Combat and political training in the Armed Forces was organized and carried out in accordance with the policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, based on an assessment of the possible nature of a future war, and was aimed at ensuring the combat readiness of the troops to repel an attack by any aggressor.

The Central Committee of the Party, having analyzed the experience of the military operations of the Soviet Army near Lake Khasan, on the Khalkhin Gol River, in Finland, drew attention to the shortcomings in the combat training of the troops, in which its separation from the harsh requirements of the war was manifested.

New requirements for combat and political training of troops were established by the People's Commissar of Defense in Order No. 120 of May 16, 1940 and clarified in Order No. 30 of January 29, 1941, as well as in the directive of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Soviet Army "On the restructuring of the party -political work", published in August 1940. These documents focused on the main thing in the training of troops - the approximation of everyday training to the conditions of combat reality. "Teach the troops only what is needed in the war, and only in the way that is done in the war" - became the military slogan of the army.

Implementing this principle of training, commanders, commanders and political workers paid special attention to comprehensive combat training, starting with the training of a single fighter and small units; continuous and precise control in any combat conditions; practical development of interaction between military branches; development of endurance in personnel; improving the work of headquarters.

Rifle troops made marches in various training and combat situations, being in constant readiness for battle, they learned to act in a coordinated manner and maneuver on the battlefield, storm fortified positions, fight in the forest, overcome river barriers, and advance in cooperation with other branches of the military.

In April 1941, a wartime staff was introduced for rifle troops. The rifle division - the main combined arms formation of the Red Army - included three rifle and two artillery regiments, anti-tank and anti-aircraft divisions, reconnaissance and engineer battalions, a communications battalion, rear units and institutions. According to the wartime states, the division was supposed to have about 14 and a half thousand people, 78 field guns, 54 anti-tank 45-mm guns, 12 anti-aircraft guns, 66 mortars of 82-120 mm caliber, 16 light tanks, 13 armored vehicles, more than three thousand horses. Fully equipped divisions could represent a fairly mobile and formidable combat unit.

In 1939, 1940 and the first half of 1941, the troops received more than 105 thousand light, heavy and heavy machine guns, more than 100 thousand machine guns. This is despite the fact that the production of small arms and artillery weapons at that time decreased somewhat, because obsolete types were discontinued, and new ones, due to complexity and design features, were not so easy to put on stream.

G.K. Zhukov writes in his memoirs: “In mid-March 1941, S.K. Timoshenko and I asked permission from I.V. Stalin to call on the assigned staff of the reserve for rifle divisions in order to be able to retrain him in the spirit of modern requirements. At first our request was denied. We were told that the draft of the assigned reserve personnel in such numbers could give the Germans a pretext to provoke a war. However, at the end of March, it was decided to call up five hundred thousand soldiers and sergeants and send them to the border military districts for resupplying in order to bring the number of rifle divisions to at least 8 thousand people.

As a result, on the eve of the war in the border districts, out of one hundred and seventy divisions and two brigades, 19 divisions were equipped with up to 5-6 thousand people, 7 cavalry divisions had an average of 6 thousand people each, 144 divisions had a strength of 8-9 thousand people each. In the interior districts, most divisions were kept on a reduced staff, and many rifle divisions were just being formed and began combat training.

In the training of tankers, special importance was attached to teaching them independent actions in all types of combat, interaction with infantry, artillery and aviation. At the same time, the main place was given to the training of a single fighter and the formation of a crew. The basis for the fire training of tank units was the provision - to teach how to fire from a place (short stops) and on the move. As the former commander of the 9th mechanized corps, Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky, already in the process of formation, comprehensive combat training of subunits, units and the entire formation as a whole was launched.

In the preparation of artillery, the main attention was paid to the conduct of centralized, controlled massive fire, interaction with infantry, tanks and aircraft. Artillerymen learned how to effectively prepare an attack, accompany infantry and tanks with massive fire, and fire in difficult meteorological and combat conditions.

Aviation was tasked with working out interaction with ground forces and the fleet in any conditions, as well as being able to conduct active combat operations, both in large masses and in small independent groups of aircraft. Much attention was paid to flights in difficult meteorological conditions, the ability to find and hit targets at night.

To improve the flight skills of instructors, "star flights" were carried out. One of them took place in September 1927. It took place in difficult conditions and confirmed the high air skills of the instructors.

In connection with the entry into service with aviation of a more advanced material part, the retraining of flight personnel and the development of new equipment in many cases took place directly in the regiments, without sending pilots and technicians to schools and courses.

The training of the personnel of the Navy was actively carried out. In 1940, the Main Military Council of the Navy adopted a special resolution in which it was planned to improve the training of naval personnel, aviation and coastal services. In particular, it was recognized as necessary to deepen the study of the experience of combat operations in the naval theaters of the Second World War, to eliminate seasonality in training, to prevent simplification in combat training, to study in more detail ways to combat the mine threat, to improve the work of commanders and Headquarters in organizing and implementing interaction between ships and ships. aviation and coastal defense facilities.

The restructuring of the combat training and indoctrination of troops, carried out on the eve of the Great Patriotic War, had a fruitful influence on the formation of high combat and moral-political qualities of the personnel of the army and navy.

The training of command personnel and the operational training of staffs were subordinated to the main task - the acquisition of solid skills in command and control. The goal was to prepare "a strong-willed commander with combat qualities that meet modern combat requirements." At live-fire exercises, command and staff field trips, staff training and military games, commanders and staffs acquired the skills of driving troops, learned to organize the interaction of troops and ensure their control in battle.

Here is what he writes about the training of the commanders of the armies in the prewar years. S.E. Lazarev in the article "The fate of the "marshal course" of the Academy of the General Staff" from the journal "Questions of History".

Among the Soviet higher military institutions that trained command personnel, the Academy of the General Staff of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army occupied a special place. It trained senior and senior officers of the armed forces and at the same time was the leading military educational institution for conducting scientific research in the field of ensuring the military security of the state and military development.

By the end of the second five-year plan, 13 military academies trained commanders with higher military and engineering education. But they were not designed to train top-level military leaders, to whom the new stage in the development of the USSR Armed Forces made much higher demands.

April 11, 1936 People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR K.E. Voroshilov signed an order on the formation of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army. 5 departments were created - army operations, tactics of higher formations, organization and mobilization, military history and foreign languages. They were led by the most experienced and trained teachers, including those transferred from the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze.

The General Staff constantly controlled the work of the academy, providing all kinds of assistance, periodically organizing reports and lectures for the students and the teaching staff of the senior staff of the People's Commissariat of Defense, the General Staff and districts on topical issues of military art and the development of the Red Army.

At the initiative of the First Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Marshal Tukhachevsky, within the framework of the Academy of the General Staff in 1936-1937. A strategic war game was held, where Mikhail Nikolayevich commanded the combined Polish-German forces (“for Hitler”), and Commander of the Belarusian Military District Army Commander 1st Rank Uborevich commanded the Western Front. The Soviet troops then won a complete victory. The former chief of staff of Hitler, the head of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army, Kuchinsky admitted, “that Tukhachevsky brought extraordinary passion into this game. He said that the Germans should have more forces.

So, the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army, established in 1936, trained the highest command and command staff at the operational-strategic level. Its first release came at a difficult and tragic time for the country - the aggravation of international relations, the tightening of the internal regime, repressions in the Armed Forces. But many of them managed to survive. In the 1940s, they received the rank of general and during the Great Patriotic War formed the core of the leadership of the Soviet armed forces. Some of them became commanders.

In 1935-1941. The leadership of the USSR carried out a number of major measures to increase the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces:

1) transfer of the Red Army in 1935-1939. on a staffing basis;

2) the introduction of universal conscription in 1939;

3) strategic mobilization deployment of the Armed Forces in 1939-1941. from the peacetime army to the wartime army (before the war), from 98 divisions to 303 divisions;

4) creation and concentration on the western borders in 1939-1941. cover armies of 186 divisions, unprecedented in the history of mankind for peacetime, taking into account 16 divisions of the second strategic echelon that arrived in the cover army before the war;

5) preparation of the Western theater for war - airfields, fortified areas, roads.

The legal newspaper reports: “... the reason why the Soviet-German war should begin this year (meaning 1941) is that the Red Army is getting stronger all the time, while the power of the German army, if the war with England drags on, will weakened. Therefore, it is more profitable for Hitler to try to break the Red Army before its reorganization is completed.

In the second half of the 1930s, military theorists and major military leaders of the capitalist countries not only recognized the achievements of the Soviet Armed Forces, but also borrowed a lot from their experience. The head of the Italian military mission, General Graziolini, who was present at the “big Russian maneuvers,” wrote: “The Red Army is organized and equipped in a modern way ...” In his opinion, the Russians have a “great passion for mobile troops,” “are fond of large mechanized formations and teachings with their use.

An interesting assessment of the Red Army was given by the Deputy Chief of Staff of the French Army, General Loiseau: "I ... saw a powerful, serious army, of very high quality both technically and morally."

A controversial topic in the consecration of the training of personnel of the Red Army on the eve of the war was the topic of repression.

An analysis of the personnel status of the Red Army on the eve of the Great Patriotic War and the impact on the combat readiness of the army of repression, which was associated with one of the main reasons for our failures at the beginning of the war, allows us to draw the following conclusions. Army personnel renewal 1937-1938 It was dictated, first of all, by the need to free the army from commanders and chiefs who held posts that did not correspond to their real military knowledge and hindered the development of the army. The documents at the disposal of the researchers, which make it possible to assess the scale of the purges, do not allow us to talk about the total "bleeding" of the officer corps of the Red Army, since the proportion of those who were actually innocently convicted or shot compared to the payroll of the command staff was relatively small. At least a third of those dismissed from the army in 1937-1938. commanders by 1940 returned back the ranks of the Red Army. The People's Commissariat of Defense controlled the process of reforming the army and immediately reacted to all deviations from its line of screening out insufficiently qualified, in the opinion of the leadership of the army and the country, commanders.

Here is what A. Reisenfeld writes about this: “Now it is fashionable to shout that the Soviet army did not know how to fight, that the generals were mediocre. And at the same time, it is vague to hint that, they say, in “democratic” states this cannot and could not happen. How, then, to understand the fact that the Anglo-French coalition, being at war with Germany for seven months, missed all the preparations of the Wehrmacht for active operations and was defeated within forty days?

At present, many facts are known that allow us to have a fairly complete picture of the state in which the USSR approached the fateful date of June 22, 1941.

The first thing to note is the impact of repression on the command staff of the Red Army and the Red Army. With the light hand of the "democratic" mass media, a fantastic figure of 40,000 officers allegedly shot in 1937-1938 is walking. In fact, the repressions affected a much smaller number of people. Moreover, after October 1938, more than 12,000 officers who were dismissed in 1937-1938 were reinstated in their positions and ranks, many of them released from imprisonment, with compensation paid and provided with the opportunity for treatment. It is characteristic that of these 12,000 people, only a few betrayed the Motherland during the war years.

Among the officers and generals released after 1938, there were such well-known military leaders as the future marshals of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky and K.A. Meretskov, brigade commander L.G. Petrovsky, who commanded the 21st Army in June-July 1941.

An analysis of the age composition in the link of division commanders shows that most of the commanders of this link in 1941 were 41-45 years old, which approximately corresponded to the age of the same level of officers in the mid-80s. Thus, there is no reason to say that in 1941 divisions were commanded by almost former company commanders. This situation, unfortunately, is typical for 1937-1938, but by 1941 it had changed radically.”

In general, the main reason for the low level of training of command personnel was the process of deployment of the Soviet armed forces. In 20 months, the size of the army and navy increased from 1400 people to 5373 thousand people! The number of combined-arms divisions increased from 98 to 303. In the absence of large contingents of trained reserve officers, one inevitably had to take such measures as training commanders at various accelerated courses.

But the highest echelon of the command staff really suffered serious losses in 1937-1938. This is especially true for officers of the general staff. Many officers and generals who had experience in the General Staff in the First World War died. And it was impossible to replace them in a short time. Most of the outstanding staff workers of the period of the Great Patriotic War - A.M. Vasilevsky, A.I. Antonov, S.M. Shtemenko and others - had to gain experience in managing troops on their own mistakes and defeats.

Separately, it must be said that, with rare exceptions, the complete unpreparedness of the Soviet troops stationed near the state border of the USSR to repel aggression was the result of the stubborn unwillingness of Stalin and part of his inner circle to take into account the most obvious facts of the naked preparation of the Nazis for aggression. Due to the fact that the USSR complied with the terms of the Non-Aggression Pact.

The overwhelming majority of historians in all countries see the cause of the outbreak of war in the policy not of the Soviet Union, but of Hitler's Germany. Soviet domestic policy is seen as a more or less adequate response to the changes taking place in the international arena. However, there is a group of authors who adhere to a different point of view and explain the military preparation of the USSR as the desire of Stalin and his leadership to deliver a preemptive strike to Germany.

The accusation of the Soviet Union of preparing an attack on Germany in the summer of 1941 was first officially voiced in a statement made by the German ambassador Schulenburg to the Soviet government immediately after the start of the war. As for historical science, the myth that the German attack on the USSR was of a preemptive nature appeared immediately after the war in the works of former Wehrmacht generals, as well as officials of the Third Reich, who sought to justify their participation, often active, in the preparation and implementation of the Barbarossa plan. ". They stated that the USSR was determined to conquer all of Europe, and if Stalin had not attacked Germany in 1941, he certainly would have done it later. Germany in the speeches of these authors was portrayed as "the guardian of Europe", "a barrier against the spread of communist pan-Slavism."

In the Russian press, works in which the arguments of West German historians and memoirists were repeated appeared in the early 1990s. and caused a lively controversy, the impetus for which was the publication in Russian of the book by V. Suvorov (Rezun) entitled "Icebreaker", where this concept was presented in a harsh and aggressive form.

The main idea of ​​"Icebreaker" is to substantiate the assertion that Stalin's policy in the 30s was determined by the desire for world domination. Stalin contributed in every possible way to the outbreak of the Second World War, hoping to turn it into a revolutionary war. In 1941, the USSR had an aggressive plan like "Barbarossa", which was implemented in the deployment of strategic echelons, and the Red Army would certainly have attacked Germany (and all of Western Europe) if Hitler had not slowed down the "offensive of world communism" on June 22.

The point of view of V. Suvorov, his methods of working with sources, caused fair criticism from historians of different countries and political orientations as being far from science. Nevertheless, there were historians in our country who supported the version that Stalin was preparing an attack on Germany. They saw proof that V. Suvorov was right in a declassified document of the General Staff of the Red Army dated May 15, 1941, called "Considerations on the Strategic Deployment Plan." Yu.N. Afanasiev, V.D. Danilov, M.I. Meltyukhov and B.V. Sokolov. “Could Stalin be the first to strike and thereby take on the soul the sin of unleashing a bloody massacre? Perhaps yes. - considers V.D. Danilov. Intention I.V. Stalin being the first to start a war is associated in this case with the general nature of the “criminal regime”, aggressive in its essence, that existed then in the USSR: ... not so much the need to fight aggression as far-reaching plans and communist ambitions to eliminate the power of capitalism on the way to world peace. revolution determined the activities of the political and military leadership in the pre-stormy situation of 1941,” writes V.D. Danilov. He is echoed by M.I. Meltyukhov, believing that the main foreign policy goal of the Soviet Union was "the achievement of world domination."

Controversy over the goals of Soviet military policy in 1939-1941. K. Bellamy also touches upon in his book, especially since he is personally acquainted with Suvorov. Analyzing his concept in the light of recent research and taking into account newly declassified documents (first of all, of course, the Soviet strategic plans of 1940-1941, which were still secret at the time the Icebreaker was written), Bellamy agrees in principle with that the intensive preparation of the Soviet Union for an offensive war is confirmed by a number of circumstantial evidence, as well as with the fact that the beginning of secret mobilization in the USSR must be recognized as the adoption on September 1, 1939 of the law on universal military service, which allowed Stalin to sharply increase the size of the Red Army.

This point of view, widely voiced in periodicals and on television, became the subject of discussion in the scientific literature, where it was subjected to comprehensive analysis and criticism. First of all, attention was drawn to the unjustified identification in the works of these authors of the concepts of "offensive" and "aggression". So, for example, A.N. and L.A. The Mertsalovs stressed that it is customary in military science to distinguish between these concepts. As early as the beginning of the 19th century, major European military theorists A. Jomini and K. Clausewitz showed that the nature of war is determined by the goals of the belligerents, and not by the methods of action of their armies. In a just or unjust war of conquest or liberation, an army can both attack and defend. So offensive does not mean aggressive.

The arguments cited by supporters of the Suvorov "version" cannot serve as evidence of the USSR's intention to attack Germany in the summer of 1941. Carrying out a number of preparatory measures - the call of reservists, the transfer of four armies to the border districts - finds a completely logical explanation within the framework of the traditional concept. In particular, such an explanation was given by G.K. Zhukov.

The latest documents, which have long been known to researchers, indicate that Stalin and the General Staff of the Red Army not only saw an ever-increasing threat from Germany, but also took measures to prevent a possible collision. In this context, modern researchers are inclined to consider both measures to strengthen the troops of the border districts, as well as to speed up defensive construction, and intensive work to adjust operational plans.

In the course of the controversy around the statements of V. Suvorov, many other problems were further developed. In particular, O.V. Vishlev proposed an explanation for the untimely return of I.V. Stalin's order to put the troops on alert. The German command set itself the goal of giving the Soviet leadership the impression that a peaceful resolution of the conflict was possible, and, apparently, Stalin, if he did not count on this, then at least considered it likely that the start of hostilities would be preceded by a showdown at the diplomatic level. O.V. Vishlev, analyzing the data obtained by Soviet intelligence, as well as some documents from the German archives that were not previously included in scientific circulation, came to the conclusion that I.V. Stalin, apparently, believed the skillfully planted disinformation and expected an ultimatum from Germany. Published by O.V. Vishlev, German documents show that the German command proceeded, on the one hand, from the fact that the USSR was not going to attack Germany in the summer of 1941, and, on the other hand, planned to lure Soviet troops out of the depths of the country closer to the border in order to defeat them in frontier battles. From this point of view, the disinformation campaign carried out by the Nazis was assessed by them as successful.

Based on all that has been said, we see that the Rezun-Suvorov concept cannot be true, since it is based on fictitious or falsified facts. In recent years, it has been analyzed in several studies by Russian authors and completely refuted.

What we know and what we don't know about the Great Patriotic War Yury Vsevolodovich Skorokhod

3. Readiness of the USSR for war

3. Readiness of the USSR for war

Today's media claims that, judging by the large losses of territory, population, weapons and military equipment in the first days of the war, the USSR was not ready for it, for which both its leadership and the state system were to blame. Let's see if that was the case.

From the first days of the existence of the Soviet state, the issue of waging war (which was then understood as the defense of its borders) was of paramount, if not the main, importance for it. Consider this question as of the end of the 30s.

The outcome of the war is determined by the economic, scientific, technical, moral and military potential of the country, its geopolitical position (permanent factors) and the conditions for waging war - its declaration or surprise attack and compliance with international conventions.

Economic and scientific and technical potentials. For 1928–1940 the country's income increased by more than five times, electricity generation by 9.7 times, coal mining by 4.7 times, oil production by 2.7 times, steel production by more than 4 times, and engineering products by 20 times. Such industrial giants as the Gorky Automobile Plant, the Stalingrad and Chelyabinsk Tractor Plants, the Ural Heavy Engineering Plant, etc. were built. In the Donbass, Siberia, the Urals and the Kola Peninsula, the extraction of non-ferrous metals and, above all, aluminum was developed. In the east of the country, in addition to the Donbass, a second coal-metallurgical complex was created, the Karaganda coal basin was also rapidly developing, and an oil-producing processing base was created between the Volga and the Urals. By the beginning of the war, the eastern regions were already producing about 20% of the country's total output.

Particular attention was paid to the development of the defense industry in the country. In 1936, the People's Commissariat of the Defense Industry was separated from the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, which in 1939 was divided into the People's Commissariats of Arms, Aviation, Shipbuilding and Tank Industry. New design organizations were created for the development of weapons and military equipment, factories for their manufacture and testing grounds. From the repressed specialists of the defense profile, "separate" and "special" design bureaus were organized. At the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, a department of military research was established and an additional experimental base was organized. In Leningrad, in the area of ​​Srednyaya Rogatka (Moskovsky district), the construction of a unified experimental base for military and civil shipbuilding has begun, which meets the needs of designing the domestic ocean-going military, commercial, river and fishing fleets at the most modern technical level. Ultimately, domestic aviation, tank and chemical industries were created in the country, and the formation of jet technology began. Some "non-military" factories (especially shipbuilding ones) were transferred to the production of military products. A thorough analysis of the produced and developed weapons was carried out, on the basis of which the construction of some warships and airships was abandoned and, at this expense, the production of tanks, artillery and combat aircraft was increased. Characteristically, the rate of output of military products in the last pre-war years was 1.5 to 2 times higher than the rate of growth of industry as a whole.

moral potential. Its formation was greatly influenced by the Constitution adopted in 1936, which legislated the achievements of the country, equalized its citizens in rights and guaranteed them certain freedoms. Based on it, a return to the patriotic roots and ideas of the Russian national state was promoted. prepared the people for unity in conditions of peace and war. A new attitude was instilled in labor as a matter of "honor, valor and heroism" and in socialist property, as the basis of the well-being of every citizen. The masses were educated in the spirit of friendship of the peoples of the USSR, argued by historical examples It was shown that extreme nationalism is beneficial only to the exploiters of the masses of the people and is hostile to the latter.From the foregoing followed the slogan about the need to defend one's fatherland - the only socialist island in the world, surrounded on all sides by imperialist countries hostile to it. increased over time, primarily due to the improvement in the well-being of workers. At the end of 1934 the rationing system was abolished and the food situation improved every year. Unemployment was eliminated, the network of all-Union health resorts and educational institutions of all levels was expanded, etc. Since 1939, not only unjustified repressions ceased, but after the review of cases, a mass return of the rehabilitated began, only in 1939 there were 837 thousand of them.

Summing up what has been said, it can be argued that the ideological work launched in the country ensured the unity of the people in the most unfavorable conditions for the country, which ultimately made it possible to win the war.

The military potential of a country depends on the size of its population and its preparation for warfare, the quantity and quality of weapons and military equipment, the optimal structure of the armed forces and their mobilization readiness.

In terms of population, the USSR surpassed Germany with its satellites. The population was completely literate (moreover, most of it, born after the revolution, had a secondary education and was healthy, of the number of conscripts unsuitable for military service, there were no more than 7%). The size of the armed forces steadily increased and by the beginning of the war had been brought to 11.4 million people (while in Germany it was 9.6 million people).

During the thirties, the number of military educational institutions in the USSR increased by almost an order of magnitude. By the beginning of the war, there were 203 secondary military schools in the country. 19 military academies, 10 military faculties at civilian universities, 7 naval schools and over 10 NKVD schools. Schools for junior commanders were established under separate training regiments. The activities of military sports organizations (such as Osoviahim), which were popular with young people, were expanded, in which military training was purposefully carried out, “military science” was introduced in the 10th grade of secondary schools, most technical schools and universities, weapon. In September 1940, the next demobilization of privates, sergeants and foremen was not carried out.

In connection with the unjustified repressions of 1937-1938. in the armed forces, a problem arose with the personnel of the command and command staff of the Red Army and the Red Army of the Russian Federation at all levels. The problem was solved by conscription from the reserve, expanding the network of military educational institutions and organizing short-term courses for command personnel at large military units. In addition, after the review of cases, about 90 thousand unjustifiably repressed at all levels, up to the generals, were returned to the ranks of the Red Army and the Red Army.

Weapons intended for war were developed according to their own designs, built and manufactured at their own factories and from their own raw materials. Armament was available in sufficient quantity, but some of it was somewhat inferior in combat qualities to the German one. However, a significant number of samples of new weapons (in particular, tanks and aircraft), superior to the German ones, were under development, fine-tuning and mass production. Therefore, those 22 months during which the Soviet government managed to avoid entering the war were of strategic importance for the country.

In the last months of the pre-war period, following the experience of the Finnish-Soviet conflict (FSVK), a number of organizational and structural changes were made in the system of the country's armed forces. He was replaced by the People's Commissar of Defense and some other persons from among the leadership of the Red Army. The draft age for military service was reduced from 21 to 18 years, the military districts were reorganized, the formation of mechanized corps, interrupted in 1939, was resumed, new regulations and instructions were introduced, etc. .

The system of mobilization readiness was worked out in the USSR by the end of the 1920s and continued to be improved in the 1930s. The beginning of WWII required further development of the existing system, and in August 1940 the Main Military Council of the Red Army (S.K. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, G.I. Kulik, L.Z. Mekhlis and G.A. Shchadenko) adopted the decision to develop a unified mobilization plan, the implementation of which was planned from May 1941. Due to the delay in agreeing with the industry, the work schedule was approved only at the end of 1940, and the plan as a whole, which received the MP-41 code, was submitted to the government and approved in February 1941 The development of documentation according to the plan began immediately and was planned for completion in the first half of 1941. According to the plan, it was planned to deploy 303 divisions (198 rifle, 61 tank, 37 motorized and 13 cavalry), 346 aviation regiments, 5 directorates of airborne corps, 10 separate anti-tank artillery brigades, 94 corps artillery regiments and 72 artillery regiments of the RGK. The total number of troops in the units listed above was to be 8.9 million people. The implementation of the above planned figures would allow the USSR, at the traditional start of the war (i.e., upon its declaration), to successfully complete the initial period of the war. Although as of June 22, 1941, some of the indicated planned figures turned out to be underfulfilled, however, a scrupulous analysis of indicators carried out by domestic experts reflecting the material objectivity of the mobilization deployment of our troops in terms of small arms and artillery weapons, aircraft, tanks, vehicles, ammunition, technical and special means, clothing and food indicates that these indicators were only slightly inferior to the corresponding indicators of the deployed German army. They testify that in the conditions of the "traditional" start of the war, the Soviet troops could provide adequate resistance to the German troops (i.e., they were sufficient for the initial period of the war) and were never as high as in 1941. They even exceeded the corresponding indicators of our troops during their brilliant victories in the second half of the Second World War.

The USSR owed its favorable geopolitical position to its glorious ancestors: Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, Catherine II, and also I.V. Stalin, who provided in 1939–1940. the accession to the country of a number of new naval bases in the Baltic, the Karelian Isthmus, which defended Leningrad, as well as exits to the Danube (only 200 km to Ploiesti, which supplied the Wehrmacht with oil products) and the Carpathians.

The USSR signed almost all international conventions relating to war and in its plans was guided by the rules stipulated in the signed conventions. The USSR did not sign the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War, however, at the beginning of the Second World War, he undertook to comply with the rules specified in this convention.

From all of the above, it follows that in the 1930s the USSR carried out a huge comprehensive work to increase the country's defense capability, which ultimately ensured not only victory in the war, but also made it possible in the future to achieve a new redivision of the world that was beneficial to itself. However, the conditions of the war were not taken into account, which will be explained in the next section.

From the book History of Russia from Rurik to Putin. People. Events. Dates author Anisimov Evgeny Viktorovich

USSR in World War II (1939-1945) August 23, 1939 - Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact By the end of the 1930s. Europe is in a very tense situation. Many countries were alarmed by the aggressive actions of Nazi Germany. In addition, the USSR was worried about Japan's activity in

From the book The Formation and Disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics author Radomyslsky Yakov Isaakovich

The Soviet Navy in the Great Patriotic War The main base of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet was Tallinn. For the direct defense of Leningrad, all the forces of the fleet were needed, and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command gives the order to evacuate the defenders of Tallinn and move

From the book Bey first! [The main mystery of World War II] author Nikonov Alexander Petrovich

Chapter 3 WHERE DISAPPEARED FOR WAR? The dispute was not between fascism and the rest of mankind, but between two fascist systems. Fascism was defeated, fascism won. Yuri Nagibin Earlier, we paid a lot of attention to the similarities between the two dictators - Hitler and Stalin.

From the book Mythical War. Mirages of World War II author Sokolov Boris Vadimovich

The myth of military losses of the USSR in World War II The official figures of the irretrievable losses of the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War - 8,668,400 dead on the battlefield, died of wounds, diseases, in captivity, shot by tribunals and died for other reasons -

From the book Russia in the War 1941-1945 the author Vert Alexander

Chapter I. Unpreparedness of the USSR for war in June 1941 Early in the morning of June 22, 1941, the Germans began to implement the "Plan Barbarossa", on which Hitler and his generals had been working for the previous six months. And the Russians were not sufficiently prepared to repel their attack. German

From the book All myths about World War II. "Unknown War" author Sokolov Boris Vadimovich

The myth of the military losses of the USSR in World War II The official figures of the irretrievable losses of the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War - 8,668,400 dead on the battlefield, died of wounds, diseases, in captivity, shot by tribunals and died for other reasons -

From the book Italy. Reluctant enemy author

Chapter 22 The USSR and Italy in the Spanish War On February 16, 1936, the left-wing parties, united in the Popular Front, won a landslide victory in the parliamentary elections in Spain. They received 268 out of 473 mandates. The left formed a coalition government. Leftist becomes President

From the book Northern Wars of Russia author Shirokorad Alexander Borisovich

Chapter 12. Losses of the USSR and Finland in the Winter War During the 105 days of the war, Soviet troops suffered losses in personnel, amounting to 333,084 people (according to final reports from units and formations on March 15, 1940). Of these: Were killed or died at the stages of sanitary

From the book Psychology of War in the 20th Century. The historical experience of Russia [Full version with applications and illustrations] author

Japan and the USSR in World War II The defeat of the Japanese troops in the area of ​​Lake Khasan in 1938 and in Mongolia in 1939 dealt a serious blow to the propaganda myth about the "invincibility of the imperial army", about the "exclusivity of the Japanese army." American historian

From the book Questions and Answers. Part I: World War II. Participating countries. Army, weapons. author Lisitsyn Fedor Viktorovich

USSR before and during the war. Economy of the pre-war USSR. Losses in the war ***> It seems to me that Comrade Bushin's comparison is incorrect. In the first case, all the forces of our state, all the resources for a very long period were thrown into preparing for war. This

From the book Stalin. Red "king" (compilation) author Trotsky Lev Davidovich

USSR in War War danger is only one of the expressions of the dependence of the Soviet Union on the rest of the world, and therefore one of the arguments against the utopia of an isolated socialist society; but it is precisely at the present time that this formidable "argument" is put forward on

From the book Opponents of Russia in the wars of the twentieth century. The evolution of the "image of the enemy" in the minds of the army and society author Senyavskaya Elena Spartakovna

Japan and the USSR in World War II The defeat of the Japanese troops in the area of ​​Lake Khasan in 1938 and in Mongolia in 1939 dealt a serious blow to the propaganda myth about the "invincibility of the imperial army", about the "exclusivity of the Japanese army." American historian J.

From the book The Only Superpower author Utkin Anatoly Ivanovich

5. Ready for the Wrong War Until September 2001, the colossal gap between the technologically advanced United States military system and the less well-equipped military forces of the rest of the world seemed to give Washington a chance for decades of military dominance, served as a sort of

From the book History of Russia the author Ivanushkina V V

43. Allies of the USSR in the war against the fascists From the very beginning of the war, close interaction between the Soviet Union and the governments of the allied countries began. So, on July 12, 1941, the first step was taken towards the creation of an anti-Hitler coalition - the Soviet-British

From the book "For Stalin!" Great Victory Strategist author Sukhodeev Vladimir Vasilievich

Prevent Falsification of the USSR Victory in the Great Patriotic War Six and a half decades separate us, our contemporaries, from the Great Victory of the Soviet Union over Nazi Germany on May 9, 1945. Preparations for the celebration of the anniversary are taking place in an aggravated

From the book Domestic History. Crib author Barysheva Anna Dmitrievna

65 THE ALLIES OF THE USSR IN THE WAR AGAINST THE FASHISTS In the summer of 1941, the first steps were taken in the formation of an anti-Hitler coalition. On July 12, 1941, an Anglo-Soviet agreement was signed on a joint struggle with Germany, and in August, after a meeting between F. Roosevelt and W. Churchill, a

© Copyright Arkhangelsk: Publishing house KIRA, 2004.

Boldyrev R.Yu. Unknown known war: World War II and the Great Patriotic War. Tutorial. All rights reserved

Email: [email protected]

§6. "If there is war tomorrow"

Preparing the USSR for war with Germany

Economy

Back in 1929, Stalin declared that the Soviet Union was in a hostile capitalist encirclement, and set the task of overcoming the technical and economic backwardness of the country within 10 years, "otherwise we will be crushed." During the years of the first two five-year plans, emphasis was placed on the development of the country's raw material and industrial base: new mineral deposits were discovered, thousands of new factories were built. The military industry did not play a major role at this stage.

The situation changed in 1938, when the world smelled distinctly of war. In the plan for the III Five-Year Plan (1938-1942) there were serious changes in priorities. Distinctive features this five-year plan steel: construction backup enterprises 8 , development of the eastern territories (the Volga region, Central Asia, Siberia and the Far East), an increase in military spending (42% of the budget in 1940) 4 . Oil fields were developed "second Baku"(Bashkiria, the Volga region), large tank factories were completed and re-built in Kharkov, Stalingrad and Chelyabinsk, shipyards in Molotovsk and Komsomolsk-on-Amur, a copper-nickel plant in Norilsk, etc. To speed up the pace, they again resorted to the help of the Gulag, which provided “ great construction projects” with free labor.

Serious changes have also taken place in labor relations. Labor productivity at Soviet enterprises remained low, financial and time resources for further extensive development of the economy were exhausted, therefore, in order to ensure growth, it was necessary to resort to emergency measures. In September 1939, all workers were assigned to the place of work, in June 1940 the working day was increased to 11 hours, and the working week was made 6-day. A fierce struggle began with absenteeism and being late for work (being late for 15 minutes was equated with sabotage and sentenced to 5 years in camps under article 58-14 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR). The preparation of labor reserves began: in the event of a war, women and children were to replace the men mobilized for the front in production. A network has been set up throughout the country schools of factory training (FZO), in which children from the age of 14 received the skills of any profession in 6 months.

Rearmament and reorganization of the army

After the repressions against the military in 1937-1938. marshals at the head of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA) K.E. Voroshilov and S.M. Budyonny. They built their military strategy based on the experience of the Civil War, where the main role was played by cavalry and infantry. The Second World War that began in Europe and the war with Finland won by the USSR with great sacrifices refuted these ideas. It became clear that only a highly maneuverable army with large tank and motorized formations, as well as strong aircraft, could win the war. One of the most important tasks was to equip the army with the latest types of weapons. To "spur" the Soviet designers resorted to cruel measures. Many talented designers and engineers were repressed, special design bureaus were created for them in prisons and camps - "sharashki". For good work, you could get a quick release.

Significant progress has been made in the aircraft industry. Talented designers S.V. Ilyushin, S.A. Lavochkin, A.I. Mikoyan, V.M. Petlyakov, A.N. Tupolev and A.S. Yakovlev developed new aircraft that were not inferior in their characteristics to the German ones: fighters 8 MiG-3, LaGG-3, Yak-1; bombers 8 - IL-4, Pe-2, Pe-8; first in the world attack aircraft 8 - IL-2. However, the transition to the production of these aircraft led to a decrease in production volumes. New equipment was produced piece by piece, serial production was only established in 1941. By the beginning of the war, 1946 new fighters, 458 bombers, 249 attack aircraft were ready. Border military districts were the first to receive new aircraft, but even there their share was only 22%.

M.I. Koshkin and N.L. spirits designed new types of tanks that have no analogues in the world: the T-34 medium tank and the KV-1 and KV-2 heavy tanks. The problem in their production was the same as with aviation. By June 22, 1941, 1225 T-34 and 639 KV tanks were produced. In terms of the total number and quality of tanks, the USSR surpassed Germany. Even obsolete Soviet tanks (T-26, T-28, BT-7) were not inferior to the German ones in terms of their characteristics.

In the prewar years, installations for firing rockets were designed BM-13 ("Katyusha"). They did not have time to establish their production, so the tests were carried out already during the war.

However, along with such impressive successes, there were also significant shortcomings in the production of weapons. Priority was given to offensive types of weapons, the production of machine guns and machine guns was reduced V.A. Degtyarev(PPD) and G.S. Shpagina(PPSh), because, from the point of view of our “theorists”, their shortcomings were the high consumption of cartridges and the lack of a bayonet. In general, anti-tank guns and rifles, mines (they were contemptuously called “weapons for the weak”) were discontinued. The real scourge of the Soviet military industry was lobbying 8 individual state and party figures of military orders, which led to the disorganization of production.

The army has also undergone major organizational changes. Previously, they tried to save money on the armed forces, so the size of the army did not exceed 500-700 thousand soldiers. In the conditions of growing aggression of the fascist states, a large army became necessary. In 1935-1938. The USSR made the transition from territorial police 8 and personnel 8 systems of organization of the Armed Forces to a full-blooded army. For this, it was necessary to increase the number of conscripts. In August 1936, the draft age was reduced to 19 years, and in September 1939, the service life was increased from an average of 2 to 3 years. 4 . These measures made it possible to raise the size of the army to 5.4 million people.

Disadvantages of preparing for war

Events held in the 30s. to strengthen the army, did not help to overcome a number of significant shortcomings.

The level of training was very low. During the repressions of 1937-1938. 82% of the commanders were destroyed, many new commanders did not even have a completed secondary education. The training of soldiers and officers was stereotyped; they did not receive practical skills in action in a combat situation. 4 .

military doctrine 8 was offensive, preparing for “War with little blood on foreign territory” 4 . In accordance with this, weapons were developed, according to mobilization plans, army formations, reserves and rear services (warehouses for food, equipment, ammunition, weapons and fuel) were concentrated in the border zone. Soviet propaganda disoriented the soldiers and the population, suggesting to them: “Our forces are innumerable”, “The Red Army is the strongest of all”, “German proletarian soldiers will turn their weapons against their masters”, etc. An example of such propaganda was the popular pre-war film “If there is war tomorrow” 4 .

The defensive fortifications were not ready. "Stalin Line" on the old border was disarmed and partially blown up, and "Molotov line" on the new frontier was not yet ready.

The production of ammunition, fuels and lubricants, and other items necessary to supply the army lagged significantly behind real needs. 4 .

Stalin stubbornly ignored the warnings of Soviet intelligence, which reported on Germany's preparations for an attack on the USSR. He believed that the Red Army still had enough time to prepare to repel aggression.

4 Witnesses and Documents

Provisions of the law "On universal military duty".

All citizens who are at least 19 years of age and who have completed secondary school at 18 years of age and are fit for military service are required to serve in the armed forces. The law establishes the following periods of active service: ground and internal troops - 2 years, air force and border troops - 3 years, navy - 5 years. Those arrested, exiled and deported, as well as those deprived of voting rights, are not drafted into the army.

S.K. Timoshenko on the readiness of the troops, December 1940

1. Commanders and headquarters of regiments do not always organize reconnaissance correctly. As a result, the attackers often acted blindly .... In the war, we will be forced to pay dearly because of this.

2. The interaction of infantry with artillery, tanks and aircraft is bad ... This should be treated not formally, but in essence.

3. Units do not always use advantageous approaches and neglect maneuvers to envelop and bypass enemy positions. The disguise breaks at times.

The main disadvantage during the offensive is the crowding of battle formations and the lag of the second echelons. The offensive must be based on precise knowledge of the situation and terrain conditions...

Soviet propaganda about the Red Army.

During the period from 1934 to 1938, the Red Army more than doubled in numbers. During this time, the technical power of the Red Army has also increased quantitatively and qualitatively ... At present, the Red Army is the strongest army in the world not only in terms of combat training, but also in terms of the wealth of equipment ... In the event of an attack on the USSR, the Red Army will destroy the enemy on that territory from which he dares to attack us...

Red Army song "If there is war tomorrow".

If there is war tomorrow, if the enemy attacks.

If the dark force comes,

As one person, the entire Soviet people

Stand up for a free Motherland.

On earth, in heaven and at sea

Our response is both powerful and harsh.

If tomorrow is a war, if tomorrow is a campaign.

We are ready to go today.

If tomorrow there is a war, the country will stir

From Kronstadt to Vladivostok.

The country will shake up, and it will be able to

For the enemy to pay dearly.

Chorus.

A plane will fly, a machine gun will rumble,

Iron tanks roar

And the battleships will go, and the infantry will go,

And dashing carts will rush.

Chorus.

There is nowhere in the whole world such a force,

To destroy our country.

Stalin is with us, dear, and with an iron hand

Voroshilov is leading us to victory.

Chorus.

Support for the 33rd tank division of the Western Special Military District.

Division security percentage:

Petrol tankers - 7%

Water and oil tankers - 9%

Iron barrels - 85%

1st grade gasoline -15%

Motor gasoline - 4%

Kerosene - 0%

Diesel fuel - 0%

Cartridges 7.62 mm rifle - 100%

Mines 50 mm and 82 mm -100%

Shells 37 mm anti-aircraft - 0%

Shells 45 mm artillery - 100%

Shells 76 mm tank - 3%.

8 Our vocabulary

Bomber - a combat aircraft designed to destroy enemy ground and sea targets with bombs.

Military doctrine - a system of views and positions that establishes the direction of military development, the preparation of the country and the army for a possible war, and the methods of its conduct.

Fighter - a combat aircraft designed to destroy enemy aircraft. Armed with cannons and machine guns.

Personnel system - the organization of the army, based on the maintenance in peacetime of a minimum number of military formations.

Lobbying - the impact of individuals, private and public organizations on the process of making important government decisions.

Understudy enterprises - enterprises that are the same or similar in their organization and purpose, located in different parts of the country. They were supposed to replace each other in the event of the capture of any area by the enemy.

Territorial militia system - the organization of the army, based on the maintenance in peacetime of military formations with a minimum number of regular military personnel (mainly command staff) and on the training of variable composition assigned to these formations.

Stormtrooper - a combat aircraft designed to destroy small and mobile ground targets. Armed with cannons and machine guns, aerial bombs and rockets. IL-2 for the first time had an armored cockpit that protected the pilot. Received the nickname "flying tank".

Russia. WWII. Soviet preparation for war

Preparation of the Red Army for war:

Since 1931, on the initiative of Tukhachevsky, mechanized corps, massive airborne forces. The total strength of the Armed Forces of the USSR in 1938 reached 1.5 million people. But in 1937-1938. there were repressions on the military elite of the country. In 1940, 70 commanders and chiefs of staff did not have basic military training, they completed only short-term courses. They had no combat experience.

AT 1940 S.K. was appointed People's Commissar of Defense. Timoshenko, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov, who proved himself at Khalkhin Gol.

Building up the military-economic potential of the country. In the 3rd five-year plan (1938-1942) the main funds were directed to the developmentheavy industry , especiallymilitary . In the Urals and Siberia were built backup enterprises. Warehouses were set up. Formed state reserves of metal, oil, coal, food. The increase in defense production in 1939-1840 amounted to. 39%.

Walked militarization of labor in 1940 d.: a 7-day working week was established, an 8-hour working day was introduced (before that it was 7-hour), a ban under the threat of criminal punishment of dismissal of one's own free will and the transition from one enterprise to another without the permission of the administration. The official attachment of workers and employees to their jobs was carried out. Being late for work was punishable by the criminal code. Delays over 20 min. equated to walking. The release of substandard products was considered an "anti-state crime." Thus, the industry has established itself team leadership style .

AT 1939 introduced universal conscription. The size of the Red Army was increased to 5.5 million people. The draft age has been reduced from 21 to 18 years, the service life has been increased to 3-5 years, the term of the state in the reserve has been increased from 40 to 50 years.

Shortage of command personnel. In 1937-1938. was arrested, expelled from the party and dropped out of the army 35 thousand Human. Of the 733 people in the top command leadership, 579 people died. Of the 16 army commanders, 15 were killed .. Of the 169 division commanders - 136. Thousands of commanders of regiments, battalions, squadrons were arrested and shot. deficit command staff was partially reimbursed the return to the army of part of the repressed officers (12 thousand). In 1938 - 1940. combat experience was gained at Khalkhin Gol, Poland, Finland

The rearmament of the Red Army with new military equipment began(from 1939-1940). The serial production of aircraft began (Yak-1, MiG-3 fighters, Il-2 attack aircraft, Pe-20 bombers; tanks (T-34 and KV), which were not inferior to the German ones. However, the equipment of the troops with them was unsatisfactory.

Developedstrategy coming war. Stalin insisted on an offensive strategy, but did not seriously consider defensive plans. Operational plans were developed to deliver a preemptive strike. But they were not approved. However, serious miscalculations were made. Management believed that A. war will be waged on two fronts, against Germany and Japan. B) The concept of retaliation: it was assumed that The Red Army will repel an enemy attack near the western border of the USSR, transfer military operations to enemy territory. AT). Main battles deploy on the border. The idea of ​​the possibility of the retreat of the Red Army deep into the country was not allowed.. It was believed that the war will be waged on the territory of the enemy "with little blood". D) defensive structures on the old border of the USSR were dismantled. But they did not have time to build defensive structures on the new borders. E). It was assumed that Germany will try to seize the lands and resources of Ukraine and deliver its main blow to the South. Therefore, the main forces of the Red Army were concentrated in the South-Western direction.. According to Zhukov, by June 22, 1941, there were no operational and mobilization plans approved by the government.

The troops did not study the experience of the Wehrmacht fighting in Europe in 1939-1940.

Ideological and moral preparation for war. A) 1934, Stalin's work “A Short Course in the History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks” was published. It developed the idea of ​​continuity between the Russian Empire and the USSR in confronting external enemies. It was intended to form a patriotic worldview. In the 1930s Stalin wrote the work "Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism", creating his own image of the main theoretician of Marxism in the USSR, the successor of the work of Marx and Lenin. B) The prestige of the Red Army was rising (the film "Tractor Drivers"; songs that stated that "the armor is strong and our tanks are fast"). People were sure that if the war starts, it will be fought on foreign territory and with "little bloodshed."

However, according to Zhukov, on the eve of the war, the organization and armament of our troops were not up to par, air defense remained at an extremely low level, and there were practically no mechanized formations.

Before the war, Soviet aviation was inferior to German, artillery was poorly provided with tractors.

The miscalculations of Hitler and his entourage(did not doubt a quick victory):

1. They underestimated the strength of the Red Army, believing that the repressions led to the loss of its combat effectiveness. The rearmament of the army has just begun.

2. They underestimated the economic potential of the USSR.

3. They underestimated the patriotism of the peoples who lived in the USSR. They hoped for an explosion of ethnic strife in the USSR.

4. They hoped for the support of collective farmers who were forcibly driven into collective farms. It was believed that the collective farmers were opposed to the Soviet regime

Before the German invasion

Stalin hoped to be able to delay the war at least until 1942. He doubted the reliability of the information about Germany's preparations for an invasion of the USSR. He was sure that Germany would attack the USSR only after the defeat of England and the conquest of the Middle East, i.e. in 1942, Stalin considered the information of intelligence officers (Richard Sorge) as disinformation.

Stalin and his entourage made serious political and military-strategic miscalculations in the analysis of the pre-war situation. The country was preparing for war, but the war was quick and victorious. These miscalculations resulted in huge losses. Preparations for war were not completed.

In order to avoid a war on two fronts, in 1941 a neutrality pact was concluded between the USSR and Japan.

To strengthen the central leadership, Stalin was appointed in May 1941 Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

Balance of forces in June 1941 before the invasion

The Red Army was inferior to the enemy in numbers, motorization of troops.

In the early days of the war, the Soviet leadership did not understand the scale of the German invasion. This is evidenced by the directive sent at 7 o'clock. On the morning of June 22, 1941: "... troops to attack enemy forces with all their strength and means and destroy them in areas where they violated the Soviet border."

The preparation of the USSR for the World War was comprehensive: they developed the national economy, increased the capabilities of the Armed Forces, created new models, and carried out mass educational patriotic work. The Soviet state rapidly increased its power. In the reasons for the Victory, one cannot underestimate the scale and enormous significance of the simply titanic work done by the peoples of the USSR in the prewar years. The first (1929-1932) and the second (1933-1937) five-year plans brought the country into the ranks of the most powerful industrial powers of the planet. Giant enterprises of ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, chemical industry, mechanical engineering, and power engineering were built, and new branches of industry were actually created.

The rise was simply amazing, in the 20s the country was a backward state, which lost even what it was in 1913, mainly of an agrarian nature. What other countries took decades and even centuries to accomplish, the Soviet Union did in years.

Assembly shop of KV-1 tanks of the Chelyabinsk Kirov Plant. It is clearly seen that all the hulls are already of a “simplified” type with a straight stern sheet, and the turrets are both welded and cast. Spring 1942.

Thus, according to People's Commissar for Armaments Boris Vannikov, “a deeply thought-out and clear mobilization task was set in the industry. It consisted in creating head factories, design bureaus and research institutes, designed to design and then master in serial or mass production new advanced weapons; produce weapons in the amount necessary to supply the army in peacetime; to ensure stockpiles of weapons in quantities corresponding to mobilization needs in case of war and to make up for losses at its initial stages, and thereby make it possible, within the time limits established by the mobilization plan, to ensure the deployment of the capacities of the military and civil industry to fully meet the needs of war with weapons.

In 1930, at the 16th Party Congress, it was decided to create a new metallurgical base in the east of the country, inaccessible to enemy aircraft, this decision actually saved our state from disaster - at the beginning of the war, almost all the metallurgy of the South and Center was either lost or exported and has not yet begun work in new places. If capacities had not been created in the east of the country in the pre-war period, it would have taken several years to compensate for the lost capacities, the war would have been even longer and bloodier.

The XVIII Party Congress, held in March 1939, decided that the main direction of economic development was still the growth of heavy industry, and much attention should be paid to the creation of a powerful industry in the east of the USSR. In 1939, it was decided to build and reconstruct in 1940-1941. aircraft factories. After it, the capacity of Soviet aircraft factories was supposed to exceed the capacity of German aircraft factories by about one and a half times. In addition, they created new fighters, bombers, attack aircraft, which were not inferior to world analogues.

At the 18th party conference held in February 1941, Gosplan Chairman N. A. Voznesensky correctly noted that modern warfare “is a war of engines, ... is also to a large extent a war of reserves, ... requires huge raw material, fuel, metal and productive reserves ... ".

Production of T-34-76 tanks. In the foreground are 76.2 mm F-34 guns of the 1940 model.
Workshop of the Chelyabinsk Kirov Plant, 1943.

A lot of work was done in the tank industry, by the summer of 1941 its production capacity was also to surpass the German one and a half times. Serial production of new KV and T-34 tanks began, Germany did not yet have such vehicles. The artillery industry was developed, from May 1940, by the beginning of the war, the gun fleet was increased by one and a half times. Mobilization stocks of all kinds have been created. During the years of the Third Five-Year Plan, the growth of military production amounted to 39% annually, while the growth of all industry was 13%. By the beginning of the war, a new tank industry had actually been created, and the aviation industry had been qualitatively restructured. The foundations have been created for the qualitative renewal and growth of the production of small arms and artillery. The Navy was regularly replenished with new warships and submarines.

Training of the Armed Forces: in 1939, the transition to a personnel recruitment system based on universal military service was completed. From August 1939 to June 1941, the army grew by more than two and a half times - up to 5.4 million people. In 1940, 9 mechanized corps were created, the Air Force was reorganized - 75 divisions and 5 brigades were created for the war, of which 25 divisions were at the formation stage. The army was quickly re-equipped.

In the pre-war period, the state actually destroyed or defeated "internal enemies", a possible "fifth column" of the enemy. The society was united and united. At present, one can find a lot of literature that says that Stalin did not invent "internal enemies", they were. From the very beginning, there were “patriots” and “internationalists” (or “Trotskyists”) among the Bolsheviks, as a result, the “statesmen” led by Stalin won, but the “Trotskyists” did not disappear, they still occupied many important posts. Therefore, in order to save the state in the face of the threat of an imminent world war, to save the people and socialism, they had to be destroyed. It is clear that innocent people also suffered in the process of repression - even at the present time, according to various estimates, approximately one in ten is in prison innocently. To do this, they also carried out a “cleansing” of commanders in the army, drunkards, politically unreliable, were fired, someone was arrested and shot. As a result, the influence of the "Trotskyites" in the army was undermined, the combat effectiveness of the army did not suffer, those commanders "went" to the top, who later in the war will show their best side.

Soviet military thought in the prewar years, on the whole, correctly assessed the changes taking place in the field of the Armed Forces and in the world. In April 1940, the General Staff developed an operational plan to repel a possible German attack. A.M. Vasilevsky, who at that time was the first deputy chief of the operational department of the General Staff, reported that Germany was considered the main enemy, Italy would also take the side of Berlin, but its role would be insignificant. Finland, Romania, and Hungary will also oppose the USSR. Chief of the General Staff B. M. Shaposhnikov believed that the war would be limited to the western borders of the USSR, so the main forces were concentrated here, but in order to fully guarantee security in the east of the state, forces were located there that guaranteed a “stable position” there. It was correctly determined that the future war would be of a maneuverable nature, but would become protracted and require the maximum exertion of all the spiritual and material forces of the state and society. Soviet military thought developed a completely new theory of deep operation.

Society was prepared for war - year after year, work was carried out on the patriotic education of children, youth, and the entire population as a whole.

As a result, we can say that, despite a number of mistakes, the foundations of the economy, the development of the Armed Forces, and the education of the population were laid in a timely and correct manner. And this is in the shortest possible time. This was confirmed by the Great Patriotic War, the USSR and its peoples with honor withstood the most terrible war in all of mankind, not only won, but became even stronger. And no one expected this, it was believed that if the USSR won, it would be so weakened that for many decades it would not be able to influence world processes. The USSR and its peoples accomplished three titanic feats in just two decades: they prepared for a world war, were able to win it, and restored the country, becoming even stronger. There is nothing like it in world history.

Shop for the production of Il-2 attack aircraft at the plant number 18 in the city of Kuibyshev

Sources:
Voznesensky N.A. Selected works. M., 1979.
Zhukov Yu., Kozhinov V., Mukhin Yu. Riddle 37 years old. M., 2010.
Kozhinov V. The truth of Stalin's repressions. M., 2009.
Smirnov G. V. Purification of the army. M., 2007.
http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/vannikov/index.html
http://historic.ru/books/item/f00/s00/z0000125/index.shtml
http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/vasilevsky/index.html
http://waralbum.ru/