Classic introspection.

W. Wundt and his research at the Leipzig Laboratory.

During the formation of psychology as an independent science, this method became the guiding one for the German psychologist Wundt and his schools, which combined introspection (meaning the subject's internal perception of the mental processes he is aware of) with the experimental method.

Classical introspection in total sense - the belief that the description of consciousness reveals complexes formed by a system of sensory elements, the so-called. "atoms". (Chemistry model: psychological atoms - (pure) sensations and possibly simple feelings and images; psychological molecules - representations and more complex formations; the connection between them - associations. Description of consciousness based on sensations.)

Dividing introspection and internal perception, Wundt insisted on training the subjects (at least 10,000 introspective recorded reactions!), otherwise the information is unreliable. Due to this, the unreliability of ordinary (“unscientific”) self-observation is overcome. The subjects develop the skill of self-reporting what they are directly aware of at the moment the stimulus is presented. The information they reported was evaluated as scientific facts only if the same subjective phenomena arose under constant external stimuli. On this basis, sensations were taken as the structural elements of the psyche, their copies - images of memory and the simplest feelings. These "atoms" of the sensory "tissue" of consciousness were studied from the point of view of their quality, intensity, etc. This approach was most consistently and straightforwardly defended by the American psychologist Titchener.

E.B. Titchener, who headed the school of structural psychology, interpreted the subject of psychology as a system of elementary conscious states (sensations, ideas, feelings) from which the whole diversity of mental life is formed. The data of introspection is "the total sum of human experience, considered depending on the experiencing subject." The main method of psychology is analytical introspection, in which the observer participating in the experiment is required to describe the elements of consciousness not in terms of external objects, but in terms of sensations. Titchener formula:

Introspection = psychological (clear experience -> report)

Those. introspection (according to Titchener) - the presence of a clear ( clear) experience from a psychological point of view and report on it also from a psychological point of view. The subject must be distracted from the physical structure of the object. An example of introspection is an illusion: the perception is different from the stimulus-object.

Titchener shared the idea proposed by Külpe, who decomposed sensation (Wundt's ps. atom) into 4 indivisible, but independently changing properties: quality, intensity, length and duration. However, he placed the biggest limitation on introspection: one must exclude values of all descriptions of consciousness! Also too much reliance on flashback: it might take 20 minutes. to describe. lasting 1.5 seconds, the state of consciousness (!), the subject is forced to remember, based only on assumptions. Bottom line: introspection demonstrated functional futility, was boring and unreliable.

Würzburg School

Kulpe: experimental psychology d. also studied. and thinking! The "New Experimental Psychology" in Würzburg works with: sensation, perception and reaction (+ memory - Ebbinghaus). Külpe the positivist argued (in contrast to Wundt) that thought can be studied experimentally, it is only necessary to find subjects who are ready to think under experimental conditions. The philosophical basis was the ideas of positivism, critical realism, E. Husserl's phenomenology. This school included: G. Mayer, I. Orth, K. Marbe, K.B Uhler, H. Watt, N. Ah, A. Messer. It carried out innovative research on thinking (N. Ah), which used a regulated methodology for presenting problems and a "method of systematic self-observation." Thinking here was understood as a purposeful activity (as opposed to associationism), designed to ensure the achievement of balance with the problem situation. It began to be understood as an active process, controlled or special psychological attitude (G. Watt), or determining trend (N. Ah), or " anticipatory schema" (O. Zelts). It has been shown that thinking does not necessarily follow logical (linguistic) rules, but can be organized along a network principle (be divergent), and that it can unfold at a preconscious level without involving representations in this process, and only in the final stages leads to the appearance of one image or another. On this basis, the position was put forward that the main role in thinking is played by not sensations and ideas, but without about frivolous thoughts, which are knowledge of an unobservable type (consciousness of rules, consciousness of relations, thoughts-intentions), which direct the flow of thoughts when solving problems.

Watt and Ah independently of others came to mutually consistent results. Watt invented the crushing method ( fractation) (to make introspection more efficient): split the psychological event ( event) for several successive periods and studied each of them separately => achieved the reduction of memory and conclusions ( inference) included in the introspective report. I realized that the purposefulness of thinking is given by the task or instruction that the subject accepted for how the thinking process began. Oh developed the concept determining trend as a leading unconscious principle that directs conscious processes along a predetermined channel in the direction of solving a problem. He also developed a procedure for crushing with chronoscopic control and called it systematic experimental introspection. the tendency (unconscious) and the conscious processes guided by it cannot be represented in terms of classical introspection (ie, in the language of sensations and images). Ah introduced the term awareness for these elusive contents (this concept did not receive further recognition). His subjects described their consciousness in terms of inexplicable experiences of consciousness. Representatives of the Würzburg school believed that with the help of introspection they discovered a new kind of mental elements. Open without about fictitious thinking. The main contribution of this school: understanding the importance unconscious task and determining trend.

P.S. Conclusion: The flow of thought is determined unconsciously, but Külpe believed that the presence of subtle consciousnesses in the mind is established reliably - he called them functions to distinguish them from contents- sensations and images (classical introspection). Function and content– 2 kinds of data about consciousness => combined Wundt's introspection with Brentano's introspection.

F. Brentano and the psychology of the act.

Another variant of introspective psychology is presented by the Austrian philosopher F. Brentano and his followers K. Stumpf, T. Lipps, O. Külpe), who saw the task of psychology in reconstructing without prejudice what an individual experiences in its entirety and concreteness. It has been argued that a careful and impartial examination of consciousness shows that it is not composed of stable elements = contents(sensations, images, etc.), but from intentional acts, eg. on the object, or acts (representations, judgments and emotional evaluation), consciously directed towards the goal (suggesting intention). Brentano defended introspection as self-reliant. Bretano criticized the artificiality of the procedure for dividing consciousness into elements adopted in the laboratories of experimental psychology. In his opinion, psychology should study the inner experience of the subject in its real and natural composition, including the actions (acts) performed by him. Brentano speaks of the objectivity of consciousness: each mental phenomenon, unlike the physical one, is characterized by the fact that an object intentionally coexists in it. An object - not a real thing independent of consciousness, but a phenomenon whose existence is given by virtue of its actualization by the subject. This led to the idea of ​​the subject as system of acts, which has a basis in itself and is comprehended through introspection (“internal perception”). Bretano's position on activity, objectivity, integrity of consciousness was the basis for the emergence of a number of trends in Western European psychology (functionalism, Husserl's phenomenological approach, the Würzburg school, etc.).

Gestalt psychology

Gestalt psychologists have used introspection to describe phenomena of consciousness that are inconsistent with the physical phenomena that caused them. This method is called phenomenological introspection. Phenomenological introspection- this is an introspective method, characterized by an orientation to the description of mental phenomena in their immediacy and integrity by "naive subjects". This method, which finds its origins in the method of "internal perception" developed by F. Brentano, was productively applied in the descriptive psychology of V. Dilthey, and then within the framework of humanistic psychology.

Summarizing

Introspective psychology, putting forward the subjective method as the only means of studying mental reality (as opposed to physical reality), identified this reality with the data of self-observation, as a result of which consciousness turned out to be opposed to the rest of the world both in its essence and in its knowability. Representatives of introspective psychology, criticizing each other for different understanding of the procedures of introspection, on the whole retained the understanding of consciousness as “the totality of states we are aware of” (W. Wundt). The idealism and subjectivism of introspective psychology led it into a crisis and deprived it of scientific influence. Introspective psychology has been sharply criticized by supporters of behaviorism and psychoanalysis, which was carried out mainly from a mechanistic position.

Similar information.

The concept of “mental functions” by K. Stumpf.

Scientific legacy of V. James.

Chicago School” by J. Dewey.

"New psychology" F. Brentano. At the origins of this direction, which became one of the dominant in American psychology at the beginning of the 20th century, was the Austrian psychologist Franz Brentano.

F. Brentano (1838-1917) began his career as a Catholic priest, leaving her because of disagreement with the dogma of the infallibility of the pope and moving to the University of Vienna, where he became a professor of philosophy. Brentano's first work was devoted to the psychology of Aristotle. In the unfinished work "Psychology from an Empirical Point of View" (1874), Brentano proposed a new program for the development of psychology as an independent science, opposing it to the program of Wundt that was dominant at that time.

He considered the problem of consciousness to be the main one for the new psychology. How is consciousness different from all other phenomena of being? - In his activity and constant focus on the object. To designate this indispensable sign of consciousness, Brentano proposed the term “intention”.

The new psychology, according to Brentano, should become the science of acts of consciousness. Describing and classifying the forms of these acts, Brentano came to the conclusion that there are three main forms: acts of representing something, acts of judging something as true or false, and acts of emotionally evaluating something as desirable or rejected. Outside the act, the object does not exist, but the act, in turn, arises only when directed towards the object.

Brentano strongly rejected the procedure of analysis adopted in the laboratories of experimental psychology. He believed that it perverts real mental processes and phenomena, which should be studied through careful internal observation of their natural course. Undoubtedly, he considered obvious only mental phenomena given in internal experience, while knowledge about the external world is of a probabilistic nature.

Having established the principle of activity, Brentano became a pioneer of European functionalism. This was the direction that opposed the so-called structuralism in psychology, led by Wundt. Functionalists and their followers opposed the view of consciousness as a device “made of bricks and cement”. Many psychologists studied with Brentano and were directly influenced by his ideas.

Brentano's ideas influenced Külpe and his Würzburg school. Among those who studied philosophy in Vienna, Brentano had 3. Freud. In his teaching, Brentano's concept of intention was transformed into a version of the "chaining" of psychic energy to external objects (including the individual's own body).

The concept of “mental functions” by K. Stumpf. An important role in the development of functionalism in its Western European version was played by a German psychologist Karl Stumpf.

K. Stumpf (1848-1936) considered the subject of psychology to be the study of psychological functions, or acts (perception, understanding, desire), distinguishing them from phenomena (sensory or represented in the form of forms, values, concepts and similar contents of consciousness). Stumpf attributed the study of phenomena to a special subject area - phenomenology, linking it with philosophy, and not with psychology.

Stumpf considered the functions (or acts) of consciousness to be his own subject of psychology. Among the functions, Stumpf distinguished two categories: intellectual and emotive (or affective). Emotive functions consist of opposite pairs: joy and sadness, desire and rejection, desire and avoidance.

Fascinated by music since childhood, Stumpf focused in most of his experimental work on the study of the perception of musical tones. Arguing with Wundt, Stumpf considered it unnatural to divide the testimony of introspection into separate elements. The results of those experiments that were carried out by psychologists trained in introspective analysis of the Wundt school, Stumpf countered as more credible testimonies of expert musicians.

Stumpf took part in research on child psychology, organizing the German "Society of Child Psychology", as well as on zoopsychology (proving, in particular, when discussing the sensational phenomenon of "smart Hans" - a horse that tapped out the "solution" of mathematical problems with its hoof - that the animal reacted to the barely noticeable movements of the trainer). Stumpf contributed to the trip of his student W. Köhler to Africa to study the behavior of great apes. He had many other students who later became well-known psychologists,

With all the interest in the works of Brentano and Stumpf, functionalism was most widespread in the United States, where it became one of the leading psychological trends. His program, in contrast to structuralism with its sterile analysis of consciousness, set the task of studying how the individual, through mental functions, adapts to a changing environment. The development of functionalism in America is closely connected with the name of William James.

Scientific heritage of V. James. W. James (1842-1910) graduated from Harvard University, having received a medical and artistic education. His psychological works set out not so much a holistic system of views as a set of concepts that served as the basis for various approaches in modern psychology - from behaviorism to humanistic psychology. James made psychology one of the most popular sciences in America. He was the first professor of psychology at Harvard University, founder of the first American psychological laboratory (1875), president of the American Psychological Association (1894-1895).

James dealt with many problems - from the study of the development of cognitive processes and emotions to personality problems and psychedelic research. One of the main issues for him was the study of consciousness. James owns the idea of ​​a "stream of consciousness", i.e. about the continuity of the work of human consciousness, despite the external discreteness caused by partially unconscious mental processes. The continuity of thought explains the possibility of self-identification despite the constant gaps in consciousness. James emphasizes not only continuity, but also dynamism, variability, saying that the awareness of even familiar things is constantly changing.

Consciousness is not only continuous and changeable, but also selective, selective, it always accepts and rejects, choosing some objects or their parameters and rejecting others. From the point of view of James, the study of the laws according to which consciousness works, according to which choice or rejection proceeds, is the main task of psychology. This issue was the main reason for the disagreement between the James functionalist school and the American psychologist Titchener, who represented the structuralist school. Unlike Titchener, for James it was not a separate element of consciousness that was primary, but its flow as a dynamic whole.

James deduced the formula for self-esteem, which is a fraction, the numerator of which is success, and the denominator is claims. This formula underlies the hierarchy of personalities, their desire for self-improvement and success, their illnesses and neuroses, their assessment of themselves and the emotions they experience.

The psychological views of James are closely intertwined with his philosophical theory of functionalism, at the forefront of which is pragmatism. Therefore, James paid great attention to applied psychology, arguing that its significance is no less than theoretical psychology. Particularly important, from his point of view, is the connection between psychology and pedagogy. He even published a special book for teachers, Conversations with Teachers on Psychology, in which he proved the enormous possibilities of education and self-education, the importance of forming the right habits in children.

James paid considerable attention to the problem of personality, understanding it as an integrative whole, which was fundamentally new in that period. He singled out the cognizable and cognizing elements in the personality, believing that the cognizable element is our empirical Self, which we recognize as our personality, while the cognizing element is our pure Self. The separation of several parts in the structure of the empirical personality - physical , social and spiritual personality. Describing them, James said that our empirical self is "wider than the purely physical, since a person identifies himself both with his social roles and with his loved ones, expanding his physical self. At the same time, the empirical self can be already physical, when a person is identified only with certain needs or abilities, fencing off other aspects of his personality.

James developed one of the most famous theories of emotions (simultaneously with the Danish psychologist K. Lange). This theory points to a link between emotions and physiological changes. James argued that physiological changes in the body are primary in relation to emotions. Despite the outward paradoxical nature of this view, the James-Lange theory has become widespread due to both the consistency and logical presentation, and the connection with physiological correlates. James' ideas about the nature of emotions are partially confirmed by modern research in the field of psychopharmacology and psychocorrection.

James did a lot for the development of psychology as an independent science, independent of medicine and philosophy. Although he is not the founder of a psychological school or system, he developed many trends in the productive development of psychological science, outlined a broad plan for the necessary transformations and directions in this development. He is still considered the most significant and outstanding American scientist, who had a huge impact not only on psychological science, but also on philosophy and pedagogy.

“Chicago School” by J. Dewey. Along with James, the forerunner of the functional direction is considered to be John Dewey(1859-1952). Having gained great fame in the 19th century as a philosopher and educator, Dewey began his career as a psychologist. His Psychology (1886) was the first American textbook on the subject. But it was not she who determined his influence on psychological circles, but a short article "The Concept of the Reflex Act in Psychology" (1896), where he sharply opposed the idea that reflex arcs serve as the basic units of behavior.

No one in psychology has defended this idea. Nevertheless, Dewey demanded a transition to a new understanding of the subject of psychology, to recognize as such a holistic organism in its restless, adaptive activity in relation to the environment. Consciousness is one of the moments in this continuum. It occurs when the coordination between the organism and the environment is disturbed, and the organism, in order to survive, seeks to adapt to new circumstances.

In 1894, Dyoi was invited to the University of Chigak, where, under his influence, a group of psychologists formed, who soon declared themselves functionalists in opposition to the followers of Wundt and Titchener. Their theoretical creed was expressed by James Angell (1869-1949). Here functional psychology was defined as the doctrine of mental operations as opposed to the structuralist doctrine of "mental elements."

These general considerations represented neither a new theory nor a new research program. However, they attracted a large number of students to Chicago who wanted to specialize in psychology. The so-called Chicago school was formed, from which dozens of American psychologists came out.

With regard to methods, the Chicago school considered it expedient to use both introspection and objective observation (the experiment was interpreted as controlled observation), and analysis of the products of activity. The Angell School of Chicago was scientific and educational in the sense that a large number of researchers were trained in it.

In general, functionalism proved to be theoretically untenable. The concept of "function" in psychology (in contrast to physiology, where it had a solid real foundation) was not productive. It was neither theoretically thought out nor experimentally substantiated and was rightly rejected. After all, a function was understood as an act emanating from the subject (perception, thinking, etc.), initially aimed at a goal or a problem situation. The determination of the psychological act, its relation to the nervous system, its ability to regulate external behavior - all this remained mysterious.

In the atmosphere of the growing weakness of functionalism, a new psychological trend is emerging. American functionalism is being replaced by behaviorism.

Brentano

Brentano

(Brentano) Franz (1838-1917) - German. and Austrian . He taught philosophy at Würzburg (1866-1873) and Vienna (1874-1894) high fur boots. Since 1864 - a Catholic priest, in 1873, in connection with the controversy surrounding the dogma of the infallibility of the Pope, he resigned from his priesthood. His direct students in Würzburg are K. Schlumpf, A. Marti and others, among the pupils and students in Vienna are T. Massaryk, A. Meinong, E. Husserl, K. Twardowski, K. von Ehrenfels, A. Hoefler, Z Freud and others In accordance with his doctrine of the four phases of the development of philosophy in each historical era (ascending and three declines), B. negatively assessed Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy (the phase of extreme decline), with the exception of positivism, with the representatives of which he nevertheless less polemical. Under the influence of Philosophy A. Trendelenburg B. turned to Aristotle, which served as the starting point for his teachings on consciousness. B. put forward the idea of ​​philosophy as a rigorous science, which was then picked up by Husserl. The initial task of B. considered the separation of the subjects of natural science and psychology. The subject of natural science is physical phenomena that are found in sensations (visible figure, color, landscape, audible sounds, etc.). The identification of the forces that cause sensations with the object is, which endows the sciences with a stable existence. Turning attention to physical phenomena in fantasy is one of the main sources of psychological knowledge. The subject of psychology is mental phenomena: acts of consciousness that cannot be given through self-observation. B. considered the source of knowledge about them to be perception, coexisting in one act of consciousness with any form of mental activity, each of which is recognized in it as such: representation - as, judgment - as judgment, etc. Internal perception, or internal perception, is at the same time a source of evidence: the representation is realized in it precisely as the representation that we have, the judgment - precisely as the judgment that we express, etc. Here the main point of his disagreement with I. Kant is outlined: according to B., internal experience does not contain a division into things-in-themselves and phenomena. The main features of the difference between mental phenomena and physical phenomena are the following: 1) all mental phenomena are either the essence of representations themselves, or are based on representations; 2) each phenomenon is characterized by the intentional (mental) existence of an object in it, or orientation towards the object. B. reintroduces the medieval "intentional", which becomes one of the main in the philosophy of the 20th century.
The classification of mental phenomena is carried out by B. according to their intentional nature, i.e. according to the way the object is defined. There are three classes that are irreducible to each other: acts of representation, which underlie all others; acts of judgment in which it is recognized or rejected (judgments are not representations), and acts of love and hate and interests (feeling and will). From this classification grows the ethical doctrine of B., based on the analogy between the third and second classes: unlike representations, they reveal the right and the wrong, the true and the false. The act of preferring the true in the sphere of feelings and will is the source of moral consciousness.
In the late period, B. clarifies that our mental is directed to things (bodies and "spirits"), which are taken as objects in various ways. Only things have existence in the proper sense, their highest generic -. What is taken as an object exists only in an improper sense: for example. corporeality and not the individual, love and not the lover, space and not spatiality, and not individuals who think. The real, according to B., can only be individual. What is taken as an object - in the view, etc. - no longer individually. Neither external nor internal perception gives an individualizing sign. The doctrine of consciousness is the point of intersection of all the main problems of B.'s philosophy: the problems of time, the critical analysis of language, the nature of moral consciousness, and the substantiation of an optimistic religious worldview ("rational theism"). The influence of the philosophy of B. can be traced in the phenomenology of Husserl and M. Heidegger, neorealism, analytical philosophy, in the Wurzburg psychological school and Gestalt Peichology.

Philosophy: Encyclopedic Dictionary. - M.: Gardariki. Edited by A.A. Ivina. 2004 .

Brentano

(Brentano)

Franz (January 16, 1838, Marienberg, near Boppard - March 7, 1917, Zurich) - German. philosopher, from 1864 - Catholic. priest, from 1872 - professor of philosophy in Würzburg, and from 1874 - in Vienna. For doubts in the faith in 1873 he was deprived of the priesthood and excommunicated from the Catholic. church, in 1880 he was also expelled from the professorship. Follower of the philosophy of Aristotle and Catholic. (neo)scholastics. He was a determined opponent of Kant and German. idealism; in contrast to the latter, he defended a pronounced . Brentano is the founder of psychology as a doctrine of mental phenomena; classifying them, he distinguishes three main. Forms: Representations, Judgments, and Emotions. Considered to be an essential sign of a mental phenomenon (cf. intention). In the field of metaphysics, he tried to justify a free Christ. . Meinong, Stumpf, Husserl proceeded from his ideas in their logical studies. As for Brentano's evolutionary views, it should be noted that, while in the early period of his work he considered all objects of intentional acts as existing eo ipso intramentally - a view that was accepted by almost all of his students, including Husserl, - in a later period of creativity, he recognizes that the objects of intentional acts are always transcendent to consciousness. Main prod.: "Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte aus", 1874; "Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis", 1889; "Grundlegung und Aufbau der Ethik, aus dem NachlaI hrsg. von F. Moyer-Hillebrand, 1952.

Philosophical Encyclopedic Dictionary. 2010 .

Brentano

Brentano (Brentano) Franz Clemens Honoratus Herman (January 16, 1838, Marienberg-March 17, 1917, Zurich) was an Austrian philosopher. Studied philosophy and psychology in Munich; Wurzburgs, then in Berlin, where in 1862, under the guidance of F. Trendelenburg, he defended his doctoral thesis “On the Different Meanings of Beings in Aristotle.” In 1864 Brentano received the rank of Catholic priest. From 1866 he reads, logic, psychology and metaphysics at the University of Würzburg, then, from 1874 already as an ordinary professor in Vienna. In 1872 and 1873, during trips to England, France and Germany, he personally met G. Spencer, G. T. Fechner, E. G. Weber, W. Windelband. In 1879, he removed his clergy (assuming to marry, Brentano, according to Austrian law, could not remain a priest), while losing his professorship. In 1896 he moved to Florence and received Italian citizenship, while ending his public academic career. Over the years, K. Stumpf, A. Marta, E. Husserl, Z. Freud, K. Twardowski, A. Meinong, T. Masaryk, X. von Ehrenfels, A. Castil, O. Kraus attended his lectures. The most devoted of his students created the “empirical school of Brentano”. Brentano correlated the creation of his own philosophical system with the original historical and philosophical concept of the “four phases of the development of philosophy”, developed by him back in 1860. According to this theory, three large periods - Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the New Age - consist of four phases cyclically replacing each other. The first phase is characterized by the rise of philosophy, the adequacy of the “natural” methods of philosophizing to their subject, the absence of artificial, external prerequisites for knowledge (for example, Plato, Aristotle; Thomas Aquinas; Locke, Descartes). The second phase marks the beginning of the decline of philosophy, accompanied by the erosion of pure philosophical interest, the dominance of “practical” goals, the transformation of philosophy into a service discipline (and Epicureanism; Duns Scotus; French and German). The third phase - the phase of skepticism - deprives the credibility of science, "entered the marketplace" and substantiates whatever it pleases (often the exact opposite, like stoicism and epicureanism). The human mind generally refuses to see and present solid foundations of knowledge (Pyrrhonism, Sext Empiric; Ockham; Hume). The fourth phase restores the cognitive rights of a person, but connects it already with external, inexperienced foundations, since all the “experimental” foundations of philosophical knowledge are destroyed by skepticism - this is the phase of “mysticism” (neopythagoreanism and; Meister Eckhart, Nicholas of Cusa; Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel). Thus, according to Brentano, after the completion of the fourth phase of the Modern Age, after the “extreme decline of philosophy”, the first phase of a new historical period is coming, the phase of rise, to which his own philosophy must correspond, moreover, initiate this phase. The title of his main work, Psychology from an Empirical Point of View (1874), as Brentano writes, “characterizes him both in subject and in method.” Psychology, according to Brentano, studies (1) human consciousness and how they are connected, as well as (2) the prerequisites and occurrence of these elements. The first is descriptive psychology (or descriptive phenomenology), the second is the subject of genetic psychology, considering it to physical and chemical processes. The descriptive one analyzes and describes the phenomena of our consciousness, i.e., facts that are directly given in experience, or, what is the same, objects that we have in our internal perception. Brentano attributed his work to descriptive psychology, calling it psychognosia. Psychognosia is the only possible form of scientific philosophy for Brentano, which provides the researcher with accurate and reliable statements about human consciousness. In general, outside the phenomena of consciousness, according to Brentano, there is no subject of philosophical research, since the givenness of our world is the sum of phenomena, or phenomena, available exclusively as existing in consciousness. He distinguishes between mental and physical phenomena. The former include acts of representation that have arisen through either fantasy, judgments and movements of the soul, ”or emotional phenomena. Representation always underlies the other two kinds of mental phenomena. If we judge something, then simultaneously with the act of judgment we necessarily represent this “something”, if we love, then we love in the representation of “something”. Physical phenomena are color, figure, cold, smell, that is, what is given in a mental phenomenon. The apparent structure of the world actually turns out to be the structure of consciousness. Consciousness is always directed towards something, it can only be described in terms of relation, relation. This fundamental consciousness Brentano calls "intentional relation". Intentionality presupposes a correlative pair, where one correlate is consciousness (a mental phenomenon), and the other is what it is aimed at. For example, “vision-visible”, “act of presentation-represented”, “desire-desired”. At the same time, only the first of the correlates is real (possesses a real being), while the second is unreal and has an exclusively intentional existence “within” the act of consciousness. For example, one who is thought about is not real in the proper sense of the word (he exists only intentionally), but the act of representing this person is real. On the whole, however, real existence can only be decided in the realm of apparent experience. The fact, writes Brentano, that I see a spot or hear a sound does not mean that the spot or sound exists. The existence of the object of a mental act is not given with evidence in the mental act itself, while the non-existence of a mental act would mean it, which is obviously contradictory. Brentano distinguishes between the primary and the objects of the mental act. The primary object of a mental act is its internal. However, in every act there is also a secondary object, the psychic act itself, which is given, as it were, “at the same time” with the primary object. In the representation of color (as a primary object, a physical phenomenon), there is always a representation of this representation.

Researchers traditionally point to two stages in the philosophical evolution of Brentano, and between them lies at the turn of the century, in any case, it is believed that in 1902 the turning point had already occurred. The second stage does not differ from the first one by the fundamental attitude towards the correlativity of the act of consciousness, only the existential primary object of the mental act changes. Brentano argues that the subject of thought cannot be

existing, but only that which really exists, and only the individual really exists. Also introduced a more differentiated mental act. Grasping an object in external perception, we grasp in internal perception this perception itself, moreover, as directed at a physical object, i.e., it turns out that this object is represented by us not only directly (in external perception), but also indirectly (in internal perception). If, for example, we have a representation of universal non-being, then here one should distinguish between the representation of us as denying universal non-being (in the “directly” mode) and the representation of a thing in general (in the “indirectly” mode). The thing that exists here, being the object of thought, is not a "universal non-being", but the very act of thinking. The sentence "There is a thought" is replaced by the sentence "There is a thinker".

Analytical work on the problem of consciousness allowed Brentano to participate productively in many fundamental discussions of his time, in particular, on the problem of the unconscious, where, in a dispute with E. Hartmann and his supporters, Brentano noted the self-contradiction of the term “unconscious consciousness”, not allowing the presence of unconscious mental phenomena. The philosophical influence of Brentano can hardly be overestimated. It is seen in the development of phenomenology, analytical philosophy, object theory, Gestalt psychology.

Op.: Selected. work. M., 1996; On the polysemy of existence according to Aristotle.-In the book: “Theology. Philosophy. Culturology". SPb., 1997, c. four; Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. Lpz., 1874; Von der Klassifikation der psychischen Phaenomene. Lpz., 1911; Wahrheit and Evidenz. Hamburg, 1962; Die Abkehr vom Nichtrealen. BemMunch., 1966; Descriptive psychology. Hamb., 1982.

Lit.; Krans 0. Franz Brentano. Munch., 1919; Most 0. Die Ethik F. Brentano "s. Münster, 1993; Windüchet H. F. Brentano und die Scholastik. Junsbrock, 1936; Methode et métaphysique selon Fr. Brentano. P., 1995; Tvardovsky K. F. Brentano and .-In the book .: Logical-Philosophical and Psychological Research, Moscow, 1997.

V. V. Anashvilch

New Philosophical Encyclopedia: In 4 vols. M.: Thought. Edited by V. S. Stepin. 2001 .

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Brentano, Luio (born in 1844) famous German economist. In 1872 he was a professor of economic sciences in Breslau, later he held the chair of political economy in Strasbourg, Vienna, Leipzig and since 1891 at Munich universities. ... ... 1000 biographies

Franz Brentano (1838–1917)

From the age of 16, the Austrian Franz Brentano studied theology at the universities of Berlin, Munich and Tübingen. He received a degree in philosophy from Tübingen in 1864. In the same year he was ordained, and two years later began teaching philosophy at the University of Würzburg. The sphere of his scientific interests was Aristotle. In 1870, the Vatican Council in Rome adopted the doctrine of papal infallibility. with which Brentano strongly disagreed. He renounced his dignity and from the professorship he had received as a priest.

Brentano's most famous work, Psychology from an Empirical Point of View (Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkie aus), was published in 1874, a year after the publication of the second volume of Wundt's Principles of Physiological Psychology. In his book, Brentano argues with Wundt, which speaks of the already emerging split within the new psychology. In the same year, 1874, he was offered a professorship at the University of Vienna. There he worked for 20 years, during which his authority and influence invariably strengthened. Brentano's lectures were extremely popular; among his students were outstanding psychologists: Karl Stumpf, Christian von Ehren-fels, Sigmund Freud. In 1894, Brentano retired, lived for a long time in Florence, where he continued to write a lot. He died in Zurich.

The diversity of Brentano's scientific interests made him one of the most influential figures among the early psychologists. Next, we will talk about how he became the spiritual forerunner of Gestalt psychology and humanistic psychology. Like Wundt, he aimed to make psychology a science. But if Wundt's psychology was purely experimental, then Brentano's main scientific method was observation, although he did not deny the usefulness of experiments. He was of the opinion that a full-fledged empirical approach is still wider, since it uses data obtained not only experimentally, but also as a result of observation and personal experience.

Brentano did not accept Wundt's fundamental idea that psychology should study the content of consciousness. He believed that the main subject of the study of psychology was mental activity - that is, not the content of the process of perception, not a visible object, but the very act of seeing. Thus, Brentano's psychology of the act is opposed to Wundt's views that psychology should deal with elements of mental processes.

Brentano argued that it is necessary to distinguish between experience as structure and experience as activity. For example, the so-called sensory content of the red color, which acts as an irritant, differs from the act of its perception. Brentano said that the real subject of psychology is the act of experiencing. In his opinion, color is not a mental, but only a physical quality. But the act of seeing color is a mental process. Of course, any act presupposes the presence of an object; some sensory content is always present, since the act of seeing is impossible if there is nothing to see.

The new conception of the subject of study of psychology required the creation of a different scientific method, since the acts of perception cannot be analyzed by introspection - a method that was used in Wundt's Leipzig laboratory. The study of mental acts requires observation on a broader basis than Wundt practiced. The psychology of Brentano's act, in its methodology, was not experimental, but empirical. But this was not a return to speculative philosophy—not being experimental, Brentano's psychology still relied on systematic observation.

In particular, Brentano argued that mental acts can be investigated in two ways: through memory (remembering what mental processes are inherent in certain mental states) and through imagination (imagining a certain mental state and observing the mental processes accompanying this state).

Psychology of the act - Brentano's concept of psychology, according to which the subject of empirical study in psychology should be mental acts.

Brentano had many followers, but Wundt's system continued to dominate psychology. Wundt's views were known more widely as he published more. In addition, it was easier to study sensations or the content of consciousness with the help of methods of psychophysics than to study, like Brentano, processes more elusive.

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