July 21st, 2012

Empire on a planetary scale

The topic of the Tatar-Mongolian yoke still causes a lot of controversy, reasoning and versions. Was it or was it not, in principle, what role did the Russian princes play in it, who attacked Europe and why, how did it all end? Here is an interesting article on the topic of Batu's campaigns in Russia. Let's get some more information on this...

Historiography about the invasion of the Mongol-Tatars (or the Tatar-Mongols, or the Tatars and the Mongols, and so on, as you like) on Russia has more than 300 years. This invasion has become a generally accepted fact since the end of the 17th century, when one of the founders of Russian Orthodoxy, the German Innokenty Gizel, wrote the first textbook on the history of Russia - "Synopsis". According to this book, the Russians hollowed out their native history for the next 150 years. However, until now, none of the historians has taken the liberty of making a "road map" of Batu Khan's campaign in the winter of 1237-1238 to North-Eastern Russia.

A little background

At the end of the 12th century, a new leader appeared among the Mongol tribes - Temujin, who managed to unite most of them around him. In 1206, he was proclaimed at a kurultai (an analogue of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR) a general Mongol khan under the nickname Genghis Khan, who created the notorious "state of nomads." Then without wasting a minute, the Mongols set about conquering the surrounding territories. By 1223, when the Mongol detachment of the commanders of Jebe and Subudai clashed with the Russian-Polovtsian army on the Kalka River, zealous nomads managed to conquer territories from Manchuria in the east to Iran, the southern Caucasus and modern western Kazakhstan, defeating the state of Khorezmshah and capturing part of northern China along the way.

In 1227, Genghis Khan died, but his heirs continued their conquests. By 1232, the Mongols reached the middle Volga, where they waged war with the nomadic Polovtsy and their allies, the Volga Bulgars (ancestors of the modern Volga Tatars). In 1235 (according to other sources - in 1236), a decision was made at the kurultai on a global campaign against the Kipchaks, Bulgars and Russians, as well as further to the West. This campaign was led by the grandson of Genghis Khan - Khan Batu (Batu). Here we must make a digression. In 1236-1237, the Mongols, who by that time were fighting in vast areas from modern Ossetia (against the Alans) to the modern Volga republics, captured Tatarstan (Volga Bulgaria) and in the fall of 1237 began a concentration for a campaign against the Russian principalities.

In general, why the nomads from the banks of the Kerulen and Onon needed the conquest of Ryazan or Hungary is not really known. All attempts by historians to laboriously justify such a agility of the Mongols look rather pale. Regarding the Western campaign of the Mongols (1235-1243), they came up with a tale that the attack on the Russian principalities was a measure to secure their flank and destroy potential allies of their main enemies - the Polovtsy (the Polovtsy partially went to Hungary, but the bulk of them became the ancestors of modern Kazakhs). True, neither the Ryazan principality, nor Vladimir-Suzdal, nor the so-called. The "Novgorod Republic" were never allies of either the Polovtsians or the Volga Bulgars.

Steppe ubermensch on a tireless Mongolian horse (Mongolia, 1911)

Also, almost all historiography about the Mongols does not really say anything about the principles of the formation of their armies, the principles of their management, and so on. At the same time, it was believed that the Mongols formed their tumens (field operational formations), including from the conquered peoples, nothing was paid for the service of the soldier, for any offense they were threatened with the death penalty.

Scientists tried to explain the successes of the nomads this way and that way, but each time it came out quite funny. Although, in the end, the level of organization of the army of the Mongols - from intelligence to communications, could be envied by the armies of the most developed states of the 20th century (although after the end of the era of miraculous campaigns, the Mongols - already 30 years after the death of Genghis Khan - instantly lost all their skills). For example, it is believed that the head of the Mongolian intelligence, the commander Subudai, maintained relations with the Pope, the German-Roman emperor, Venice, and so on.

Moreover, the Mongols, of course, during their military campaigns acted without any radio communications, railways, road transport, and so on. In Soviet times, historians interspersed the then-traditional fantasy about steppe aubermenshes, who do not know fatigue, hunger, fear, etc., with the classic shamanism in the field of the class-formational approach:

With a general recruitment into the army, each ten wagons had to put up from one to three soldiers, depending on the need, and provide them with food. Weapons in peacetime were stored in special warehouses. It was the property of the state and was issued to soldiers when they went on a campaign. Upon returning from a campaign, each soldier was required to hand over his weapons. The soldiers did not receive salaries, but they themselves paid the tax with horses or other cattle (one head from a hundred heads). In the war, each warrior had an equal right to use booty, a certain part of which he was obliged to hand over to the khan. In the periods between campaigns, the army was sent to public works. One day a week was set aside for the service of the khan.

The decimal system was used as the basis for the organization of the troops. The army was divided into tens, hundreds, thousands and tens of thousands (tumyns or darkness), at the head of which were foremen, centurions and thousandths. The chiefs had separate tents and a reserve of horses and weapons.

The main branch of the army was the cavalry, which was divided into heavy and light. Heavy cavalry fought with the main enemy forces. Light cavalry carried guard duty and conducted reconnaissance. She started a fight, upsetting the enemy ranks with the help of arrows. The Mongols were excellent archers from horseback. The light cavalry pursued the enemy. The cavalry had a large number of clockwork (reserve) horses, which allowed the Mongols to move very quickly over long distances. A feature of the Mongolian army was the complete absence of a wheeled convoy. Only the wagons of the khan and especially noble persons were transported on wagons ...

Each warrior had a file for sharpening arrows, an awl, a needle, thread and a sieve for sifting flour or filtering muddy water. The rider had a small tent, two tursuks (leather bags): one for water, the other for kruta (dried sour cheese). If food supplies ran low, the Mongols bled the horses and drank it. In this way, they could be content with up to 10 days.

In general, the very term "Mongol-Tatars" (or Tatar-Mongols) is very bad. It sounds something like Croatian-Indians or Finno-Negroes, if we talk about its meaning. The fact is that Russians and Poles, who encountered nomads in the 15th-17th centuries, called them the same - Tatars. In the future, the Russians often transferred this to other peoples who had nothing to do with the nomadic Turks in the Black Sea steppes. The Europeans also contributed to this mess, who for a long time considered Russia (then Muscovy) as Tatar (more precisely, Tartaria), which led to very bizarre designs.

The view of the French on Russia in the middle of the 18th century

One way or another, the fact that the “Tatars” who attacked Russia and Europe were also Mongols, the society learned only at the beginning of the 19th century, when Christian Kruse published “Atlas and tables for reviewing the history of all European lands and states from their first population to our times." Then the idiotic term was happily picked up by Russian historians.

Particular attention should also be paid to the issue of the number of conquerors. Naturally, no documentary data on the size of the Mongol army has come down to us, and the most ancient and unquestioningly trusted source among historians is the historical work of a team of authors led by an official of the Iranian state Hulaguid Rashid-ad-Din "List of annals". It is believed that it was written at the beginning of the 14th century in Persian, although it only surfaced at the beginning of the 19th century, the first partial edition in French was published in 1836. Until the middle of the 20th century, this source was not completely translated and published at all.

According to Rashid-ad-Din, by 1227 (the year of the death of Genghis Khan), the total number of the army of the Mongol Empire was 129 thousand people. If you believe Plano Carpini, then 10 years later the army of phenomenal nomads amounted to 150 thousand Mongols proper and another 450 thousand people recruited in a “voluntary-compulsory” order from subject peoples. Pre-revolutionary Russian historians estimated the size of the Batu army, concentrated in the fall of 1237 at the borders of the Ryazan principality, from 300 to 600 thousand people. At the same time, it seemed self-evident that each nomad had 2-3 horses.

By the standards of the Middle Ages, such armies look absolutely monstrous and implausible, we have to admit. However, to reproach pundits for fantasy is too cruel for them. It is unlikely that any of them could even imagine even a couple of tens of thousands of mounted warriors with 50-60 thousand horses, not to mention the obvious problems with managing such a mass of people and providing them with food. Since history is an inexact science, and indeed not a science at all, everyone can evaluate the run-up of fantasy researchers. We will use the already classical estimate of the strength of the Batu army at 130-140 thousand people, which was proposed by the Soviet scientist V.V. Kargalov. His assessment (like all the others, completely sucked from the finger, if we speak with the utmost seriousness) in historiography, however, is prevailing. In particular, it is shared by the largest contemporary Russian researcher of the history of the Mongol Empire, R.P. Khrapachevsky.

From Ryazan to Vladimir

In the autumn of 1237, the Mongol detachments, who fought throughout the spring and summer in the vast expanses from the North Caucasus, the Lower Don and to the middle Volga region, were drawn to the place of general assembly - the Onuz River. It is believed that we are talking about the modern Tsna River in the modern Tambov region. Probably, also some detachments of the Mongols gathered in the upper reaches of the Voronezh and Don rivers. There is no exact date for the start of the Mongols' performance against the Ryazan principality, but it can be assumed that it took place in any case no later than December 1, 1237. That is, the steppe nomads with almost half a million herd of horses decided to go on a campaign already in the winter. This is important for our reconstruction. If so, then they probably had to be sure that in the forests of the Volga-Osk interfluve, still rather weakly colonized by the Russians by that time, they would have enough food for horses and people.

Along the valleys of the Lesnoy and Polny Voronezh rivers, as well as the tributaries of the Pronya River, the Mongol army, moving in one or more columns, passes through the wooded watershed of the Oka and Don. The embassy of the Ryazan prince Fyodor Yuryevich arrives to them, which turned out to be unsuccessful (the prince is killed), and somewhere in the same region the Mongols meet the Ryazan army in the field. In a fierce battle, they destroy it, and then move upstream the Pronya, robbing and destroying small Ryazan cities - Izheslavets, Belgorod, Pronsk, burning Mordovian and Russian villages.

Here it is necessary to make a small clarification: we do not have accurate data on the population in the then North-Eastern Russia, but if we follow the reconstruction of modern scientists and archaeologists (V.P. Darkevich, M.N. Tikhomirov, A.V. Kuza), then it was not large and, in addition, it was characterized by a low density of settlement. For example, the largest city of the Ryazan land - Ryazan, totaled, according to V.P. Darkevich, a maximum of 6-8 thousand people, about 10-14 thousand more people could live in the agricultural district of the city (within a radius of up to 20-30 kilometers). The rest of the cities had a few hundred people, at best, like Murom - up to a couple of thousand. Based on this, it is unlikely that the total population of the Ryazan Principality could exceed 200-250 thousand people.

Of course, 120-140 thousand soldiers were more than an excess number to conquer such a “proto-state”, but we will stick to the classical version.

On December 16, the Mongols, after a march of 350-400 kilometers (that is, the pace of the average daily transition here is up to 18-20 kilometers), go to Ryazan and begin to lay siege to it - they build a wooden fence around the city, build stone-throwing machines, with which they lead bombardment of the city. In general, historians admit that the Mongols achieved incredible - by the standards of that time - success in the siege business. For example, the historian R.P. Khrapachevsky seriously considers that the Mongols were capable of literally a day or two to bung up any stone-throwing machines on the spot from the available wood:

There was everything necessary for the assembly of stone throwers - in the united army of the Mongols there were enough specialists from China and Tangut ..., and the Russian forests supplied the Mongols with wood in abundance for the assembly of siege weapons.

Finally, on December 21, Ryazan fell after a fierce assault. True, an uncomfortable question arises: we know that the total length of the city's defensive fortifications was less than 4 kilometers. Most of the Ryazan soldiers died in the border battle, so it is unlikely that there were many soldiers in the city. Why did the gigantic Mongol army of 140 thousand soldiers sit for 6 whole days under its walls, if the ratio of forces was at least 100-150: 1?

We also do not have any clear evidence of what the climatic conditions were in December 1238, but since the Mongols chose the ice of the rivers as a way of transportation (there was no other way to go through the wooded area, the first permanent roads in North-Eastern Russia are documented only in the XIV century, all Russian researchers agree with this version), it can be assumed that it was already a normal winter with frosts, possibly snow.

Also important is the question of what the Mongolian horses ate during this campaign. From the works of historians and modern studies of steppe horses, it is clear that it was about very unpretentious, small horses, growing at the withers up to 110-120 centimeters. Their main food is hay and grass (they did not eat grain). Under natural habitat conditions, they are unpretentious and quite hardy, and in winter, during tebenevka, they are able to break snow in the steppe and eat last year's grass.

On the basis of this, historians unanimously believe that due to these properties, the question of feeding horses during a campaign in the winter of 1237-1238 did not arise in Russia. Meanwhile, it is not difficult to notice that the conditions in this region (the thickness of the snow cover, the area of ​​grass stands, and the general quality of phytocenoses) differ from, say, Khalkha or Turkestan. In addition, the winter tebenevka of steppe horses is the following: a herd of horses slowly, passing a few hundred meters a day, moves across the steppe, looking for withered grass under the snow. Animals thus save their energy costs. However, in the campaign against Russia, these horses had to travel 10-20-30 or even more kilometers a day in the cold (see below), carrying luggage or a warrior. Were the horses able to replenish their energy costs under such conditions? Another interesting question: if the Mongolian horses dug snow and found grass under it, then what should be the area of ​​their daily fodder grounds?

After the capture of Ryazan, the Mongols began to move towards the fortress of Kolomna, which is a kind of "gateway" to the Vladimir-Suzdal land. Having traveled 130 kilometers from Ryazan to Kolomna, according to Rashid-ad-Din and R.P. Khrapachevsky, the Mongols were “stuck” at this fortress until January 5 or even January 10, 1238 - that is, at least for almost 15-20 days. On the other hand, a strong Vladimir army is moving towards Kolomna, which, probably, the Grand Duke Yuri Vsevolodovich equipped immediately after receiving the news of the fall of Ryazan (he and the Chernigov prince refused to help Ryazan). The Mongols send an embassy to him with a proposal to become their tributary, but the negotiations also turn out to be fruitless (according to the Laurentian Chronicle, the prince nevertheless agrees to pay tribute, but still sends troops to Kolomna. It is difficult to explain the logic of such an act).

According to V.V. Kargalov and R.P. Khrapachevsky, the battle near Kolomna began no later than January 9 and it lasted for 5 whole days (according to Rashid ad-Din). Here another logical question immediately arises - historians are sure that the military forces of the Russian principalities as a whole were modest and corresponded to the reconstructions of that era, when an army of 1-2 thousand people was standard, and 4-5 or more thousand people seemed to be a huge army. It is unlikely that Prince Yuri Vsevolodovich of Vladimir could collect more (if we make a digression: the total population of the Vladimir land, according to various estimates, varied between 400-800 thousand people, but they were all scattered over a vast territory, and the population of the capital city of the earth - Vladimir, even according to the most daring reconstructions, did not exceed 15-25 thousand people). Nevertheless, near Kolomna, the Mongols were shackled for several days, and the intensity of the battle shows the fact of the death of Genghisid Kulkan, the son of Genghis Khan. With whom did the gigantic army of 140 thousand nomads fight so fiercely? With several thousand Vladimir soldiers?

After the victory near Kolomna, either in a three- or five-day battle, the Mongols cheerfully move along the ice of the Moskva River towards the future Russian capital. They cover a distance of 100 kilometers in literally 3-4 days (the pace of the average daily march is 25-30 kilometers): according to R.P. Khrapachevsky, the nomads began the siege of Moscow on January 15 (according to N.M. Karamzin, on January 20). The nimble Mongols took the Muscovites by surprise - they did not even know about the results of the battle of Kolomna, and after a five-day siege, Moscow shared the fate of Ryazan: the city was burned, all its inhabitants were exterminated or taken prisoner.

Again - Moscow of that time, if we take archeological data as the basis for our reasoning, was a completely tiny town. So, the first fortifications, built back in 1156, had a length of less than 1 kilometer, and the area of ​​the fortress itself did not exceed 3 hectares. By 1237, it is believed that the area of ​​fortifications had already reached 10-12 hectares (that is, about half of the territory of the present Kremlin). The city had its own settlement - it was located on the territory of modern Red Square. The total population of such a city hardly exceeded 1000 people. What the huge army of the Mongols, who supposedly have unique siege technologies, did for five whole days in front of this insignificant fortress, one can only guess.

It is also worth noting here that all historians recognize the fact of the movement of the Mongol-Tatars without a convoy. Say, unpretentious nomads did not need it. Then it remains not entirely clear how and on what the Mongols moved their stone-throwing machines, shells for them, forges (for repairing weapons, replenishing the loss of arrowheads, etc.), how they stole prisoners. Since not a single burial of “Mongol-Tatars” was found during the entire period of archaeological excavations in the territory of North-Eastern Russia, some historians even agreed to the version that the nomads took their dead back to the steppes (V.P. Darkevich, V. .V. Kargalov). Of course, it’s not even worth raising the question of the fate of the wounded or sick in this light (otherwise our historians will think of the fact that they were eaten, a joke) ...

Nevertheless, after spending about a week in the vicinity of Moscow and plundering its agricultural contado (the main agricultural crop in this region was rye and partly oats, but the steppe horses perceived grain very poorly), the Mongols moved already along the ice of the Klyazma River (crossing the forest watershed between this river and Moscow-river) to Vladimir. Having traveled over 140 kilometers in 7 days (the pace of the average daily march is about 20 kilometers), on February 2, 1238, the nomads begin the siege of the capital of Vladimir land. By the way, it is at this crossing that the Mongolian army of 120-140 thousand people is "caught" by a tiny detachment of the Ryazan boyar Yevpaty Kolovrat, either 700 or 1700 people, against which the Mongols - out of impotence - are forced to use stone-throwing machines in order to defeat him ( it is worth considering that the legend of Kolovrat was recorded, according to historians, only in the 15th century, so ... it is difficult to consider it completely documentary).

Let's ask an academic question: what is an army of 120-140 thousand people with almost 400 thousand horses (and it's not clear if there is a convoy?), moving on the ice of some river Oka or Moscow? The simplest calculations show that even moving in front of 2 kilometers (in reality, the width of these rivers is much less), such an army in the most ideal conditions (everyone goes at the same speed, observing a minimum distance of 10 meters) stretches for at least 20 kilometers. If we take into account that the width of the Oka is only 150-200 meters, then Batu's gigantic army stretches for almost ... 200 kilometers! Again, if everyone is walking at the same speed, keeping the minimum distance. And on the ice of the Moscow or Klyazma rivers, the width of which varies from 50 to 100 meters at best? At 400-800 kilometers?

It is interesting that none of the Russian scientists over the past 200 years has even asked such a question, seriously believing that giant cavalry armies literally fly through the air.

In general, at the first stage of Batu Khan's invasion of North-Eastern Russia - from December 1, 1237 to February 2, 1238, the conditional Mongolian horse traveled about 750 kilometers, which gives an average daily rate of movement of 12 kilometers. But if we exclude from the calculations at least 15 days of standing in the Oka floodplain (after the capture of Ryazan on December 21 and the battle of Kolomna), as well as a week of rest and looting near Moscow, the pace of the average daily march of the Mongol cavalry will seriously improve - up to 17 kilometers per day.

It cannot be said that these are some kind of record march rates (the Russian army during the war with Napoleon, for example, made 30-40-kilometer daily marches), the interest here is that all this happened in the dead of winter, and such rates were maintained for quite a long time.

From Vladimir to Kozelsk

On the fronts of the Great Patriotic War of the XIII century

Prince Vladimir Yuri Vsevolodovich, having learned about the approach of the Mongols, left Vladimir, leaving with a small squad in the Volga region - there, in the middle of windbreaks on the Sit River, he set up camp and expected reinforcements from his brothers - Yaroslav (father of Alexander Nevsky) and Svyatoslav Vsevolodovich. There were very few warriors left in the city, led by the sons of Yuri - Vsevolod and Mstislav. Despite this, the Mongols spent 5 days with the city, shelling it with stone throwers, taking it only after the assault on February 7. But before that, a small detachment of nomads led by Subudai managed to burn Suzdal.

After the capture of Vladimir, the Mongol army is divided into three parts. The first and largest part under the command of Batu goes from Vladimir to the northwest through the impenetrable forests of the watershed of the Klyazma and the Volga. The first march is from Vladimir to Yuryev-Polsky (about 60-65 kilometers). Further, the army is divided - part goes exactly to the north-west to Pereyaslavl-Zalessky (about 60 kilometers), and after a five-day siege this city fell. What was Pereyaslavl like then? It was a relatively small city, slightly larger than Moscow, although it had defensive fortifications up to 2.5 kilometers long. But its population also hardly exceeded 1-2 thousand people.

Then the Mongols go to Ksnyatin (about another 100 kilometers), to Kashin (30 kilometers), then turn west and move along the ice of the Volga to Tver (from Ksnyatin in a straight line a little more than 110 kilometers, but they go along the Volga, there it turns out all 250- 300 kilometers).

The second part goes through the dense forests of the watershed of the Volga, Oka and Klyazma from Yuryev-Polsky to Dmitrov (in a straight line about 170 kilometers), then after taking it - to Volok-Lamsky (130-140 kilometers), from there to Tver (about 120 kilometers) , after the capture of Tver - to Torzhok (together with the detachments of the first part) - in a straight line it is about 60 kilometers, but, apparently, they walked along the river, so it will be at least 100 kilometers. The Mongols reached Torzhok already on February 21 - 14 days after leaving Vladimir.

Thus, the first part of the Batu detachment travels at least 500-550 kilometers through dense forests and along the Volga in 15 days. True, from here it is necessary to throw out several days of the siege of cities and it turns out about 10 days of the march. For each of which nomads pass through the forests 50-55 kilometers a day! The second part of his detachment travels a total of less than 600 kilometers, which gives an average daily march rate of up to 40 kilometers. Taking into account a couple of days for the siege of cities - up to 50 kilometers per day.

Under Torzhok, a rather modest city by the standards of that time, the Mongols got stuck for at least 12 days and took it only on March 5 (V.V. Kargalov). After the capture of Torzhok, one of the Mongol detachments advanced another 150 kilometers towards Novgorod, but then turned back.

The second detachment of the Mongolian army under the command of Kadan and Buri left Vladimir to the east, moving along the ice of the Klyazma River. Having traveled 120 kilometers to Starodub, the Mongols burned this city, and then “cut off” the wooded watershed between the lower Oka and the middle Volga, reaching Gorodets (this is still about 170-180 kilometers, if in a straight line). Further, the Mongolian detachments on the ice of the Volga reached Kostoroma (this is about 350-400 kilometers), some detachments even reached Galich Mersky. From Kostroma, the Mongols of Buri and Kadan went to join the third detachment under the command of Burundai to the west - to Uglich. Most likely, the nomads moved on the ice of the rivers (in any case, we recall once again, this is customary in Russian historiography), which gives about 300-330 more kilometers of travel.

In the first days of March, Kadan and Buri were already at Uglich, having covered 1000-1100 kilometers in a little over three weeks. The average daily pace of the march was about 45-50 kilometers among the nomads, which is close to the indicators of the Batu detachment.

The third detachment of the Mongols under the command of Burundai turned out to be the “slowest” - after the capture of Vladimir, he marched on Rostov (170 kilometers in a straight line), then overcame another 100 kilometers to Uglich. Part of Burundai's forces made a march to Yaroslavl (about 70 kilometers) from Uglich. In early March, Burundai unmistakably found the camp of Yuri Vsevolodovich in the Volga forests, which he defeated in the battle on the Sit River on March 4. The passage from Uglich to the City and back is about 130 kilometers. Together, Burundai's detachments traveled about 470 kilometers in 25 days - this gives us only 19 kilometers of the average daily march.

In general, the conditional average Mongolian horse clocked up “on the speedometer” from December 1, 1237 to March 4, 1238 (94 days) from 1200 (the lowest estimate, suitable only for a small part of the Mongolian army) to 1800 kilometers. The conditional daily transition ranges from 12-13 to 20 kilometers. In reality, if we throw out standing in the floodplain of the Oka River (about 15 days), 5 days of storming Moscow and 7 days of rest after its capture, a five-day siege of Vladimir, and also another 6-7 days for the siege of Russian cities in the second half of February, it turns out that Mongolian horses traveled an average of 25-30 kilometers for each of their 55 days of movement. These are excellent results for horses, given that all this happened in the cold, in the middle of forests and snowdrifts, with a clear lack of fodder (it is unlikely that the Mongols could requisition a lot of fodder for their horses from the peasants, especially since the steppe horses did not eat practically grain) and hard work.

The steppe Mongolian horse has not changed for centuries (Mongolia, 1911)

After the capture of Torzhok, the bulk of the Mongol army concentrated on the upper Volga in the Tver region. Then they moved in the first half of March 1238 on a broad front to the south in the steppe. The left wing, under the command of Kadan and Buri, passed through the forests of the watershed of the Klyazma and the Volga, then went to the upper reaches of the Moskva River and descended along it to the Oka. In a straight line, this is about 400 kilometers, taking into account the average pace of movement of swift nomads, this is about 15-20 days of travel for them. So, apparently, already in the first half of April, this part of the Mongolian army went to the steppes. We have no information about how the melting of snow and ice on the rivers affected the movement of this detachment (the Ipatiev Chronicle only reports that the steppes moved very quickly). There is also no information about what this detachment did the next month after leaving the steppe, it is only known that in May Kadan and Buri came to the rescue of Batu, who by that time was stuck near Kozelsk.

Small Mongolian detachments, probably, as V.V. Kargalov and R.P. Khrapachevsky, remained on the middle Volga, robbing and burning Russian settlements. How they came out in the spring of 1238 in the steppe is not known.

Most of the Mongol army under the command of Batu and Burundai, instead of the shortest path to the steppe, which the detachments of Kadan and Buri took, chose a very intricate route:

More is known about Batu's route - from Torzhok he moved along the Volga and Vazuz (a tributary of the Volga) to the interfluve of the Dnieper, and from there through the Smolensk lands to the Chernigov city of Vshchizh, lying on the banks of the Desna, writes Khrapachevsky. Having made a detour along the upper reaches of the Volga to the west and northwest, the Mongols turned south, and crossing the watersheds, went to the steppes. Probably, some detachments went in the center, through Volok-Lamsky (through the forests). Tentatively, the left edge of Batu covered about 700-800 kilometers during this time, other detachments a little less. By April 1, the Mongols reached Serensk, and Kozelsk (annalistic Kozeleska, to be precise) - April 3-4 (according to other information - already March 25). On average, this gives us about 35-40 more kilometers of a daily march (moreover, the Mongols are no longer on the ice of the rivers, but through dense forests on the watersheds).

Near Kozelsk, where the ice drift on Zhizdra and the melting of snow in its floodplain could already begin, Batu was stuck for almost 2 months (more precisely, for 7 weeks - 49 days - until May 23-25, maybe later, if we count from April 3, and according to Rashid ad-Din - generally for 8 weeks). Why the Mongols needed to besiege an insignificant, even by medieval Russian standards, town, which has no strategic significance, is not entirely clear. For example, the neighboring towns of Krom, Sleep, Mtsensk, Domagoshch, Devyagorsk, Dedoslavl, Kursk, were not even touched by the nomads.

Historians are still arguing on this topic, no sane argument is given. The funniest version was proposed by the folk historian of the "Eurasian persuasion" L.N. Gumilyov, who suggested that the Mongols took revenge on the grandson of the Chernigov prince Mstislav, who ruled in Kozelsk, for the murder of ambassadors on the Kalka River in 1223. It's funny that the Smolensk prince Mstislav Stary was also involved in the murder of the ambassadors. But the Mongols did not touch Smolensk ...

Logically, Batu had to hastily leave for the steppes, since the spring thaw and lack of food threatened him with a complete loss of at least "transport" - that is, horses.

The question of what the horses and the Mongols themselves ate, besieging Kozelsk for almost two months (using standard stone-throwing machines), none of the historians was puzzled. Finally, it is corny hard to believe that a town with a population of several hundred, even a couple of thousand people, a huge army of Mongols, numbering in the tens of thousands of soldiers, and supposedly having unique siege technologies and equipment, could not take 7 weeks ...

As a result, the Mongols allegedly lost up to 4,000 people near Kozelsk, and only the arrival of the Buri and Kadan detachments in May 1238 saved the situation from the steppes - the town was nevertheless taken and destroyed. For the sake of humor, it is worth saying that the former President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev, in honor of the merits of the population of Kozelsk before Russia, awarded the settlement the title of "City of Military Glory". The humor was that archaeologists, for almost 15 years of searching, could not find unequivocal evidence of the existence of Kozelsk destroyed by Batu. About what passions about this boiled in the scientific and bureaucratic community of Kozelsk, you can.

If we sum up the estimated data in the first and very rough approximation, it turns out that from December 1, 1237 to April 3, 1238 (the beginning of the siege of Kozelsk), the conditional Mongolian horse traveled an average of 1700 to 2800 kilometers. In terms of 120 days, this gives an average daily transition ranging from 15 to 23 kilometers. Since the periods of time are known when the Mongols did not move (sieges, etc., and this is about 45 days in total), the framework of their average daily real march spreads from 23 to 38 kilometers per day.

Simply put, this means more than intense workloads for horses. The question of how many of them survived after such transitions in rather harsh climatic conditions and an obvious lack of food is not even discussed by Russian historians. As well as the question of the actual Mongolian losses.

For example, R.P. Khrapachevsky generally believes that for the entire time of the Western campaign of the Mongols in 1235-1242, their losses amounted to only about 15% of their original number, while the historian V.B. Koshcheev counted up to 50 thousand sanitary losses only during the campaign against North-Eastern Russia. However, all these losses - both in people and horses, the brilliant Mongols quickly made up for at the expense of ... the conquered peoples themselves. Therefore, already in the summer of 1238, the armies of Batu continued the war in the steppes against the Kipchaks, and in 1241, I don’t understand what kind of army invaded Europe at all - so, Thomas of Split reports that it had a huge number of ... Russians, Kipchaks, Bulgars, Mordovians, etc. P. peoples. How many "Mongols" themselves were among them is not really clear.

The Russian princely squads were an excellent army at that time. Their weapons were famous far beyond the borders of Russia, but these squads were few in number and numbered only a few hundred people. In order to organize the defense of the country from a well-prepared aggressive enemy, this was too little. The princely squads were of little use for large forces under a single command, according to a single plan. The main part of the Russian army was made up of urban and rural militias, recruited at the moment of danger. About their weapons and training, we can say that they left much to be desired. Russian cities with their fortifications could not be an insurmountable obstacle to the powerful siege equipment of the nomads. The population of large cities was 20-30 thousand people and, in the event of an attack, could put up to 10 thousand defenders, and since the city, as a rule, resisted alone, the resistance of the defenders could be broken by a 60-70 thousandth army within a week. Thus, the Russian state consisted of several large principalities, constantly competing with each other, not possessing one large army capable of resisting the armada of nomads.

In 1223, the 30,000-strong army of Subdeey and Ocheuchi, having completed the defeat of the states of Central Asia, passed through Northern Iran, entered the Caucasus, destroyed several ancient and rich cities, defeated the Georgian troops, penetrated through the Shirvan Gorge into the North Caucasus and collided with the Alans. The Alans teamed up with the Polovtsy who roamed there, as the Persian historian Rashid-ad-Din testifies, they fought together, "but none of them remained the winner." Then the Mongol-Tatars persuaded the Polovtsian leaders to leave the lands of the Alans, and then "defeated the Alans, having done everything in their power in terms of robbery and murder."

"In 1223, an unknown people appeared; an unheard-of army came, godless Tatars, about whom no one knows well who they are and where they came from, and what kind of language they have, and what tribe they are, and what faith they have ... The Polovtsians do not could resist them and fled to the Dnieper. Their Khan Kotyan was the father-in-law of Mstislav of Galicia; he came with a bow to the prince, his son-in-law, and to all the Russian princes ..., and said: The Tatars have taken our land today, and tomorrow they will take yours, so protect us; if you do not help us, then today we will be cut off, and you will be cut off tomorrow."

The princes decided to help Kotyan. The campaign was started in April when the rivers were in full flood. The troops were heading down the Dnieper. The command was carried out by the Kyiv prince Mstislav Romanovich Dobry and Mstislav Mstislavich Udaly, who were cousins. Just before the Russian offensive, Mongol-Tatar ambassadors arrived in Russia, who assured that they would not touch the Russians if they did not go to the aid of their neighbors.

On the 17th day of the campaign, the army stopped near Olshen, somewhere on the banks of the Ros. There he was found by the second Tatar embassy. Unlike the first, when the ambassadors were killed, these were released. Immediately after crossing the Dnieper, Russian troops collided with the enemy’s vanguard, chased him for 8 days, and on the eighth day they reached the bank of the Kalka River (now the Kalchik River, a tributary of the Kalmius River, in the Donetsk Region, Ukraine). Here Mstislav Udaloy with some princes immediately crossed the Kalka, leaving Mstislav of Kyiv on the other side.

According to the Laurentian Chronicle, the battle took place on May 31, 1223. The troops that crossed the river were almost completely destroyed. The onslaught of the brave squad of Mstislav the Udaly, who almost broke through the ranks of the nomads, was not supported by other princes and all his attacks were repulsed. The Polovtsian detachments, unable to withstand the blows of the Mongol cavalry, fled, upsetting the battle formations of the Russian troops. The camp of Mstislav of Kyiv, set up on the other side and heavily fortified, the troops of Jebe and Subedei stormed for 3 days and were able to take it only by cunning and deceit, when the prince, believing the promises of Subedei, stopped resisting. As a result of this, Mstislav the Good and his entourage were brutally destroyed, Mstislav the Udaloy fled. Russian losses in this battle were very high, six princes were killed, only a tenth of the soldiers returned home.

The battle of Kalka was lost not so much because of disagreements between the rival princes, but because of historical factors. Firstly, Jebe's army was tactically and positionally completely superior to the combined regiments of the Russian princes, who had in their ranks mostly princely squads, reinforced in this case by the Polovtsians. All this army did not have sufficient unity, was not trained in combat tactics, based more on the personal courage of each combatant. Secondly, such a united army also needed an autocratic commander, recognized not only by the leaders, but also by the warriors themselves, and who exercised a unified command. Thirdly, the Russian troops, having made a mistake in assessing the forces of the enemy, were also unable to choose the right place for the battle, the terrain on which was completely favorable to the Tatars. However, in fairness, it must be said that at that time, not only in Russia, but also in Europe, there would not have been an army capable of competing with the formations of Genghis Khan.

The army of Jebe and Subedei, having defeated the militia of the southern Russian princes on Kalka, entered the Chernigov land, reached Novgorod-Seversky and turned back, carrying fear and destruction everywhere. In the same 1223, Jebe and Subedei raided the Volga Bulgaria, but failed. The Arab historian Ibn-al-Asir described these events in the following way: "The Bulgars ambushed them in several places, opposed them and, luring them until they went beyond the place of ambush, attacked them from the rear."

The campaign, which lasted two and a half years, allowed the Mongol-Tatars to directly get acquainted with the Russian troops and the fortifications of Russian cities, they received information from the prisoners about the situation inside the Russian principalities - a deep strategic reconnaissance was carried out.

Conquest of North-Eastern Russia

The military council (kurultai) of 1235 announced a general Mongol campaign to the west. The Great Khan Udegey sent Batu, the head of the Juchi ulus, to reinforce the main forces of the Mongol army under the command of Subedei to conquer the Volga Bulgaria, Diit-Kinchak and Russia. In total, 14 "princes", descendants of Genghis Khan, with their hordes took part in the campaign. Throughout the winter, the Mongols gathered in the upper reaches of the Irtysh, preparing for a big campaign. In the spring of 1236, countless horsemen, innumerable herds, endless carts with military equipment and siege weapons moved west.

In the autumn of 1236, their army attacked the Volga Bulgaria.
Possessing a huge superiority of forces, they broke through the defense line of the Bulgars, the cities were taken one by one. Bulgaria was terribly destroyed and burned. In the spring of 1237, Subedei's troops advanced into the Caspian steppes and rounded up the Polovtsy, most of whom were killed, the rest fled to Russian lands. In battles with their fast and elusive opponents, the khans used the tactics of "raid": they walked along the steppes with a wide front of small detachments, gradually encircling the Polovtsian nomad camps. The campaign was led by three noble khans: Guyuk, Manhe and Mengu. The war in the Polovtsian steppes dragged on for the whole summer. But as a result, the Mongol-Tatars subjugated almost all the lands between the Volga and Don rivers. The most powerful Polovtsian Khan Yuri Konchakovich was defeated.

Another large army, led by Batu, as well as the khans Ordu, Berke, Buri and Kulman, fought on the right bank of the Middle Volga River in the lands of the Burats, Arzhans and Mordovians. The events of this campaign are little known.

Thus, the peoples of the Lower and Middle Volga region put up stubborn resistance, which delayed the advance of Batu and only by the autumn of 1237 was he able to concentrate all the main forces for the invasion of North-Eastern Russia. The Russian princes could not have been unaware of the impending offensive. They received information from Russian and Bulgarian merchants. And the situation with the conquest of the southeastern neighbors prompted certain thoughts. But despite this, after the battle on the Kalka River, the strife between the princes did not stop. Consequently, there was no single army under a single command to repel the onslaught of a powerful enemy, and the unified defense system of the southern steppe borders was violated. Many princes hoped for strong wooden fortresses, not taking into account the sophisticated siege technique available to the Mongol-Tatars.

In the autumn of 1237, Batu was placed at the head of the united army. In December 1237, the rivers rose. On the Sura, a tributary of the Volga, on Voronezh, a tributary of the Don, Batu's troops appeared. Winter opened the way on the ice of the rivers to North-Eastern Russia.

Based on considerations of a geographical and demographic nature, as well as military calculations, it can be assumed that Batu brought 30-40 thousand horsemen to Russia. Even such, at first glance, a small army, the Russian sovereign princes had nothing to oppose.

The first city that stood in the way of the conquerors was Ryazan. For the Ryazan princes, this was a complete surprise. They got used to the raids on Russia by the Polovtsians and other nomadic tribes in the summer-autumn period. Khan Batu, having invaded the boundaries of the principality, presented an ultimatum, where he demanded "tithes in everything: in princes, in horses, in people." The prince, in order to gain time, sent his son Fedor to Batu Khan with rich gifts, and in the meantime he himself began to quickly prepare for battle. He sent messengers to Prince Vladimir Yuri Vsevolodovich and to Chernigov for help. But both of them refused the Ryazan prince. Despite this, the people of Ryazan decided to stand for their land to the death, and they answered the ultimatum: "If we are all gone, then everything will be yours!"

Together with the prince of Ryazan, several more "improvised" princes moved towards the Mongol-Tatars - the Pronsky, Murom and Kolomna principalities. But their squads did not have time to reach the fortified lines on the steppe border. Batu Khan interrupted Fedor's embassy and moved his cavalry to the Ryazan land. Somewhere "near the borders of Ryazan" a battle took place, described in "The Tale of the Devastation of Ryazan". During the battle, many "local princes, strong governors and a daring army" died. With a few soldiers, Prince Yuri Igorevich broke through the ring of enemies and left for the city of Ryazan to organize the defense of his capital. Having been defeated in battle, the people of Ryazan hoped to sit out behind the strong city walls. Ryazan stood on the high right bank of the Oka River, below the mouth of the Proni River. The city was well fortified: on three sides it was surrounded by ditches and powerful ramparts up to 10 meters high, on the fourth side a steep bank broke off to the Oka River; wooden walls with numerous towers stood on the ramparts. Under the walls of the city, the population from the surrounding villages fled, boyar detachments came from distant estates. The entire urban population took up arms.

The siege of Ryazan began on December 16, 1237. The Mongol-Tatars surrounded the city so that no one could leave it. The city walls were shelled around the clock from vices (stone-throwing machines). Day and night there were attacks on the city. Accurate Mongolian archers fired continuously. The killed Mongols were replaced by new ones, and the city did not receive any reinforcements. December 21 began a decisive assault on Ryazan. The defense of the city managed to break through in several metas at once. Heavy fighting ensued in the streets. As a result, all the soldiers and most of the inhabitants were brutally destroyed. An army of nomads near Ryazan stood for ten days - they plundered the city, divided the booty, robbed neighboring villages.

In front of Batu lay several roads into the depths of the Vladimir-Suzdal land. Since Batu was faced with the task of conquering all of Russia in one winter, he went to Vladimir along the Oka, through Moscow and Kolomna. On the way, they were suddenly attacked by a detachment led by Evpaty Kolovrat, a Ryazanian. His detachment consisted of about 1700 people. The nomads were so confused that they mistook them for the risen from the dead. But the 5 soldiers who were captured answered: "We are the wars of the Grand Duke Yuri Ingorevich - Ryazan, in the regiment of Evpaty Kolovrat. We were sent to honor you strong and honestly see you off." Batu decided to send his brother-in-law Khoztovrul with regiments to beat Kolovrat. But Khoztovrul lost, and then Batu brought a lot of his troops to Yevpatiy. In the battle, Kolovrat died, and his head was given to Batu. The Khan was surprised at the courage of the Russian soldiers and ordered the captured part of the squad to be released.

The Grand Duke of Vladimir Yuri Vsevolodovich sent reinforcements to Kolomna, which covered the only convenient way to Vladimir in winter - along the Moscow and Klyazma rivers. The troops were led by the eldest son of Prince Vladimir Vsevolod. The surviving Ryazan squads, led by Prince Roman, also came here. Chronicles claim that even Novgorodians came. The experienced governor of Vladimir Yeremey Glebovich was also near Kolomna. The city itself was sufficiently fortified in case the troops failed in the field. In terms of the number of troops and the stubbornness of the battle, the battle near Kolomna can be considered one of the most significant events of the invasion. Solovyov writes: "The Tatars surrounded them at Kolomna, and fought hard; there was a great battle; they killed Prince Roman and the governor Yeremey, and Vsevolod with a small retinue ran to Vladimir." In the battle of Kolomna, Genghis Khan Kulkan died - perhaps the only case in the entire history of the Mongol conquests.

Having defeated the Vladimir-Suzdal regiments near Kolomna, Batu came to Moscow, which was defended by the detachment of the son of the Grand Duke Yuri - Vladimir and the governor Philip Nyanka. The city was taken by storm on the 5th day. As a result, Moscow was completely destroyed. Prince Vladimir was taken prisoner, and the governor was killed. On the way from Ryazan to Vladimir, the conquerors had to storm every city, repeatedly fight with Russian warriors in the "open field"; defend against sudden attacks from ambushes. The heroic resistance of the common Russian people held back the conquerors.

On February 3, the advance detachments of the conquerors approached Vladimir. The city of Vladimir was surrounded by high wooden walls and strong stone towers fortified. Rivers covered it from three sides: from the south - the Klyazma River, from the north and east - the Lybed River. Above the western wall of the city rose the Golden Gate - the most powerful defensive structure of ancient Vladimir. Behind the outer contour of the Vladimir fortifications were the inner walls and ramparts of the Middle or Monomakh city. And, finally, in the middle of the capital there was a stone Kremlin - Detinets. Thus, the enemies needed to break through three defensive lines before they could reach the city center - the Prince's Court and the Assumption Cathedral. But for the numerous towers and walls there were not enough warriors. At the princely council, it was decided to leave the surviving army in the city and supplement it with the city militia, and the Grand Duke himself to go north with his closest squad and collect new rati. On the eve of the siege, Yuri left with his nephews Vasilko, Vsevolod and Vladimir on the river Sit and began to gather regiments against the Tatars. The defense of the city was headed by the sons of the Grand Duke - Vsevolod and Mstislav, as well as the governor Peter Oslyadyakovich.

The Mongol-Tatars approached from the west. Before that, the conquerors took Suzdal by storm, and without much difficulty. On February 4, a small detachment drove up and offered to surrender. In response, arrows and stones flew. Then the Mongols surrounded the city from all sides, cutting it off from the outside world, and the siege of the city began. On February 6, the installation of heavy throwing guns and shelling began. The walls were broken through in some places, but the Mongols could not penetrate the city. Early in the morning of February 7, a general assault on the city of Vladimir began. The main blow came from the west. As a result of the shelling, the wooden wall south of the Golden Gates was destroyed and the Mongol-Tatars broke into the city. They broke through the Irininy, Copper and Volga gates to Detinets, where there were almost no soldiers left. The princely family, boyars and townspeople took refuge in the Assumption Cathedral. To surrender to the mercy of the winner, they categorically turned out to be and were burned. The city of Vladimir itself was completely ruined.

Yuri Vsevolodovich stood with troops near Yaroslavl. Upon learning of the death of the capital and the death of loved ones, the prince, according to the chronicle, "shouted with tears in a great voice, weeping for the orthodox faith of the Christian and the Church." "It would be better for me to die than to live in the world," he said, "for which reason I was left alone." Vasilko, who arrived in time with the Rostov squad, strengthened him for a feat of arms.

Vladimir was the last city of North-Eastern Russia, which was besieged by the combined forces of Batu Khan. The Mongol-Tatars had to make a decision so that three tasks were completed at once: cut off Prince Yuri Vsevolodovich from Novgorod, defeat the remnants of the Vladimir forces and go along all river and trade routes, destroying cities - centers of resistance. The troops of Batu were divided into three parts: the First moved north to Rostov and further to the Volga (Rostov surrendered without a fight, as well as Uglich); Separate detachments advanced to the Volga River and defeated Yaroslavl, Kostroma, Ksnyatin, Kashin and other cities. The second part went east along the ice of the Klyazma River, defeated the city of Starodub and went to the middle Volga - to the city of Gorodets; the third moved to the northwest through Pereyaslavl-Zalesky, Yuryev, Dimitrov, Volok-Lamsky to Tver and Torzhok. As a result of the February campaigns of 1238, the Mongol-Tatars destroyed Russian cities in the territory from the Middle Volga to Tver (fourteen cities in total).

By the beginning of March, the invaders reached the line of the Middle Volga. Yuri Vsevolodovich, who was gathering troops on the Sit River, found himself in close proximity to these detachments. The unexpected attack of the Mongol-Tatars predetermined the outcome of this battle (March 4, 1238). Few of the Russian soldiers left this terrible battle alive, but the enemies paid a heavy price for the victory. Saint Yuriy was hacked to death in a desperate fight. Cornflower, wounded, was brought to Batu's headquarters.
The Tatars forced him to "follow the Nogai custom, be in their will and fight for them." With anger, the holy prince rejected the idea of ​​betraying the Motherland and Orthodoxy. "You can't take me away from the Christian faith," said the holy prince, recalling the ancient Christian confessors. "And much more tormenting him, betraying death, throwing him in the forest of Shern." Thus the holy Prince Vasilko of Rostov gave up his soul to God, becoming like in his death the holy passion-bearer Boris, the first of the princes of Rostov, whom he imitated in life. Like St. Boris, Vasilko was not yet thirty years old.
Bishop Kirill of Rostov, having come to the battlefield, buried the dead Orthodox soldiers, found the body of the holy Prince Yuri (only his severed head could not be found in the piles of fallen bodies), transferred the honest remains to Rostov - to the Assumption Cathedral. The body of Saint Basil was found in the Shern forest by the priest's son and brought to Rostov. There, the prince's wife, children, Bishop Kirill and all the people of Rostov greeted the body of their beloved prince with bitter weeping and buried him under the vaults of the cathedral church.

At the end of March 1238, the "raid" of the invaders moved from the Volga to the south, to Novgorod. Torzhok, standing on the way to Batu, lasted 2 weeks, and was taken only on March 23. From there, Batu moved further along the Seliger route, but before reaching Novgorod a hundred miles, he turned south (from the place called "Ignach Cross" in the annals) and went to Smolensk.

The turn from Novgorod is usually explained by spring floods. But there are other explanations: firstly, the campaign did not meet the deadlines, and secondly, Batu was unable to defeat the combined forces of North-Eastern Russia in one or two battles, using numerical and tactical superiority. The heavy and bloody campaign against the northeastern principalities exhausted and bled the Mongol-Tatars. It is likely that Batu did not dare to fight with untouched and full-blooded Novgorod and Pskov.

The Mongols failed to take Smolensk. On the outskirts of the city, the Smolensk regiments met the enemy and threw him back. Batu decided to turn to the northeast and went to the city of Kozelsk. In the annals there is no exact date for the approach of the Mongol-Tatars to this city, and most scientists claim that it was besieged in April 1238. Kozelsk defended for 51 days, but was taken. Batu called it the "Evil City" and ordered to raze it to the ground.

Batu did not reach Vologda, or Beloozero, or Veliky Ustyug, and behind him all Chud Zavolotskaya, Novgorod possessions, remained untouched.

The defeat of Southern Russia and Eastern Europe

In 1239, the Mongol-Tatars invaded South Russia. At the same time, they went the way the Polovtsy raided. Pereyaslavl-Yuzhny was taken, which no one had been able to do before. The city was well fortified: on three sides it was surrounded by high banks of the Trubezh and Alta rivers, as well as high ramparts and walls. But the Tatars managed to take, plunder the city and completely destroy the church of St. Michael.

The next blow was directed at the Chernigov Principality. Chernihiv Detinets (Kremlin), located on a high hill at the confluence of the river Strizhen in the Desna, was surrounded by a "roundabout city", behind which stretched a three-kilometer shaft that covered the "suburbs". By the autumn of 1239. Tatars surrounded the city of Chernigov. They were met with the army by Prince Mstislav Glebovich (cousin of Mikhail Chernigov). There was a "fierce battle", but the Russians lost. October 18, 1239 Chernigov was taken, after which the Tatars destroyed the cities of Putivl, Glukov, Vyr, Rylsk.

Batu began the invasion of Southern Russia and Eastern Europe in the autumn of 1240, again gathering all the people devoted to himself under his command. Batu approached Kyiv in November 1240. "Batu came to Kyiv in a heavy force, the Tatar force surrounded the city, and nothing was heard from the creaking of carts, from the roar of camels, from the neighing of horses; the Russian land was filled with soldiers." Daniil Romanovich Galitsky then reigned in Kyiv, who left the city, leaving the governor Dmitry to protect the city. From the side where the forest adjoined the city gates, the Tatars fired at the walls from stone-throwing guns around the clock. As a result, the walls collapsed and the Mongol-Tatars broke into the city in the evening. During the night, the people of Kiev built a new wall around the Church of the Tithes, but the Tatars broke through the defenses of Kiev and after a 9-day siege and assault on December 6, 1240, Kyiv fell.

After that, the main forces of Batu moved further west to Vladimir-Volynsky. The invaders could not take the cities of Kremenets, Danilov and Kholm. Fortified towns were superbly adapted for defense. Vladimir-Volynsky was taken by the Mongol-Tatars after a short siege. All the cities of the Volyn and Galician lands were subjected to a terrible defeat. (For more details, see "Biography of Daniil Galitsky").

In the spring of 1241, the hordes of the Mongol-Tatars crossed the border of Russia and invaded Hungary. The Hungarians put up fierce resistance in the passes of the Carpathians. But Batu crossed the mountains in April 1241. At this time, the Hungarian king Bela II gathered 60 thousand soldiers and set out from the city of Pest. On April 11, a battle began near the Sayo River. The king received no support and was defeated. After a 3-day siege, the city of Pest fell, and then the cities of Arat, Perth, Egres, Temeshever were devastated.

In the same spring, the Mongol-Tatars moved to Poland. At the head of the Mongol army were the Batu brothers - Baydar and Horde. The nomads captured the city of Lublin, Zavykhos, Sandomierz. On the way to the large city of Krakow, they fought with the Krakow and Sandomore regiments (near the city of Krakow). The Mongol-Tatars won and captured the city itself, but according to legend, a bunch of brave men took refuge in the Cathedral of St. Andrew, who could not be defeated. They also failed to capture the city of Wroclov.

The Czech king Wenceslas I sent 40 thousand soldiers to help the Poles. On April 9, 1241, the allied troops were defeated near Legnica, but the Mongols failed to take the city of Legnitz and the city of Ratibozh. The Czech Republic was preparing for a stubborn struggle; in the battle of Olomouc in 1242, the Mongol-Tatars were defeated.

Then the invaders invaded the lands of Bukovina, Moldavia and Romania. Slovakia, which was under the rule of Hungary, seriously suffered from their attack. Batu still moved west to the Adriatic Sea, invaded Silesia and defeated the Duke of Silesia. Thus, the way to Germany was open, but the troops ran out of steam and the khan turned his troops back to the east, never reaching the "Sea of ​​the Franks" (according to the will of Genghis Khan).

However, the danger of new invasions has not disappeared. Batu, returning from an unsuccessful campaign to the West, founded the state of the "Golden Horde" on the borders of Russia. In 1243, Batu "granted and approved" the Grand Duke Yaroslav Vsevolodovich, after this prince, other princes - Uglich, Rostov, Yaroslavl - were drawn to the Horde. The Mongol-Tatar yoke was established.

"From Ancient Russia to the Russian Empire". Shishkin Sergey Petrovich, Ufa.

Battle on Kalka.

At the beginning of the XIII century. there was a unification of the nomadic Mongolian tribes, who embarked on conquest campaigns. Genghis Khan, a brilliant commander and politician, stood at the head of the tribal union. Under his leadership, the Mongols conquered Northern China, Central Asia, and steppe territories stretching from the Pacific Ocean to the Caspian Sea.

The first clash of the Russian principalities with the Mongols took place in 1223, during which the Mongol reconnaissance detachment descended from the southern slopes of the Caucasian mountains and invaded the Polovtsian steppes. The Polovtsy turned to the Russian princes for help. Several princes responded to this call. The Russian-Polovtsian army met the Mongols on the Kalka River on May 31, 1223. In the ensuing battle, the Russian princes acted uncoordinated, and part of the army did not participate in the battle at all. As for the Polovtsians, they could not withstand the onslaught of the Mongols and fled. As a result of the battle, the Russian-Polovtsian army was utterly defeated, the Russian squads suffered heavy losses: only every tenth warrior returned home. But the Mongols did not invade Russia. They turned back to the Mongolian steppes.

Reasons for the victories of the Mongols

The main reason for the victories of the Mongols was the superiority of their army, which was well organized and trained. The Mongols managed to create the best army in the world, in which strict discipline was maintained. The Mongolian army consisted almost entirely of cavalry, therefore it was maneuverable and could cover very long distances. The main weapon of the Mongol was a powerful bow and several quivers with arrows. The enemy was fired upon at a distance, and only then, if necessary, did selected units enter the battle. The Mongols made extensive use of military techniques such as feigned flight, flanking, and encirclement.

Siege weapons were borrowed from China, with the help of which the conquerors could capture large fortresses. The conquered peoples often provided military contingents to the Mongols. The Mongols attached great importance to intelligence. There was an order in which spies and scouts penetrated into the country of the future enemy before the alleged military operations.

The Mongols quickly cracked down on any disobedience, brutally suppressing any attempts to resist. Using the policy of "divide and rule", they sought to split the enemy forces in the conquered states. It was thanks to this strategy that they managed to maintain their influence in the occupied lands for a fairly long time period.

Campaigns of Batu in Russia

Batu's invasion of North-Eastern Russia (1st campaign of Batu)

In 1236 the Mongols undertook a grand campaign to the west. At the head of the army stood the grandson of Genghis Khan - Batu Khan. Having defeated the Volga Bulgaria, the Mongol army approached the borders of North-Eastern Russia. In the autumn of 1237, the Conquerors invaded the Ryazan Principality.

The Russian princes did not want to unite in the face of a new and formidable enemy. Ryazanians, left alone, were defeated in a border battle, and after a five-day siege, the Mongols took the city itself by storm.

Then the Mongol army invaded the Vladimir principality, where it was met by the grand ducal squad led by the son of the Grand Duke. In the battle of Kolomna, the Russian army was defeated. Using the confusion of the Russian princes in the face of impending danger, the Mongols successively captured Moscow, Suzdal, Rostov, Tver, Vladimir and other cities.

In March 1238, a battle took place on the Sit River between the Mongols and the Russian army, gathered throughout North-Eastern Russia. The Mongols won a decisive victory, killing the Grand Duke of Vladimir Yuri in battle.

Further, the conquerors headed towards Novgorod, but, fearing to get stuck in the spring thaw, they turned back. On the way back, the Mongols took Kursk and Kozelsk. Especially fierce resistance was put up by Kozelsk, called the "Evil City" by the Mongols.

Campaign of Batu to South Russia (2nd campaign of Batu)

During 1238 -1239. the Mongols fought with the Polovtsy, after the conquest of which they set off on a second campaign against Russia. The main forces here were thrown into South Russia; in North-Eastern Russia, the Mongols captured only the city of Murom.

The political fragmentation of the Russian principalities helped the Mongols quickly seize the southern lands. The capture of Pereyaslavl and Chernigov was followed by the fall on December 6, 1240 after fierce battles of the ancient Russian capital - Kyiv. Then the conquerors moved to the Galicia-Volyn land.

After the defeat of South Russia, the Mongols invaded Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and reached Croatia. Despite his victories, Batu was forced to stop, as he did not receive reinforcements, and in 1242 he completely recalled his troops from these countries.

In Western Europe, waiting for imminent ruin, this was taken as a miracle. The main reason for the miracle was the stubborn resistance of the Russian lands and the damage suffered by the Batu army during the campaign.

Establishment of the Tatar-Mongol yoke

After returning from the western campaign, Batu Khan founded a new capital in the lower reaches of the Volga. The state of Batu and his successors, covering the lands from Western Siberia to Eastern Europe, was called the Golden Horde. Here in 1243 all the surviving Russian princes, who were at the head of the devastated lands, were called. From the hands of Batu, they received labels - letters for the right to govern this or that principality. So Russia fell under the yoke of the Golden Horde.

The Mongols established an annual tribute - "exit". Initially, the tribute was not fixed. Its arrival was monitored by tax-farmers, who often simply robbed the population. This practice caused discontent and unrest in Russia, therefore, in order to fix the exact amount of tribute, the Mongols conducted a population census.

The collection of tribute was monitored by the Baskaks, relying on punitive detachments.

The great devastation caused by Batu, subsequent punitive expeditions, heavy tribute led to a protracted economic crisis and the decline of the Russian land. During the first 50 years of the yoke, there was not a single city in the principalities of North-Eastern Russia, a number of crafts disappeared in other places, serious demographic changes took place, the territory of settlement of the Old Russian people was reduced, strong Old Russian principalities fell into decay.

Lecture 10

The struggle of the peoples of North-Western Russia against the aggression of the Swedish and German feudal lords.

Simultaneously with the Tatar-Mongol invasion of the Russian people in the XIII century. had to wage a fierce struggle with the German and Swedish invaders. The lands of Northern Russia and, in particular, Novgorod attracted invaders. They were not ruined by Batu, and Novgorod was famous for its wealth, since the most important trade route connecting Northern Europe with the countries of the East passed through it.

§ 19. INVASION OF BATY INTO RUSSIA

The first campaign of Batu. Ulus Juchi was succeeded by his eldest son, Khan Batu, known in Russia under the name of Batu. Contemporaries noted that Batu Khan was cruel in battle and "very cunning in war." He even instilled great fear in his people.

In 1229, the kurultai elected the third son of Genghis Khan Ogedei as the kaan of the Mongol Empire and decided to organize a large campaign to Europe. The army was led by Batu.

In 1236, the Mongols entered the lands of the Volga Bulgars, devastating their cities and villages, exterminating the population. In the spring of 1237, the conquerors conquered the Polovtsians. The commander Subedei brought reinforcements from Mongolia and helped the khan to establish tight control over the conquered territories. Captured warriors replenished the composition of the Mongol army.

In the late autumn of 1237, the hordes of Batu and Subedei moved to Russia. The first on their way was Ryazan. The Ryazan princes turned to the princes of Vladimir and Chernigov for help, but did not receive timely assistance. Batu offered the Ryazan prince Yuri Igorevich to pay "a tenth of everything." “When we are all gone,” the people of Ryazan answered, “then everything will be yours.”

Batu. Chinese drawing

Subeday. Chinese drawing

Defense of Ryazan. Artist E. Deshalyt

On December 16, 1237 Batu's army laid siege to Ryazan. The vastly outnumbered Mongols continuously stormed the city. The fighting went on until December 21st. The enemy destroyed the fortifications and razed Ryazan to the ground. Captured Mongols chopped with sabers and shot with bows.

According to legend, the bogatyr Yevpaty Kolovrat, originally from Ryazan nobles, gathered a squad of 1,700 people. They moved after the Mongols and caught up with them in the Suzdal land. "Mercilessly destroying" the conquerors, the warriors, led by Evpaty, fell in an unequal battle. Mongolian commanders spoke about Russian soldiers: “We have been with many kings in many lands, in many battles (battles), but we have not seen such daring men and our fathers did not tell us. For these are winged people, who do not know death, fought so hard and courageously: one with a thousand, and two with darkness. None of them can leave alive from the battle.

From Ryazan, Batu's army moved to Kolomna. The Prince of Vladimir sent reinforcements to the city. However, the victory was again celebrated by the Mongols.

On January 20, 1238, Batu took Moscow by storm and burned the city. The chronicle briefly reported on the consequences of Batu's victory: "People were beaten from the old man to the existing baby, and they betrayed the city and the churches of the holy fire." In February 1238, the Mongol detachments approached Vladimir. The city was surrounded by a palisade so that no one could leave it. The Mongols pulled up vices and catapults and started the attack. On February 8, they broke into the city. The last defenders took refuge in the temple of the Virgin, but all died from fire and suffocation, because the Mongols set fire to the city.

Vladimir Prince Yuri Vsevolodovich was not in the city during the assault. He gathered an army to repulse the Mongols in the north of the principality. On March 4, 1238, the battle took place on the City River (a tributary of the Mologa). Russian squads were defeated, the prince died.

Batu moved to the north-west, he was attracted by the wealth of Novgorod. However, early spring, high water, lack of roads, lack of fodder for the cavalry and impenetrable forests forced Batu to turn back 100 miles from Novgorod. On the way of the Mongols stood the small town of Kozelsk. Its inhabitants detained Batu for seven weeks under the walls of the city. When almost all the defenders died, Kozelsk fell. Batu ordered to destroy the survivors, including babies. Kozelsk Batu called the "Evil City".

The Mongols went to the steppe to recuperate.

Mongols at the walls of the Russian city. Artist O. Fedorov

Defense of Kozelsk. chronicle miniature

The second campaign of Batu. In 1239, Batu's troops invaded South Russia, took Pereyaslavl and Chernigov. In 1240 they crossed the Dnieper south of Pereyaslavl. Destroying cities and fortresses along the Ros River, the Mongols approached Kyiv from the side of the Lyadsky (Western) gates. The Kyiv prince fled to Hungary.

The defense of the city was headed by Tysyatsky Dmitry. In early December, the Mongols laid siege to Kyiv. Through the gaps formed by the battering rams, the conquerors entered the city. The people of Kiev also resisted on the city streets. They defended the main shrine of Kyiv - the Church of the Tithes - until its vaults collapsed.

In 1246, the Catholic monk Plano Carpini, who was passing through Kyiv to the headquarters of Batu, wrote: “When we drove through their land, we found countless heads and bones of dead people lying on the field. Kyiv is reduced to almost nothing: there are barely two hundred houses, and they keep people in the most difficult slavery.

Before the Mongol invasion, according to archaeologists, in Russia there were up to one and a half thousand fortified settlements, of which about a third were cities. After Batu's campaigns in the Russian lands, only their names remained from many cities.

In 1241-1242, Batu's troops conquered Central Europe. They devastated Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and went to the Adriatic Sea. From here, Batu turned east into the steppe.

Attack of the Horde on the Russian city. chronicle miniature

The Mongols are chasing prisoners. Iranian miniature

Vice – battering ram, battering ram.

Catapult – a stone-throwing tool driven by the elastic force of twisted fibers - tendons, hair, etc.

Fodder - feed for farm animals, including horses.

1236 year- the defeat of the Volga Bulgaria by the Mongols.

1237 year- the invasion of the Mongol troops under the leadership of Batu Khan to Russia.

December 1237- the capture of Ryazan by the Mongols.

1238 year- the capture of 14 Russian cities by the Mongols.

December 1240- the capture of Kyiv by Batu's troops.

Questions and tasks

2. What are the main reasons for the defeat of the Russian squads in the fight against the Mongolian troops?

3. Based on the illustrations “Defense of Ryazan”, “Defense of Kozelsk”, “Mongols are chasing prisoners”, make up a story about the Mongol invasion.

Working with a document

Nikon chronicle about the capture of Kyiv by the troops of Batu:

“In the same year (1240), King Batu came to the city of Kyiv with many soldiers and surrounded the city. And it was impossible for anyone to leave the city, nor to enter the city. And it was impossible to hear each other in the city from the creak of carts, the roar of camels, from the sounds of pipes and organs, from the neighing of herds of horses and from the scream and scream of countless people. Batu put a lot of vices (ram guns) to the city of Kyiv near the Lyatsky Gates, because the wilds came up there. Many vices beat on the walls incessantly, day and night, and the townspeople fought hard, and there were many dead, and blood flowed like water. And Batu sent to Kyiv to the townspeople with these words: "If you submit to me, you will have mercy, but if you resist, you will suffer a lot and die cruelly." But the townspeople did not listen to him in any way, but slandered and cursed him. Batu was very angry and ordered with great fury to attack the city. And people began to faint and ran with their belongings to the church mosquitoes (vaults), and the church walls fell from the weight, and the Tatars took the city of Kyiv, on the 6th day of December, on the day of memory of the holy miracle worker Nikola. And Dmitr the governor was brought to Batu wounded, and Batu did not order him to be killed for the sake of his courage. And Batu began to ask about Prince Danilo, and they told him that the prince had fled to Hungary. Batu planted his governor in the city of Kyiv, and he himself went to Vladimir in Volyn.

1.How did the siege of Kyiv take place?

2.Describe the damage that was inflicted on Kyiv by the conquerors.

The invasion of the Tatar-Mongols into Russia began in 1237, when Batu's cavalry invaded the territory of the Ryazan lands. As a result of this attack, Russia found itself under the yoke of a two-century yoke. This interpretation is set out in most history books, but in reality the relationship between Russia and the Horde was much more complicated. In the article, the yoke of the Golden Horde will be considered not only in the usual interpretation, but also taking into account its controversial points.

Beginning of the Mongol-Tatar invasion

For the first time, the squads of Russia and the Mongol hordes began to fight at the end of May 1223 on the Kalka River. The Russian army was led by Prince Mstislav of Kyiv, and the Horde was commanded by Jebe-noyon and Subedey-bagatur. The army of Mstislav was not just defeated, but almost completely destroyed.

In 1236, the Tatars launched another invasion of the Polovtsians. In this campaign, they won many victories and by the end of 1237 came close to the lands of the Ryazan principality.

Mongol conquest of Russia, which took place from 1237 to 1242, is divided into two stages:

1. 1237 - 1238 - invasion of the northern and eastern territories of Russia.
2. 1239 - 1242 - a campaign in the southern territories, which led to a further yoke.

Chronology of events up to 1238

The Horde cavalry was commanded by Batu Khan (Batu Khan), the grandson of the famous Genghis Khan, who subordinated about 150 thousand soldiers. Together with Batu, Subedei-bagatur, who fought with the Russians earlier, participated in the invasion. The invasion began in the winter of 1237, its exact date is unknown. Some historians claim that the attack took place in the late autumn of the same year. Batu's cavalry moved at high speed across the territory of Russia and conquered cities one after another.

The chronology of Batu's campaign against Russia is as follows:

• Ryazan was defeated in December 1237 after a six-day siege.
• Before the conquest of Moscow, Vladimir Prince Yuri Vsevolodovich tried to stop the Horde near Kolomna, but was defeated.
• Moscow was conquered in January 1238, the siege lasted four days.
• Vladimir. After an eight-day siege, it was conquered in February 1238.

The capture of Ryazan - 1237

At the end of the autumn of 1237, an army of about 150 thousand, led by Khan Batu, invaded the territory of the Ryazan principality. Arriving at Prince Yuri Igorevich, the ambassadors demanded tribute from him - a tenth of what he owns. They were refused, and the Ryazans began to prepare for defense. Yuri turned to Vladimir Prince Yuri Vsevolodovich for support, but received no help.

At the same time, Batu defeated the vanguard of the Ryazan squad and in mid-December 1237 laid siege to the capital of the principality. The first attacks were repulsed, but after the use of battering rams by the invaders, the fortress, which had held out for 9 days, was defeated. The Horde broke into the city, arranging a massacre in it.

Even though the prince and almost all the inhabitants of the fortress were killed, the resistance of the Ryazans did not stop. Boyar Evpaty Kolovrat gathered an army of about 1,700 people and went in pursuit of Batu's army. Having caught up with her, the warriors of Kolovrat defeated the rearguard of the nomads, but subsequently they themselves fell in an unequal battle.

Battle of Kolomna, capture of Moscow and Vladimir - 1238

After the fall of Ryazan, the Tatars attacked Kolomna, a city that at that time was an important strategic center. Here was the vanguard of the troops of Prince Vladimir, commanded by Vsevolod. Having entered into an unequal battle with the troops of Batu, the Russians suffered a crushing defeat. Most of them died, and Vsevolod Yurievich with the surviving squad retreated to Vladimir.

Batu reached Moscow in the third decade of 1237. At that time, there was no one to defend Moscow, since the basis of the Russian army was destroyed near Kolomna. At the beginning of 1238, the Horde broke into the city, completely ruined it and killed everyone, young and old. Prince Vladimir was taken prisoner. After the defeat of Moscow, the troops of the invaders went on a campaign against Vladimir.

In early February 1238, an army of nomads approached the walls of Vladimir. The Horde attacked him from three sides. Destroying the walls, using wall-beating devices, they broke into the city. Most of the inhabitants were killed, including Prince Vsevolod. And eminent citizens were locked in the temple of the Virgin and burned . Vladimir was plundered and destroyed.

How did the first invasion end?

After the conquest of Vladimir, almost the entire territory of the northern and eastern lands was in the power of Batu Khan. He took cities one after another: Dmitrov, Suzdal, Tver, Pereslavl, Yuriev. In March 1238, Torzhok was taken, which opened the way for the Tatar-Mongols to Novgorod. But Batu Khan decided not to go there, but sent an army to storm Kozelsk.

The siege of the city went on for seven weeks and ended only when Batu offered to surrender to the defenders of Kozelsk in exchange for saving their lives. They accepted the conditions of the Tatar-Mongols and surrendered. Batu Khan did not keep his word and gave the order to kill everyone, which was done. Thus ended the first invasion of the Tatar-Mongols on the lands of Russia.

Invasion of 1239 - 1242

A year and a half later, in 1239, a new campaign of troops under the command of Batu began in Russia. This year the main events unfold in Chernigov and Pereyaslav. Batu did not advance as rapidly as in 1237, due to the fact that he was actively fighting against the Polovtsy in the Crimean lands.

In the autumn of 1240, Batu leads the army directly to Kyiv. The ancient capital of Russia was not able to resist for a long time, and in early December 1240 the city fell under the onslaught of the Horde. There was nothing left of him, Kyiv was actually "wiped off the face of the earth." Historians speak of particularly cruel atrocities perpetrated by the invaders. The Kyiv that has survived to this day, has absolutely nothing to do with a city destroyed by the Horde.

After the destruction of Kyiv, the Tatar troops were divided into two armies, one headed for Galich, and the other for Vladimir-Volynsky. After the capture of these cities, the Tatar-Mongols set off on a European campaign.

The consequences of the invasion of Russia

All historians give an unambiguous description of the consequences of the invasion of the Tatar-Mongols:

• The country was divided and was completely dependent on the Golden Horde.
• Russia paid tribute to the Khanate every year (in people, silver, gold and furs).
• The state stopped its development due to the most difficult situation.

The list can go on and on, but the overall picture of what is happening is already clear.

In short, this is how the period of the Horde yoke in Russia is presented in the official historical interpretation found in textbooks. Further, the arguments cited by L. N. Gumilyov, a historian-ethnologist and orientalist, will be considered. And also a number of important issues will be touched upon, giving an understanding of how much more complex the relations between Russia and the Horde were than is commonly believed.

How did nomads conquer half the world?

Scholars often question whether how a nomadic people, who only a few decades ago lived in a tribal system, was able to create a huge empire and conquer almost half the world. What goals did the Horde pursue in the campaign against Russia? Historians claim that the purpose of the invasion was to plunder the lands and subjugate Russia, and it is also said that the Tatar-Mongols achieved this.

But in reality it's not quite like that., because in Russia there were three very rich cities:

• Kyiv is one of the largest European cities, the capital of ancient Russia, captured and destroyed by the Horde.
• Novgorod is the largest trading city and, at that time, the richest. From the invasion of the Tatar-Mongols, he did not suffer at all.
• Smolensk, like Novgorod, was a trading city, and in terms of wealth it was compared with Kyiv. He also did not suffer from the Horde.

It turns out that two of the three largest cities of ancient Russia did not suffer from the Golden Horde in any way.

Historians' explanations

If we consider the version of historians - to ruin and rob, as the main goal of the Horde's campaign against Russia, then there is no logical explanation. Batu captures Torzhok, the siege of which takes two weeks. This is a poor city, its main task was to guard and protect Novgorod. After the capture of Torzhok Batu goes not to Novgorod, but to Kozelsk. Why is it necessary to waste time and energy on the siege of an unnecessary city, instead of just going to Kozelsk?

Historians give two explanations:

1. Heavy losses during the capture of Torzhok did not allow Batu to go to Novgorod.
2. Spring floods prevented the move to Novgorod.

The first version seems logical only at first glance. If the Mongols suffered heavy losses, then it was advisable to leave Russia to replenish the troops. But Batu goes to besiege Kozelsk. It suffers colossal losses and rapidly leaves the lands of Russia. The second version is also difficult to accept, since in the Middle Ages, according to climatologists, it was even colder in the northern regions of Russia than now.

Paradox with Kozelsk

An inexplicable and paradoxical situation has developed with Smolensk. As described above, Batu Khan, after conquering Torzhok, went to besiege Kozelsk, which in its essence was a simple fortress, a poor and small town. The Horde tried to capture it for seven weeks, while suffering many thousands of losses. There was absolutely no strategic and commercial benefit from the capture of Kozelsk. Why such sacrifices?

Just a day of riding on horseback and you could be at the walls of Smolensk, one of the richest cities of ancient Russia, but Batu for some reason does not go in this direction. It is strange that all the above logical questions are ignored by historians.

Nomads do not fight in winter

There is another interesting fact that orthodox history simply ignores because it cannot explain it. And one and the other Tatar-Mongolian invasions of Ancient Russia were made in winter or late autumn. Let's not forget that the army of Batu Khan consisted of nomads, and they, as you know, began their military campaigns only in the spring and tried to finish the battle before the onset of winter.

This is due to the fact that the nomads traveled on horses, which need food every day. How was it possible to feed tens of thousands of Mongolian horses in the conditions of snowy winter Russia? Many historians call this fact insignificant, but it cannot be denied that the success of a long campaign directly depends on the supply of troops.

How many horses did Batu have?

Historians say that the army of nomads ranged from 50 to 400 thousand cavalry. What kind of support should such an army have?

As far as is known, going on a military campaign, each warrior took three horses with him:

• riding, on which the rider constantly moved during the campaign;
• a pack-house, on which weapons, ammunition and things of a warrior were transported;
• fighting, which went without any load, so that at any time the horse with fresh forces could enter the battle.

It turns out that 300 thousand riders is 900 thousand horses. Plus the horses involved in the transportation of rams and other tools, provisions. That's over one million. How is it possible to feed such a herd in a snowy winter, during the Little Ice Age?

What was the number of nomads?

There is conflicting information about this. It is said about 15, 30, 200 and 400 thousand people. If we take a small number, then it is difficult to conquer a principality with such a number, the squad of which includes 30-50 thousand people. Moreover, the Russians resisted desperately, and many nomads died. If we talk about large numbers, then the question arises of providing food.

Thus, apparently, things happened differently. The main document, according to which the invasion was studied, is the Laurentian Chronicle. But she is not without a flaw, which was recognized by official history. Three pages of the annals describing the beginning of the invasion have been changed, which means they are not original.

In this article, contradictory facts were considered, and it is proposed to draw conclusions on your own.