the country and created a real threat to Russian statehood.

The unification is based on the gradual aggravation of various contradictions (political, territorial, economic, interethnic, etc.). In its development, it undergoes several stages (inception, aggravation, crisis), which makes it possible to make the process of conflict resolution manageable. Its resolution is a national task, and not just the military. It must be resolved by applying a combination of diplomatic and military measures. The use of the entire arsenal of peaceful means, relying on military power, makes it possible to prevent a conflict at an early stage. The main bottleneck in the organization of conflict prevention remains the absence, inconsistency, and sometimes inconsistency of existing legislation.

In a kind of advance to the South, the Russian government was guided by the protection of Russian borders and the region as a whole from possible expansion from the outside.

2.Vert P.V. From "resistance" to subversion": the power of the empire, the confrontation of the local population and their interdependence // Russian Empire in foreign historiography. Works of recent years.

3. Gardanov V.K. The social system of the Adyghe peoples (XVIII - the first half of the XIX century). M., 1967. P. 121 Sat. articles. M., 2005. S.48-83.

4. Degoev V. Three silhouettes of the Caucasian war: A.P. Ermolov, M.S. Vorontsov, A.I. Baryatinsky // Great game in the Caucasus: history and modernity. M., 2001. S. 156-204.

5. Dubrovin N.F. History of war and domination of Russians in the Caucasus. T.1-6. SPb., 2006. - 412 p.

6. Zakharova L.G. Russia and the Caucasus: a view from the 19th century // Russia and the Caucasus through two centuries. SPb., 2001. S.126-137.

7. Zisserman A.L. Field Marshal Prince Alexander Ivanovich Baryatinsky. 1815-1879. T.1-3. M., 2005. - 147 p.

8. Pokrovsky M. N. Caucasian wars and the imamate of Shamil. M., 2009. - 436s. 9. Smirnov N. A. Russian policy in the Caucasus in the XVI - XIX centuries. M., 2008. -412s.

Weekly tour, one-day hiking trips and excursions combined with comfort (trekking) in the mountain resort of Khadzhokh (Adygea, Krasnodar Territory). Tourists live at the camp site and visit numerous natural monuments. Rufabgo Waterfalls, Lago-Naki Plateau, Meshoko Gorge, Big Azish Cave, Belaya River Canyon, Guam Gorge.

By the end of the 19th century, the proportion of the Russian population increased here, primarily due to the migration of peasants from the central provinces of Russia. In the Stavropol province, Kuban and Terek regions, they were called "out-of-town". Having no rights to land, they are forced to engage in crafts and trade.

During this period, the development of the remaining virgin lands continues, and the role of commercial agriculture increases accordingly. By the end of the 19th century, the North Caucasus, along with the Ukrainian and central black earth, became the breadbasket of the Russian Empire. Sale to the market grain, meat, leather becomes the main profile of the Caucasus. For the quick export of products, construction is carried out railroads and highways.

In 1875, traffic was opened along the Rostov-Vladikavkaz railway, which connected the region with the rest of Russia. In 1878, the railway line Tikhoretskaya - Ekaterinodar was opened. In 1896 - Caucasian - Stavropol. In 1899 - Tikhoretskaya - Tsaritsin.

The appearance of roads enhances the importance of cities, contributes to rapid growth of settlements along highways. The need to export agricultural raw materials increases the role of ports.

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The drawing of the North Caucasus into the all-Russian market increased the capitalization of this region and contributed to the formation of international economic ties. At the end of the 19th century, agricultural products of the Kuban region were exported to Germany, Holland, Denmark, Italy, Belgium, France and England.

In addition to agricultural raw materials, natural resources were actively developed. Several mines for the extraction of polymetals operated in Ossetia. Oil was developed in Adygea and Chechnya.

The North Caucasus and Russia as a whole were characterized by the following features:

• uneven development of some regions and regions;
• communal survivals;
• backlog of infrastructure from production.

Civilizational difficulties of mountain dwellers entering the Russian economic and social space

Not the entire Slavic population took part in capitalist relations, the old-fashioned methods were still used in agriculture, and the population itself hardly had an idea of ​​​​the advanced methods of agricultural technology.

Indigenous highlanders were even less involved in the market. Objectively, in order to participate in the business life of the country, it was necessary to join Russian civilizational values. For a long time, this was available only to the mountain nobility, especially those peoples where social differentiation had developed (Ossetians, Kabardians, Abazins, Kumyks).

Princes and nobles were enrolled in the royal service, received awards, money, land. Representatives of noble families studied at universities. In the Stavropol gymnasium for the period 1850-1887, 1839 highlanders received education.

In general, the highlanders had few nobility, the bulk of the population were communal peasants. Being illiterate, dark, they steadfastly held on to their tribal customs, faith, language, and suspiciously perceived everything new coming from the authorities, giaours (kafir).

The final end did not at all mean the automatic end of the enmity between the Russians and the highlanders. Anti-Russian sentiments also took place after the end. For example, in 1864-1865 the performance Zikrist sects under the leadership of Kunta-Khadzhi, later, Kadiriyya, mountainous Chechnya. In 1868 - unrest of the Circassians in the villages along the Khodz River. Spring-summer 1877 - an uprising in Chechnya and Dagestan under the slogans for freedom and sharia. All these performances were not without the instigation of the Muslim clergy and Turkish agents.

These facts did not testify to the universal anti-Russian mood of all mountaineers. During the uprising of 1887, part of the Dagestanis fought with the Russian units, the other part voluntarily signed up for the mounted police, which helped to suppress the uprising. During the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, several hundred Caucasian highlanders fought against the Turks. In these battles, the Ingush squadron and the Ossetian division distinguished themselves during the liberation of Bulgaria. In Transcaucasia, the Kabardino-Kumyk and Chechen formations showed themselves.

The tsarist government used the qualities and natural militancy of the highlanders, and therefore many of them in military service reached military ranks and positions in society. The composition included two villages, Chernoyarskaya and Novoossetinskaya, whose population consisted of Ossetians.

In addition to military activities, the highlanders also achieved success in economic areas. In the late 19th - early 20th centuries, the resorts of the Caucasian Mineralnye Vody were almost entirely supplied with meat and dairy products(butter factory Blandova and T. Bacherova). In Balkaria - cheese making. They formed their own regions of specialization. Karachaevsk and Balkaria - sheep breeding. Kabarda and Adygea - horse breeding. Dagestan - gardening and viticulture.

Some of the highlanders, unable to engage in traditional activities, turned into hired workers. In 1897, 356 Dagestanis and 993 in the Terek region worked at various enterprises in European Russia. On the Baku oil fields about 3,000 Dagestanis worked.

Cultural change among indigenous peoples

The familiarization of the highlanders with the values ​​of Russian civilization was facilitated not only by economic ties, but also by the cultural and educational activities of the Russian state. In 1881, a real school where local highlanders begin to study. In 185 - library. In 1897 - female gymnasium. By the end of the 19th century, there were 26 schools, although the general literacy of the population remained low (9-10%).

Having received knowledge in Russian schools, gymnasiums, and colleges, the highlanders became enlighteners of their own peoples. In the second half of the 19th century, the largest number of local researchers, the future national intelligentsia, appeared. For example, works are printed Abduly Omarov on the history of the Laks; works on the ethnography of the Avars Aidamir Cherkeevsky; Balshit Dalgat, after graduating from the law faculty of St. Petersburg University, he publishes a work on the religious beliefs of the Chechens. A native of Ingushetia Chakh Akhriev collects materials on the material and spiritual culture of the Ingush, publishes their legends and traditions. Representative of the Cabara Kazi Atazhukin publishes the Kabardian alphabet, publishes articles about the Circassians.

The most capable of the highlanders became not only educators, they mastered other occupations. At the beginning of the 20th century, a Chechen businessman and oilman gained fame Tapa Chermoev.

The bulk of the mountain population as a whole was slowly drawn into the all-Russian market, weakly attached to culture. Nevertheless, as part of the Russian Empire, all local peoples got the opportunity to preserve their language and culture, and demographically, they found themselves in favorable conditions. If in 1897 there were approximately 65,000 of all Adyghes in the Kuban region, then in 1917 - 100,000 people. The highlanders of the North Caucasus, except for volunteers, were not subject to universal military service, which had a positive effect on demographic processes.

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