The collapse of the Western Front Due to poor foresight, low insight of Stalin, his strategic mistakes of the pre-war period, military events developed exclusively according to the German scenario, which demanded a huge payment from our side. For the first three weeks

ACTIONS OF THE TROOPS OF THE SOUTH-WESTERN FRONT AGAINST POLAND LVIV OPERATIONThe Battle of Warsaw, which lasted from July 23 to August 25, became the culmination of the entire Russian-Polish war. The Warsaw operation was carried out by the troops of the Western Front. But in her last period in actions on

The crew of the T-26 tank of the 1933 model under the command of Lieutenant S. M. Fedorov knocked out 2 German armored personnel carriers. Southwestern Front, July 1941

Colonel General von Kleist reports to Field Marshal von Brauchitsch. Ukraine, July 1941

Commander of the Southwestern Front, Colonel-General M.P. Kirponos. In the photo, he is still in the rank of lieutenant general and in the position of commander of the Leningrad district, next to him (on the right) is Hero of the Soviet Union V. Kh. Buinitsky

German soldiers in ambush. Ukraine, July 1941

Light artillery tractor T-20 "Komsomolets", put out of action by an air strike. Ukraine, July 1941

A group of Wehrmacht light vehicles Sd.Kfz.223 conducts tactical reconnaissance. Ukraine, Army Group South, July 1941

A German Pz.Kpfw.II tank moves past a Soviet T-26 tank of the 1933 model abandoned by the crew. Southwestern Front, July 1941

A half-tracked transporter towing a crew and a 50-mm German Pak 38 anti-tank gun. Ukraine, sector of responsibility of the 48th motorized corps of the Wehrmacht, July 1941

Commander of the South-Western direction, which included the South-Western and Southern fronts, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. M. Budyonny. Snapshot of the second half of the 30s

Major B.S. Fedoseev sets tasks for the gunners of the tank destroyer division. Ukraine, 26th Army of the Southwestern Front, late July 1941

German light tank Pz.Kpfw.II Ausf.F or Ausf.C from the 8th company of the 13th TD, shot down by Soviet troops in the Dnepropetrovsk region. Ukraine, September 1941

Senior political officer VN Avdeev distributes to the Red Army soldiers IS Bazdev and FI Astafiev gifts received from the workers of the city of Melitopol. Southwestern Front, September 1941

An artillery tractor ZiS-5 NATI with a 152-mm M-10 howitzer of the 1938 model, which fell into a ravine, is in tow. Ukraine, August 1941

Armored control car Sd.Kfz.263, shot down by soldiers of the South-Western Front. Equipped with handrail radio antenna for long range transmitter. Ukraine, August 1941

A group of commanders and political workers of the 108th Panzer Division of the Red Army, who participated in the attack on Guderian's tank group. From left to right: Astakhov, Seliverstov, Lutsenko, Grishin, Ivanov, Eremin, Perepechin. Bryansk Front, strike group of the 3rd Army of the Red Army, September 1941

Heroes of the tankers who participated in the battles with the Guderian group. From left to right: Grigory Breslavets - junior lieutenant, destroyed 3 German tanks and 2 150-mm guns with his tank; Ivan Venzhega - senior sergeant, destroyed 3 enemy tanks and up to an enemy infantry company. Bryansk Front, September 1941

Lunch at Lieutenant Colonel Gruzdev's unit. Bryansk Front, shock units of the 3rd Army of the Red Army, September 1941

A peasant woman gives the soldiers of the Red Army fresh milk to drink. Red Army soldiers are armed with 7.62 mm SVT-40 self-loading rifles. Bryansk Front, September 1941

Marshal S.K. Timoshenko, commander of the troops of the YuZN. Snapshot of the second half of the 30s

German experts inspecting a wrecked Soviet T-34-76 tank manufactured at the end of August 1941. This combat vehicle probably belongs to the 1st Tank Brigade of the Red Army, attached to the 2nd Cavalry Corps of the Red Army. Ukraine, area of ​​the city of Romny, September 1941

The crew of the BT-7 light tank under the command of Sergeant N. Nikitin from the 129th Tank Brigade of the Red Army. South-Western Front, September 1941 Soviet soldiers who went to the location of their troops from the German encirclement. Ukraine, September 1941

Soviet soldiers who went to the location of their troops from the German encirclement. Ukraine, September 1941

Members of the heroic tank crew of the BT tank, who distinguished themselves in battles near the city of Romny. From left to right: tank commander, political officer N. T. Borovtsev, gunner-radio operator N. Dolgikh, driver Sergeant Sh. Kh. Khabibulin. Southwestern Front, 1st Tank Brigade, September 1941

Heavy tank KV abandoned by the Soviet crew. Probably, the tankers tried to tow the combat vehicle, but for some reason this was not possible. The tank went to the Germans. Ukraine, September 1941

A typical caponier mount for a 76.2 mm gun (side and top view). The characteristics of this installation are as follows: the height of the line of fire (at an elevation angle of 0 °) is 1080 mm, the height of the axis of the pins is 880 mm, the normal length of the rollback of the barrel is 990–1040 mm, the maximum possible length of the rollback of the barrel is 1080 mm, the maximum elevation angle is 12 °, the maximum angle of declination 7°, firing sector 40–60°, maximum firing range (at an angle of 12°) 5.5 km

Typical machine-gun armored casemate of light type (top and side view)

Metal machine for the easel machine gun of the Maxim system (side view)

The device of a machine-gun machine for casemate-type armored closures (side view)

During the first 20 days of the war, the Wehrmacht infantry passed 250 kilometers from the border to the Sluch River (judging by the map of the German General Staff, by the evening of July 10, at the turn of the Sluch River or east of it, there were 299, 298, 44, 111, 75, 57, 9 and 297- I infantry divisions), and the tanks went even further to the east.

Such a pace was in no way inferior to what Soviet historiography called "the triumphal march of German troops across France." And in September 1939, during the so-called liberation campaign, the Red Army occupied the eastern provinces of Poland (later called Western Ukraine) a little faster, despite the fact that the Polish army was already in a state of agony by that time.

The price of victory

What price did the Wehrmacht pay for a success of this magnitude?

First of all, it is worth noting the stunning numbers of losses of anti-tank guns in the formations of the 1st Tank Group (recall that these are not only tank and motorized, but also infantry divisions attached to tank corps at the initial stage of the operation). During the long 42 days of the war, during the time when the Southwestern Front lost more than four thousand tanks, the Germans lost only 105 anti-tank guns (see table 1).

The last two lines of the table deserve special attention. One side of the armed confrontation is losing hundreds of "new types" tanks, while the other side is losing only 18 guns, theoretically capable of penetrating the armor of the KV or T-34. Here it is also necessary to take into account that the table shows the losses on August 3, and the tanks in the tank units of the South-Western Front "ended" in quantities worthy of mention three or four weeks earlier; accordingly, some (hardly anyone can give exact numbers) part of these guns was lost already without any interaction with the tanks of the Red Army.

Of course, not only the artillerymen of the divisions of the 1st Panzer Group of the Wehrmacht fired at Soviet tanks. Some comrades argue that heavy Soviet tanks were destroyed mainly by the fire of 88-mm anti-aircraft guns and the elite anti-aircraft regiment "Hermann Goering" was used for these purposes in the offensive zone of Army Group South. Alas, the loss of personnel of this unit casts doubt on the fact that German anti-aircraft gunners even saw more than a dozen KV tanks. As of July 2, the losses amounted to five people killed and 21 wounded, by July 16, the losses of the regiment rose to 10 killed and 35 wounded. At the same time, one should not forget that no one released anti-aircraft gunners from their direct duties, and Soviet planes bombed and fired at them with far from inflatable balls ...

Losses (killed, wounded, missing) of the personnel of the motorized formations of the Army Group "South" are presented in table 2.

The unusually high (by the standards of the Wehrmacht) losses of the tank divisions of the 48th TK is a completely understandable result of the battle near Dubno (see the losses of the 16th TD by July 4), near Ostrog (where the 11th TD is almost completely alone under a hail of blows Soviet aviation fought against the 109th MD, 213th MD and the tank regiment of the 57th TD) and near Berdichev, where fresh 16th mechanized corps and 3rd PTABR were on the way of German tanks, which had not previously participated in the battles. The relatively low losses of the formations of the 14th TK (9th TD and the Viking SS motorized division) are equally easily explained - the corps was put into battle six to seven days later and advanced south of the main battle area.

The reason for the relatively low losses of the motorized divisions of the 48th and 3rd tank corps (16th MD and 25th MD) is not so obvious. These divisions invariably advanced in the second echelon of their corps, lagging behind the advanced tank divisions by one or two days and by 20-40 kilometers on the ground; apparently, even this difference was enough to make their losses half as much. If such an assumption is correct, then it suggests that even in those cases when the Germans ran into the resistance of units of the Red Army, this resistance did not last long and the collection of prisoners and trophies remained for the share of the divisions of the second echelon.

Collage by Andrey Sedykh

The losses of the infantry divisions attached to the tank corps were on the whole even lower. So, by July 2, the 57th Infantry Division lost 211 people (54 killed, 157 wounded), the 44th Infantry Division lost only 104 people. High (by Wehrmacht standards) losses are found only in the 298th Infantry Division - 520 people, it can be assumed that this is the result of a meeting with the 131st Motorized Division at the turn of the Styr River north of Lutsk.

In general and on average, the division of the 1st Tank Group in the battles of the first three weeks of the war lost 60 people a day. Over a twice longer time period, for 42 days of the war (until August 3), the 1st TGr lost 16,584 people (5,029 killed and missing, 11,555 wounded), that is, about 45 per division per day.

Judging by the entry in Halder's diary dated August 2, the losses of the entire Army Group South (including the formations of the 11th Army, which entered the battle from July 2) amounted to 63 thousand people, which, in terms of the number of divisions, gives even slightly less (32– 37 people) figures for average daily losses. The absolute maximum was most likely the losses of the 68th Infantry Division, which in three days of fighting (June 24-26) with the tanks of the 4th mechanized corps near Krakovets, Yavorov lost 547 people killed and wounded (182 per day).

The final conclusion is beyond doubt: 35, and 45, and 60, and even 180 people per division per day - this is the level of losses at which the question of "fierce battles and fierce resistance of the Red Army" can be considered closed.

Tanks don't burn

The irretrievable losses of German tanks were exceptionally low. By July 5, the 1st Panzer Group had lost only 85 tanks, and this number included 11 Pz-I tankettes. In the future, the rate of increase in losses even decreased, and by August 3, the total irretrievable losses of German tanks (including Pz-I and the so-called commanders) amounted to 156 pieces. Comparing these figures with the losses of personnel, we see that in the tank divisions of the Wehrmacht, for one irretrievably lost tank, there were 60-70 killed and wounded people. Even if we divide this figure by four (assuming that the losses of the personnel of the tank regiment were about one-fourth of the losses of the division), then the losses of tankers in the belligerent army will still be an order of magnitude greater than the losses of tanks.

The Germans took care of their small tanks, so each division had a large (exceeding irretrievable losses) number of tanks temporarily out of order and under repair. In mid-July, the specific loss pattern is shown in Table 3.

Taken together in a single table, these figures clearly show that in divisions involved in fierce battles (11th TD, 16th TD), irretrievable losses are approximately equal to the number of tanks temporarily out of action. On the contrary, where they marched more than they fought (9th TD), there are significantly more tanks in repair than irretrievably lost ones. This fact gives grounds to assume that temporarily out of order tanks are not only (and not so much) knocked out, but not finished off by enemy fire, but also mediocrely broken down for technical reasons.

It is worth recalling here that without exception, all German tanks ran on gasoline, and the calibers of Soviet anti-tank guns started at 45 mm; the German tank that actually received a shell in the side had a great chance of catching fire; a burnt tank cannot be repaired (heating causes the so-called tempering of armored steel, after which the remains of the tank are suitable only for remelting).

“A lot” and “little” are relative concepts. If we recall that by the beginning of the war, the troops of the Kyiv OVO were armed with 1900 anti-tank 45-mm guns, 870 divisional 76-mm guns, 1140 anti-aircraft guns of 76 mm and 88 mm caliber (and this is not counting 4.5 thousand 45-mm and 76- mm guns in the turrets of tanks and armored vehicles), then against this background, the losses of Wehrmacht tanks are negligible. In relation to the initial number of tanks of the 1st TGr (728 units), the losses turned out to be very large, and already in mid-July a little more than half of the initial number of tanks was in good condition. In fact, the tank formations of the Wehrmacht turned into a motorized infantry division, reinforced by a battalion of tanks.

The cost of defeat

Now let's look at the situation from the other side of the front. One of the many fundamental differences between the USSR and France or Poland was the geography of a completely different scale, and on this scale, the loss of a “plot of land” measuring 250 by 250 kilometers (which is larger than the area of ​​​​the territory of countries such as Belgium, Holland, Denmark or Switzerland) didn't pose much of a problem. The misfortune, the real irreversible misfortune, was the loss of the army that was in this territory. What was managed to be withdrawn beyond the line of fortified areas on the “old border” was only scattered remnants of the troops of the Kyiv OVO, which, as of the morning of June 22, was not inferior in number and armament to the armies of the largest European powers.

A document has been preserved that makes it possible to present the losses of the troops of the front in concrete numbers. At the headquarters of the South-Western Front, a certificate was prepared "Information on formations and individual units that are part of the armies of the front as of 15.7.41." The certificate contains data on the number of personnel for 28 divisions (of all types). The arithmetic mean is 4,086, which at first glance suggests that the casualties amounted to "only" 60 percent of the original strength.

Alas, this is a crafty figure, reminiscent of the notorious "average temperature in the hospital." For a more realistic assessment, it should, firstly, be taken into account that the list contains three divisions of the 12th Army (44th and 192nd Guards Rifle Division and 240th Guards Rifle Division), which were hundreds of kilometers from the battlefield and were practically inactive; it is enough to remove them from the general list, as the average number of front divisions drops to 3317 people.

But that's not all. Regarding the 15 rifle divisions, the compilers of the certificate were forced to limit themselves to the short “no reports”, which in the real situation of the summer of 1941 did not give grounds for optimism; this list included, for example, the 124th SD, which later emerged from the encirclement of 1.5 thousand people, and the 228th SD, defeated in several days of fighting near Mlynov and Dubno. Three rifle divisions of the 6th Army (the heroic 41st and the 97th and 159th, which melted in the first days of the war in the Lvov direction) do not appear on the list at all, there is no information on six divisions of the 8th and 15th mechanized corps in the certificate. It is clear that if the figures of the remnants of the personnel of these formations were taken into account in the certificate, then the average number of front divisions would be significantly less than three thousand.

Reasonable doubts are caused by the reliability of the data themselves included in the certificate. Here, for example, is the 135th Infantry Division (5th Army), which was defeated on June 24 in the very first battle near Voinitsa and later occasionally appears in documents only in the context of "parts of the division randomly retreated." As Vladimirsky writes (and he writes not from memory, but with reference to the primary document stored in TsAMO), by June 30 "in the 135th rifle division, together with the 16th rifle regiment of the 87th division, only 1511 people remained". Two weeks later, there could only have been fewer people in the division, however, in the certificate of the headquarters of the South-Western Front, the line of the 135th rifle division contains the number 3335. It is alleged that there were still 56 guns in the 135th rifle division, but it is very difficult to believe that the division, which lost more than 80 percent of the personnel, retained half of the artillery pieces.

According to the compilers of the certificate, by July 15, 33 guns still remained in the 81st Motorized Division (4th MK). Where does this "abundance" come from? The artillery regiment of the division was defeated and all its materiel was lost on June 25 in the battle near Krakovets, Yavorov. Opersvodka No. 010 of the headquarters of the 81st MD, compiled on July 8, after the remnants of the division were withdrawn to the rear, has been preserved. In accordance with this document, there are no guns at all in the 202nd MRR, two 76-mm guns remain in the 323rd MRR, in the artillery regiment of the division “up to 20% of the personnel, no artillery, except for rifles, there are no weapons”, there is no information on the state of the anti-tank division. Further, it is reported that a “consolidated battalion” was formed from the remnants of the 202nd and 323rd regiments, however, in the certificate, the number of the 81st MD is indicated in the amount of 3287 people. Too much for a battalion...

Precise information about the losses of the Southwestern Front will most likely never be given; The available primary documents suggest that by July 10, no less than 70-80 percent of the personnel in the divisions that found themselves in the enemy offensive zone had been lost. Altogether, this means a loss 300-350 thousand people, which is ten times more enemy losses.

The facts force us to reconsider the opinion that has been established in Russian historiography that in the first weeks of the war on the Southwestern Front, unlike the neighboring Western Front, everything was not so bad, the encirclement catastrophe was avoided, and the troops were withdrawn to the east in a more or less organized manner. . Alas, to the east, beyond the line of the "old border", the remnants of the troops were withdrawn, in which the division turned into a badly battered rifle regiment.

Like dew at dawn

From the mechanized formations of the Southwestern Front - the largest and most powerful in the entire Red Army - there were numbers and the name "Tank Division". In a completely official statistical collection, “Secrecy has been removed. Losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR ”it is reported that by July 6 the Southwestern Front had irretrievably lost 4381 tanks. 50 times more enemy losses. Of course, the claimed attempt to establish Soviet losses with an accuracy of one tank can hardly be taken seriously, but the general order of magnitude is beyond doubt: the tanks were lost almost completely (more than 90%). With regard to many divisions that found themselves in the epicenter of the battle in Western Ukraine, the "almost" clause can be completely removed.

Available documents allow in some cases to "tweak the sharpness" and consider the process of the disappearance of mighty mechanized corps in detail. Let's start with the 37th Panzer Division (15th MK), after which there was a report with a detailed list of personnel losses. So, 103 people were killed, 280 were wounded. The numbers are very modest, in any division of the Wehrmacht that fought from June 22, there were much more killed and wounded. But the list of losses of the 37th Panzer Division does not end with these figures, it is just beginning.

653 people "disappeared". 2040 people left with the cryptic wording "for other reasons." Is it all losses? No, not yet. Approximately 2.5 thousand people disappeared without any explanation. Simple arithmetic leads us to this conclusion: by the beginning of the war, the division had (according to the August report of the command) 9,775 people, and by July 12, 2,423 people had reached the concentration area near the city of Pyriatyn (this is already beyond the Dnieper). According to the August report of the command of the 15th MK, even less - only 2021 people.

This is how the "pyramid" of irretrievable losses turns out: 103, 653, 4500. Killed, "missing", disappeared. By a strange coincidence of arithmetic circumstances, the number of those killed is exactly 50 times less than the number of "missing".

It is worth paying attention to the amazing ratio of losses of tanks and tankers. Only six tanks (one T-34 and five T-26) out of 312, which were considered serviceable by the beginning of the war, came out to Piryatin. But at the same time, the losses of the personnel of the two tank regiments of the division taken into account (we emphasize this word with three lines) amount to only 112 people (50 killed, 62 wounded). But maybe this is such a unique, extremely disorganized division? Let's continue the boring work with numbers and turn to the documents of the division, which is really unique.

The 34th Panzer Division of Colonel Vasilyev actually fought for five whole days (from June 26 to 30), in the last of these days the enemy was outnumbered many times over, the 34th Panzer created such problems for the Germans that they were reflected in the documents of the Wehrmacht high command; many primary documents remained from this division, including the Journal of Combat Actions, compiled directly in the course of these actions. The division is undoubtedly unique, the best of the best. In the August report on the combat operations of the division, the following numbers of personnel losses are given: 209 killed, 456 wounded and sick, 4388 missing.

Alas, even in this heroic division, there are 20 times more missing than those killed. However, even here, the arithmetic of losses categorically “does not converge” - judging by the balance of the initial and final presence of personnel, in addition to the clearly recorded “missing”, it is not known where several thousand more people disappeared. And in this division, the number of lost tanks (275 units, not counting the faulty ones, not counting all the heavy five-tower giants T-35) significantly exceeds the counted number of killed and wounded in two tank regiments (136 people in total).

"Tanks raced, shaking the ground..."

Now let's turn to the documents of the mighty 4th mechanized corps of Vlasov. With an insignificant result, having fought on the "Lviv ledge", the corps began a swift march to the east. On June 29, Lvov was left, on July 3 the mechanized corps was already in Zbarazh (135 kilometers east of Lviv), the morning of July 9 found the 4th MK in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe town of Ivanopol (180 kilometers from Zbarazh). Finally, on July 12, the remnants of the most powerful tank formation in the Red Army crossed the Kyiv bridges across the Dnieper and concentrated in the Priluki area (650 kilometers east of the border). In fact, there was no single and controlled mechanized corps for a long time, since during the withdrawal, individual divisions of the corps divisions were united, separated, transferred to other parts of the front, etc.

Judging by the report of the commander of the 32nd TD, the losses of this division, which was armed with a record number of "new types" tanks (49 KV and 173 T-34), were as follows. A total of 269 tanks were lost: 37 KV, 146 T-34, 28 BT-7, 58 T-26. Where, when and under what circumstances such a mountain of the latest military equipment was lost is impossible to understand. In the June battles, judging by the same report, the division lost 34 tanks (15 in the counterattack near Yavorov, eight during the withdrawal to Lvov, 11 tanks allegedly lost two battalions sent to Radzekhuv). The only episode related to the combat losses of tanks during the retreat to the east is described in the report as follows:

“On July 10, 1941, a group of tanks under Captain Karpov (10 tanks and 2 armored vehicles) concentrated in the Beizymovka area and attacked the enemy in the direction of Olshanka at 20 o’clock, but, not supported by infantry, retreated at 23 o’clock and took up defenses 300-400 m south Olshanka. During the next day, the group fought an unbearable battle in the same area, and as a result of the flight from the front of the 32nd motorized rifle regiment, it was destroyed and left on the battlefield, with the exception of one tank.

In total, 43 tanks lost in battle are recruited. It can be assumed that several more pieces were lost in skirmishes with the enemy, which the compilers of the report forgot to mention. On July 3, the division transferred 10 tanks to another unit, which is described in the report with a completely untranslatable phrase: "Commander of the 37th Rifle Corps on behalf of the Military Council(which armed forces? front? army?) were detained and left to reinforce the 32nd separate anti-aircraft artillery division(what is this?) 10 tanks under the command of Captain Yegorov". Be that as it may, the loss of about 200 tanks does not have any explanation in the report.

The losses of the personnel of the 32nd Panzer Division are indicated twice and in different ways. The text of the report itself says: "The division lost 103 people killed and 259 people wounded". However, in the appendix to the report (“information on the losses of units of the 32nd TD for the period from June 22 to July 30. 41”), large numbers are given: a total of 495 people were lost (139 killed, 356 wounded), including 191 in two tank regiments people (64 killed, 127 wounded). Losses are approximately the same order as in the divisions mentioned above, the losses of the personnel of tank regiments are also less than the number of lost tanks. The most important thing is that the data given in the report on the number of killed and wounded are ten times less than the actual losses of the division. The division entered the war with 9,337 men, and by July 15, according to the information of the front headquarters, only 736 men remained in it. Where are the other eight thousand people?

The second tank division of the 4th MK was equipped with the latest tanks a little worse - the 8th TD was armed with 50 KV and 140 T-34s (as well as 122 serviceable tanks of the "old types"). I was not able to establish the exact number of personnel of the division based on the identified documents, but knowing the total number of people in the mechanized corps (33,734 people), it can be assumed that there were at least 9.5-10 thousand people in the division. By July 13, the state of the 8th TD in the Journal of Combat Operations (ZhBD) was described as follows: “The division (9 tanks, 600 SMEs) is on the defensive on a wide front Andrushevka, Mal. Klitenka, Kropyvna...» Prior to that, judging by the records in the same railway, the division lost 50 tanks in the June battles (including the loss of the "consolidated tank regiment" transferred to the operational subordination of the commander of the 15th mechanized corps). Nine more tanks were lost during the withdrawal. Where is everyone else?

Indestructible gaziki

The report on the combat operations of the 8th Panzer Division is accompanied by the "Statement of the availability of combat and auxiliary vehicles." This document is remarkable in that it reveals the incredible survivability of the indestructible Soviet trucks. By August 1, the division had three tanks left out of 312 that were considered serviceable as of June 22. Lost 99 percent of the tanks. But out of 572 ZIS-5 trucks, 317 pieces survived, out of 360 cargo trucks, 139 survived. Yes, and passenger cars turned out to be invulnerable - out of 23, 17 survived.

Such interesting proportions could be understood in a situation where tanks are lost during many days of fierce battles; in this case, the loss of trucks of the tank division, which, although they are not far from the battlefield, but still do not go to the very front line, could be less. But the 8th Panzer lost its tanks during multi-day marches. As modern Russian historians explain to us - from the strikes of the ubiquitous and all-destroying German aviation. What kind of bombings are these, under which diesel (!) Tanks, covered with armor impenetrable to fragments, burn like candles, and miserable plywood gas trucks with gasoline engines go on and on and on?

Against the background of such "order in the tank units", the report on the losses of personnel of the 8th TD already looks quite ordinary. In the division, which by July 13 had become an incomplete battalion, only the following losses were taken into account (as of July 30): 306 killed, 696 wounded, 1,033 missing. The absence of another 6-6.5 thousand people is not explained in any way.

Another "old" personnel division, which received a fair amount of "new types" tanks (63 KV and 38 T-34) before the start of the war, is the 10th Panzer. The division went beyond the Dnieper, having in its composition 4650 people (according to the report of the command of the 15th MK) or even 5253 (according to the report of the division command). This is an absolute "record" among all tank divisions of the Southwestern Front.

Here, however, it is appropriate to recall the aphorism about "half-empty or half-full glass." The 10th TD lost half of its personnel - is it very little or very much? No less relevant is the question of where these five thousand people were, if on July 7 from all parts of the division it was possible to collect "a consolidated infantry battalion from the 10th SME, a tank company from the 20th TP, a consolidated artillery battalion consisting of 3 152-mm guns and 2 122-mm guns, a reconnaissance company consisting of 6 armored vehicles and 2 BT tanks, a communications platoon and 2 walkie-talkies 5-AK".

Loss arithmetic traditionally "does not converge". The August report of the division command gives the following figures: 210 killed, 587 wounded. There is no simple and honest column “missing in action”, it has been replaced by such polysyllabic constructions as “did not return from the battlefield when attacking and when leaving the battle”, “lagged behind on the march”, “did not leave the battle when surrounded by the enemy”; in total, 2,145 people left on these grounds. About 1.5 thousand more (and this is if you believe that 5 thousand went beyond the Dnieper to Piryatin) are absent without explanation.

In the June battles at Radzekhuv and Lopatin, the 10th TD lost (more precisely, these losses are mentioned in the reports of the division and mechanized corps command) exactly 60 tanks, including 14 KV and 7 T-34s. After that, there was a continuous retreat to the east, but by the morning of July 6, only 20 tanks remained in the division (including two KVs and three T-34s). About 250 tanks, including 47 invincible KVs and 28 T-34s, were lost no one knows where and how. Everything went much better with cars: 648 units left the Dnieper (more than half of the original number of vehicles).

No questions

The final conclusion from this sea of ​​numbers is obvious: the combat (directly related to the enemy's influence) losses of the Southwestern Front are many times less than the losses from overt and covert desertion. The fat herds of Soviet/Russian scientists, who had been grazing in the field of studying the history of the Great Patriotic War for half a century, did not see these figures point-blank. It is understandable - "historians" had to tell stories about "mass heroism unparalleled in history." Another thing is much more important - did the high command of the Red Army understand the meaning of what happened? Today, on the basis of the identified documents, we can give a very specific answer to this question - as you understand!

There is a piece of paper in the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense (TsAMO, f. 38, op. 11360, d. 5, l. 35). On it is a typewritten table with figures of the initial number and loss of tanks and vehicles of the 2nd and 18th mechanized corps of the Southern Front. Quite typical figures: the tanks were gone, the cars remained. These figures are underlined by someone's hand, and at the bottom of the sheet in a round, clear handwriting is written: “It’s clear that they didn’t lead the rear, they succumbed to panic and draped, leaving the corps without used supplies and fuel and lubricants”.

The assistant to the commander of the South-Western Front, Major General of the Tank Forces Volsky, also tried to clarify the situation:

“The loss figures in the statement are purely indicative. Material has been collected, there are acts for each machine of irretrievable losses, but the final answer can only be submitted after reviewing the acts, conducting an additional investigation, which should reveal the true causes and number of irretrievable losses ... I ask for the second time to send commissions to review the materials on the spot and establish the reasons irretrievable losses of the material part ... "

“Now I am paying exceptional attention to finding out why so much materiel was lost, under what circumstances the materiel was left and how much of it. Apparently, someone will have to be brought to justice, who left the materiel out of confusion, so that it would be discourteous for the future ... "

“It has been established that the driver-mechanics(Handwritten word "some." - M.S.) BT and T-26 vehicles tend to damage the vehicle and not go into battle. These are individuals, but nonetheless they exist. The struggle is simple: on trial and execution, but it is very difficult to establish the fact of damage. There were cases when a number of cars went into the forest, defended in the forest with a reference to a malfunction, and after the battle they left. In this matter, the political apparatus and the Special Department must work hard ... "

“In this case” there could be exactly two options. Or condescendingly wave your hand, saying something like "for one beaten they give two unbeaten." Or call everything that happened in the first days of the war "treason", "sabotage", "complicity with the enemy" and punish accordingly. It was impossible to get off with a stern reprimand in a situation where for one killed in battle there are 50 disappeared, when tanks break down all at once, and vehicles are rapidly rushing east. Only one person could choose one of the two, and everyone knew his name.

Stalin thought about it and made a decision in mid-July. “So that it would be repulsive for the future” they arrested (and subsequently shot) a large group of the highest command staff of the Western Front, headed by General of the Army Pavlov. The Leader forgave all the other commanders - he had no other generals for this war.

The beginning of the war on the Southwestern Front

According to the Thunderstorm plan, the southwestern strategic direction was defined as the main one, therefore more troops were concentrated on the territory of the Kyiv Special Military District than in the ZapOVO and PribOVO combined. A.M. Vasilevsky recalled: “Speaking of the alleged direction of the enemy’s main attack, B.M. Shaposhnikov considered that the deployment of the main forces of the German army to the north of the mouth of the San River was the most advantageous for Germany, and therefore the most probable. Accordingly, the plan was supposed to deploy our main forces in the sectors of the North-Western and Western fronts ... However, when considering it, I.V. Stalin, referring to the most likely direction of the main attack of a potential enemy, expressed his point of view. In his opinion, in the event of war, Germany will try to direct its main efforts not in the center, but in the southwest, in order first of all to seize from us the richest industrial, raw materials and agricultural regions. In accordance with this, the General Staff was instructed to revise the plan, providing for the concentration of the main grouping of our troops in the South-Western direction.

Moreover, on the eve of the war, the grouping of Soviet troops in the southwestern direction was constantly increasing.

Marshal I.Kh. Bagramyan, at that time the head of the operational department of the headquarters of the Kyiv Special Military District, recalled: “In the second half of May, we received a directive from the General Staff, in which the command of the district was ordered to accept from the North Caucasian Military District and place in the camps the command of the 34th Rifle Corps with corps units, four 12,000-strong rifle and one mountain rifle divisions ...

At the end of May, trains after trains began to arrive in the district. The operational department turned into a kind of control center, where all the information about the movement and condition of the troops received from the North Caucasus Military District flowed ...

No sooner had five divisions from the North Caucasian Military District completed their concentration on the territory of our district than in the first days of June the General Staff announced that the Directorate of the 19th Army had been formed by directive of the People's Commissar of Defense, which would arrive in Cherkassy by June 10. The army will include all five divisions of the 34th Rifle Corps and three divisions of the 25th Rifle Corps of the North Caucasus Military District. It was headed by the commander of the troops of the North Caucasian Military District, Lieutenant General I.S. Konev.

A day later, the General Staff warned the district command to prepare to receive and deploy another one - the 16th Army of Lieutenant General M.F. Lukin, transferred from Transbaikalia. The plan provided for the concentration of General Lukin's troops on the territory of the Kyiv Special Military District in the period from June 15 to July 10.

So, we had to accept the second army as soon as possible and place it on the territory of the district. It pleased. The fear that in the event of war we would not be in the depths of the troops fell away by itself. Now it has become quite clear that the People's Commissar and the General Staff took care of this, giving the order to prepare for the advancement of all the forces of the district directly to the border.

Looking ahead, it should be noted that the head of the operational headquarters of the KOVO rejoiced prematurely. After June 22, all these troops were taken from the district. “In the very first days of the war,” wrote G.K. Zhukov, - the 19th Army, a number of units and formations of the 16th Army, previously concentrated in Ukraine and pulled up there recently, had to be transferred to the western direction and included on the move in battles as part of the Western Front.

Nevertheless, there were still more troops on the Southwestern Front than on other fronts. It is not surprising that on June 22 the Germans were unable to make a deep breakthrough in this direction. And the 9th and 18th armies of the Southern Front, against which the much less combat-ready Romanian troops mainly acted, held out in Bessarabia for three whole weeks.

The troops of Army Group South, which were to act directly in the southwestern direction, included the 1st Panzer Group of Field Marshal von Kleist, the 6th and 17th armies under the command of Field Marshal von Reichenau and General Colonel von Stulpnagel. In total, they were armed with about 1,200 tanks, 1,200 combat aircraft, 16,000 guns and mortars. At the same time, the German 11th, 3rd and 4th Romanian armies and the Hungarian expeditionary force, which were subordinate to the commander of the South group, Field Marshal Gerd von Runstedt, were only supposed to hold back the Soviet troops in the southern direction, since about their Allies Hitler and his generals did not build any illusions.

The KOVO troops that opposed the invasion forces in the first echelon had the 5th, 6th, 12th and 26th armies. Together with the 9th and 18th armies, they could field 8,000 tanks, 4,500 combat aircraft, 26,500 guns and mortars on the battlefield. In manpower, the ratio with the enemy was almost equal.

The scheme of operations of the Army Group "South" in general corresponded to the plan of the "Barbarossa" plan. The Germans concentrated their strike forces in narrow areas and delivered the main blows to the vulnerable places of the enemy's defense. At the junction between the Vladimir-Volynsky and Strumilovsky fortified areas, the 1st tank group was supposed to make a breakthrough. The mobile tank-motorized units of the 17th Army were to break through at the junction between the Rava-Russky and Przemyslsky URs. At the same time, part of the German infantry divisions were allocated for frontal attacks in order to pin down the defending units of the Red Army.

On the morning of June 22, von Kleist's tanks successfully broke through at the junction of the 57th and 124th rifle divisions, which, as was the case almost everywhere, did not have time to advance to the border fortifications. Thus, a gap was formed between the 5th and 6th Soviet armies, where the German command began to quickly introduce motorized troops. By the end of the day, the Germans took Sokal. At the same time, the commander of the 5th Army, Major General M.I. Potapov did not have the opportunity to concentrate his 22nd mechanized corps to localize the German breakthrough throughout the day, since his units were at a considerable distance from each other. As for the frontal attacks of the German infantry on the URs, they were everywhere repulsed by the fighters of the 15th Rifle Corps of Major General I.I. Fedyuninsky.

On the left flank of the Southwestern Front, the fighting developed somewhat differently. On the site of the Rava-Russian fortified area, the border detachment of Major Ya.D. managed to take up firing positions. Small, 35th and 140th separate machine-gun battalions and the 41st rifle division of Major General G.N. Mikushev. Therefore, the five German infantry divisions that stormed the UR immediately ran into fierce resistance. Rifle units were supported by two artillery regiments of the 41st division. Then, around 2 pm on June 22, the defenses organized here were strengthened by the approaching batteries of the 209th corps artillery regiment, which was armed with 152-millimeter guns. The enemy failed to complete the combat mission of the day - to take Rava-Russkaya.

The 92nd border detachment, the 52nd and 150th separate machine-gun battalions defended themselves in the zone of the Przemysl UR. Initially, the Germans had some success in this area and took Przemysl in the afternoon. But the 99th Rifle Division of Colonel N.I. was brought up to the city. Dementieva. A joint counterattack by riflemen and border guards managed to drive the Germans out of Przemysl and push them back to their original positions.

Nevertheless, at the junction of the Rava-Russian and Przemysl fortified areas, the Soviet defense was broken through. The 14th German motorized corps knocked down the 97th and 159th Russian rifle divisions from their positions. The 159th Division began a hasty retreat, exposing the flank of the 6th Army. By the end of the day on June 22, there was a gap between the 6th and 26th armies about 15 kilometers wide.

Commander of the 6th Army, Lieutenant General I.N. Muzychenko decided to use the forces of the 4th mechanized corps to launch a counterattack on the enemy that had broken through. But the main problem was that on June 22 the mechanized corps was stretched along the entire front of the army and it took at least a day to assemble it. Since the commander's headquarters received reports from the commanders of rifle divisions who were under a strong emotional impact of the first battles about the superior forces of the enemy, Muzychenko scattered his tanks in all threatening directions. Accordingly, the organization of the counterattack was carried out in a fire order. There was no exact information about the enemy, there was no time to conduct thorough reconnaissance, there was no air cover, communication was constantly broken. Therefore, those tanks that managed to be assembled rushed into battle without interaction and without infantry support. “Undertaken by the commander of the 6th Army, General I.N. Muzychenko's countermeasures did not improve the situation. And by the end of June 24, the gap in defense reached 40 kilometers here, ”stated G.K. Zhukov . Nevertheless, the 41st and 99th Rifle Divisions continued to successfully defend themselves in the fortified areas for another five days.

On the whole, however, the situation at the front worsened more and more. G.K. Zhukov recalled: “At 5 p.m. on June 24, I had a conversation on Bodo with the commander of the 5th Army, General M.I. Potapov.

Zhukov. Submit the situation.

Potapov. Up to five infantry divisions and up to two thousand tanks operate on the Vladova-Ustilug front [in total, Kleist had 700 of them. - Auth.]. At the junction between the 5th and 6th armies, a mechanical unit of an unidentified force. The enemy delivers the main blow in the direction of Vladimir-Volynsky - Lutsk ... I report the position of our army units at 14.20 24.6.41. The 87th Rifle Division occupies the URs in the Ustiluga area with two regiments and is fighting in the encirclement. I have no information about the 124th division since yesterday evening. After the battle, the 41st Panzer Division puts the materiel in order... The main thing I fear is an attack by enemy tank units from the south in the direction of Lutsk. I have absolutely no strength to fend off a blow in a southerly direction ... I ask you to increase assistance with the actions of bomber aircraft, attack and fighter aircraft in the destruction of the enemy’s Vladimir-Volyn grouping ... I have no reserves. The 9th mechanized corps has up to two hundred old tanks. Telephone communication has been destroyed everywhere ... I ask for instructions on further actions.

Zhukov... Muzychenko is leading successful battles north of Kamenka-Strumilovskaya, Rava-Russkaya and further along the state border. The enemy, having introduced a powerful group of tanks, tore the junction between the 5th and 6th armies and is striving to capture Brody ... Measures will be taken with regard to aviation. Nothing has been received or decoded from you on the radio... Close the approaches to Kovel firmly from the north, do not rush with rifle divisions into counterattacks without tanks. For this will not give anything ... Approximately how many tanks did the enemy lose on your front?

Potapov. The 14th air division is subordinate to me, which by the morning of today had 41 aircraft. The order from the front states that the 62nd and 18th bomber divisions are covering us. Where they are - I do not know, I have no connection with them. There are 30 large KB tanks. All of them without shells for 152-mm guns ... About a hundred enemy tanks were destroyed.

Zhukov. The 152 mm KB guns fire 1909-30 shells, so order the 1909-30 concrete-piercing shells to be immediately issued and put into action. You will beat enemy tanks with might and main ... Otherwise, we will organize help. Goodbye". .

On this day, the command of the Southwestern Front and the representative of the Headquarters of the High Command G.K. Zhukov planned a counter-offensive in pursuance of Directive No. 3 in order to defeat the enemy grouping in the Lutsk-Dubno-Brody region. Zhukov himself assessed this document as follows: “General N.F. Vatutin said that I.V. Stalin approved the draft Directive No. 3.

What is this directive? I asked.

The directive provides for the transition of our troops to counter-offensive operations with the task of defeating the enemy in the main directions, moreover, with access to enemy territory.

But we still don’t know exactly where and with what forces the enemy is delivering his blows, ”I objected,“ wouldn’t it be better to figure out what is happening on the fronts before morning. And then make the right decision.” Nevertheless, no one began to understand anything, on June 22 Directive No. 3 was transferred to the troops, and G.K. Zhukov was sent to monitor its implementation as a representative of the Headquarters on the Southwestern Front.

From the Soviet side, powerful forces were thrown into the battle. The 4th, 8th, 9th, 15th, 19th and 22nd mechanized corps acted against the Kleist tank group. At the same time, parts of the 15th mechanized corps were already drawn into the fighting, while all the rest were only concentrating or were just moving forward into the areas of concentration. In the period from June 24 to July 2 inclusive, fierce tank battles broke out in the Lutsk-Dubno-Brody triangle. By the end of June 29, it became obvious to the Soviet command that the counteroffensive had failed. The mechanized corps lost 75-80 percent of the materiel, and therefore it was decided to take them out of the battle as far as possible. On June 30, the Germans captured Kovel, Lutsk and Rovno. Their troops were not weakened enough to stop further advance. Although the German advance on this sector of the front slowed down. Before moving forward, Kleist had to regroup.

Equally unfavorable was the situation on the left flank. On June 27, the rifle units of the 6th and 26th armies, being under the threat of encirclement, left the fortified areas. At the junction between these two armies, large mobile units of the enemy freely operated. On June 29, the Red Army left Lvov.

Seeing no real opportunity to create a solid defense in the border zone, the commander of the Southwestern Front, M.P. Kirponos gave the order to start preparing a defensive line along the line of the old border. But on July 2, the 14th German motorized corps made a swift breakthrough and broke into Ternopil. Thus, the Germans violated the control of the troops of the 6th Army, went to the rear of the 26th and 12th armies. The gap in the front line in this area reached almost 60 kilometers.

Taking into account the sad experience of similar cases on the North-Western and Western fronts, the Stavka sent an order to Kirponos to break away from the enemy and gain a foothold in Novograd-Volynsky, Korostensky, Starokonstantinovsky and Proskurov U Pax in order to contain the Germans on the old border. P.A. Rotmistrov recalled: “The troops of the front had to retreat 120-200 km within seven days. The retreat was planned along the lines at a rate of 25–35 km per day. The general retreat of the front troops took place in the conditions of a lack of ammunition and fuel and lubricants [the ammunition depots and fuel and lubricants were located near the border and were captured by the Germans. - Auth.], under the continuous influence of enemy aircraft. This led to the fact that our units were often forced to burn or blow up precious military equipment.

The German command could not fail to notice the general withdrawal of the Russian troops. Rundstedt ordered Kleist to get ahead of the enemy in order not to allow him to gain a foothold on lines favorable for long-term defense. Knocking down separate Russian barriers, the German 11th Panzer Division broke into Shepetovka on July 4. At the same time, the units of the 7th Rifle Corps that advanced to the Shepetovsky UR were forced to engage in battle on the move and therefore fell under the rout. Developing a further offensive, the 11th Panzer crossed the Sluch and Teterev rivers and captured Berdichev on July 8. In the north, the German 13th Panzer Division, bypassing the Novograd-Volynsky UR, entered Zhitomir. German tanks straddled the highway to Kyiv and were preparing for a direct attack. They were only 131 kilometers away from the capital of Ukraine.

The command of the Southwestern Front was well aware of the threat looming over Kyiv. Kleist's tanks, rushing into the breakthrough, managed to pass more than 100 kilometers along the Zhytomyr highway. But they ran into the first line of the Kyiv fortified area, where our troops were advanced in advance, and could not advance further. On July 9, the 5th Army launched a strong flank attack on the enemy's extended units. CM. Shtemenko noted: “The 5th Army, led by Major General M.I. Potapov, firmly held Polesie and the area adjacent to it. She offered the strongest resistance to the enemy and inflicted significant damage on him. The fascist German troops here failed to quickly break through the front. Potapov's divisions knocked them off the road Lutsk - Rivne - Zhytomyr and forced them to abandon an immediate attack on Kyiv.

From the south, the army of Muzychenko, reinforced by the 16th mechanized corps, who had approached from the reserve, launched a counterattack against the German troops that had broken through. The Germans also threw cash reserves on the near approaches to Kyiv. As a result, protracted battles unfolded on the Korosten - Irpen - Skvira line with varying success, lasting almost two weeks.

By the end of July 19, the troops of Army Group South were forced to go on the defensive. They needed some time to regroup and make up for significant losses. The command of the Southwestern Front was able to buy time to further strengthen the defense of Kyiv.