Chapter 6. Creation and combat activity of the "Separate paratrooper battalion of the Air Force of the Black Sea Fleet in May 1943 - January 1944

Chapter 6

3. BORDER TROOPS IN COMBAT ACTIONS ON THE SOUTHERN AND NORTHERN SECTIONS OF THE SOVIET-GERMAN FRONT

§ 1.2.3. Formation of the operational plan for the spring-summer campaign of 1943 in the East - the concept of Operation Citadel, its discussion and final approval When Hitler decided to deliver a preemptive strike, questions arose before the German command about

§ 1.2.4. The validity of the decision to conduct Operation Citadel due to the delays in the start of the offensive. Changes in the positions of the parties in March-June 1943

Chapter One ON THE FRONT LINE By the beginning of the Battle of Stalingrad, the head of the UNKVD in the Stalingrad region was the 34-year-old senior major of state security Alexander Ivanovich Voronin. It was not only a professional Chekist, but also a well-trained military leader: in

Military operations in autumn 1943

By September 1943, the front of the Eastern Army was basically a solid line, and only one gap remained open between Army Groups South and Center. However, the strength of the newly created front left much to be desired. There were no significant reserves. The divisions were worn out in battle, their numbers and weapons indicated that they would not be able to withstand new severe tests. On huge sectors of the front, the positions were poorly equipped, the stretching of the front of individual formations did not allow the Germans to create a sufficient operational density of troops even in the main defense zone, not to mention the construction of a deeply echeloned and well-equipped defense system. The problem of the number of formations, which ran like a red thread through the entire Eastern campaign, began to become more and more acute. It became quite obvious that Hitler had set a task for the armed forces in the East that was beyond their power.

Under such conditions, the conclusion suggested itself that it was necessary once again before the start of a new Russian offensive to withdraw troops in an organized manner and occupy the least extended and well-prepared line of defense. First of all, it was necessary to withdraw troops from the Crimea, as well as from the arc protruding to the east along the Dnieper south of Kyiv. This was the only way to achieve some reduction in the front of individual formations and create at least a minimum of reserves. But Hitler did not agree to this for the political and economic reasons already partially indicated above. Although Hitler was constantly up to date with accurate reports and reports and knew how many people and weapons were in individual divisions, he overestimated their ability to resist, as well as underestimated the offensive capabilities of the Russians. In addition, he believed that such a wide water barrier as the Dnieper could be successfully defended even with insignificant forces.

On October 7, the Russians, having previously captured a small bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper in the area south of Kyiv, which the Germans failed to liquidate, went on the offensive. They concentrated their main effort at first between Kremenchug and Dnepropetrovsk, as well as in the area of ​​Zaporozhye and Melitopol. After heavy fighting, during which the German troops and command, realizing the decisive importance of holding the occupied lines for the entire Eastern campaign, strained all their forces and stubbornly repulsed the onslaught of superior Russian forces, the latter managed to break through the front of the 6th Army in the Melitopol region on October 23. They threw back the army behind the Dnieper in its lower reaches and cut off the Crimea, blocking the Perekop isthmus. At the same time, they landed in the eastern part of the Crimea on the Kerch Peninsula. However, both near Perekop and on the Kerch Peninsula, the advance of Russian troops was temporarily stopped. The Crimean peninsula continued to remain in the hands of the Germans.

On the front of the 1st Panzer Army, which took place in the sector from Chigorin to Nikopol, the Russians, having failed in an attempt to eliminate the German bridgehead in the Zaporozhye region, crossed the Dnieper between Dnepropetrovsk and Kremenchug and broke through the defenses of the German troops along the Dnieper on a wide front. With forces of up to about 100 divisions, including many tank units and formations, they struck in a westerly direction and reached Krivoy Rog. Army Group A, whose right wing was still holding the defense along the Dnieper in its lower reaches, turned around from Nikopol with its front to the west. Now the front line passed through Krivoy Rog and west of Kirovograd. Army Group South, having pulled back the troops of the right wing of the 8th Army after the 1st Panzer Army, at first continued to hold the old positions in the zone of this army. As a result, a new protrusion of the front was formed here, strongly elongated to the east.

A critical situation also developed on the front of the 4th Panzer Army, which operated as part of Army Group South. This army, in the course of bloody battles that lasted almost four weeks, repulsed all the attacks of the enemy, who was trying to make a breakthrough in the Kyiv region. Only in a few sectors did the enemy manage to slightly push her troops. But after these battles, the army was bled and unable to continue resistance.

When, on November 3, the Russians, with up to 50 divisions, launched a decisive offensive from the bridgeheads they had captured on the right bank of the Dnieper, the 4th Panzer Army was unable to offer sufficient resistance to the Russian strike force. Kyiv fell on November 6th. The front of the German troops was broken, and the Russian tank and motorized units, almost without resistance, rushed to the west. On November 11, the advanced units of the advancing Russian troops approached Zhitomir.

At the same time, the Russians also went on the offensive on the front of the 2nd Army, which operated on the right flank of Army Group Center. Having struck south and north of Gomel, the Russians pushed the army back to the northwest. As a result, the gap that existed between the army groups widened even further. A desperate situation arose. If the Russians now began to build on the success they had achieved, then the fate of Army Groups "A" and "South", and at the same time the fate of the entire Eastern Front, would be finally decided. The situation could only be saved by striking the left flank of the Russian troops that had broken through. Having gathered all the forces that could be withdrawn from other sectors of the front, replacing them with temporary, hastily formed units from vacationers, as well as consolidated units of rear services, etc., and transferring here individual units from other theaters of military operations, the Germans managed to to create in the area between Fastov and Zhytomyr the grouping necessary to carry out this task. This strike force launched a counteroffensive against the left flank of the Russian troops that had broken through and stopped their advance to the west. Although the Germans did not have enough forces to achieve a decisive success, they nevertheless managed to eliminate the mortal danger of a deep breakthrough of Russian formations and their entry into the operational space. By transferring part of the forces to the west, the Germans were able to detain the enemy approximately on the Fastov-Radomyshl-Korosten line. For this failure, the Russians tried to respond with a new offensive on the front of the 8th Army and Army Group A. In the course of heavy fighting, which dragged on until December 1943, they managed to achieve some local successes here: to seize a bridgehead in the Kherson region and capture Chigirin and Cherkassy. But the Germans still retained the integrity of their front. The serious danger that threatened the front in October-November had passed. However, despite this seemingly satisfactory development of events, the German troops, despite everything that was done to increase their combat effectiveness, became even weaker. The fact that in the course of its counteroffensive the 4th Panzer Army, despite the skillful leadership of the command, favorable conditions and selfless actions of the troops, failed to build on the initial tactical success and achieve victory on an operational scale, should have been a new alarm signal for the Germans. . The superior forces of the Russians, operating as part of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts, threatened to break through the thin fabric of the German defense in any place they desired with a new blow.

Battles for the Dnieper in autumn 1943

The troops of Army Group Center, meanwhile, made a systematic withdrawal and also took up new defenses. The front line now ran along the Sozh and Pronya rivers and, continuing further north east of Orsha and Vitebsk, connected in the area east of Nevel with the front line of Army Group North. But the troops of the army group could not get at least a small respite on this new frontier. The large forces of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Fronts operating here made frequent attacks on the German troops, trying to outflank them, in the sector of the 2nd Army and break through the weak front of the army group. However, the German troops, with the support of the small, but extremely operational aviation units of Colonel-General von Greim, successfully overcame numerous and sometimes very dangerous positions.

The situation that developed on the right flank of the 2nd Army, where the defeats suffered by the Army Group South, made itself felt especially strongly, took on the most critical character. Becoming more and more open, this flank forced the army command to allocate part of the forces to cover it. The Russians took advantage of the difficult situation in which the army found itself and went on the offensive in the direction of Gomel. In stubborn battles, the Germans at first managed to hold their positions and prevent the enemy from breaking through their front. However, in early November, when the front of the neighboring 4th Panzer Army (Army Group South) was broken through and the Russians began to advance in the direction of Korosten, the situation deteriorated significantly. Now the enemy launched an offensive also against the completely uncovered junction of Army Groups "South" and "Center". After fierce fighting, the Russians broke through the front of the 2nd Army, which threw its last reserves into battle, and, turning then to the northwest, began to advance towards Rechitsa and Mozyr. As a result, the formations operating on its right flank south of the Pripyat River were cut off from the army, and a threat was created to the main communications of the Germans, the Minsk-Mozyr railway. Communication with the 4th Panzer Army, maintained for quite a long time only by moving units, was completely lost. The enemy went deep into the rear of the troops of the right flank of the 2nd Army in the Ovruch area. The small southern grouping, cut off from the main forces of the army, was under the threat of encirclement, which it managed to avoid only as a result of a quick breakthrough in the north-western direction. The breakthrough was carried out successfully, and the grouping again connected with the main forces of the army in the area southeast of Mozyr. But the gap that existed between Army Groups Center and South widened to more than 100 km. A serious threat arose to the troops defending on the eastward ledge of the front in the Gomel region. Despite this, Hitler rejected a proposal to withdraw these troops to new positions. As a result, the situation became even more aggravated. On November 17, Rechitsa was surrendered, and after that the Russians went to the Mozyr-Zhlobin railway and thereby cut the last communication linking the troops defending Gomel with the main German forces.

Now the Russians went on the offensive and, in the sector of the front north of Gomel, in the Propoisk region, in the course of heavy fighting, they broke through the German defenses to a considerable depth. The advance of the enemy was stopped approximately only at the Chausy-Bykhov line. German troops operating in the Gomel region were under the threat of encirclement. The resulting situation forced the German command at the very last moment to withdraw its troops from the ledge of the front they occupied. By mid-December, the troops took up new positions along the Dnieper, and their position was somewhat strengthened. The gap formed during the fighting between the main forces of the Army Group and the 2nd Army was liquidated as a result of the counteroffensive undertaken here. Thus, by the end of the year, the troops of the right wing of Army Group Center again occupied a more or less strong position, and only the gap that existed at the junction of Army Groups Center and South in the area south of Mozyr was still not closed. From the beginning of winter, the Pripyat swamps became relatively passable, at least it was now possible to conduct military operations here, and this forced the Germans to allocate additional forces to cover the swamps.

In front of the central sector of the front of the army group, the Russians concentrated their main effort on the direction of Smolensk - Orsha - Minsk. Here they tried several times with large forces to launch an offensive with the aim of breaking through the front of the 4th Army on its right flank. Thanks to the exceptional stamina of the troops, the skillful actions of the commanders of units and formations, as well as the presence of a deeply echeloned and well-equipped defense here, the Germans managed to repulse all the attacks of the significantly superior enemy forces that they made until December 1943. The Russians suffered great damage here.

Less successful were the actions of the 3rd Panzer Army, which was defending on the right wing of the army group. In early October, the Russians broke through its front near Nevel in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe junction with the 16th Army (Army Group North). The inner flanks of both armies had to be turned back. It was not possible to close the ever-widening gap, and since Hitler this time again rejected the proposal to withdraw the troops located on the flanks of both armies and found themselves in danger of being captured, the danger was gradually created that the Russians would go behind the rear of the left wing of the 3rd Panzer Army from the north and northwest. Since both army groups did not have the strength to close the gap by counterattack, as Hitler repeatedly demanded, the pressure of the enemy against the open left flank of Army Group Center became more and more sensitive. Gradually, a great threat arose for the main communications of the 3rd Panzer Army, which passed through Polotsk. On December 13, the Russians launched a decisive offensive. They launched a series of attacks in converging directions from the east, north and northeast. The division, which was defending on the left flank of the army, was defeated; its remnants managed to break through the encirclement, but at the same time all the materiel was lost. The tank army was thrown back to Vitebsk, but here it managed to gain a foothold and hold a bridgehead on the right bank of the Western Dvina. All attacks of the enemy, who tried to break through the front of the army, were repulsed. The gap between Army Group Center and Army Group North, covered only by insignificant forces, continued to exist and posed a serious danger, since the Russians could use it to advance along the Western Dvina to the northwest in order to deeply envelop Army Group North ".

On the front of Army Group North, the Russians limited themselves to a slight increase in activity. However, this allowed them to pin down the significant forces of the army group, which, because of this, was unable to find the means to eliminate the crisis near Nevel, which also posed a serious danger to it.

The results of hostilities in 1943

1943 brought Germany equally disappointing results both in the Mediterranean and in the East. The last attempt by the Germans to seize once again the initiative in the East into their own hands failed amazingly quickly in the Kursk region. In subsequent offensive operations in the summer and autumn, the Russian army demonstrated its high fighting qualities and showed that it had not only significant manpower reserves, but also excellent military equipment. The active actions of the Russians were the cause of numerous crises, the catastrophic consequences of which the Germans managed to avoid only thanks to the tactical superiority they retained and the exceptional dedication of the German soldiers. However, there could be no doubt - and this has to be constantly emphasized - that serious signs of fatigue began to appear in the German troops, who had experienced tremendous strain for a number of years. As a result of huge losses in the officers, non-commissioned officers and specialists who made up the backbone of the German troops, their stamina became less and less strong, in connection with which the German command met with great anxiety each new enemy offensive.

The German High Command could stabilize the situation in the East only if the Germans were able to decisively eliminate the first attempt by the Western Allies to launch an invasion of the continent, definitely expected next year.

The Tehran Conference clearly showed that the Western Powers were completely unaware of the danger that could arise for the entire international situation after the defeat of Germany. They firmly adhered to the course of defeating Germany, and therefore, at that time, the Germans could not find any way out of the situation with the help of political means, even if Hitler had decided to take this step.

Thus, the task of the German Eastern Army remained the same - to weaken the forces of the Russians and to hold the lines located as far as possible to the east of the borders of Germany and the most important sources of raw materials that were still in the hands of the Germans. Unfortunately, as experience showed, it was difficult to hope that the political and military leadership would be able to convince Hitler of the need to find for this task a method of conducting combat operations that would best suit the forces and means of the Eastern Army.

The offensive of Russian troops in the winter of 1943-1944 on the southern sector of the front and their exit to the Carpathians

By the end of the autumn battles of 1943, German troops in the southern sector of the front occupied a weak defense, covered only in some areas by natural obstacles, in which there were many dangerous ledges and dents. Hitler, for reasons that have been repeatedly pointed out, all the time refused to level the front line and withdraw the troops back to more advantageous lines. The troops of the right wing of Army Groups "A" and "South" were still behind the Dnieper, holding a large bridgehead to the east of Nikopol, covering the manganese mines. Further, the front line went west through Krivoy Rog and again went to the Dnieper, covering a large Russian bridgehead at Cherkasy. Then the front again turned to the northwest, forming a large arc, passed east of Brusilov and Radomyshl and ended east of Korosten. Here, between Army Group South and Army Group Center, whose right flank was in the Mozyr area, there was a wide gap. The dividing line between Army Group A (6th Army and 1st Tank Army) and Army Group South (8th Army and 4th Tank Army) ran from Kirovograd to the west.

Thus, the southern sector of the front, with its salient in the Nikopol region and with the excessively extended defense zones of its formations, gave the enemy many opportunities for conducting offensive operations here. Of course, Hitler understood this too. But for some reason that was becoming more and more incomprehensible, he constantly overestimated his own strength and underestimated the strength of the enemy. This was probably due to political and economic considerations.

During the winter, troops of the 1st Russian Ukrainian Front inflicted a series of powerful blows on the southern sector of the German front. So, on Christmas Day 1943, they went on the offensive in the area west of Kyiv in the sector of the 4th Panzer Army. They managed to break through a gap in the German defenses in the Radomyshl area, quickly expand it and make a deep breakthrough. The Germans were forced to leave Brusilov, Korostyshev and Radomyshl. On January 1, 1944, the Russians approached Zhitomir. The resistance of the 4th Panzer Army was broken, and the Russian troops, expanding the breakthrough to the south and north, rushed in an unstoppable stream in a westerly direction. A few days later, having put forward large forces to cover their left flank, they reached the old Polish-Soviet border and crossed it. By mid-January, the enemy, almost without meeting any resistance, reached the line of Sarny - Shepetovka - Berdichev - Pogrebishchensky.

Due to the fact that the advancing Russian troops and their communications turned out to be excessively stretched, in early February the Germans managed, by taking a number of emergency measures to strengthen their defenses, to stop the enemy, who was striking in a westerly direction, at the turn east of Dubna, Lutsk and Kovel. However, the enemy troops, advancing on the left flank of the strike force, turned to the south-west and tried to encircle the 8th Army with a strike on Uman. The German reserves managed to stop the advance of these troops and, as a result of a skillfully executed counterattack, threw them back to the Zhashkov-Pogrebishchensky line.

The next blow the enemy brought down directly on the 8th army. Despite the fact that as a result of the defeat of the 4th Panzer Army, a serious threat was created to the left flank of the 8th Army, to cover which almost all of its reserves were thrown, Hitler continued to keep the army on the Dnieper, wanting to maintain contact with the army group advanced far to the east. "BUT". Even the strikes of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts, which were carried out with the aim of probing the German front in January 1944 and which led to the loss by the Germans of Krivoy Rog on the right and Bila Tserkva on the left flanks, clearly showing the intentions of the Russians, did not force the Germans to accept the self-evident decision to withdraw the 8th Army. The reason that the only correct conclusion was not drawn from this situation should, obviously, be sought in the fact that the withdrawal of the 8th Army would inevitably entail the retreat of the entire Army Group "A" and the surrender to the enemy of the important areas of Krivoy Rog and Nikopol.

But since no such decision was made, the 8th Army was doomed to defeat. On January 28, the advanced units of the Russian troops, advancing from the north and southeast, united in the rear of the 8th Army in the Zvenigorodka region and surrounded its two corps. Having gathered into a fist all the tank units of the 8th Army and the 1st Tank Army, the Germans in early February made an attempt to free their encircled troops, which were initially supplied by air. The attempt failed. The advancing troops did not have enough strength to break through to the encircled corps. Despite this, both corps launched an excellently prepared offensive with the aim of breaking through to the southwest, while achieving significant success on the night of February 16-17. But the corps failed to fully connect with the tank formations advancing towards them. Only a few days later, about 30 thousand people, having lost almost all heavy weapons and equipment, left the encirclement, uniting with the main forces of the German troops. The disastrous method of operational leadership used by Hitler and expressed in the words "hold on at all costs" became his constant principle, which he very rarely changed, and even then only under the influence of his closest military assistants. This principle led the Germans to new heavy losses, which, with the right actions of the command, could have been avoided.

The Russians delivered their third blow on the front of the 1st Panzer and 6th armies. Their presence on the Krivoy Rog-Kherson arc, where they defended the iron and manganese mines, now, after the defeat of Army Group South, was completely meaningless from an operational point of view, but Hitler continued to keep them there. The superior forces of the Russian 3rd Ukrainian Front launched an offensive against the positions of the 1st Tank and 6th Armies from the north and south. Part of the German troops was trapped in the Nikopol area. Only at the very last moment did they manage to withdraw with heavy losses across the Ingulets River. On February 22, the Russians captured Krivoy Rog.

Exit of Russian troops to the Carpathians

The southern sector of the front still had a ledge on its right flank, which went far into the enemy's disposition. The front line began in the Kherson region, passed along the Dnieper, continued further along the Ingulets River to the northeast and, turning then to the northwest, went to Shepetovka, thus forming a large arc. To the north of Shepetovka, the solid front ended, and before the Pripyat swamps, the troops were located only in separate strongholds, carrying out security service at the turn east of Brody, Dubna, Lutsk and Kovel. At the first glance at the map, it becomes clear to anyone, not even a military specialist, that such a disposition of troops was fraught with great danger for the entire southern sector of the front. After all, the remnants of Army Group A, as if on purpose, were located in such a way that they could easily be bypassed from the north and surrounded. Only by the brutal pressure that Hitler exerted at that time on his military commanders, who directed military operations in the East, can one explain the fact that, in spite of all counterproposals and objections, and proceeding only from considerations of political and economic order, he was able to carry out his decision in life, leaving the troops of the southern sector of the front, in fact, to the mercy of fate. The Russians, of course, could not miss the opportunity so kindly provided to them to close the trap.

In early March, the 1st Ukrainian Front, now commanded by Marshal Zhukov, went on the offensive again. In the course of short battles, his troops broke through the weak defenses of the 4th Panzer Army and turned their main forces to the south in order to completely close the trap by means of a deep enveloping blow from the north. Despite the fact that in the area east of Ternopil, the Germans made an attempt to quickly gather their tank units into a fist and stop the offensive of the Russian troops with a counterattack, the latter, like an avalanche, moved uncontrollably south. Soon the railway line Ternopol - Proskurov was cut, the most important communication that provided the Germans with communication with Army Group A.

Meanwhile, on March 6, the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front under the command of Marshal Konev also went on the offensive. They quickly broke through the front of the significantly weakened 8th Army, but were briefly stopped in the Gaisin area by a counterattack by one German tank group, which fought with exceptional dedication and stubbornness. By March 10, the Russians reached Uman. Without stopping, they continued to advance to the southwest and on March 13 they reached the Southern Bug in the Gaivoron region on a wide front, capturing small bridgeheads on the unprotected right bank of the river. The German troops, still defending in the Vinnitsa area, in the gap between the advancing troops of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts, were under the threat of encirclement from the adjacent wings of both fronts and were forced to quickly withdraw in a southwestern direction.

Both Russian strike groups, interacting with each other, continued their offensive to the southwest in order to encircle the troops of Army Group A, which were still far to the east. On March 20, the advanced units of the Russians reached the Dniester and crossed it in the area of ​​Soroka and Mogilev-Podolsky, thereby depriving the Germans of the opportunity to gain a foothold on this new, advantageous line for them.

The German command, with all the forces at its disposal, sought to prevent the rupture that threatened to materialize between Army Group South and Army Group A and to stop the Russian offensive, which even spatially approached its climax.

The 8th Army was reinforced and received an order, clinging to all lines convenient for defense, to counteract the Russian offensive. The headquarters of the 1st Panzer Army received the task of stopping the Russian offensive in the area south of Proskurov and Ternopol, which was developing in a southerly direction towards the Carpathians, using the forces of formations reassigned to it. But these measures were taken by the Germans too late and therefore only partially led to the desired results.

On March 21, the 1st Ukrainian Front, whose troops achieved the greatest operational successes, again went on the offensive from the Ternopil-Proskurov line. After heavy fighting, the Russians knocked down the barriers created with great difficulty by the 4th Panzer Army and threw them back in a general direction to the west. Encountering weak resistance here from the troops of the 1st Panzer Army, which, after reforming, were pulled up to the front, the Russians bypassed them north of the Dniester in the area of ​​​​Kamianets-Podolsky and Skala-Podolskaya and surrounded them with part of the forces, sending the main forces further through Kolomyia and Chernivtsi to the spurs Carpathians. The 1st Panzer Army, which was in the "cauldron" and somehow supplied by air, stubbornly resisted. In early April, she managed, interacting with units trying to free her from the west, to break through in the direction of Stanislav.

Interestingly, since the time of Stalingrad, "boilers" have already ceased to seem so terrible to the Germans. The German soldier and the German command realized that even surrounded, almost unsupplied troops have a lot of opportunities to avoid destruction or surrender. But this discovery did not at all remove the blame from the German High Command, which, by its directives, again and again put its troops in a position from which they could be freed only at the cost of unjustified and at the same time completely irreparable human and material losses.

The 8th Army was also able to delay the advance of superior enemy forces only for a very short time. Striking with large forces between Soroca and Rybnitsa across the Dniester, the Russians advanced southwest in the direction of Iasi and south between the Prut and Dniester and along both banks of the Dniester.

Following the capture of Krivoy Rog at the end of February, the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front continued their offensive against Army Group A. Delivering the main blow to her left wing, the Russians tried to bypass the army group and press it to the Black Sea. As a result of the offensive of the concentrated Russian forces between the rivers Ingul and Ingulets, the 1st Panzer Army, even before the dissolution of its headquarters, fell into a very difficult situation. However, despite the fact that during the pursuit the Russians went through the Kinburn Peninsula to the rear of the German troops, the German command still managed to timely withdraw to the west through the Southern Bug both the right wing of the 1st Panzer Army and the entire 6th Army operating to the south, in the region of Kherson and Nikolaev. Meanwhile, the troops of the left wing of the 1st Panzer Army were still far advanced to the northwest in the area between Novoukrainka and Novoarkhangelsk. Here the enemy has not yet attacked. When the Russians, bypassing them from the west, crossed the Southern Bug and approached the Dniester, the Germans had to quickly withdraw these forces through the crossings near Voznesensk and Pervomaisk, which were still in their hands, and include them in the new front created beyond Tiligul.

At the end of March, the 6th Army, together with units of the former 1st Tank Army now subordinate to it, occupied a new defense behind Tiligul. In the Ananiev area, it joined up with the 8th Army, whose front was turned to the north and, crossing the Odessa-Lvov railway, reached the city of Iasi. Defending in the direction of the main Russian attack, the 8th Army tried to stop the enemy offensive, which had begun to gradually weaken. From the area west of Yass to the Carpathians, Romanian units operated, commanded by the headquarters of the 4th Romanian army. On the northeastern spurs of the Carpathians, the Hungarian troops defended themselves.

Completely unacceptable from a military point of view, Hitler's leadership of the fighting on the southern sector of the Eastern Front led the Germans to huge and unnecessary losses. It caused sharp disagreements between the Supreme High Command and the commanders of the troops operating there, Field Marshals von Manstein and von Kleist. Hitler unjustly blamed these eminent military leaders for all the failures that had taken place and replaced the first with Colonel-General Model, and the second with Colonel-General Schörner, hoping that the latter would more vigorously implement his decisions.

Army groups were again renamed. Army Group South became Army Group Northern Ukraine and Army Group A became Southern Ukraine. They were given the task of finally stopping the offensive of the Russian troops at the turn: the mouth of the Dniester, the area east of Chisinau, north of Yass, the eastern spurs of the Carpathians, Kolomyia, the area west of Ternopil, Brody, Kovel. In pursuance of this directive, the southern wing of the German troops was withdrawn beyond the Dniester, and on April 9, Odessa was evacuated. In the northern part of the Carpathians, the Germans managed to push back the advanced Russian units to Kolomya, which advanced to the Yablunytsky Pass, but the Germans failed to release the Ternopil garrison, which had been surrounded for several months. On April 25, after fierce resistance from the units that were part of the garrison and fought to the last drop of blood, the enemy stormed the city.

Fight for Crimea

Let us now turn to what was happening at that time on the Crimean peninsula. The main forces of the German troops were already several hundred kilometers from it, and meanwhile the troops remaining there continued to chain significant Russian forces to themselves. The supply and evacuation of these troops could only be carried out by sea.

Even at a time when German troops could be withdrawn from the Crimea through the Isthmus of Perekop, a proposal was made to Hitler for the planned evacuation of the Crimea. But Hitler decided to defend the peninsula. The reasons that prompted him to do so remain unclear to this day. The peninsula, the narrow approaches to which could be easily blocked, was not a base from which, on occasion, it would be possible to strike against the open left flank of the Russian troops advancing to the west, and the forces of the 17th Army left on the peninsula were insufficient and unsuitable for conducting such offensive actions. In addition, while holding the Crimea, the Germans could not, of course, tie down such a large number of Russian troops that this would to some extent justify the forces and means spent on the defense of the peninsula. Obviously, the decisive factors in Hitler's decision were considerations related to the need to ensure the operation of the Romanian oil fields, since with the fall of the Crimea the threat of air attack on these areas increased significantly, as well as considerations related to the possibility of continuing to put pressure on Turkey, which supplied Germany with extremely the raw material she needs is chromium. With the entry of the Russians to the Carpathians, these considerations, of course, completely lost their significance, but it was not possible to convince Hitler of making a timely decision to evacuate the Crimea, until in early April the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front went on the offensive and with a swift blow threw off peninsula, the forces stationed there (4 German and 6 Romanian divisions).

On April 8, the Russians launched an offensive against the positions of the 17th Army simultaneously on the Kerch Peninsula, on the Perekop Isthmus and across the Sivash. In the Kerch region, during many days of fighting, the Russians somewhat pressed the German troops defending the isthmus. But since the Russians, meanwhile, managed to break through from the north and put all the troops in the eastern part of the peninsula at risk of encirclement, the troops defending the Kerch Peninsula had to retreat. In the north, the enemy, having pinned down the troops operating on the Perekop Isthmus, suddenly crossed the Sivash - a shallow bay of the Sea of ​​\u200b\u200bAzov, replete with islands, along which the Melitopol-Dzhankoy railway was also laid. Thus, bypassing the Perekop group of Germans from the flank, the Russians deprived the defense system of the peninsula of its strength. Due to the fact that it was impossible to create defenses on the islands with the insignificant forces available, the army command, not being able to contain the strongest onslaught of the enemy, was forced to decide on the immediate withdrawal of all units to the well-defended fortress of Sevastopol. Under the strong influence of enemy aircraft, in the conditions of superiority of the enemy in the Naval Forces, the evacuation of the peninsula was begun. It was carried out with the help of a very small number of available marine vehicles. First of all, the rear services and units of the Germans, as well as the Romanian units, were evacuated. German divisions held the city and its environs, providing loading.

In the course of heavy fighting, which lasted about three weeks, the Russians pushed back the stubbornly resisting German divisions to the line of the old forts of the fortress. On May 7, having launched a night attack, the Russians captured this line. After fierce battles for the city, port and separate defensive structures of the fortress, the remnants of the German troops were thrown back to the Cape of Chersonesus. Here, repulsing the attacks of superior enemy forces and hoping for an early evacuation, they held out for another day, but the ships promised to them for evacuation were not sent. All hopes of rescuing these forces squeezed into a tiny space collapsed, and continuous Russian attacks from land and air strikes, together with devastating artillery fire, forced them to capitulate. The main forces of the 17th Army, as well as the remnants of the Romanian units and all military equipment, were lost.

The loss of the Crimea by the Germans, the advance of Russian troops in Romania and the threat of an invasion of Hungary - all this, of course, could not but affect Germany's allies. The unrest caused by the development of events in Romania and Hungary led to a further reduction in the already very insignificant contribution of the allies to the common cause. Hitler failed to achieve a serious increase in their ability to fight through political influence on these countries. The Romanians, having taken a number of measures to defend their territory from the Russians, apparently as a distraction, at the same time tried to establish contact with Soviet Russia and the Western powers behind the back of the dictator Antonescu.

In order to prevent the withdrawal of Hungary, whose troops were always unreliable, and which was now more busy arguing with Rumania over the remaining unresolved border issues than fighting against Russia, German troops suddenly occupied it, occupying the most important points of the country. The Hungarian regent Horthy was forced to form a new government. But the new government failed to achieve a serious intensification of the struggle against the Bolsheviks, who were already standing at the borders of Hungary.