Formation of a new system of interstate relations in Europe

End of the Cold War in Europe

The turning point in Europe in the second half of the 1980s was initiated by changes in the policy of the USSR, whose leadership gradually abandoned the stereotypes of "class struggle" in the international arena, showed readiness to reduce military potentials on the principles of reasonable sufficiency, took the first steps to democratize the political system, went to participate in international human rights mechanisms. Of fundamental importance was the USSR's rejection of the Brezhnev Doctrine, which justified direct intervention, including military intervention, in the affairs of countries within the sphere of Soviet influence. After the partial elections in Poland in June 1989, in which the ruling Workers' Party lost its monopoly of power, the leaders of a number of orthodox communist regimes called for the return of the PZPR's leadership role in Poland by force. M. S. Gorbachev's speech in the Council of Europe on July 6, 1989 finally drew a line under these disputes: "Any interference in internal affairs, any attempts to limit the sovereignty of states - both friends and allies, and anyone else - are unacceptable."

The USSR's rejection of the Brezhnev Doctrine opened the way for the democratic revolutions of the second half of 1989, during which, in most cases, the communist regimes in the GDR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Albania fell almost without resistance. These states, like Hungary and Poland before them, embarked on the path of reforms based on the values ​​of democracy, political pluralism, and a market economy. The first free multi-party elections in the post-war period held in most countries of Eastern Europe in 1990 led to the final collapse of communism in Europe, and with it the post-war Yalta-Potsdam system. One of the most important symbols of the end of the Cold War and the division of Europe was the fall of the Berlin Wall and the unification of Germany, which ended on October 3, 1990.

The rapid changes in Eastern Europe have not gone unanswered in the West. In May 1989, President George W. Bush told Brussels that the United States was ready to abandon the "deterrence" doctrine that formed the basis of its policy in the postwar period. The declaration adopted by the heads of state and government of the NATO countries in July 1990 in London outlined significant changes in the bloc's policy. It stated, in particular, that the alliance did not have aggressive intentions, that it was committed to the peaceful resolution of disputes and the renunciation of the first use of military force; the need for NATO to abandon the doctrine of forward defense and flexible response; readiness to reduce the armed forces, to change the tasks and number of nuclear weapons in Europe; consent to the institutionalization of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

On November 19–21, 1990, a meeting of heads of state and government of 34 CSCE member states was held in Paris, and on the eve of its opening, a meeting of the heads of 22 states of the Warsaw Pact (WTS) and NATO. The Paris Charter of the CSCE for a New Europe stated the end of the era of confrontation and division of Europe, and the states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO stated in a joint declaration that “in the new era that is opening up in European relations, they are no longer adversaries, they will build new partnerships and extend each other friend's hand of friendship."

Search for mechanisms to manage the situation

Based on those adopted in 1990-1991. decisions were based on the idea that with the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the continuation of reforms in the USSR, the main reason for the split of Europe disappeared. Realizing that reforms in the east of the continent would take time, the CSCE participants proceeded from the fact that the path to a united democratic Europe could be paved through a gradual rapprochement between East and West on the basis of the values ​​enshrined in the Paris Charter. This was intended to be facilitated by new mechanisms of interaction between European states, the formation of which began at the turn of the 80s and 90s. This refers to the following processes:

Institutionalization of political dialogue and interaction within the framework of the CSCE, which was assigned an important role in securing common values, norms and standards of behavior of states in relations with each other and in domestic political terms; in continuing negotiations on arms control and disarmament; developing mechanisms for emergency response, conflict prevention and crisis management; organizations for cooperation in the economic and human dimensions of the CSCE;

Reform of multilateral organizations of the countries of the East (CMEA, WTO) and West (NATO, EU, WEU);

Establishing cooperation between NATO, the EU, the WEU, the Council of Europe, on the one hand, and the states of Eastern Europe, on the other;

Formation of sub-regional organizations, which include, in particular, the Central European Initiative, the Visegrad Group, the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the Council of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAC), the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, the Initiative for Cooperation in South-Eastern Europe.

The combination of various forms of pan-European, regional and sub-regional cooperation was supposed to ensure the management of the processes of formation of a new system of interstate relations in Europe. However, the events of the early 1990s called into question the feasibility of many of the original calculations.

1. Within a short time, the organizations that ensured the dominance of the USSR in Eastern Europe during the Cold War ceased to exist. These organizations have never been effective instruments for the equal cooperation of their members. In view of the fears that had intensified since the end of 1990 in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) about a possible return of the Soviet leadership to one form or another of the Brezhnev Doctrine, the fate of the CMEA and the Warsaw Pact in 1991 was a foregone conclusion. On June 27, 1991, a protocol was signed on the dissolution of the CMEA, and on July 1 of the same year, a protocol on the termination of the Warsaw Pact, which had existed only on paper since 1990. In 1991, the CEE countries accelerated the process of revising bilateral political treaties with the USSR. Soviet troops were withdrawn from Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia. A new system of foreign policy priorities was formed for the CEE countries, which saw their main task in integration into the Council of Europe, the EU, and NATO.

2. The emergence of the Yugoslav crisis, the beginning in 1991 of a military confrontation between Serbia and Croatia and Slovenia, which announced their withdrawal from the federation, and since 1992, the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH); the collapse of the USSR at the end of 1991 - all this led to profound changes in the situation in Europe, which the authors of the Paris Charter did not even think about. Chief among them is the disappearance of the "East", which was conceived by the counterparty of the "West" in the process of their gradual rapprochement. This led to a decrease in the manageability of domestic and international processes in the post-communist space in the absence of effective regional and subregional mechanisms.

3. Under the new conditions, the institutions of Western European (EU, WEU, Council of Europe) and Euro-Atlantic cooperation (NATO) have retained their role. However, these organizations also faced the need to define their new role in solving the problems of European development, as well as to form new relations with post-communist states.

The main dilemmas of the formation of a new Europe

With the end of the Cold War, the former problems of national and European security, and above all the danger of a large-scale armed conflict between the two military blocs, receded into the background. New problems and challenges that the countries of the continent face individually and collectively have come to the fore. The main dilemmas of European politics, on the resolution of which the future system of interstate relations in Europe largely depends, include the following:

1. The unification of Germany and the removal of the last formal restrictions on its sovereignty contributed to the revival in a number of countries of fears about the possible claims of Germany to a dominant role in Europe. Activation of political and economic relations of Germany with the CEE countries and Russia; its leading role in supporting the ongoing reforms here and in attracting foreign investment only fuels the suspicion that at some stage Germany may be tempted to pursue a policy that is not coordinated with EU and NATO partners. The "renationalization" of the policy of Germany, and as a result, of other states, would lead to a revival of the rivalry between the European powers, fraught with new conflicts.

In the process of Germany's unification, Western countries proceeded from the fact that the main guarantee of the predictability of its policy is Germany's integration into the EU and NATO. This point of view was eventually accepted by the Soviet leadership, which agreed with the participation of a united Germany in NATO and stipulated a number of restrictions on NATO military activities on the territory of the former GDR. The desire to ensure the deepest possible integration of Germany into multilateral structures has become one of the motives for accelerating the process of transforming the European Communities into the European Union, the gradual expansion of the union's supranational powers, which mean "dissolving" the increased influence of the FRG.

Although in Germany itself the discussion about its role in Europe and the world is just beginning, the country's policy after unification is aimed at removing the fears of neighboring states. Since the beginning of the 1990s, a consensus has developed in the political class of Germany on the priorities of European policy, which include:

Maintaining commitment to integration into the EU and NATO, refusal of Germany from unilateral actions; Germany not only agreed with the expansion of EU powers, but is also a supporter of this process;

Facilitating the entry of CEE countries into Western structures; in this way, Bonn sought to overcome the contradiction between integration into the EU and NATO, on the one hand, and active politics in CEE, on the other;

Germany seeks to maintain partnership relations with Russia, while avoiding the establishment of "special" ones that could revive fears about the "revisionist" nature of German policy in Europe; the balance of their own interests, the interests of the European states and Russia is seen in the determination of the optimal ways of integrating Russia into the new system of relations in Europe.

2. For centuries, Russia's relations with Europe, conceptually and practically, have been characterized by both mutual attraction and mutual repulsion. Democratization first in the USSR and then in Russia, the policy of market reforms and adaptation to world economic processes create the prerequisites for Russia's gradual integration into a new system of European and global relations based on partnership. Nevertheless, the fate and final result of Russian reforms, Russia's self-identification, and the definition of its place and role in the new Europe are still highly uncertain. Will Russian reforms end with the creation of a truly democratic society with an efficient market economy, or, as has happened more than once in history, will national-patriotic reaction prevail again? The answer to this question should be given by Russia itself.

3. Overcoming the political and ideological division of Europe at the end of the 1980s did not and could not automatically remove the problem of the gap in the levels of socio-economic development between the states of Western and Eastern Europe. Decades of communist domination and a planned economy slowed down the development of CEE, threw it to the sidelines of the world and European economy. The most developed CEE countries in terms of GDP per capita are comparable to the poorest EU countries. The problems and duration of the transition period in CEE were significantly underestimated in the early 1990s, so the socio-economic dividing lines will remain in Europe for the foreseeable future. The difficulties of the transition period give rise to the danger of internal destabilization in individual countries, which can have cross-border consequences. The most disturbing example of internal destabilization was the chaos in Albania in 1996-1997.

4. After the end of the Cold War, Europe did not avoid the emergence of local and regional conflicts, including armed ones. The massive use of force in the former Yugoslavia was the most severe shock for Europe, which did not experience such large-scale upheavals throughout the entire post-war period. In connection with the emergence of open conflicts in the countries of the former USSR, the conduct of an ethnocratic policy by a number of newly independent states, sometimes acquiring the character of "ethnic cleansing", the latent danger of separatism and irredentism in CEE, the problem of internal conflicts and "aggressive nationalism" is today considered as one of the main challenges European security.

Most modern conflicts in Europe have taken the form of military confrontation in those countries that, for various reasons, did not go through the stage of formation of nation-states (or nation-states), which most European peoples went through in the 19th century. In many countries of Southeast Europe and the former Soviet Union, there are other complex factors that suggest that conflict and instability are likely to be constant companions of the formation of new nation-states and modernization. All this in the early 1990s put the community of European states in front of the need to identify effective tools for managing crisis situations, as well as developing a long-term strategy and policy for preventing internal conflicts.

5. NATO's military intervention in the conflict in Kosovo (FRY) in March-June 1999 confronted Europe with a number of new problems. The first of these is NATO's claim to the right to intervene without the sanction of the UN Security Council or the OSCE outside the zone of its own responsibility in the event (as was the case in the FRY) of gross violations of human rights and national minorities.

However, the Kosovo crisis of 1998-1999 exposed another, more serious and long-term problem. It is connected with the lack of tools for the international, in particular the European community of states, to intervene peacefully, without military escalation, in the internal processes in a particular state, when they put this state on the brink of a humanitarian catastrophe or a massive violation of human rights and national minorities. The need to develop appropriate international instruments became apparent precisely and above all against the backdrop of the Kosovo crisis.

6. New security challenges made it possible in the 1990s to talk about non-traditional dimensions of security policy, no longer reducible to the policy of defense, arms limitation and arms control. Among the new security challenges, mass migration of the population, including increased flows of refugees, has recently attracted the most attention; drug trafficking and arms trafficking; internationalized terrorism and organized crime.

If in 1989–1992 most European states were cautious in assessing possible options for the formation of a new European system, then from 1993-1994. under the influence of a number of objective processes, the set of discussed options gradually narrowed. By 1997, the stage of discussions was over. The contours of the emerging image of Europe have become more obvious, although its details are still the subject of discussion. In fact, in 1993-1997. there was a "paradigm shift" in the formation of a united Europe, which is born today not on the basis of the "rapprochement" of East and West, but as a result of the gradual expansion of Western organizations. The most significant in this regard is the expansion to the East of the EU and NATO. At the same time, the diversity of European processes is not limited to the expansion of these organizations, but leads to the formation of a "concert" of European institutions, each of which is unique and indispensable in terms of managing European processes.

Institutionalization and transformation of the CSCE into the OSCE

Until 1990, the CSCE was a series of intergovernmental forums. The meeting ensured the solution of three main tasks: maintaining an intensive and regular dialogue between East and West; harmonization of norms and standards of behavior of states in mutual relations and in relation to citizens; consideration of issues related to the fulfillment by states of their obligations. By the beginning of the 1990s, the CSCE had become a dynamically developing effective instrument for regulating relations between East and West. With the fall of communist regimes, the CSCE documents expressed the commitment of all its participants to pluralistic democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights, private property, a market economy and social justice. These values ​​were consolidated and concretized in the documents of the Copenhagen (June-July 1990) and Moscow (September-October 1991) meetings of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, the Bonn Conference on Economic Cooperation in Europe (March-April 1990) and in the Paris Charter for a New Europe, signed on November 21, 1990. After 1990, the development of the CSCE, from January 1, 1995 renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), was characterized by a number of features.

1. In 1992–1993 the composition of the OSCE participants has significantly expanded as a result of the admission to it of the countries of the former USSR and the former Yugoslavia, as well as Albania and Andorra. The OSCE is the most universal, pan-European organization, which determines both a number of its advantages and difficulties in its work. Among the problems of the organization, in addition to the difficulty of reaching consensus, the cultural and political diversity of the participating States is noted.

2. The Charter of Paris marked the beginning of the institutionalization of the CSCE, leading to its transformation into the OSCE. Since 1990, permanent and regularly meeting structures and institutions of the organization have been created. Meetings are held every two years to review the implementation of commitments, culminating in summit meetings (Helsinki, 1992; Budapest, 1994; Lisbon, 1996). At first, once a year, and now every two years, meetings of the OSCE Ministerial Council are held (Berlin, 1991; Prague and Stockholm, 1992; Rome, 1993; Budapest, 1995; Copenhagen, 1997; Oslo, 1998). The body empowered to make independent decisions is the Permanent Council, which meets weekly in Vienna. The institutions of the Chairman-in-Office and the Troika, the Secretary General, the High Commissioner for National Minorities, and a number of others have been created in the OSCE. A secretariat is located in Vienna, with an office in Prague; in Warsaw - the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), in Geneva - the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration within the OSCE. The OSCE Economic Forum is held annually in Prague. The OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation operates in Vienna, within the framework of which issues of arms control are discussed.

3. Along with the preservation of norm-setting functions and a shift in emphasis to monitoring compliance with the commitments made, the operational activities of the OSCE are expanding in such areas as conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation; the formation of institutions of the rule of law (in particular, the OSCE plays an active role in election observation, and in some cases in their organization) and ensuring human rights.

Since 1992, the OSCE has been sending missions to conflict zones, including long-term missions, whose mandate varies depending on the situation and includes tasks for the prevention and political settlement of conflicts. Long-term missions operate in BiH, Georgia, Latvia, Macedonia, Moldova, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Croatia, Estonia, Kosovo. Since 1995, the OSCE Assistance Group has been working in Chechnya. Since 1998 - in Belarus. The Minsk Group has been mediating the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict since 1992. The OSCE is permanently represented in Albania. Special OSCE missions were sent in 1997 to the FRY to resolve the political conflict over the falsification of the results of municipal elections, as well as to Albania to seek a political solution to the Albanian crisis.

Since 1992, by decision of the Helsinki Summit, the OSCE has been a regional agreement within the meaning of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and reserved the right to conduct peacekeeping operations, excluding the possibility of using coercive measures. However, until now, the OSCE has never exercised this right. In accordance with the decision of the Budapest summit meeting in 1994, an OSCE operation is planned in the zone of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the implementation of which is being delayed due to the lack of agreement between the parties on the principles of a political settlement.

Since 1996, the OSCE has been implementing a number of post-conflict reconstruction tasks in accordance with the 1995 Dayton General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH. The OSCE was entrusted with tasks such as promoting the development of sub-regional arms control measures, negotiating regional arms control measures and confidence-building measures in South Eastern Europe; determination of the existence of the necessary conditions, organization and holding of all-Bosnian and municipal elections in BiH under international control; promoting the formation of democratic institutions and ensuring human rights.

Operational activities to provide early warning of a brewing conflict are carried out by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities in cooperation with the ODIHR. The role of the Chairman-in-Office, the Troika, personal representatives and special commissioners of the Chairman, acting on behalf of the OSCE on the basis of agreement with the Permanent Council, is growing. Since the 1990s, the OSCE has been cooperating with other international organizations.

4. Despite the conflicting attitudes towards the organization of various participating States, some of which either do not believe in the capabilities of the OSCE, or give priority to other European structures and for this reason are wary of strengthening the operational capabilities of the OSCE, the latter is gradually becoming one of the main instruments for ensuring security based on collaboration. The functions of the OSCE, which determine its unique character and are uncharacteristic of any other European organization, include the following:

As the only pan-European organization, the OSCE carries out norm-setting activities, and is also able to ensure the legitimacy of measures taken by other regional organizations outside the territory of their member states;

Within the framework of the Vienna Forum for Security Co-operation or in close conjunction with the OSCE, issues of arms control are considered and resolved: confidence- and security-building measures; the Open Skies Treaty (formally concluded outside the OSCE), the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and OBCE-IA (the composition of the parties to the treaty concluded in November 1990 is already the membership of the OSCE);

The operational activities of the OSCE in the field of early warning, conflict prevention and resolution remain unique;

Despite a certain overlap in the activities of the Council of Europe and the OSCE, the latter remains the only organization designed to ensure respect for human rights and promote the formation of institutions of the rule of law throughout the OSCE region, including in countries that are not members or candidate members of the Council of Europe.

Transformation processes in CEE

The dynamics of internal development and foreign policy of the CEE countries in the 1990s was determined by a number of factors. The artificiality of the communist regimes imposed on them predetermined not only the rapid collapse of the latter in the face of weakening bloc confrontation and the USSR’s rejection of the “Brezhnev doctrine”, but also a relatively painless parting with the communist ideology, the transition of the former communist workers’ parties to the positions of social democracy. By the beginning of the 1990s, after a short period of discussion, a more or less broad consensus had formed in these countries regarding the main domestic and foreign policy goals. Its essence boils down to determining the ways for the reintegration of the CEE countries into Europe, which is understood as joining the Council of Europe, the EU and the WEU, as well as NATO. The differences between the successive conservative and left parties in power relate mainly to the means and methods of achieving this goal.

A number of factors are increasingly affecting the position of the CEE countries and their internal development. First, the reform process here turned out to be much more complex and lengthy than originally predicted. Secondly, over time, the differentiation of the CEE countries in terms of progress in the implementation of political and economic reforms became more prominent. Both of these circumstances determine the emerging differences both in the pace and in the prospects for reintegration into Europe of individual CEE countries.

The legacy of the planned economy, the complexities of change, and the relatively low level of economic development are among the main challenges to reform in the CEE countries. The legacy of communism has a negative impact on the ongoing transformations: the lack of power, the underdevelopment of civil society, and the lack of stable value orientations. Carrying out systemic and structural reforms of the economy is complicated by the firm position of the bureaucracy and interest groups. The stereotypes of behavior generated by the previous system - paternalism, egalitarianism, etc. - hinder the establishment of a new model of economic behavior. The need for a structural reform of the economy predetermined the inevitability of a social shock in any variant of the reforms. Many difficulties are generated by the simultaneous implementation of the transition to a market economy and the transformation of the political system.

One of the ten CEE countries - Albania, according to the UN classification, belongs to the low-income countries (GDP per capita is less than 750 US dollars in 1994). Most of the states belong to the group with low average incomes (up to 3 thousand US dollars). Only three countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia) fall into the group with high average incomes. None of the CEE countries falls into the group with high incomes. Underdevelopment was aggravated by the decline in production that began after 1989 and was associated with the processes of transformation, although in the CEE countries this decline was much smaller than in the former USSR, which predetermined a relatively rapid resumption of economic growth. The low level of economic development, the rapid collapse of the communist system, the burden of old problems and the decline in production were, in turn, the cause of many negative socio-economic processes.

In the course of transformations in the CEE countries, depending on the combination of the initial prerequisites for reforms, the consistency and purposefulness of the policies pursued, as well as external conditions, there has been a differentiation of the states of the region in all areas of transformation. Depending on the progress achieved in the implementation of political and economic transformations, as well as economic recovery in CEE, two groups of states are distinguished, although the boundaries between these groups are sometimes unclear, and within each of them there is its own differentiation. The five CEE states - the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia are considered leaders in the implementation of reforms. The rest of the CEE countries (some of them making efforts to catch up with the group of leaders) are in a delicate balance, in which positive and negative factors balance each other.

The top five CEE countries have made significant progress in implementing reforms, and their economic situation has improved in the second half of the 1990s. Due to more favorable starting conditions, systemic transformations in these countries were launched faster and were more successful. From 1993–1994 all five countries are experiencing economic growth. The decline in production here was less significant - the fall in GDP since 1990 was only 15%. Favorable factors for these countries are the growth of investment and moderate inflation, which in 1997 ranged from 6.4% (Slovakia) to 10% (Hungary). It is believed that in the future, these five countries in terms of their economic indicators can reach the level of the least developed countries of the EU. Negative factors here include a relatively high unemployment rate (the only exception is the Czech Republic); a decrease in the level of real average wages; the growth of social differentiation; lack of an effective social security system; impoverishment of a part of the population.

The Baltic countries - Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are among the countries that can come close to the top five CEE. However, they still face serious economic and social problems, also due to the fact that the recession here was deeper. Despite numerous problems in the short term, the Baltic countries have significantly expanded their freedom of maneuver as a result of a quick, albeit painful exit from the economic space of the former USSR. The transformation processes in the countries of South-Eastern Europe - Albania, Bulgaria and Romania are characterized by instability and fragility of the results achieved, which manifested itself in the most acute form during the Albanian crisis of 1996-1997. The general low level of economic development exacerbates the problems in these countries.

In terms of foreign policy, the situation in CEE is characterized by the absence of effective mechanisms for regional political and economic cooperation. Virtually all CEE countries that are already members of the Council of Europe give priority to unilateral efforts to integrate into the EU and NATO, sometimes competing with each other. After the end of the Cold War, various sub-regional organizations emerged here, and bilateral interaction between individual states became more intense. The CEE countries are members of the Central European Initiative, the Visegrad Group, the CBSS, the BSEC, the cooperation of the Carpathian regions (including Ukraine). Bulgaria takes the initiative to establish a regular dialogue between the states of South-Eastern Europe. Romania pursues its own policy of subregional cooperation, which in the 1990s built a complex system of "triangles" - complementary trilateral cooperation pacts (with Poland and Ukraine, Bulgaria and Turkey, Moldova and Ukraine, Hungary and Austria, Bulgaria and Greece).

Nevertheless, participation in various forms of subregional cooperation was most often considered by the CEE countries either as a temporary option for regulating relations with neighboring states for the period before joining the EU, or - in the event of a less favorable scenario - as a backup, although not the best option for foreign policy strategy. An example of intensive, but ultimately ineffective sub-regional cooperation, which, in accordance with the initial plans, covered the spheres of the economy, foreign policy and security policy, is the interaction of the countries of the Visegrad group, on the basis of which the Central European Free Trade Area was created in 1993 (in 1995 in it included Slovenia). However, it did not contribute to a significant revival of regional trade.

European Union: deepening and expanding integration

The end of the Cold War, the disappearance of bloc confrontation in Europe, the unification of Germany, the beginning of a systemic transformation in CEE put the EU countries before new challenges. The desire to "dissolve" the growing influence of Germany on European politics pushed Bonn's partners to deepen integration within the EU. Supporters of this line, although with certain reservations, were, in particular, France, Italy, and a number of small EU countries. Germany also supported this line from the very beginning. Great Britain, which was the most skeptical about the deepening of integration, preferred a different variant of the EU's adaptation to the new conditions, namely, the expansion of the EU at the expense of the CEE states. For a short period, the main discussions within the EU were reduced to a discussion of the dilemma: deepening or widening? Ultimately, the choice was made in favor of deepening integration, which would be accompanied by its subsequent expansion, first at the expense of the developed Western European states, and then the CEE countries.

Efforts to deepen integration within the EU were repeatedly made before the end of the Cold War, although due to disagreements between the main member states, they were usually limited to half-hearted solutions. In 1985, the heads of state and government of the EU countries agreed on a package of reforms and additions to the EU treaties, summarized in the Single European Act, which entered into force in 1987. This document provided, in particular, for the completion of the formation of a common internal market by the end of 1992. , a return to the adoption of a significant part of decisions in the EU by a majority vote, as well as the expansion of the powers of the European Parliament. At the same time, the scope of the EU's competence was expanded to include research, technology and environmental policy. With the adoption of a single European act, a contractual basis was created for the activities of the European Council, as well as "European political cooperation", which assumed the harmonization of the foreign policy of the EU states.

Changes in Europe have pushed the EU countries to take more radical steps towards deepening integration. On December 9-10, 1991, at a meeting of EU leaders in Maastricht (Netherlands), a draft treaty on the European Union was approved, signed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Finance on February 7, 1992 and entered into force on November 1, 1993. The Treaty provides for a significant deepening of integration in a number of areas:

1. The European Economic Community, established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957, is transformed into the European Union. The sphere of activity of the EU has been noticeably expanded. The customs union, common market, common agricultural and foreign trade policy have since 1999 been supplemented by the European Monetary Union (EMU), a coherent policy in the areas of environmental protection, health, education and the social sphere. Due to the compromise nature of the Maastricht Treaty, the competence of EU bodies in these areas is not the same and is not always unconditional. The agreement provides for the introduction of the institution of "EU citizenship", which does not cancel the citizenship of individual states. A committee on regional issues has been formed. The powers of the European Parliament have been expanded.

2. A new area of ​​EU activity has become the implementation of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP), which develops the experience of "European political cooperation" and provides for the coordination and implementation of joint foreign policy actions by the EU countries on the basis of unanimously adopted decisions.

3. Cooperation in the field of domestic policy has become a new direction. We are talking, in particular, about harmonizing the policies of the EU countries on granting political asylum, regulating immigration processes, combating drug trafficking and crime, and closer cooperation between police services. However, even in this area, concerted action requires unanimity in the EU Council of Ministers.

The Maastricht Treaty itself was the result of complex compromises between Euro-optimists and Euro-skeptics within the union. The agreement provided for the possibility of reviewing and further developing its provisions by an intergovernmental conference of the EU countries, whose competence included consideration of issues of further development of cooperation in the fields of SFS, domestic policy and justice. The conference opened on March 29, 1996 in Turin (Italy) with a meeting of the European Council at the level of Heads of State and Government and ended in Amsterdam on June 16-17, 1997 with the adoption of the Treaty of Amsterdam, signed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs on October 2, 1997. The Treaty formalized the progress on a number of areas, including those that were the subject of disagreement in the process of preparing the Maastricht Treaty. The Treaty, which entered into force on May 1, 1999, provides in particular:

Expanding the competence of the EU in the field of domestic policy. Europol, established in The Hague as a center for the collection, processing and exchange of information, is endowed with operational functions. International cooperation between national police and customs departments and judicial authorities is expanding. Within five years of the entry into force of the treaty, border controls between all EU countries (with the exception of Great Britain and Ireland) must be lifted and common standards for external border control established. The competence of the EU in the field of policy on granting political asylum, immigration, in relation to refugees is expanding;

Regulation of the legal status of EU citizens. The EU's capacity to take action against manifestations of discrimination is expanding. The principle of equal rights for men and women becomes obligatory for all countries of the union;

Expansion of the Union's functions in the field of social policy. For the first time, a chapter on the coordination of employment policy appeared in the treaty. For the first time, the UK agreed to fully recognize the obligations arising from the agreed social policy of the EU countries. The treaty establishes minimum standards in the field of healthcare. The EU policy in any field must meet environmental criteria - strengthening and improving the SFS mechanism. The decision-making procedure within the framework of the SFS has been improved. While policy decisions still require unanimity, so-called executive decisions can now be taken by majority vote. Established the post of Secretary General of the European Council responsible for the development and implementation of the SFS;

New Functions for the Regulation of International Crises The Amsterdam Treaty placed the competence of the EU on the implementation of humanitarian actions, as well as operations to maintain and strengthen peace. On the basis of unanimity, the EU may take political decisions authorizing the WEU to conduct such operations. Since the issue of the prospect of integrating the Western European Union (WEU) into the EU structures was not resolved during the intergovernmental conference, the possibility was envisaged for the EU to take political decisions on the basis of unanimity, authorizing the WEU to conduct peacekeeping operations. After the change in the negative position of England regarding the integration of the WEU into the European Union (which was reflected in the French-British declaration signed in Saint Malo on December 4, 1998), a fundamental shift took place in this area of ​​cooperation between the EU countries. At the EU summit in Cologne on June 3–4, 1999, a decision was made to develop and implement a joint European security and defense policy within the framework of the SFS. The Cologne decision, which provides for the granting of powers for the independent implementation of military operations to ensure peace in the context of armed crises, relying on NATO infrastructure, as well as the creation of the EU bodies necessary for this, including the security policy committee, the military committee, the EU headquarters, etc., in essence means the full integration of the WEU into the structures of the European Union - the reform of the structures and institutions of the EU. Its goal is to strengthen the positions of the European Parliament and the European Commission, improve the decision-making rules, including by expanding the list of issues on which decisions are made by majority vote.

On July 15, 1997, the EU Commission presented the "Agenda 2000", containing recommendations on the main directions of reform in the activities of the union, due to the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty and the forthcoming enlargement of the EU to the East. These recommendations were approved by the heads of state and government of the EU countries at a special meeting of the European Council in Berlin on March 26, 1999.

The harmonization of the 2000 Agenda is intended to resolve the contradictions that arise in the course of the simultaneous deepening of integration and enlargement of the European Union. The least controversial issue was the entry into the EU of the developed countries of Europe. In 1993, an agreement between the EU countries and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) on the creation of the European Economic Area (CES) came into force, which actually allowed the EFTA countries to enter the EU single market. However, the CES agreement rather quickly faded into the background due to the fact that Switzerland did not ratify it in a referendum, and four states - Austria, Norway, Finland and Sweden began negotiations on joining the EU. On January 1, 1995, Austria, Finland and Sweden became members of the EU, the number of members of which increased from 12 to 15.

The most difficult and controversial issue was the accession to the EU of the CEE countries. For a number of years after the collapse of the communist regimes in Europe, the EU did not take a clear position on this issue, although at an early stage it developed a strategy for closer cooperation with the CEE countries through association agreements known as “European agreements”. Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia were the first to sign such agreements with the EU on December 16, 1991. Subsequently, they were signed with all 10 CEE states.

The "European Agreements" granted the countries that signed them the status of associate members and provide for the possibility of their entry into the EU, regulate political and economic relations with the union, including the establishment of a free trade regime. The agreements establish mechanisms for maintaining a permanent dialogue between the parties, ensure wider access of the CEE countries to information on the decision-making process in the EU, determine the mechanisms for providing technical and financial assistance to reforms, in particular, within the framework of the PHARE program.

However, the acquisition of the status of associate members in itself was not a guarantee of entry into the European Union. It was not until its meeting in Copenhagen on June 21-22, 1993 that the European Council took the political decision that "the associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe who wish to become members of the European Union." At the same time, the highest political body of the EU did not outline the time frame for possible entry, stipulating only that candidates must meet a number of economic and political criteria for full membership in the union. At the same time, the council stipulated that the entry of new members should not damage the capacity of the union. In addition to the orientation of the PHARE program towards preparing the CEE countries for EU accession, in Copenhagen, the candidate countries were invited to enter into a “structured dialogue” with the EU, during which all issues of their relations with the union could be clarified.

A more specific EU strategy for the integration of the CEE countries was adopted at the meeting of the European Council in Essen (Germany) on December 9-10, 1994. The Council noted that negotiations on the accession of the CEE countries to the EU could only begin after the completion of the intergovernmental conference, as well as after a thorough analysis the possible impact of EU enlargement on its viability and the readiness of candidates to join the union. The Council determined a set of short-term and long-term measures to prepare the CEE countries for entry into the union.

Despite the disagreements that existed in the union and the presence of supporters of the simultaneous start of negotiations with all candidate countries, the EU ultimately pursues a differentiated policy towards the CEE countries. The top five CEE candidates included Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Estonia. On March 31, 1998, negotiations began with them, as well as with Cyprus. It is believed that they will be able to join the EU in 2001, although the EU Commission proceeds from a more realistic date - 2003.

The remaining five candidates for EU accession were offered a special partnership program, a special conference was established with the participation of all candidate countries for EU accession to ensure closer coordination and harmonization of their policies with those of the union.

NATO: adaptation and expansion

With the end of the Cold War, NATO, to a greater extent than other European organizations, faced the problem of adapting its policies and strategies to the new situation and developing new relations with the countries that were part of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The process of adapting NATO policy and strategy was initiated by the London session of the NATO High Level Council (July 1990). At the same time, the alliance responded to a number of major challenges faced by the organization.

1. The change in the military-political situation, the disappearance of the danger of a sudden large-scale military conflict between East and West, the emergence of local internal and interstate conflicts that do not directly affect the military security of NATO countries, not only required a revision of the military strategy of the alliance, but also strengthened the mood in in favor of reductions in armed forces and military spending in most NATO countries.

2. The tendency to intensify defense cooperation within the framework of the WEU, which intensified in the early 1990s in a number of Western European countries, stimulated stratification within NATO.

3. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the change in the ratio of traditional and new (mainly non-military) security challenges has called into question the future of NATO as a military organization.