The Zemsky Sobor of 1653 decided Fr. Zemsky Sobor (briefly)

In the autumn of 1650 a campaign was undertaken in Moldavia. This campaign thwarted the raid of the Turkish-Tatar invaders on Russia. The hetman sought from the Sultan an order to the Crimean Khan to support Khmelnitsky in his new campaign against the Polish king. Knowing that King Jan Casimir was gathering large forces, the hetman actively prepared to repulse the enemy.

At the request of Khmelnitsky, the Russian government allowed the passage of Cossack troops through Russian territory to strike at the Polish troops in the Lithuanian-Belarusian lands. The arrival of the Cossacks in Belarus caused a new upsurge in the liberation movement there.

At the beginning of 1651, the Russian government convened the Zemsky Sobor in Moscow specifically to consider the issue of accepting Ukraine into Russia.

The war with Poland resumed in 1651. This time, the khan and his horde joined the army of Khmelnitsky.

At the beginning of the battle, success was on the side of the people's army. However, on the third day of the battle, the khan betrayed again; he withdrew from his horde and moved east, began to smash the defenseless Ukrainian cities and villages. Khan detained the hetman as his prisoner. The people's army found itself in a very difficult situation. Nevertheless, a significant part of the army, led by Ivan Bohun, escaped defeat and retreated.

Meanwhile, Khmelnitsky was freed from the khan's captivity. A new people's army soon gathered near Belaya Tserkov. Khmelnytsky could not quickly and completely restore the forces lost near Berestechko. However, the position of the army of Jan-Kazimir worsened as it moved towards the Dnieper, the population of which rose up against the enemy. Under such conditions, in September 1651, a new, Belotserkovsky treaty was concluded.

Concluding the Bila Tserkva Treaty, the hetman, like the whole people, was not going to give up the continuation of the war, from the struggle for the unification of Ukraine with Russia.

5. Zemsky Sobor 1653

On May 22, 1652, the battle near Batoga (on Podolia) ended with the complete defeat of the gentry army. It became increasingly clear that Poland was powerless to restore its power in Ukraine and prevent its unification with Russia. Turkey's predatory aspirations became more active, and the possibilities of its and Crimea's rapprochement with Poland expanded. At the same time, the victory at Batoga convinced the tsarist government that the Commonwealth was weakened.

In 1653, the Russian government resolutely took the path of joining Ukraine to Russia.

The government of the Commonwealth resumed the war in Ukraine. The Polish army began to devastate Ukraine in order to force the Ukrainian people to submit. The popular masses in the Ukraine were in an exceptionally difficult situation.

At the end of April 1653, a Russian embassy headed by Prince Repnin was sent to Poland. The embassy demanded from the Polish king the renewal of the Zboriv Treaty and an end to the oppression of the Ukrainian people. The Polish government refused to comply with these demands, insisting on the full restoration of the power of the Polish gentry in Ukraine.

In May 1653, the Russian government convened the Zemsky Sobor to consider the issue of uniting Ukraine with Russia and the war against Poland. The council was held in Moscow, in the Pomegranate Chamber of the Kremlin. In the work of the Zemsky Sobor, in addition to the tsar, the patriarch and the higher clergy, “boyars, devious, thoughtful people, stewards and solicitors took part. and Moscow nobles, and residents, and nobles from cities, and boyar children. guests and living rooms and cloth hundreds and black hundreds, and palace settlements, merchant and other ranks, people and archers.

Given the repeated requests of Ukraine. and also taking into account the danger that threatened the existence of the Ukrainian people from the Polish and Turkish-Tatar invaders, the Zemsky Sobor in Moscow on October 1, 1653 agreed to the admission of Ukraine to Russia and the declaration of war against gentry Poland for the liberation of Ukraine, Belarus and Smolensk .

The decision of the Zemsky Sobor on October 1, 1653 also reflected the patriotic mood of the masses of Russia, their desire to reunite with the fraternal Ukrainian people, their willingness to make sacrifices to implement this decision.

In October 1653, the Russian government sent the Great Embassy to Ukraine, headed by the boyar V. Buturlin. The Kremlin soon solemnly announced the beginning of the war for Ukraine.

Khmelnitsky with his army participated at that time in a new campaign against the Polish army. The meeting with the royal army took place at Zhvanets (not far from Kamenetz-Podolsk). Hetman and this time was forced to conclude an alliance with the khan. By the end of November, the troops led by him completely wrested the initiative from the hands of the enemy, exhausted and surrounded the royal army and were ready to deliver the final blow to it. However, this time the khan also demanded that Khmelnitsky conclude peace with the king, and then participate in a joint attack on Russia. Bogdan Khmelnitsky resolutely refused to comply with these demands.

On January 8, 1654, the Pereyaslav Rada decided to reunite the Ukrainian people with the Russian people in a single Russian state. This event was preceded, as is known, by the decision of the Zemsky Sobor in 1653 on the acceptance of Ukraine into Russian citizenship and on the war with Poland.

Despite the great historical significance of this Cathedral, so far it has not attracted the attention of researchers. Therefore, it is necessary to at least briefly highlight its activities.

From the beginning of the liberation war in 1648, the Russian government provided extensive economic and financial assistance to the struggling Ukraine. Gradually expanded diplomatic support for Ukraine from Russia, as well as assistance in people, weapons, ammunition. At the beginning of 1649, the Russian government recognized Hetman Khmelnytsky and since that time regularly exchanged ambassadors with him. At the same time, the government informed the hetman of its readiness to accept Ukraine into Russian citizenship, but considered it necessary for the time being to avoid a war with Poland.

In its diplomatic speeches in Poland, the Russian government made no secret of the fact that, depending on the outcome of the negotiations, the eye would bring the issue of Ukraine to the consideration of the Zemsky Sobor. So, the Russian ambassadors G. and S. Pushkin and G. Leontiev, having arrived in Warsaw in 1650, quite decisively raised the question of “untruths” before the royal government, threatening to break off relations. At the same time, the Russian ambassadors warned the Polish government that if the lords "do not reform," then the tsar "orders a Council to be held in Moscow" and on it "to subtract the royal wrongs" and discuss violations by the other side of the "peaceful end" 1 . The lords "didn't improve"; in December 1650, the Seimas passed a decision to resume the war in Ukraine.

At the end of 1650 - beginning of 1651, the hetman's embassy headed by M. Sulichich arrived in Moscow. The Russian government put before him the question of how to carry out the transition of Ukraine into citizenship and how to organize the administration of Ukraine in the future 2 . Shortly thereafter, the Russian government for the first time considered it necessary to bring the Ukrainian question to the Zemsky Sobor. This was done by the Councils in 1651 and 1653.

At the end of January 1651, after negotiations with the embassy of M. Sulichich, the government decided to hastily convene the Zemsky Sobor. Its convocation was scheduled for February 19, 1651. In the government's "conscription letter" dated January 31, 1651, it was ordered to choose two people from the nobles, "and two people from the townspeople at the same time", sending the elected "by the specified date" 3 .

However, at first only the consecrated Council was convened. He started

1 S. M. Solovyov. Russian history. Book. 2. T. VI - X. St. Petersburg, b. city, page 1596

2 "Reunification of Ukraine with Russia". Documents and materials in three volumes. T. II. M. 1953, pp. 490 - 492.

3 B. Latkin. Materials for the history of Zemsky Sobors of the 17th century St. Petersburg. 1884, p. 91.

his work in Moscow on February 19, 1651. The government reported to the clergy about the state of affairs in Ukraine, about Russia's relations with Poland, and also about the threat to Russia from the Crimea, Poland and Sweden 4 .

On February 27, 1651, the clergy, headed by Patriarch Joseph, presented their opinion ("advice") to the government. Its meaning was as follows: if the Polish government "does not give justice and justice to the guilty under the agreement and will not give eternal completion", then the church "may give permission" from the kissing of the cross under the agreement; in this case, "hetman from Cherkasy can be accepted with approval." However, it was recommended that even if the Polish king was "just right", then the government would act according to the circumstances, as "God will inform" 5 .

Having received a response from the clergy, the government convened in full force the secular part of the Zemsky Sobor. Here, in addition to the tsar, the clergy, boyars and duma people, stewards, solicitors, Moscow nobles, nobles and boyar children, elected from the cities, living room, cloth and black hundreds and settlements and city elected trade people were represented. The "postscript" to the report of the government to the consecrated Council says that the meeting of the secular part of the Council took place in the "dining hut" in the Kremlin on February 28 and to those assembled "according to this letter it was announced" 6 . However, in the available documents there is no information either about the decision of the secular part of the Council, or about the decision of the Council in its entire composition.

Until now, historians believed that this was the result of poor preservation of the sources. Now, we think, this idea should be reconsidered. The Russian government, through its ambassadors, warned Poland that it would raise the question of the "falsehood" of the Polish government at the Council. But in February 1651, only the opinion of the spiritual part of the Cathedral was requested. The secular part of the Council was only made aware of these "untruths". However, she apparently did not make decisions on this issue, since Russia was not at that moment sufficiently prepared for a war with Poland. Such a final decision was made by the secular part of the Zemsky Sobor only in 1653. It is no coincidence that the decision of the Council of 1653, especially its first half, largely repeats the text of the materials of the Council of 1651. It can be assumed that the discussion of the issue of Ukraine at the Zemsky Sobor in 1651 was important for the Russian government in order to prepare public opinion for a war with Poland for Ukraine. This was the significance of the Council of 1651.

After this Council, the Russian government took the path of realizing the reunification of Ukraine with Russia more and more firmly. In this regard, a special conference on the question of Ukraine, convened at the beginning of 1653, little covered in our historical literature, was of great importance. At one time, S. M. Solovyov mentioned this fact, but did not attach much importance to it. Materials about this meeting, unfortunately, were not included in the three-volume "Reunification of Ukraine with Russia."

The meeting began on February 22, 1653 in Moscow. It was attended by the king and the boyars. It ended on March 14, 1653. At this meeting, it was decided to send a great embassy to Poland, convene a Zemsky Sobor in Moscow and begin preparations for war with Poland. At the same time, it was planned to strengthen ties with the hetman Khmelnitsky and inform him of the consent of the Russian government to accept the Zaporizhzhya Host as his citizenship and, finally, send an embassy to the hetman "to take over" Ukraine. All these activities have been implemented.

4 See "Reunification of Ukraine with Russia". T. III. page 11.

5 Ibid., pp. 11-12.

6 See ibid., p. 11.

On March 19, 1653, a decree was sent "to all cities" "to be service people" in Moscow "by the 20th of May, with all the service, and for that period their sovereign deigns to look at Moscow, at the horses" 7 .

On April 24 of the same year, it was decided to send an embassy to Poland headed by Prince B. A. Repnin-Obolensky and B. M. Khitrovo. At the same time, preparations began for the convening of the Zemsky Sobor. There is no reason to believe that the Zemsky Sobor of 1653 was convened only on October 1 and lasted only one day, as S. M. Solovyov, for example, claims 8 . As early as May 2, 1653, that is, shortly after the state meeting in February - March, the government sent out a "draft letter" with a call to Moscow for elected people from the nobility. In the "Palace ranks" for 1653, the following entry speaks of this: "On the second day of May, sovereign letters were sent to Zamoskovye and to all Ukrainian cities to governors and to order people. It was ordered in all cities to send two people from each city from the choice gentlemen of good and reasonable people, and send them to Moscow for a specified period, on the 20th of May" 9 .

By the deadline, the majority of the elect came to Moscow 10 . On the appointed day, May 20, 1653, the Zemsky Sobor began its work. This is directly indicated by the June letter of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich discovered by us to the ambassadors in Poland B. A. Repnin and B. M. Khitrovo. “Yes, you know,” this letter said, “there was a Council on the seventh week on Wednesday Maya on the 20th day ...” The same charter indicates that one question was submitted to the Council - about Ukraine. The discussion dragged on; "For a long time the conversation was repaired," the letter said. "And all the ranks of the people were interrogated whether to accept Cherkasy" 11 .

By May 25, the unanimous opinion of the Council became clear. "And all sorts of ranks and market people all unanimously spoke about that, in order to accept the Cherkasy." The tsar approved this opinion, which made those present at the Council "overjoyed" 12 .

The fact that on May 25 the opinion of the Council was determined is also confirmed by the surviving draft of the decision of this Council (or the report at it) 13 . Subsequently, this draft formed the basis of the final judgment of the Council, issued on October 1, 1653. As you know, this verdict began with a reference to the May discussion of the issue: “In the past, in the year 161 May 25, by decree of the great sovereign ... it was said at the councils about the Lithuanian and Cherkasy affairs. the great sovereign ... indicated that a council should be held about the same Lithuanian and Cherkasy affairs ... " 14 . The expression "spoken at the councils" confirms the fact that the issue was discussed at a number of meetings of the Council, as evidenced by the June royal letter cited above. On October 1, the Council met in its former composition, only to formalize its final decision, prepared on May 25. This connection is indicated by the beginning of the sentence on October 1, 1653. On October 1, 1653, the Council met with the members elected in May, since there were no new elections during the period from June to September 1653.

The Zemsky Sobor of 1653 certainly belongs to the so-called "full" Sobors. It included more than one rank, estate. In the record of the "Palace Ranks" the composition of the Cathedral is defined as follows: the tsar, the consecrated Cathedral, the boyars, the devious, thoughtful people, "with the stolniks and with

7 It was about the general review of the Russian army, which took place on the Maiden's field from June 13 to 28, 1653. "Palace ranks". T. III. SPB. 1852, pp. 343, 356.

8 S. M. Solovyov. Decree. cit., p. 1631.

9 "Palace ranks". Vol. III, p. 350.

10 Central State Archive of Ancient Acts (TsGADA), Discharge. Belgorod table, p. 351, ll. 346 - 351.

11 Ibid., State Archive, Category XXVII, N 79, 1653, fol. one

14 "Reunification of Ukraine with Russia". Vol. III, p. 406.

solicitors, and from the nobles of Moscow, and from the tenants, and with the elected townspeople ..., and from the stewards, and from the solicitors, and from the nobles, and from the tenants, and from the townspeople were elected people "15.

From the very beginning, this Council included a significant part of the elected "from Zamoskovye and Ukrainian cities" - from nobles, children of boyars and merchants 16 . It also included the consecrated Cathedral - the patriarch, two metropolitans, a bishop, abbots, as well as the Boyars, the Duma in full force and the king. It should be noted that Metropolitan Mikhail of Serbia also participated in the work of the Council and was specially mentioned in the verdict. In the draft decision of the Council of May 25, stewards, solicitors and nobles of Moscow and clerks, who were present, obviously at the call of the government, were also named from among its non-elected participants. The verdict of the Zemsky Sobor on October 1 refers to a more expanded composition of its participants. In addition to those who participated earlier in the work of the Council, in addition to the Moscow nobles, tenants are also named in the cathedral act, then guests and living rooms and cloth hundreds and black hundreds, and palace settlements and all kinds of ranks, people, and archers. In the final part of the verdict on October 1, in addition, more streltsy heads were named and it was clarified that taxable people 17 participated from the Black Hundreds and palace settlements.

Thus, the Zemsky Sobor of 1653 began its work in May in a limited composition, in which the proportion of elected from the provincial nobility (2 people each from the county) and merchant people was relatively high. When the verdict was passed, the composition of the Cathedral was significantly expanded by the Moscow prikaz administration, streltsy heads, as well as hard-working merchants from the Moscow Black Hundreds, palace settlements and archers. Since in the presentation of the opinions of these ranks, the verdict speaks only of service and merchant "all kinds of ranks" people, it can be concluded that only merchants, that is, actually townspeople, were attracted from the black hundreds and palace settlements, although legally they could be peasants. It was important for the government to know the opinion of merchants of all ranks, since the financing of the upcoming war was connected with this.

The Zemsky Sobor of 1653 opened on May 20, met with long breaks, and finished its work only on October 1. On May 25, when the unanimous consent of the members of the Council to the annexation of Ukraine was determined and a draft of his sentence had already been drawn up, the work of the Council was interrupted. This break can be established not only by the above quotation from the judgment of October 1st. In the list of cities we found in the archives, from which "the nobles were sent to Moscow by the sovereign's decree and were at the cathedral" in 1653, those cities are also named, from where "the nobles came after the cathedral." Those who arrived after May 25 18 are included in the list of absentees.

The government was going to resume the activities of the Cathedral from June 5. This is evidenced by letters sent from the Razryad to Kursk, Putivl, Sevsk and Voronezh. Thus, in a letter received in Kursk on May 30, it was ordered that the electors who did not appear should be sent "to Moscow in the Razryad for the period of June by the 5th" 19 .

How to explain the break in the sessions of the Council? This is directly answered by the royal charter sent in June to Poland to B. A. Repnin and B. M. Khitrovo. Having announced the consent of the Zemsky Sobor to "accept the Cherkasy", the government announced the break of the meetings of the Council until the return of the ambassadors from Poland: "and we postponed this until you..." 20 .

15 "Palace ranks". Vol. III, p. 369.

16 TsGADA, Discharge, Sevsky table, pp. 145, 148. Belgorod table, pp. 351, 362, 366; Polish Affairs, 1653, NNs 6 and 8.

17 "Reunification of Ukraine with Russia". Vol. III, pp. 407, 414.

18 TsGADA, Discharge, Belgorod table, p. 351, l. 352a.

19 Ibid., Sevsky Table, p. 148, ll. 152, 154, 179.

20 Ibid., State Archive, Category XXVII, N 79, fol. one.

It is known that the embassy, which left for Poland on April 30, completed negotiations only on August 7 and returned to Moscow only in September 21. That is why the Cathedral did not resume its work on June 5, since the government intended in its decision to take into account the results of the embassy of Prince B. A. Repnin and B. M. Khitrovo.

The government was well aware of the mood of all the ranks of the Zemsky Sobor. In this regard, the departure of the embassies of A. Matveev and I. Fomin to Ukraine in early June becomes understandable. A. Matveev later stated that he was "sent to Hetman Khmelnitsky to call for citizenship" 22 .

Already on June 22, the government informed the hetman by royal letter of consent to accept Ukraine as a subject. This letter was also sent after the preliminary opinion of the Zemsky Sobor was revealed. Shortly before this, information about the growth of aggressive aspirations on the part of Turkey accelerated this step of the government. The royal charter of June 22, 1653 informed the hetman of his readiness to accept Ukraine and that "our military people ... are recruiting a builder and a builder for the militia"; the government offered to exchange ambassadors 23 .

Meanwhile, there was still no news from the embassy of Prince B. A. Repnin from Poland. Then it was decided to send ambassadors R. Streshnev and M. Bredikhin to the hetman. They had to inform the hetman that the government was waiting for the return of the embassy of B. A. Repnin to make a final decision. At the same time, it was instructed to clarify with the hetman the issues of future joint military operations, to find out about the forces of the enemies, etc.

Streshnev and Bredikhin left Moscow on September 13, and in the middle of that month news was received that the embassy was returning from Poland. Therefore, on September 20, a royal letter was sent to M. Bredikhin and R. Streshnev, in which the government suggested that the ambassadors notify the hetman that the royal decree would be sent "soon" through the personal representative of the hetman L. Kapusta, who arrived at that time in Moscow. At the same time, the ambassadors were ordered to inform the hetman about the acceptance of Ukraine into citizenship if the battle with the royal army had already taken place, and, conversely, that the hetman waited for the decree if there had not yet been a battle 24 .

This directive of the Russian government by no means gives grounds to see the existence of any fluctuations in its policy. If the war in the Ukraine was resumed and the battle had already taken place, then this also predetermined Russia's entry into the war even before the final decision of the Council. If there was no battle, then the responsible decision, which should have entailed Russia's entry into the war with Poland, should have been made with the participation of the Zemsky Sobor. The decision of the Council was necessary, since the impending war would inevitably require large human and material sacrifices on the part of Russia.

Such was the meaning of the instructions sent by the government to Streshnev and Bredikhin. Klyuchevsky was mistaken in considering this directive "a cruel mockery."

On September 25, 1653, the Russian ambassadors finally returned from Poland and were immediately received by the tsar, who was at that time in the Trinity-Sergius Monastery. In September, but a little earlier, the hetman's embassy arrived in Moscow, headed by Bogdan Khmelnitsky's personal confidant, Colonel Lavrin Kapusta, Chigirinsky. L. Kapusta asked the government to immediately send to Ukraine - to Kyiv and other cities

21 In the article list of the embassy there is a mention of the royal charter received on July 5 (TsGADA, Polskie delo, 1653, N 84, fol. 552).

22 "The story of the innocent imprisonment ... of the boyar Artemon Sergeevich Matveev." SPB. 1776, p. 43.

23 "Reunification of Ukraine with Russia". Vol. III, p. 323.

24 See ibid., p. 406.

yes - under the governors of "military people, although with 3000 people." He said that the horde was already under the Bila Tserkva, that ambassadors had arrived from the Turkish Sultan to the hetman, insistently "calling for his allegiance," but that the hetman "he (the sultan. - A. K.) he refused, but he hopes for the sovereign's mercy" 25 .

The situation in Ukraine was indeed very serious. The reply of the Polish government, delivered by B. A. Repnin and B. M. Khitrovo, spoke of Poland's intention to resume the war in Ukraine, which had already actually begun; the hetman set out with an army on a campaign. There was a final decision to be made. The Zemsky Sobor was sufficiently prepared for this during its work from May 20.

On October 1, the last, final meeting of the Zemsky Sobor took place, at which the conciliar act was approved. The meeting took place in the Kremlin, in the Palace of Facets. It is indicative that in the entry of "Palace Ranks" it is noted that at the Council, in fact, only the question of Ukraine was discussed; relations with Poland are not even mentioned. At the final meeting, the tsar appeared with a procession from St. Basil's Church. This emphasized the solemn nature of the meeting. At the Council in full force, the "letter" of the government, that is, the report, was "read aloud". Basically, the first part of the report, devoted to the analysis of relations between Russia and Poland after the Polyanovsky Peace, repeated the report to the Council of 1651 and the draft edition of May 25, 1653. Then the results of the embassy of B. A. Repnin and B. M. Khitrovo to Poland were reported.

The embassy demanded that the Polish government stop all "untruths", punish those responsible and invited the king to make peace with Ukraine. The pans refused to comply with this and, in turn, demanded the complete surrender of Khmelnytsky. With the departure of the embassy, Poland resumed the war in Ukraine.

In the report to the Sobor, the Russian government specifically emphasized that the king had taken an oath not to oppress Orthodox subjects, and in the event of its violation, the subjects were released from the oath to the king.

Further, the report stated that the hetman's embassy headed by L. Kapusta had arrived in Moscow, that the war had resumed in Ukraine and was developing favorably for the Ukrainian people's army, but the pans were not inferior and intended to fight with Russia in the future. It was also reported about the request of the hetman to send at least 3,000 soldiers to Ukraine.

To make a decision, all the officials who participated in the Council were interrogated carefully and separately. The answer was given primarily by the boyars and the people of the Duma, that is, the secular non-elected part of the Cathedral. They spoke in favor of a war with Poland and for the admission of Ukraine. The question of the release of the population of Ukraine from the oath to the Polish king was considered very important, because it affected the principles of monarchism. According to the Duma officials, in connection with the violation of the oath by the Polish king, the Ukrainian people were thereby freed from their oath to the king, and, consequently, the tsarist government accepted "free people", and not rebels. "And for this reason they were sentenced for everything: Hetman Bogdan Khmelnytsky and the entire Zaporizhia Host with cities and lands to accept" 27 .

After that, the opinion of the elected people was requested. They were interviewed by class groups. All of them spoke in favor of declaring war on Poland, "for the honor" of the tsar "to stand and wage war against the Lithuanian king." A special conciliar act informs about the unanimous decision of the elected representatives of the two main classes - service people and townspeople. The servants promised that they would "fight without sparing their heads.

25 Ibid. page 412.

26 "Palace ranks". T. III. pp. 369 - 372.

27 "Reunification of Ukraine with Russia". Vol. III, p. 414.

and for the sake of dying for their state honor. "Posadsky, merchant "of all ranks" "people of help and for their state honor with their own heads for the sake of dying." These assurances of servicemen and townspeople, of course, were especially important for the government. In general, the elective part Sobor resolutely recommended to the government to accept Ukraine as a subject of Russia: "And Hetman Bogdan Khmelnytsky... would be granted by the great sovereign... according to their petition, he ordered them to be accepted under his sovereign high hand" 28 .

As you can see, in the council act of October 1, 1653, there is no mention of the opinion of the clergy, the consecrated Council, and this is not accidental, since this opinion was already expressed on February 27, 1651 at the first Zemsky Sobor dedicated to the issue of Ukraine.

How did the verdict of the Council on October 1 differ from the draft decision (or government report) on May 25? In general, the verdict sounds more decisive, referring to the rationale for the break with Poland and the acceptance of Ukraine into citizenship, while this intention was not formulated in the draft. It recalled the obligation of the parties not to lay claim to foreign lands, “and not to fight and not to hook on both sides of the lands, but to put aside all past and new things and to reconcile and forward ... no hostility to take revenge” 29 .

The judgment does not mention this. On the other hand, it strengthens the accusatory part against the Polish government with reference to the results of the embassy of B. A. Repnin and B. M. Khitrovo. For example, it is reported about the king's relations with the khan, about the passage of the Crimean ambassadors to Sweden "for quarrels and war." The verdict also strengthens the concept of the liberation war of the Ukrainian people, gives an explanation of the reasons for the alliance of Bohdan Khmelnitsky with the khan and the hetman's appeals to Russia.

In the verdict, the Polish king Jan Casimir is accused of violating his oath of religious tolerance, and thereby justifies the right of Ukrainians to consider themselves free from the oath to the Polish king. Finally, and most importantly, there is a final part in the verdict with a decision on the war against Poland and the adoption of Ukraine into Russian citizenship.

Thus, comparing these two documents related to the beginning and end of the work of the Zemsky Sobor, we can trace a certain evolution in the views of the Russian government, its readiness to finally make a firm decision on this issue by October 1, 1653.

In accordance with the position of individual ranks in the Russian feudal-absolutist state of the middle of the XVII century. the participation in the Zemsky Sobor of all these ranks was also of a different nature. While the boyars and the Duma people "were sentenced for everything" and their sentence was fully inscribed in the decision of the Council, the rest of the ranks were only interrogated "separately". The servants could only answer whether they were ready to “fight without sparing their heads” on this decision with the king. The trading people had to answer whether they would provide "help" for the war, whether they would fight.

By the end of the final meeting, the Council was informed of the government's intention to send an embassy to Ukraine, headed by V. Buturlin, in order to "lead" its inhabitants to faith. "And this date (October 1. - A. K.) boyar Vasily Vasilyevich Buturlin and his comrades in the Faceted Room said "30, - recorded in" Palace ranks ".

On October 4, the hetman's embassy, headed by Lavrin Kapusta, left for Ukraine, and behind them on October 9 "to seize" Ukraine, the embassy of V. Buturlin also left Moscow.

29 TsGADA, Polish affairs, 1653, N 6, l. 3.

30 "Palace ranks". Vol. III, p. 372.

The decision of the Zemsky Sobor in 1653 under the conditions of the feudal-absolutist monarchy could not be binding on the tsarist government. However, the government took into account the opinion of the "officials" of the state. Suffice it to recall, for example, the royal letter to the embassy of Prince B. A. Repnin and B. M. Khitrovo regarding the break in the work of the Cathedral in June 1653.

However, in relations with both new subjects, tsarism never referred to the decision of the Zemsky Sobor of 1653 and did not even mention it. An example is the royal letter sent on the second day after the decision was made to ambassadors Streshnev and Bredikhin to Ukraine, as well as the article list of the embassy of VV Buturlin, who "received" Ukraine 31 .

For all that, the decision of the Zemsky Sobor in 1653, of course, was of historical significance. It expressed the opinion of certain social circles (landlords, merchants and archers close to the masses, as well as taxable black hundreds and palace settlements). The opinion of these circles, represented at the Council in 1653, was undoubtedly influenced by the mood of the Russian people, their sympathetic attitude towards the struggling Ukraine. Without the categorical and unanimous verdict of the Zemsky Sobor in 1653, the tsarist government would not have risked accepting Ukraine as a subject and starting a war for it with Pan Poland.

Soviet historical science gave a correct assessment of the Zemsky Sobor of 1653. This assessment found its expression in the "Theses on the 300th Anniversary of the Reunification of Ukraine with Russia", approved by the Central Committee of the CPSU: "The decision of the Zemsky Sobor was an expression of the will and desire of the entire Russian people to help the fraternal Ukrainian people in their liberation struggle against foreign enslavers" 32.

31 "Reunification of Ukraine with Russia". Vol. III, p. 415.

32 "Abstracts on the 300th anniversary of the reunification of Ukraine with Russia (1654 - 1954)". M. 1954, p. 10.

Putin V.V. will now go down in history as a new reunifier of Russia,
it is a pity that all the Slavic lands can no longer be collected.

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ON THE ADOPTION OF THE DECISION ON THE REUNION OF UKRAINE WITH RUSSIA

On October 1, 1653, the Zemsky Sobor met in Moscow, whose task was to consider the issue of reuniting the lands of the previously unified ancient Russian state - Kievan Rus. And although at that time the satisfaction of the request of the Cossacks considered by the Council, speaking on behalf of everything that was exhausted from the Polish oppression of the people of South-Western Russia (still then called Little Russia), to receive "under the high hand of the Moscow sovereign" meant a war with Poland, the opinion of the Council on the formation of a single state was unanimous.

The reunification of Little Russia with Moscow Rus corresponded to the vital interests and aspirations of the forcibly divided population of the ancient Russian state and was conditioned by the entire previous course of history.

The ancestors of both Little Russians and Great Russians were East Slavic tribes, who from ancient times inhabited the territory from the Carpathians to the Volga and from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The Eastern Slavs moved from a primitive communal system to a feudal one, having a common territory, religion, culture, a single language and way of life. In the VI-VIII centuries. AD they formed the largest single ancient Russian nationality in Europe.

The interests of socio-economic, political and cultural development, as well as the need for defense against external enemies, led to the creation of one of the largest and most powerful states in Europe - Kievan Rus. However, due to the laws of development of feudal society, the ancient Russian state was divided into a number of separate principalities. In the XIII century. the Mongol-Tatar invasion from the east, German and Swedish aggression from the west, hostile relations with the Poles and Hungarians put Russia in extremely difficult conditions. She was able to repel German and Swedish attacks, but could not resist the Mongol-Tatar hordes.

The Poles at the same time captured the southwestern Russian lands - Galicia and Western Volhynia (and in the 15th century, Western Podolia).
Bukovina was included in the Moldavian Principality, and Transcarpathian Rus back in the 11th century. fell into the hands of the Hungarians.
In the 15th century, Turkey seized Moldova and the southern Russian lands on the northern coast of the Black and Azov Seas - Novorossia (now part of Ukraine) and placed the Crimean Khanate, which by that time had separated from the Golden Horde, into vassal dependence.
In the 16th century, already at the Principality of Lithuania, Poland essentially wrested Eastern Volyn, Bratslav and Kiev regions with part of the left bank of the Dnieper.
As a result of all these seizures, Kievan Rus was torn apart into territories that fell under the rule of various countries.

However, even in these difficult conditions, the ancient Russian people did not succumb to assimilation: the previously achieved high level of economic and cultural development, its internal strength, affected.
Ethnic, economic, cultural and political ties were preserved and continued to develop.
The ideas of unity and independence, as evidenced, in particular, by the Kievan and Galician-Volhynian chronicles*, were firmly rooted in the consciousness of the entire Russian people as early as the period of feudal fragmentation of Kievan Rus. Therefore, having strengthened itself internally, the people waged a liberation struggle against the enslavers, striving to restore their unity.

This desire for unity manifested itself, first of all, in the form of the resettlement of the inhabitants of Little Russia to the Muscovite state.
Starting from the end of the 13th century, all classes moved: from peasants to boyars and princes.
Moreover, the latter, as a rule, moved with their lands and peasants.

A wave of popular uprisings swept across the territory of the occupied lands.
At the end of the 14th century, the Kiev region rebelled against foreign domination.
At the beginning of the 15th century, uprisings engulfed Galicia, Volhynia, Podolia, and again the Kiev region.
The struggle of the Little Russians against the enslavers reached a special strength in the second half of the 15th century.

At this time, the apotheosis of Russian resistance was the deliverance from the hated Mongol-Tatar yoke of North-Eastern Russia, united in the Muscovite state.
In the future, it was it that played a decisive role in the liberation and unification of all the occupied Russian territories.
As it rose, Moscow became more and more the center of attraction for the Russian people, who found themselves under the yoke of foreign enslavers.

The tsarist government after the great "standing on the Ugra" almost immediately took an active position in the issue of the return of the seized lands.
In 1492, Grand Duke Ivan III demanded from the Grand Duke of Lithuania: "... and you would have given up our cities and volosts, lands and waters that you hold behind you." **.
He declared to the Poles that "United Great Russia will not lay down its arms until it returns all the other parts of the Russian land, torn off by its neighbors, until it has gathered all the people" ***.
All Russian lands, based on the ethnicity of the population and their historical past, were called "fatherland".
“Our fatherland is not the only one, which cities and volosts are now behind us: and the whole Russian land, Kyiv and Smolensk and other cities ... from antiquity ... our fatherland ....” ****, - Russian diplomats explained.

Ivan the Terrible also demanded the return of Russian lands.
So, in 1563, he presented King Sigismund II Augustus with a list in which a number of Russian lands and cities captured by the Poles were named.
Among them were Przemysl, Lvov, Galich and others.
Justifying the rights of Russia to them, Russian diplomats declared: “... and those cities were originally Russian sovereigns ... and that patrimony came for your sovereign ... some hardships after Batu’s captivity, as the godless Batu captured many Russian cities, and after that from our sovereigns ... those cities have departed” *****.
Since the invaders did not even think of returning the seized territories, the Russian people more than once had to wage liberation wars for their liberation.

The Little Russians, for their part, also fought for unification with Muscovite Rus.
In the XVI century. on the territory of Southwestern Russia, they launched a broad people's liberation movement. A prominent place in it was occupied by the Cossacks, who appeared in Zaporozhye (as earlier on the Don and in other places on the southern borders of what was then Russia), who were destined to play an important role in the future of the historical fate of Little Russia, in its struggle for liberation from the yoke of the Polish-Lithuanian invaders and reunification with Russia.

In order to suppress the liberation struggle and strengthen their dominance, the Polish and Lithuanian pans in 1569 united Poland and Lithuania into the Commonwealth (Union of Lublin).
In Southwestern Russia, the Poles seized vast possessions, numbering in some cases up to hundreds of settlements.
The Polish gentry strengthened the feudal-serf, religious and national-colonial oppression. Serfdom in Poland in the 16th century reached the highest level in Europe.
“The gentry even arrogated to themselves the right of life and death over their peasants: to kill a serf for a gentry was like killing a dog” ******.
The situation of local townspeople in Little Russia also deteriorated significantly. They were limited in everything, even in the right to reside: in Lvov, for example, they were allowed to settle only on one street (“Russkaya Street”). The Poles waged a tough fight against Orthodoxy.
In 1596, a union was formalized in Brest, proclaiming the subordination of the Orthodox Church to the Catholic Church, the recognition of the Pope of Rome as the head of the Uniates and the adoption of the main dogma of Catholicism.
The Orthodox clergy were subjected to repression.

The planting of Catholicism, Polonization, national discrimination - everything was aimed at the Vatican-inspired denationalization of the Little Russians, the weakening of their ties with the Muscovite state, and the strengthening of the dominant position of the Poles and Lithuanians.
The population was required to have knowledge of the Polish language as the only state language of the Commonwealth.
It was forbidden to use the national language in business correspondence, schools teaching in Russian were closed.
Such a policy of the ruling circles of the Commonwealth put the bulk of the local peasantry and philistinism in an exceptionally difficult and disenfranchised position.

The strengthening of Polish oppression after the Unions of Lublin and Brest caused a new upsurge in the liberation movement of the Little Russians. The main forces of this movement were the peasantry and the Cossacks.
In the early 90s of the 16th century, protests against Polish dominance became widespread.

At the end of the 16th century, the resettlement of the Little Russians, primarily the Cossacks, to the borders of Muscovite Russia intensified.
The Cossacks settled, as a rule, on its southern borders, protecting them. At the same time, they not only moved to the lands of the Russian state, but sometimes passed into the citizenship of the king along with the territories cleared by them from the Polish pans.
In this regard, the example of such a transition of the Cossack army led by Kr. Kosinsky is widely known, in correspondence with whom in 1593 the Russian tsar already calls himself, among other things, the sovereign of “Zaporozhye, Cherkasy and Nizov”.

The Polish lords responded to the liberation struggle of the people by strengthening the national-colonial oppression. "To exterminate Russia in Russia" - this is how the goals and policy of the Commonwealth regarding South-Western Russia were defined in one of the appeals to the Sejm in 1623.
The uprisings were suppressed with particular cruelty.
The Poles continued to use force and coercion as the main means of maintaining their rule.
Separate attempts to somehow soften such a policy did not lead to anything.
For example, the so-called "Articles for the Calm of the Russian People" by King Vladislav IV (1633) did not in fact grant any rights and freedoms to the oppressed.

Resistance to the Polish lords, the fight against common enemies - the Turks and the Crimean Tatars contributed to the expansion and strengthening of the military-political ties of the Little Russians and the Great Russians, especially the Cossacks of the Zaporizhzhya Sich and the Don.
Russian-Little Russian economic ties have also undergone significant development.
After 1612, there was an increase in the liberation struggle and an intensification of the desire of the population of the lands of Southwestern Russia occupied by the Poles to reunite with Eastern Russia, with Moscow.

In the 17th century, representatives of Little Russia repeatedly turned to the Russian sovereigns with requests to accept the Little Russians "under their high hand."
Such plans often arose among the Cossacks ******, especially since the Cossacks have been actively entering the service of Moscow since the time of Ivan the Terrible.
This service to the Russian tsar with the entire Zaporizhzhya army ******** was sought even by such hetmans as Sagaydachny, a gentry by birth, who got along well with Warsaw (1620).

However, not only the Cossacks wanted to unite with Moscow Rus.
Representatives of the Orthodox clergy, Archbishop Isaiah Kopinsky (later Lithuanian Metropolitan) in 1622 and Metropolitan Job Boretsky in 1625, appealed to the Moscow Tsar for patronage and the reunification of Little Russia with Russia.

After the suppression of a number of uprisings in the 30s of the 17th century, the Polish lords further intensified feudal, national and religious oppression.
Along with the peasants and philistines, the petty Ukrainian gentry and the Orthodox clergy were subjected to harassment.

General discontent and protest resulted in the Liberation War of the Ukrainian people against the Commonwealth of 1648-1654.
Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky led the fight against the oppression of Pan Poland. At the initial stage of the war, he tried to win over to his side the Turkish sultan, the Crimean Khan, and the Swedish king.
At first, B. Khmelnitsky was lucky. The rebels won a series of victories: at Zhovti Vody, near Korsun and near Pilyavtsy. However, later, due to the betrayal of the Crimean Khan, the hetman suffered a series of serious defeats: in 1649 near Zborov, in 1651 near Berestechko, and in 1652 in the vicinity of Zhvanets. The well-known historian S.M. Solovyov wrote that “the defeat near Berestechko clearly showed B. Khmelnitsky and the Cossacks that they cannot cope with Poland alone ..., and you can’t rely on the Khan either when it comes to fighting with a large army, not to rob…" *********.

For six years the Little Russians fought hard against the Poles. The war demanded huge sacrifices and enormous exertion of forces.
The position of Little Russia was extremely difficult. Under these conditions, the hetman began to offer reunification to Moscow even more actively. They sent about 20 embassies to the king with such a request. B. Khmelnitsky even offered Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, with the support of the rebels, to take the then free Polish throne and thus unite Little Russia and Russia **********.

However, the Russian government, fearing a new war with Poland, took a low-key position.
Muscovite Russia has not yet fully recovered from the Time of Troubles. In addition, such a war could push (later pushed) Sweden to seize Primorye (which was then in the hands of the Poles), which would make it difficult for Moscow to return the Russian lands adjacent to the Baltic Sea.

At the same time, Russia could not remain completely aloof from the struggle of the Little Russians and provided assistance to the rebels with "bread and guns", as well as diplomatic methods.
In 1653, the tsar demanded from Warsaw not to violate the rights of the Orthodox population in Little Russia and to stop persecuting the Orthodox Church. However, the embassy sent in this regard returned with nothing.

Taking into account the numerous requests of the representatives of Little Russia for its admission to Russia and the danger that threatened the Little Russians from the Poles, as well as the Turks and Tatars ***********. (who were increasingly asserting their claims to South-Western Russia), the tsarist government decided to convene a Zemsky Sobor in order to enlist the support of the entire people when deciding on the issue of reunification.

On October 1 (11), 1653, almost all segments of the population of the then Russian state gathered in Moscow: the clergy, boyars, representatives of Russian cities, merchants, peasantry and archers.

When considering the issue of “petition to the sovereign for the allegiance of Bogdan Khmelnitsky and the entire Zaporizhzhya Army,” the serious danger looming over Little Russia was emphasized: “in the year 161 (1652) at the Sejm in Brest-Litovsk, it was indeed sentenced that they, Orthodox Christians ... who live in Korun of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, to beat ... "***************.
The intentions of the Poles "to eradicate the Orthodox Christian faith and destroy the holy churches of God to the end..." ************** were also noted.

The cathedral was informed that the Turkish sultan called the Little Russians to his citizenship, but the hetman "refused him"; that the Cossacks called the Crimean Khan with a horde into their allies against the Poles "involuntarily"; that the Cossacks sent their embassies with a request to take them into citizenship and help in the war with Poland "many times".

Despite the fact that the report was discussed separately at the meetings of each class, the decision was unanimous.
The Council “sentenced”: “so that the great sovereign, the tsar and the great prince Alexei Mikhailovich of all Russia, deigned that hetman Bogdan Khmelnitsky and the entire Zaporizhzhya Army with their cities and lands to accept under their sovereign high hand for the Orthodox Christian faith and the holy churches of God ... "** ***********.
Here it was no longer only about the hetman's army, which a year ago it was proposed to settle on the lands of Muscovite Russia, but also about "cities" and "lands", i.e. about the whole of Little Russia.
The liberation of the Little Russians from the citizenship of the Commonwealth was legally justified not only by their desire, but also by the failure of the king himself to fulfill the oath in terms of non-oppression of his subjects of the non-Catholic faith.

It was obvious that in connection with the reunification of the Russian lands, the war with the Poles could not be avoided.
With this in mind, the Council decided: “there is a message of war against the Polish king” **************** On October 23 (November 2), 1653, in the Assumption Cathedral of the Kremlin, the tsar, referring to this decision, announced about the beginning of the war with Poland.

The resolutions of the Council were announced to the Russian people and met with unanimous support.

The Hetman's embassy, headed by L.Kapusta, was also present at the Council, which immediately after its completion left for B.Khmelnitsky and informed him of the decisions taken.
To complete the process of reunification, a special tsarist embassy was also sent to the hetman, headed by the close boyar V.V. Buturlin.
Having received Moscow's consent to the unification, B. Khmelnitsky on January 8, 1654 in the city of Pereyaslavl convened a national assembly - the Rada, which, according to Cossack traditions, alone was competent to resolve the most important political issues. The Rada was "explicit", that is, open to all the people.
It represented both all Little Russian lands and all estates (Cossacks, clergy, philistines, merchants, peasants).
Thus, the question of reunification with Russia and in Little Russia was decided with the widest possible representation.
After the polls, the people unanimously “cryed out: Let us free under the Tsar of the East, the Orthodox ... God confirm, God strengthen, so that we will be united forever!” *****************.

After the Rada, first the inhabitants of Pereyaslavl, and then the Cossack regiments (military administrative units of Little Russia) and the population of the cities of Little Russia swore allegiance to the Russian sovereign.

The March Articles of 1654 formalized the position of Little Russia within Russia, and also defined the rights and privileges of the Cossacks, the Ukrainian gentry and the clergy.

The decisions of the Zemsky Sobor and the Pereyaslav Rada clearly demonstrated the will of a single people divided back in the years of the Mongol-Tatar invasion to live in a single state.
Then, in accordance with the clearly expressed desire of all sections of the population of Little and Great Russia, their reunification began in a single state.

There were still centuries of struggle ahead for the return of all the lands seized from Kievan Rus.
Only after the bloody wars with the Polish lords in 1667, according to the Andrusovo truce, Left-bank Little Russia went to the Moscow state, and in 1686, according to the "Eternal Peace", Kyiv and its environs were returned.
The northern Black Sea region or Novorossiya were conquered from Turkey in the wars of 1768-1774. and 1787-1791. Right-bank Little Russia became part of Russia as a result of the partitions of Poland in 1793 and 1795. Galicia and Northern Bukovina were returned in 1939-1940, and Transcarpathian Rus in 1945.
The Russian Crimea, conquered from the Turks in 1783, was transferred to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954.

The modern independent state of Ukraine appeared on the political map of the world in 1991.

___________________________________________________________

* Great Soviet Encyclopedia, third edition, M., "Soviet Encyclopedia", 1977, V.26, p.539.
** Collection of the Russian Historical Society, St. Petersburg, 1882, volume XXXV, pp. 61-66.
*** V. O. Klyuchevsky, Course of Russian History. Works in 9 volumes, M. Thought, 1988, Vol. III, p. 85.
**** Collection of the Russian Historical Society, St. Petersburg, 1882, volume XXXV, pp. 457-460.
***** Ibid., pp. 265-270
****** V.O.Klyuchevsky, Vol.III, p.97.
******* Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts (RGADA), f. 210, Discharge order, Moscow table, stb. 79, ll. 370-372.
******** Reunification of Ukraine with Russia. Documents and materials in three volumes, M., publishing house of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 1953. Vol. 1, No. 1.
********* S.M. Soloviev. Works in 18 volumes. History of Russia since ancient times. M., Thought, 1990, T.T. 9-10, pp. 559.
********** Reunification of Ukraine with Russia Vol. II, pp. 32-33.
*********** V.O. Klyuchevsky, T III, p. 111.
*************** Reunification of the Ukraine with Russia, T III, p. 411.
**************** Ibid.
*************** Ibid., p. 413.
**************** Ibid.
***************** Ibid., p. 461.

Historical Documentary Department
Russian Foreign Ministry

This day in history:

After the Mongol-Tatar invasion, the ancient Russian state turned out to be significantly weakened, which was not slow to take advantage of the neighbors. Already in the XIV century. Western Russia (now Belarus), Volyn, Eastern Podolia, Kiev region, Chernihiv-Severshchina, as well as Smolensk lands were captured by the Lithuanians. The Poles at the same time captured the southwestern Russian lands - Galicia and Western Volhynia (and in the 15th century, Western Podolia). Bukovina was included in the Moldavian Principality, and Transcarpathian Rus back in the 11th century. fell into the hands of the Hungarians. In the 15th century, Turkey seized Moldova and the southern Russian lands on the northern coast of the Black and Azov Seas - Novorossia (now part of Ukraine) and placed the Crimean Khanate, which by that time had separated from the Golden Horde, into vassal dependence. In the 16th century, already at the Principality of Lithuania, Poland essentially wrested Eastern Volyn, Bratslav and Kiev regions with part of the left bank of the Dnieper. As a result of all these seizures, Kievan Rus was torn apart into territories that fell under the rule of various countries.

However, even in these difficult conditions, the ancient Russian people did not succumb to assimilation: the previously achieved high level of economic and cultural development, its internal strength, affected. Ethnic, economic, cultural and political ties were preserved and continued to develop. The ideas of unity and independence, as evidenced, in particular, by the Kievan and Galician-Volhynian chronicles*, were firmly rooted in the consciousness of the entire Russian people as early as the period of feudal fragmentation of Kievan Rus. Therefore, having strengthened itself internally, the people waged a liberation struggle against the enslavers, striving to restore their unity.

This desire for unity manifested itself, first of all, in the form of the resettlement of the inhabitants of Little Russia to the Muscovite state. Starting from the end of the 13th century, all classes moved: from peasants to boyars and princes. Moreover, the latter, as a rule, moved with their lands and peasants.

A wave of popular uprisings swept across the territory of the occupied lands. At the end of the 14th century, the Kiev region rebelled against foreign domination. At the beginning of the 15th century, uprisings engulfed Galicia, Volhynia, Podolia, and again the Kiev region. The struggle of the Little Russians against the enslavers reached a special strength in the second half of the 15th century.

At this time, the apotheosis of Russian resistance was the deliverance from the hated Mongol-Tatar yoke of North-Eastern Russia, united in the Muscovite state. In the future, it was it that played a decisive role in the liberation and unification of all the occupied Russian territories. As it rose, Moscow became more and more the center of attraction for the Russian people, who found themselves under the yoke of foreign enslavers.

The tsarist government after the great "standing on the Ugra" almost immediately took an active position in the issue of the return of the seized lands. In 1492, Grand Duke Ivan III demanded from the Grand Duke of Lithuania: "... and you would have given up our cities and volosts, lands and waters that you hold behind you." **. He declared to the Poles that "United Great Russia will not lay down its arms until it returns all the other parts of the Russian land, torn off by its neighbors, until it has gathered all the people" ***. All Russian lands, based on the ethnicity of the population and their historical past, were called "fatherland". “Our fatherland is not the only one, which cities and volosts are now behind us: and the whole Russian land, Kyiv and Smolensk and other cities ... from antiquity ... our fatherland ....” ****, - Russian diplomats explained.

Ivan the Terrible also demanded the return of Russian lands. So, in 1563, he presented King Sigismund II Augustus with a list in which a number of Russian lands and cities captured by the Poles were named. Among them were Przemysl, Lvov, Galich and others. Justifying the rights of Russia to them, Russian diplomats declared: “... and those cities were originally Russian sovereigns ... and that patrimony came for your sovereign ... some hardships after Batu’s captivity, as the godless Batu captured many Russian cities, and after that from our sovereigns ... those cities have departed” *****. Since the invaders did not even think of returning the seized territories, the Russian people more than once had to wage liberation wars for their liberation.

The Little Russians, for their part, also fought for unification with Muscovite Rus. In the XVI century. on the territory of Southwestern Russia, they launched a broad people's liberation movement. A prominent place in it was occupied by the Cossacks, who appeared in Zaporozhye (as earlier on the Don and in other places on the southern borders of what was then Russia), who were destined to play an important role in the future of the historical fate of Little Russia, in its struggle for liberation from the yoke of the Polish-Lithuanian invaders and reunification with Russia.

In order to suppress the liberation struggle and strengthen their dominance, the Polish and Lithuanian pans in 1569 united Poland and Lithuania into the Commonwealth (Union of Lublin). In Southwestern Russia, the Poles seized vast possessions, numbering in some cases up to hundreds of settlements. The Polish gentry strengthened the feudal-serf, religious and national-colonial oppression. Serfdom in Poland in the 16th century reached the highest level in Europe. “The gentry even arrogated to themselves the right of life and death over their peasants: to kill a serf for a gentry was like killing a dog” ******. The situation of local townspeople in Little Russia also deteriorated significantly. They were limited in everything, even in the right to reside: in Lvov, for example, they were allowed to settle only on one street (“Russkaya Street”). The Poles waged a tough fight against Orthodoxy. In 1596, a union was formalized in Brest, proclaiming the subordination of the Orthodox Church to the Catholic Church, the recognition of the Pope of Rome as the head of the Uniates and the adoption of the main dogma of Catholicism. The Orthodox clergy were subjected to repression.

The planting of Catholicism, Polonization, national discrimination - everything was aimed at the Vatican-inspired denationalization of the Little Russians, the weakening of their ties with the Muscovite state, and the strengthening of the dominant position of the Poles and Lithuanians. The population was required to have knowledge of the Polish language as the only state language of the Commonwealth. It was forbidden to use the national language in business correspondence, schools teaching in Russian were closed. Such a policy of the ruling circles of the Commonwealth put the bulk of the local peasantry and philistinism in an exceptionally difficult and disenfranchised position.

The strengthening of Polish oppression after the Unions of Lublin and Brest caused a new upsurge in the liberation movement of the Little Russians. The main forces of this movement were the peasantry and the Cossacks. In the early 90s of the 16th century, protests against Polish dominance became widespread.

At the end of the 16th century, the resettlement of the Little Russians, primarily the Cossacks, to the borders of Muscovite Russia intensified. The Cossacks settled, as a rule, on its southern borders, protecting them. At the same time, they not only moved to the lands of the Russian state, but sometimes passed into the citizenship of the king along with the territories cleared by them from the Polish pans. In this regard, the example of such a transition of the Cossack army led by Kr. Kosinsky is widely known, in correspondence with whom in 1593 the Russian tsar already calls himself, among other things, the sovereign of “Zaporozhye, Cherkasy and Nizov”.

The Polish lords responded to the liberation struggle of the people by strengthening the national-colonial oppression. "To exterminate Russia in Russia" - this is how the goals and policy of the Commonwealth regarding South-Western Russia were defined in one of the appeals to the Sejm in 1623. The uprisings were suppressed with particular cruelty. The Poles continued to use force and coercion as the main means of maintaining their rule. Separate attempts to somehow soften such a policy did not lead to anything. For example, the so-called "Articles for the Calm of the Russian People" by King Vladislav IV (1633) did not in fact grant any rights and freedoms to the oppressed.

Resistance to the Polish lords, the fight against common enemies - the Turks and the Crimean Tatars contributed to the expansion and strengthening of the military-political ties of the Little Russians and the Great Russians, especially the Cossacks of the Zaporizhzhya Sich and the Don. Russian-Little Russian economic ties have also undergone significant development. After 1612, there was an increase in the liberation struggle and an intensification of the desire of the population of the lands of Southwestern Russia occupied by the Poles to reunite with Eastern Russia, with Moscow.

In the 17th century, representatives of Little Russia repeatedly turned to the Russian sovereigns with requests to accept the Little Russians "under their high hand." Such plans often arose among the Cossacks ******, especially since the Cossacks have been actively entering the service of Moscow since the time of Ivan the Terrible. This service to the Russian tsar with the entire Zaporizhzhya army ******** was sought even by such hetmans as Sagaydachny, a gentry by birth, who got along well with Warsaw (1620).

However, not only the Cossacks wanted to unite with Moscow Rus. Representatives of the Orthodox clergy, Archbishop Isaiah Kopinsky (later Lithuanian Metropolitan) in 1622 and Metropolitan Job Boretsky in 1625, appealed to the Moscow Tsar for patronage and the reunification of Little Russia with Russia.

After the suppression of a number of uprisings in the 30s of the 17th century, the Polish lords further intensified feudal, national and religious oppression. Along with the peasants and philistines, the petty Ukrainian gentry and the Orthodox clergy were subjected to harassment.

General discontent and protest resulted in the Liberation War of the Ukrainian people against the Commonwealth of 1648-1654. Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky led the fight against the oppression of Pan Poland. At the initial stage of the war, he tried to win over to his side the Turkish sultan, the Crimean Khan, and the Swedish king. At first, B. Khmelnitsky was lucky. The rebels won a series of victories: at Zhovti Vody, near Korsun and near Pilyavtsy. However, later, due to the betrayal of the Crimean Khan, the hetman suffered a series of serious defeats: in 1649 near Zborov, in 1651 near Berestechko, and in 1652 in the vicinity of Zhvanets. The well-known historian S.M. Solovyov wrote that “the defeat near Berestechko clearly showed B. Khmelnitsky and the Cossacks that they cannot cope with Poland alone ..., and you can’t rely on the Khan either when it comes to fighting with a large army, not to rob…" *********.

For six years the Little Russians fought hard against the Poles. The war demanded huge sacrifices and enormous exertion of forces. The position of Little Russia was extremely difficult. Under these conditions, the hetman began to offer reunification to Moscow even more actively. They sent about 20 embassies to the king with such a request. B. Khmelnitsky even offered Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, with the support of the rebels, to take the then free Polish throne and thus unite Little Russia and Russia **********.

However, the Russian government, fearing a new war with Poland, took a low-key position. Muscovite Russia has not yet fully recovered from the Time of Troubles. In addition, such a war could push (later pushed) Sweden to seize Primorye (which was then in the hands of the Poles), which would make it difficult for Moscow to return the Russian lands adjacent to the Baltic Sea.

At the same time, Russia could not remain completely aloof from the struggle of the Little Russians and provided assistance to the rebels with "bread and guns", as well as diplomatic methods. In 1653, the tsar demanded from Warsaw not to violate the rights of the Orthodox population in Little Russia and to stop persecuting the Orthodox Church. However, the embassy sent in this regard returned with nothing.

On October 1 (11), 1653, almost all segments of the population of the then Russian state gathered in Moscow: the clergy, boyars, representatives of Russian cities, merchants, peasantry and archers.

When considering the issue of “petition to the sovereign for the allegiance of Bogdan Khmelnitsky and the entire Zaporizhzhya Army,” the serious danger looming over Little Russia was emphasized: “in the year 161 (1652) at the Sejm in Brest-Litovsk, it was indeed sentenced that they, Orthodox Christians ... who live in Korun of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, to beat ... "***************. The intentions of the Poles "to eradicate the Orthodox Christian faith and destroy the holy churches of God to the end..." ************** were also noted.

Despite the fact that the report was discussed separately at the meetings of each class, the decision was unanimous. The Council “sentenced”: “so that the great sovereign, the tsar and the great prince Alexei Mikhailovich of all Russia, deigned that hetman Bogdan Khmelnitsky and the entire Zaporizhzhya Army with their cities and lands to accept under their sovereign high hand for the Orthodox Christian faith and the holy churches of God ... "** *************** Here it was not only about the hetman's army, which a year ago it was proposed to settle on the lands of Muscovite Russia, but also about "cities" and "lands", i.e. The liberation of the Little Russians from the citizenship of the Commonwealth in legal terms was justified not only by their desire, but also by the failure of the king himself to fulfill the oath in terms of non-oppression of his subjects of the non-Catholic faith.

It was obvious that in connection with the reunification of the Russian lands, the war with the Poles could not be avoided. With this in mind, the Council decided: “there is a message of war against the Polish king” **************** On October 23 (November 2), 1653, in the Assumption Cathedral of the Kremlin, the tsar, referring to this decision, announced about the beginning of the war with Poland.

The resolutions of the Council were announced to the Russian people and met with unanimous support.

The Hetman's embassy, headed by L.Kapusta, was also present at the Council, which immediately after its completion left for B.Khmelnitsky and informed him of the decisions taken. To complete the process of reunification, a special tsarist embassy was also sent to the hetman, headed by the close boyar V.V. Buturlin. Having received Moscow's consent to the unification, B. Khmelnitsky on January 8, 1654 in the city of Pereyaslavl convened a national assembly - the Rada, which, according to Cossack traditions, alone was competent to resolve the most important political issues. The Rada was "explicit", that is, open to all the people. It represented both all Little Russian lands and all estates (Cossacks, clergy, philistines, merchants, peasants). Thus, the question of reunification with Russia and in Little Russia was decided with the widest possible representation. After the polls, the people unanimously “cryed out: Let us free under the Tsar of the East, the Orthodox ... God confirm, God strengthen, so that we will be united forever!” *****************.

The March Articles of 1654 formalized the position of Little Russia within Russia, and also defined the rights and privileges of the Cossacks, the Ukrainian gentry and the clergy.

The decisions of the Zemsky Sobor and the Pereyaslav Rada clearly demonstrated the will of a single people divided back in the years of the Mongol-Tatar invasion to live in a single state. Then, in accordance with the clearly expressed desire of all sections of the population of Little and Great Russia, their reunification began in a single state.

There were still centuries of struggle ahead for the return of all the lands seized from Kievan Rus. Only after the bloody wars with the Polish lords in 1667, according to the Andrusovo truce, Left-bank Little Russia went to the Moscow state, and in 1686, according to the "Eternal Peace", Kyiv and its environs were returned. The northern Black Sea region or Novorossiya were conquered from Turkey in the wars of 1768-1774. and 1787-1791. Right-bank Little Russia became part of Russia as a result of the partitions of Poland in 1793 and 1795. Galicia and Northern Bukovina were returned in 1939-1940, and Transcarpathian Rus in 1945. The Russian Crimea, conquered from the Turks in 1783, was transferred to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954. The modern independent state of Ukraine appeared on the political map of the world in 1991.

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* Great Soviet Encyclopedia, third edition, M., "Soviet Encyclopedia", 1977, V.26, p.539.

** Collection of the Russian Historical Society, St. Petersburg, 1882, volume XXXV, pp. 61-66.

*** V. O. Klyuchevsky, Course of Russian History. Works in 9 volumes, M. Thought, 1988, Vol. III, p. 85.

**** Collection of the Russian Historical Society, St. Petersburg, 1882, volume XXXV, pp. 457-460.

***** Ibid., pp. 265-270

****** V.O.Klyuchevsky, Vol.III, p.97.

******* Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts (RGADA), f. 210, Discharge order, Moscow table, stb. 79, ll. 370-372.

******** Reunification of Ukraine with Russia. Documents and materials in three volumes, M., publishing house of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 1953. Vol. 1, No. 1.

********* S.M. Soloviev. Works in 18 volumes. History of Russia since ancient times. M., Thought, 1990, T.T. 9-10, pp. 559.

********** Reunification of Ukraine with Russia Vol. II, pp. 32-33.

*********** V.O. Klyuchevsky, T III, p. 111.

*************** Reunification of the Ukraine with Russia, T III, p. 411.

**************** Ibid.

*************** Ibid., p. 413.

**************** Ibid.

***************** Ibid., p. 461.

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5. Zemsky Sobor 1653

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