Personnel and leadership of the General Staff in the period (1941-1945)

During the Great Patriotic War, the General Staff was the main working body of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command for strategic planning and leadership of the armed forces on the fronts. The Chiefs of the General Staff were:

Shaposhnikov B.M. (August 1941 - May 1942),

Vasilevsky A.M. (June 1942 - February 1945),

Antonov A.I. (since February 1945).

The General Staff was figuratively called the "brain of the army", and very high demands were always placed on the personality of its chief. The Chief of the General Staff must have extensive military knowledge, an analytical mind and extensive staff service experience. It takes many years to gain experience. Therefore, being in the position of Chief of the General Staff for 8-10 years was considered normal.

A special place among all the Soviet chiefs of the General Staff was occupied by Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov, a career officer in the tsarist army, an excellently educated person who had served in the headquarters for a long time. Uncommon abilities and deep military-theoretical training, received by Boris Mikhailovich at the Academy of the General Staff, helped him to rise to the rank of colonel while still in the tsarist army. From April 1918, his service in the Red Army began. Commander of the Moscow, Volga, Leningrad military districts; head and military commissar of the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze; Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR - this is far from a complete track record of Shaposhnikov B.M., who received the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union in May 1940.

He was deservedly called "Patriarch of the General Staff." The legendary general staff personality - Boris Shaposhnikov - a major tactician and strategist, military thinker - the creator of the Soviet school of general staff officers. Shaposhnikov B.M. made a significant contribution to the theory and practice of organizational development of the Armed Forces of the USSR, to their strengthening and improvement, and to the training of military personnel. In 1923, he published a major scientific study of the tactics and organization of the cavalry - "Cavalry", and a year later - the book "On the Vistula", summarizing the combat experience of the First World War and the Civil War.

In 1927-1929. his three-volume work "The Brain of the Army" is published, dedicated to the work of the General Staff, economic and political issues of warfare. In this fundamental work, Boris Mikhailovich determined the main provisions on the nature of the future war, revealed the features of the leadership of the army in the war and gave a clear idea of ​​the role, functions and structure of the General Staff as the body of the Supreme High Command for the management of the Armed Forces. The appearance of the work "The Brain of the Army" aroused great interest, both among the command staff of the Red Army, and was highly appreciated in the pages of the military press abroad. As chief of the General Staff, Shaposhnikov purposefully sought to put into practice the ideas he had expressed, consistently solving issues related to centralization in the leadership of the Armed Forces, fought for the implementation of a clear regulation of the staff service at all levels.

Back in the late 30s, Boris Mikhailovich, who was well versed in operational and strategic issues, became one of Stalin's main advisers on military issues, being in 1937-1940. chief of the General Staff. However, the plan for conducting a campaign with Finland, prepared by the General Staff, and involving the use of not only the troops of the Leningrad Military District, but also additional reserves in the upcoming war, was sharply criticized by Stalin as overestimating the capabilities of the Finnish army. As a result, Shaposhnikov was removed from the post of chief of the General Staff, and the war with the Finns that began soon showed that the General Staff was right. Thus, before the start of the Great Patriotic War, the General Staff was successively led by Generals Meretskov K.A. and Zhukov G.K., who came to the highest army positions recently. Mistakes in their activities were an inevitable consequence of the lack of experience in commanding troops across the country. At the same time, we must not forget that the shadow of terror hung invisibly over every top commander. Neither Shaposhnikov, nor Zhukov, nor anyone else dared to argue with Stalin on matters of principle, remembering that it was very easy to get into the basement on the Lubyanka.

At the direction of Stalin I.V. on the very first day of the war, June 22, a group of senior officials was sent from the central office of the General Staff to help the front commanders, including the chief of the General Staff, General of the Army Zhukov G.K., his first deputy, Lieutenant General Vatutin N.F., and also Marshal Shaposhnikov B.M. Since July 1941, Shaposhnikov was the chief of staff of the Western direction, then again - the chief of the General Staff and a member of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov headed the General Staff of the Red Army during the most difficult period of the Great Patriotic War, from July 20, 1941 to May 11, 1942.

In the General Staff Shaposhnikov B.M. quickly carried out a number of organizational measures that improved the work of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The General Staff under his leadership became the center of operational-strategic planning, the real organizer of the military operations of the army and navy. Gradually and not immediately, the General Staff - the most important governing body - acquired its inherent role, becoming the working (and in fact - intellectual) body of the Headquarters.

The most important issues of strategic planning were previously discussed at the Headquarters in a narrow circle of people - Stalin I.V., Shaposhnikov B.M., Zhukov G.K., Vasilevsky A.M., Kuznetsov N.G. Usually, a decision in principle was first outlined, which was then considered by the Central Committee of the Party or the State Defense Committee. Only after this did the General Staff begin to plan and prepare in detail the campaign or strategic operation. At this stage, front commanders and specialists were involved in strategic planning - L.V. Khrulev, head of logistics, N.N. Voronov, commander of artillery of the Red Army, L.A. other.

“Staff work,” Shaposhnikov said more than once, “should help the commander to organize the battle; the headquarters is the first body with the help of which the commander puts his decisions into practice ... In modern conditions, without a well-knit headquarters, one cannot think of good command and control of troops.” Under the leadership of Boris Mikhailovich, a regulation was developed that regulated the work of front-line departments and departments of the General Staff, which to a large extent ensured the reliable fulfillment of the tasks of the Headquarters. Shaposhnikov paid priority attention to improving the strategic leadership of troops, establishing uninterrupted command and control of them at all levels, and took energetic measures to improve the activities of front-line, armies and military headquarters.

Under his direct leadership, reserves were quickly brought up from the depths of the country, the combat composition of the troops of the army in the field was clarified after the brutal blows of the enemy. In the difficult situation of the first months of the war, Boris Mikhailovich did a lot for the army and the country. With his direct participation, a plan was developed for the battle of Smolensk, a counteroffensive near Moscow, a number of major operations during the battle for Leningrad, planning and preparation for a general offensive in the winter of 1942. "The main burden of leadership of the General Staff lay on the shoulders of Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov. Despite a serious illness, he managed to do all the necessary work in the General Staff and, besides, he played no small role in the Headquarters. Our heart sank every time we saw our boss: he unusually stooped, coughed, but never complained. And his ability to maintain restraint, courtesy was simply amazing ", - from the memoirs of Army General Shtemenko S.M.

A man of great charm, laconic, with outward restraint and aspiration, he keeps away from the political scene, Boris Mikhailovich treated his young employees with true paternal warmth: “If something didn’t work out for us, he didn’t scold, didn’t even raise his voice, but only asked with reproach:

What are you, dove?

The word "darling" was his favorite. Depending on intonation and stress, it determined the position of the marshal, "S.M. Shtemenko recalled.

“His deep knowledge and erudition in various areas of military affairs was sometimes simply amazing. In my opinion, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief often used this as well. using his many years of experience as a General Staff officer, as a rule, he put forward well-reasoned proposals, "wrote Admiral Kuznetsov N.G. Boris Mikhailovich had an amazing ability to memorize details, the interlocutor had the impression that he knew the work of the classic of military art Karl von Clausewitz “On War” by heart. His great industriousness and ability to work with people had a huge impact on the formation of the personalities of the employees of the General Staff. His politeness in relations with subordinates, modesty and great tact, as well as discipline and utmost diligence, personal authority - all this instilled in the people who worked with him a sense of responsibility and a high culture of behavior.

Shaposhnikov B.M. I. Stalin enjoyed great respect. Vasilevsky A.V. wrote about this: “When my first trips took place together with Boris Mikhailovich to the Kremlin, the first meetings with members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and personally with Stalin, I had the opportunity to make sure that Shaposhnikov enjoyed special respect there. Stalin called him only by name and patronymic. Only he was allowed to smoke in his office, and in a conversation with him he never raised his voice, if he did not share the point of view expressed by him on the issue under discussion. But this is a purely external side of their relationship. The main thing is that that Shaposhnikov's proposals, always deeply thought out and deeply argued, as a rule, did not meet with any special objections.

The hard work of the Chief of the General Staff, frequent lack of sleep - as a result of extreme overwork at the end of November 1941, led to the illness of Boris Mikhailovich, he had to interrupt work for almost two weeks. By mid-March, the General Staff completed all the justifications and calculations for the plan of operations for the spring and early summer of 1942. The main idea of ​​the plan was active strategic defense, the accumulation of reserves, and then the transition to a decisive offensive. Boris Mikhailovich reported the plan to the Supreme Commander, then work on the plan continued. Stalin agreed with the proposals and conclusions of the chief of the General Staff. At the same time, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief provided for the conduct of private offensive operations in a number of areas.

Although Shaposhnikov did not consider such a solution as optimal, he did not consider it possible to defend his opinion further. He was guided by the rule: the Chief of the General Staff has extensive information, but the Supreme Commander-in-Chief assesses the situation from a higher, most authoritative position. In particular, Stalin gave Timoshenko consent to the development of an operation with the aim of defeating the Kharkov grouping of the enemy with the available forces and means of the South-Western direction. Shaposhnikov, taking into account the riskiness of an offensive from the operational bag, which was the Barvenkovsky ledge for the troops of the Southwestern Front, intended for this operation, made a proposal to refrain from conducting it. However, his opinion was not taken into account. The offensive of the Southwestern Front was unsuccessful. As a result, both the situation and the balance of forces in the south changed dramatically in favor of the Germans, and they changed precisely where the enemy planned his summer offensive. This ensured his success in the breakthrough to Stalingrad and the Caucasus.

Shaposhnikov B.M. was sick, and hard work could not but affect his health - in the spring of 1942, his illness worsened. Boris Mikhailovich turned to the State Defense Committee with a request to transfer him to another area of ​​work. Shaposhnikov was replaced by his deputy, General of the Army A.M. Vasilevsky, as Chief of the General Staff. Boris Mikhailovich still remained Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, and from June 1943 - Head of the Voroshilov Higher Military Academy. On behalf of the State Defense Committee, he led the development of new charters and instructions. In a short time, the commission, which Shaposhnikov B.M. headed, considered the drafts of the new Infantry Combat Regulations, the Field Regulations, the combat regulations of the armed forces. On March 26, 1945, 45 days before the Victory, Shaposhnikov died.

Vasilevsky Alexander Mikhailovich was born on September 18, 1895 in the village of Novaya Golchikha near Kineshma on the Volga in a large family of an Orthodox priest. Alexander Vasilevsky began his education at the theological school in Kineshma, which he graduated in 1909. Then he continued his education at the theological seminary in Kostroma. Being already a well-known Soviet military leader, Alexander Mikhailovich was forced to renounce his parents as "class alien elements" and for many years did not even correspond with his father. Perhaps Alexander would have become a priest, although he dreamed of becoming an agronomist, but the First World War began. "In youth, it is very difficult to solve the problem of which way to go. And in this sense, I always sympathize with those who choose the path. I eventually became a military man. And I am grateful to fate that it happened that way, and I think that in life I ended up in its place. But the passion for the land has not disappeared. I think every person, one way or another, experiences this feeling. I really love the smell of thawed earth, green leaves and the first grass ... "- recalled Marshal Vasilevsky A.M.

Having passed an external examination for the fourth year of the seminary and having submitted a petition to be allowed to go to the front as a volunteer, he receives a referral to the Alekseevsky military school, which at that time was preparing accelerated graduations. This school, founded in 1864 in Lefortovo, was first called the Moscow Infantry Junker School, and in 1906, by decree of Nicholas II, it was renamed in honor of the birth of the heir to the throne. "By rank" it was considered the third - after Pavlovsky and Aleksandrovsky - and it was mainly the children of commoners who studied there. Four months later, graduation took place on an accelerated course of wartime training. In the autumn and winter of 1915, in the mud and cold, there were battles with the Austro-Hungarian army. They lived right in the trenches: they dug dugouts for two or three people, slept in overcoats, spreading one floor and covering the other. By spring, his company becomes the best in the regiment in terms of discipline and combat effectiveness. Two years on the front line, without vacations and normal rest, in battles and campaigns, the real character of a warrior was forged. During the First World War, Alexander Vasilevsky commanded a company, a battalion, rose to the rank of staff captain. He had authority among progressive officers.

In the Red Army, Alexander Mikhailovich from May 1919 to November 1919 - assistant platoon commander, company commander, for two months - battalion commander: from January 1920 to April 1923 - assistant regiment commander; until September - acting commander of the regiment, until December 1924 - head of the divisional school and until May 1931 - commander of the rifle regiment. From 1931 to 1936 Alexander Mikhailovich went through the school of staff service in the People's Commissariat of Defense and the headquarters of the Volga Military District. In the fall of 1936, Colonel Vasilevsky was sent to the newly created Academy of the General Staff. His outstanding abilities allowed him to successfully graduate from the Academy of the General Staff and head the department of operational training in the General Staff. Of the 137 comrades Vasilevsky at the Academy - the best of the best - who were specially selected for the course by the Central Committee of the Party, only 30 graduated from the Academy, the rest were repressed.

Since October 4, 1937 Vasilevsky A.M. began service in the General Staff, under the command of Shaposhnikov Boris Mikhailovich. A great success in life for the future marshal was a meeting with Shaposhnikov B.M., who possessed the richest erudition, an excellently trained memory, worked, by his own admission, to exhaustion. Outstanding theoretical knowledge happily combined with his practical experience. Being a professional, Boris Mikhailovich did not like half-educated people, superficials, arrogant and narcissistic people. Only those who graduated with honors from military academies were invited to the General Staff. He conquered his subordinates with politeness, endurance, and respect for their opinions. For these reasons, the relatively small staff of the General Staff, on the whole, successfully fulfilled its mission in the most difficult conditions of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. In addition, Shaposhnikov enjoyed the rare confidence of I. Stalin, who highly appreciated the professional qualities of the largest General Staff officer.

Shaposhnikov introduced Vasilevsky I.V. Stalin. His recommendation, multiplied by the talent and efficiency of Alexander Mikhailovich himself, sharply raised his authority in the eyes of the leader. After the bloody Soviet-Finnish war, it was Vasilevsky (on the general instructions of Stalin) who developed the draft of the new border and headed the commission for its implementation for two months - he negotiated with the Finnish side. It was he who, as a military expert, went to Berlin as part of the delegation of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars V.M. Molotov for negotiations with Hitler and German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop. Vasilevsky was the main executor of the plan for the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the event of aggression in the West and East.

At the end of July 1941, Alexander Mikhailovich was appointed chief of the Operations Directorate and deputy chief of the General Staff. For the first two months of the war, he literally did not leave the General Staff, he slept there, for four or five hours a day. "A distinctive feature of Alexander Mikhailovich has always been trust in subordinates, deep respect for people, respect for their dignity. He subtly understood how difficult it is to maintain organization and clarity in the critical situation of the beginning of the war, which is unfavorably developing for us, and tried to rally the team, create such a working a situation where there would be no pressure from the authorities at all, but only a strong shoulder of an older, more experienced comrade, on which, if necessary, you can rely. We all paid him the same for warmth, sincerity, sincerity. Vasilevsky enjoyed not only the highest authority in the General Staff , but also with universal love, "- this is how S.M. Vasilevsky recalled. Shtemenko (The General Staff during the War).

Becoming the second in his role in the General Staff, Vasilevsky, together with B.M. Shaposhnikov, who replaced G.K. Zhukov, as chief of the General Staff, visited Headquarters daily, and sometimes several times a day, participated in the consideration of all important issues of conducting military operations, increasing the combat power of the Armed Forces. Alexander Mikhailovich, with the participation of eight General Staff officers, prepared all the necessary information about the situation on the fronts, presented recommendations on the distribution of incoming forces and means for the troops on the front line, proposals for the reshuffle and promotion of military personnel. The General Staff, most of the war was in Moscow on Kirov Street. The Kirovskaya metro station served as a bomb shelter for the operational staff of the headquarters. For passengers, it was closed - trains passed without stopping. The station hall was fenced off from the track and divided into working rooms. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief and members of the Politburo, who were in Moscow, also descended here during the air raid. "The work of the Headquarters was organized in a special way. The Supreme Commander, in order to develop this or that operational-strategic decision or to consider other important problems of the armed struggle, summoned responsible persons who were directly related to the issue under consideration. There could be members and non-members of the Headquarters, but necessarily members of the Politburo, industry leaders, commanders called from the front. Everything that was worked out here during mutual consultations and discussions was immediately formalized into directives from the Headquarters to the fronts. This form of work was effective, "recalled Marshal Vasilevsky A.M.

During the battle near Moscow, Alexander Mikhailovich became a lieutenant general, received his first slight wound, and became even closer to the front commander G.K. Zhukov. At the most critical moments of the defense, Vasilevsky softened, as best he could, the anger of the Supreme in relation to Zhukov, Rokossovsky, Konev. According to the memoirs of K.M. Simonov "Alexander Mikhailovich combined in himself a steady will and amazing sensitivity, delicacy and sincerity." On June 24, 1942, in the most difficult time for the country and the Red Army, Alexander Mikhailovich became chief of the General Staff, and from October 15, 1942 - simultaneously deputy people's commissar of defense of the USSR. He performed a huge amount of work as the Chief of the General Staff and at the same time as a representative of the Headquarters at the fronts. Military statisticians calculated that during the 34 military months of being the chief of the General Staff, Alexander Mikhailovich worked at the fronts for 22 months, coordinating their actions in the most important strategic operations, and only 12 months in Moscow.

Zhukov G.K. writes in his memoirs about A.M. Vasilevsky: “Alexander Mikhailovich was not mistaken in assessing the operational-strategic situation. Therefore, it was him that I.V. Stalin sent to responsible sectors of the Soviet-German front as a representative of the Vasilevsky's talent as a military leader on a large scale and a deep military thinker unfolded to the fullest.In those cases when I.V. Stalin did not agree with the opinion of Alexander Mikhailovich, Vasilevsky was able to convince the Supreme Commander with dignity and weighty arguments that in a given situation there was a different solution than he proposed should not be accepted." Front-line trips did not always end happily. On the day of the liberation of Sevastopol, Vasilevsky decided to see the city sung in glory. There were a lot of cars on it. One by one they brought soldiers and ammunition. We arrived at the Mekenziev mountains. And suddenly under the wheels of the car - an explosion. They hit a mine. There was a blow of such force that the engine was thrown to the side. Alexander Mikhailovich was wounded in the head.

Zhukov G.K. and Vasilevsky A.M. they prepared a plan for a counteroffensive, encirclement and defeat of the largest Wehrmacht group near Stalingrad, and then successfully implemented it. On A.M. Vasilevsky, the Stavka entrusted the coordination of the actions of all three fronts of the Stalingrad direction during the counteroffensive. With this mission, he, as a representative of the Headquarters, will stay on the Stalingrad front until the great victory on the Volga. However, after the end of the Battle of Stalingrad, the tension in Vasilevsky's activities did not subside. A.M. Vasilevsky was still torn between the leadership of the General Staff and business trips to the front. February 16, 1943 A.M. Vasilevsky was awarded the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union. On behalf of the Headquarters, Alexander Mikhailovich coordinated the actions of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts in the Battle of Kursk. In the Battle of Kursk, the best military strategist of the Wehrmacht, Field Marshal Manstein, fought against Vasilevsky.

Then Vasilevsky A.M. led the planning and conduct of operations to liberate the Donbass, Northern Tavria, the Krivoy Rog-Nikopol operation, the operation to liberate the Crimea, the Belarusian operation. In Operation Bagration, he coordinated the actions of the 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts. For the exemplary performance of the tasks of the Headquarters for the management of these operations, on July 29, 1944, Alexander Mikhailovich was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal. After the death of General I.D. Chernyakhovsky from February 1945 commanded the 3rd Belorussian Front in the East Prussian operation, which ended in the famous assault on Koenigsberg. In four days, from April 6 to April 9, the troops of the front captured this "absolutely impregnable bastion of the German spirit." On April 25, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, with the active participation of the Baltic Fleet, occupied the port and fortress of Pillau, the last German stronghold on the Zemland Peninsula.

In July 1945 A.M. Vasilevsky was appointed commander-in-chief of the Soviet troops in the Far East. In just 24 days, Soviet and Mongolian troops managed to defeat the million-strong Kwantung Army in Manchuria. The second medal "Gold Star" Vasilevsky A.M. was awarded September 8, 1945 for the skillful leadership of Soviet troops in the Far East during the war with Japan.

In relation to Stalin, Vasilevsky A.M. believed that he was an "uncommon man, with a complex, contradictory nature. By virtue of his position, he had a special responsibility. He was deeply aware of this responsibility. However, this does not mean that he did not make mistakes. At the beginning of the war, he clearly overestimated his strength and knowledge in the management of the war, he tried to solve the main issues of an extremely difficult front-line situation on his own, which often led to even greater complication of the situation and heavy losses. Being a man of strong will, but with an extremely unbalanced and tough character, Stalin at that time of serious setbacks at the front often lost his temper, sometimes taking out his anger on people whom it was difficult to blame. But it must be frankly said: Stalin not only deeply experienced his mistakes made in the first years of the war, but also managed to draw the right conclusions from them. Starting with the Stalingrad operation, his attitude towards everyone who took part in the development of strategically important decisions changed dramatically for the better. Few, however, dared to argue with Stalin. But he himself, listening to sometimes very heated debates, caught the truth and knew how to change a decision that had already seemed to be made. It must be said frankly: the Headquarters kept its finger on the pulse of the war constantly.

In March 1946, Alexander Mikhailovich again headed the General Staff, in 1949-1953. Vasilevsky - Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR. In 1953-1956. he was the first deputy minister of defense of the USSR, but on March 15, 1956 he was relieved of his post at his personal request, but already in August 1956 he was again appointed deputy minister of defense of the USSR for military science. In December 1957, he was "dismissed due to illness with the right to wear a military uniform", and in January 1959 he was again returned to the cadres of the Armed Forces and appointed Inspector General of the Group of General Inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense (until December 5, 1977). Died A.M. Vasilevsky December 5, 1977 Vasilevsky A.M. was buried. on Red Square in Moscow near the Kremlin wall. As parting words in life for today's youth, his words sound: "I must tell young people about the main value in human life. The motherland is our main wealth. Appreciate and take care of this wealth. Think not about what the Motherland can give you. Think about what what can you give to the Motherland. This is the main key to a well-meaning life."

Aleksey Innokemntievich Antomnov was born on September 15, 1896 in the city of Grodno, in the family of an officer of the 26th artillery brigade. The Antonov family was an ordinary family of a battery commander with a small income. In 1915, Alexei entered St. Petersburg University, but soon, due to financial difficulties, he was forced to interrupt his studies and go to work at a factory.

In 1916, Alexei Antonov was drafted into the army and sent to the Pavlovsk Military School. At the end of the course of study, the newly made warrant officer is appointed to the Life Guards Jaeger Regiment.

Taking part in the battles on the fields of the First World War, the young officer A. Antonov was wounded and awarded the Order of St. Anna IV degree with the inscription "For Courage". After recovery, the soldiers elect him assistant regimental adjutant.

In May 1918, ensign Antonov was transferred to the reserve. He studied at the evening courses of the Forestry Institute, worked in the food committee of Petrograd, and in April 1919 he was drafted into the Red Army. From that moment on, Alexei Innokentyevich devoted his whole life to serving the Motherland in the ranks of its Armed Forces. He began his service as assistant chief of staff of the 1st Moscow Workers' Division, which fought on the Southern Front. After heavy fighting in June 1919, the remnants of this division were transferred to the 15th Inza Rifle Division. A.I.Antonov served in this division until August 1928, holding various staff positions. For active participation in crossing the Sivash, he was awarded the Honorary Weapon of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, and in 1923 he was awarded a Certificate of Honor.

In 1928, the young commander entered the Academy named after M.V. Frunze, after which he was appointed chief of staff of the 46th Infantry Division in the city of Korosten. In 1933, he graduated from the operational department of the same academy and again left for his previous position. In October 1934 A.I. Antonov became chief of staff of the Mogilev-Yampolsky fortified area, and in August 1935 - chief of the operational department of the headquarters of the Kharkov military district.

In October 1936, the Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army was opened. Among the first students of this educational institution were A.M. Vasilevsky, L.A. Govorov, I.Kh. Bagramyan, N.F. Vatutin and A.I. Antonov.

After graduating from the academy in 1937, Alexei Innokent'evich was appointed chief of staff of the Moscow Military District.

At the end of 1938 A.I. Antonov was appointed senior lecturer, and after some time - deputy head of the department of general tactics of the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze. In February 1940, he was awarded the academic rank of associate professor, and in June of the same year, the military rank of major general. In March 1941 A.I. Antonov was appointed to the post of Deputy Chief of Staff of the Kiev Special Military District.

The Great Patriotic War began. In August 1941, Major General A.I. Antonov was appointed Chief of Staff of the Southern Front. By this time, the troops of the front were engaged in tense defensive battles. During these battles, the headquarters of the Southern Front prepared and carried out the Rostov offensive operation in November, as a result of which the 1st German tank army was defeated. Rostov-on-Don was liberated, and the enemy was thrown back from this city by 60-80 kilometers. For successful actions in the Rostov operation A.I. Antonov was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, he was awarded the military rank of lieutenant general. From July 1942, Alexei Innokent'evich consistently headed the headquarters of the North Caucasian Front, the Black Sea Group of Forces and the Transcaucasian Front. The troops of these fronts, having shown exceptional stamina, stopped the enemy, preventing him from seizing the Black Sea coast and breaking through into the Transcaucasus. For the flexible and skillful leadership of the troops, Lieutenant-General A.I. Antonov was awarded the second Order of the Red Banner. In December 1942, by order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, Alexei Innokent'evich was appointed First Deputy Chief of the General Staff and Chief of the Operational Directorate. Since that time, the active work of A.I. Antonov in this supreme governing body of the Red Army.

Work in the General Staff is complex and multifaceted. Its functions included the collection and processing of operational-strategic information about the situation on the fronts, the preparation of operational calculations and proposals for the use of the Armed Forces, the direct development of plans for military campaigns and strategic operations in theaters of military operations. Based on the decisions of the Headquarters and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the General Staff prepared directives for the commanders of the fronts, fleets and services of the Armed Forces and their headquarters, prepared orders of the People's Commissar of Defense, supervised their execution, monitored the preparation of strategic reserves and their correct use.

The General Staff was also entrusted with the task of generalizing the advanced combat experience of formations, formations and units. The General Staff developed the most important provisions in the field of military theory, prepared proposals and applications for the production of military equipment and weapons. He was also responsible for coordinating the fighting of the partisan formations with the formations of the Red Army.

In January 1943, General A.I. Antonov, as a representative of the Headquarters, was sent to the Bryansk, and then to the Voronezh and Central fronts. The Voronezh-Kastornenskaya operation, during which Alexei Innokent'evich coordinated the actions of the troops, was successfully completed. The cities of Voronezh and Kursk were liberated. According to A.M. Vasilevsky Lieutenant General A.I. Antonov was awarded the Order of Suvorov, I degree. At the end of this business trip, Alexei Innokent'evich began to visit Headquarters several times a day. He carefully analyzed the information coming from the fronts, listened to many generals and officers, coordinated the most important issues with the command of the fronts and reported proposals to the Supreme Commander. In April 1943 A.I. Antonov was awarded the military rank of colonel general, and in May he was relieved of his duties as chief of the Operations Directorate, remaining the first deputy chief of the General Staff.

The first major strategic operation, in the planning of which A.I. Antonov was directly involved, there was the Battle of Kursk. For the organization and preparation of this battle, he was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, I degree. The Soviet Supreme High Command decided to oppose the defense in depth, insurmountable defense, to bleed the German troops, and then complete their rout with a counteroffensive. As a result, the Red Army inflicted such a defeat on the enemy from which Nazi Germany was no longer able to recover. A solid foundation was created for carrying out extensive offensive operations on the entire front in order to completely drive the enemy out of Soviet territory.

For the brilliantly planned and successfully carried out operation on the Kursk Bulge in August 1943, A.I. Antonov was awarded the military rank of army general. The Belarusian operation became important in the life of Alexei Innokentevich. In the course of its preparation and holding, his outstanding organizational skills and strategic talents were fully revealed. On May 20, 1944, the general submitted a plan for this operation, which received the code name "Bagration", for consideration by the Headquarters. Huge work was carried out on the covert concentration of troops and military equipment, measures to disinform the enemy. The offensive that had begun came as a complete surprise to the Nazi troops.

As a result of powerful blows from four fronts, Soviet troops defeated Army Group Center, liberated Belarus, part of Lithuania and Latvia, entered Poland and approached the borders of East Prussia, advancing 550-600 kilometers and expanding the offensive front by more than 1000 kilometers. For the organization and conduct of this operation, Alexei Innokent'evich was again awarded the Order of Suvorov, I degree.

The Belarusian operation further strengthened business relations between A.I. Antonov with the Supreme Commander. It was during this period that I.V. More and more frequently, Stalin entrusted Aleksei Innokent'evich with responsible tasks and listened attentively to him, especially on operational matters. Much more often, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief began to turn to him on numerous problems of relations with the allies. The famous aircraft designer A.S. Yakovlev wrote: “Antonov was very close to Stalin, who considered his opinion, had obvious sympathy and trust in him, spent long hours with him, discussed the situation on the fronts and planned future operations.”

The commanders of the troops who came to Headquarters, before going to the Supreme Commander, went to A.I. Antonov and consulted with him on their plans and all issues of preparing military operations. Representatives of the Headquarters, sending their reports to I.V. Stalin, they certainly addressed a copy of them to “Comrade Antonov”, knowing that the general would take everything necessary on these reports accurately and on time.

In the second half of 1944, it became clear that it was A.I. Antonov will be tasked with leading a group of Soviet military experts at the forthcoming conference of the heads of the three governments. The Crimean Conference began its work on February 4, 1945 with a discussion of military issues. The heads of government of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain reviewed the situation on the European fronts. A report on the situation on the Soviet-German front was made by General of the Army A.I. Antonov. During the negotiations, he was entrusted with the responsibility of coordinating the actions of the Allied strategic aviation. In February 1945, Alexei Innokentevich was awarded the Order of Lenin. Presenting him for this award, Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky wrote: “Army General Antonov A.I., being the First Deputy of the beginning. The General Staff, in fact, from the spring of 1943 bears the brunt of the work of the beginning. The General Staff at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and copes with it completely. He superbly manages the work of the entire Central Office of the NPO.” After the death of I.D. Chernyakhovsky, A.M. was appointed commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front. Vasilevsky, and A.I. Antonov became Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army. At the same time, he was included in the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. A map of Berlin and the surrounding areas appeared on Alexei Innokentevich's desk in the summer of 1944, during the Belarusian operation. And on April 1, 1945, his report on the general plan of the Berlin operation was heard at Headquarters. For ten days, Soviet troops surrounded the Berlin enemy grouping and joined the Allied troops on the Elbe River. On May 8, 1945, Germany signed an act of unconditional surrender, and a few days later, Soviet troops defeated the grouping of the Nazi army in Czechoslovakia. On June 4, 1945, “for the skillful fulfillment of the tasks of the Supreme High Command in conducting large-scale military operations,” General of the Army A.I. Antonov was awarded the highest military order "Victory".

In early June 1945, the General Staff under the leadership of A.I. Antonova together with A.M. Vasilevsky completed the development of a plan for a war with Japan. At the Potsdam Conference, the general informed the military representatives of the United States and Great Britain about this. August 7 I.V. Stalin and A.I. Antonov signed an order to start hostilities against Japan on the morning of August 9. In the difficult conditions of this theater of war, the Red Army dealt a crushing blow to the Japanese armed forces. Soviet troops completely liberated Manchuria, the Liaodong Peninsula, North Korea, the southern part of Sakhalin Island and the Kuril Islands. Immediately after the end of the war in Europe, the General Staff began to develop a plan for the demobilization of older soldiers from the army and navy and their speedy return home and involvement in the reconstruction of the country. During 1945, all fronts and many armies, corps and separate units were disbanded, the number of military educational institutions was reduced. In March 1946, Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky again assumed the post of Chief of the General Staff, and General of the Army A.I. Antonov became his first deputy. It was he who was entrusted with all responsibility for the implementation of the Law on Demobilization and a number of other organizational measures.

During the years 1945-1948, more than 8 million people were demobilized, the regular troops were organized into military districts. At the end of 1948, the general was appointed first deputy, and since 1950 - commander of the Transcaucasian Military District. Now the life and activities of the troops were based not on battles and battles, but on combat training in peacetime conditions. It was necessary to deal with the issues of training commanders and headquarters of the tactical and operational level, to study new military equipment and weapons. In the autumn of 1953, in the Transcaucasian Military District, under the leadership of General of the Army A.I. Antonov, major maneuvers were carried out, in which the personnel showed exceptional physical endurance, moral endurance and military skill. In 1949, the NATO military-political bloc was created. The so-called Cold War began. In response, on May 14, 1955, the Soviet Union and its allies signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Military Assistance in Warsaw. A year before the establishment of the Warsaw Pact, Army General A.I. Antonov was again appointed First Deputy Chief of the General Staff and a member of the Collegium of the USSR Ministry of Defense. And with the signing of the Treaty, he was elected Secretary General of the Political Consultative Committee and appointed Chief of Staff of the Joint Armed Forces. While in this post, Alexei Innokent'evich spent a lot of time working out issues of an operational, organizational and military-scientific nature, carrying out measures for the technical equipment of the troops, their combat and operational training. In a short time, the control apparatus for the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries was established, and the training of troops in joint operations in modern warfare was organized. The indefatigable Chief of Staff of the Joint Armed Forces personally participated in many exercises of the troops of the allied countries, helping our friends and sharing his invaluable experience with them. Since 1946, for 16 years, A.I. Antonov was a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. He often met with his voters, sensitive to their requests, suggestions and requests.

general staff war domestic

Zakharov Matvey Vasilievich

General Staff in the prewar years

Publisher's annotation: This book was written in 1969, but for the first time it is published only now, when it becomes possible to use in print facts that were previously considered closed. Marshal of the Soviet Union M. V. Zakharov (1898-1972) in his historical and memoir book spoke about his service in the General Staff of the Red Army, explored some aspects of the activities of this most important body of the Soviet Armed Forces in the prewar years. The book is written on a broad documentary basis and personal memoirs of the author. Designed for the general reader.

Chapter 1. From headquarters to the General Staff of the Red Army

Chapter 2. Strategic leadership and military scientific work

Chapter 3

Chapter 4. Strengthening the security of the USSR

Chapter 5. The danger of fascist aggression is growing

Chapter 6

Applications

Notes

From the publisher

We express our gratitude to the daughter of the Marshal of the Soviet Union M. V. Zakharov, researcher at the Institute of the International Labor Movement of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Candidate of Economic Sciences Valentina Matveevna Zakharova for her active assistance in preparing the book for publication.

The activity of the General Staff of the Red Army in the prewar years was great and many-sided. To cover all its aspects, it would take more than one monograph, and it is quite clear that, starting work on a real historical and memoir work, it was impossible to set such a goal.

The author would like to show the reader, within the framework of the available, only some aspects of the activities of the General Staff, related to the preparation of the Soviet Armed Forces to repel the impending aggression of the fascist states, to tell about the most important activities that were carried out with the participation of the author, to pay tribute to the remarkable general staff officers of the pre-war period, who selflessly paid all the strength and knowledge to a complex and responsible business.

As you know, the General Staff of the Red Army did not take shape all at once, but as a result of a long search for an organizational structure and a complex evolution of the central bodies of military control, carried out at various stages of the development of the armed forces. Therefore, it would be legitimate to briefly speak about the predecessors of the General Staff, their functions and role in organizing the country's defense.

Considering the solution of the problems of building up the armed forces and strategic planning - the basis of all the activities of the General Staff, the author, analyzing and evaluating the events, used not only personal memories and impressions, but, above all, numerous archival documents, materials related to the assessment of the international situation, took into account the most important decisions of the party and government, the economic possibilities of our state, the level of development of military-theoretical thought, military equipment and weapons.

Comprehensive documentary substantiation of a number of provisions in this work is also necessary because the majority of readers have a fairly general idea of ​​the activities of the General Staff in the prewar years, obtained from military memoirs. The military reader, having critically comprehended what is presented in this work, will more definitely imagine both the historical moments of Soviet military development and some current problems.

I express my gratitude for the help in preparing this work to Major General of Aviation M. T. Chernyshev, Colonels N. V. Eronin and V. G. Klevtsov, and Colonel N. E. Tereshchenko for the selection and verification of archival documents.

From headquarters to the General Staff of the Red Army

Central bodies of military administration during the civil war. Headquarters of the Red Army in the transition period from wartime to peacetime and during the years of military reform. Mixed system of military construction and the Headquarters of the Red Army. The headquarters of the Red Army became the General Staff. The General Staff during the period of transition to a single personnel principle for the construction of the Red Army. General Staff and Military Academy of the General Staff.

After the creation of the world's first Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army, its leaders for a number of years repeatedly discussed how to name the central organ in the system of the highest military organization - the Headquarters or the General Staff. Disputes around this important issue arose naturally. If the name "General Staff" was adopted, it was necessary to centralize the operational and administrative functions of many leading army institutions in a single control body. While attaching great importance to the principle of centralization in armed struggle, the party and government during the years of the civil war could not, however, agree to this due to the prevailing situation. The untimeliness of posing this question was obvious: the newly created proletarian army did not have its own highly qualified personnel, it was very dangerous to completely entrust the leadership in the central military apparatus to military experts - people who came from classes socially alien to the revolution - it was very dangerous; the creation of such a large and complex military mechanism as the General Staff required a considerable amount of time, and history set aside an extremely limited time frame for organizing the defense of the young Soviet Republic from the pressing forces of internal and external counter-revolution. And the thing was something completely new after the Great October Revolution. The experience of military experts of the old army, recruited to serve in the Red Army, was not very suitable for building new armed forces in spirit and tasks. Some of the surviving institutions of the former General Staff were cumbersome and did not meet the challenges that arose. Therefore, before making the final decision to create this or that body of military control, it was necessary to make sure that it was expedient at a certain stage in the development of the armed forces.

Considering these circumstances, the leading figures of the party and the government were cautious about the proposals of some military experts regarding the creation at that time of a central body of military control, called the General Staff. Nevertheless, they attached great importance to the service of headquarters: after the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, some organs of the old military department were retained, and in particular the Main Directorate of the General Staff (1), serving mainly the demobilized tsarist army. Former generals and officers assigned to the General Staff were taken into account. The official title of some of them who served in the Red Army was added, for example: "Chief of Staff of the 15th Army of the General Staff I.I. Ivanov." In the autumn of 1918, 526 former officers of the General Staff served in the Red Army, including 160 generals, 200 colonels and lieutenant colonels. It was the most trained part of the old officer corps.

Despite the fact that during the civil war there was formally no single body similar to the General Staff, practically centralized operational leadership of the armed struggle was carried out through the Field Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, which had broader powers in relation to other bodies of the military department.

At the final stage of the civil war, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, along with the general problems of building up the armed forces in a peacetime period, also faced the question of organizing central military command and control bodies. The development of proposals on this issue was entrusted to the Field Headquarters and a specially created commission headed by former General P. S. Baluev.

On January 21, 1920, in the report "On the organization of the country's armed forces" submitted to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, signed by Commander-in-Chief S. S. Kamenev, Chief of the Field Staff P. P. Lebedev and Commissar of Staff, member of the RVOR D. I. Kursky, it was recommended at the expense of the Field Headquarters RVSR and the All-Russian General Staff to create the Main Directorate of the General Staff or the Great General Staff - the highest operational body of the armed forces, which was supposed to develop plans for war and operations, combat activities of the armed forces, transfer orders from the commander-in-chief to the army and navy, give other departments and departments assignments arising from operational considerations, as well as to collect various information necessary for the conduct of the war. At the same time, it was envisaged to have the General Staff as the highest administrative body of the armed forces in the combat and administrative parts, in charge of the formation, organization and training of troops, as well as serving the rear units and institutions of the army and navy.

In 1941, the General Staff of the Red Army, headed by G.K. Zhukov carried out his work in parallel in several directions.

Measures continued to strengthen the Red Army, increase its combat power, primarily through the receipt of new models of weapons and military equipment by the troops.

Tanks. In this regard, much attention was paid to the creation of large formations of tank troops and equipping them with new military equipment. After the February conference of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1941, the creation of large tank formations went faster. New mechanized corps began to be deployed. For their armament in the first half of the same year, 1,500 tanks of new designs were manufactured. All of them entered the troops, but due to lack of time they were not properly mastered. The human factor also played a significant role - many military commanders did not dare to launch new models of tanks into intensive operation without a command from above, but such a command was not received.

Artillery. By the beginning of the war, the leadership of artillery was carried out by the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army, which was headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union G.I. Sandpiper. His deputy was Colonel-General of Artillery N.N. Voronov. On June 14, 1941, Colonel-General of Artillery N.D. Yakovlev. Directly in the troops there were chiefs of artillery of districts, armies, corps, divisions. Military artillery was subdivided into regimental, divisional and corps artillery. There was also artillery of the RKG, which consisted of cannon and howitzer regiments, separate divisions of high power and anti-tank artillery brigades. The cannon artillery regiment had 48 122-mm cannons and 152-mm howitzer cannons, and the high-capacity cannon regiment had 24 152-mm cannons. The howitzer artillery regiment had 48 152-mm howitzers, and the high-capacity howitzer regiment had 24 152-mm howitzers. Separate divisions of high power were armed with five 210-mm cannons, or 280-mm mortars, or 305-mm howitzers.

Characteristics of the staffing of the mechanized corps of the western border military districts on June 22, 1941

By June 1941, prototypes of rocket launchers, the future Katyushas, ​​were made. But their mass production has not yet been established. There were also no specialists able to effectively operate these new weapons.

With anti-tank artillery in the Red Army there was a big backlog. Only in April 1941 did the Soviet command begin to form artillery brigades of the RGK. According to the state, each brigade was to have 120 anti-tank guns and 4,800 anti-tank mines.

Cavalry. Despite the predilection for the cavalry of individual Soviet military leaders, its share in the structure of the ground forces had noticeably decreased by the beginning of the war, and it accounted for only 5% of their total strength. Organizationally, the cavalry consisted of 13 divisions, eight of which were part of four cavalry corps. The cavalry division had four cavalry and one tank regiment (almost 7.5 thousand personnel, 64 tanks, 18 armored vehicles, 132 guns and mortars). If necessary, the cavalry division could fight dismounted, like an ordinary rifle formation.

Engineering Troops. Engineering support was dealt with by the Main Engineering Directorate, which until March 12, 1941 was headed by Major General of the Engineering Troops A.F. Khrenov, and from March 20 - Major General of the Engineering Troops L.Z. Kotlyar. Engineering units were deployed in the troops, but their technical support was very weak. Basically, the calculation was made on a shovel, an ax and improvised building materials. In peacetime, sappers almost did not deal with the issues of mining and demining the area. Starting from 1940, almost all the engineering units of the border military districts were constantly involved in the construction of fortified areas on the new border of the USSR and were not engaged in combat training.

Connection. All issues of strategic communications and supply of troops with communications equipment were assigned to the Communications Directorate of the Red Army, which from July 1940 was headed by Major General N.I. Gapich. By that time, front-line, army, corps and divisional radio communication sets had been developed and entered the troops, but not all of them were mastered to a sufficient extent. In addition, many commanders did not trust radio communications, and also did not know how to use it in terms of ensuring secrecy of control.

Air defense. To solve the problems of air defense on a strategic scale, in 1940 the Main Directorate of the Air Defense Forces of the country was created. His chief at first was Lieutenant General D.T. Kozlov, and from March 19, 1941 - Colonel General G.M. Stern. On June 14, 1941, Colonel-General of Artillery N.N. Voronov.

To solve air defense tasks, the entire territory of the USSR was divided into air defense zones in accordance with the boundaries of military districts. The zones were headed by assistant district commanders for air defense. To solve specific tasks, the Main Directorate of the Air Defense Forces of the country had anti-aircraft artillery forces, searchlight, balloon units, as well as fighter aviation formations.

To solve air defense tasks, 39 fighter aviation regiments were allocated from the aviation formations of the military districts, which organizationally remained subordinate to the commanders of the air forces of the districts. In this regard, the assistant commander of the military district for air defense, who was subordinate to the units of anti-aircraft artillery, had to coordinate all issues of using aviation for air defense purposes with the commander of the Air Force.

The military air defense was equipped with anti-aircraft guns and machine guns, but these weapons were scarce in rifle and tank formations, and in practice they could not provide reliable cover for the entire troop concentration area.

Aviation. Aviation was equipped mainly with aircraft of obsolete designs. There were very few new combat vehicles. So, an armored attack aircraft designed by A.S. Ilyushin Il-2, created in 1939, began to enter the troops only in 1941. Fighter design A.S. Yakovlev Yak-1, accepted for mass production in 1940, began to enter the troops also in 1941.

Since April 1941, the head of the Main Directorate of the Air Force was Lieutenant General P.F. Zhigarev, who from November 1937 to September 1938 commanded a group of Soviet "volunteer" pilots in China.

Flight performance and combat characteristics of Soviet aircraft

Then, as a result of mass purges among the senior command staff of the Air Force, he made a quick career and in December 1940 became the first deputy commander of the Red Army Air Force.

There was an increase in the total number of personnel of the Red Army. As of June 22, 5 million people were already under arms in the Armed Forces of the USSR. Of this number, the Ground Forces accounted for 80.6%, the Air Force - 8.6%, the Navy - 7.3%, the Air Defense Forces - 3.3%. In addition, numerous reserves were prepared. At the same time, the level of specialization of the reservists was not very high. We proceeded from the fact that more than 1.4 million tractor drivers and car drivers work on collective farms alone, who could be quickly transferred to combat vehicles if necessary. Throughout the country, pilots, radio operators, paratroopers, infantrymen-shooters were trained in the Osoaviahima system.

reconnaissance of a potential enemy. Barely entering a new position, G.K. Zhukov called the head of the Intelligence Directorate, Lieutenant General F.I. Golikov. He arrived exactly at the appointed time and entered the office of the Chief of the General Staff with a large folder in his hands. In a well-trained voice, he began to confidently report ...

In the last months before the start of the Great Patriotic War, Soviet intelligence worked quite actively. Already on January 12, 1941, in the intelligence report No. 2 of the Border Troops Directorate of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR, it was reported that on December 9, the area of ​​​​the city of Sanok was visited by the commander-in-chief of the German land army, Field Marshal Walter von Brauchitsch, who reviewed the troops and fortifications in the area. The same report reported on the arrival of new German units in the border zone, the construction of barracks for personnel there, concrete firing points, loading and unloading areas on the railway and airfields.

Following this, there are frequent cases of violations by the German side of the State border of the USSR. So, on January 24, 1941, the head of the border troops of the NKVD of the BSSR in his report also reports on the deployment of an army headquarters in Warsaw, and on the territory of the border districts - the headquarters of an army corps, eight headquarters of infantry and one cavalry divisions, 28 infantry, seven artillery, three cavalry and one tank regiment, two aviation schools.

F. I. Golikov - Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army

It was reported below: “From the moment the Convention was concluded to January 1, 1941, a total of 187 various conflicts and incidents arose on the border with Germany ... During the reporting period, 87 cases of border violations by German aircraft were recorded ... Three German aircraft after flying across the border were landed ... which were subsequently released to Germany.

One German aircraft was shot down on March 17, 1940 at the site of the 10th outpost of the Augustow border detachment as a result of the use of weapons.

In connection with the need to maximize the improvement of the intelligence and operational work of the state security organs and the increased volume of this work, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on February 3, 1941, adopts a special Decree on the division of the USSR People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs into two People's Commissariats: the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) and the People's State Security Commissariat (NKGB). The NKGB is entrusted with the tasks of conducting intelligence work abroad and combating the subversive, espionage, sabotage, and terrorist activities of foreign intelligence services within the USSR. He is also instructed to carry out the operational development and liquidation of the remnants of all anti-Soviet parties and counter-revolutionary formations among various sections of the population of the USSR, in the system of industry, transport, communications, agriculture, etc., and also to protect the leaders of the party and government. The same Decree ordered the organization of the republican, regional, regional and district bodies of the NKGB and the NKVD.

On February 8, 1941, the following Resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR was adopted on the transfer of a special department from the NKVD of the USSR to the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR and the People's Commissariat of the Navy of the USSR. “Assign to the special departments of the NPO and the NKVMF (Third Directorates) the tasks of combating counter-revolution, espionage, sabotage, sabotage and all kinds of anti-Soviet manifestations in the Red Army and Navy; identification and informing, respectively, the people's commissar of defense and the people's commissar of the Navy about all the shortcomings and the state of the army and navy units and about all available compromising materials and information on the military personnel of the army and navy.

The same document determined that "all appointments of the operational staff of the Third Directorates of the NPO and the NKVMF, starting with the operational regiment and the corresponding unit in the fleet, are made by orders of the people's commissars of defense and the Navy." Thus, in the structure of the Red Army and the Navy, powerful punitive bodies arose, possessing enormous powers and not accountable to the commanders and commanders of the formations under which they operated. It was determined that the head of the 3rd department of the corps was subordinate to the head of the 3rd department of the district (front) and the commander of the district (front), and the head of the 3rd department of the division was subordinate to the head of the 3rd department of the corps and the commander of the corps.

On February 7, 1941, the 2nd Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR reported rumors spreading among the diplomatic corps in Moscow about the impending German attack on the USSR. At the same time, it was indicated that the purpose of the German attack was the southern regions of the USSR, rich in grain, coal and oil.

Around February 8, the same information was confirmed by an agent of the Berlin residency of the NKGB of the USSR "Corsican", and on March 9, 1941, a telegraph report was received from Belgrade from the military attaché to the head of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army. It reported that "the German General Staff refused to attack the British Isles, the immediate task was to capture Ukraine and Baku, which should be carried out in April-May of this year, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria are now preparing for this."

In March 1941, two more secret messages were received from Berlin from an agent nicknamed "The Corsican". The first reported on the preparation of the German Air Force for military operations against the USSR.

The second once again confirmed Germany's plans for a war against the USSR. At the same time, it was pointed out that the main goal of the aggressor could be grain-producing Ukraine and the oil regions of Baku. The statements of the Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, General F. Halder, about the low combat capability of the Red Army were also cited. Both of these messages were reported to I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov and L.P. Beria.

On March 24, 1941, a message was received from the Berlin residency of the NKGB of the USSR about the preparation of the General Staff of Aviation for military operations against the USSR. And this document emphasizes that “photographs of Soviet cities and other objects, in particular the city of Kyiv, are regularly received by the aviation headquarters.

Among the officers of the aviation headquarters there is an opinion that the military action against the USSR is supposedly dated for the end of April or the beginning of May. These dates are associated with the intention of the Germans to keep the harvest for themselves, hoping that the Soviet troops, during the retreat, will not be able to set fire to more green bread.

On March 31, 1941, the head of foreign intelligence of the NKGB of the USSR informed the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR about the advance of German troops to the border of the Soviet Union. It was said about the transfer of specific formations and units of the German army. In particular, he reported that “in the border points of the General Government against the Brest region, the German authorities proposed to vacate all schools and additionally prepare premises for the arrival of the expected military units of the German army.”

In early April 1941, the head of foreign intelligence of the NKGB of the USSR informed the higher authorities that, on his instructions, an agent nicknamed "Sergeant" met with another agent nicknamed "Corsican" in Berlin. At the same time, Sergeant-Major, referring to other sources, reported on the complete preparation and development of a plan for Germany's attack on the Soviet Union. According to available information, “the operational plan of the army consists in a lightning-fast surprise attack on Ukraine and advance to the east. From East Prussia, a blow is simultaneously struck to the north. The German troops advancing northward must link up with the army advancing from the south, thereby cutting off the Soviet troops located between these lines, closing their flanks. The centers are left without attention, following the example of the Polish and French campaigns.

S. K. Timoshenko and G. K. Zhukov during exercises (spring 1941)

On April 5, 1941, the Department of the Border Troops of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR reports on the construction by the Germans of airfields and landing sites in the border areas with the USSR. In total, from the summer of 1940 to May 1941, 100 airfields and 50 landing sites were built and restored on the territory of Poland. During this time, 250 airfields and 150 landing sites were built directly on the territory of Germany itself.

On April 10, the head of foreign intelligence of the NKGB of the USSR reports to the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army specific data on the concentration of German troops on the Soviet border and the transfer of new formations and units there. At the same time, the agent of the Berlin residency "Yuna" reports on the plans of German aggression against the USSR.

On April 21, 1941, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the NPO of the USSR received another message from the NKVD of the USSR signed by the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. Beria about the receipt by the border detachments of the NKVD of new intelligence data on the concentration of German troops on the Soviet-German border.

At the end of April 1941, Moscow received another message from Berlin from an agent who worked in Germany under the name "Sergeant" with the following content:

“A source working at the headquarters of the German army reports:

1. According to the information received from the liaison officer between the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the headquarters of the German aviation Gregor, the question of Germany's action against the Soviet Union has been finally decided, and its beginning should be expected from day to day. Ribbentrop, who until now had not been a supporter of an attack against the USSR, knowing Hitler's firm determination in this matter, took the position of supporters of an attack on the USSR.

2. According to information received at the aviation headquarters, in recent days there has been increased activity in cooperation between the German and Finnish General Staffs, expressed in the joint development of operational plans against the USSR ...

The reports of the German Aviation Commission, which visited the USSR, and Aschenbrenner, the Air Force Attaché in Moscow, made a depressing impression at the Aviation Headquarters. However, it is hoped that, although Soviet aviation is capable of inflicting a serious blow on German territory, the German army will nevertheless quickly be able to suppress the resistance of Soviet troops by reaching the strongholds of Soviet aviation and paralyzing them.

3. According to information received from Leibrandt, who is an assistant on Russian affairs at the foreign policy department, Gregor's message is confirmed that the issue of speaking out against the Soviet Union is considered resolved.

The postscript to this message indicates that it was reported to I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov and L.P. Beria by the head of the 1st Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR Fitin on April 30, 1941, but the document does not contain resolutions of any of the named persons.

On the same day, April 30, 1941, an alarm message was received from Warsaw. It stated: “According to intelligence data received from various sources, in recent days it has been established that military preparations in Warsaw and on the territory of the General Government are being carried out openly and German officers and soldiers are speaking quite frankly about the upcoming war between Germany and the Soviet Union, as about a matter already decided. The war supposedly should begin after the completion of spring field work ...

From April 10 to April 20, German troops moved eastward through Warsaw continuously, both during the night and during the day ... Trains loaded mainly with heavy artillery, trucks and parts of aircraft go along the railways in an easterly direction. Since mid-April, trucks and Red Cross vehicles have appeared on the streets of Warsaw in large numbers.

The German authorities in Warsaw issued an order to urgently put in order all bomb shelters, darken all windows, and create Red Cross sanitary teams in every house. Mobilized and selected for the army all the vehicles of private individuals and civilian institutions, including German ones. Since the beginning of April, all schools and courses have been closed, and their premises have been occupied by military hospitals.”

This message was also reported to I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov and L.P. Beria.

On May 6, 1941, the head of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army F.I. Golikov made a special report "On the grouping of German troops in the east and southeast on May 5, 1941." In this report, it was directly indicated on many points about the preparation of Germany for a war against the USSR. The conclusions stated: “In two months, the number of German divisions in the border zone against the USSR increased by 37 divisions (from 70 to 107). Of these, the number of tank divisions increased from 6 to 12 divisions. With the Romanian and Hungarian armies, this will amount to about 130 divisions.

On May 30, 1941, the Chief of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army received a telegraph report from Tokyo. It reported:

“Berlin informs Ott that the German action against the USSR will begin in the second half of June. Ott is 95% sure that the war will start. The circumstantial evidence I see for this is currently this:

The Technical Department of the German Air Force in my city was instructed to return shortly. Ott demanded that BAT not send any important messages through the USSR. The transport of rubber through the USSR has been reduced to a minimum.

Reasons for the German action: The existence of a powerful Red Army does not allow Germany to expand the war in Africa, because Germany must keep a large army in Eastern Europe. In order to eliminate completely any danger from the USSR, the Red Army must be driven off as soon as possible. That's what Ott said.

Under the message was the signature: "Ramsay (Sorge)". But even in this message there is no resolution of any of the leaders of the Soviet state.

May 31, 1941 on the table of the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army G.K. Zhukov received a special message from the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army No. 660569 with the following content:

During the second half of May, the main German command, at the expense of the forces liberated in the Balkans, carried out:

1. Restoration of the Western grouping to fight England.

2. Increasing forces against the USSR.

3. Concentration of reserves of the main command.

The general distribution of the German armed forces is as follows:

- against England (on all fronts) - 122-126 divisions;

- against the USSR - 120-122 divisions;

- reserve - 44-48 divisions.

The specific distribution of German forces against England:

- in the West - 75-80 divisions;

- in Norway - 17 divisions, of which 6 are located in the northern part of Norway and can be used against the USSR ...

The distribution of German forces against the USSR in the directions is as follows:

a) in East Prussia - 23-24 divisions, including 18-19 infantry, 3 motorized, 2 tank and 7 cavalry regiments;

b) in the Warsaw direction against ZapOVO - 30 divisions, including 24 infantry, 4 tank, one motorized, one cavalry and 8 cavalry regiments;

c) in the Lublin-Krakow region against KOVO - 35-36 divisions, including 24-25 infantry, 6 tank, 5 motorized and 5 cavalry regiments;

d) in Slovakia (region Zbrov, Presov, Vranov) - 5 mountain divisions;

e) in Carpathian Ukraine - 4 divisions;

f) in Moldova and Northern Dobruja - 17 divisions, including 10 infantry, 4 motorized, one mountain and two tank divisions;

g) in the area of ​​Danzig, Poznan, Thorn - 6 infantry divisions and one cavalry regiment.

The reserves of the main command are concentrated:

a) in the center of the country - 16-17 divisions;

b) in the region of Breslau, Moravska-Ostrava, Kattowice - 6-8 divisions;

c) in the center of Romania (Bucharest and to the west of it) - 11 divisions ... "

This document says: "Read Zhukov 11.6.41."

On June 2, about the concentration of large formations of the German and Romanian armies on the border with the USSR, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks receives information from the Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Ukraine and the authorized representative of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR in Moldova. Then the certificates of the Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Ukraine about the military activities of Germany on the border with the USSR are received almost every day. On June 11, an agent of the Berlin residency of the NKGB of the USSR, acting under the name "Foreman", reports about the impending German attack on the USSR in the near future. On June 12, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks received a message through the NKVD of the USSR about the strengthening of intelligence activities by the German side on the border with the USSR and in the border areas. In accordance with this report, from January 1 to June 10, 1941, 2080 border violators were detained by Germany.

On June 16, NKGB agents working in Berlin under the nicknames "Old Man", "Sergeant" and "Corsican" receive messages about the timing of the German attack on the Soviet Union in the coming days. At the same time, the structural units of the NKGB and the NKVD of the USSR, in parallel with reports on the state of affairs at the border, continue to engage in routine paperwork.

On June 19, the NKGB of Belarus sends a special message to the NKGB of the USSR about the military mobilization preparations of fascist Germany for a war against the USSR. This message contains extensive information about the redeployment and deployment of German troops to the Soviet border. It is said about the concentration in the border areas of a large number of formations, units, combat aircraft, artillery pieces, boats and vehicles.

On this day, the NKGB resident "Tit", who worked in Rome, reports that Germany's military operations against the USSR will begin between June 20 and 25, 1941.

On June 20, 1941, a telegraph report arrived to the head of the intelligence department of the Red Army from Sofia. It literally said the following: “A source said today that a military clash is expected on June 21 or 22, that there are 100 German divisions in Poland, 40 in Romania, 5 in Finland, 10 in Hungary and 7 in Slovakia. A total of 60 motorized divisions. The courier, who arrived by plane from Bucharest, says that in Romania the mobilization is over and military operations are expected at any moment. There are currently 10,000 German troops in Bulgaria.”

There is also no resolution on this message.

On the same day (June 20, 1941), a telegraphic report also arrives from Sorge to the head of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army from Tokyo. In it, the intelligence officer writes: “The German ambassador to Tokyo, Ott, told me that a war between Germany and the USSR was inevitable. German military superiority makes it possible to defeat the last large European army as well as it was done at the very beginning (of the war), because the strategic defensive positions of the USSR are still no more combat-ready than it was in the defense of Poland.

Incest told me that the Japanese General Staff was already discussing the position to be taken in case of war.

The proposal for Japanese-American negotiations and the issues of internal struggle between Matsuoka on the one hand and Hiranuma on the other have stalled because everyone is waiting for a solution to the question of relations between the USSR and Germany.

This report was received by the 9th Division at 17:00 on June 21, 1941, but there is no resolution on it either.

On the evening of June 20, another intelligence report of the NKGB of the USSR No. 1510 was compiled on Germany's military preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union. It states the concentration of German troops near the border with the USSR and the preparation of fascist troops for military operations. In particular, it is said that machine guns and anti-aircraft guns have been installed in some houses in Klaipeda, that timber has been harvested in the Kostomoloty region for building bridges across the Western Bug River, that in the Radom district, out of 100 settlements, the population has been evicted to the rear, that German intelligence is sending its agents to USSR for a short time - three to four days. These measures cannot be regarded otherwise than as direct preparation for the aggression that should take place in the coming days.

As a result of the analysis of all these documents, it can be concluded that Soviet intelligence on the territory of Germany and its allies worked quite successfully. Information about Hitler's decision to attack the USSR and the beginning of preparations for this action began to arrive in the Soviet Union more than a year before the start of the aggression.

Simultaneously with reconnaissance through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the GRU, reconnaissance was also carried out by the Western military districts, which constantly and in some detail reported on the preparation of Germany and its allies for a war against the USSR. Moreover, as we approached the fateful date, these reports became more frequent and more specific. From their content, Germany's intentions could not be doubted. The activities that were carried out on the other side of the border no longer had a reverse course, but inevitably had to result in a military operation of a strategic scale. This concerned the resettlement of the local population from the border strip, the saturation of this strip with troops, the clearing of the border strip from mines and other engineering obstacles, the mobilization of vehicles, the deployment of field hospitals, the storage of a large number of artillery shells on the ground, and much more.

The top Soviet leadership and command of the Red Army had information about the composition and deployment of the troops of the border military districts of the Soviet Union by the fascist command, which were received and summarized already in early February 1941, almost 5 months before the start of the aggression, and practically corresponded to reality.

However, the fact that many intelligence reports do not have the signatures of the highest leaders of the state and the highest ranks of the military leadership of the country suggests that they were either not brought to these people or ignored by these people. The first is actually excluded by the practice of the Soviet bureaucracy of that time. The second is possible in two cases: first, distrust of information sources; secondly, the stubborn unwillingness of the country's top leadership to abandon their vision of the future course of events that they have worked out.

As is known, only general orders were sent to the troops from the General Staff in the last peaceful months. No specific reaction of the Soviet government and the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense to the situation developing near the borders of the USSR was indicated. Moreover, the Soviet leadership and the General Staff constantly warned the local command "not to succumb to provocations", which negatively affected the combat readiness of the troops covering the state border. Apparently, interaction and mutual information between the bodies of the NKGB, the NKVD and the headquarters of the Red Army were poorly established.

Although it should be recognized that the measures taken by the NKVD, aimed at strengthening the protection of the border, were carried out. So, on June 20, 1941, the head of the border troops of the NKVD of the Belarusian District issued a special order in order to strengthen the protection of the state border. In accordance with this order, it was prescribed “to build the calculation of people for service in such a way that from 23.00 to 5.00 all people served at the border, with the exception of those returning from the outfits. Set up posts for ten days on separate, most vulnerable flank directions under the command of the assistant chief of the outpost.

Thus, an opinion is being created that the Soviet leadership deliberately ignored intelligence information abundantly received from various sources about Germany's preparations for a war against the USSR. Some researchers say that this was a special line of conduct of the top Soviet leadership, who tried in every possible way to delay the start of the war in order to prepare the country and the Red Army. Others argue that in 1940-early 1941, the Soviet leadership was more concerned with internal problems arising in the new territories annexed to the USSR in 1939-1940 than with external threats. In recent years, there are also such authors who write that the behavior of the Soviet government on the eve of the war, and in particular the position of I.V. Stalin, was a manifestation of the leader's hatred for his people.

Of course, all this is only the subjective conclusions of various researchers. What do the facts say? Before me is an extract from the instruction of the Second Bureau of the General Staff of the French Army dated May 15, 1941. It says:

“At present, the USSR is the only European power that, having powerful armed forces, is not drawn into a world conflict. In addition, the volume of Soviet economic resources is so great that Europe, in the face of a continuing naval blockade, can be provided with raw materials and food from this reserve.

It seems that until now the USSR, following the tactics of survival, has been seeking to use the exhaustion of the forces of both belligerents to strengthen its own position ... However, the turn of events over the past two months makes it seem that the USSR will not be able to carry out its plans in their original form and, probably, will be drawn into the war sooner than expected.

Indeed, according to numerous reports received recently, the capture of South Russia and the overthrow of the Soviet regime is now part of the plan developed by the Axis countries ...

According to other reports, Russia, worried that it is alone in the face of Germany, whose funds are not yet touched, is trying to buy time to keep its dangerous neighbor. The Russians satisfy all the demands of Germany of an economic nature ... "

On the same day, a memorandum from the German Foreign Ministry on German-Soviet relations was adopted. It notes that, "as in the past, difficulties arose in connection with the fulfillment of German obligations on deliveries to the USSR, especially in the field of armaments." The German side admits: “We will continue to be unable to meet delivery deadlines. However, the failure of Germany to fulfill its obligations will begin to affect only after August 1941, since until then Russia is obliged to make deliveries in advance. It was stated below: “The situation with the supply of Soviet raw materials still presents a satisfactory picture. In April, the following most important types of raw materials were delivered:

grain - 208,000 tons;

oil - 90,000 tons;

cotton - 8300 tons;

non-ferrous metals - 6340 tons of copper, tin and nickel ...

Total deliveries in the current year are calculated:

grain - 632,000 tons;

oil - 232,000 tons;

cotton - 23,500 tons;

manganese ore - 50,000 tons;

phosphates - 67,000 tons;

platinum - 900 kilograms.

Of course, these deliveries stopped with the outbreak of hostilities. But there is numerous evidence that trains with Soviet raw materials were heading to Germany as early as June 22, 1941. Some of them were captured by German troops in the border areas in the early days of the Great Patriotic War.

Thus, intelligence information about Germany's preparations for a war against the USSR was more than enough. G.K. Zhukov in his memoirs “Memoirs and Reflections” also writes that this information was known to the General Staff, and immediately admits: “During the period of a dangerous military situation, we, the military, probably did not do everything to convince I. AT. Stalin in the inevitability of war with Germany in the very near future and to prove the need to implement the urgent measures provided for by the operational mobilization plan. Of course, these measures would not guarantee complete success in repelling the enemy onslaught, since the forces of the parties were far from equal. But our troops could enter the battle in a more organized manner and, consequently, inflict much greater losses on the enemy. This is confirmed by the successful defensive actions of units and formations in the areas of Vladimir-Volynsky, Rava-Russkaya, Przemysl and in sectors of the Southern Front.

Below G.K. Zhukov writes: “Now there are different versions about whether we knew or not the specific date for the start of the war.

I cannot say for sure whether I.V. was truthfully informed. Stalin, perhaps, received it personally, but he did not inform me.

True, he once said to me:

“One person is giving us very important information about the intentions of the German government, but we have some doubts…

Perhaps it was about R. Sorge, whom I learned about after the war.

Could the military leadership independently and in a timely manner open the exit of enemy troops directly to the initial areas, from where their invasion began on June 22? In those conditions, it was extremely difficult to do this.

In addition, as it became known from captured maps and documents, the command of the German troops actually concentrated on the borders at the very last moment, and its armored troops, which were at a considerable distance, were transferred to the starting areas only on the night of June 22 ".

The closest deputy chief of the General Staff of the Red Army was the chief of the Operations Directorate. On the eve of the war, this position was held by Nikolai Fedorovich Vatutin. He was a relatively young general (born in 1901), who in 1929 graduated from the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze studied for a year at the Academy of the General Staff, from which he was released ahead of schedule in 1937 in connection with the arrests of many military leaders.

He served as chief of staff of the Kiev Special Military District during the liberation campaign of Soviet troops in Western Ukraine, and since 1940 he headed the Operations Directorate of the General Staff. According to the memoirs of many contemporaries, N.F. Vatutin was a literate and thinking person, capable of solving voluminous and complex problems. He had some experience in planning military actions within the framework of the final operations of the Soviet-Finnish war and the actions of the troops of the military district during the liberation campaign. But this experience was clearly not enough to solve problems on the scale of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War.

Unfortunately, even from the available reports, the correct conclusions were not always drawn, which could promptly and authoritatively guide the top management. Here, in connection with this, are some documents from the military archive.

On March 20, 1941, the head of the Intelligence Directorate, General F.I. Golikov presented the management with a report containing information of exceptional importance. This document outlined the options for possible directions of strikes by the Nazi troops during an attack on the Soviet Union. As it turned out later, they consistently reflected the development of the Barbarossa plan by the Nazi command, and in one of the options, in essence, the essence of this plan was reflected.

... According to our military attache on March 14, it was indicated later in the report, the German major said: “We are heading east, to the USSR. We will take grain, coal, oil from the USSR. Then we will be invincible and can continue the war with England and America.

N. F. Vatutin - Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff (1939–1941)

However, the conclusions from the information given in the report, in essence, removed all their significance. At the end of his report, General F.I. Golikov wrote:

"one. Based on all the above statements and possible options for action in the spring of this year, I believe that the most possible date for the start of actions against the USSR will be the moment after the victory over England or after the conclusion of an honorable peace for Germany with her.

2. Rumors and documents that speak of the inevitability of a war against the USSR this spring must be regarded as disinformation coming from British and even, perhaps, German intelligence.

So, F.I. Golikov served as chief of the Intelligence Directorate and deputy chief of the General Staff from July 1940. His report was prepared for the country's top leadership and was labeled "of exceptional importance." Such reports are usually prepared very carefully and cannot be based on the words of some "German major". They require the collection and analysis of dozens, if not hundreds, of various sources of information, and, as other military leaders testify, there was such information, including from the military attache in Berlin, intelligence agents in the countries allies of Germany.

Now about the agents of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (now the Main Intelligence Directorate). This body exists mainly to conduct military intelligence in the interests of the country's security and carefully study a potential enemy. The arrival of German troops on the territory of Poland created ideal conditions for the organization of intelligence work in this country. Czechoslovakia, occupied by Germany, was also a good field for the activities of Soviet military intelligence. For many years, Hungary was considered by the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union as a potential adversary, which required the presence of an expanded agent network there. The Soviet Union had only recently ended the war with Finland and had no reason to trust its government. Romania was also offended by the rejection of Moldavia and Bessarabia and therefore required constant close attention. And there is no doubt that the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff had its agents in these countries and received relevant information from it. One has to doubt the quality of this agency, information and the correctness of F.I. Golikov and G.K. Zhukov.

Secondly, from January 14, 1941 G.K. Zhukov already worked at the General Staff (Politburo resolution No. P25/85 dated 01/14/41 on the appointment of the chief of the General Staff and commanders of military districts), was up to date, got acquainted with his deputies, heads of departments and departments. Twice - on January 29 and 30 - he, together with the people's commissar of defense, was at the reception of I.V. Stalin. He constantly received alarming information from the Soviet-German border, knew that the Red Army was not ready for a war with Germany, and in early February he instructed the head of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff, Lieutenant General G.K. Malandin to prepare an updated operational plan by March 22 in the event of a German attack on the Soviet Union. Then, on February 12, together with the People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko and the head of the Organizational and Mobilization Department, Major General Chetvertikov G.K. Zhukov represented I.V. Stalin's mobilization plan, which was approved with virtually no amendments. Thus, it turns out that the General Staff was thoroughly preparing to repel fascist aggression.

The meeting at which the report of the head of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army was made took place on March 20, 1941, when G.K. Zhukov had been in the post of Chief of the General Staff for almost two months and had done some work to improve the combat effectiveness of the Red Army. At the same meeting, of course, was the People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko. Deputy Chief of the General Staff F.I. Golikov reports to the leadership of the country conclusions that are fundamentally at odds with the conclusions of his direct superiors, and S.K. Timoshenko and G.K. Zhukov does not react to this in any way. To allow this situation, knowing the cool character of G.K. Zhukov, absolutely impossible.

Before me is the capital work of retired Colonel-General Yuri Alexandrovich Gorkov “Kremlin, Headquarters, General Staff”, which the author developed over the course of seven years, being a consultant for the Historical-Archival and Military-Memorial Center of the General Staff. In the appendix, he gives an extract from the journals of visiting I.V. Stalin in his Kremlin office since 1935. It follows from this journal that S.K. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, K.A. Meretskov and P.V. Rychagov (Head of the Main Directorate of the Air Force) was at the reception of I.V. Stalin on February 2 and conferred for almost two hours.

The next time they, as well as S.M. Budyonny and Chetverikov visited this high office on February 12 to approve the mobilization plan.

February 22 at a meeting with I.V. Stalin except S.K. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukova, S.M. Budyonny, K.A. Meretskova, P.V. Rychagova were also present G.I. Kulik (Head of the Main Directorate of Artillery of the Red Army) and the famous test pilot General M.M. Gromov (head of the Flight Research Institute), as well as all members of the Politburo of the RCP (b). This meeting was held from 17.15 to 21.00.

February 25 for an appointment with I.V. Stalin is again invited to S.K. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, K.A. Meretskov, P.V. Rychagov, as well as the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Main Directorate of the Air Force of the Red Army, General F.A. Astakhov. The presence of two leading military pilots at a meeting with the head of state indicates either special tasks for this branch of the Armed Forces, or some important information received from air reconnaissance. The discussion of these issues took almost two hours.

March 1 for an appointment with I.V. Stalin is again invited by S.K. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, K.A. Meretskov, P.V. Rychagov, G.I. Kulik, as well as the first deputy commander of the Red Army Air Force, General P.F. Zhigarev and a member of the Economic Council for the Defense Industry under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR P.N. Goremykin. The meeting takes 2 hours and 45 minutes.

March 8 at a meeting with I.V. Stalin arrived at 20.05 S.K. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, S.M. Budyonny, P.V. Rychagov and consulted until 23:00.

The next meeting with the military at I.V. Stalin took place on March 17, 1941, and S.K. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, K.A. Meretskov, P.V. Rychagov, P.F. Zhigarev. They conferred from 15.15 to 23.10, but, apparently, they did not finally agree. Therefore, the next day, S.K. were invited to the head of state. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, P.V. Rychagov and G.I. Kulik, who were in the office of I.V. Stalin from 19.05 to 21.10, and as a result of this meeting, the resolution of the Politburo on mobilization fees No. 28/155, prepared on March 3, 1941, was adopted.

And now we are reading from G.K. Zhukov on the report of the Chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff to the leadership of the country on March 20, 1941. Prior to this, S.K. Timoshenko and G.K. Zhukov was held in the office of I.V. Stalin at various meetings for a total of more than 30 hours each. Was this time really not enough to discuss the issues of the country's defense and the combat readiness of the Red Army?

V. D. Sokolovsky - Deputy Chief of the General Staff

So, according to the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov, at a meeting on March 20, based only on the report of General F.I. Golikov's threat of an attack by fascist Germany on the USSR in 1941 was dispelled. But further in the same work, Georgy Konstantinovich writes: “On May 6, 1941, I.V. Stalin was sent a note by the People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov: “The naval attaché in Berlin, Captain 1st Rank Vorontsov, reports that, according to one German officer from Hitler’s Headquarters, the Germans are preparing an invasion of the USSR through Finland, the Baltic states and Romania by May 14. At the same time, powerful air raids on Moscow and Leningrad and parachute landings in border centers are planned ... I believe the note said that the information is false and was specifically sent along this channel in order to check how the USSR would react to this.

And again we return to the monograph by Yu.A. Gorkov. According to her data, S.K. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukov and other senior military leaders conferred with I.V. Stalin April 5, 9, 10, 14, 20, 21, 23, 28, 29. At the last meeting, a note by the People's Commissariat of Defense on the combat readiness of the western border military districts was discussed. And again, a completely logical question arises: what did the top military leaders talk about with the head of state for many hours, if not about the growing threat of war? Why then, according to G.K. Zhukov, “... the tension grew. And the closer the threat of war approached, the harder the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense worked. The leadership of the People's Commissariat and the General Staff, especially Marshal S.K. Tymoshenko, at that time worked 18-19 hours a day. Often the people's commissar stayed in his office until the morning.

Work, judging by the notes of Yu.A. Gorkov, and in fact it was tense. In May 1941, S.K. Timoshenko and G.K. Zhukov confer with I.V. Stalin on the 10th, 12th, 14th, 19th, 23rd. On May 24, in addition to the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff, commanders, members of the Military Council and air force commanders of the Western Special, Kiev Special, Baltic, and Odessa military districts are invited to a meeting with the head of state. This meeting has been going on for over three hours.

At the beginning of June 1941, on the 3rd, 6th, 9th and 11th, I.V. Stalin at the meeting were S.K. Timoshenko and G.K. Zhukov, and also often the head of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff, General N.F. Vatutin. The presence of the latter speaks of the preparation of the most important operational documents, probably related to bringing the troops to combat readiness.

But here again we open the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov and read: “June 13 S.K. Timoshenko called I.V. in my presence. Stalin and asked for permission to give instructions on bringing the troops of the border districts to combat readiness and deploying the first echelons according to cover plans.

- Let's think, - answered I.V. Stalin.

The next day we were again at I.V. Stalin and reported to him about the anxious mood in the districts and the need to bring the troops to full combat readiness.

- Do you propose to mobilize the country, raise troops now and move them to the western borders? This is war! Do you both understand this or not?!”

According to G.K. Zhukov, I.V. On June 14, Stalin decisively rejected the proposal of the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff to put the troops on combat readiness.

But according to Yu.A. Gorkov, in the period from June 11 to June 19, neither S.S. Timoshenko, nor G.K. The head of state did not have Zhukov. But it is known that at the end of the first half of June 1941, the advancement of military formations located in the interior regions of the western border military districts, closer to the state border, began. Some of these formations were transferred by rail, and a significant number of them were put forward by marching order at night.

Also, as early as mid-May 1941, a gradual transfer by rail and partly marching order of individual rifle corps and divisions from the internal military districts: Ural, Volga, Kharkov and North Ural to the border of the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers began. In the first half of June, the transfer of six divisions from the Trans-Baikal Military District to the Right-Bank Ukraine to the areas of Shepetovka, Proskurov and Berdichev began.

Planning of military operations. By June 22, 1941, preparing to repel fascist aggression, the Soviet leadership deployed troops of three military districts and part of the forces of the Odessa military district on the western border from the Baltic to the Black Sea, which, in the event of a war, were to be transformed into fronts and a separate army. To bring this entire mass of troops to full combat readiness and use it to defeat the enemy, mobilization and operational plans were developed.

The mobilization plan for 1938-1939 (November 29, 1937 - MP-22), developed by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR under the leadership of B.M. Shaposhnikov, provided for in the event of war, due to additional conscription, the growth of rifle troops by 1.7 times, tank brigades by 2.25 times, an increase in the number of guns and tanks by 50%, and an increase in the Air Force to 155 air brigades. Special hope was placed on tank troops. It was envisaged that eight of the 20 light tank brigades, consisting of BT tanks, would be withdrawn. They were to be reduced to four tank corps. The remaining six brigades of BT tanks and the same number of brigades of T-26 tanks remained separate. In addition to the three existing motorized rifle brigades, it was planned to form another brigade, so that in the future there would be one such brigade in each tank corps.

The mobilization plan adopted in the USSR in 1938 began to be revised by B.M. Shaposhnikov in connection with the change in the territory of the USSR in 1939-1940, the reorganization of the Red Army, the experience of the Soviet-Finnish and the outbreak of World War II. But he did not have time to complete this work to the end. This is evidenced by the acts of transfer of the People's Commissariat of Defense to K.E. Voroshilov and the General Staff B.M. Shaposhnikov to the new People's Commissar S.K. Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff K.A. Meretskov in the summer of 1940. They stated: “The NPO does not have a Mobplan by the time it is received, and the army cannot be mobilized systematically.” And further: “In connection with the holding of organizational events, the redeployment of units and the change in the boundaries of military districts, the current mob plan is fundamentally disrupted and requires complete revision. At present, the army does not have a mobilization plan."

But B.M. Shaposhnikov handed over the position to K.A. Meretskov already has a practically ready mobilization plan, which Kirill Afanasyevich only has to approve. A new version of the mobilization plan was prepared by the General Staff of the Red Army by September 1940. But then it turned out that it needed to be linked with other documents, so the revision of the mobilization plan dragged on until February 1941.

However, this plan was not approved by the political leadership of the country. He also had opponents in the highest military circles, who considered it necessary to have a significantly larger number of large mechanized formations. Therefore, the General Staff had to get back to work.

The draft of the new mobilization plan was presented by S.K. Timoshenko and K.A. Meretskov for consideration by the government of the USSR on February 12, 1941, when G.K. was already at the head of the General Staff. Zhukov. The presented project was approved by I.V. Stalin.

Based on the experience of the outbreak of the First World War, the Soviet leadership believed that a significant time would pass from the declaration of war to the actual start of hostilities. Based on this, it was supposed to carry out mobilization by echelon within one month. The first echelon on the first or third day after the declaration of war was supposed to mobilize units and formations of the armies covering the state border of the border military districts, which accounted for 25-30% of combat formations and were kept in peacetime in reinforced strength. In the same echelon, the Air Force, air defense troops and fortified areas were put on alert. In the second echelon on the fourth-seventh day of the war, it was planned to mobilize the rest of the combat units, combat support units, army rear units and institutions. In the third echelon, on the eighth to fifteenth day of the war, it was necessary to deploy front-line rear services, repair bases, and front-line spare parts. In the fourth echelon on the sixteenth to thirtieth day, it was planned to deploy spare parts and stationary hospitals.

The deployment of rifle, tank, cavalry and motorized divisions of the border military districts, contained in a reinforced composition (70-80% of the wartime staff), was supposed to be carried out in two echelons. The first echelon (permanent personnel) was supposed to be ready for action in two to four hours from the moment the order was received, and tank units in six hours. The second echelon was supposed to be ready for action by the end of the third day.

For the deployment of new formations and units, reserves were created in advance in the troops and in warehouses. As of June 22, 1941, all border formations were provided with small arms and machine guns by 100%, machine guns, heavy machine guns, anti-aircraft machine guns - by 30%, artillery pieces of all systems - by 75-96%, tanks of all types - by 60% , including heavy - by 13%, medium (T-34 and T-36) - by 7%, light - by 133%. The provision of the Air Force with aircraft was about 80%, including combat aviation - 67%.

Thus, the predecessors of G.K. Zhukov managed to develop such an important document as a mobilization plan in case of war. Georgy Konstantinovich had only to bring this plan to the executors and ensure its implementation. But this is where things get weird.

After that, in order to develop private mobilization plans, directives were immediately sent to the headquarters of the military districts, which indicated mobilization tasks, calendar dates for the implementation of the main events and deadlines for the development of district mobilization plans (June 1, 1941). In accordance with these directives, meetings of military councils were held in the military districts, the decisions of which were immediately brought to the attention of the troops.

But here the strangest begins. Due to the fact that the mobilization plan was subsequently changed and refined several times, directives that were not finally approved were constantly sent to the troops, and the military headquarters did not have time to work them out. Frequent changes in policy documents also led to the fact that many of them were simply not worked out. There were other reasons for the delay in working out mobilization documents. Thus, it is known that the meeting of the Military Council of the Western Special Military District was held twenty days late compared to the calendar dates, and the directive was sent to the troops only on March 26, 1941. By this directive, the deadline for developing the district's mobilization plan was postponed until June 15, 1941.

But developing a mobilization plan is only part of the story. It was necessary to ensure its implementation, but here the situation was unimportant. Employees of the military registration and enlistment offices of the border districts did not know well the mobilization capabilities of their areas, as a result of which many scarce specialists could not arrive in time for the troops. The air forces of the districts also had low combat readiness - 12 air regiments and 8 air bases were not equipped with personnel and military equipment.

The condition of the mechanized corps was not the best either. So, in the Western Special Military District, only one of the mechanized corps was equipped with tanks by 79%, the other five - by 15-25%. Due to the lack of the necessary military equipment, the 26th, 31st and 38th tank divisions, as well as the 210th motorized division, were armed with 76-mm and 45-mm guns in order to continue to act as anti-tank formations.

The combat readiness and combat training of a number of units of the Western Special Military District were unsatisfactory. The District Air Force received an unsatisfactory rating during an inspection in the fall of 1940. During a re-inspection of the District Air Force by the head of the Main Directorate of the Red Army Air Force, Lieutenant General P.F. Zhigarev in March-April 1941 again noted low combat readiness, poor maintenance of weapons, insufficient level of flight training of the personnel of aviation regiments.

In the Baltic Special Military District, things were even worse. The deployment of the district to wartime states was supposed to be carried out at the expense of local resources, but for this it was necessary to create a network of military commissariats in the Baltic republics, then it was necessary to determine the availability of these resources at the enterprises of the national economy and only then paint them in formations and parts. And this despite the fact that in May 1941 there was not yet introduced universal military duty, defined by law in September 1940.

In a number of military districts, poor combat readiness of air defense forces and means was noted. So, the air defense control commission headed by Colonel General G.M. Stern, following the results of the check, indicated that “the combat readiness of the air defense of Leningrad is in an unsatisfactory state ... The combat readiness of the 3rd and 4th air defense divisions of the Kiev Special Military District is in an unsatisfactory state. The air defense units of Kyiv are almost not preparing for night defense ... The combat training of the 4th air defense division, as well as the air defense system of Lviv as a whole, is in an unsatisfactory state.

The second extremely important document developed by the General Staff was the Considerations on the Fundamentals of the Strategic Deployment of the USSR Armed Forces in the West and East for 1940 and 1941 dated September 18, 1940. They indicated that on the western borders the most likely enemy of the USSR would be Germany, with which Italy, Hungary, Romania and Finland could also come out in an alliance. In total, according to the developers of this document, “taking into account the above probable opponents, the following can be deployed against the Soviet Union in the West: Germany - 173 infantry divisions, 10,000 tanks, 13,000 aircraft; Finland - 15 infantry divisions, 400 aircraft; Romania - 30 infantry divisions, 250 tanks, 1100 aircraft; Hungary - 15 infantry divisions, 300 tanks, 500 aircraft. In total - 253 infantry divisions, 10,550 tanks, 15,100 aircraft.

To combat this enemy, the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff proposed to deploy the main forces of the Red Army in the west "or south of Brest-Litovsk, in order to make a powerful blow in the direction of Lublin and Krakow and further to Breslav (Bratislav) in the very first stage of the war cut off Germany from the Balkan countries, deprive her of her most important economic bases, and decisively influence the Balkan countries on questions of their participation in the war; or north of Brest-Litovsk with the task of defeating the main forces of the German army within East Prussia and capturing the latter.

A.M. Vasilevsky writes in his book The Work of All Life that he began work on the Considerations in mid-April 1940. At the same time, he admits that “the main thing had already been done by that time. During all recent years, the preparation of the plan was directly supervised by B.M. Shaposhnikov, and by that time the General Staff had completed its development for submission and approval to the Central Committee of the Party.

K.A. Meretskov found many shortcomings in the plan for covering the state border, developed by his predecessor. They were eliminated by N.F. Vatutin, G.K. Malandin and A.M. Vasilevsky. The latter writes that this project and the plan for the strategic deployment of the Red Army troops were reported directly to I.V. Stalin on September 18, 1940 in the presence of some members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the party. From the People's Commissariat of Defense, the plan was presented by S.K. Timoshenko, K.A. Meretskov and N.F. Vatutin. The General Staff believed that the main blow of the enemy could be inflicted on one of two options: south or north of Brest-Litovsk (Brest). Thus, I.V. had to put an end to this issue. Stalin.

When considering this plan, as A.M. Vasilevsky, referring to the evidence of K.A. Meretskova (Kirill Afanasyevich himself does not write anything about this), I.V. Stalin expressed the opinion that in the event of war the German troops would strike the main blow in the Ukraine. Therefore, the General Staff was instructed to develop a new plan, providing for the concentration of the main grouping of Soviet troops in the South-Western direction.

On October 5, 1940, the plan for the strategic deployment of the Soviet Armed Forces was considered by the leaders of the party and state. During the discussions, it was considered expedient to emphasize once again that the main grouping of Soviet troops should be deployed in the South-Western direction. Based on this, it was supposed to further strengthen the composition of the troops of the Kiev Special Military District.

The plan, modified taking into account the comments received on the deployment of the Red Army near the western borders of the USSR, was submitted for approval by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Government on October 14, 1940. All issues relating to the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff were to be completed no later than December 15, 1940. From January 1, the headquarters of the military districts were to start developing the appropriate plans.

But at the end of 1940, new information was received about Germany's preparations for a war in the East and about the grouping of its forces and means. Based on this, according to A.M. Vasilevsky, “The General Staff and our Operational Directorate as a whole made adjustments to the operational plan developed during the autumn and winter of 1940 for the concentration and deployment of the Armed Forces to repel an enemy attack from the west.” At the same time, it was envisaged "that our troops would enter the war in all cases fully prepared and as part of the groupings provided for by the plan, that the mobilization and concentration of troops would be carried out in advance."

With the advent of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov's considerations changed radically on March 11, 1941, taking into account the increased role of the Kiev Special Military District. It is believed that "Germany, most likely, will deploy its main forces in the southeast - from Sedlec to Hungary, in order to seize Ukraine with a blow to Berdichev, Kyiv." At the same time, it is assumed that "this strike, apparently, will be accompanied by an auxiliary strike in the north - from East Prussia to Dvinsk and Riga, or concentric strikes from Suwalki and Brest to Volkovysk, Baranovichi."

At the same time, Georgy Konstantinovich made a number of significant remarks on the Deployment Plan worked out by his predecessors. M.V. Zakharov writes: “With the appointment of General of the Army G.K. Zhukov, Chief of the General Staff, the strategic deployment plan in the spring of 1941 again became the subject of discussion and clarification.

As you can see, the finalization of the Plan for covering the state border was carried out in February - April 1941 with the participation of the General Staff and the leadership of the headquarters of the military districts (commander, chief of staff, member of the Military Council, head of the Operations Department). “At the same time, it was envisaged that by the beginning of the enemy’s operations, being fully staffed according to the wartime staff, the covering echelons would deploy on prepared defensive lines along the border and, together with fortified areas and border troops, would be able, in case of emergency, to cover the mobilization of troops of the second echelons of the border districts, which, according to the mobilization plan, were allotted for this from several hours to one day.

M.V. Zakharov writes that the last revision of this document was made in May-June 1941. The document was written, as before, by A.M. Vasilevsky, and then corrected by N.F. Vatutin. The idea of ​​concentrating the main efforts in Ukraine remains in force.

Considerations in the new edition are signed by People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko, Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov and its developer Major General A.M. Vasilevsky.

Only a few months remain before the start of the war, but G.K. Zhukov is not appeased. On May 15, 1941, new Considerations on the plan for the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, developed on his orders, were proposed to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.

In them, the Chief of the General Staff warned that "Germany currently keeps its army mobilized, with deployed rears and has the opportunity to warn us in the deployment and deliver a surprise strike." Therefore, G.K. Zhukov suggested "in no case give the initiative to the German command, preempt the enemy in deployment and attack the German army at a time when it will be in the deployment stage and will not have time to organize the front and the interaction of troops."

To achieve this goal, G.K. Zhukov proposed in the first phase of the operation to defeat the main forces of the German army deployed south of Brest - Demblin, and to ensure the exit of Soviet troops by the 30th day of the operation to the line of Ostrolenka, r. Narew, Lovich, Lodz, Kreutzburg, Opeln, Olomouc. Subsequently, he intended to advance from the Katowice region in a northern or northwestern direction, defeat the enemy and seize the territory of former Poland and East Prussia.

As an immediate task, it was planned to defeat the German army east of the river. Vistula and in the Krakow direction to reach the line of the river. Narew, Vistula and capture the area of ​​Katowice. To do this, it was proposed to deliver the main blow by the forces of the Southwestern Front in the direction of Krakow, Katowice, cut off Germany from its southern allies, and an auxiliary blow by the left wing of the Western Front - in the direction of Warsaw, Demboin in order to pin down the Warsaw grouping and capture Warsaw, as well as to assist Southwestern Front in the defeat of the Lublin group. At the same time, it was planned to conduct an active defense against Finland, East Prussia, Hungary, Romania and be ready, if the situation was favorable, to strike against Romania.

This is how a document appeared, on the basis of which some authors later began to assert that the USSR was preparing for aggression against Germany and its allies. This document was first published in Military Historical Journal No. 2, 1992. At the same time, the author of the publication V.N. Kiselev pointed out that it was written by A.M. Vasilevsky, but not signed by G.K. Zhukov, nor S.K. Timoshenko, not to mention I.V. Stalin. Consequently, it represented only one of the possible courses of action, which was not approved and was not further developed.

Time will pass, and the researchers of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War will unanimously begin to blame I.V. Stalin in that he incorrectly determined the direction of the main attack of the enemy. At the same time, these “researchers” completely do not take into account the factor that since the middle of 1940, almost the entire top of the Red Army consisted of representatives of the Kiev Special Military District, and these people, quite naturally, were used to working in the interests of their region and knew its features better than others. operational directions.

It all started with the appointment of the former commander of KOVO S.K. Timoshenko, who immediately began to drag his colleagues to Moscow. He invited the former chief of staff of this district, N.F. Vatutin to the post of Chief of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff, Chief of the mobilization department of the KOVO, Major General N.L. Nikitin - to the post of head of the Mobilization Directorate of the General Staff. Former commander of a mechanized brigade and head of the armored forces of the KVO I.Ya. Fedorenko becomes the head of the Armored Directorate of the Red Army. Former commander of the 6th Army KOVO F.I. Golikov becomes chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate and deputy chief of the General Staff. Former member of the Military Council of the KOVO Corps Commissar S.K. Kozhevnikov is appointed to the post of Military Commissar of the General Staff. After the post of Chief of the General Staff instead of K.A. Meretskov, the commander of the KOVO, General G.K. Zhukov, he makes N.F. Vatutin, and the deputy chief of staff of the KOVO, Major General G.K. Malandin. The head of the fortified areas of the KOVO, Major General S.I. Shiryaev.

M.V. Zakharov writes: “Employees promoted to responsible work in the General Staff from the Kiev Special Military District, by virtue of their previous service, continued to attach more importance to the South-Western direction. When assessing the general military-strategic situation in the Western theater of war, their attention, in our opinion, was involuntarily riveted to what “stuck to the heart”, possessed consciousness for a long time and, naturally, obscured and relegated to the background the most significant facts and circumstances, without which it was impossible to reproduce a true picture of impending events. Further, he concludes that “this method of selecting the leading employees of the General Staff cannot be considered successful. There was no reason or good reason to widely update it in the conditions of the approaching war, and besides, there were no persons who gravitated, from the experience of their previous activities, to assess the situation from the standpoint of the interests of the command of the South-Western direction.

Thus, when developing the main document for the operational use of troops, the General Staff of the Red Army, represented at first by K.A. Meretskov, and then G.K. Zhukov showed certain hesitation and delayed the time. But on the basis of these Considerations, military districts, armies, corps and divisions were to develop their plans.

Based on the Considerations, operational plans were developed to cover the state border of military districts and armies. There was very little time left for this work.

S. K. Timoshenko and G. K. Zhukov in the General Staff of the Red Army

Thus, the plan for covering the state border, developed by the General Staff, was brought to the headquarters of the Baltic Special Military District in early May 1941. On the basis of this document, the headquarters of the district was to develop and bring to the armies a plan to cover the land border with East Prussia, which was done. The memories of the former commander of the 8th Army, General P.P., have been preserved about how this happened. Sobennikov. In particular, he writes:

“The position of the commander of the army of the border military district obliged me, first of all, to familiarize myself with the plan for the defense of the state border in order to clarify the place and role in this plan of the army entrusted to me. But, unfortunately, neither at the General Staff, nor upon arrival in Riga, at the headquarters of the Baltic Special Military District, I was informed of the existence of such a plan. Upon arrival at the headquarters of the 8th Army, in the city of Jelgava, I also did not find any instructions on this issue. I have the impression that it is unlikely that at that time (March 1941) such a plan existed. Only on May 28, 1941, I was summoned with the Chief of Staff of the Army, Major General Larionov G.A. and a member of the Military Council, divisional commissar Shabalov S.I. to the headquarters of the district, where the commander of the troops of the district, Colonel-General Kuznetsov F.I. literally hastily acquainted me with the plan of defense.

At the headquarters of the district on this day, I met the commander of the 11th Army, Lieutenant General Morozov V.I., the chief of staff of this army, Major General Shlemin I.T., the commander of the 27th Army, Major General Berzarin N.E., his chief of staff and members of the Military Councils of both armies. The commander of the district received the commanders of the armies separately and, apparently, gave them similar instructions - to urgently familiarize themselves with the defense plan, make and report to him a decision.

Further, the commander of the 8th Army recalls that the plan was a rather voluminous notebook, the text in which was typed on a typewriter. Approximately one and a half to two hours after receiving the plan, without having had time to get acquainted with it, the army commander was summoned to the district commander, who, in a darkened room, dictated to him his decision on defense one to one. It came down to concentrating the main efforts of the army in the Siauliai - Tauragu direction (125th and 90th rifle divisions) and covering the border from the Baltic Sea (Palanga cape) on a front of about 80 kilometers with the forces of one 10th rifle division of the 11th rifle division corps. The 48th Rifle Division was supposed to be transferred to the left flank of the army and extend the front of defense to the left of the 125th Rifle Division, covering the main direction. The 12th mechanized corps (commander - Major General N.M. Shestopalov) was withdrawn north of Shauliai to the second echelon of the army. However, the right to issue an order to the commander of this corps, the commander of the 8th Army, was not granted. It was to be used by order of the front commander.

After that, workbooks with notes on the defense plan from the army commander and his chief of staff were confiscated. It was promised that these notebooks would be immediately sent to the army headquarters by special mail. “Unfortunately, after that, we did not receive any instructions or even our workbooks,” the army commander admits. “Thus, the defense plan was not communicated to the troops.”

The situation with operational planning in the troops of the Western Special Military District was no better. So, the chief of staff of the 10th Army, General P. I Lyapin, writes: “We made and reworked the 1941 state border defense plan from January until the very beginning of the war, but we never finished it. Changes to the first plan directive were made three times during this time, and all three times the plan had to be redone. The last change in the operational directive was personally received by me in Minsk on May 14, in which it was ordered to complete the development of the plan by May 20 and submit it to the district commander for approval. On May 18, Major Sidorenko, deputy chief of the operational department of the army headquarters, delivered to Minsk the decision of the army commander on the map, which the commander of the district troops had to approve. Major Sidorenko returned on the evening of May 19 and reported that Major General Semyonov, the head of the operational department of the district headquarters, had transmitted: “Basically approved, continue development.” Major Sidorenko did not bring any written document confirming the plan.

We did not expect the arrival of Major Sidorenko and the instructions that he was supposed to bring from Minsk, but continued to develop a written plan for the defense of the state border, and on May 20 in the evening I reported to the chief of staff of the district: “The plan is ready, the approval of the commander of the district troops is required in order to proceed to development of executive documents. We look forward to your call for a report." But I did not wait for this call before the start of the war.

In the book “Combat operations of the troops of the 4th Army in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War”, the chief of staff of the 4th Army of the Western Special Military District, General L.M. Sandalov writes:

“In April 1941, the command of the 4th Army received a directive from the headquarters of the Western Special Military District, according to which it was necessary to develop a plan for covering, mobilizing, concentrating and deploying troops on the territory of the district ... The army was to form the basis of the 4th (Brest) cover area.

In accordance with the directive received from the district, an army cover area was developed ...

The main drawback of the district and army cover plans was their unreality. A significant part of the troops provided for covering tasks did not exist ...

The most negative impact on the organization of the defense of the 4th Army was the inclusion of half of area No. 3 in its zone ... This determined that in the event of the opening of hostilities, parts of three divisions (42, 49 and 113) were forced to be transferred on alarm at a distance of 50–75 km.

The unreality of the tasks facing the troops of RP-4 (4th Army) also consisted in the fact that the Brest fortified region did not yet exist, field fortifications were not built; the organization of defense on a front of more than 150 km in a short time by the forces of three rifle divisions, a significant part of which was on the construction of a fortified area, was unfeasible.

The task assigned to the 14th mechanized corps was also unrealistic. The divisions of the corps had just received a new replenishment of the rank and file, they had a shortage of tank weapons. There is also a lack of the required amount of traction means for artillery, understaffed rear units and a lack of command personnel ... ".

In his memoirs, the former head of the operational department of the headquarters of the Kiev Special Military District I.Kh. Bagramyan writes that for the first time he got acquainted with the Plan for covering the state border by the troops of this district at the end of January 1941.

In 1989, the Military Publishing House published a book by A.V. Vladimirsky "On the Kiev direction", compiled on the basis of the experience of conducting combat operations by the 5th Army of the South-Western Front in June - September 1941. In it, the author examined this issue in some detail, on the basis of new documents that have been opened, and made a number of competent, well-founded conclusions. On the issue of implementing the plan for covering and training army troops, the author writes: “Mobilization plans in all rifle formations and units were worked out. They were systematically checked by higher headquarters, refined and corrected. The assignment to the formations and units of personnel, mechanized transport, horses, baggage and clothing at the expense of the resources of the national economy was basically completed (except for the 135th rifle division) ".

But it should be noted that A.V. Vladimirsky writes about the mobilization plan, and not the operational plan for covering the state border, which, in terms of tasks and content, are completely different documents. The first talks about how to gather troops, the second - how to use them to solve a worthwhile combat mission.

To answer the second question, we take the memories of the former chief of staff of the 15th Rifle Corps, Major General Z.Z. Rogozny. This corps was supposed to form the basis of the defense sector No. 1 of the covering area of ​​the 5th Army. Z.Z. Rogozny writes that on the eve of the war, the commander, the chief of staff of the corps, as well as all division commanders, who clarified the combat missions facing them, were familiarized with the defense plan on the eve of the war at the army headquarters. However, the headquarters of the corps and divisions did not have documents regarding defense plans, therefore, they did not develop their own plans.

Commander of the 45th Rifle Division of the 15th Rifle Corps, Major General G.I. Sherstyuk writes that when studying the combat readiness plans of units of the 45th Infantry Division, he was surprised that the leading officers of the division headquarters (Chief of Staff - Colonel Chumakov) and the commanders of rifle and artillery regiments with their headquarters "did not know the line of defense of the state border" , and therefore, they did not work out the issues of "advancing, occupying defensive lines and conducting battles to hold the state border, as was played out when I was in command of the 97th Infantry Division of the 6th Army."

Former Chief of Staff of the 62nd Rifle Division of the 15th Rifle Corps of the 5th Army P.A. Novichkov wrote that the division did not have any written document on the organization of the defense of the state border by the beginning of the war. However, he confirms the fact that in the first days of April, the commanders and chiefs of staff of the 87th and 45th rifle divisions were called to the headquarters of the 5th army, where they received maps at a scale of 1: 100,000 and made copies of the battalion areas from the army plan with their own hands. engineering equipment of defense lines of compounds.

In the 6th Army, on the basis of the Plan for covering the Kiev Special Military District, the commander and headquarters developed a Plan for covering area No. 2. The same plans were available in the 62nd and 12th armies of this district. But they were not brought to subordinate connections.

Thus, the commander of the 72nd Rifle Division of the 8th Rifle Corps of the 26th Army, Colonel P.I. After the war, Abramidze wrote in his memoirs that he did not know the mobilization plan (MP-41) before the start of the war. True, after opening the package, he was convinced that all command-staff exercises and other preparatory work on the eve of the war were carried out in strict accordance with this plan.

The headquarters of the Odessa Military District, according to the memoirs of the head of the operational department of the 9th Army G.F. Zakharov, received a directive from the People's Commissar of Defense on the development of a plan for covering the state border on May 6, 1941. In this directive, the tasks of the district troops were formulated in general terms.

The plan for covering the state border was submitted to the General Staff by the headquarters of the Odessa Military District on June 20, 1941. For his approval, the deputy chief of staff of the district for operational issues, Colonel L.V., left for Moscow. Vetoshnikov. He arrived in Moscow when the war had already begun. But the headquarters of the Odessa Military District, without waiting for the official approval of the plan by the General Staff, gave instructions to the corps commanders on the development of plans for formations.

* * *

Thus, in the first half of 1941, the General Staff of the Red Army carried out a lot of work to strengthen the Red Army, engineer equipment for the theater of operations, reconnaissance of a potential enemy and planning military operations in the event of a war. At the same time, this work was mainly carried out at the level of the General Staff, the headquarters of the military districts and the headquarters of the armies covering the state border. This work did not descend in full to the level of corps, divisions and regiments. Therefore, it is quite appropriate to say that the Great Patriotic War was sudden only at the tactical level.

There was no proper clarity in the work of the Soviet General Staff. Many events were planned and carried out spontaneously, without a specific assessment of the country's capabilities and the conditions of the current situation. Huge efforts were spent on the engineering equipment of the new border of the USSR, despite the fact that world experience spoke of the low effectiveness of such defensive lines in the new conditions of warfare.

There are many incomprehensible things in the work of Soviet foreign intelligence. On the one hand, she received the necessary information about Germany's preparations for aggression against the USSR, on the other hand, this information was not enough to make a decision by the top Soviet leadership. This means that it was either incomplete or stuck on the way to the Kremlin and the People's Commissariat of Defense.

A lot of questions arise related to the development by the General Staff of the main guiding documents in case of war. The quality of these documents can be recognized as good, but the deadlines for execution turned out to be too long, which nullified all the great work done. As a result, the troops were forced to enter the war without the necessary combat documents.

The result of all these factors was that many defensive measures were not planned or carried out until June 21, 1941, by the time the impending war had already become a fact.

Zhukov against Halder [Fight of military geniuses] Runov Valentin Aleksandrovich

The work of the General Staff of the Red Army in 1941

In 1941, the General Staff of the Red Army, headed by G.K. Zhukov carried out his work in parallel in several directions.

Measures continued to strengthen the Red Army, increase its combat power, primarily through the receipt of new models of weapons and military equipment by the troops.

Tanks. In this regard, much attention was paid to the creation of large formations of tank troops and equipping them with new military equipment. After the February conference of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1941, the creation of large tank formations went faster. New mechanized corps began to be deployed. For their armament in the first half of the same year, 1,500 tanks of new designs were manufactured. All of them entered the troops, but due to lack of time they were not properly mastered. The human factor also played a significant role - many military commanders did not dare to launch new models of tanks into intensive operation without a command from above, but such a command was not received.

Artillery. By the beginning of the war, the leadership of artillery was carried out by the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army, which was headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union G.I. Sandpiper. His deputy was Colonel-General of Artillery N.N. Voronov. On June 14, 1941, Colonel-General of Artillery N.D. Yakovlev. Directly in the troops there were chiefs of artillery of districts, armies, corps, divisions. Military artillery was subdivided into regimental, divisional and corps artillery. There was also artillery of the RKG, which consisted of cannon and howitzer regiments, separate divisions of high power and anti-tank artillery brigades. The cannon artillery regiment had 48 122-mm cannons and 152-mm howitzer cannons, and the high-capacity cannon regiment had 24 152-mm cannons. The howitzer artillery regiment had 48 152-mm howitzers, and the high-capacity howitzer regiment had 24 152-mm howitzers. Separate divisions of high power were armed with five 210-mm cannons, or 280-mm mortars, or 305-mm howitzers.

Characteristics of the staffing of the mechanized corps of the western border military districts on June 22, 1941

By June 1941, prototypes of rocket launchers, the future Katyushas, ​​were made. But their mass production has not yet been established. There were also no specialists able to effectively operate these new weapons.

With anti-tank artillery in the Red Army there was a big backlog. Only in April 1941 did the Soviet command begin to form artillery brigades of the RGK. According to the state, each brigade was to have 120 anti-tank guns and 4,800 anti-tank mines.

Cavalry. Despite the predilection for the cavalry of individual Soviet military leaders, its share in the structure of the ground forces had noticeably decreased by the beginning of the war, and it accounted for only 5% of their total strength. Organizationally, the cavalry consisted of 13 divisions, eight of which were part of four cavalry corps. The cavalry division had four cavalry and one tank regiment (almost 7.5 thousand personnel, 64 tanks, 18 armored vehicles, 132 guns and mortars). If necessary, the cavalry division could fight dismounted, like an ordinary rifle formation.

Engineering Troops. Engineering support was dealt with by the Main Engineering Directorate, which until March 12, 1941 was headed by Major General of the Engineering Troops A.F. Khrenov, and from March 20 - Major General of the Engineering Troops L.Z. Kotlyar. Engineering units were deployed in the troops, but their technical support was very weak. Basically, the calculation was made on a shovel, an ax and improvised building materials. In peacetime, sappers almost did not deal with the issues of mining and demining the area. Starting from 1940, almost all the engineering units of the border military districts were constantly involved in the construction of fortified areas on the new border of the USSR and were not engaged in combat training.

Connection. All issues of strategic communications and supply of troops with communications equipment were assigned to the Communications Directorate of the Red Army, which from July 1940 was headed by Major General N.I. Gapich. By that time, front-line, army, corps and divisional radio communication sets had been developed and entered the troops, but not all of them were mastered to a sufficient extent. In addition, many commanders did not trust radio communications, and also did not know how to use it in terms of ensuring secrecy of control.

Air defense. To solve the problems of air defense on a strategic scale, in 1940 the Main Directorate of the Air Defense Forces of the country was created. His chief at first was Lieutenant General D.T. Kozlov, and from March 19, 1941 - Colonel General G.M. Stern. On June 14, 1941, Colonel-General of Artillery N.N. Voronov.

To solve air defense tasks, the entire territory of the USSR was divided into air defense zones in accordance with the boundaries of military districts. The zones were headed by assistant district commanders for air defense. To solve specific tasks, the Main Directorate of the Air Defense Forces of the country had anti-aircraft artillery forces, searchlight, balloon units, as well as fighter aviation formations.

To solve air defense tasks, 39 fighter aviation regiments were allocated from the aviation formations of the military districts, which organizationally remained subordinate to the commanders of the air forces of the districts. In this regard, the assistant commander of the military district for air defense, who was subordinate to the units of anti-aircraft artillery, had to coordinate all issues of using aviation for air defense purposes with the commander of the Air Force.

The military air defense was equipped with anti-aircraft guns and machine guns, but these weapons were scarce in rifle and tank formations, and in practice they could not provide reliable cover for the entire troop concentration area.

Aviation. Aviation was equipped mainly with aircraft of obsolete designs. There were very few new combat vehicles. So, an armored attack aircraft designed by A.S. Ilyushin Il-2, created in 1939, began to enter the troops only in 1941. Fighter design A.S. Yakovlev Yak-1, accepted for mass production in 1940, began to enter the troops also in 1941.

Since April 1941, the head of the Main Directorate of the Air Force was Lieutenant General P.F. Zhigarev, who from November 1937 to September 1938 commanded a group of Soviet "volunteer" pilots in China.

Flight performance and combat characteristics of Soviet aircraft

Then, as a result of mass purges among the senior command staff of the Air Force, he made a quick career and in December 1940 became the first deputy commander of the Red Army Air Force.

There was an increase in the total number of personnel of the Red Army. As of June 22, 5 million people were already under arms in the Armed Forces of the USSR. Of this number, the Ground Forces accounted for 80.6%, the Air Force - 8.6%, the Navy - 7.3%, the Air Defense Forces - 3.3%. In addition, numerous reserves were prepared. At the same time, the level of specialization of the reservists was not very high. We proceeded from the fact that more than 1.4 million tractor drivers and car drivers work on collective farms alone, who could be quickly transferred to combat vehicles if necessary. Throughout the country, pilots, radio operators, paratroopers, infantrymen-shooters were trained in the Osoaviahima system.

reconnaissance of a potential enemy. Barely entering a new position, G.K. Zhukov called the head of the Intelligence Directorate, Lieutenant General F.I. Golikov. He arrived exactly at the appointed time and entered the office of the Chief of the General Staff with a large folder in his hands. In a well-trained voice, he began to confidently report ...

In the last months before the start of the Great Patriotic War, Soviet intelligence worked quite actively. Already on January 12, 1941, in the intelligence report No. 2 of the Border Troops Directorate of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR, it was reported that on December 9, the area of ​​​​the city of Sanok was visited by the commander-in-chief of the German land army, Field Marshal Walter von Brauchitsch, who reviewed the troops and fortifications in the area. The same report reported on the arrival of new German units in the border zone, the construction of barracks for personnel there, concrete firing points, loading and unloading areas on the railway and airfields.

Following this, there are frequent cases of violations by the German side of the State border of the USSR. So, on January 24, 1941, the head of the border troops of the NKVD of the BSSR in his report also reports on the deployment of an army headquarters in Warsaw, and on the territory of the border districts - the headquarters of an army corps, eight headquarters of infantry and one cavalry divisions, 28 infantry, seven artillery, three cavalry and one tank regiment, two aviation schools.

F. I. Golikov - Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army

It was reported below: “From the moment the Convention was concluded to January 1, 1941, a total of 187 various conflicts and incidents arose on the border with Germany ... During the reporting period, 87 cases of border violations by German aircraft were recorded ... Three German aircraft after flying across the border were landed ... which were subsequently released to Germany.

One German aircraft was shot down on March 17, 1940 at the site of the 10th outpost of the Augustow border detachment as a result of the use of weapons.

In connection with the need to maximize the improvement of the intelligence and operational work of the state security organs and the increased volume of this work, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on February 3, 1941, adopts a special Decree on the division of the USSR People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs into two People's Commissariats: the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) and the People's State Security Commissariat (NKGB). The NKGB is entrusted with the tasks of conducting intelligence work abroad and combating the subversive, espionage, sabotage, and terrorist activities of foreign intelligence services within the USSR. He is also instructed to carry out the operational development and liquidation of the remnants of all anti-Soviet parties and counter-revolutionary formations among various sections of the population of the USSR, in the system of industry, transport, communications, agriculture, etc., and also to protect the leaders of the party and government. The same Decree ordered the organization of the republican, regional, regional and district bodies of the NKGB and the NKVD.

On February 8, 1941, the following Resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR was adopted on the transfer of a special department from the NKVD of the USSR to the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR and the People's Commissariat of the Navy of the USSR. “Assign to the special departments of the NPO and the NKVMF (Third Directorates) the tasks of combating counter-revolution, espionage, sabotage, sabotage and all kinds of anti-Soviet manifestations in the Red Army and Navy; identification and informing, respectively, the people's commissar of defense and the people's commissar of the Navy about all the shortcomings and the state of the army and navy units and about all available compromising materials and information on the military personnel of the army and navy.

The same document determined that "all appointments of the operational staff of the Third Directorates of the NPO and the NKVMF, starting with the operational regiment and the corresponding unit in the fleet, are made by orders of the people's commissars of defense and the Navy." Thus, in the structure of the Red Army and the Navy, powerful punitive bodies arose, possessing enormous powers and not accountable to the commanders and commanders of the formations under which they operated. It was determined that the head of the 3rd department of the corps was subordinate to the head of the 3rd department of the district (front) and the commander of the district (front), and the head of the 3rd department of the division was subordinate to the head of the 3rd department of the corps and the commander of the corps.

On February 7, 1941, the 2nd Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR reported rumors spreading among the diplomatic corps in Moscow about the impending German attack on the USSR. At the same time, it was indicated that the purpose of the German attack was the southern regions of the USSR, rich in grain, coal and oil.

Around February 8, the same information was confirmed by an agent of the Berlin residency of the NKGB of the USSR "Corsican", and on March 9, 1941, a telegraph report was received from Belgrade from the military attaché to the head of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army. It reported that "the German General Staff refused to attack the British Isles, the immediate task was to capture Ukraine and Baku, which should be carried out in April-May of this year, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria are now preparing for this."

In March 1941, two more secret messages were received from Berlin from an agent nicknamed "The Corsican". The first reported on the preparation of the German Air Force for military operations against the USSR.

The second once again confirmed Germany's plans for a war against the USSR. At the same time, it was pointed out that the main goal of the aggressor could be grain-producing Ukraine and the oil regions of Baku. The statements of the Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, General F. Halder, about the low combat capability of the Red Army were also cited. Both of these messages were reported to I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov and L.P. Beria.

On March 24, 1941, a message was received from the Berlin residency of the NKGB of the USSR about the preparation of the General Staff of Aviation for military operations against the USSR. And this document emphasizes that “photographs of Soviet cities and other objects, in particular the city of Kyiv, are regularly received by the aviation headquarters.

Among the officers of the aviation headquarters there is an opinion that the military action against the USSR is supposedly dated for the end of April or the beginning of May. These dates are associated with the intention of the Germans to keep the harvest for themselves, hoping that the Soviet troops, during the retreat, will not be able to set fire to more green bread.

On March 31, 1941, the head of foreign intelligence of the NKGB of the USSR informed the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR about the advance of German troops to the border of the Soviet Union. It was said about the transfer of specific formations and units of the German army. In particular, he reported that “in the border points of the General Government against the Brest region, the German authorities proposed to vacate all schools and additionally prepare premises for the arrival of the expected military units of the German army.”

In early April 1941, the head of foreign intelligence of the NKGB of the USSR informed the higher authorities that, on his instructions, an agent nicknamed "Sergeant" met with another agent nicknamed "Corsican" in Berlin. At the same time, Sergeant-Major, referring to other sources, reported on the complete preparation and development of a plan for Germany's attack on the Soviet Union. According to available information, “the operational plan of the army consists in a lightning-fast surprise attack on Ukraine and advance to the east. From East Prussia, a blow is simultaneously struck to the north. The German troops advancing northward must link up with the army advancing from the south, thereby cutting off the Soviet troops located between these lines, closing their flanks. The centers are left without attention, following the example of the Polish and French campaigns.

S. K. Timoshenko and G. K. Zhukov during exercises (spring 1941)

On April 5, 1941, the Department of the Border Troops of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR reports on the construction by the Germans of airfields and landing sites in the border areas with the USSR. In total, from the summer of 1940 to May 1941, 100 airfields and 50 landing sites were built and restored on the territory of Poland. During this time, 250 airfields and 150 landing sites were built directly on the territory of Germany itself.

On April 10, the head of foreign intelligence of the NKGB of the USSR reports to the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army specific data on the concentration of German troops on the Soviet border and the transfer of new formations and units there. At the same time, the agent of the Berlin residency "Yuna" reports on the plans of German aggression against the USSR.

On April 21, 1941, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the NPO of the USSR received another message from the NKVD of the USSR signed by the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. Beria about the receipt by the border detachments of the NKVD of new intelligence data on the concentration of German troops on the Soviet-German border.

At the end of April 1941, Moscow received another message from Berlin from an agent who worked in Germany under the name "Sergeant" with the following content:

“A source working at the headquarters of the German army reports:

1. According to the information received from the liaison officer between the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the headquarters of the German aviation Gregor, the question of Germany's action against the Soviet Union has been finally decided, and its beginning should be expected from day to day. Ribbentrop, who until now had not been a supporter of an attack against the USSR, knowing Hitler's firm determination in this matter, took the position of supporters of an attack on the USSR.

2. According to information received at the aviation headquarters, in recent days there has been increased activity in cooperation between the German and Finnish General Staffs, expressed in the joint development of operational plans against the USSR ...

The reports of the German Aviation Commission, which visited the USSR, and Aschenbrenner, the Air Force Attaché in Moscow, made a depressing impression at the Aviation Headquarters. However, it is hoped that, although Soviet aviation is capable of inflicting a serious blow on German territory, the German army will nevertheless quickly be able to suppress the resistance of Soviet troops by reaching the strongholds of Soviet aviation and paralyzing them.

3. According to information received from Leibrandt, who is an assistant on Russian affairs at the foreign policy department, Gregor's message is confirmed that the issue of speaking out against the Soviet Union is considered resolved.

The postscript to this message indicates that it was reported to I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov and L.P. Beria by the head of the 1st Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR Fitin on April 30, 1941, but the document does not contain resolutions of any of the named persons.

On the same day, April 30, 1941, an alarm message was received from Warsaw. It stated: “According to intelligence data received from various sources, in recent days it has been established that military preparations in Warsaw and on the territory of the General Government are being carried out openly and German officers and soldiers are speaking quite frankly about the upcoming war between Germany and the Soviet Union, as about a matter already decided. The war supposedly should begin after the completion of spring field work ...

From April 10 to April 20, German troops moved eastward through Warsaw continuously, both during the night and during the day ... Trains loaded mainly with heavy artillery, trucks and parts of aircraft go along the railways in an easterly direction. Since mid-April, trucks and Red Cross vehicles have appeared on the streets of Warsaw in large numbers.

The German authorities in Warsaw issued an order to urgently put in order all bomb shelters, darken all windows, and create Red Cross sanitary teams in every house. Mobilized and selected for the army all the vehicles of private individuals and civilian institutions, including German ones. Since the beginning of April, all schools and courses have been closed, and their premises have been occupied by military hospitals.”

This message was also reported to I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov and L.P. Beria.

On May 6, 1941, the head of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army F.I. Golikov made a special report "On the grouping of German troops in the east and southeast on May 5, 1941." In this report, it was directly indicated on many points about the preparation of Germany for a war against the USSR. The conclusions stated: “In two months, the number of German divisions in the border zone against the USSR increased by 37 divisions (from 70 to 107). Of these, the number of tank divisions increased from 6 to 12 divisions. With the Romanian and Hungarian armies, this will amount to about 130 divisions.

On May 30, 1941, the Chief of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army received a telegraph report from Tokyo. It reported:

“Berlin informs Ott that the German action against the USSR will begin in the second half of June. Ott is 95% sure that the war will start. The circumstantial evidence I see for this is currently this:

The Technical Department of the German Air Force in my city was instructed to return shortly. Ott demanded that BAT not send any important messages through the USSR. The transport of rubber through the USSR has been reduced to a minimum.

Reasons for the German action: The existence of a powerful Red Army does not allow Germany to expand the war in Africa, because Germany must keep a large army in Eastern Europe. In order to eliminate completely any danger from the USSR, the Red Army must be driven off as soon as possible. That's what Ott said.

Under the message was the signature: "Ramsay (Sorge)". But even in this message there is no resolution of any of the leaders of the Soviet state.

May 31, 1941 on the table of the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army G.K. Zhukov received a special message from the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army No. 660569 with the following content:

During the second half of May, the main German command, at the expense of the forces liberated in the Balkans, carried out:

1. Restoration of the Western grouping to fight England.

2. Increasing forces against the USSR.

3. Concentration of reserves of the main command.

The general distribution of the German armed forces is as follows:

- against England (on all fronts) - 122-126 divisions;

- against the USSR - 120-122 divisions;

- reserve - 44-48 divisions.

The specific distribution of German forces against England:

- in the West - 75-80 divisions;

- in Norway - 17 divisions, of which 6 are located in the northern part of Norway and can be used against the USSR ...

The distribution of German forces against the USSR in the directions is as follows:

a) in East Prussia - 23-24 divisions, including 18-19 infantry, 3 motorized, 2 tank and 7 cavalry regiments;

b) in the Warsaw direction against ZapOVO - 30 divisions, including 24 infantry, 4 tank, one motorized, one cavalry and 8 cavalry regiments;

c) in the Lublin-Krakow region against KOVO - 35-36 divisions, including 24-25 infantry, 6 tank, 5 motorized and 5 cavalry regiments;

d) in Slovakia (region Zbrov, Presov, Vranov) - 5 mountain divisions;

e) in Carpathian Ukraine - 4 divisions;

f) in Moldova and Northern Dobruja - 17 divisions, including 10 infantry, 4 motorized, one mountain and two tank divisions;

g) in the area of ​​Danzig, Poznan, Thorn - 6 infantry divisions and one cavalry regiment.

The reserves of the main command are concentrated:

a) in the center of the country - 16-17 divisions;

b) in the region of Breslau, Moravska-Ostrava, Kattowice - 6-8 divisions;

c) in the center of Romania (Bucharest and to the west of it) - 11 divisions ... "

This document says: "Read Zhukov 11.6.41."

On June 2, about the concentration of large formations of the German and Romanian armies on the border with the USSR, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks receives information from the Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Ukraine and the authorized representative of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR in Moldova. Then the certificates of the Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Ukraine about the military activities of Germany on the border with the USSR are received almost every day. On June 11, an agent of the Berlin residency of the NKGB of the USSR, acting under the name "Foreman", reports about the impending German attack on the USSR in the near future. On June 12, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks received a message through the NKVD of the USSR about the strengthening of intelligence activities by the German side on the border with the USSR and in the border areas. In accordance with this report, from January 1 to June 10, 1941, 2080 border violators were detained by Germany.

On June 16, NKGB agents working in Berlin under the nicknames "Old Man", "Sergeant" and "Corsican" receive messages about the timing of the German attack on the Soviet Union in the coming days. At the same time, the structural units of the NKGB and the NKVD of the USSR, in parallel with reports on the state of affairs at the border, continue to engage in routine paperwork.

On June 19, the NKGB of Belarus sends a special message to the NKGB of the USSR about the military mobilization preparations of fascist Germany for a war against the USSR. This message contains extensive information about the redeployment and deployment of German troops to the Soviet border. It is said about the concentration in the border areas of a large number of formations, units, combat aircraft, artillery pieces, boats and vehicles.

On this day, the NKGB resident "Tit", who worked in Rome, reports that Germany's military operations against the USSR will begin between June 20 and 25, 1941.

On June 20, 1941, a telegraph report arrived to the head of the intelligence department of the Red Army from Sofia. It literally said the following: “A source said today that a military clash is expected on June 21 or 22, that there are 100 German divisions in Poland, 40 in Romania, 5 in Finland, 10 in Hungary and 7 in Slovakia. A total of 60 motorized divisions. The courier, who arrived by plane from Bucharest, says that in Romania the mobilization is over and military operations are expected at any moment. There are currently 10,000 German troops in Bulgaria.”

There is also no resolution on this message.

On the same day (June 20, 1941), a telegraphic report also arrives from Sorge to the head of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army from Tokyo. In it, the intelligence officer writes: “The German ambassador to Tokyo, Ott, told me that a war between Germany and the USSR was inevitable. German military superiority makes it possible to defeat the last large European army as well as it was done at the very beginning (of the war), because the strategic defensive positions of the USSR are still no more combat-ready than it was in the defense of Poland.

Incest told me that the Japanese General Staff was already discussing the position to be taken in case of war.

The proposal for Japanese-American negotiations and the issues of internal struggle between Matsuoka on the one hand and Hiranuma on the other have stalled because everyone is waiting for a solution to the question of relations between the USSR and Germany.

This report was received by the 9th Division at 17:00 on June 21, 1941, but there is no resolution on it either.

On the evening of June 20, another intelligence report of the NKGB of the USSR No. 1510 was compiled on Germany's military preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union. It states the concentration of German troops near the border with the USSR and the preparation of fascist troops for military operations. In particular, it is said that machine guns and anti-aircraft guns have been installed in some houses in Klaipeda, that timber has been harvested in the Kostomoloty region for building bridges across the Western Bug River, that in the Radom district, out of 100 settlements, the population has been evicted to the rear, that German intelligence is sending its agents to USSR for a short time - three to four days. These measures cannot be regarded otherwise than as direct preparation for the aggression that should take place in the coming days.

As a result of the analysis of all these documents, it can be concluded that Soviet intelligence on the territory of Germany and its allies worked quite successfully. Information about Hitler's decision to attack the USSR and the beginning of preparations for this action began to arrive in the Soviet Union more than a year before the start of the aggression.

Simultaneously with reconnaissance through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the GRU, reconnaissance was also carried out by the Western military districts, which constantly and in some detail reported on the preparation of Germany and its allies for a war against the USSR. Moreover, as we approached the fateful date, these reports became more frequent and more specific. From their content, Germany's intentions could not be doubted. The activities that were carried out on the other side of the border no longer had a reverse course, but inevitably had to result in a military operation of a strategic scale. This concerned the resettlement of the local population from the border strip, the saturation of this strip with troops, the clearing of the border strip from mines and other engineering obstacles, the mobilization of vehicles, the deployment of field hospitals, the storage of a large number of artillery shells on the ground, and much more.

The top Soviet leadership and command of the Red Army had information about the composition and deployment of the troops of the border military districts of the Soviet Union by the fascist command, which were received and summarized already in early February 1941, almost 5 months before the start of the aggression, and practically corresponded to reality.

However, the fact that many intelligence reports do not have the signatures of the highest leaders of the state and the highest ranks of the military leadership of the country suggests that they were either not brought to these people or ignored by these people. The first is actually excluded by the practice of the Soviet bureaucracy of that time. The second is possible in two cases: first, distrust of information sources; secondly, the stubborn unwillingness of the country's top leadership to abandon their vision of the future course of events that they have worked out.

As is known, only general orders were sent to the troops from the General Staff in the last peaceful months. No specific reaction of the Soviet government and the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense to the situation developing near the borders of the USSR was indicated. Moreover, the Soviet leadership and the General Staff constantly warned the local command "not to succumb to provocations", which negatively affected the combat readiness of the troops covering the state border. Apparently, interaction and mutual information between the bodies of the NKGB, the NKVD and the headquarters of the Red Army were poorly established.

Although it should be recognized that the measures taken by the NKVD, aimed at strengthening the protection of the border, were carried out. So, on June 20, 1941, the head of the border troops of the NKVD of the Belarusian District issued a special order in order to strengthen the protection of the state border. In accordance with this order, it was prescribed “to build the calculation of people for service in such a way that from 23.00 to 5.00 all people served at the border, with the exception of those returning from the outfits. Set up posts for ten days on separate, most vulnerable flank directions under the command of the assistant chief of the outpost.

Thus, an opinion is being created that the Soviet leadership deliberately ignored intelligence information abundantly received from various sources about Germany's preparations for a war against the USSR. Some researchers say that this was a special line of conduct of the top Soviet leadership, who tried in every possible way to delay the start of the war in order to prepare the country and the Red Army. Others argue that in 1940-early 1941, the Soviet leadership was more concerned with internal problems arising in the new territories annexed to the USSR in 1939-1940 than with external threats. In recent years, there are also such authors who write that the behavior of the Soviet government on the eve of the war, and in particular the position of I.V. Stalin, was a manifestation of the leader's hatred for his people.

Of course, all this is only the subjective conclusions of various researchers. What do the facts say? Before me is an extract from the instruction of the Second Bureau of the General Staff of the French Army dated May 15, 1941. It says:

“At present, the USSR is the only European power that, having powerful armed forces, is not drawn into a world conflict. In addition, the volume of Soviet economic resources is so great that Europe, in the face of a continuing naval blockade, can be provided with raw materials and food from this reserve.

It seems that until now the USSR, following the tactics of survival, has been seeking to use the exhaustion of the forces of both belligerents to strengthen its own position ... However, the turn of events over the past two months makes it seem that the USSR will not be able to carry out its plans in their original form and, probably, will be drawn into the war sooner than expected.

Indeed, according to numerous reports received recently, the capture of South Russia and the overthrow of the Soviet regime is now part of the plan developed by the Axis countries ...

According to other reports, Russia, worried that it is alone in the face of Germany, whose funds are not yet touched, is trying to buy time to keep its dangerous neighbor. The Russians satisfy all the demands of Germany of an economic nature ... "

On the same day, a memorandum from the German Foreign Ministry on German-Soviet relations was adopted. It notes that, "as in the past, difficulties arose in connection with the fulfillment of German obligations on deliveries to the USSR, especially in the field of armaments." The German side admits: “We will continue to be unable to meet delivery deadlines. However, the failure of Germany to fulfill its obligations will begin to affect only after August 1941, since until then Russia is obliged to make deliveries in advance. It was stated below: “The situation with the supply of Soviet raw materials still presents a satisfactory picture. In April, the following most important types of raw materials were delivered:

grain - 208,000 tons;

oil - 90,000 tons;

cotton - 8300 tons;

non-ferrous metals - 6340 tons of copper, tin and nickel ...

Total deliveries in the current year are calculated:

grain - 632,000 tons;

oil - 232,000 tons;

cotton - 23,500 tons;

manganese ore - 50,000 tons;

phosphates - 67,000 tons;

platinum - 900 kilograms.

Of course, these deliveries stopped with the outbreak of hostilities. But there is numerous evidence that trains with Soviet raw materials were heading to Germany as early as June 22, 1941. Some of them were captured by German troops in the border areas in the early days of the Great Patriotic War.

Thus, intelligence information about Germany's preparations for a war against the USSR was more than enough. G.K. Zhukov in his memoirs “Memoirs and Reflections” also writes that this information was known to the General Staff, and immediately admits: “During the period of a dangerous military situation, we, the military, probably did not do everything to convince I. AT. Stalin in the inevitability of war with Germany in the very near future and to prove the need to implement the urgent measures provided for by the operational mobilization plan. Of course, these measures would not guarantee complete success in repelling the enemy onslaught, since the forces of the parties were far from equal. But our troops could enter the battle in a more organized manner and, consequently, inflict much greater losses on the enemy. This is confirmed by the successful defensive actions of units and formations in the areas of Vladimir-Volynsky, Rava-Russkaya, Przemysl and in sectors of the Southern Front.

Below G.K. Zhukov writes: “Now there are different versions about whether we knew or not the specific date for the start of the war.

I cannot say for sure whether I.V. was truthfully informed. Stalin, perhaps, received it personally, but he did not inform me.

True, he once said to me:

“One person is giving us very important information about the intentions of the German government, but we have some doubts…

Perhaps it was about R. Sorge, whom I learned about after the war.

Could the military leadership independently and in a timely manner open the exit of enemy troops directly to the initial areas, from where their invasion began on June 22? In those conditions, it was extremely difficult to do this.

In addition, as it became known from captured maps and documents, the command of the German troops actually concentrated on the borders at the very last moment, and its armored troops, which were at a considerable distance, were transferred to the starting areas only on the night of June 22 ".

The closest deputy chief of the General Staff of the Red Army was the chief of the Operations Directorate. On the eve of the war, this position was held by Nikolai Fedorovich Vatutin. He was a relatively young general (born in 1901), who in 1929 graduated from the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze studied for a year at the Academy of the General Staff, from which he was released ahead of schedule in 1937 in connection with the arrests of many military leaders.

He served as chief of staff of the Kiev Special Military District during the liberation campaign of Soviet troops in Western Ukraine, and since 1940 he headed the Operations Directorate of the General Staff. According to the memoirs of many contemporaries, N.F. Vatutin was a literate and thinking person, capable of solving voluminous and complex problems. He had some experience in planning military actions within the framework of the final operations of the Soviet-Finnish war and the actions of the troops of the military district during the liberation campaign. But this experience was clearly not enough to solve problems on the scale of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War.

Unfortunately, even from the available reports, the correct conclusions were not always drawn, which could promptly and authoritatively guide the top management. Here, in connection with this, are some documents from the military archive.

On March 20, 1941, the head of the Intelligence Directorate, General F.I. Golikov presented the management with a report containing information of exceptional importance. This document outlined the options for possible directions of strikes by the Nazi troops during an attack on the Soviet Union. As it turned out later, they consistently reflected the development of the Barbarossa plan by the Nazi command, and in one of the options, in essence, the essence of this plan was reflected.

... According to our military attache on March 14, it was indicated later in the report, the German major said: “We are heading east, to the USSR. We will take grain, coal, oil from the USSR. Then we will be invincible and can continue the war with England and America.

N. F. Vatutin - Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff (1939–1941)

However, the conclusions from the information given in the report, in essence, removed all their significance. At the end of his report, General F.I. Golikov wrote:

"one. Based on all the above statements and possible options for action in the spring of this year, I believe that the most possible date for the start of actions against the USSR will be the moment after the victory over England or after the conclusion of an honorable peace for Germany with her.

2. Rumors and documents that speak of the inevitability of a war against the USSR this spring must be regarded as disinformation coming from British and even, perhaps, German intelligence.

So, F.I. Golikov served as chief of the Intelligence Directorate and deputy chief of the General Staff from July 1940. His report was prepared for the country's top leadership and was labeled "of exceptional importance." Such reports are usually prepared very carefully and cannot be based on the words of some "German major". They require the collection and analysis of dozens, if not hundreds, of various sources of information, and, as other military leaders testify, there was such information, including from the military attache in Berlin, intelligence agents in the countries allies of Germany.

Now about the agents of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (now the Main Intelligence Directorate). This body exists mainly to conduct military intelligence in the interests of the country's security and carefully study a potential enemy. The arrival of German troops on the territory of Poland created ideal conditions for the organization of intelligence work in this country. Czechoslovakia, occupied by Germany, was also a good field for the activities of Soviet military intelligence. For many years, Hungary was considered by the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union as a potential adversary, which required the presence of an expanded agent network there. The Soviet Union had only recently ended the war with Finland and had no reason to trust its government. Romania was also offended by the rejection of Moldavia and Bessarabia and therefore required constant close attention. And there is no doubt that the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff had its agents in these countries and received relevant information from it. One has to doubt the quality of this agency, information and the correctness of F.I. Golikov and G.K. Zhukov.

Secondly, from January 14, 1941 G.K. Zhukov already worked at the General Staff (Politburo resolution No. P25/85 dated 01/14/41 on the appointment of the chief of the General Staff and commanders of military districts), was up to date, got acquainted with his deputies, heads of departments and departments. Twice - on January 29 and 30 - he, together with the people's commissar of defense, was at the reception of I.V. Stalin. He constantly received alarming information from the Soviet-German border, knew that the Red Army was not ready for a war with Germany, and in early February he instructed the head of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff, Lieutenant General G.K. Malandin to prepare an updated operational plan by March 22 in the event of a German attack on the Soviet Union. Then, on February 12, together with the People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko and the head of the Organizational and Mobilization Department, Major General Chetvertikov G.K. Zhukov represented I.V. Stalin's mobilization plan, which was approved with virtually no amendments. Thus, it turns out that the General Staff was thoroughly preparing to repel fascist aggression.

The meeting at which the report of the head of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army was made took place on March 20, 1941, when G.K. Zhukov had been in the post of Chief of the General Staff for almost two months and had done some work to improve the combat effectiveness of the Red Army. At the same meeting, of course, was the People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko. Deputy Chief of the General Staff F.I. Golikov reports to the leadership of the country conclusions that are fundamentally at odds with the conclusions of his direct superiors, and S.K. Timoshenko and G.K. Zhukov does not react to this in any way. To allow this situation, knowing the cool character of G.K. Zhukov, absolutely impossible.

Before me is the capital work of retired Colonel-General Yuri Alexandrovich Gorkov “Kremlin, Headquarters, General Staff”, which the author developed over the course of seven years, being a consultant for the Historical-Archival and Military-Memorial Center of the General Staff. In the appendix, he gives an extract from the journals of visiting I.V. Stalin in his Kremlin office since 1935. It follows from this journal that S.K. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, K.A. Meretskov and P.V. Rychagov (Head of the Main Directorate of the Air Force) was at the reception of I.V. Stalin on February 2 and conferred for almost two hours.

The next time they, as well as S.M. Budyonny and Chetverikov visited this high office on February 12 to approve the mobilization plan.

February 22 at a meeting with I.V. Stalin except S.K. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukova, S.M. Budyonny, K.A. Meretskova, P.V. Rychagova were also present G.I. Kulik (Head of the Main Directorate of Artillery of the Red Army) and the famous test pilot General M.M. Gromov (head of the Flight Research Institute), as well as all members of the Politburo of the RCP (b). This meeting was held from 17.15 to 21.00.

February 25 for an appointment with I.V. Stalin is again invited to S.K. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, K.A. Meretskov, P.V. Rychagov, as well as the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Main Directorate of the Air Force of the Red Army, General F.A. Astakhov. The presence of two leading military pilots at a meeting with the head of state indicates either special tasks for this branch of the Armed Forces, or some important information received from air reconnaissance. The discussion of these issues took almost two hours.

March 1 for an appointment with I.V. Stalin is again invited by S.K. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, K.A. Meretskov, P.V. Rychagov, G.I. Kulik, as well as the first deputy commander of the Red Army Air Force, General P.F. Zhigarev and a member of the Economic Council for the Defense Industry under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR P.N. Goremykin. The meeting takes 2 hours and 45 minutes.

March 8 at a meeting with I.V. Stalin arrived at 20.05 S.K. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, S.M. Budyonny, P.V. Rychagov and consulted until 23:00.

The next meeting with the military at I.V. Stalin took place on March 17, 1941, and S.K. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, K.A. Meretskov, P.V. Rychagov, P.F. Zhigarev. They conferred from 15.15 to 23.10, but, apparently, they did not finally agree. Therefore, the next day, S.K. were invited to the head of state. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, P.V. Rychagov and G.I. Kulik, who were in the office of I.V. Stalin from 19.05 to 21.10, and as a result of this meeting, the resolution of the Politburo on mobilization fees No. 28/155, prepared on March 3, 1941, was adopted.

The work of the German General Staff in 1941 The General Staff of the German Land Forces carried out preparations for war with the USSR with all diligence and German punctuality. Already on January 31, 1941, a directive was signed on the strategic deployment of troops in

From the author's book

Reports of the People's Commissar of Defense on the state of affairs in the Red Army in 1939 These documents should not be read, but studied. Study by spreading a bunch of reference books around you, armed with a pencil, paper, maps. And even so, in themselves, these reports to a person who is not very well versed in

From the author's book

Military specialists in the corps of the General Staff of the Red Army Before proceeding to the presentation of the question of attracting to the Red Army the most valuable and trained part of the officer corps of the Russian army - the corps of officers of the General Staff, let us briefly dwell on the fact that

From the author's book

Academy of the General Staff The Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff at that time was the main higher military educational institution. It was created by personal decree of Emperor Nicholas I in 1832 to train staff members of the highest tactical level of management.

From the author's book

of the General Staff, Major-General Mikhail Gordeevich Drozdovsky The darkness of the night grew darker and thicker, Having lost their guiding lights, The people laughed at themselves, mocked at their faith. And then, against darkness and violence, Among cowardice, lies, slander, Straightening the mighty

From the author's book

Chief of the Military Academy of the General Staff I am probably especially well prepared for writing this chapter. Firstly, in 1948 (before Bagramyan's appointment) I graduated from the Higher Academic Courses (Higher Academic Courses) at this academy. And even for some time after the release worked

From the author's book

Academy of the General Staff The most elite military educational institution was founded on the project of Adjutant General Baron Jomini on November 26, 1832 in St. Petersburg at the main headquarters of His Imperial Majesty under the name of the Imperial Military Academy. academies

From the author's book

5. FROM THE NOTE OF THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE FRENCH ARMY, M. GAMELIN Paris, September 9, 1938. From the point of view of France, the preservation of the Czechoslovak state is of certain interest in the event of hostilities in Europe. Already by its location, Czechoslovakia

From the author's book

Appendix 11 Report of the Colonel of the General Staff of Poland Art. Dovoino-Sollogub to the Chief of Staff on the need to evict General B.S. Permikin and other officers from Poland Warsaw, 04/06/1921. Stanislav Dovoino-SollogubColonel of the General StaffTo the Chief

From the author's book

AT THE SCHOOL AND ACADEMY OF THE GENERAL STAFF In the military history literature there are many memoirs of officers and generals (although in fact the generals are the same officers, but only of the highest rank) about their studies at the military (cadet) school. Each of

From the author's book

Chief of the General Staff against his will In January 1941, Stalin appointed Zhukov chief of the General Staff, as a result of which, at the age of 44, he became the second, after People's Commissar for Defense Timoshenko, in the hierarchy of the Red Army. Why did the leader choose him? According to

From the author's book

B.M. Shaposhnikov: "THE POSITION OF THE GENERAL STAFF WOULD BE PREFERABLE FOR ME" If, as mentioned above, the first Soviet marshal K.E. Voroshilov belonged to the type of people who could do something for an arbitrarily long time, but never become a real professional, then

From the author's book

A.M. Vasilevsky: “THE LEADING PERSONS OF THE GENERAL STAFF ARE RESPONSIBLE” Who can doubt what a courageous person Marshal Vasilevsky was. And sometimes tears welled up in his eyes. In August 1943, Alexander Mikhailovich was in the army of General V.V.

Photo from the archive of the German General Staff. 1940

In January 1941, Zhukov took part in 2 bilateral operational-strategic map games. Initially, one game was planned, November 17 - 19, 1940 on the topic: “Offensive operation of the front with a breakthrough of a fortified area”, during which it was supposed to give practice to the highest command personnel in organizing, planning and directing front and army offensive operations, to study the Baltic theater of operations and East Prussia, as well as to get acquainted with the basics of the defensive measures of the troops.

Later, the start date of the game was postponed and linked to the end of the December meeting of the top command staff of the Red Army, while the scope of the game expanded significantly: in addition to the game in the northwest direction, a second game was also provided - in the southwest.

Both games were held in three stages, at each of which, in accordance with the tasks, the participants made decisions and prepared in writing directives, combat orders, operational reports and other official documents.

In the first game, which took place from January 2 to 6, 1941, Zhukov commanded the "Western", attacking from the territory of East Prussia and Poland.

The northwestern front of the "Eastern" (Comfront D. G. Pavlov), stopped the "Western" and went on the offensive, fulfilling the task of reaching the lower reaches of the Vistula River.

The “Eastern”, according to the conditions of the game, had approximately one and a half superiority in forces (in tanks - almost triple). In the early days, Pavlov's troops crossed the Neman, capturing the Suvalka ledge (surrounding a large group of "Western" in it), and on the left wing they broke through the front led by Zhukov.

A cavalry-mechanized army was introduced into the breach, which entered the area located 110-120 km west of the USSR State Border. In response, Zhukov launched a counterattack, leading to the encirclement and loss of the Vostochny, after which the game was stopped by intermediaries.

In the second game, which took place from January 8 to 11, 1941, Zhukov commanded the Eastern grouping, which repelled the aggression of the Western, South-Western and Southern in the territory of Ukraine and Bessarabia. The second game ended with the adoption of the "Eastern" decision to attack Budapest, break through to Lake Balaton and force the Danube.

On January 14, 1941, by a resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks “On the Chief of the General Staff and Commanders of the Military Districts,” General of the Army Zhukov was appointed to replace Kirill Meretskov, to the post of Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, which he held until July 1941.

In general, the activities of Georgy Konstantinovich as Chief of the General Staff are ambiguously assessed by modern historians. Taking into account the level of knowledge and character of the commander of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade Zhukov G.K., the future Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky, who commanded the 7th Samara Cavalry Division in 1930, on November 8, 1930, noted in his certification for him:

George Konstantinovich himself wrote later:

And the frequent change of leadership in the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff in the prewar years did not contribute to the qualitative development of plans and the creation of a competent team of professionals.

At the XVIII Conference of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in February 1941, Zhukov was elected a candidate member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

May - June 1941

Occupying in February - July 1941 the post of Chief of the General Staff and Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Zhukov took part in the preparation of "Considerations on the plan for the strategic deployment of the forces of the Soviet Union in case of war with Germany and its allies". The plan is dated no earlier than May 15, 1941. This document specifically stated:

Considering that Germany currently keeps its army mobilized, with its rear deployed, it has the ability to warn us in the deployment and launch a surprise attack. In order to prevent this, I consider it necessary in no case to give the initiative of action to the German command, to preempt the enemy in deployment and attack the German army at the moment when it is in the deployment stage and has not yet had time to organize the front and the interaction of military branches. "Soviet military-strategic planning on the eve of the Great Patriotic War in modern historiography"

After listing the tasks assigned to the troops of the fronts, it was proposed:

People's Commissar of Defense S. K. Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff Zhukov reported the contents of the document to Stalin. In the event of its implementation, a strike was proposed through the territory of Southern Poland on Katowice, with a further turn either to Berlin (if the main enemy grouping retreats to Berlin), or to the Baltic Sea, if the main German forces do not withdraw and try to hold the territory of Poland and East Prussia.

An auxiliary strike by the left wing of the Western Front was supposed to be delivered in the direction of Sedlec - Demblin, with the aim of pinning down the Warsaw grouping and capturing Warsaw, as well as assisting the Southwestern Front in defeating the enemy's Lublin grouping.

Modern historians do not know if the plan was adopted. The document is not signed, although the places for signatures are indicated in it. According to Zhukov in an interview on May 26, 1965, the plan was not approved by Stalin. However, Zhukov did not specify which plan was accepted for execution and was in effect at the start of the war - June 22, 1941.

As stated in the study “1941 - lessons and conclusions” (M. Voenizdat - 1992.), the General Staff had two options for repelling aggression, carried out on the basis of the general “Considerations on the plan for the strategic deployment of the forces of the Soviet Union in case of war with Germany and its allies for 1940-1941”, dated autumn 1940. And according to one of the options, "Southern", preparations were underway for war.

On the evening of June 21, 1941, Zhukov, according to the memoirs of General I.V. Tyulenev, commander of the Moscow Military District in June 1941, called the districts and warned the commanders of a possible attack by Germany and its allies in the next day.

On June 21, 1941, at a meeting in the Kremlin (from 20:50 to 22:20), Zhukov and S.K. Timoshenko proposed to Stalin a draft Directive No. 1. According to Zhukov, after a tense discussion, they were able to convince him.

Directive No. 1 was adopted by the commanders of the troops of the western districts a few hours before the invasion of the Axis forces.

The Great Patriotic War

During the Great Patriotic War, he held the posts of Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army (June-July 1941), member of the Headquarters of the High Command (since June 23, 1941), Headquarters of the Supreme Command (since July 10, 1941), Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (since August 8, 1941), commander of the Leningrad Front (since September 14), commander of the Western Front (since October 10).

Since August 26, 1942 he was the Deputy Supreme Commander; from August 27, 1942 - First Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR.

He commanded the fronts: Reserve, Leningrad, Western (at the same time he was the commander-in-chief of the Western direction), 1st Ukrainian and 1st Belorussian.

Georgy Zhukov. 1941

On June 22, 1941, after the German attack, Zhukov prepared Directives No. 2 (sent at 07:15) and No. 3 (sent at 23:50) of the People's Commissar of Defense (signed by Timoshenko and Zhukov), which contained orders to repel Wehrmacht attacks , - “to collapse with all forces and means” where the enemy crossed the border, but do not cross the border itself (Directive No. 2) and “to a decisive attack on German troops” (Directive No. 3).

The command of the border districts was unable to fulfill the tasks set in the Directives, due to the fact that the troops were not brought to combat readiness in a timely manner. The factor of surprise also played its role.

Soon, communication with some formations was lost, and the troops themselves began a disorderly retreat, without offering organized resistance to the enemy. The offensive on June 23-28 turned into a series of ineffective counterattacks that did not lead to the expected results and a change in the operational situation.

The troops of the Southwestern Front, where Zhukov, since June 23, was as a representative of the commander-in-chief, were unable to surround and destroy the advancing enemy groups, as suggested by the pre-war plans, although they managed to seriously slow down the advance of the German troops, using the superiority of the Red Army in armored vehicles, almost completely lost during the famous battle in the Dubno region, where the Red Army suffered a tactical defeat.

The troops of the Western and Northwestern fronts, which did not have a significant advantage over the German troops in terms of forces and means, suffered serious losses when trying to launch counterattacks.

The Western Front, which was the main blow of Army Group Center, was soon actually defeated.

At the end of July 1941, after a series of defeats and boilers, units of the Red Army, on July 28, 1941, were forced to leave Smolensk ( more...).

On July 29, 1941, Stalin dismisses Zhukov from the post of Chief of the General Staff and appoints him commander of the Reserve Front, where Georgy Konstantinovich continues the counterattacks undertaken as part of the Smolensk battle, and then conducts the Yelnin offensive operation with the forces of the 24th and 43rd armies.

It was planned that the troops of the Red Army would "cut off the German penetration" into the Soviet front, formed as a result of the battle of Smolensk, and surround 8 enemy divisions. Although on the night of September 6-7, in the conditions of heavy rains, the Germans managed to withdraw troops from the bag, the Yelninskaya operation became the first successful offensive operation of the Red Army since the beginning of the war.

The losses of the Soviet troops in the Elninsk operation amounted to 31,853 people out of 103,200 participating (31% of which were killed and wounded), the losses of the Germans amounted to 8-10 thousand killed and wounded

After the completion of the Elninsk operation (by order of September 11, 1941), Zhukov was appointed commander of the Leningrad Front. The task was set to keep Leningrad from being captured, to release it until the Germans created defenses around the city - to break through towards Kulik, whose troops were to break through towards Zhukov.

The 42nd and 55th armies, concentrated on the southern sector of the front in a strip of about 25 km, were placed at the disposal of the front commander, all the artillery of the Baltic Fleet, 125 thousand sailors who went ashore, 10 divisions of the people's militia ...

Kulik, on approximately the same sector of the front, was supposed to break through to Leningrad from the area of ​​\u200b\u200bst. MGA forces of the 54th separate army. According to some estimates, "the operation was a failure due to the small number of troops" allocated by Zhukov in support of Kulik.

The capture of Leningrad by the German military command was also considered as a probable "heavy moral blow" to the Soviet people, since Leningrad was the so-called "cradle of the Great October Revolution" and the city of revolutionary, military and labor traditions of the Bolsheviks. In July 1941, when visiting the headquarters of Army Group North, Adolf Hitler emphasized that with the capture of Leningrad, for the Russians -

In the military-political and strategic perspective for Germany, in addition to the capture or blockade of Leningrad as a major industrial center of the USSR, reunification with parts of the Finnish army advancing on the city from the North was of great importance. It was also believed that upon "reaching Leningrad" by the Germans, "the Russian Baltic Fleet would lose its last stronghold and find itself in a hopeless situation."

On August 21, having rejected a number of proposals from the leaders of the main command of the ground forces, Hitler, in his instructions, determined the most important tasks for the coming period:

On September 17, the advanced units of the enemy break through to the Gulf of Finland west of Leningrad, cutting off the troops of the 8th Army from the main forces of the front. To the west of the city, the Oranienbaum bridgehead is formed. The next day, the Germans capture Slutsk and break into Pushkin.

The situation seemed critical, and Zhukov went to extreme measures, hoping, first of all, to restore confidence in his forces and capabilities to the troops:

On September 17, he gives a stern order to the military councils of the 42nd and 55th armies, in which he demands the immediate execution of all commanders, political workers and fighters who left the defense line without an order.

On September 22, he sends a cipher telegram to the 8th Army, where he orders the army command to "personally lead into battle" the fighters and warns of the imminent execution of all commanders who arbitrarily left Peterhof as "cowards and traitors."

Some publications claim that on September 28, 1941, Zhukov allegedly sent an encrypted telegram to the troops of the Leningrad Front under No. all were shot”… [see. comments - 2]

On September 25, the headquarters of the Army Group North informs the high command of the German ground forces that, with the forces remaining at its disposal, it is not in a position to continue the attack on Leningrad.

It would be naive to assume that the mission of General Zhukov on the Leningrad front was limited only to the signing of "cannibalistic orders" and "filling up the noble enemy with corpses" in the name of an illusory goal. Relative stabilization of the front on the outskirts of the city was achieved thanks to: painstaking, round-the-clock work on maps, trips to units and subunits, competent operational-tactical planning, solving the most difficult tasks of supplying and transferring troops under blockade conditions. Zhukov devoted a lot of time to studying the forces and means available to the enemy, interacting with the Headquarters, the party and economic leadership of the city of Leningrad.

Zhukov in October 1941. Photo from the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper, published on the personal instructions of Stalin

Under the command of General of the Army Zhukov, from September 14 to October 6, 1941, the troops of the Leningrad Front, together with the Baltic Fleet, courageously held the defense on the near approaches to the city. For the first time in the course of the war, German troops were forced to switch from a strategic offensive to a long positional siege. Before the start of Operation Typhoon, the Wehrmacht failed to capture Leningrad and reunite with the Finnish army.

The disruption of the plan for the lightning capture of Leningrad was of great military and strategic importance for the Soviet command. Stuck near Leningrad, the Wehrmacht lost the opportunity to turn the forces of the Army Group "North" to the Moscow direction to reinforce the troops of the Army Group "Center" advancing there. Only the remnants of the 4th Panzer Group were turned to Moscow (about half of the original forces remained in it), but near Leningrad they were forced to leave two divisions, the 12th and 8th Panzer. [cm. comments - 3] .

After the stabilization of the front near Leningrad, Zhukov was recalled to the central direction of the Soviet-German front (he led the Reserve Front from October 8 and the Western Front from October 10), where the main forces of the Western, Reserve and Bryansk fronts were surrounded and destroyed by German troops in the first half of October ( 16th, 19th, 20th armies and Boldin's army group of the Western Front, 24th and 32nd armies of the Reserve Front, etc.). On October 12, the Germans captured Kaluga, on October 15 - Kalinin, and on October 18 - Mozhaisk and Maloyaroslavets.

During the second half of October and November 1941, the troops of the Western Front under the command of Zhukov conducted an active defense in order to wear down the enemy forces and prepared for a counteroffensive.

After the fighting at the turn of Volokolamsk, Mozhaisk, Maloyaroslavets, Kaluga, our troops were fixed in defensive positions east of these points, equipped, rearmed and prepared for private counterattacks against the enemy groups that had emerged by that time

- Shaposhnikov B. M: "The Battle for Moscow: Moscow Operation of the Western Front November 16, 1941-January 31, 1942" .

On the night of December 5-6, 1941, the Klinsko-Solnechnogorsk offensive operation of the troops of the right wing of the Western Front began with the support of the left wing of the Kalinin Front under the command of Konev.

The troops of the Western and other fronts inflicted a significant defeat on the formations of Field Marshal von Bock's Army Group Center during the counteroffensive near Moscow (December 5, 1941 - January 7, 1942).

The losses of the Soviet troops amounted to 372 thousand killed and wounded, or 37% of the number of troops at the beginning of the operation.

As a result of a successful offensive, the threat of a quick capture by the enemy of the capital of the USSR was removed. The front line moved away from Moscow by 100-250 km. The first major defeat of the Wehrmacht in World War II had an inspiring moral impact on the peoples of the anti-Hitler coalition.

This year, Zhukov commanded the Soviet troops in four major offensive operations:

• Moscow counteroffensive (until January 7, 1942);
• Rzhev-Vyazemskaya operation (January 8 - April 20, 1942);
• First Rzhev-Sychev operation (July 30 - August 23, 1942);
• Second Rzhev-Sychev operation - (Operation "Mars") (November 25 - December 20, 1942)

Plan-scheme of operations "Mars"

Significant successes of the Soviet troops near Moscow in December 1941 led to an active offensive of the Red Army along the entire front. But already in January 1942, it began to choke due to the increased resistance of the German troops, due to interruptions in the reinforcements and ammunition of the Red Army, due to the reassessment by the Headquarters of the successes achieved. Losses in the relatively ineffective Rzhev-Vyazemsky operation amounted to 776,889 people - 73.3% of the number of troops at the beginning of the operation.

During the Rzhev-Sychevsk operation in the summer of 1942, the enemy front again held out, the Soviet troops advanced 30-40 km. This operation did not lead to the outflow of German forces from the southern direction of the Soviet-German front, however, the transfer of divisions of Army Group Center to it was not allowed either. Losses in the operation amounted to 193,683 people (56.1% of the original number). The infamous Operation Mars, which was carried out simultaneously with the initial phase of Operation Uranus, was not prepared directly by Zhukov as a front commander. During the period of its preparation, he was as a representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in the Stalingrad direction. However, the coordination of the efforts of the Western Front (front commander Konev) and the Kalinin Front (front commander Purkaev) during the operation was entrusted to him.

The main objective of the operation was to encircle and destroy the 9th field army of the Wehrmacht, but this was not possible for a number of reasons. The losses of Soviet troops in it amounted to 215 thousand killed, wounded and captured, 1315 tanks and self-propelled guns in 25 days. Thus, the average losses of Soviet troops in one day of hostilities (8666 people and 52.6 tanks) significantly exceeded the losses in the Stalingrad offensive operation (6466 people and 38.9 tanks).

At the same time, the offensive actions of the Red Army in the Rzhev region did not allow the German command to transfer units as additional reserves from the central direction of the Soviet-German front to the south, where they could influence the course and outcome of the Battle of Stalingrad.

"Mars" is one of the clearest examples of the emergence of a positional crisis at a qualitatively new level in the development of military equipment and operational art. Tanks, which in the First World War became one of the tools for solving the problem of breaking through the front, in the Second World War themselves often turned out to be victims of new means of struggle. Anti-tank guns mowed down the advancing tanks with the same terrifying speed and efficiency as machine guns and rapid-fire guns stopped foot soldiers on the Marne. In the late autumn of 1942, tanks increasingly began to collide with anti-tank artillery in its most dangerous variant - with self-propelled guns fully protected by anti-cannon armor

In addition, Zhukov, as a representative of the Headquarters, coordinated the actions of the armies of the Stalingrad Front in the interfluve of the Don and Volga in the first half of September 1942.

In addition to the operational activities of the commander, Zhukov, according to the version put forward by him and Vasilevsky in his memoirs, is also a co-author (together with Vasilevsky) of the key Soviet military plan of 1942 - the plan for the strategic operation "Uranus", to defeat the German troops near Stalingrad. The plan, on which, according to the memoirs of Zhukov and Vasilevsky, they and I.V. Stalin are signed, has not yet been published, despite the expiration of the statute of limitations.

At the beginning of 1943, Zhukov coordinated the actions of the fronts in Operation Iskra during the breakthrough of the Leningrad blockade.

After the "Iskra" Zhukov participates in the preparation of the operation "Polar Star", which was entrusted to S. K. Timoshenko. It was supposed to defeat Army Group North, liberate the Leningrad Region and create the prerequisites for a successful offensive in the Baltic. ( more...)

January 18, 1943 Zhukov was awarded the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union. He became the first marshal of the USSR since the beginning of the war.

From March 17, Zhukov was in the Belgorod direction of the emerging Kursk Bulge. Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky spoke about Zhukov's activities as a representative of the Headquarters on the Central Front at that time:

Since July 5, during the defensive and offensive stages of the Battle of Kursk, Zhukov coordinated the actions of the Western, Bryansk, Steppe and Voronezh fronts.

In late August-September, during the Chernigov-Poltava operation, Zhukov coordinated the actions of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts during operations to pursue the enemy, retreating to the Dnieper.

Liberation of Ukraine (1944)

As a result of the Zhytomyr-Berdichev operation, the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky ledge was formed, which Zhukov and Vatutin, in a report to Stalin on January 11, 1944, proposed to cut off.

According to Manstein's memoirs, the 42nd Army Corps of the 1st Tank Army and the 11th Army Corps of the 8th Army were encircled: 6 divisions and one brigade. According to the research of I. Moshchansky - 10 divisions and one brigade.

During the operation, General Konev accused Zhukov and Vatutin of inactivity in relation to the encircled German group, which led to its breakthrough from the encirclement. As a result of Konev's appeal to Stalin, the inner front of the encirclement was completely transferred to Konev's command. This episode further complicated the relationship between Zhukov and Konev.

After Vatutin was severely wounded, Stalin ordered Zhukov to lead the 1st Ukrainian Front. In March-April 1944, the troops under the command of Zhukov carried out the offensive Proskurov-Chernivtsi operation and reached the foothills of the Carpathians.

On April 10, 1944, Marshal G.K. Zhukov was awarded the highest military award - the Order of Victory. He was the first among those awarded. There were no orders, as they were made not at the Mint, but in a jewelry watch workshop.

In the summer of 1944, Zhukov coordinated the actions of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts during Operation Bagration. The operation, well supported by logistical means, ended successfully. The advance was not 150-200 km, as planned, but 400-500.

During the offensive, on July 8, Zhukov (regardless of Vasilevsky, who proposed the same idea) put forward a proposal to transfer one tank army from the 1st Ukrainian Front, which had an excess of forces and means, to the Vasilevsky front group and to the 2nd Belorussian Front, with the simultaneous reinforcement of this grouping by one combined-arms army from the Stavka reserve and a number of other units, for a surprise attack on the still extremely weakly defended East Prussia.

However, the idea was rejected. As G.K. Zhukov later noted:

I think that this was a serious mistake by the Supreme Commander, which subsequently led to the need for an extremely complex and bloody East Prussian operation.

In July 1944, Zhukov also coordinated the actions of the 1st Ukrainian Front, which delivered strikes in the Lvov, Rava-Rus and part of the forces in the Stanislav directions. In November 1944 he was appointed commander of the 1st Belorussian Front.

At the final stage of the war, the 1st Belorussian Front, led by Marshal Zhukov, together with the 1st Ukrainian Front under the command of Konev, carried out the Vistula-Oder operation, during which Soviet troops liberated Warsaw, defeated Army Group A of General J. Harpe with a cutting blow and Field Marshal F. Scherner.

The losses of the Soviet troops in this operation amounted to 193,215 people. Of this number, the 1st Belorussian Front lost 77,342 out of 1,028,900 people (7.5%), while the 1st Ukrainian Front lost 115,783 out of 1,083,800 people (10.7%), that is, in 1 .5 times more.

Despite the fact that Zhukov's front went on the offensive two days later than the neighboring 1st Ukrainian Front, the pace of the offensive of the 1st Belorussian Front so much exceeded the pace of the offensive of the neighboring two fronts that this led to the exposure of the flanks 100-150 km from the north and from south of the forward units. The width of the front by the end of January 31 reached 500 km.

February 10 - April 4, the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front took part in the East Pomeranian operation, while losing 52,303 out of 359,600 people (14.5%). The 2nd Belorussian Front under the command of Rokossovsky lost 173,389 out of 560,900 people (30.9%).

The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front ended the war with participation in the Berlin operation, while losing 179,490 out of 908,500 people (19.7%), while the 1st Ukrainian Front lost 113,825 out of 550,900 people (20.7% ) .

On May 8, 1945, at 22:43 (May 9 at 0:43 Moscow time) in Karlshorst (Berlin), Zhukov received from Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel the unconditional surrender of the troops of Nazi Germany.

Zhukov and two Victory Parades

On June 24, 1945, Marshal Zhukov took over the Victory Parade of the Soviet Union over Germany in the Great Patriotic War, which took place in Moscow on Red Square. Marshal Rokossovsky commanded the parade.

On September 7, 1945, the Victory Parade of the Allied Forces in the Second World War took place in Berlin at the Brandenburg Gate; Marshal Zhukov hosted the parade from the Soviet Union. The parade was commanded by the English Major General Nares.