By the beginning of hostilities, the Entente naval forces significantly outnumbered the Navy of the Union of Central States

In terms of the spatial scope, the number of participants and the intensity of the armed struggle in the continental, oceanic and maritime theaters of military operations of the First World War, there were no analogues in previous history.

The most intense military operations were conducted: in the North Sea, in the northern part of the Atlantic Ocean, in the Mediterranean, Baltic, Black, Barents and White Seas. In addition, episodic military operations, especially in the initial period of the war, and then when single German cruisers entered the ocean, were deployed in the central and southern parts of the Atlantic Ocean, as well as in the Pacific and Indian Oceans and (during the period of unrestricted submarine warfare) off the Atlantic coast. North America.

In the northern part of the Atlantic Ocean, between North America and Western Europe, the most important sea routes passed, which were of great importance for the military economy of the Atlantic countries, especially for England, whose economy was completely dependent on maritime trade. The main hub of these messages were the southwestern approaches to England.

On the coast of the Atlantic Ocean, England and its allies had an extensive basing system, while the few German cruisers stationed before the war in the Atlantic and destined in the event of a war to operate on sea communications did not have such bases. In addition, counting on the short duration of the war, the outcome of which was to be decided in land battles and in the North Sea, Germany did not attach much importance to cruising operations on distant ocean communications. The English cruiser squadrons assigned to protect ocean communications were to operate, each in its own zone, based on Halifax, Kingston and Gibraltar, etc. In the first three or four months of the war, single German cruisers operated on sea communications in the Atlantic, which did not achieve significant success, but diverted large British cruising forces from the main maritime theater - the North Sea.

After the defeat of the German squadron in the battle near the Falkland Islands, operations on ocean communications in the Atlantic almost ceased.

In 1915-1916, single German auxiliary cruisers appeared here only periodically, breaking through the British blockade in the North Sea. In the autumn of 1916, the first German submarines appeared off the coast of the United States. With the entry of the United States into the war (April 1917), during the period of unrestricted submarine warfare, they extended their area of ​​operations to the central and western parts of the North Atlantic, up to the coast of the United States, having committed to this area in 1917 - 1918. up to 15 trips. However, the main area of ​​operations of German submarines throughout the entire submarine war remained the western approaches to England, which included the northeast Atlantic, the Bay of Biscay, the English Channel and the Irish Sea. Here, during the period of the most intense unrestricted submarine warfare, up to 1/4 of all combat resources of the submarine forces of the German Navy based in the North Sea were concentrated, and up to six million tons of merchant tonnage were sunk (during the entire war). However, the huge forces and means of the allies, in the presence of numerous and well-equipped bases, made it possible to successfully deploy a powerful anti-submarine defense. Transportation along the most important maritime communications of the Entente in the Atlantic Ocean continued, albeit with great tension and with significant losses of tonnage, throughout the war.

In the Pacific, especially with the entry of Japan into the war, the allied fleets had a developed basing system that ensured the actions of any formations of ships to protect sea communications. Germany had here its only colonial naval base, Qingdao, where in peacetime the East Asia Cruiser Squadron was based, which accounted for half of all German cruiser forces, which it kept before the war outside the waters of the mother country. In view of the overwhelming superiority of the forces of the allied fleets in the Pacific, the German command did not intend to use Qingdao as a base in wartime. The German cruiser squadron, after some minor actions in the western part of the Pacific Ocean, went to the shores of South America. Here, at Coronel, the only naval battle between the German and English cruiser squadrons took place in the Pacific War. After that, only in 1917, two German auxiliary cruisers operated on sea communications in the Pacific Ocean for quite a long time. At this time, there were minefields off the coast of New Zealand and Australia. These actions, in view of the relatively small military significance of the Pacific communications, were predominantly demonstrative in nature and aimed at diverting part of the forces of the Allied fleets from the main theater of military operations - the Atlantic Ocean and the North Sea.

The Indian Ocean, to the shores of which the vast colonial possessions of England came out, was considered, in relation to the basing system, the "English lake".

The well-equipped ports of Cape Town, Aden, Bombay, Colombo, Singapore provided the base for all the forces necessary to protect sea communications against single German cruisers that periodically operated here. In the initial period of the war in the Indian Ocean, there were two German light cruisers, against which the Entente, given the length and dispersion of ocean communications, had to allocate quite significant forces. After the destruction of these cruisers, transportation across the Indian Ocean, which was of great importance for the economy of England, was carried out without hindrance. In 1917, during a particularly intense German submarine operation in the Mediterranean, the important sea route leading from the Indian Ocean through the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean Sea was temporarily (and not for all ships) moved and passed around the southern tip of Africa. At the same time, a German auxiliary cruiser operated on sea communications in the Indian Ocean, which laid mines off the southern coast of Africa and off Ceylon.

The most important sea routes of communication> passed through the English Channel (English Channel), as well as along the east coast of England and to the coast of Norway.

Through this sea, almost all of Germany's foreign maritime trade was carried out. With the closure of trade routes through the North Sea, Germany was left with the possibility of importing only from the Scandinavian countries through the Baltic Sea and its strait zone. Maritime communications of the North Sea were of significant importance for England as well. Food and timber from the Scandinavian countries, Swedish iron ore were imported this way, and coal was exported.

The main fleets of the strongest maritime powers - England and Germany - were concentrated in the bases of the North Sea.

Table 1

The composition of the naval forces in the North Sea at the beginning of the war

The main naval base of the German fleet, Wilhelmshaven, had sufficient repair facilities for ships of all classes and supplies. At the same time, approaches from the sea were covered by the island fortress of Heligoland, which in turn was the base of light forces and hydroaviation.

The body of water protected by the fortifications of Helgoland, about. [Borkum] and adjacent to the mouths of the Weser and Elbe, was called the German Bay or "wet triangle". In preparation for the war, the German command paid great attention to the defense of this area. Coastal batteries were installed here, and barriers were placed on the approaches to the base. In the course of the war, the basing of the German fleet was expanded by equipping submarine bases in the Belgian ports of Bruges, [Zeebrugge] and Ostend.

It should be noted that the pre-war basing of the British fleet did not meet the task assigned to it of a long-range blockade of Germany and clearly lagged behind the construction of the fleet itself.

The absence of well-equipped bases in the northern part of the sea put the Grand Fleet in a difficult position at the beginning of the war, and only the presence of convenient sheltered anchorages allowed the fleet to be in this part of the sea. Before the war, the main base of the English fleet was Portsmouth, the base of the fleet was Plymouth (Devonport). These bases were fortified from the sea and had docks, repair facilities and stockpiles of logistics.

The bases were Dover and Portland. On the southeast coast of England (the mouth of the Thames) was located the naval area of ​​Nor with the bases of Chatham and Sheerness. On the east coast of England, in the depths of the Firth of Forth, the Rosyth base was equipped, and the construction of the Cromarty base was begun in the Moray Firth. However, the location of all these peacetime bases did not meet the main tasks facing the British fleet, to establish a long-range blockade of Germany and prevent the enemy from weakening the forces of the British fleet by the actions of mine fleets and submarines. Therefore, immediately before the start of the war, the main forces of the English fleet were transferred to the vast sheltered bay of the Orkney Islands - Scapa Flow.

At the beginning of the war on the west coast of Scotland, Loch U Bay and Loch na Keel Bay were temporarily used as base points (before Scapa Flow was equipped). In the Shetland Islands, the port of Lerwick (Lerwick) was used to base the light forces that provided the Scandinavian convoys since 1917.

An important frontier separating England from the continent was the English Channel (English Channel) - a junction of the most important sea routes. All cargo and military transportation from England to France was carried out through the canal and passed from the Atlantic to the eastern ports of England. At the same time, the English Channel with the Strait of Dover was the shortest way for German submarines to enter the western sea lanes of England.

The main naval base of the French fleet, Brest, and the base of Cherbourg were also located on the coast of the English Channel. Due to the fact that the main forces of the fleet operated in the Mediterranean, these bases were of secondary importance.

A developed network of hydroaerodromes was created on the east coast of England, and coastal batteries were installed to protect the direct approaches to the ports.

Throughout the war, the North Sea remained the base area for the main forces of the British and German navies. Together with the northeastern part of the Atlantic Ocean, the English Channel and approaches to it from the west, it was the most important of the maritime theaters of military operations, although there were no decisive clashes between the fleets concentrated here.

An important strategic position during the First World War was occupied by the Mediterranean theater of operations, where sea routes to Europe from India and the Far East passed, as well as sea communications from France and Italy with their North African colonies.

With the entry into the war of Italy, superiority in forces in the Mediterranean turned out to be on the side of the Entente. England could not allocate significant forces for operations in the Mediterranean. However, the main forces of the French fleet were concentrated here, which made it possible to block the Austrian fleet in the Adriatic Sea.

table 2

Considering the problem of basing fleets, it should be noted that the main naval base of the British fleet in the Mediterranean was La Valletta on the island of Malta, which was well fortified. Gibraltar served as the base of the fleet, and Alexandria was the temporary base.

Assessing the whole system of basing the British fleet in the Mediterranean, it should be recognized that it ensured its combat activities, however, during the Dardanelles operation, the lack of bases in the Aegean Sea affected.

The main naval base of the French fleet was Toulon. At the same time, the base had all the ship repair facilities and large stocks of material and technical equipment. Bizerte served as a base for all classes of ships, Algiers was used mainly for basing destroyers, and Oran was a basing point.

The existing basing system as a whole ensured the operations of the French fleet in the western Mediterranean. For operations in the Adriatic Sea, the French fleet was based on La Valletta.

The main base of the Italian fleet in the Mediterranean was La Spezia. At the same time, Taranto was the main base of the Italian fleet on the Adriatic Sea. Naples was also used as a base for the fleet. Ports on the east coast of Italy served as temporary bases: Brindisi, Ancona, Venice.

As for the basing systems of the Italian fleet, it provided combat operations in the middle part of the Mediterranean Sea, but it was underdeveloped in the Adriatic Sea.

Of particular interest is the basing system in the Mediterranean Sea of ​​the Austro-Hungarian fleet. his main naval base, Pola, had sheltered berthing for ships of all classes, several docks, and repair shops. The basing point with limited repair facilities was Kotor. The close proximity to the Montenegrin border allowed until 1916 the possibility of shelling this base with artillery. From the sea, the approaches to the Bay of Kotor were protected by coastal artillery. During the war, the equipment of the Kotor base was improved. Most of the German submarines operating in the Mediterranean were based here.

By the beginning of the war, the German ships Goeben and Breslau, which were in the Mediterranean, passed through the straits to Constantinople and continued to operate in the Black Sea during the war.

During the entire war in the Mediterranean, there were no major operations and combat clashes of surface forces. At the same time, the actions of German submarines acquired the greatest development in the sea communications of the Entente. Moreover, in three years, from the autumn of 1915, about 4 million tons of merchant tonnage were sunk here, i.e. 1/3 of the total merchant tonnage sunk by German submarines in 1915-1918. Throughout the war, the Entente carried out large-scale military transportation across the Mediterranean Sea to the Western European and Balkan theaters of military operations.

With the outbreak of the First World War, the ports of the Baltic and Black Seas were cut off from the ocean, it became especially important as the only way of communication between Russia and its allies (except for the route through the Pacific Ocean and Siberia), the Northern Russian Maritime Theater of War.

As is known, the Barents and White Seas, due to harsh climatic conditions in winter, are covered in a significant part by floating ice. At this time, only the Barents Sea near the western part of the Kola coast does not freeze and is available for swimming all year round.

It should be emphasized that military operations in the Northern Theater were not envisaged in the plans of the Russian soldiers. The Barents and White Seas had only some commercial value. The ports of the White Sea were used for timber export. There were no ports on the ice-free coast of the Barents Sea. Only Arkhangelsk was connected with the center of the country by rail. From a military point of view, the theater of operations was not equipped, there were no defensive structures. All monitoring of the coast was carried out by the messenger vessel "Bakan", which annually came from the Baltic Sea to protect the fisheries.

The current situation required the rapid development of the equipment of existing ports and the creation of new ones, as well as the deployment of measures to protect maritime communications. First of all, it was necessary to build a railway to the coast of the ice-free Kola Bay, and to use icebreakers to extend navigation on the White Sea. The first measures to equip the theater were limited to the construction of observation posts on the approaches to Arkhangelsk. Coastal batteries were installed on Mudyugsky Island and a sentinel service was organized. In January 1915, the laying of an underwater telegraph cable from England to Aleksandrovsk was completed. At the same time, a battery and booms were installed to protect the cable exit near Aleksandrovsk. A radio station and several observation posts were also built here.

Throughout the war, the Baltic Sea theater of operations was of great importance for Russia, from where the enemy, who had a strong fleet, could threaten the entire Russian Baltic coast, including the St. Petersburg region.

In addition, the northern flank of the Russian-German front rested on the sea.

Difficult navigational and hydrometeorological conditions and prolonged ice cover made it difficult to conduct combat operations and limited the use of naval forces. At the same time, the small size of the sea made it possible to deploy forces for operations in a relatively short time, and also facilitated the interaction of various classes of ships.

Of great strategic importance was the Gulf of Finland, on the eastern coast of which the capital of Russia was located. Before the war, Kronstadt was the backbone of the naval defense of the bay and the main repair base of the fleet, but basing on Kronstadt was difficult due to prolonged freezing. Of particular importance for the defense of the Gulf of Finland was the bottleneck of the bay between Nargen Island and the Porkkala-Udd Peninsula, as well as the Abo-Aland and Moonsund regions, which occupied a flank position to the entrance to the Gulf and ensured the exit of the fleet for operations on the high seas. The Abo-Alandsky skerry region was used for basing light forces, and the Moonsund region, which had no means for basing and defense by the beginning of the war, covered the entrance to the Gulf of Riga.

The main base of the Russian fleet on the Baltic Sea was Helsingfors with the raid and the fortress of Sveaborg. However, Helsingfors was not sufficiently fortified and equipped to base the fleet. The inner roadstead was inconvenient for large ships, so the battleships were forced to stand on the unprotected outer roadstead. As for ship repair facilities, they were insignificant: the only dry dock for battleships on the Baltic Sea was located in Kronstadt. Revel also had limited repair capabilities: the construction and equipment planned here for the main, well-defended base of the Baltic Fleet (Peter the Great Fortress) had just begun before the war.

Baltic Port, Rogonyul (since 1915) and Ust-Dvinsk were used as basing points for light forces of the Russian fleet. The roads Porkkala-Uddsky [Lapvik], Eryo, Ute, Werder [Kuivast] served as anchorages.

The forward bases and strongholds of Libava and Vindava, according to the plan, were abandoned by the Russian fleet at the beginning of the war, and in 1915 they were occupied by the enemy.

For Germany, the importance of the Baltic Theater increased due to the fact that, in the presence of an almost circular blockade, the Baltic Sea with its strait zone remained the only way to transport iron ore and other raw materials from Sweden, which Germany badly needed.

The German Navy had an extensive base system in the Baltic Sea with sufficient repair facilities. In this case, the main base was Kiel. Due to the presence of the Kiel Canal, this base, as a repair and rear base, was of great importance for the North Sea. Danzig with a well-hidden Putzig raid, the Pillau base point, and from the middle of 1915 - Libau were used as bases. It should be emphasized that the ratio of the permanent forces of the fleets in the Baltic Sea was in favor of the Russian fleet.

Table 3

The composition of the naval forces in the Baltic Sea at the beginning of the war

However, the German command had the opportunity, if necessary, to transfer significant forces of the High Seas Fleet through the Kiel Canal and thus create a large superiority in forces. So, in 1915, ships were transferred from the North Sea to break into the Gulf of Riga, and in 1917 - for the Moonsund operation.

Given the possibility of quickly concentrating the main forces of the German fleet on the Baltic Sea, the Russian command proceeded from the general balance of forces of the fleets and set defensive tasks for its fleet, the most important of which was the defense of the coast and covering the approaches to the capital from the sea.

It should be noted that the equipment of the Baltic Theater by the beginning of the war was insufficient and clearly did not meet the tasks assigned to the Russian fleet.

The basis of the defense of the Gulf of Finland at the beginning of the war was the Central mine-artillery position - a minefield, exposed in the narrowness of the bay and covered from the flanks by batteries on the sharp Nargen and at Porkkala-Udda. Directly adjacent to it was a flank-skerry position to the west of Porkkala Udda, where mines were laid out and batteries were installed in the first days of the war. The coastal defense of the Central Position did not provide solid cover for the flanks. The defense of the position was entrusted to the fleet, the main forces of which were deployed in the rear of the position in anticipation of a battle with the German fleet during its breakthrough into the Gulf of Finland.

The deployment in 1914 of inactive operations in the middle and southern parts of the sea required the strengthening of the theater equipment in order to ensure the defense of the Gulf of Finland. Batteries were built in the areas of the island of Nargen and Reval, two batteries on the island of Worms and a battery on the Porkkala Udd peninsula.

To expand the basing of light forces and submarines in the areas of the Abo-Aland skerries and the Moonsund archipelago, intensive work began at the end of 1914, which continued in subsequent years.

Assessing the state of the defense of the coast of Germany at the beginning of the war, it should be recognized as stable. During the war, a wide network of airfields, radio stations and direction-finding stations was created on the coast. Defensive minefields were placed mainly in the strait zone and on the approaches to their bases, active minefields - in the northern part of the Baltic Sea in order to block the Russian fleet in the Gulf of Finland.

Turning to the consideration of the Black Sea Theater of Operations, it should be noted that if more or less sufficient attention was paid to the equipment of the Baltic Sea Theater of Operations (TVD) before the First World War, then the same cannot be said about the Black Sea Theater of Operations. The attitude of the top military leadership of Russia towards the latter, as a secondary theater of operations, had a negative effect not only on the construction of ships, but also on the organization of the basing system.

Meanwhile, the limited size of the Black Sea, and consequently the relatively short distances to the enemy's most important objectives (from Sevastopol to the Bosphorus 280 miles) made it possible to quickly deploy forces in any area.

The main base of the Black Sea Fleet was Sevastopol, the base points were Odessa and Batum, and the rear repair base was Nikolaev. At the same time, only the main base of the fleet was relatively equipped. However, Sevastopol was weakly fortified from the sea. Therefore, the safety of the ships in Sevastopol was not guaranteed in wartime. The port itself was insufficiently equipped. The rest of the bases were in extremely poor condition. The military department, to which they were subordinate until 1910, repeatedly demanded the elimination of the fortifications in Batum (Batumi) and Ochakovo, and only the resolute statement of the Naval Ministry against such a rash decision allowed them to be preserved as possible bases for the fleet during the war.

Batum was of great importance not only as a base for the fleet, but also as a transport and reloading point for supplying the Caucasian army. Intensified defensive work to strengthen Batum began only during the war. The coastal defense was reinforced with field guns, an observation post, and minefields on the approaches to the port. A hydroaviation base was equipped, and the Batum fortress artillery, which had an insufficient firing range, at the end of 1914 received new guns for reinforcement.

In addition to the listed fortified points, coastal batteries were installed near Odessa, on the Tendrovskaya Spit, near Ak-Mechet, Evpatoria, Yalta, Feodosia, Novorossiysk, Tuapse, Sochi, Gagra, Sukhumi, Poti.

By the beginning of the war in Russia there were several radio stations, a number of new stations were built during the war.

The network of observation and communication posts was widely developed, all coastal points were interconnected by telegraph and telephone communications. The airfield network was developed.

The most serious shortcoming of the system of basing the forces of the fleet on the Black Sea theater of operations was the absence of a well-equipped and protected naval base on the Caucasian coast.

The main opponent of Russia in the Black Sea theater of operations was Turkey.

By the beginning of the war, Turkey had the only fleet base in the theater of operations - Constantinople, and since 1915, when Bulgaria acted on the side of the Central Powers, Varna was used for temporary basing (in particular, by submarines).

Maritime communications on the Black Sea were of great importance for Turkey, since the road network on the Anatolian coast was very poorly developed. Its most important inland sea route ran along the Anatolian coast from Constantinople to Trebizond. This route was used to supply the armies of the Caucasian Front, and also delivered coal from the Zonguldak and Eregli regions to the capital. The absence of convenient, sea-protected anchorages made it difficult for the Turks to organize the protection of sea communications. During the war, this path has undergone some changes compared to peacetime. At the same time, the ships sailed closer to the coast at relatively shallow depths, which greatly complicated the actions of Russian submarines.

Table 4

The composition of the naval forces on the Black Sea at the beginning of the war with Turkey

By the beginning of the war, there were no new battleships in the Black Sea Fleet (3 dreadnoughts were built in Nikolaev), nevertheless, Russian battleships were stronger than Turkish ones. However, the arrival in August 1914 of the German battlecruiser Goeben from the Mediterranean Sea to Constantinople nullified the advantage of the Russian fleet.

The fact is that the high-speed "Goeben", as well as the German light cruiser "Breslau", could get away from any formation of Russian ships that was superior in strength and, in turn, had the opportunity to impose a battle on the weaker of the enemy's ships.

A few words should be said about the Black Sea straits Bosphorus and Dardanelles, connecting the Black and Mediterranean Seas through the Sea of ​​Marmara. The length of the Bosphorus is 16 miles, the width is up to two miles; depths along the axis of the strait are 28-100 m. Both banks at the entrance to the strait from the Black Sea were heavily fortified by the beginning of the war.

On the Asian coast of the strait, from the side of the entrance from the Black Sea, there were eight forts and coastal batteries - in total up to 50 guns of caliber from 150 to 80 mm; on the European coast there are also eight forts and batteries - in total over 20 guns of caliber from 150 to 350 mm.

The mine defense of the Bosphorus was organized even before the start of the war. Three rows of shore-controlled mines were placed across the strait in the narrowness between Rumeli-Kavak and Agadolu-Kwvak. At the same time, the passage was left on the east side. Several rows of mines were placed north of Anadolu-Kavak, and several separate mine banks along the Asian coast. Directly at the entrance, a barrier was erected across the strait. Mines were also placed near Kilyos.

The length of the Dardanelles is 35 miles, the width is two or three miles, the depth along the axis of the strait is 50 - 100 m; the narrowness at Çanakkale is eight cables wide.

The fortifications of the Dardanelles consisted of a number of batteries, which were located near the coast and were divided into external and internal. Intermediate batteries, located at heights, had guns (mostly field and mortars) of a caliber not exceeding 150 mm.

By the beginning of hostilities, the defense of the strait included a number of old open forts built in 1877-1878, armed with obsolete cannons, and several batteries. The firing range of the guns did not exceed nine kilometers. The total number of guns reached 100. During the war, the equipment was updated and expanded, especially in connection with the Dardanelles landing operation of the Anglo-French fleet.

When approaching the strait from the Aegean Sea, enemy ships first of all fell into the zone of fire of the forts and external batteries of Kumkale and Seddulbakhir, installed at the very entrance to the strait. These forts and batteries were armed with 26 guns, including 16 of 240-280 mm caliber.

Approaching the traverse of the batteries of Seddulbakhir, the ships left the shelling of the Kumkale battery, but remained in the zone of fire of the batteries and the fort of Seddulbakhir. Such a system of gun placement made it possible to fire both across and along the strait, into the stern of ships breaking through into the strait.

Further along the Asian and European coasts, intermediate batteries were located (85 guns of 120 - 210 mm caliber. Among them was the Dardanos battery on a high hill on the Asian coast near the Kepez Limany Bay, which fired at the strait in both directions to the maximum firing range.

The basis of the defense of the strait was made up of strong internal batteries located on both sides of the narrow part of the strait up to Canakkale. On the Asian coast there were coastal batteries Hamidiye I and Chimenlik, on the European coast - Rumeli, Hamidiye II, Namazgah. In addition, north of Canakkale on the Asian coast, up to the narrowness of Nagra, there were three forts, which were also part of the general defense system of the narrowness of the strait.

All internal forts and batteries had 88 guns, including 12 guns of caliber 280 - 355 mm, 57 guns from 210 to 260 mm. Batteries of the newest construction were especially heavily fortified - Hamidiye I on the Asian coast and against it Hamidiye II - on the European one. The fire control of the batteries, like the entire management of the naval defense of the strait, was carried out by German officers.

Assessing the balance of forces of the parties at sea by the beginning of the First World War, it should be noted that the combined naval forces of the Entente (England, France and Russia) significantly outnumbered the naval forces of the Union of Central States both in general and in most naval theaters.

Taking into account the ships under construction, the fleets of the Entente states outnumbered the naval forces of Germany and its allies in new battleships by two times, in battlecruisers by 2.5 times, in destroyers - by 2.5 times, in submarines - three times.

In addition, the Entente fleets had a more developed basing system and a better strategic position in most maritime theaters of war.

Special for the Centenary

And Germany's attempts to disrupt British and French shipping, blockade Russia (for the supply of firearms, aeronauts, armored vehicles, small arms, etc.) with the help of submarines and raiders.

In the autumn of 1914, three British Type E submarines broke into the Baltic Sea through the Danish straits: E1 , E9 and E11. In the fall of 1916, four more British submarines were delivered to the Baltic through Arkhangelsk, and then on barges along the Northern Dvina, Sukhona and Mariinsky system: S26, S27, S 32, S36. British submarines were based in Reval, and at the end of December 1917 the flotilla moved to Helsingfors.

On April 3, 1918, after the conclusion of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the British, under the leadership of Commander F. Kromy, took the boats E-1, E-9, E-19 from Helsingfors to great depths and there, in order to avoid being captured by the Germans, they were flooded. On April 4, 1918, E-8 and S-26 were scuttled there, and on April 5, S-27 and S-35. The submarine S-32 was blown up, and the submarine E18 died on May 25, 1916 for an unknown reason.

Before the outbreak of the First World War, the great powers paid great attention to their naval forces, and large-scale naval programs were being implemented. Therefore, when the war began, the leading countries had numerous and powerful fleets. A particularly stubborn rivalry in building up naval power was between Great Britain and Germany. The British at that time possessed the most powerful navy and merchant fleet, which made it possible to control strategic communications in the oceans, to link together numerous colonies and dominions.

In 1897, the German Navy was significantly inferior to the British Navy. The British had 57 class I, II, III battleships, the Germans had 14 (4:1 ratio), the British had 15 coastal defense battleships, the Germans had 8, the British had 18 armored cruisers, the Germans had 4 (4.5:1 ratio). ), the British had 125 cruisers of classes 1-3, the Germans had 32 (4: 1), the Germans were inferior in other combat units.

Arms race

The British wanted not only to maintain the advantage, but also to increase it. In 1889, Parliament passed a law that allocated more funds for the development of the fleet. London's naval policy was based on the principle that the British Navy was to outperform the two fleets of the most powerful maritime powers.

Berlin initially did not pay much attention to the development of the fleet and the capture of colonies, Chancellor Bismarck did not see much point in this, believing that the main efforts should be directed to European politics, the development of the army. But under Emperor Wilhelm II, priorities were revised, Germany begins the struggle for colonies and the construction of a powerful fleet. In March 1898, the Reichstag passed the "Law on the Navy", which provided for a sharp increase in the Navy. Within 6 years (1898-1903) it was planned to build 11 squadron battleships, 5 armored cruisers, 17 armored cruisers and 63 destroyers. The shipbuilding programs of Germany were subsequently constantly adjusted upwards - in 1900, 1906, 1908, 1912. According to the law of 1912, the size of the fleet was planned to be increased to 41 battleships, 20 armored cruisers, 40 light cruisers, 144 destroyers, 72 submarines. Particular attention was paid to battleships: in the period from 1908 to 1912, 4 battleships were laid in Germany annually (in previous years, two).

In London, it was believed that German naval efforts posed a great threat to Britain's strategic interests. England intensified the naval arms race. The task was to have 60% more battleships than the Germans. Since 1905, the British began to build battleships of a new type - "dreadnoughts" (after the name of the first ship of this class). They differed from squadron battleships in that they had stronger weapons, were better armored, with a more powerful power plant, large displacement, etc.

Battleship Dreadnought.

Germany responded by building its own dreadnoughts. Already in 1908, the British had 8 dreadnoughts, and the Germans had 7 (some were in the process of being completed). The ratio of "pre-dreadnoughts" (squadron battleships) was in favor of Britain: 51 against 24 German. In 1909, London decided to build two of its own for every German dreadnought.

The British tried to maintain their naval power through diplomacy. At the 1907 Hague Peace Conference, they proposed limiting the scale of building new warships. But the Germans, believing that only Britain would benefit from this step, rejected this proposal. The naval arms race between England and Germany continued until the First World War. By its beginning, Germany had firmly taken the position of the second military maritime power, overtaking Russia and France.

Other great powers - France, Russia, Italy, Austria-Hungary, etc., also tried to build up their naval armaments, but for a number of reasons, including financial problems, they could not achieve such impressive success.

The Queen Elizabeth is the lead ship of the superdreadnoughts of the Queen Elizabeth series.

The Importance of the Fleets

The fleets had to perform a number of important tasks. Firstly, to protect the coast of countries, their ports, important cities (for example, the main purpose of the Russian Baltic Fleet is the protection of St. Petersburg). Secondly, the fight against enemy naval forces, the support of their ground forces from the sea. Thirdly, the protection of sea lanes, strategically important points, especially Britain and France, they owned huge colonial empires. Fourthly, to ensure the status of the country, a powerful navy showed the position of the power in the world informal table of ranks.

The basis of the then naval strategy and tactics was a linear battle. In theory, the two fleets were supposed to line up and in an artillery duel to find out who was the winner. Therefore, the fleet was based on squadron battleships and armored cruisers, and then dreadnoughts (from 1912-1913 and superdreadnoughts) and battlecruisers. Battlecruisers had weaker armor and artillery, but were faster and had a longer range. Squadron battleships (battleships of the pre-dreadnought type), armored cruisers were not written off, but they were brought to the background, ceasing to be the main striking force. Light cruisers were supposed to carry out raids on enemy sea lanes. Destroyers and destroyers were intended for torpedo strikes, the destruction of enemy transports. Their combat survivability was based on speed, maneuverability and stealth. The Navy also included special-purpose ships: minelayers (set sea mines), minesweepers (made passages in minefields), seaplane transports (hydrocruisers), etc. The role of the submarine fleet was constantly growing.

Battlecruiser Goeben

Great Britain

The British at the beginning of the war had 20 dreadnoughts, 9 battlecruisers, 45 old battleships, 25 armored and 83 light cruisers, 289 destroyers and destroyers, 76 submarines (most outdated, they could not operate on the high seas). I must say that, despite all the power of the British fleet, its leadership was very conservative. New items hardly found their way (especially those not related to the linear fleet). Even Vice-Admiral Philip Colomb, a naval theorist and historian, author of the book “Naval Warfare, Its Basic Principles and Experience” (1891), said: “There is nothing that would show that the laws of naval wars long established by any have changed in a way." The admiral substantiated the theory of "ownership of the sea" as the basis of the imperial policy of Britain. He believed that the only way to achieve victory in the war at sea was to create complete superiority in naval forces and destroy the enemy's navy in one pitched battle.

When Admiral Percy Scott suggested that "the era of dreadnoughts and super-dreadnoughts was over forever" and advised the Admiralty to focus on the development of aviation and the submarine fleet, his innovative ideas were sharply criticized.

The general management of the fleet was carried out by the Admiralty, headed by W. Churchill and the first sea lord (chief of the main naval headquarters) Prince Ludwig Battenberg. British ships were based in the harbors of Humberg, Scarborough, Firth of Forth and Scapa Flow. In 1904, the Admiralty considered relocating the main naval forces from the English Channel north to Scotland. This decision removed the fleet from the threat of a blockade of the narrow strait by the growing German Navy, and allowed for operational control of the entire North Sea. According to the British naval doctrine, which was developed shortly before the war by Battenberg and Bridgman, the basing of the main forces of the fleet in Scapa Flow (a harbor in Scotland on the Orkney Islands), outside the effective range of the German submarine fleet, should have led to a blockade of the main forces of the German fleet, which and happened during the First World War.

When the war began, the British were in no hurry to meddle with the German shores, fearing attacks by submarines and destroyers. The main fighting took place on land. The British limited themselves to covering communications, protecting the coast and blockade Germany from the sea. The British fleet was ready to join the battle if the Germans brought their main fleet to the open sea.

British Grand Fleet.

Germany

The German Navy had 15 dreadnoughts, 4 battlecruisers, 22 old battleships, 7 armored and 43 light cruisers, 219 destroyers and destroyers, and 28 submarines. According to a number of indicators, for example, in speed, the German ships were better than the British. Much more attention was paid to technical innovations in Germany than in England. Berlin did not have time to complete its naval program, it was supposed to be completed in 1917. Although the German naval leaders were quite conservative, Admiral Tirpitz initially believed that it was "frivolous" to get involved in the construction of submarines. And dominance at sea is determined by the number of battleships. Only realizing that the war would begin before the completion of the battle fleet construction program, he became a supporter of unlimited submarine warfare and the forced development of the submarine fleet.

The German "High Seas Fleet" (German: Hochseeflotte), it was based in Wilhelmshaven, was supposed to destroy the main forces of the British fleet ("Grand Fleet" - "Big Fleet") in an open battle. In addition, there were naval bases in Kiel, Fr. Helgoland, Danzig. The Russian and French navies were not perceived as worthy opponents. The German "High Seas Fleet" created a constant threat to Britain and forced the English Grand Fleet to be constantly in the North Sea region in full combat readiness throughout the war, despite the shortage of battleships in other theaters of operations. Due to the fact that the Germans were inferior in the number of battleships, the German Navy tried to avoid open clashes with the Grand Fleet and preferred the strategy of raids into the North Sea, trying to lure part of the British fleet, cut it off from the main forces and destroy it. In addition, the Germans focused on waging unrestricted submarine warfare to weaken the British Navy and lift the naval blockade.

The lack of autocracy affected the combat capability of the German Navy. The main creator of the fleet was Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz (1849 - 1930). He was the author of the "risk theory", which argued that if the German fleet was comparable to the British in strength, then the British would avoid conflicts with the German Empire, because in the event of war, the German Navy would have a chance to inflict sufficient damage on the Grand Fleet for the loss of the British fleet supremacy at sea. With the outbreak of war, the role of the grand admiral fell. Tirpitz became responsible for building new ships and supplying the fleet. The "High Seas Fleet" was led by Admiral Friedrich von Ingenol (in 1913-1915), then Hugo von Pohl (from February 1915 to January 1916, before that he was chief of the General Naval Staff), Reinhard Scheer (1916-1918). In addition, the fleet was the favorite brainchild of the German Emperor Wilhelm, if he trusted the generals to make decisions about the army, then the Navy controlled himself. Wilhelm did not dare to risk the fleet in an open battle and allowed only a "small war" to be waged - with the help of submarines, destroyers, mine productions. The battle fleet had to stick to a defensive strategy.

German "High Seas Fleet"

France. Austria-Hungary

The French had 3 dreadnoughts, 20 battleships of the old type (battleships), 18 armored and 6 light cruisers, 98 destroyers, 38 submarines. In Paris, they decided to focus on the "Mediterranean Front", since the British agreed to defend the Atlantic coast of France. Thus, the French saved expensive ships, because there was no big threat in the Mediterranean - the Ottoman Navy was very weak and connected by the Russian Black Sea Fleet, Italy was neutral at first, and then went over to the side of the Entente, the Austro-Hungarian fleet chose a passive strategy. In addition, there was a rather strong British squadron in the Mediterranean.

The Austro-Hungarian Empire had 3 dreadnoughts (the 4th entered service in 1915), 9 battleships, 2 armored and 10 light cruisers, 69 destroyers and 9 submarines. Vienna also chose a passive strategy and "defended the Adriatic", almost the entire war the Austro-Hungarian fleet stood in Trieste, Split, Pula.

"Tegetthoff" in the prewar years. Austro-Hungarian battleship of the Viribus Unitis class.

Russia

The Russian fleet under Emperor Alexander III was second only to the British and French navies, but then lost this position. The Russian Navy received a particularly large blow during the Russo-Japanese War: almost the entire Pacific squadron and the best ships of the Baltic Fleet sent to the Far East were lost. The fleet needed to be rebuilt. Several naval programs were developed between 1905 and 1914. They provided for the completion of 4 previously laid down squadron battleships, 4 armored cruisers and the construction of 8 new battleships, 4 battleships and 10 light cruisers, 67 destroyers and 36 submarines. But by the beginning of the war, not a single program had been fully implemented (the State Duma also played its role in this, which did not support these projects).

By the beginning of the war, Russia had 9 old battleships, 8 armored and 14 light cruisers, 115 destroyers and destroyers, 28 submarines (a significant part of the old types). Already during the war, the following entered service: in the Baltic - 4 dreadnoughts of the Sevastopol type, all of them were laid down in 1909 - Sevastopol, Poltava, Petropavlovsk, Gangut; on the Black Sea - 3 dreadnoughts of the Empress Maria type (laid down in 1911).

"Poltava" during the First World War.

The Russian Empire was not a backward power in the naval field. It even took the lead in a number of areas. In Russia, excellent destroyers of the Novik type were developed. By the beginning of the First World War, the ship was the best destroyer in its class, and served as a world model in the creation of destroyers of the military and post-war generation. The technical conditions for it were created at the Marine Technical Committee under the leadership of the outstanding Russian shipbuilders A. N. Krylov, I. G. Bubnov and G. F. Schlesinger. The project was developed in 1908-1909 by the shipbuilding department of the Putilov Plant, which was headed by engineers D. D. Dubitsky (for the mechanical part) and B. O. Vasilevsky (ship building part). At Russian shipyards, in 1911-1916, in 6 standard projects, a total of 53 ships of this class were laid down. The destroyers combined the qualities of a destroyer and a light cruiser - speed, maneuverability and rather strong artillery armament (4th 102-mm guns).

Russian railway engineer Mikhail Petrovich Nalyotov was the first to implement the idea of ​​a submarine with anchor mines. Already in 1904, during the Russo-Japanese War, participating in the heroic defense of Port Arthur, Naleytov built a submarine with a displacement of 25 tons, capable of carrying four mines, at his own expense. He conducted the first tests, but after the surrender of the fortress, the device was destroyed. In 1909-1912, a submarine was built at the Nikolaev shipyard, which received the name "Crab". She became part of the Black Sea Fleet. During the First World War, the "Crab" made several combat exits with mine productions, even reached the Bosphorus.

The world's first underwater mine layer - the submarine "Crab" (Russia, 1912).

Already during the war, Russia became the world leader in the use of hydrocruisers (aircraft carriers), since this was facilitated by the factor of dominance in the creation and use of naval aviation. Russian aircraft designer Dmitry Pavlovich Grigorovich, since 1912 he worked as the technical director of the plant of the First Russian Aeronautics Society, in 1913 he designed the world's first seaplane (M-1) and immediately began to improve the aircraft. In 1914, Grigorovich built the M-5 flying boat. It was a two-seat biplane of wooden construction. The seaplane entered service with the Russian fleet as a reconnaissance and spotter of artillery fire, and in the spring of 1915 the aircraft made its first sortie. In 1916, Grigorovich's new aircraft, the heavier M-9 (sea bomber), was adopted. Then the Russian nugget designed the world's first seaplane fighter M-11.

On Russian dreadnoughts of the Sevastopol type, for the first time, they used the installation system of not two, but three-gun turrets of the main caliber. In England and Germany, they were initially skeptical of the idea, but the Americans appreciated the idea and Nevada-class battleships were built with three-gun turrets.

In 1912, 4 Izmail-class battlecruisers were laid down. They were intended for the Baltic Fleet. These would be the most powerful battlecruisers in the world in terms of artillery armament. Unfortunately, they were never completed. In 1913-1914, eight light cruisers of the Svetlana type were laid down, four each for the Baltic and Black Sea fleets. They were going to be put into operation in 1915-1916, but did not have time. Russian submarines of the Bars type were considered one of the best in the world (they began to be built in 1912). A total of 24 Bars were built: 18 for the Baltic Fleet and 6 for the Black Sea.

It should be noted that in the pre-war years in the West European fleets little attention was paid to the submarine fleet. This is due to two main reasons. Firstly, previous wars have not yet revealed their combat significance, only in the First World War did their enormous significance become clear. Secondly, the then dominant naval doctrine of the "high seas" assigned submarine forces one of the last places in the struggle for the sea. Dominance in the seas was to be won by battleships, having won a decisive battle.

Russian engineers and artillery sailors made a great contribution to the development of artillery. Before the start of the war, Russian factories mastered the production of improved models of naval guns of caliber 356, 305, 130 and 100 mm. The production of three-gun turrets began. In 1914, the engineer of the Putilov factory F.F. Lender and the artilleryman V.V. Tarnovsky became pioneers in the field of creating a special anti-aircraft gun with a caliber of 76 mm.

In the Russian Empire, before the war, three new types of torpedoes were developed (1908, 1910, 1912). They surpassed similar torpedoes of foreign fleets in speed and range, although they had a lower total weight and charge weight. Before the war, multi-tube torpedo tubes were created - the first such tube was built at the Putilov plant in 1913. He provided salvo fire with a fan, Russian sailors mastered it before the start of the war.

Russia was a leader in the field of mines. In the Russian Empire, after the war with Japan, two special minelayers "Amur" and "Yenisei" were built, and the construction of special minesweepers of the "Zapal" type also began. In the West, before the start of the war, no attention was paid to the need to create special ships for setting and sweeping sea mines. This is also proved by the fact that in 1914 the British were forced to buy a thousand ball mines from Russia to protect their naval bases. The Americans bought not only samples of all Russian mines, but also trawls, considering them the best in the world, and invited Russian specialists to teach them how to mine. The Americans also bought Mi-5, Mi-6 seaplanes. Before the start of the war, Russia developed galvanic and shock-mechanical mines of the 1908 and 1912 models. In 1913, they designed a floating mine (P-13). She was kept underwater at a certain depth due to the action of an electric navigation device. The mines of the previous models were kept at a depth due to buoys, which did not give much stability, especially during storms. P-13 had an electric shock fuse, a charge of 100 kg of tola and could stay at a given depth for three days. In addition, Russian specialists created the world's first river mine "Rybka" ("R").

In 1911, undercutting kite and boat trawls entered service with the fleet. Their use shortened the time of minesweeping, because the undercut and pop-up mines were immediately destroyed. Previously mines had to be towed into shallow water and destroyed there.

The Russian fleet was the cradle of radio. Radio became a means of communication and control in combat. In addition, before the war, Russian radio engineers designed radio direction finders, which made it possible to use the device for reconnaissance.

Given the fact that the new battleships in the Baltic did not enter service, besides the Germans had complete superiority in the forces of the battle fleet, the Russian command adhered to a defensive strategy. The Baltic Fleet was supposed to protect the capital of the empire. Minefields were the basis of naval defense - during the years of the war, 39 thousand mines were put up at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland. In addition, there were powerful batteries on the coast and islands. Under their cover, cruisers, destroyers and submarines made raids. The battleships were supposed to meet the German fleet if it tried to break through the minefields.

By the beginning of the war, the Black Sea Fleet was the master of the Black Sea, because the Turkish Navy had only a few relatively combat-ready ships - 2 old squadron battleships, 2 armored cruisers, 8 destroyers. The attempts of the Turks before the war to change the situation by buying the latest ships abroad did not bring success. The Russian command planned to completely block the Bosphorus and the Turkish coast from the beginning of the war, to support the troops of the Caucasian Front (if necessary, the Romanian) from the sea. The issue of conducting a landing operation in the Bosphorus region, to capture Istanbul-Constantinople, was also considered. The situation was somewhat changed by the arrival of the newest battlecruiser Goeben and the light Breslau. The cruiser "Goeben" was more powerful than any Russian battleship of the old type, but together the squadron battleships of the Black Sea Fleet would have destroyed it, therefore, in a collision with the entire squadron, "Goeben" retreated, using its high speed. In general, especially after the commissioning of dreadnoughts of the Empress Maria type, the Black Sea Fleet controlled the Black Sea basin - it supported the troops of the Caucasian Front, destroyed Turkish transports, and attacked the enemy coast.

Destroyer type "Novik" ("Ardent").

The navy has always been a means of protecting national trade and defending state interests far from their own borders. During the wars, the squadrons of the opposing sides sought to gain freedom of action in the seas and oceans, as well as to interrupt the enemy’s communications with the coast. Usually the culmination of such a confrontation was naval battles, where the fleets of the opponents tried to defeat each other in open battle. This is how the warring powers intended to operate at sea in 1914.

The main role was assigned to the battleships (battleships), which changed noticeably in the pre-war decade, especially with the advent of powerful dreadnoughts. The first-born of this type of ship, the British Dreadnought had ten 12-inch guns, but by 1914 it was surpassed in all respects by the battleship Queen Elizabeth with eight 15-inch guns.

They could hit targets at a distance of up to eight miles, although, of course, the effectiveness of firing was determined primarily by the capabilities of artillery optics. The Queen Elizabeth was remarkable in another respect - it was one of the first ships whose power plant did not run on coal, but on oil, which made it possible to reduce the required fuel reserves on board and increase speed characteristics.

The battleships were supported by the cruisers, which served two main tasks. Firstly, they were used for long-range reconnaissance, and secondly, they protected battleships from attacks by destroyers, which constitute the third important component of the navy. Dreadnoughts, in addition to the increased firepower, had superiority in speed, and such that the cruisers built earlier could not keep up with them. This created a lot of problems, so in 1908 the battlecruiser Invincible (Fearless) was launched in Great Britain, a high-speed vessel second only to dreadnoughts in terms of armament. To increase speed, the British often sacrificed armor, in contrast to the Germans, who built cruisers with enhanced armor.

Subsequently, the British more than once had to regret such savings. However, armored cruisers were too expensive, and besides, Great Britain, whose ships plowed almost all the seas and oceans of our planet, needed ships that could control the most remote sea areas. This led to the fact that the British began to build not only battlecruisers, but also light ones, and other powers quickly followed suit.

In the second half of the 19th century, the torpedo was invented. In order to more effectively use this new weapon, starting from the 80s, light torpedo boats were created, capable of developing a fairly high speed. In order to protect large ships from torpedo attacks, destroyers (destroyers) equipped with torpedo and artillery weapons appeared. In addition, destroyers attacked enemy ships with torpedoes. Battleships and cruisers were also equipped with torpedo tubes. Torpedoes were also launched from submarines, but more on that later. In addition to artillery and torpedoes, ships were threatened by floating mines. They were first used by the Russians in the Baltic during the Crimean War8. Then they were abundantly used by both sides in the Russo-Japanese War. By 1914, "horned mines" were most commonly used, triggered by a collision with a ship. Mines were laid both from submarines and conventional ships, but during the war, large minefields were created with the help of special minelayers. Minesweepers were used to eliminate these fields. The latter usually worked in pairs, cutting mines with a cable stretched between the minesweepers.

Floated mines were fired from small-caliber guns or machine guns. At the beginning of the 1914 war, the ships of the belligerents, which were at sea, headed for their military bases. Great Britain, still superior to other countries in the number of ships, had two fleets: the so-called Grand Fleet, stationed in the Orkney Islands, based on Scapa Flow, and the Mediterranean Fleet in Malta. Separate British squadrons were in the West Indies and the South Atlantic. In addition, Great Britain has always been able to use the services of the small navies of Australia and New Zealand. The French, having a naval base in Toulon, at the request of the British, concentrated their efforts on the Mediterranean Sea.

This allowed the British to strengthen their positions near their own borders against the German navy, which had bases in Kiel and Wilhelmshaven. Austria-Hungary could operate in the Mediterranean from the Adriatic, but its ships had to pass through the narrow Strait of Otrante, which was easy to block. The same situation developed in the Black Sea, where one could pass from the Mediterranean through narrow straits. The Russian fleet, which had bases in Sevastopol and Odessa, opposed the Turkish fleet, which operated from Constantinople and Trabzon. Russia also had a navy in the Baltic Sea, but its activities were limited by a tangible German presence in those waters.

Germany also had a small Pacific squadron in the Far East to guard its island possessions and the small Chinese colony of Tsingtao. She was, however, opposed by the formidable Japanese fleet, most of whose ships were built in Britain. Great Britain hoped to lock up the German navy in the North Sea by blockading the Pas de Calais and establishing patrols with its ships from the Orkney Islands to the coast of Norway. The British hoped that the Germans would soon withdraw their ships from the ports in order to give a decisive battle, but this did not happen. Germany was not going to risk her fleet, numerically inferior to the British. She hoped to inflict damage on the British Grand Fleet in small skirmishes without engaging in a big battle. The Germans also decided to mine the British coastal waters to limit the movement of British ships there. Actually, it was with this that the war at sea began. On August 4, 1914, two British destroyers discovered a German mine layer ("Queen Louise") heading to mine the Thames Estuary area and sank it. In addition to mining the territorial waters of Great Britain, the Germans actively used their submarines to detect British ships. The British, for their part, sent submarines to the Baltic Sea. There were several minor clashes in the North Sea.

The culmination was a raid by British destroyers and light cruisers towards Helgoland at the end of August, when the German side lost three light cruisers and one destroyer. When the war began, several German ships were sailing. Among them were the cruisers Goeben and Breslau. Initially, they were ordered to bombard Algiers in order to prevent the transfer of French colonial forces to France. Then the plans changed, and the ships were ordered to go to Turkey, but nevertheless, early in the morning of August 4, the commander of this formation decided to bombard Algiers. "Goeben" and "Breslau" successfully completed this task and thus challenged the Entente naval forces in the Mediterranean Sea, while managing to evade persecution.

This happened due to the poor coordination of the actions of the British and French sailors and the indecision of their commanders. On August 10, two German ships arrived safely in Constantinople and joined the Turkish navy. Their new mission was to shell the Russian coast and disrupt shipping on the Black Sea. These ships caused a lot of anxiety to the enemy, until they themselves were blown up by mines during a military operation in the Aegean Sea in early 1918. The Far Eastern squadron under the command of Vice Admiral Count von Spee operated even more actively far from their native shores. One of the ships of this squadron, the light cruiser Emden, distinguished itself in the Indian Ocean at the beginning of the war, sinking a Russian cruiser, a French destroyer and sixteen cargo ships.

And only after these exploits was he taken by surprise and sunk by the Australian cruiser Sydney off the Cocos Islands. The rest of the ships of the Far Eastern squadron were given the task of interfering with the normal functioning of the English merchant fleet in the Pacific communications. Two battlecruisers and a light cruiser under the command of von Spee left the Caroline Islands, which then belonged to Germany, and headed towards South America, sowing terror on the trade routes. The British squadron, stationed in the Falkland Islands, was ordered to track down von Spee, to whose aid two more light cruisers had been sent by that time. On November 1, 1914, a battle took place between the British and Germans near Coronel on the Chilean coast.

The British, whose ships were of a very outdated design, were defeated, losing two of their four ships. Then two of the most modern battlecruisers were urgently sent from Great Britain to help, and on December 8, not far from the Falkland Islands, the British took revenge. Four of von Spee's five ships were sunk, and the only surviving light cruiser Dresden was subsequently hunted down and destroyed in March 1915. Thus was put an end to the activity of the German fleet far from their shores, except, of course, the actions of the German submarines. As for the North Sea, the Germans decided to resort to new tactics there. Intending to pull the tail of the British lion, they set about bombarding the English resorts on the east coast.

In January 1915, a serious battle took place in the North Sea near Dogger Bank. Having intercepted a radio message about the impending sortie of German battlecruisers, Admiral David Beatty decided to act. His first squadron of five battlecruisers discovered the German ships and entered into battle with them. Beatty's flagship Lion was severely damaged after several hits, but two gun turrets were destroyed at the German Seidlitz. The cruiser Blucher, also badly damaged by shelling, was forced to slow down, after which the British ships shot her. The cruiser rolled over and sank, and with it eight hundred crew members. The remaining ships of the German squadron retreated. The loss of the Blucher forced the German command to focus on its submarines, and the British, having received a respite, were able to pay attention to other regions, primarily to the Dardanelles. The plan to send warships there was developed on the initiative Winston Churchill, who was then the first Lord of the Admiralty, in charge of which was the British Royal Navy. Initially, it was planned to go to the Black Sea and destroy the Goeben and Breslau, which greatly bothered the allies. When Russia asked its Western allies to take some action to divert the Turkish threat from the Caucasus, the Dardanelles seemed like the perfect place to operate. While land formations were being assembled, French and British ships in early February 1915 began shelling the Turkish forts guarding the Dardanelles. The successful completion of the mission was hampered by bad weather and minefields. Three battleships were blown up by mines. Other smaller ships were also damaged. Minesweepers were sent to eliminate the minefields, but they also suffered greatly from the coastal artillery of the Turks. The forts were suppressed, but the minefields posed too much of a threat to the large ships, and so it was decided to carry out an amphibious landing from the Mediterranean. Only submarines continued to penetrate the Black Sea, and even then with great difficulty, since the Turks installed anti-submarine nets in the straits.

As for other areas of the Mediterranean, the entry into the war of Italy in May 1915 allowed the Austro-Hungarian fleet to be locked up in the port of Pula in the North Adriatic, although individual Austrian ships managed to make sorties from time to time. In addition, German submarines began to use Pula as their base and also managed to achieve some success. In early 1916, the Allies, with the help of 120 drifters and 30 depth charge motor boats, supported by destroyers, managed to establish an impressive barrier in the Strait of Otrante. It was with the help of such a system that the British blocked the Pas de Calais. However, individual German submarines and Austro-Hungarian ships managed to penetrate these barriers - they did it especially well in 1918. In January 1916, the command of the German navy was entrusted to Admiral Reinhard von Scheer.

He resumed raiding operations off the coast of England, and then, when in May the Germans reduced the size of their "submarine war", fearing that the exploits of their submarines would force America to enter the war, he proposed an original plan to help surround and destroy parts of the British Grand Fleet. However, bad weather caused the original plan to be changed. In its final form, it was based on the fact that German battlecruisers would appear off the Norwegian coast and behave extremely defiantly, thereby luring Admiral Beatty's battlecruisers from their Rosit base in Scotland. Then the German dreadnoughts would try to destroy them before the main British force under Sir John Jellicoe could approach from Scapa Flow.

The operation was scheduled for May 31st. Sir John Jellicoe deduced from an intercepted radio message that the Germans were up to something. Then he decided to preempt them. He ordered Admiral Beatty to rendezvous with his ships on the afternoon of May 31 near the entrance to the Skagerrak, which separated Danish Jutland from Norway. It is significant that the German submarines carrying patrols lost sight of the fact that almost the entire Big Fleet went to sea. The Germans themselves went to sea early in the morning on May 31. Ahead, about 50 miles from the bulk of the ships, were Admiral Hipper's battlecruisers. Beatty's ships approached the rendezvous point first and entered into battle with Hipper's cruisers.

The superiority of German artillery quickly became clear, primarily due to stereoscopic rangefinders. Four of Beatty's six ships were badly damaged, and one exploded and sank after a shell hit her gun magazine. Beatty's battleships soon approached and began heating the Hippsrl ships, which, however, survived and managed to sink one more battlecruiser. Both sides launched destroyers, which launched torpedo attacks that did not bring, however, success. Finally, the main German ships approached, after which Beatty ordered to retreat to the northwest, in the direction of the Jellicoe ships.

At first, however, he failed to warn his commander of what was happening, because his signals were misunderstood. However, von Scheer, who had sixteen battleships at his disposal against twenty-four British ones, began to pursue Beatty, not knowing that Jellicoe ships were coming towards them. It was already 6:30 p.m., and Jellicoe, having learned of von Scheer's approach, decided to change course in order to cut off his ships from the base. The battleships of the British and Germans began to fire at each other, and although the German artillery as a whole was of a higher class, the quantitative superiority of the British guns soon began to affect. Realizing the danger posed by the Jellicoe fleet, von Scheer initially decided to return home with his ships turned one hundred and eighty degrees. But then he headed east, perhaps intending to get through to the Skagerrak ahead of the British ships that were on a parallel course.

However, von Scheer underestimated the driving performance of the British ships, and it quickly became clear that a new collision could not be avoided. The British opened fire again, and then, in desperation, von Scheer launched destroyers with torpedoes forward. Torpedo attacks this time did not inflict damage on enemy ships, but still somewhat cooled the ardor of Jellicoe. Von Scheer ordered another one hundred and eighty-degree turn, and his ships slipped away in the ensuing dusk. Jellicoe, it was true, gave chase, firing after him from quite a distance, but in the growing darkness it was becoming more and more difficult to keep aim. Nevertheless, he managed to sink two light cruisers, while losing one of his own. Finally, the British destroyers went on the attack. They managed to sink the battleship Pommern. Another German warship was blown up by a British mine, but on the whole, von Scheer managed to leave the battlefield with dignity. The British ships suffered more than the German ones. German artillery, in addition to more advanced rangefinders, had shells that pierced armor and only then exploded.

German ships were better suited for naval battles, as they had good armor and watertight compartments. This, however, led to more Spartan living conditions for the crews, but during the stops in the ports, the sailors were transferred to the barracks. After the German fleet recovered from the damage suffered in the battle of Jutland, in August 1916, von Scheer's ships undertook another sortie in the North Sea and almost found themselves surrounded by British ships in the same way as in the previous case, although this time it cost without gun salvos. After that, German warships were more at their bases. Thus, Jellicoe, although tactically inferior in the Battle of Jutland, won a decisive strategic victory: the German fleet no longer undertook military operations. Instead, the Germans focused on their submarine fleet, which had already shown its ability to influence the course of the war.

By 1914, the idea of ​​submarine warfare was centuries old. Back in 1778, the American David Bushnell designed the Turtle submersible, with which he tried to sink a British warship. The first modern submarine was designed by another American, John Holland. His submarine Holland VII, with a crew of seven and one bow torpedo tube, entered service with the US Navy in 1903. Other leading maritime powers followed suit, and by 1914 the submarine had become a common and effective means of warfare. Submarines could carry out reconnaissance, lay mines and sink enemy ships.

From the very beginning of the war, all three tasks were carried out by submarines in the most active way. On September 22, 1914, the possibilities of this type of ships were demonstrated in all their grim fullness. A single German submarine off the coast of Denmark sank three old-style British battleships within an hour, killing 1,400 sailors. Soon, however, it became clear that the main danger of the submarine is not so much for the military as for the merchant fleet. This became especially clear in connection with such a concept as a trade blockade, when the success of the war largely depended on the ability of one belligerent to prevent the entry of imported goods into the enemy country. This, in turn, dealt a serious blow to the economy of the besieged state, sometimes leading to food shortages. The traditional way to implement a blockade was to stop enemy ships and escort them to a port where their cargoes were confiscated. In 1914, Great Britain had such an advantage in the ocean that within a few months the activities of the German merchant fleet were almost completely paralyzed, except for shipping in the Baltic Sea. Therefore, the Germans had to rely on merchant ships of neutral countries, as well as on pre-war international treaties.

According to these, only certain types of goods could be considered contraband. In addition, the capture of a merchant ship of a neutral country could only be justified when it was heading to the port of the enemy. In response, the British forced them to sell goods forcibly, after which they allowed the intercepted ship to proceed further. This avoided human losses and gave shipowners some compensation. The Germans, for their part, were deprived of the opportunity to arrange a retaliatory trade blockade of Great Britain. But they could attack the merchant ships of the Entente and sink them, provided that the lives of the crew members were guaranteed. For trade transportation, the Germans began to attract warships or merchant ships equipped with guns, but rather quickly the opponents discovered and destroyed them. Germany has one effective weapon left - a submarine. True, certain complications immediately arose here. Submarines could not, for example, escort a captured ship to the harbor, and they could not accommodate the crew of wrecked enemy ships, so that the prisoners were guaranteed safety. They could only order the crew to get into lifeboats and then sink the ship, shooting it with guns if possible and saving torpedoes. From about October 1914, the Germans began to adhere to just such methods.

However, the captain of the submarine took a certain risk when he gave the command to surface. Since Germany had only twenty-eight submarines in operation by the end of 1914 and they were treasured like the apple of an eye, the German admirals argued that the only way to respond to the blockade of the British was to attack their merchant ships from under the water and without warning. The German government and Kaiser Wilhelm himself initially opposed this, but after the defeat at the Dogger Bank in January 1915, they were forced to give in. Already in February, Germany announced that it was launching an unrestricted submarine war off the coast of Britain and Ireland.

The Germans, according to their assurances, were not going to sink ships under neutral flags, but at the same time they could not guarantee their safety, especially since the captains were instructed to primarily take care of the safety of the submarines entrusted to them. The Germans, however, very much hoped that such a warning would be enough to discourage neutral ships from entering British iols. At first, this campaign did not bring any tangible results, since the small size of the German submarine fleet meant that only two or three submarines could conduct operations against merchant ships at the same time. In addition, the emergence of anti-submarine nets and the hunting of German submarines by surface ships led to heavy losses. In March alone, three German submarines were destroyed. In May, however, an event occurred that had a serious impact on the course of the submarine war. On March 1, the passenger liner Lusitapia of the Cunard Shipping Company left New York for Liverpool. On the same day, a warning appeared in the New York newspapers that British-flagged ships were at risk of being sunk. Six days later, southwest of Ireland, the liner was hit by a single torpedo fired from the German submarine U-20.

Of the two thousand passengers on the Lusitania, one thousand two hundred drowned, including 128 Americans. The sinking of the Lusitania caused a wave of public indignation both in Great Britain and in the United States, where, on the contrary, they had previously expressed dissatisfaction with the treatment of neutral ships by the British. Nevertheless, the Lusitania carried a prohibited cargo - explosives and ammunition. Although she did not have guns, she retained special supports for their installation and therefore was officially considered a merchant and military vessel. The sinking of the Lusitania caused a surge of anti-German sentiment in America, but with it the conviction that the war was being waged by uncivilized methods.

As then US President Wilson put it, "self-respect prevents America from taking part in this war." So, by the end of 1915, submarine warfare slowly began to fade away, since only a small number of submarines could be used at the same time. And although 1.3 million tons of cargo were sunk during the campaign and two-thirds of them belonged to Great Britain, this still did not cause serious damage to its trade and cargo operations. However, on March 24, 1916, a torpedo sank the British steamer Sussex, which sailed between Great Britain and continental Europe, and more US citizens died than in the sinking of the Lusitania. This provoked a much stronger reaction from the American government. It was stated that if Germany did not stop this practice, the United States would be forced to break off diplomatic relations with it.

Fearing that this could lead to the entry of the United States into the war, the Germans curtailed operations, and British cargo losses decreased sharply. Germany, on the other hand, stepped up its activity in the Mediterranean, where there were far fewer American ships sailing. During this "unrestricted submarine war" German boats took on board no more than eight torpedoes and therefore spent them very sparingly. 80 percent of the sunken ships became victims of shelling, and therefore the crew, as a rule, had time to evacuate in boats. Taking this into account, the British in 1915 applied a new tactic to combat submarines using decoy ships. Outwardly, these were the most ordinary merchant ships, specially appearing in areas where German submarines operated.

When the submarine surfaced, the crew of such a vessel pretended to panic and even made attempts to launch the boats. But at the same time, camouflaged guns were being prepared for battle, and fire was opened from them at the submarine. Such vessels were extremely effective at first, but by 1917 submarine commanders had learned to recognize them. In August 1916, when it was decided to leave large German warships in ports, the issue of submarine warfare was again on the agenda of the military-political leadership of Germany. The British blockade of Germany became more and more severe, attempts to bleed the French army near Verdun did not bring success, after the battle on the Somme, the military power of Germany itself clearly began to wane. But the production of submarines was growing, so the number of enemy ships sunk by them also increased, especially in the second half of 1916.

According to the representatives of the German naval command, with a sufficient number of submarines, British trade could be so damaged that the British would quickly sue for peace. However, there was one factor that prevented a final decision in this regard. Throughout 1916, US President Wilson actively probed the ground, trying to find out if he could not mediate in the reconciliation of the warring parties. In November 1916, the US presidential election was to be held. Much depended on their outcome, including the attitude of the United States to the German conditions for concluding peace. Wilson was re-elected president, but only at the end of December did he make it clear that he was not satisfied with the German proposals. Therefore, in early January 1917, Germany began an all-out submarine war, no longer sparing ships under neutral flags. At the beginning of this new campaign, which began to unfold on February 1, 1917, Germany had about 110 submarines at its disposal. They were divided into two types - long-range (ocean), based in German ports on the North Sea, and short-range, using bases in Belgium. The British, in addition to trap ships, which had noticeably lost their effectiveness, anti-submarine nets and surface hunter ships, began to use new military equipment.

Hydrophones appeared, capable of detecting the appearance of submarines by the noise of their engines under water. Radio direction finders were also used, which determined the location of the submarine by its radio signals. In addition, special bombs were dropped from surface ships that exploded at a given depth, although their production volumes were insufficient. Ordinary mines were also used against submarines, but they were not of high quality, and only in the summer of 1917 a more effective H-type mine was adopted. The British developed a new type of anti-submarine vessel - a patrol boat, which had a small draft. At first it was used as a trap vessel.

More and more often aviation was used. Seaplanes10, including "flying boats", attacked the submarines with torpedoes, bombs and machine guns. Airships with a range of up to 1500 miles, capable of staying in the air for up to 50 hours, were used to locate submarines, although they were not suitable for attacks due to poor maneuverability. However, despite all these methods and means of anti-submarine warfare, German submarines sank at least five hundred ships in February and March, and the number of neutral ships in the North Sea was reduced by three-quarters. Some submarine commanders had impressive lists of victories, and the leader here was Arnold de la Pierre, who had 195 ships sunk by the end of the war.

The performance of the British in the fight against submarines was much more modest. The success of the submarine war was not least due to the fact that submarines began to roll off the stocks in Germany, carrying twice as many torpedoes as their predecessors. Part of the reason was the flaws in the strategy of the British Royal Navy. When the British patrol ships combed the main sea routes, the German submarines quietly waited on the sidelines, and when the patrols passed, they attacked the next victim. If the Germans managed to sink merchant ships at the same pace, then very soon there would be

there would be problems with food and cards would have to be introduced. Combined with the stalemate on the Western Front in the spring of 1917, this created a bleak outlook for both France and Britain. But, as they say, there is no evil without good. Two days after the start of a new round of submarine warfare, US President Wilson carried out his year-old threat: he severed diplomatic relations with Germany. And two months later, on April 6, he declared war on Germany. Now the American fleet could join the fight against German submarines. And yet, the mere presence of ships, aircraft and airships did not solve all the problems.

A new concept of anti-submarine warfare was required. The key to the problem of the German submarines was found in tactics, which, however, were used in the navy for more than one century. In previous wars, merchant ships were usually collected in a caravan, which, under the escort of warships, set off. However, the British Royal Navy rejected this approach for three reasons. Such caravans had to be assembled for a rather long time, warships performed only protective functions, and, finally, the accumulation of a large number of ships only

provoked massive attacks by submarines. Approximately the same arguments were put forward by representatives of the US Navy. Nevertheless, at the end of April, in the face of increasing losses of merchant ships, it was decided to resort to escort. Of course, it took a lot of time, but the results exceeded all expectations. Of the eight hundred ships escorted by convoy in July and August 1917, only five were lost. In September, ten German submarines were sunk - for the first time more than were commissioned by the Germans every month. The tactics of military convoys contributed to a sharp decrease in the number of ship losses in the Mediterranean.

But the Americans and the British did not stop there and began to establish a giant minefield - a northern minefield from the Orkney Islands to the Norwegian coast, creating great difficulties for German submarines trying to penetrate the Atlantic. This grandiose project was carried out in eight months, from March to October 1918, and required 70,000 mines of the latest design. In addition, in April 1918, the British carried out a curious operation, the purpose of which was to prevent the Germans from using the port of Zeebrugge on the Belgian coast. To do this, it was necessary to flood the old cruiser so that she blocked the narrow passage to the harbor. This was done very skillfully, although not

so effective, since the submarines still managed to bypass this barrier. All the measures taken by the Allies contributed to a significant reduction in the damage that they suffered from German submarines, although until the very end of the war, the loss of merchant ships still continued. But the blockade they had imposed on the states of the German-Austrian bloc became more and more severe.

To top it all off, 1917 proved to be a lean year in Germany, and it got access to Ukrainian wheat too late. An acute shortage of food and other vital goods began in the country, which contributed to the growth of discontent and anti-war sentiment in both Germany and Austria-Hungary.

England's entry into the war gave such a superiority of naval forces in favor of the Entente that it predetermined the nature of naval operations in advance.

It was difficult to assume under such conditions that the German fleet would willingly seek battles on the high seas, although Tirpitz suggested sending it to counter the British landing on the mainland; rather, it was to be expected that he would confine himself to the defense of his own coasts, the use of a suitable opportunity to attack the enemy's coasts, cruising war and the search for another way to deal with a numerous enemy fleet, which in the end was found in submarine warfare.

As early as August 2, the French fleet received an order to head to Pas de Calais in order to resist the alleged passage of the German fleet, but given the inequality of forces, this operation could be reduced solely to "saving the honor of the French flag."

Only the declaration of war by England sharply changed the situation here on August 4, and the general direction of naval operations in the Atlantic Ocean, the English Channel and the North Sea was entrusted to the British.

The 2nd French light squadron, reinforced by a division of English cruisers, provided the entrance to the English Channel from the east, which was defended by French and English destroyers. Thanks to this, the transportation of the British expeditionary army to the mainland from August 8 to 18 (150 thousand soldiers) passed completely calmly and without any attempts to prevent it from the German fleet. The British, convinced from this fact that the English Channel was sufficiently defended, even disbanded their 2nd and 3rd squadrons, reinforcing the 1st squadron, which from then on became known as the Grand Fleet and remained concentrated in the British waters with a main base at Scapa Flow.

In the Mediterranean, the management of naval operations was in the hands of the French.

Here, the role of the allied fleet during this period of the campaign was reduced to the transportation of the XIX French corps from Algiers to the metropolis, to the unsuccessful pursuit of the German cruisers Goeben and Breslau, which, after bombarding the Algerian coast, hid in the Dardanelles and went to strengthen the Turkish fleet, and, finally, on August 16, to the bombardment of the fortified points of the Dalmatian coast and Katarro, which did not lead to anything, since the Austrian fleet locked itself in Pola.

While the main naval forces of the Entente were virtually inactive in European waters, a cruising war was waged with particular vigor in the distant seas. From the very beginning of hostilities, the Germans waged a cruising war with great activity, which destroyed the trade of the Entente powers, and, consequently, disrupted the supply of the raw materials they needed, made it difficult for them to communicate with Russia and the colonies, and, finally, prevented the conquest of the German colonies. German cruising was concentrated mainly in the following areas: "Emden" and "Königsberg" operated in the Indian Ocean, "Karlsruhe" - in the Antilles Sea, "Dresden" - in the South Atlantic Ocean and, finally, a strong squadron of Spee - in the Pacific ocean. Only the beginning of the struggle against the German cruisers belongs to this period of the war, which continued throughout 1914.