70 years ago, on February 8, 1945, the Lower Silesian offensive began. The 1st Ukrainian Front under the command of Ivan Stepanovich Konev dealt a blow to the enemy. The Lower Silesian offensive operation was essentially a continuation of the Vistula-Oder operation and was directly adjacent to it in time. Konev's troops were to take or block the heavily fortified city of Breslau, and then advance in the direction of Berlin.

Situation before the battle

During the Vistula-Oder operation, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front on a wide front reached the Oder River and, having crossed the river, captured several bridgeheads. At this, the operation was suspended, since in order to continue the offensive in the Berlin direction, it was necessary to wait for the success of the right flank of the strategic front in East Prussia and Pomerania.

At the same time, fighting continued in some areas. So in early February, the troops of the 3rd Guards Army of Gordov and the formations of the 4th Panzer Army of Lelyushenko liquidated the encircled enemy group south of Rützen. In these battles, 13 thousand enemy soldiers and officers were liquidated, about 3 thousand people were taken prisoner. Heavy fighting also took place in the area of ​​​​the city of Brig, which stood on the right bank of the Oder and was turned into a powerful stronghold. The 5th Guards Army of Zhadov and the 21st Army of Gusev captured bridgeheads south and north of the city and sought to connect them. First, they connected bridgeheads and surrounded the city, and then took it, creating one large bridgehead, on the right bank of the Oder. The fighting in the Brig area ended just before the start of a new operation. In addition, there were battles of a local nature, the Soviet troops expanded their bridgeheads, liquidated the remnants of scattered and surrounded German units in the rear, etc.

Meanwhile, the German command made great efforts to prepare a new defensive line, which relied on powerful fortress cities: Breslau, Glogau and Liegnitz. Unable to create several continuous deep echeloned defensive lines, which were on the Vistula, the German command relied on fortress cities with a double - internal and external - defensive bypass, strong points. Old fortresses, castles, barracks, railway depots, railway stations, powerful stone buildings turned into defense centers, the streets were blocked off by strong barricades, anti-tank ditches were dug in front of them. The barricades were occupied by separate units armed with machine guns, anti-tank rifles and faustpatrons. All small garrisons were connected with each other by communications, including underground, concreted ones, trying to support each other. Hitler ordered to defend the fortress to the last soldier. The Germans were a serious adversary and fought not only under the threat of a whole system of punitive measures, but also being patriots of their country. The garrisons included not only regular troops, but SS troops, various training, special units, militia battalions (Volkssturm).

German self-propelled guns "Hummel", destroyed by Soviet troops in the Polish city of Brig

122-mm howitzer M-30 senior sergeant G.E. Makeeva on Gutenberg Strasse (Gutenberg) in the city of Breslau. Photo source: http://waralbum.ru/

Operation plan

The Lower Silesian operation was planned at the end of January 1945 by the command of the 1st Ukrainian Front during the Vistula-Oder operation. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command approved the presented plan. According to the original plan, the operation was to be carried out to a considerable depth. However, the course of the operation made its own adjustments, and the plan was changed in the course of the offensive.

The Soviet command hoped, until the enemy had stabilized the front, to continue the offensive and advance as close as possible to Berlin. The main blow was planned to be delivered from two bridgeheads on the Oder - north and south of the city of Breslau. At the first stage of the operation, the troops of the front were to take or besiege Breslau, and at the second stage they were to overcome the line of the Neisse River and develop an offensive in the Berlin direction. In addition, the troops of the left wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front were to develop an offensive in the Dresden direction, defeating the enemy in cooperation with the 4th Ukrainian Front.

The troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front advanced in three directions. The first most powerful strike force advancing from the bridgehead northwest of Breslau (3rd Guards, 13th, 52nd and 6th, 4th Tank, 3rd Guards Tank Army, 25th Tank, 7th th Guards Mechanized Corps), was supposed to strike in the general direction of Cottbus. At the same time, part of the group was supposed to take part in the encirclement and capture of Breslau. The second grouping, advancing from the bridgehead southeast of Bruslau (5th Guards and 21st Armies, 31st Tank, 4th Guards Tank Corps), attacked Görlitz in the general direction. The troops of the left wing of the front (the 59th and 60th armies, the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps) advanced from the bridgehead north of Ratibor along the northern slopes of the Sudeten Mountains in order to facilitate the offensive of the front's main shock groups. Later, part of the forces of the left wing was transferred to the right flank of the front (1st Guards Cavalry Corps).

Side forces

The 1st Ukrainian Front included: the 3rd Guards Army of Vasily Gordov, the 13th Army of Nikolai Pukhov, the 52nd Army of Konstantin Koroteev, the 6th Army of Vladimir Gluzdovsky, the 4th Tank Army of Dmitry Lelyushenko, the 3rd Guards the tank army of Pavel Rybalko, the 5th guards army of Alexei Zhadov, the 21st army of Dmitry Gusev, the 59th army of Ivan Korovnikov and the 60th army of Pavel Kurochkin. In addition, the front included the 25th and 31st Tank Corps, the 4th Guards Tank Corps, the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps and the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps. From the air, the troops of the front were supported by Stepan Krasovsky's 2nd Air Army. Total: about 980 thousand people, about 1300 tanks and self-propelled guns, about 2400 aircraft.

The Soviet troops were opposed by formations of the 4th Panzer Army, the 17th Army, the Heinrici Army Group (part of the 1st Panzer Army) from the Army Group Center. From the air, the German troops were supported by the 4th Air Fleet. In total, the German group consisted of 25 divisions (including 4 tank and 2 motorized), 7 battle groups, 1 tank brigade, and the Breslau corps group. Already during the battle, the German command transferred several more divisions to counter the advancing Soviet troops. In addition, there were a significant number of separate, special, training units and divisions, militia battalions.

The column on the march during the retreat of German troops from Breslau. In front, a Sd.Kfz 10 tractor tows a 75 mm PaK 40 anti-tank gun

Battle

The first stage of the operation. The offensive began at 6 am on February 8, 1945, after a fifty-minute artillery preparation. In order to increase the strike force of the combined arms armies from the very beginning and achieve a decisive victory in the very first days of the battle, both such armies had to advance in the first echelon. Tired of long battles and largely drained of blood, rifle divisions had to be reinforced with tanks so as not to get stuck in the German defense. Significant superiority in forces was created in two directions of the main attack: in infantry at 2:1, in artillery at 5:1, in tanks at 4.5:1.

Despite the lack of ammunition, which did not allow for a longer artillery preparation and bad weather, which prevented the work of aviation, on the very first day, Soviet troops broke through the enemy defenses. A gap up to 80 km wide and up to 30-60 km deep was created in the direction of the main attack. However, further the pace of the offensive fell sharply. In the next week, until February 15, the armies of the right wing of the front managed to cover only 60-100 km with battles. The Germans stubbornly resisted. The Soviet divisions were exhausted. The average daily rate of infantry advance was now only 8-12 km, and it was simply impossible to demand more. In addition, the spring thaw also reduced the pace of advance. The terrain was wooded, swampy in places, it was possible to advance mainly along the roads.

Soviet troops reached the Bober River, on which the Germans had a rear line of defense and, having crossed the river in a number of sectors, started fighting to expand their bridgeheads. Lelyushenko's tankers broke through further, across the Kveis River and reached the Neisse. However, parts of the 13th army of Pukhov did not keep up with the tankers. German troops were able to close the gap behind the 4th Panzer Army, and for several days it was cut off from the infantry, which was stuck in the German defenses. Konev had to leave for the location of Pukhov's army. Counter strikes of the 13th Combined Arms Army and the 4th Panzer Army, which turned back, broke through the German defenses. Aviation played a major role in the success of the operation. The weather improved these days and the Soviet Air Force delivered powerful blows to the enemy.

At the same time, the 3rd Guards Army of Gordov, having partly blocked a significant enemy grouping in the Glogau fortress (about 18 thousand soldiers), by February 15 also reached the Bober River. The powerful fortress of Glogau was taken only on April 1-2. Thus, despite some surprises, the right wing of the front continued to advance successfully.

In the center and on the left flank the situation was more complicated. The stubborn resistance of the German troops in the area of ​​the Breslau fortified area delayed the further advance to the west of the troops of the second strike group of the front - part of the 5th Guards and 21st armies. Yes, and the 6th army of General Gluzdovsky, advancing directly on Breslau, which first successfully broke through the enemy's defenses, then scattered its forces and got stuck. On the left flank, the offensive did not lead to success. The left-flank 59th and 60th armies, against which German formations were approximately equal in strength, failed to break through the enemy’s defenses, and on February 10 Konev ordered them to go on the defensive. This complicated the position of the armies of the center, who had to look back at the situation on the left wing.

The German command, in order to prevent the threat of encirclement of the city, strengthened the Breslav group. At first, separate units and marching reinforcements were transferred here. Then the 19th and 8th Panzer and 254th Infantry Divisions were transferred from other directions. The Germans constantly went on counterattacks. So, the 6th army of Gluzdovsky repelled twelve attacks in just one day. The 5th Guards Army of Zhadov also had a hard time. The army fought hard battles, repelling fierce enemy counterattacks, and continuing the offensive, breaking enemy barriers along the roads and storming the strongholds into which the settlements were turned. To strengthen the striking power of the army, Konev gave it the 3rd Guards Division of heavy rocket launchers from the front reserve.

Panzergrenadiers and Panther tanks on the march in Lower Silesia

The Soviet command, in order to activate the offensive of the front, tried to solve the problem of Breslau. The city had to be taken or at least surrounded, freeing troops for an offensive to the west. To do this, Konev stretched out the front of Koroteev's 52nd Army to strengthen the strike of the 6th Army and reinforced the 5th Guards Army with the 31st Tank Corps. And in order to prevent the enemy from releasing the Breslau garrison from the outside, the commander deployed Rybalko's 3rd Guards Tank Army towards Breslau. Two guards tank corps, which had reached Bunzlau at that time, were sent to help the troops of the 5th Guards and 6th Armies.

On February 13, the mobile formations of the combined arms armies united west of Breslau, surrounding a large 80,000. German group. It was a big win. At the same time, the tank corps of Rybalko's army west of Breslau dealt a powerful blow directly to the flank of the enemy's 19th Panzer Division. This made it impossible for the German command to immediately send troops to break through the encirclement, while it had not yet been stabilized.

Almost immediately, a dense encirclement was created, which thwarted attempts to break through some encircled units and unblock the "boiler" from the outside. Konev decided not to tie up the troops by storming the fortress, leaving only the 6th Army to besiege the city, which did not exceed the German garrison of Breslau. The city, whose garrison relied on a powerful defense, capitulated only at the very end of the war - on May 6, 1945, the 5th Guards Army was withdrawn from the battles for Breslau and strengthened the outer front of the encirclement.

Thus, despite some flaws, the first stage of the Lower Silesian operation ended in complete success. From February 8 to 15, the troops of the right wing and the center of the front broke through the enemy defenses, advanced westward up to 110 km, reached the Bober River and captured bridgeheads on the western bank. Soviet troops captured a number of important administrative and industrial centers of Lower Silesia, including Bunzlau, Liegnitz, Sorau, and others. The enemy groupings in the fortresses of Glogau and Breslau were completely surrounded and doomed to defeat. A particularly large garrison was in Breslau - 80 thousand soldiers. The fortresses were perfectly prepared for all-round defense and intra-city combat, taking into account the battle for Stalingrad, so the Soviet command did not waste energy on an assault, limiting itself to a blockade and the gradual destruction of enemy positions. The 4th German Panzer Army was defeated, all that was left of it fled across the Beaver and Neisse rivers.

These were impressive results. However, they were achieved at the maximum physical and moral efforts of the commanders and soldiers of the 1st Ukrainian Front. An average of 4.5 thousand people remained in the divisions, mobile formations lost up to half of the fleet (not only due to losses in battles, but also for technical reasons, the resource of the equipment was exhausted, but there were no spare parts). The railroads did not have time to restore. The gap from forward supply bases increased even further. The rate of ammunition and fuel in parts fell to a "hungry" minimum. Aviation also could not operate at full strength. The weather conditions continued to be challenging. The spring thaw made field airfields unusable, almost all concrete strips remained far in the rear. Aircraft had to operate at the limit of their flight capabilities. The 2nd Air Army (more than 2,000 vehicles), on average, made about 500-550 sorties per duck, which, with a front width of 520 km, made it possible, in fact, to provide only reconnaissance functions. For the entire duration of the operation, there were only 4 flight days.

At the same time, neighboring fronts could not support the offensive of the 1st Ukrainian Front. The 4th Ukrainian Front was still not successful, and the 1st Belorussian Front fought stubborn battles in Pomerania, and went on the defensive at the junction with Konev's troops. As a result, the German command was able to take measures to stabilize the front in the Silesian direction. Troops from quieter sectors of the front and reserves were transferred to the offensive zone of the 1st Ukrainian Front. Gradually, the balance of power began to change in favor of the German group. The Soviet troops still had an advantage, but not so obvious.

Destroyed and completely burned out medium tank Pz.Kpfw.IV Ausf.H of late production in the battles near Breslau.

2 stage of the operation. The front command came to the conclusion that an attack on Berlin under these conditions was impossible and would lead to senseless losses, and by February 16 corrected the plan of operation. The headquarters approved the new plan. The main strike force of the front was to reach the Neisse River and seize bridgeheads on the western bank; 6th Army - take Breslau; the left flank of the front - to push the enemy back into the Sudetenland. In the same period, they planned to restore the railways, tighten up the supply bases, bring the rear back to normal, etc.

Meanwhile, on the right flank of the front, heavy fighting was going on in the area of ​​the cities of Guben, Christianstadt, Zagan, Zorau, where the enemy had a number of important military factories, including underground ones. Lelyushenko's 4th Panzer Army reached the Neisse River. Behind her, units of the 3rd Guards Army of Gordov and the 52nd Army of Koroteev came to this river. This forced the German command to finally leave the collapsing defensive line on the Bober River and take up a new line of defense from the mouth of the Neisse River to the city of Penzig. Attempts by the Soviet troops to cross the Neisse on the move and seize bridgeheads failed.

As a result, the front command abandoned attempts to cross the river on the move. The troops of the right wing of the front were ordered to go on the defensive. Small bridgeheads occupied on the western bank of the river were evacuated. The front command brought Lelyushenko's tank army to the front reserve for replenishment and putting in order.

Meanwhile, Rybalko's 3rd Guards Tank Army was returning to the Bunzlau area. On the way, one of the corps entered into battle with the German 8th Panzer Division. Rybalko, having the task of reaching the Neisse and capturing Görlitz, decided to carry out a bold double envelopment of the entire Görlitz enemy grouping with two army corps. It turned out not to be the best solution. The 6th Guards Tank Corps had already fought unsuccessful battles in this direction and was exhausted, having lost striking power. And the 7th Guards Tank Corps was given the task of crossing the Queiss River and taking the city of Lauban, entering Görlitz from the south.

At this time, the German command organized a counterattack in the Lauban area. The advanced units of the 7th Panzer Corps, right on the march, entered into battle with the enemy's tank reserves. The Germans transferred units of the 8th Panzer, 10th Motorized and 408th Infantry Divisions here. As a result, German troops reached the rear and flank of our 7th and partly 6th Guards Tank Corps and tried to envelop Rybalko's army from the east. The fighting was very stubborn. Only by regrouping the forces of three corps and having received the support of the 52nd army of Koroteev, by February 22, Rybalko managed to defeat the attacking enemy grouping and push it back to the south. The dangerous plan of the German command was destroyed. However, Rybalko's army was unable to complete the task - to take Görlitz.

In the following days, stubborn oncoming battles continued in the Görlitz and Lauban directions. As Konev recalled: “Some settlements, heights and borders changed hands several times.” Although there were no significant changes in the course of this operation in this area. Soon, Rybalko's army was also withdrawn to the front reserve, for replenishment. Only 15-20 tanks remained in the brigades. This completed the operation.

German tank destroyers Jagdpanzer 38(t), abandoned during the retreat in Silesia

Operation results

As a result of the Lower Silesian operation, Soviet troops broke through the enemy defenses on the Oder, Bober and Queiss rivers, advanced 150 km deep into German territory and reached the Neisse River in a wide area. Lower Silesia was occupied - one of the most important military-industrial regions of the German Empire. The exit on the Neisse to the level of the positions of the 1st Belorussian Front was of great operational and strategic importance, since now the troops of the two largest Soviet fronts took up convenient positions for an attack on Berlin.

In addition, with their left wing, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front hung over the Upper Silesian enemy grouping and began to prepare for its destruction. It became possible to attack the enemy in the Dresden direction and liberate the central regions of Czechoslovakia.

The Lower Silesian operation had an impact on the course of hostilities in other strategic areas. The troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front pulled back the enemy forces and assisted the troops of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts in defeating the East Pomeranian grouping of the enemy and the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts in eliminating the threat of a Wehrmacht breakthrough to the Danube.

The German 4th Panzer Army was defeated, and enemy garrisons were surrounded in Glogau and Breslau. The losses of the German troops are unknown, but they were significant. In addition, about 100 thousand German soldiers and officers, a whole army, were blocked in Glogau and Breslau. The total losses of the Soviet troops amounted to about 100 thousand people (of which 23,577 are irretrievable).

Due to a number of reasons, the front had to abandon the original plan of the operation, adjusting the tasks of the front. As Konev noted, among the reasons why the front could not complete the tasks in its entirety, three should be singled out. Firstly, a powerful strike required an operational pause and appropriate preparation. The troops of the front without respite after the first strategic operation (Vistula-Oder) immediately proceeded to the second. As a result, for 44 days (from January 12 to February 24, 1945) the troops fought continuously and advanced, covering from 500 to 700 km. The soldiers were tired, the divisions needed to be replenished with manpower (there were 5 thousand people in the divisions) and equipment. Communications were greatly stretched, the railways did not have time to restore. By February 8, the nearest supply stations were 500 km away from the divisions of the first echelon. This led to a shortage of ammunition, fuel and other supplies and materials needed by the troops.

Secondly, when the operation was planned, it was believed that the further offensive of the 1st Ukrainian Front to the west would take place simultaneously with the ongoing offensive of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front on the right flank and the 4th Ukrainian Front on the left flank. However, the 1st Belorussian Front had to solve the problem of the threat from Pomerania and temporarily abandoned the attack on Berlin. On the left flank, the 4th Ukrainian Front fought heavy battles in Czechoslovakia and hardly advanced. The absence of serious progress among the neighbors also had an impact on the operation of the 1st Ukrainian Front.

Thirdly, the Soviet command underestimated the enemy. The German command, using rear reserves, was able to quickly restore the combat capability of the units defeated on the Vistula and Oder and create a new strong line of defense. The Germans did it quite quickly and decisively. Despite the proximity of defeat, the German war machine remained a serious enemy that could not be underestimated.

Troops of the 3rd Guards Tank Army in Germany

Having lost the Silesian industrial region, the enemy did not give up hope of returning this territory back. Soviet intelligence repeatedly reported that the Germans were preparing a new attack on the southern wing of the Konev front. In order to eliminate the threat to its left flank, the command of the 1st Ukrainian Front began to prepare a plan for the Upper Silesian offensive operation, which provided for the destruction of a dangerous ledge in the area of ​​​​the city of Oppeln, part of which was occupied by our troops in February 1945.

The main objectives of this operation were to defeat the enemy grouping southwest of Oppeln and create more favorable conditions for an offensive in the Berlin direction. The encirclement and destruction of the German army group "Heinrici" was also supposed to contribute to the successful conduct of the Moravian-Ostrava operation by the 4th Ukrainian Front to liberate the eastern regions of Czechoslovakia. The second half of March was allotted for the implementation of the plan.

When planning an offensive operation in Upper Silesia, Stalin paid special attention to the need, if possible, to preserve industrial enterprises from destruction. And after the liberation, these primordially Polish lands were to go to Poland. Studying the map of the forthcoming hostilities, the Supreme Commander circled the area with his finger and said: "Gold".

To achieve the set goals, the front command concentrated almost half of its forces on a relatively small area. To participate in the operation, the Headquarters allocated the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps, which had been in reserve since May 1944 and was not weakened by the fighting. It was supposed to defeat the enemy in stages: first, to encircle and destroy the German formations in the Oppeln area (Oppeln operation), then to clear the Rybnik coal basin south of Oppeln from the enemy, at the last, final, stage, the last major city of this region, Ratibor (Ratsibuzh), was to be taken.

Preparation for the operation took 5 weeks. During this time, two strike groups were formed: the northern one was in the area of ​​​​the city of Grottkau, the southern one was in the Kozel area. Their task was to cut through the German units and close the encirclement. Significant forces were concentrated in the narrow sections of the breakthrough.

The enemy is also intensively preparing for battles, actively increasing his grouping in this direction. By mid-March, the Germans managed to well strengthen the front line of defense in this sector., as well as to create fairly strong nodes of resistance in their rear, to prepare most settlements and even individual houses for a long defense. The dense defense of the enemy by mid-March extended to a depth of 20-25 kilometers. The Germans paid special attention to the engineering support of the defense, placing as many minefields as possible wherever possible. The redeployment of Soviet troops did not become a secret for German intelligence, and the Wehrmacht command decided to violate the plans of the command of the 1st Ukrainian Front, ahead of the Red Army in striking.

March 8, 1945 German troops went on the offensive in the southern sector. But the factor of surprise did not work, and the attempt to break through the front line of the Soviet troops was not crowned with success. Having received a decisive rebuff and advancing only a couple of kilometers, the German units again went on the defensive.

On March 15, both Soviet groups went on the offensive. It was not possible to immediately break through the enemy defenses to its entire depth, despite the tank support of the offensive. The spring thaw, as well as dense minefields, greatly slowed down the attacking Soviet units. Tankers already suffered serious losses on the first day. The Germans hurriedly transferred reinforcements to the places of breakthroughs and themselves made unsuccessful attempts to counterattack. Unfavorable weather conditions prevented the use of aviation in full force.

On the first day, the armies of the front managed to advance only 8-10 kilometers. In order not to reduce the pressure, Konev's troops were on the offensive around the clock. At night, specially created night battalions were connected to the operation, which in the morning gave way to the positions of the main forces. After two days of heavy bloody battles, the tactical defense of the enemy was broken through.

On March 17, in the Rothaus area, the troops of the 61st Tank Brigade of the 10th Tank Corps managed to force the Neisse River on the move and develop success in the direction of Neustadt.

The next day, the northern and southern groupings of Soviet troops met near the town of Neustadt, and by evening, the 61st Guards Tank Brigade of V.I. Zaitsev took the city on the move. Three German divisions and other parts of large formations with a total strength of about 45 thousand people were surrounded. The Wehrmacht command did not abandon attempts to break through the encirclement of the Oppeln grouping from the outside with the help of redeployed reserves. However, they suffered one setback after another.

In the battle for the village of Lesobschütz, a Soviet wrecked tank remained in no man's land. Sergeant Kazimir Arkhipov, the driver of the tank guard, volunteered to take the tank to the location of his troops at night. The muddy field was full of caterpillar tracks, it was not easy to find the tracks of your tank in the dark. Enemy flares helped. Silently crawling up to the tank, Arkhipov heard a light tapping and German speech. A German soldier was lying face down on the tank, looking into the open hatch and talking to someone. Quietly sneaking up behind, the sergeant killed the German with a knife. He knocked on the armor - a second German leaned out of the hatch. Arkhipov eliminated him too, after which he climbed into the tank and checked whether all control systems were working. The tank started up, and Kazimir Arkhipov drove the tank out of the neutral zone at full speed and returned to his own. In daylight, it turned out that the crew died from an exploding shell, but the mortally wounded driver apparently still had the strength to throw back the hatch cover, and the Nazi soldiers took advantage of this.

Meanwhile, the 21st Army fought to destroy the encircled enemy. On March 20, our troops managed to cut through the enemy forces that were in the cauldron, and by the morning of March 22, completely destroy them. The Germans lost about 30 thousand people killed. Another 15,000 surrendered.

Thus, the possibility of a flank attack by the enemy against the troops of the front from Upper Silesia during the Berlin operation was eliminated. In addition, our troops pulled back part of the German forces, which violated the plans of the Wehrmacht to release Breslau.

The main burden of the second stage of the plan - the capture of Rybnik and Ratibor - fell on the 60th Army of General A.P. Kurochkin. On March 22, the offensive was resumed. But on the first day of the offensive, they managed to advance only 8 km. The enemy, who was in well-fortified positions and constantly increasing his forces in this sector, desperately resisted.

On March 23, the offensive of the 21st Army was resumed with the task of capturing the city of Neisse, which was taken the very next day.

To speed up the operation, Konev decided to launch an auxiliary tank strike from the north. But already after 5 km, units of the 5th mechanized corps were forced to stop, having come across the destroying fire of enemy artillery. Thanks to the tank platoon, which managed to break into the settlement and destroy the firing points, forward movement resumed, but extremely slowly. To develop the offensive, the command of the 4th Army sent the 10th Guards Tank Corps to the south. But the enemy, in turn, pulled up reserves, trying to strike at the junction of two Soviet corps.

On March 24, the 38th Army of the neighboring 4th Ukrainian Front resumed its offensive in the Moravian-Ostrava direction, creating a threat of encirclement of the German group in the area of ​​​​Rybnik and Ratibor and changing the operational situation in favor of the Red Army. On March 27, Rybnik was taken by the troops of the 60th Army, and the next day the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps struck and broke through the enemy’s defenses, creating the threat of another “cauldron”. The enemy was forced to start a retreat in order to avoid encirclement..

On March 31, a decisive assault on Ratibor was planned. The German command gave the order to keep this city, which was the key on the way to Moravian Ostrava, at any cost. Having made a successful roundabout maneuver, our troops broke into Ratibor from the west. The battles for the city took on an extremely fierce character, but, nevertheless, on the same day Ratibor was occupied by the Red Army. Having captured the city, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front went on the defensive.

For the main forces of the front, the Upper Silesian operation was completed at this point. A little later, the 60th army of A.P. Kurochkin and the 4th tank army of D.D. Lelyushenko completed the fighting in this sector. On April 1, Lelyushenko's troops united in Resnitsa and completed the encirclement of the Biskau enemy grouping.. Parts of the 1st Ski-Jäger Division, the Führer Guard division and the penal battalion fell into the boiler. On April 2 and 3, the encircled German grouping was dismembered and destroyed by the forces of the 60th and 4th tank armies.

The enemy lost the last stronghold in Upper Silesia. The tasks facing the Soviet troops in terms of the Upper Silesian offensive operation were completed. For 17 days of the offensive (from March 15 to March 31), our armies were able to advance up to 45 km and occupy cities such as Neustadt, Kozel, Ratibor, Rybnik, Biskau. Up to 5 German divisions were destroyed, and the rest of the enemy forces were thrown back into the Sudetenland. This eliminated the threat of a German counteroffensive and undermined the military and economic potential of the Reich. As a result, the Soviet troops, having captured the southwestern part of Upper Silesia, took up an advantageous position for subsequent attacks on the Dresden and Prague directions.

In the second half of February 1945, the armies of the right wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front, with access to the Oder and Neisse rivers, were almost 200 km ahead of the formations operating on its left wing. The situation on the line of contact between the parties allowed the enemy to launch a counterattack from the area of ​​the Oppeln ledge, which called into question the prospects for a further offensive in the Berlin direction. In order to exclude such a development of events, the commander of the troops of the front, Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev decided to encircle the German 17th Army and the Heinrici army group, which posed a serious danger, concentrated southwest of Oppeln, and after their defeat, reach the Strehlen, Patschkau, Opava line, that is, in the foothills of the Sudetenland.

The idea of ​​the operation was to strike at the directions converging on Neustadt by the forces of two groups - Oppeln (northern) and Ratibor (south). The first of them included the 21st and 4th (since March 17, 1945 - the 4th Guards) tank armies of Colonel General D.N. Gusev and D.D. Lelyushenko, the 34th Guards Rifle Corps of the 5th Guards Army (Colonel General A.S. Zhadov) and the 4th Guards Tank Corps (Lieutenant General P.P. Poluboyarov). The basis of the southern grouping was the 59th and 60th armies of Lieutenant General I.T. Korovnikov and Colonel General P.A. Kurochkin, 7th Guards Mechanized Corps, Lieutenant General I.P. Korchagin and the 31st Tank Corps of Major General G.G. Kuznetsova. The support of the ground troops was assigned to the 2nd Air Army, Colonel General of Aviation S.A. Krasovsky. In total, 31 rifle divisions (average number - 3-5 thousand people), 5640 guns and mortars, 988 tanks and self-propelled guns, more than 1700 aircraft were involved in the offensive.

The Soviet troops were opposed by up to 15 divisions, over 1420 guns and mortars, 94 tanks and assault guns, operating with the support of the forces of the 4th Air Fleet. Given the shallow construction of the enemy’s defense, as well as the great superiority of the front over him in military equipment and weapons, Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev planned to achieve the goal of the operation in a short time. Therefore, the main role in the offensive was assigned to the formations of the 4th Tank Army, the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps and the 31st Tank Corps. Together with the rifle units, they were supposed to break through the enemy defenses, and then rapidly move in depth in order to deprive the German command of the opportunity to respond in a timely manner to changes in the situation.

On March 15, after artillery preparation, formations of two strike groups attacked the front line of the enemy defense. However, from the very beginning, bad weather made adjustments to the plans of the front command. Due to bad weather conditions, aviation began to operate only in the afternoon. Of the total number of 2995 sorties scheduled for the day, she was able to make only 1283. During the preparation of the attack and from its beginning, only artillery carried out fire damage to the enemy, which could not destroy most anti-tank weapons. In such circumstances, the calculation of the use of mobile units in the first echelon to break through the defense did not justify itself. Tank corps suffered heavy losses. So, for example, in the 31st tank corps they made up more than 30% of combat vehicles.

The actions of the tanks, moreover, were significantly complicated by the spring thaw. They were forced to move mainly along the roads, on which the German units had prepared strong knots of resistance and ambushes in advance. Fights went on for every height, road junction, settlement. As a result, by the end of the day, the northern strike group was able to break through only two enemy defense positions. The southern group operated more successfully, which covered from 8 to 10 km.

The slow advance of the Soviet troops allowed the enemy command to take measures to strengthen the threatened directions. During March 15-16, it began to transfer motorized, tank and infantry divisions to them. To preempt them in occupying defensive lines, Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev ordered not to stop the offensive at night, for which purpose one reinforced rifle battalion from each division should be allocated daily. As a result of the measures taken, the formations of the two strike groups completed the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone and on March 18 established contact in the Neustadt area. Parts of the 20th SS Infantry Division, the 168th and 344th Infantry Divisions, the 18th SS Motorized Division, several separate regiments and battalions were surrounded.

The content of the method of defeating the enemy chosen by the commander of the front was to immediately deliver several blows without additional preparation, cut the encircled grouping into parts, isolate them from each other, disrupt interaction and disorganize control. He entrusted the fulfillment of these tasks to the 21st and 59th Armies, at the same time ordering the 4th Guards Tank Army to exclude the approach of enemy reserves from the area west of the city of Neisse. During March 19-20, this army thwarted all attempts by the German command to release its troops and created the conditions for their liquidation by rifle formations.

Subsequently, the offensive was carried out in separate directions with the aim of reaching the foothills of the Sudetenland. The most favorable situation for pursuing the enemy developed in the sector of the 21st Army. Here, on March 24, its units, together with units of the 4th Guards Tank Army, after intense street fighting, captured a large junction of railways and highways - the city of Neisse. Thus, they deprived the enemy command of the opportunity to operate the railway line connecting the Army Groups Center and South.

In more difficult conditions, at the final stage of the operation, the 60th Army had to act, which struck in the direction of Ratibor, Opava. In the event of its exit to Opava, a threat was created to the rear of the enemy group that covered the Moravian-Ostrava industrial region. Therefore, the German command tried in every possible way to delay the further advance of the army, for which it deployed an additional two tank divisions against it. In order to break the increased resistance of the enemy, Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev decided to withdraw the 4th Guards Tank Army from the battle in the zone of the 21st Army and regroup it in the zone of the 60th Army.

The arrival of tank formations made it possible to increase the overall pace of the offensive. On March 27, the divisions of the 60th Army liberated the city of Rybnik, but were stopped on the outskirts of Ratibor. The turning point in the course of hostilities came after the concentration of two breakthrough artillery divisions and most of the army artillery here. Their massive use left the enemy no chance of success. On March 31, Soviet troops completed the liberation of the city.

As a result of the operation, the armies of the left wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front captured the southwestern part of Upper Silesia and occupied an advantageous position for subsequent attacks on the Dresden and Prague directions. They destroyed more than 40,000 enemy soldiers and officers, captured 14,000 people, disabled 280 tanks and assault guns (including those arrived during the fighting), up to 600 field guns, and a large number of other military equipment. At the same time, the losses of the front in people amounted to 66,801 people, of which 15,876 were killed, dead and missing.

Anatoly Borshov,
Senior Research Fellow, Research
Institute (military history) of the Military Academy
General Staff of the RF Armed Forces,
Candidate of Historical Sciences

Fulfilling the instructions of the Headquarters, which was mentioned above, the front commander decided to destroy the enemy in front of the center and left wing and throw him back into the Sudeten Mountains. The offensive was planned to be carried out by the forces of the 5th Guards, 21st, 59th, 60th Combined Arms and 4th Panzer Army. The plan was to encircle and destroy the Oppeln enemy grouping and advance to the Strehlen, Münsterberg, Troppau line. Action was scheduled to start March 15th.
To achieve the intended goal, groups were created: the Oppeln group as part of the 21st combined arms and 4th Panzer Army, a rifle corps from the 5th Guards Army and the 4th Guards Tank Corps to strike from the Grottkau area to the southwest in the direction of Neustadt and Ratiborskaya as part of the 59th and 60th armies, the 7th Guards Mechanized, 31st tank corps, which was to advance towards the Oppeln grouping in the western in the north-western directions.
March 8 1945 war council 4th Panzer Army received a directive from the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, which ordered: “The commander of the 4th Panzer Army from the breakthrough site of the 21st Army strikes in the direction of Neisse, Neustadt and, in cooperation with the 21st and 59th armies, destroy the opposing enemy grouping. On the first day of the operation, capture the Neisse area, on the second day, capture Neustadt and Sylz and connect with parts of the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps, Major General I.P. Korchagin. He was advancing towards us from the site of the 59th Army of Lieutenant General I. T. Korovnikov, of which he was a member.
Before 4th Panzer Army units of the 45th, 344th, 20th SS and 168th infantry divisions of the enemy were defending. In the depths were his 10th motorized and 100th light infantry divisions. Operational reserves: 16, 17, "Hermann Goering" tank divisions were located south of the city of Neisse.
The first position of the main line of defense of the Nazis was equipped with full profile trenches and barbed wire, the second took place at a depth of 3-5 km from the front line.
From 10 to 12 March two night crossings 4th Panzer Army was regrouped from the forests north of Luben to the Olau region (40 km southeast of Breslau) to the starting area for the offensive.
We had 7 days to plan the operation. The army headquarters under the leadership of K. I. Upman worked like clockwork. The material support of the operation and party political work were carried out at the proper level under the leadership of A. K. Yarkov and N. G. Kladovoy.
The intense creative work of the entire field administration made it possible to set tasks for the troops in a timely manner.
The 6th Guards Mechanized Corps, together with the 118th Rifle Corps of the 21st Army, was to advance in the direction of Kalkau, by the end of the first day to capture the Otmahau area, on the second day - the Neustadt area.
The 10th Guards Tank Corps with the 117th Rifle Corps of the 21st Army attacked in the direction of Neisse. By the end of the first day, he was supposed to capture the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthis city, and part of the forces, together with the 93rd separate tank brigade, to capture the crossings across the river. Neisse (southern) in the Rothaus area, the next day to connect with the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps. One brigade of the corps should remain in the area of ​​​​the city of Neisse until the infantry of the 21st Army approaches. 22nd self-propelled artillery brigade c. as an army reserve followed the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps.
The tasks of the troops in the Upper Silesian operation differed from the previous ones in that our tank army had to break through the enemy’s defenses together with the infantry from the very beginning, and only after breaking through it to its entire tactical depth, break away from the rifle units and rapidly go to the Neustadt, Sylz area and jointly with the 59th Army of General I. T. Korovnikov to complete the encirclement of the enemy group. The front commander apparently used this method of interaction in order to break through the entire depth of the enemy’s defense as quickly as possible, which, by the way, was relatively small, but strong.
The fighting has begun March 15th 1945 21st Army Colonel General D.N. Gusev and 4th Panzer Army went on the offensive at the same time after a 40-minute artillery preparation.
We could see from the observation post how the troops, overcoming the stubborn resistance of the enemy and repulsing the repeated counterattacks of his tactical reserves, broke into the front line of his defense and went forward. 4th Panzer Army by the end of the first day, in cooperation with the infantry, Guseva broke through 2 fortified positions of the enemy on an 8-kilometer section of the front and advanced 9 km into the depth of his defense.
On the second and third days, the offensive of our troops was successful. In connection with the improvement of the weather, the aviation of the 1st Ukrainian Front began to provide active assistance to the ground forces, inflicting bombing and assault strikes on the strongholds, headquarters and communication centers of the Nazis.
March 17 The 6th Guards Mechanized Corps, breaking into the operational depth of the enemy troops, captured the settlement of Stephansdorf. The 10th Guards Tank Corps crossed the river. Neisse at the Rothaus and developed success on Neustadt. Here, near the Rothaus, the commander of the 10th Guards Tank Corps, Colonel Nil Danilovich Chuprov, who had gone through a glorious military path since the beginning of the war, died in battle. It was a very heavy loss for us. Together with Chuprov, his adjutant, Lieutenant Bazylev, was killed, and the commander of the armored personnel carrier, Sergeant A.V. Chenchikov, was shell-shocked. Major General E. E. Belov, deputy commander of the 4th tank army, again took command of the corps.
March 17 we were with the operational group at the location of the 10th Guards Tank Corps at the crossing over the river. Neisse (south) near the Rothaus. At this moment, the enemy pulled up the tanks and from behind the copses began aimed fire with armor-piercing shells at our tanks, which went out to the pontoon bridge we had built across the river. Neisse. I immediately instructed Belov to cover the flank and increase the pace of movement. Within 3 hours, 2 brigades were on the east bank of the Neisse. The enemy fire on the bridge began to weaken, apparently, he began to retreat. The remaining 2 brigades of the 10th Corps began to force the river.
At this time, the commander of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev, drove up to us. I reported the situation. Ivan Stepanovich began to observe the crossing of troops. Unexpectedly, a shell whistled from the opposite bank and hit under the car "jeep" on which the guards of the front commander were. The car jumped, but everything went well, the shell did not explode, probably it was armor-piercing. Soon, I. S. Konev went to D. N. Gusev.
After 1.5 hours, the entire 10th Guards Tank Corps crossed the river and moved to Neustadt, and part of the forces to Sylz, towards Korchagin's 7th Guards Mechanized Corps. Together with Belov, we moved in the battle formations of his main forces, leading the troops in order to complete the encirclement of the enemy's Oppeln grouping as quickly as possible.
Our 93rd separate tank brigade A. A. Dementiev, advancing along the eastern bank of the river. Neisse, ran into fierce resistance from the 20th SS Infantry Division. Yet March 18 the brigade managed to break the resistance of the SS and go to the eastern Rothaus area. By the evening of the same day, the 61st Guards Tank Brigade of V.I. Zaitsev immediately captured the city of Neustadt, where there were a lot of Nazis armed with faustpatrons. We had to take the necessary measures. The main forces of the 10th Guards Tank Corps, led by E.E. Belov, entered the Sylz area, where they joined with units of the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps of General I.P. Korchagin, advancing from the east, completing the encirclement of the Oppeln enemy grouping. 4 Nazi divisions, several separate regiments and separate battalions, an artillery regiment, 9 artillery battalions and other units ended up in the cauldron and were defeated.
It was obvious that the enemy would try to release the encircled grouping, and we took measures to strengthen the outer front of the encirclement. This task fell to the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps. The assumption was confirmed: on the night of March 18 the enemy brought his reserve into action: the 16th, 17th, 20th Panzer and 45th Infantry Divisions, the Hermann Goering Division and the 184th Assault Gun Brigade in the direction of the towns of Neisse to the Rothaus. Since morning March 18 with these formations, our 6th Guards Mechanized Corps of V. F. Orlov entered into a fierce battle. For reinforcements, an army artillery brigade was sent here. The fight went on for 2 days. The enemy made continuous one after another violent attacks. Separate settlements and borders repeatedly passed from hand to hand. However, despite all efforts, the Nazis failed to unblock their grouping, and their units were thrown back with heavy losses.
In these bloody battles, the commander of the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps, Colonel Vasily Fedorovich Orlov, and the commander of the 17th Guards Mechanized Brigade, Colonel Leonid Dmitrievich Churilov, were seriously wounded, but they did not leave the battlefield and continued to command the troops. A few hours after the wound, the brave warrior, talented commander, favorite of the entire army, the 28-year-old communist corps commander Vasily Fedorovich Orlov, died. His warriors swore to avenge the enemy for the death of their commander. The chief of staff of the corps, Colonel Vasily Ignatievich Koretsky, took command of the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps.
Intense fighting continued. We pushed the enemy to the west.
In the midst of the Upper Silesian battle, news was received that excited all the fighters and commanders. At 3 o'clock. 10 min. March 18 in the name of the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front and commander 4th Panzer Army received a telegram signed by the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR I. V. Stalin:
“In the battles for our Soviet Motherland against the German invaders, the 4th Panzer Army showed examples of courage and stamina, courage and courage, discipline and organization.
During the fighting on the fronts of the Patriotic War with the German invaders, the 4th Panzer Army, with its crushing blows, destroying the enemy's manpower and equipment, inflicted heavy losses on the fascist troops. For the courage shown in the battles for the fatherland, fortitude, courage, courage, discipline, organization and skillful performance of combat missions, transform the 4th tank army into the 4th guards tank army and ... hand over the guards banner to the transformed tank army.
The joyful news caused a new surge of strength among the entire personnel of the army. Briefly, rallies were held in all parts.
Events at the front developed successfully.
March 19 The 10th Guards Tank Corps with the 93rd Separate Tank and 22nd Self-Propelled Artillery Brigades, in cooperation with the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps of I.P. Korchagin and the rifle divisions of the 21st and 59th armies, were dismembered into parts of the enemy, caught in the cauldron, and by morning March 22 the encircled group was completely eliminated.
After the enemy was destroyed in the Neustadt area and our troops reached the Neisse-Leobschutz line, the threat to the left flank of the front was basically eliminated. However, in the area of ​​​​Ratibor, Egerndorf, Troppau, the enemy forces the 78th and 75th infantry, 100th light infantry and 8th tank divisions, having a reserve in the depth of defense as part of the Fuhrer's Guard division and the remnants of the 16th and 17th th tank divisions, continued to hold the occupied area, covering the western part of the Upper Silesian region.
Another blow against the enemy in Upper Silesia was to follow. Before dawn March 24 we received a directive from the front commander on preparations for a new operation. It said that it included 5th Guards Mechanized and the 10th Guards Tank Corps, in cooperation with the 60th Army, were to defeat the enemy’s Ratibor grouping and, by the end of March 25, capture the Yegorndorf, Troppau, Stoiberwitz area, and strike with the main forces in the direction of Troppau.
From March 24, 1945, the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps was included in the 4th Guards Tank Army. He was supposed to advance with the main forces in the direction of Troppau, and take part of the forces to capture Jägerndorf. On the night of March 25, the 10th Guards Tank Corps was ordered to concentrate in the Leobshütz area in readiness to develop a strike in the direction of Troppau. For the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps, the task remained the same (together with the 21st Army, it cleared the area of ​​enemy remnants). The start of the operation was scheduled for 12 noon. 30 minutes. March, 25. Inclusion in our army raised the spirit of the tank guards even more. I have long sought to have a third corps in the tank army, but the most important thing was that a mechanized corps was introduced into the army. This increased the combat effectiveness, and most importantly, the survivability of the army due to artillery, motorized infantry and tanks. Two mechanized and one tank corps - at that time, from my point of view, the most profitable organization of a tank army.
As part of 5th Guards Mechanized Corps in addition to artillery and motorized infantry, there were 150 tanks. The corps was commanded by Major General Boris Mikhailovich Skvortsov, and from April 14 - Major General Ivan Prokhorovich Ermakov, the head of the political department was Colonel Leonid Ivanovich Okhlopkov, the chief of staff Ivan Vasilievich Shabarov, and from April 14, Colonel Alexander Pavlovich Ryazansky. The corps did not yet have experience in operations as part of a tank army. From December 1944 to February 1945 he was in the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, and from February to March 1945 - in the reserve of the 4th Ukrainian Front and was previously attached to the combined arms armies.
The corps included: 10th Guards Mechanized Brigade Colonel V. N. Buslaev (head of the political department, Major A. I. Panchenko), 11th Guards Mechanized Brigade, Colonel I. T. Noskov (head of the political department, Major T. A. Bogdanov), 12th Guards Mechanized Brigade, Colonel G. Ya Borisenko (head of the political department, Lieutenant Colonel A. S. Dmitriev), 24th Guards Tank Brigade, Colonel V. P. Ryazantsev (head of the political department, Lieutenant Colonel N. V. Orlov).
An interesting detail - there were many volunteer sailors of the Pacific Fleet in the corps who wished to fight the enemy on land combat "ships", and they did not drop the dignity of the sailors, they showed high valor in the Berlin and Prague operations.
Fulfilling the order 5th Guards Mechanized Corps at 8 o'clock. on the morning of March 24, 1945 attacked the enemy in the direction of Leobschütz - Troppau. On the right, the 93rd separate tank brigade attacked the city of Egerndorf, and the 22nd self-propelled artillery brigade of Lieutenant Colonel N.F. Kornyushkin attacked the city of Biskau.
The 10th Guards Tank Corps, making up the second echelon of the army, developed success 5th Guards Mechanized Corps towards Troppau. However, the first attacks had only limited success. Relying on pre-prepared positions, the Nazis fanatically resisted. Location on 5th Guards Mechanized Corps we managed to advance only 3-4 km.
Warriors 5th [Guards Mechanized] Corps were zealous in their task. On March 24, the commander of a tank platoon of the 24th Guards Tank Brigade, Lieutenant N. Kh. Khazipov, was the first to break into the enemy’s battle formations when capturing the village of Vladey and destroyed 3 enemy combat vehicles there and up to an infantry platoon. The next day, developing the offensive, Khazipov's guards burned the "tiger" tank and the self-propelled unit, destroyed up to a company of the Nazis. Tankers V. Ya. Iksar, G. S. Gorokhovsky, A. Kolovetnykh, L. I. Salyukov and G. D. Volkov showed outstanding courage and combat skill in this battle. While performing his military duty, Volkov died a hero's death. Soon an enemy shell hit the commander's tank. The entire crew was wounded. Khazipov, bleeding, helped evacuate his subordinates. Then, having gathered the last of his strength, he returned to the tank and destroyed more than an infantry platoon from a machine gun; communist Nazip Khazipovich Khazipov died a heroic death. He was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
To build up the blow to the left 5th [Guards Mechanized] Corps March 25 we brought the 10th Guards Tank Corps into battle. The enemy command, in turn, sent its 16th and 17th tank divisions here against our 93rd separate tank brigade, and the Fuhrer's Guard division ordered to wedge between 5th Guards Mechanized and 10th Guards Tank Corps. The situation became more complicated, it was necessary to take the necessary measures without delay.
Taking advantage of the fact that March 27 After completing the combat mission, the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps handed over the area it occupied near the city of Neisse to the 21st Army, by the morning of the next day it concentrated in the Stein area (9 km northeast of Leobshütz), I decide March 28 to bring the corps into battle in the direction of Stoiberwitz, where the enemy did not expect our strike at all. This was an exit to the rear of the Fuhrer's Guard division.
In order for the support artillery fire to be most effective, artillery spotters were planted in the tanks. Heavy IS tanks and SU-122 self-propelled guns covered the flanks. This played a very important role in breaking through the enemy defense to its full depth. The enemy, who tried to launch a counterattack on the flanks of the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps, ran into our artillery fire screens, powerful tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts. The aviation of Colonel-General S. A. Krasovsky contributed to the success of our actions. Our maneuver paid off. The 6th Guards Mechanized Corps advanced 10 km deep into the enemy defenses and created a direct threat to the encirclement of the Fuhrer's Guard tank division, which until that time had held back the advance of the 10th Guards Tank Corps. The enemy defenses began to fall apart, and the Fuhrer's vaunted bodyguards began to hastily retreat.
In the next 3 days, we completed the encirclement of the enemy in the Biskau area. The 6th Guards Mechanized Corps continued its offensive between Ratibor and Biskau towards Stoiberwitz and further towards Resnitz. With this blow, the enemy’s battle formations were cut into pieces: his 97th mountain rifle division was thrown back to the east and destroyed there by the troops of our 60th army, and the 8th tank and 75th infantry divisions pressed against Biskau, where they were surrounded by units of the 10th th Guards Tank and 5th Guards Mechanized Corps our army. The 6th corps intercepted the enemy's main communications between Ratibor and Moravsko-Ostrov, the 93rd separate tank and 22nd self-propelled artillery brigades pressed the enemy from the north.
April 1 united in Resnitse with outgoing flanks and proceeded to destroy the Biskau enemy grouping. Surrounded by the enemy and here was cut into 2 parts. April 2 and 3 connections 4th Guards Tank and the 60th Army destroyed this enemy grouping.
As a result of two operations in Upper Silesia 4th Guards Tank Army in cooperation with the 21st, 59th and 60th armies and other troops contributed to the liberation of the western part of the Upper Silesian industrial region. A large enemy grouping, hanging over the left flank of the 1st Ukrainian Front, was now completely eliminated. Here is what Hitler's general K. Tippelskirch said about the importance of the Upper Silesian industrial region for Nazi Germany:
“The 17th Army entered into fierce battles for the Upper Silesian industrial region. At that time, work was still going on underground, and trains with coal went west every day. The army only handed over the last functioning German weapons forge step by step. With the loss of Upper Silesia, the Reich, also in the field of armaments, was deprived of the last opportunity to continue the struggle for any length of time.
In Upper Silesia, the troops of the left wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front, which included 4th Guards Tank Army played an important role, inflicted a serious defeat on the enemy, destroyed about 40 thousand of his soldiers and officers, captured 14 thousand, destroyed and captured about 80 tanks, thousands of guns and mortars, more than 1000 machine guns and many other military equipment.
We have enriched our combat experience. Breakthrough of the tactical defense of the enemy was carried out both in cooperation with combined arms formations and independently.
The depth of the operation was small. It was determined by the plan of the command, the nature of the terrain and the enemy defense system. The enemy, trying to keep the western part of the Upper Silesian basin - the only coal and metallurgical base left in his hands after the loss of the Ruhr, tightly saturated the defense with tanks, artillery and infantry, widely used faustpatrons. The Nazis stubbornly resisted, clinging to every settlement and frontier. They brought here several formations taken from other sectors of the front, including the 16th, 17th tank divisions, the Fuhrer's Guard tank division, etc.
Our commanders and staffs acquired skills in command and control of troops in specific combat conditions, determined by the nature of the terrain, where there were many settlements with stone buildings, ravines, rivers, streams, and copses.
During the fighting, starting from the Vistula, i.e. from January 12 to February 15, 1945, 4th Panzer Army passed more than 600 km, and taking into account the Silesian operation - over 800 km. But it didn't come easily. Replenishment still hasn't arrived. There was a need to pause in order to bring up reserves and replenish the troops with personnel, military equipment and all types of allowances, primarily ammunition and fuel. In addition, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front were too stretched out (at a distance of about 400 km) from Guben on the Oder to Upper Silesia. Approximately the same situation developed among the neighbors.
Meanwhile, all of us, from a soldier to a general, felt that for the final defeat of the enemy and the capture of the fascist lair - Berlin, solid forces and means, extreme tension, and therefore, we need to properly prepare.
The headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to pause.
Per month 4th Panzer Army destroyed 780 enemy tanks, 378 armored personnel carriers, 385 guns and mortars, 47 aircraft, 35 thousand enemy soldiers and officers, captured 84 serviceable tanks, 62 armored personnel carriers, 288 aircraft, captured 6779 Nazis (excluding the Silesian operation).
Together and in cooperation with other armies troops 4th Guards Tank defeated the 31st SS, 45th, 68th, 168th, 29th, 291st, 408th infantry divisions, 16th, 17th, 25th tank, 20th motorized divisions, dozens of Volkssturm battalions and inflicted heavy defeats on 6, 73, 76, 158th and 214th Infantry Divisions, Panzer Division "Hermann Goering", Motorized Division "Brandenburg", etc.
The military council of the army, commanders of formations, headquarters and political agencies have multiplied the experience of rapidly developing success in the operational depth of the enemy’s defense with open flanks, in isolation from combined arms armies, as well as reliable command and control of troops in these conditions, holding captured lines until the combined arms armies approach. The average rate of advance at the first stage of the operation (during the encirclement and destruction of the Kielce-Radom grouping of the enemy) was 23-25 ​​km per day. At the second stage (during the pursuit of the defeated enemy to the Oder and Neisse rivers) - up to 50 km per day, and in some cases up to 70 km.
Large water barriers were forced: Charna Nida, Pilica, Varta, Prosna, Oder, Bober, both Neisses. Many of them were overcome on the move along the captured bridges and crossings, for example, on January 17, the 93rd separate tank brigade of the river. Pilica near Suleyjów, January 19 Warta near the city of Osyakow, on January 20, the 61st Guards Tank Brigade of the river. Varta near the city of Burzenin, on February 11, the 29th Guards Rifle Brigade of the river. Bober, on February 14, the 49th mechanized brigade of the river. Neisse near the city of Gross-Gastrose, on March 17, the 10th tank corps of the river. Southern Neisse.
The successful capture of bridges, as a rule, was carried out thanks to swift night attacks. Where it was not possible to capture serviceable crossings, river crossings were carried out using improvised means or using ferries and built bridges.
Army troops, in cooperation with other units, stormed dozens of cities on the territory of Nazi Germany. There we met with the widespread use of a new enemy weapon that posed a serious threat to tanks, especially when fighting in populated areas - the so-called faustpatrons. The Hitlerite command en masse armed with faustpatrons not only the troops, but also the population, mainly teenagers, united in the Volkssturm organization. This required special vigilance, constant tension and tactical skill.
The detours we used posed a threat to the encirclement of the city. When it was necessary to operate in the city, we used the following tactics: units with machine guns and anti-tank rifles followed in front, supported by individual tanks; they combed all suspicious places, destroying the nests of Faustians. When necessary, assault groups were created.
Experience was accumulated in the actions of tank formations and the entire army at night. The work of logistic institutions for combat support of troops in the conditions of the rapid advance of tank and motorized rifle units has become more clear.
The great depth of the operation and the rapid advance of the troops were a serious test of the survivability of the T-34 and IS tanks. Tank technical service was up to the mark. The combat readiness of the tanks during the month-long battles was maintained primarily by the crews themselves, as well as by the workers of the repair units. So, most of the damaged tanks were restored by the army.
Under the conditions of the dynamic actions of the tank army on the territory of Poland and Nazi Germany, political agencies and party organizations enriched the experience of political educational work among the troops. Party and Komsomol organizations grew continuously. In January 1945 alone, compared with December 1944, the ranks of communists increased by more than 1.5 times, and Komsomol members doubled.
Successful actions of the troops 4th Guards Tank Army as part of the 1st Ukrainian Front, they were noted 6 times in the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief for the 1st Ukrainian Front: on January 15 - for mastering the communication center and the stronghold of the defense of the Nazis, the large administrative and economic center of Poland - the city of Koltse; January 18 - for the capture of the city and the railway station Piotrkow (Petrokov) - an important communications hub and stronghold of the defense of the Nazis in the Lodz direction; January 23 - for the capture of the cities of Milic, Bernstadt; January 24 - for the capture of the cities of Ravich, Trachenberg; February 15 - for the capture of the cities of Sommerfeld, Sorau; March 22 - for the capture of the city of Neustadt.
Several thousand soldiers, sergeants and officers of the army were awarded orders and medals for the heroism shown in battles, and 72 soldiers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
For valor and deeds, the 62nd Guards Tank, 71st Light Artillery Brigade, 241st Guards Mortar and 2nd Regiment of the 68th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division received the honorary titles of Keletsky; Petrokovskikh - the 63rd Guards Tank Brigade of the 10th Guards Corps, the 17th Guards Mechanized Brigade of the 6th Guards Corps and the 2nd Regiment of the 68th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division.
The assignment of our army to the rank of guards raised the morale of the soldiers even higher on the eve of the Berlin operation.
The Vistula-Oder operation, carried out by the forces of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts, is one of the outstanding ones in the Great Patriotic War. Fascist General F. Mellenthin is forced to admit:
“The Russian offensive developed with unprecedented strength and swiftness. It was clear that their Supreme High Command had completely mastered the technique of organizing the offensive of huge armies ... It is impossible to describe everything that happened between the Vistula and the Oder in the first months of 1945. Europe has not known anything like it since the death of the Roman Empire. This recognition of the beaten general is not to the advantage of those bourgeois historians who are trying to belittle the significance of the Vistula-Oder operation and deliberately keep silent in their writings about its decisive role in delivering the allied forces from the catastrophe in the Ardennes.

Upper Silesian operation

The 1st Ukrainian Front was not allowed to rest and recuperate before the last attack on Berlin. While the troops of Zhukov and Rokossovsky fought for Danzig, the Altdamm bridgehead and Kustrin, several of Konev's armies fought the last battle before Berlin on their left flank. The offensive operation was initiated by the Stavka. Even during the February offensive of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front in Lower Silesia, the Supreme High Command repeatedly drew the attention of I.S. Konev to the serious backlog of the troops of the left wing of the front. It emphasized that this circumstance could subsequently complicate the preparation and conduct of the operation by the troops of the front in the Berlin direction.

To be precise, it was not so much the flank of the 1st Ukrainian Front that lagged behind, but the 4th Ukrainian Front of I.E. Petrov, advancing into Upper Silesia from the east. On February 13, 1945, I.E. Petrov submitted a report to Headquarters with a plan of operation to capture the Moravian-Ostrava industrial region. The purpose of the operation in the report was formulated as follows: “delivering a concentrated blow by the forces of two armies (38th and 1st Guards A) in the direction of Olomouc, Pardubice, defeat the opposing enemy and, having reached the line of the river with the main forces. Vltava, take possession of Prague. For the operation, the 126th and 127th light mountain rifle corps and the 5th Guards were transferred to the 4th Ukrainian Front. mechanized body. Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 11029 of February 17, the plan submitted by the command of the 4th Ukrainian Front was approved. I.E. Petrov was recommended: "The operation should begin no later than March 10." In terms of the March offensives, the desire of the Soviet command to conduct a coordinated operation on the adjacent flanks of the two fronts is clearly visible. Advancing into Upper Silesia from the north, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front went to the flank and rear of the Heinrici army group, which was defending itself against the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front.

Fulfilling the instructions of the Stavka, the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front developed an offensive plan in Upper Silesia and on February 28 submitted it for approval. In his memoirs, Konev described his plan as follows: “Planning the Upper Silesian operation, we counted primarily on the encirclement of that part of the Nazi troops that were located on the very Oppeln ledge and directly in Oppeln.” On March 1, the plan submitted to the Headquarters was approved.

To solve the problem set by the Headquarters, I.S. Konev decided to use the overhanging position of the bridgehead captured by the Soviet troops in the Grottkau area. To some extent, she repeated the operation to encircle Breslau, carried out in February 1945. In Upper Silesia, it was also supposed to strike in converging directions from two bridgeheads on the Oder. In accordance with the general plan for the operation, the front commander created two strike groups - Oppeln (in the ledge northwest of Oppeln) and Ratibor (on the bridgehead north of Ratibor).

The shelling of Gdynia is carried out by a 203-mm B-4 howitzer.

The Oppeln group included the 21st combined arms and 4th tank armies, the 34th Guards. Rifle Corps 5th Guards. army and 4th Guards. tank corps. She was supposed to strike in the general direction of Grottkau, Neisse, Neustadt, where she would connect with the Ratibor group. The ratibor group included the 59th and 60th armies, the 7th guards. mechanized and 31st tank corps. This grouping had the task of striking from a bridgehead north of Ratibor in a westerly direction towards the troops of the Oppeln grouping and, by the end of the third day of the operation, to connect with it in the area of ​​Neustadt and Sülz.

Possessing a strategic initiative, the Soviet command could concentrate tank rams in any direction, providing itself, at least, with the advantage of the first strike. The 4th Panzer Army, which had just moved westward between the Beaver and Neisse rivers, was moving far to the southeast. In particular, the 6th Guards. the mechanized corps of the 4th Panzer Army withdrew from the bridgehead at Steinau on March 4-6 and set out on night marches past the encircled Breslau to the southeast. He concentrated in the designated area by 10 March. The corps, battered in the February battles, left the 49th Guards. mechanized brigade in the former deployment area. Only 4 T-34 tanks remained in it. But in general, in 1945, the replenishment of equipment occurred regularly. During the period of preparation for the operation, the 4th Tank Army received 159 T-34-85s, 45 IS-2s, 21 SU-100s and 2 ° SU-76s for resupply. The newest SU-100s were received in the form of a brand new 1727th self-propelled artillery regiment. In total, by March 14 in the army, D.D. Lelyushenko, there were 302 T-34-85s, 11 T-34-76s, 47 IS-2s, 2 SU-122s, 21 SU-100s, 5 SU-85s, 52 SU-57s, 38 SU-76s and 4 Valentine » Mk.IX/X. Another 6 vehicles (2 T-34-85, 3 IS-2 and 1 SU-85) were under maintenance due to minor malfunctions and were commissioned by the morning of March 15.

Having survived the meat grinder near Lauban in early March, the 3rd Guards. the tank army was not ready for a new operation. Therefore, the second "claw" in the encirclement operation was made up of individual mobile formations of the front. Surrounding Breslau in February, the 7th Guards. mechanized and 4th Guards. the tank corps moved south along with the 4th tank army and concentrated on the bridgehead at Ratibor. This maneuver allowed the Soviet command to achieve superiority in forces in the chosen area of ​​operations. The enemy could only respond by moving reserves to the emerging crisis after the success of the first strike of the Soviet troops.

"Kotel" on the banks of the Oder

Information about the upcoming Soviet offensive was leaked to the Germans in early March 1945. From interrogations of prisoners, data were even obtained on the approximate date of the start of the offensive - March 10th. Colonel General Heinrici decided to launch a preemptive strike against the Soviet foothold between Kozel and Ratibor. With a counterattack on the launch pad of the Soviet offensive, it was necessary to defeat the concentrating troops and reduce the bridgehead. The maximum program was the elimination of the foothold. For the counterattack, a Jaeger battle group was created as part of the 97th Jaeger Division and part of the 1st Ski Jaeger Division. She concentrated against the southern front of the bridgehead. The battle group was led by Lieutenant General von Pappenheim. Also, the formation of the XI Army Corps of General von Bünau, the 371st Infantry Division, the 18th SS Horst Wessel Division, defending along the perimeter of the bridgehead, was to participate in the offensive. Since the Germans considered the start date of the operation of the Soviet troops on March 10, the counterattack was supposed to be launched on the night of March 8.

The German counteroffensive began at the appointed time. The Jaeger battle group advanced north along the banks of the Oder. The 371st Infantry Division advanced towards the rangers from the west. The two strike groups were supposed to connect and surround the Soviet units in the southern part of the bridgehead. At first, the offensive developed successfully, but after three days of fighting, it fizzled out. The Germans failed to encircle at least part of the Soviet troops in the bridgehead. Only a few kilometers were recaptured on the southern face of the bridgehead. After stopping the counteroffensive, the Germans regrouped units along the perimeter of the bridgehead. They had to wait for his "opening" by the Soviet troops.

The offensive of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front began on March 15 with the actions of the forward battalions of the 21st and 5th Guards armies from the Grottkau area. Artillery preparation began at 7.00 and lasted 1.5 hours. At 8.40 the main forces of the 21st and 4th tank armies went on the offensive. Overcoming the enemy's stubborn fire resistance and repulsing repeated counterattacks by his tactical reserves, by the end of the first day of the offensive, the army formations broke through two enemy fortified positions on an 8-kilometer front and advanced 8 km into the depth of the enemy defense.

The troops of the 59th and 60th armies, advancing from the bridgehead north of Ratibor in the direction of Neustadt, went on the offensive after an 80-minute artillery preparation. Having broken the resistance of the enemy, they broke through the main line of his defense on a 12-kilometer front and advanced 6–8 km in a day of fighting.

The relatively low rate of advance on the first day of the operation was due to a number of reasons. Firstly, the enemy defense system was not completely suppressed by artillery preparation. Aviation training on March 15, due to bad weather, turned out to be less intensive than planned. Until 12.00, due to bad weather, Soviet aviation did not carry out combat missions. Only from 12.00, as the weather improved, aviation began to deliver bombing and assault strikes against enemy strongholds, headquarters and communication centers. However, instead of 2,995 sorties scheduled for the first day of the operation, aviation made only 1,283 sorties. Secondly, the spring thaw inevitably influenced the fighting. In the combat log of the 6th Guards. mechanized corps, it was noted: “The terrain in the area of ​​action is medium-crossed open. The soil is loamy and sandy in places, the springtime made the soil loose and marshy, as a result, tanks could only operate along roads, which deprived the corps of the main element in the offensive - maneuver on the battlefield. It was much easier for the enemy to build the defense of directions along the roads than to hold a solid front. Also in the offensive, a “marginal effect” appeared - the advance of the front of the 4th Guards Front, which was on the right flank of the Oppeln grouping. tank corps on the first day of the operation was insignificant. However, on the whole, the Soviet offensive developed successfully: the defense of the 45th Infantry Division in the Grottkau area was broken, and the regiments of the division lost contact with each other.

Self-propelled gun SU-85 on the outskirts of Gdynia.

Despite the information received from the prisoners about the impending Soviet offensive, the Germans clearly underestimated its scope. Therefore, before the start of the operation, they had not accumulated reserves in close proximity to the Soviet bridgeheads. The real scale of the Soviet offensive was realized by the German command only after it had begun. On March 16, an entry appeared in the combat log of the Wehrmacht’s operational leadership headquarters: “South of Grottkau, the enemy managed to drive a deep wedge. The 4th Panzer Army appeared here, the whereabouts of which remained unknown. Mechanized units could become a lifesaver. The 20th Panzer, 10th Panzergrenadier and 19th Panzer divisions were withdrawn from the Strehlen and Schwednitz area and rushed to the rescue. They were still fighting. On March 15, the 20th Panzer Division had 9 Pz.V Panthers, 21 Pz.IVs, 13 StuGIII self-propelled guns, 10 PanzerjaegerIV / 70 and 2 FlakpanzerIV, in the 10th Panzer Grenadier Division - 29 StuGIII and StuGIV self-propelled guns and 9 PanzerjaegerIV / 70, in the 19th Panzer Division - 17 Pz.V "Panther", 20 Pz.IV and 11 PanzerjaegerIV / 70. Not all of these divisions were tank divisions in reality. The 10th Panzergrenadier Division sank in numbers to the battle group. The name "battle group" itself meant a temporary association of tank, motorized infantry, sapper and artillery units under a single command to solve a tactical problem. As a rule, a tank, tank-grenadier or infantry division was divided into two or three battle groups. The fact that the division became a "battle group" meant that half, a third, or even a smaller fraction of its composition remained from the connection. In other words, the remaining units from the division were only enough to create one typical battle group. Separate units were also put forward to repel the Soviet offensive. The 300th assault gun brigade was transferred from the Striegau area.

The arrival of enemy reserves inevitably complicated the situation on the flank of the Oppeln grouping of the 1st Ukrainian Front. In this regard, one cannot fail to note Konev's thoughtful formation of the right-flank shock grouping of the front in the Upper Silesian operation. Two armored and mechanized corps walked parallel routes and in the depths of the enemy defenses began to move in a ledge. 4th Guards tank corps and the 6th Guards. the mechanized corps of the 4th Panzer Army operated on the outer front of the emerging encirclement, the 10th Guards. tank corps - on the inside. The movement of the ledge led to the fact that a possible counterattack on the flank of the 10th Guards. tank corps in the direction from west to east inevitably fell under the blow of the 6th Guards. mechanized corps, moving from north to south. A blow to the flank of the entire tank army was under attack from the north of the 4th Guards. tank corps. The Germans lived up to the expectations of the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front and acted exactly as he expected. Therefore, the greatest burden in the operation fell on the 4th Guards. tank and 6th Guards. mechanized body. They were supposed to prevent the direct impact of the German reserves on the bypass maneuver and repel deblocking strikes.

March 16 was the day of the struggle of the advancing with the arrived mechanized formations of the enemy. As is usually the case, the reserves were brought into action piecemeal. The 19th Panzer Division and the 10th Panzer Grenadier Division were the first to enter the battle. They could not fill the front torn to shreds. Therefore, the 10th Guards. tank corps of the 4th Guards. tank army quickly found a gap in the formation of the enemy and moved far ahead, starting a maneuver to encircle the enemy. Two other corps of the Oppeln grouping of the 1st Ukrainian Front were drawn into battles with enemy reserves. The battle group of the 10th Panzergrenadier Division covered the city of Neisse from the north. The 19th Panzer Division encountered a dense barrier at the base of the breakthrough created by the 4th Guards. tank corps and the 34th Guards. rifle corps. 6th Guards meanwhile, the mechanized corps was groping for gaps in the restored defense for a breakthrough to the southwest. 16th and 17th Guards. mechanized brigades began to bypass the Neisse from the west. Counterattacks were provided by units of the 10th Panzergrenadier Division and artillery of the 405th People's Artillery Corps. The intensity of the fighting increased sharply. If on March 15 the 6th Guards. the mechanized corps lost 7 people killed and 18 wounded, 16 tanks burned out and knocked out, then on March 16 the corps lost 149 people killed and 247 wounded, 36 tanks and 2 SU-100. The number of tanks in the 16th and 17th Guards. mechanized brigades of the corps dropped to 16 vehicles.

Street fighting in Gdynia. For the 1st Guards. tank army, they became a rehearsal for the battles for Berlin.

March 17 was the day of throwing. On the previous day, the 10th Guards. the tank corps successfully advanced to the river. Neisse to the east of the city of Neisse. At 3.00 am D.D. Lelyushenko ordered the 6th Guards. the mechanized corps to turn around after its faster advancing neighbor and cross the Neisse at the Rotthaus. However, the corps commander could send only one 16th Guards to the Rotthaus. mechanized brigade. 17th Guards the mechanized brigade was left on the line captured the previous day as a flank cover. At 8.20 the commander of the 4th Panzer Army changed his mind and ordered the 6th Guards. mechanized corps to capture the city of Ottmachau, and the 10th Guards. Corps - the city of Neisse.

10th Guards the tank corps at 13.00 on March 17 crossed the river. Neisse near Rotthaus by the forces of the 61st Guards. tank brigade and developed success at Neustadt. 62nd Guards the tank brigade was placed in a flank barrier to avoid counterattacks from Neisse. In a futile attempt to stop the advance of Soviet tanks, police from Neisse, armed only with small arms, were thrown towards parts of the 10th Panzer Corps. This led to the immediate destruction of the Neissen city police. Naturally, people who went into battle with unsuitable weapons and without hope of success tried to seek a better fate for themselves. However, Scherner put things in order with draconian measures: deserters were mercilessly shot.

It cannot be said that overcoming the 10th Guards. tank corps of the Neisse River went painlessly. Near Rotthaus, the commander of the 10th Guards was killed in battle. tank corps colonel N.D. Chuprov. Major General E.E. took command of the corps. Belov - Deputy Commander of the 4th Tank Army. 6th Guards. the mechanized corps had to reap the consequences of throwing between the two directions on the afternoon of March 17th. The stumbling block was the settlement of Stephansdorf on the way to the Ottomachau. In the middle of the day it was stormed by the 17th Guards. mechanized brigade, and in the afternoon - the 16th Guards returned from Rotthaus. mechanized brigade. 17th Guards the mechanized brigade in the second half of the day defended itself with the front to the west - the advanced units of the 20th tank division of the enemy pulled up to the battlefield.

At the height of the battle in Upper Silesia, on March 17, 1945, the 4th Panzer Army of D.D. Lelyushenko received the rank of guards. Of the six Soviet tank armies that existed at that time, the army of D.D. Lelyushenko received the last guard. Formed in 1944, the 6th tank army of A.G. Kravchenko received the rank of guards in September of the same year. Formed almost simultaneously with the 4th Tank Army, the 2nd Tank Army became the guards in November 1944. The 1st Tank Army M.E. Katukova joined the Soviet Guards in April 1944. The 3rd and 5th Tank Armies held the rank of Guards from the spring of 1943.

ISU-122 in Danzig.

The 4th Tank Army celebrated the assignment of the Guards rank with success on the battlefield. The task of closing the ring around the formations of the LVI tank corps was successfully solved by the 10th Guards. tank corps. At the end of the day on March 18, the 61st Guards. the tank brigade of the corps and the 93rd separate tank brigade went to the Buchensdorf area, where they connected with units of the 7th Guards. mechanized corps and the 31st tank corps, advancing from the east. The lid of the "cauldron" for four German divisions slammed shut. Encircled were: the 20th SS Infantry Division (1st Estonian), the 168th and 344th Infantry Divisions, part of the forces of the 18th SS Division "Horst Wessel".

The expected I.S. Konev's counterattacks could no longer prevent the closing of the ring. They were carried out by formations of Army Group Center, transferred from other sectors of the front. The delay was due to the need to make long marches to reach the Neisse region. Already on the first day of the Soviet offensive, March 15, 1945, the 1st parachute-tank division "Hermann Goering" received an order to advance to a new concentration area. By that time, the division had been withdrawn from the bridgehead at Muskau and was on vacation in the Görlitz area. The first parts of the Hermann Goering were unloaded from the trains in Ottmachau on March 17th. The division was given the task of attacking the extended flank of the "pincer" of the Soviet troops surrounding the LVI Panzer and XI Army Corps. The starting positions for the counterattack was the area southeast of the city of Neisse. However, the offensive of the Soviet troops led to a violation of the concentration of "Hermann Goering" at the starting positions for the counteroffensive. If not for the throwing of the 6th Guards. mechanized corps between the two directions on March 17, the starting positions for the counterattack would have been simply captured by the Soviet troops.

On March 18, the reserves thrown into battle by the Germans collided with the aggressive cover of the flank of the Oppeln grouping of the 1st Ukrainian Front. 6th Guards the mechanized corps advanced in a southwestern direction. The task of the corps was to capture Ottmachau - the very station at which the Hermann Goering was unloaded. In the early morning of March 18, the 16th and 17th Guards. the mechanized brigades jointly captured the Stephansdorf road junction, which they had stormed one by one the previous day, and continued their advance on Ottmachau. However, the forward detachments of the corps were met with ambushes, and further advance stopped. The Soviet mechanized corps stretched out in a wedge in the direction of Ottmachau.

The middle of the day passed in the reflection of the counterattacks of the arriving units of the "Hermann Goering" and the 20th Panzer Division. 6th Guards the mechanized corps created a direct threat to the flank of the Hermann Goering and thus prevented an effective counterattack. Resistance from the front was weak, but the threat to the flank forced the Germans to stop their advance to the east and deal with the threat from the north. Massed fire of the 17th Guards. mechanized brigade, as well as the entire artillery of the 16th Guards. mechanized brigade and corps artillery group, all counterattacks of the Hermann Goering units were repulsed. Also unsuccessful was the offensive of the 20th Panzer Division on the flank of the 6th Guards. mechanized corps. The received 4th Guards participated in repelling enemy attacks. tank army shortly before the operation in Upper Silesia self-propelled guns SU-100. Realizing the importance of covering the flank, the commander of the 4th Guards. tank army also sent units of army subordination to support the mechanized corps: the 22nd self-propelled artillery brigade on Lend-Lease SU-57s and the 57th motorcycle battalion.

Commander of the 6th Guards mechanized corps Colonel V.I. Koretsky.

The repulse of German counterattacks was personally led by the commander of the 6th Guards. mechanized corps. However, an excellent view of the battlefield from the front line had a downside - the risk of falling under enemy fire. A shell that exploded at the command post mortally wounded the commander of the 6th Guards. mechanized corps, General V.F. Orlov, head of the intelligence department of the corps, Major Chernyshev and commander of the 17th Guards. mechanized brigade Hero of the Soviet Union Lieutenant Colonel L.D. Churilov. Colonel V.I., Chief of Staff of the Guards, took command of the corps. Koretsky. Despite the rather calm development of events, the Upper Silesian operation became for the 4th Guards. tank army with a period of loss of command personnel. Total losses of the 6th Guards. mechanized corps for March 18 amounted to 99 people killed, 318 wounded, 8 tanks burned.

The commander of the division "Escort of the Fuhrer" Otto-Ernst Roemer (pictured in the rank of lieutenant colonel).

The formations transferred from other sectors of the front of Army Group Center were also brought into battle immediately south of the newly formed "cauldron". An enemy well known to the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, the XXIV Panzer Corps of Neringa, advanced to the Leobshütz area. The 16th and 17th Panzer Divisions, the 78th Assault Division and the Fuhrer Escort Division were subordinate to him. On March 15, the 16th Panzer Division had 14 Panther Pz.V and 31 Hetzer self-propelled guns, the Fuhrer Escort division had 10 Panther Pz.V, 7 Pz.IV, 2 ° StuGIII, 12 PanzerjaegerIV /70 and 2 FlakpanzerIV. The condition of all these formations was far from being brilliant, but they could still play their part in the battle.

However, the encircled German divisions did not wait for the release. In the second half of the war, waiting for help from outside could already lead to fatal consequences. Memories of the fate of the destroyed "festungs" made me nervous. The commander of the 344th Infantry Division, General Jolasse, recalled: "Replies to all the division's inquiries regarding a possible breakthrough to the south through Deutsch-Rasselwitz were hampered by the XXIV Panzer Corps." At 3:00 pm on March 19, Yolasse decided "to act on his own in the face of a rapidly deteriorating situation." He signed the breakout order, which was originally scheduled for 5:00 pm. The general in his memoirs insisted that he had made the decision to break through on his own. The breakthrough began at 19.00 on the same day. The 18th SS division and the 344th infantry division went to the breakthrough. If you call a spade a spade, then the German troops southwest of Oppeln (north of the positions of the division of Yolasse) threw this breakthrough to their fate. They soon found themselves in a separate "cauldron" with no hope of salvation. When the commanders of the formations believed less and less the promises of the command about an early release, the principle "every man for himself" inevitably began to operate.

The target of the breakthrough was the village of Deutsch-Rasselwitz. The area was open, without any natural shelters. As a result, the fire of Soviet guns and mortars punched holes in the ranks of the German units going to break through, mixed with refugees. A desperate dash paved the way for salvation for a lucky few. Deutsch-Rasselwitz was captured at about 2200 hours. There was a river 2 km from the village, but the bridge over it was blown up. Someone sought salvation by swimming, someone waited until a ford was found. The next point of the breakthrough was the village of Hotzenplotz on the banks of the river of the same name. Here the bridges across the river were also prudently blown up by Soviet sappers. General Yolasse recalled: “The river bank was turned into a solid mess of mud and was under continuous fire from enemy artillery. Here we have suffered significant losses. Many vehicles, guns and the last self-propelled guns got stuck trying to cross the Hotzenplotz. All of them were blown up and abandoned.” Those who were able to break through the Hotzenplotz soon reached the positions of units of the XXIV Panzer Corps.

If the threat from the west from the "Hermann Goering", the 19th and 20th Panzer Divisions managed to fend off the 4th Guards. tank and 6th Guards. mechanized corps, Neringa's XXIV tank corps could well deliver a strong deblocking blow. However, without waiting for outside help, the remnants of the encircled troops made a breakthrough. Therefore, the XXIV Panzer Corps had to restore the integrity of the front, in which, after the encirclement of the LVI Panzer Corps, an extensive gap had formed.

While the encircled German units broke through from the encirclement, to the north-west of the city of Neisse, Soviet troops repelled enemy counterattacks. 6th Guards the mechanized corps itself did not move forward, but held the positions captured in the previous days. In the combat log of the headquarters of the Wehrmacht's operational leadership, the situation on March 20 was outlined as follows: “The troops cut off between the bridgeheads are withdrawing. The strikes of the division "Hermann Goering" failed. The enemy managed to finally tie up the bridgeheads and form a large bridgehead on the western bank [of the Oder].”

Tank T-34-85 with an infantry landing in the Danzig area.

Within five days, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front surrounded and liquidated a large enemy grouping on the western bank of the Oder. As a result of this, the possibility of a flank attack by the enemy against the troops of the front from Upper Silesia during the Berlin operation was eliminated. The Soviet offensive also forced the German command to withdraw the mechanized formations concentrated in the area of ​​Zobten and Schweidnitz and throw them into battle in the Neisse area. Thus, the plans for the release of Breslau were thwarted. On March 5, Lieutenant General Hermann Niehoff was appointed commandant of Breslau. He flew to the fortress by plane with Scherner's promise to break through to the surrounded city from the outside. This promise remained unfulfilled. The losses of the 1st Ukrainian Front at the first stage of the operation can be assessed as moderate. The irretrievable losses of armored vehicles in the troops of the front for the period from March 15 to March 20 amounted to 259 armored units (196 tanks and 63 self-propelled guns).

Loss of equipment of the 4th Guards. tank army for the period March 15–22 and their distribution according to the nature of the damage are shown in the table. There were no losses from aviation and from faustpatrons in Lelyushenko's army units during this period. This is due to the air dominance of the Soviet Air Force and the lack of street fighting. Failure due to technical malfunctions mainly fell on the development of a motor resource in throwing along the roads of Poland and Germany. By the beginning of the operation, the 4th Panzer Army had 123 tanks that had completed 1.5-2 norms.

Table

LOSS 4th Guards. OF THE TANK ARMY IN THE PERIOD FROM MARCH 15 TO 22, 1945 AND THEIR DISTRIBUTION BY CAUSES OF DAMAGE

Just like the East Pomeranian operation of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts, the Upper Silesian operation took place in the conditions of spring thaw. This inevitably led to losses. In the report of the department of armored supply and repair of the 4th Guards. tank army stated that "the operation in the period from 15.3 to 22.3.45 took place during the spring thaw, off-road movement was impossible even for tanks, which explains the large number of stuck tanks, stuck tanks, as a rule, were hit by the enemy."

Failure I.E. Petrova and its consequences

If the offensive of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front was quite successful, then the 4th Ukrainian Front could not boast of any significant achievements. The ambitious plan of I.E. Petrova began to crumble, not even having time to achieve the goals of the first stage of the operation. The armies in the direction of the main attack were commanded by the future dignitaries of the upper echelon of power in the Soviet Union of the Brezhnev era. The 38th Army was led by K.S. Moskalenko, 1st Guards Army - A.A. Grechko. In the auxiliary direction, the 18th Army of Lieutenant General A.I. was deployed on a 70-kilometer front. Gastilovich. Like most Soviet armies on the Soviet-German front, they could not boast of a good complete set of rifle formations. The number of personnel of the rifle divisions of the 18th and 38th armies ranged from 3 to 4 thousand people. Only two divisions of the 38th Army had 5,000 men each. The number of rifle divisions of the 1st Guards Army ranged from 4 to 5.5 thousand people.

The reasons for the failures were quite trivial. Firstly, it was perceived as an unshakable date for the start of the operation - March 10. Perhaps the fact that the notorious L.Z. was a member of the Military Council of the front played a role here. Mehlis. It is his pressure that can explain the impeccable implementation of the Headquarters' instructions "to start the operation no later than March 10." As a result, the offensive began in the conditions of incomplete preparation of troops for it. Instead of reporting to the top about the unpreparedness of the troops for the offensive, the front command preferred to keep silent about the difficulties that had arisen.

Secondly, against the shock grouping of the 4th Ukrainian Front, a trick with the withdrawal of troops from the first trench worked. Information about the Soviet offensive was leaked to the Germans. The date of its beginning has become known - March 10. On the evening of March 9, the German units defending in the direction of the alleged attack by the Soviet troops received an order to withdraw to the second line of trenches. The withdrawal was made before dawn on 10 March. The withdrawal, which was carried out under the cover of a snowstorm, was not noticed, and the artillery strike fell almost on an empty place. The results of this blunder were not long in coming. Instead of breaking through to a depth of 23–25 km, on March 10, army troops wedged into the enemy defenses for 3–4 km on a front of 15 km. The penetration of Soviet troops into the defense of the Heinrici group attracted mobile reserves in the face of the 8th Panzer Division. As of March 15, this division had 42 Pz.IVs (of which 11 were operational), 10 Panther Pz.Vs (of which 9 were operational) and 30 Panzerjaeger IV/70s (of which 6 were operational). By the end of March 17, in the direction of the main attack, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front managed to advance only 12 km.

The obvious failure, as usual, was followed by organizational conclusions. Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 11045 I.E. On March 25, Petrov was removed from the post of commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front with the wording: "for trying to deceive the Headquarters about the true position of the front's troops, who were not fully ready for the offensive at the appointed time." Place I.E. Petrov was taken by A.I. Eremenko. A few days later, the chief of staff of the front was replaced: General F.K. Korzhenevich was replaced by Colonel-General L.M. Sandals.

Commander armored personnel carrier SdKfz.251 abandoned on the shore of the Danzig Bay. Pay attention to the "panicle" of the antenna of a powerful radio station.

To bring the offensive of the 4th Ukrainian Front out of the crisis, a tried-and-tested method was applied - shifting the direction of the main attack. K.S. Moskalenko, who commanded the 38th Army, described in his memoirs his impressions of observing the front line in the new direction:

“One and a half kilometers south of the height was the small town of Zorau. It was not large, but it was a junction of seven highways and three railways, rays diverging in all directions. Even closer, directly at the slopes of the height, a small river flowed. Its valley, up to 500 m wide, was a wetland with many artificial ponds and covered Zorau from the northeast. We got even closer to the city, as far as the front line allowed. Now we were separated from Zorau by a distance of up to 1 km. The streets were clearly visible, quiet, calm. Soldiers walked along them slowly and just as calmly. They didn't seem to expect a hit. Meanwhile, it should have been applied here. Moreover, to the northeast of Zorau, a forest was visible, which could provide a secret concentration of troops and equipment "( Moskalenko K.S. In the southwest direction. M.: Science. S. 568).

The decision to advance through Zorau was approved by I.E. Petrov, but A.I. had to reap its results. Eremenko. For the breakthrough, the 95th Rifle and 126th Light Mountain Rifle Corps of the 38th Army were concentrated. Each of them received a tank brigade. The offensive in the new direction began on March 24 and developed much more successfully than on March 10. In the main direction, the 95th Rifle and 126th Light Mountain Rifle Corps advanced to a depth of 7 km that day, and the 101st Rifle Corps advanced 4 km in the auxiliary direction.

The German command tried to plug the gap formed at Zorau by the 715th Infantry Division of General von Rohr, who arrived by rail. The division arrived from Italy, and its soldiers and officers were completely unprepared for the realities of the Eastern Front. Having come under attack from the mountain infantry units of the 38th Army, it was scattered into pieces and suffered heavy losses. For the failure of his division, its commander was instantly demoted to colonel "by order of the Fuhrer." Also, by order of Hitler, the soldiers and officers of the 715th Infantry Division were deprived of all awards and insignia.

During March 25–28, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front moved forward at an average daily pace of 4–5 km. By March 28, they were 20 km from Moravian Ostrava. At this line, they met increased enemy resistance and could not advance further. Realizing the importance of the Moravian-Ostrava industrial region, the enemy advanced the 16th and 19th tank divisions, the 10th tank-grenadier division to defend it. The 8th Panzer Division also advanced here, successfully participating in repelling the Soviet offensive on March 10–18. The fighting here froze until mid-April.

The second phase of the Upper Silesian operation

Since the 4th Ukrainian Front was hopelessly stuck, after the encirclement and defeat of the divisions of the LVI Panzer and XI Army Corps, the operation of the 1st Ukrainian Front did not stop. The collapse of the enemy front made it possible to push forward the rifle divisions of the combined arms armies and reinforce the mechanized and tank brigades with them. 6th Guards the mechanized corps, in cooperation with the 382nd and 72nd rifle divisions, was to advance on the city of Neisse from the north, to clear the northern bank of the Neisse river from the enemy. The next task was to advance along the northern bank of the river towards Ottmachau. The task of flank cover was entrusted to the 128th Infantry Division. Closing the encirclement of the 10th Guards. the tank corps was turning around and, in cooperation with the 55th rifle corps, was to advance on the town of Neisse, bypassed a few days ago, from the southeast.

SU-76 enter the streets of the city of Neisse.

March 23 6th Guards. the mechanized corps and the approaching rifle divisions simultaneously solved two tasks: they defended the front to the west and advanced to the south. Lying on the north bank of the Neisse, part of the city of Neisse was captured. By 20.00 on March 23, the 10th Guards reached the eastern outskirts of the Neisse. tank and 55th rifle corps. The defenders of the city had only one way to escape - to the west.

Once the city of Neisse was a fortress, but in 1945 it was already completely unsuitable for this role. As the commander of the 17th Army, General Schultz, put it, "the fortifications of Neisse were fit for battle in the time of Frederick the Great, but not during the Second World War." The main problem was the lack and limited capacity of the defenders. In the city of Neisse, at the end of January, the 273rd and 274th Volkssturm battalions were formed. But their possibilities were simply insignificant. Each consisted of four companies of about 60 people. Each company had one heavy machine gun and up to 15 faustpatrons. Volkssturmists had about 60 rounds of ammunition per carbine. In addition, circumstances did not allow the "Volkssturm" to take advantage of the battle on the streets of the city. The 273rd battalion "Volkssturm Neisse" was withdrawn from the city and took the fight in the open. Under these conditions, the outcome of the struggle for Neisse was a foregone conclusion. By the end of the day on March 24, the southern part of the city was cleared of German troops by the forces of the 10th Guards. tank and 55th rifle corps.

Volkssturmist examines holes from faustpatrons in the sides of the turret and hull of the Soviet T-34-85 tank.

After the surrender of Neisse, the commander of Army Group Center Scherner demanded a death sentence for his commandant, Colonel Georg Sparr. Neisse, like many other German cities, was declared a "festung" (fortress). Sparre managed to save his life only with the help of a bluff, saying that he was the brother-in-law of Reichsleiter Bormann. Hearing the name of one of the highest dignitaries of the Third Reich, the judge stopped the process with a predetermined result. Therefore, instead of appearing before the squad of soldiers with rifles, Colonel Sparré went to the Glatz fortress for further proceedings. There he soon became a prisoner of war of the Soviet troops from a prisoner.

In the meantime, it was necessary to galvanize the advance of the 1st Ukrainian Front in the area of ​​Ratibor. The 60th Army of P.A. was advancing here. Kurochkin. On the first day of the offensive, she advanced 8 km. In the memoirs of I.S. Konev wrote: “Such a pace of advance did not suit us in any way, and I brought in two corps of the 4th Guards Tank to help the 60th Army. The tankers were supposed to deliver an additional blow from the north. To be precise, army units and one of the army corps were initially withdrawn to the new direction. On the morning of March 24, the 10th Guards. tank corps of the 4th Guards. the tank army was ordered to continue fighting for the southern part of the Neisse in cooperation with the 55th rifle corps. Corpus E.E. Belov was also transferred to the 1727th self-propelled artillery regiment on the SU-100. The rest of the army D.D. Lelyushenko was supposed to be withdrawn from the Neisse region and already on March 25 to go on the offensive in a new direction.

Destroyed SU-85M. Silesia, March 1945

In addition, the 4th Guards. the tank army received a new formation, with which it had to end the war. Since March 24, 1945, the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps of Major General of Tank Troops B.M. Skvortsova. Initially, it was part of the 4th Ukrainian Front, but the failure to conduct an offensive operation led to the transfer of the corps to the more effective advancing 1st Ukrainian Front. Completeness of the 5th Guards. mechanized corps can be rated as high. By the time of the transition to the submission of D.D. Lelyushenko mechanized corps B.M. Skvortsov had 171 tanks and self-propelled guns in service (116 T-34-85, 17 IS-2, 18 SU-85, 2 ° SU-76). Since June 1944, Skvortsov's corps was in the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, by February 7–8, 1945 it was fully equipped with tanks. However, the corps was sorely lacking in vehicles. Commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front I.E. Petrov was annoyed in February: “The 5th MK, having concentrated in the area of ​​​​Dembica, is fully equipped with personnel and tanks, but does not have vehicles - the shortage is expressed in 1243 units. 800 planned vehicles for the corps are on the way and some have not yet been shipped. Their delivery to the corps is scheduled for 02/20/1945. As a result, the corps went into battle only on March 10 and managed to irretrievably lose only 35 T-34-85s. Therefore, the 5th Guards. the mechanized corps was well preserved by the time when most of the mobile formations of the 1st Ukrainian Front were thoroughly beaten in battles. The introduction of management, army units and one badly battered corps of the 4th Guards. tank army, the front commander did not so much strengthen the 60th army as sought to increase the level of command and control in the Ratibor area.

New connection of the 4th Guards. tank army was the first to launch an offensive at a new stage of the operation. 5th Guards the mechanized corps at 8.00 on March 24 went on the offensive in the direction of Leobschütz-Troppau. On the first day of the offensive to the corps of B.M. Skvortsov, only separate units of army subordination joined: the 93rd separate tank and 22nd self-propelled artillery brigades. However, instead of a gap in the collapsed front of the 4th Guards. tank army met with the defense of the XXIV tank corps. As a result, the advance of the Soviet troops was only 3–4 km.

Stubborn resistance instead of loose ruins of defense at the site of the liquidated "cauldron" was an unpleasant surprise. Conclusion of the 4th Guards. tank army in a new direction followed in a changed order relative to the original plan. The 10th Guards was the first to be withdrawn from the captured city of Neisse. tank corps. Corps E.E. Belova was brought into battle on March 25 to build up a blow to the left of the 5th Guards. mechanized corps. But by coincidence, in the planned direction of attack, several German tank formations were assembled at once, sent to Oppeln and Ratibor as a “fire brigade”: the 16th and 17th tank divisions, the Fuhrer Escort division, the 254th infantry and 78th I am an assault division. Despite the fact that the 17th Panzer Division was in the status of a “battle group”, on March 15 it could boast 14 PzKpfw.IV (10 of them serviceable), 23 Panther PzKpfw.V (of which only 4 serviceable), 19 PanzerjaegerIV / 70 (of which 18 are serviceable) and 3 anti-aircraft Flakpanzer.IV.

The unfinished submarines of the XXI series captured by the Soviet troops in Danzig are a subject of concern for the allies.

However, the German reserves in 1945 could not be ubiquitous. The path to success lay in probing new directions with strikes. 6th Guards the mechanized corps gave up positions to the infantry after a two-day pause. The transfer of positions by the corps to the formations of the 21st Army took place on the night of March 27, and already on the morning of March 28 it was necessary to go on the offensive. His decision D.D. Lelyushenko explained in his memoirs as follows: "I decide on March 28 to send the corps into battle in the direction of Stoiberwitz, where the enemy did not expect our strike at all." By that time, the 6th Guards. the mechanized corps consisted of 15 T-34s in the 16th Guards. mechanized brigade, 16 T-34s in the 17th Guards. mechanized brigade, 9 IS-2 in the 28th Guards. heavy tank regiment, 17 T-34s in the 95th separate motorcycle battalion and 14 SU-76s in the 1433rd self-propelled artillery regiment. Compared to the mass of tanks in Skvortsov's mechanized corps, Koretsky's mechanized corps, which remained in the two-brigade composition, was much weaker. But even two brigades at the right time in the right place could play a significant role. A gap in the enemy's defense was supposed to be pierced by the 107th Rifle Division, and the 6th Guards. the mechanized corps was tasked with advancing on Troppau from the northeast. This blow brought the mechanized corps to the rear of the XXIV tank corps of the enemy. According to the plan of the 6th Guards. the mechanized corps were supposed to break into Troppau in the evening of March 28th. 5th Guards mechanized and 10th Guards. the tank corps were to advance in the same direction, leading to Troppau from the north. Thus, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front were to form another "cauldron" in Upper Silesia.

The operation began at 1200 on March 28 with the advance of the 107th Rifle Division and the 31st Tank Corps. At 18.00 he was joined by units of the 6th Guards. mechanized corps. The offensive developed on the whole successfully, but the pace was still much lower than the planned rush to Troppau. The approaches to the Stolmotz road junction lying on the offensive path of the corps brigades were heavily mined, and the bridge over the Zinna River was blown up. With fire from Stolmotz, the enemy also prevented a detour. Clearing the roads, searching for a ford and crossing the Cinna took time, and Stolmotz was taken by the 17th mechanized brigade by 0100 on 29 March. The defense of Stolmotz was surrendered to the 95th motorcycle battalion, and the two mechanized brigades continued their offensive.

By the evening of March 29, the 31st Panzer Corps captured Ratibor and connected with units of the 60th Army advancing on the city from the east. It should be noted the decisive role of artillery in the battles for Ratibor. For several days, the troops of the 60th Army unsuccessfully tried to seize this strong knot of enemy resistance. Then I.S. Konev ordered the 17th breakthrough artillery division to be concentrated in the Ratibor area, the 25th breakthrough artillery division that had just arrived at the front, as well as most of the army’s military artillery. The enemy resistance was quickly broken by the massive fire of this artillery, and the Soviet troops captured the city.

The capture of Ratibor was reliably covered by the left flank of the 6th Guards. mechanized corps. On the contrary, the rest of the formations of the 4th Guards. the tank army could not yet boast of resounding successes. The right flank of the 10th Guards. tank corps and the left flank of the 5th Guards. mechanized corps advanced only 2 km. At 18.00 D.D. Lelyushenko ordered the commander of the 6th Guards. create a mobile detachment with a mechanized corps and throw it forward to intercept the communications of the surrounded enemy. The detachment was created from the 95th separate motorcycle battalion, the battalion of the 17th Guards. mechanized brigade and two IS-2 tanks of the 28th Guards. heavy tank regiment. In total, the detachment had 14 T-34s and 2 IS-2s. The detachment was led by the commander of the 17th Guards. mechanized brigade of the guard Major Bushmakin. The detachment was ordered to advance through Reisnitz to Piltsch.

However, the moment for a sudden breakthrough in depth was lost. On the direction of the strike of the 6th Guards. mechanized corps, the division "Escort of the Fuhrer" was transferred. On March 30, Bushmakin's detachment came under counterattacks from newly arrived units, lost 10 tanks and 110 infantry, and retreated. Two brigades of the 6th Guards. mechanized corps continued to push forward.

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