The main operation of the summer campaign of 1944 unfolded in Belarus. The Belarusian offensive operation, carried out on June 23 - August 29, 1944, became one of the largest military operations in the history of mankind. She was named after the Russian commander of the Patriotic War of 1812, P. I. Bagration. During the “fifth Stalinist strike”, Soviet troops liberated the territory of Belarus, most of the Lithuanian SSR, as well as eastern Poland. The Wehrmacht suffered heavy losses, German troops were defeated in the area of ​​Vitebsk, Bobruisk, Mogilev, Orsha. In total, the Wehrmacht lost 30 divisions east of Minsk, about half a million soldiers and officers killed, missing, wounded and captured. The German army group "Center" was defeated, and the army group "North" in the Baltic was cut in two.

The situation at the front

By June 1944, the line of the Soviet-German front in the northeast reached the line Vitebsk - Orsha - Mogilev - Zhlobin. At the same time, in the southern direction, the Red Army achieved tremendous success - the entire Right-Bank Ukraine, Crimea, Nikolaev, and Odessa were liberated. Soviet troops reached the state border of the USSR, began the liberation of Romania. Conditions were created for the liberation of all of Central and South-Eastern Europe. However, by the end of the spring of 1944, the offensive of the Soviet troops in the south slowed down.

As a result of successes in the southern strategic direction, a huge ledge was formed - a wedge facing deep into the Soviet Union (the so-called "Belarusian balcony"). The northern end of the ledge rested on Polotsk and Vitebsk, and the southern end on the basin of the Pripyat River. It was necessary to eliminate the "balcony" in order to exclude the possibility of a flank attack by the Wehrmacht. In addition, the German command transferred significant forces to the south, the fighting took on a protracted character. The Headquarters and the General Staff decided to change the direction of the main attack. In the south, the troops had to regroup their forces, replenish the units with manpower and equipment, and prepare for a new offensive.

The defeat of Army Group Center and the liberation of the BSSR, through which the shortest and most important routes to Poland and major political, military-industrial centers and food bases (Pomerania and East Prussia) of Germany passed, were of great military-strategic and political significance. The situation in the entire theater of operations changed radically in favor of the Soviet Union. Success in Belorussia was the best way to ensure our subsequent offensive operations in Poland, the Baltic States, Western Ukraine and Romania.

Su-85 column on Lenin Square in liberated Minsk

Operation plan

In March 1944, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief invited Rokossovsky and announced the planned major operation, invited the commander to express his opinion. The operation was called "Bagration", this name was proposed by Joseph Stalin. According to the plan of the Headquarters, the main actions of the summer campaign of 1944 were to unfold in Belarus. For the operation, it was supposed to involve the forces of four fronts: the 1st Baltic, 1st, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian fronts. The Dnieper military flotilla, long-range aviation and partisan detachments were also involved in the Belarusian operation.

At the end of April, Stalin made the final decision about the summer campaign and the Belorussian operation. Alexei Antonov, Chief of the Operational Directorate and Deputy Chief of the General Staff, was instructed to organize work on planning front-line operations and begin the concentration of troops and material resources. So, the 1st Baltic Front under the command of Ivan Bagramyan received the 1st Tank Corps, the 3rd Belorussian Front of Ivan Chernyakhovsky - the 11th Guards Army, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps. In addition, the 5th Guards Tank Army (Stavka reserve) was concentrated in the offensive zone of the 3rd Belorussian Front. On the right flank of the 1st Belorussian Front, the 28th Army, the 9th Tank and 1st Guards Tank Corps, the 1st Mechanized Corps and the 4th Guards Cavalry Corps were concentrated.

In addition to Antonov, only a few people were involved in the direct development of the plan for Operation Bagration, including Vasilevsky and Zhukov. Substantive correspondence, telephone conversations or telegraph were strictly prohibited. One of the priorities in the preparation of the Belarusian operation was its secrecy and misinformation of the enemy regarding the planned direction of the main attack. In particular, the commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, General of the Army Rodion Malinovsky, was instructed to conduct a demonstrative concentration of troops behind the right flank of the front. A similar order was received by the commander of the 3rd Baltic Front, Colonel-General Ivan Maslennikov.

Aleksey Antonov, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, leading developer of the plan for the Belarusian operation

On May 20, Vasilevsky, Zhukov and Antonov were summoned to Headquarters. The plan for the summer campaign was finally approved. First, the Leningrad Front () was supposed to strike in the area of ​​the Karelian Isthmus. Then, in the second half of June, they planned to launch an offensive in Belarus. Vasilevsky and Zhukov were responsible for coordinating the actions of the four fronts. Vasilevsky was entrusted with the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts, Zhukov - the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts. In early June, they left for the location of the troops.

According to the memoirs of K.K. Rokossovsky, the offensive plan was finally worked out at Headquarters on May 22-23. The considerations of the command of the 1st Belorussian Front on the offensive of the troops of the left wing of the 1st Belorussian Front in the Lublin direction were approved. However, the idea that the troops of the right flank of the front should deliver two main blows at once was criticized. The members of the Headquarters believed that it was necessary to deliver one main blow in the direction of Rogachev - Osipovichi, so as not to scatter forces. Rokossovsky continued to stand his ground. According to the commander, one blow had to be delivered from Rogachev, the other from the Ozarichs to Slutsk. At the same time, the Bobruisk grouping of the enemy fell into the "boiler". Rokossovsky knew the area well and understood that the movement of the armies of the left flank in one direction in the heavily swampy Polesie would lead to the fact that the offensive would stall, the roads would be clogged, the front troops would not be able to use all their capabilities, as they would be introduced into battle in parts. Convinced that Rokossovsky continued to defend his point of view, Stalin approved the plan of operation in the form proposed by the headquarters of the 1st Belorussian Front. I must say that Zhukov refutes this story of Rokossovsky. According to him, the decision on two strikes of the 1st Belorussian Front was made by the Headquarters on May 20.

On May 31, the front commanders received a directive from the Headquarters. The purpose of the operation was to cover two flank strikes and destroy the enemy grouping in the Minsk region. Particular importance was attached to the defeat of the most powerful enemy flank groupings, which held the defense in the areas of Vitebsk and Bobruisk. This provided the possibility of a rapid offensive of large forces in converging directions to Minsk. The remaining enemy troops were supposed to be thrown back to an unfavorable area of ​​operations near Minsk, cut off their communications, surrounded and destroyed. The plan of the Headquarters provided for the application of three strong blows:

The troops of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts attacked in the general direction of Vilnius;
- forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front, in cooperation with the left wing of the 3rd Belorussian Front and the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front, advanced in the direction of Mogilev - Minsk;
- formations of the 1st Belorussian Front advanced in the direction of Bobruisk - Baranovichi.

At the first stage of the operation, the troops of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts were to defeat the enemy's Vitebsk grouping. Then introduce mobile units into the gap and develop an offensive to the west on Vilnius-Kaunas, covering the left flank of the Borisov-Minsk group of the Wehrmacht. The 2nd Belorussian Front was supposed to destroy the enemy's Mogilev grouping and advance in the Minsk direction.

The 1st Belorussian Front at the first stage of the offensive was supposed to destroy the enemy's Zhlobin-Bobruisk grouping with the forces of its right flank. Then introduce tank-mechanized formations into the gap and develop an offensive on Slutsk-Baranovichi. Part of the forces of the front were to cover the enemy's Minsk grouping from the south and south-west. The left flank of the 1st Belorussian Front struck in the Lublin direction.

It should be noted that initially the Soviet command planned to strike to a depth of 300 km, defeat three German armies and reach the line of Utena, Vilnius, Lida, Baranovichi. The tasks for the further offensive were set by the Headquarters in mid-July, based on the results of the identified successes. At the same time, at the second stage of the Belarusian operation, the results were no longer so brilliant.

Fights for Belarus

Operation preparation

As Zhukov noted in his memoirs, in order to ensure Operation Bagration, it was necessary to send up to 400 thousand tons of ammunition, 300 thousand tons of fuel and lubricants, up to 500 thousand tons of food and fodder to the troops. It was necessary to concentrate in the given areas 5 combined arms armies, 2 tank and one air armies, as well as parts of the 1st Army of the Polish Army. In addition, 6 tank and mechanized corps, more than 50 rifle and cavalry divisions, more than 210 thousand march reinforcements and over 2.8 thousand guns and mortars were transferred to the fronts from the Stavka reserve. It is clear that all this had to be transferred and transported with great care so as not to reveal to the enemy the plan of a grandiose operation.

Particular attention was paid to camouflage and secrecy during the immediate preparation of the operation. The fronts switched to radio silence. At the forefront, earthworks were carried out, which imitated the strengthening of the defense. The concentration of troops, their transfer was carried out mainly at night. Soviet planes even patrolled the area to monitor compliance with camouflage measures, etc.

Rokossovsky in his memoirs pointed out the great role of intelligence at the forefront and behind enemy lines. The command paid special attention to air, military of all types and radio intelligence. Only in the armies of the right flank of the 1st Belorussian Front more than 400 searches were carried out, Soviet intelligence officers captured more than 80 "languages" and important documents of the enemy.

On June 14-15, the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front conducted exercises on drawing the upcoming operation at the headquarters of the 65th and 28th armies (the right wing of the front). Representatives of the Headquarters were present at the headquarters game. Commanders of corps and divisions, commanders of artillery and chiefs of military branches of the armies were involved in the draw. During the classes, the issues of the upcoming offensive were worked out in detail. Particular attention was paid to the nature of the terrain in the zone of the offensive of the armies, the organization of the enemy's defense and the methods of an early breakthrough on the Slutsk-Bobruisk road. This made it possible to close the escape routes of the Bobruisk grouping of the 9th army of the enemy. In the following days, similar exercises were held in the 3rd, 48th and 49th armies.

At the same time, a large educational and political training of the Soviet troops was carried out. Fire missions, tactics and technique of attacks, offensive in cooperation with tank, artillery units, with the support of aviation were worked out in the classroom. The headquarters of units, formations and armies worked out the issues of control and communications. Command and observation posts were moved forward, a system of observation and communications was created, the order of movement and command and control of troops during the pursuit of the enemy was specified, etc.

Soviet tanks "Valentine IX" move into combat positions. 5th Guards Tank Army. Summer 1944

Great assistance in the preparation of the offensive operation was provided by the Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement. A close connection was established between the partisan detachments and the Soviet troops. The partisans received instructions from the "mainland" with specific tasks, where and when to attack the enemy, what communications to destroy.

It should be noted that by the middle of 1944, partisan detachments were operating in most of the BSSR. Belarus was a real partisan region. 150 partisan brigades and 49 separate detachments operated in the republic with a total strength of the whole army - 143 thousand bayonets (already during the Belarusian operation, almost 200 thousand partisans joined the Red Army units). The partisans controlled vast territories, especially in the wooded and swampy areas. Kurt von Tippelskirch wrote that the 4th Army, which he commanded from the beginning of June 1944, ended up in a huge wooded and swampy area that stretched to Minsk and this area was controlled by large partisan formations. German troops have never been able to completely clear this territory in all three years. All crossings and bridges in this remote area, covered with dense forests, were destroyed. As a result, although German troops controlled all major cities and railway junctions, up to 60% of the territory of Belarus was under the control of Soviet partisans. Soviet power still existed here, the regional committees and district committees of the Communist Party and the Komsomol (All-Union Leninist Communist Youth Union) worked. It is clear that the partisan movement could only hold out with the support of the "mainland", from where experienced personnel and ammunition were transferred.

The offensive of the Soviet armies was preceded by an unprecedented scale attack by partisan formations. On the night of June 19-20, the partisans began massive operations to defeat the German rear. The partisans destroyed the enemy's railway communications, blew up bridges, set up ambushes on the roads, and disabled communication lines. Only on the night of June 20, 40 thousand enemy rails were blown up. Eike Middeldorf noted: "In the central sector of the Eastern Front, Russian partisans carried out 10,500 explosions" (Middeldorf Eike. Russian campaign: tactics and weapons. - St. Petersburg, M., 2000). The partisans were able to carry out only part of their plans, but even this was enough to cause a short-term paralysis of the rear of Army Group Center. As a result, the transfer of German operational reserves was delayed for several days. Communication on many highways became possible only during the day and only accompanied by strong convoys.

Side forces. Soviet Union

Four fronts connected 20 combined arms and 2 tank armies. A total of 166 divisions, 12 tank and mechanized corps, 7 fortified areas and 21 separate brigades. About one-fifth of these forces were included in the operation at its second stage, about three weeks after the start of the offensive. At the start of the operation, Soviet troops numbered about 2.4 million soldiers and commanders, 36 thousand guns and mortars, more than 5.2 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns and over 5.3 thousand aircraft.

The 1st Baltic Front of Ivan Bagramyan included in its composition: the 4th shock army under the command of P.F. Malyshev, the 6th guards army of I.M. Chistyakov, the 43rd army of A.P. Beloborodov, the 1st tank building V. V. Butkov. From the air, the front was supported by N. F. Papivin's 3rd Air Army.

The 3rd Belorussian Front of Ivan Chernyakhovsky included: the 39th Army of I.I. Lyudnikov, the 5th Army of N.I. Krylov, the 11th Guards Army of K.N. Galitsky, the 31st Army of V.V. Glagolev, the 5th Guards Tank Army of P.A. Rotmistrov, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps of A.S. guards mechanized corps). From the air, the troops of the front were supported by the 1st Air Army of M. M. Gromov.

The 2nd Belorussian Front of Georgy Zakharov included: the 33rd Army of V.D. Kryuchenkin, the 49th Army of I.T. Grishin, the 50th Army of I.V. Boldin, the 4th Air Army of K.A. Vershinin.

1st Belorussian Front of Konstantin Rokossovsky: 3rd Army of A.V. Gorbatov, 48th Army of P.L. Romanenko, 65th Army of P.I. Batov, 28th Army of A.A. Luchinsky, 61- the army of P. A. Belov, the 70th army of V. S. Popov, the 47th army of N. I. Gusev, the 8th guards army of V. I. Chuikov, the 69th army of V. Ya. Kolpakchi, 2 -I tank army of S. I. Bogdanov. The front also included the 2nd, 4th and 7th Guards Cavalry Corps, the 9th and 11th Tank Corps, the 1st Guards Tank Corps, and the 1st Mechanized Corps. In addition, the 1st Army of the Polish Army Z. Berling and the Dnieper military flotilla of Rear Admiral V. V. Grigoriev were subordinate to Rokossovsky. The front was supported by the 6th and 16th air armies of F.P. Polynin and S.I. Rudenko.

Member of the military council of the 1st Belorussian Front, Lieutenant General Konstantin Fedorovich Telegin (left) and front commander General of the Army Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky at the map at the front command post

German forces

The Soviet troops were opposed by the Army Group Center under the command of Field Marshal Ernst Busch (since June 28, Walter Model). The army group included: the 3rd Panzer Army under the command of Colonel General Georg Reinhardt, the 4th Army of Kurt von Tippelskirch, the 9th Army of Hans Jordan (on June 27 he was replaced by Nikolaus von Forman), the 2nd Army of Walter Weiss (Weiss ). Army Group Center was supported by aviation from the 6th Air Fleet and partly from the 1st and 4th Air Fleets. In addition, in the north, the forces of the 16th Army of the North Army Group adjoined the Center Army Group, and in the south - the 4th Panzer Army of the Northern Ukraine Army Group.

Thus, the German troops numbered 63 divisions and three brigades; 1.2 million soldiers and officers, 9.6 thousand guns and mortars, over 900 tanks and assault guns (according to other sources 1330), 1350 combat aircraft. The German armies had a well-developed system of railways and highways, which made it possible to widely maneuver troops.

The plans of the German command and the defense system

"Belarusian Balcony" closed the road to Warsaw and further to Berlin. During the transition of the Red Army to the offensive in the northern and southern directions, the German grouping could inflict powerful flank attacks on the Soviet troops from this "balcony". The German military command made a mistake about Moscow's plans for the summer campaign. If at Headquarters the enemy forces in the area of ​​the proposed offensive were quite well represented, then the German command believed that the Red Army could only deliver an auxiliary strike in Belarus. Hitler and the Supreme High Command believed that the Red Army would again go on a decisive offensive in the south, in Ukraine. The main blow was expected from the Kovel region. From there, Soviet troops could cut off the "balcony", reaching the Baltic Sea and surrounding the main forces of the Army Group "Center" and "North" and pushing the Army Group "Northern Ukraine" to the Carpathians. In addition, Adolf Hitler feared for Romania - the oil region of Ploiesti, which was the main source of "black gold" for the Third Reich." Kurt Tippelskirch noted: "Army Groups" Center "and" North "predicted" calm summer ".

Therefore, in total, there were 11 divisions in the reserves of Army Group Center and army reserves. Of the 34 tank and motorized divisions that were on the Eastern Front, 24 were concentrated south of Pripyat. So, in the army group "Northern Ukraine" there were 7 tank and 2 tank-grenadier divisions. In addition, they were reinforced by 4 separate battalions of heavy Tiger tanks.

In April 1944, the command of Army Group Center proposed to shorten the front line and withdraw the armies to more convenient positions across the Berezina River. However, the high command, as before, when it was proposed to withdraw troops to more convenient positions in Ukraine or withdraw them from the Crimea, rejected this plan. The army group was left in its original positions.

German troops occupied a well-prepared and deeply echeloned (up to 250-270 km) defense. The construction of defensive lines began as early as 1942-1943, and the front line finally took shape during stubborn battles in the spring of 1944. It consisted of two lanes and relied on a developed system of field fortifications, nodes of resistance - “fortresses”, numerous natural frontiers. So, defensive positions usually passed along the western banks of numerous rivers. Their forcing was hampered by wide swampy floodplains. The wooded and swampy nature of the terrain, many reservoirs seriously worsened the ability to use heavy weapons. Polotsk, Vitebsk, Orsha Mogilev, Bobruisk were turned into "fortresses", the defense of which was built taking into account the possibility of all-round defense. The rear lines passed along the rivers Dnieper, Drut, Berezina, along the line Minsk, Slutsk and further to the west. Local residents were widely involved in the construction of field fortifications. The weakness of the German defense was that the construction of defensive lines in the depths was not completed.

In general, Army Group Center covered the strategic East Prussian and Warsaw directions. The Vitebsk direction was covered by the 3rd Panzer Army, the Orsha and Mogilev direction by the 3rd Army, and the Bobruisk direction by the 9th Army. The front of the 2nd Army passed along the Pripyat. The German command paid serious attention to replenishing the divisions with manpower and equipment, trying to bring them up to full strength. Each German division had about 14 km of front. On average, there were 450 soldiers, 32 machine guns, 10 guns and mortars, 1 tank or assault gun per 1 km of the front. But these are average numbers. They differed greatly in various sectors of the front. So, on the Orsha and Rogachev-Bobruisk directions, the defense was stronger and more densely saturated with troops. In a number of other areas that the German command considered less important, the defensive formations were much less dense.

The 3rd tank army of Reinhardt occupied the line east of Polotsk, Bogushevskoye (about 40 km south of Vitebsk), with a front length of 150 km. The army consisted of 11 divisions (8 infantry, two airfield, one security), three assault gun brigades, the von Gottberg combat group, 12 separate regiments (police, security, etc.) and other formations. All divisions and two regiments were in the first line of defense. There were 10 regiments in the reserve, they were mainly engaged in the protection of communications and counterguerrilla warfare. The main forces defended the Vitebsk direction. On June 22, the army numbered more than 165 thousand people, 160 tanks and assault guns, more than 2 thousand field and anti-aircraft guns.

The 4th Army of Tippelskirch occupied the defense from Bogushevsk to Bykhov, with a front length of 225 km. It consisted of 10 divisions (7 infantry, one assault, 2 tank-grenadier divisions - the 25th and 18th), an assault guns brigade, the 501st heavy tank battalion, 8 separate regiments and other units. Already during the Soviet offensive, the Feldherrnhalle Panzer-Grenadier Division arrived. There were 8 regiments in the reserve, which performed the tasks of protecting the rear, communications and fighting partisans. The most powerful defense was in the Orsha and Mogilev directions. On June 22, the 4th Army had more than 168 thousand soldiers and officers, about 1700 field and anti-aircraft guns, 376 tanks and assault guns.

The 9th Army of Jordan defended itself in the zone south of Bykhov to the Pripyat River, with a front of 220 km. The army consisted of 12 divisions (11 infantry and one tank - the 20th), three separate regiments, 9 battalions (security, engineer, construction). In the first line were all divisions, the Brandenburg regiment and 9 battalions. The main forces were located in the Bobruisk area. There were two regiments in the army reserve. By the beginning of the Soviet offensive, the army had more than 175 thousand people, about 2 thousand field and anti-aircraft guns, 140 tanks and assault guns.

The 2nd Army took up defense along the line of the Pripyat River. It consisted of 4 divisions (2 infantry, one jaeger and one guard), a corps group, a tank-grenadier brigade, and two cavalry brigades. In addition, the Hungarian 3 reserve divisions and one cavalry division were subordinate to the 2nd Army. There were several divisions in the army group command reserve, including security and training divisions.

The Soviet command was able to keep the preparation of a major offensive operation in Belarus until its very beginning. German aviation and radio intelligence usually noticed large transfers of forces and concluded that an offensive was approaching. However, this time the preparation of the Red Army for the offensive missed. The secrecy and disguise did their job.

Destroyed tanks of the 20th division near Bobruisk (1944)

To be continued…

ctrl Enter

Noticed osh s bku Highlight text and click Ctrl+Enter

Operation Bagration is considered one of the largest military operations in the history of mankind.

It represents the third stage of the "Rail War", which took place in June and August 1944 on the territory of Belarus.

During this operation, the German troops were dealt such a strong blow that they could no longer recover from it.

Prerequisites

At that time, the Germans advanced in several directions. On the territory of the Ukrainian SSR, Soviet troops managed to accomplish something unprecedented: to liberate almost the entire territory of the republic and destroy a huge number of Nazi troops.

But on the Belarusian territory, the Red Army for a long time could not organize a successful breakthrough to Minsk. The German forces were lined up in a wedge directed towards the USSR, and this wedge stood at the line of Orsha - Vitebsk - Mogilev - Zhlobin.

Belarusian operation photo

At the same time, part of the troops was transferred to Ukraine, which the Wehrmacht still hoped to recapture. Therefore, the General Staff and the Supreme High Command decided to change the course of action and focus on the liberation of Belarus.

Side forces

The offensive in Belarus was organized on four fronts. Soviet troops were opposed by four German armies here:

• 2nd Army of the "Center", located in the area of ​​Pinsk and Pripyat;
• the 9th Army of the "Center", located in the Berezina region near Bobruisk;
• 4th Army of the "Center" - the space between the rivers Berezina and Dnieper and between Bykhov and Orsha;
• 3rd Panzer Army "Center" - in the same place, as well as Vitebsk.

Operation progress

Operation "Bagration" was very large-scale and was carried out in two stages. At the first stage, the actions were carried out on the territory of Belarus, and at the second stage - on the territory of Lithuania and Eastern Poland.

On June 22, 1944, reconnaissance in force began to clarify the point location of enemy guns. And on the morning of June 23, the operation itself began. Soviet troops surrounded a group of five divisions near Vitebsk and liquidated it already on June 27. Thus, the main defensive forces of the "Center" army were destroyed.

In addition to the actions of the Red Army, Operation Bagration was accompanied by unprecedented partisan activity: in the summer of 1944, almost 195,000 partisans joined the Red Army.

Soviet troops in attack photo

Eike Middeldorf noted that "Russian partisans" carried out more than ten thousand explosions on railways and other communications, which delayed the movement of German troops for several days. On the other hand, partisan actions facilitated the offensive actions of the Soviet army.

The partisans planned to produce much more explosions - up to forty thousand, however, what was done was enough to inflict a crushing blow on the German side.

Polish Committee of National Liberation

In the midst of "Bagration" Soviet troops entered the territory of Poland. There they formed an interim government, which many experts regard as puppet. The provisional government, called the Polish Committee of National Liberation, did not take into account the Polish government in exile and consisted of communists and socialists. Subsequently, some of the emigrants joined the Committee, but the rest decided to stay in London.

The result of the operation

Operation Bagration exceeded all expectations of the Soviet command. The Red Army showed the advantage of its theory of military affairs and demonstrated careful organization and sequence of actions. Many believe that the defeat of the Germans on the Belarusian front is the largest in the history of the Second World War.

June 23, Minsk / Corr. BELTA/. Preparations for the Byelorussian offensive operation began in the spring of 1944. Based on the military-political situation and the proposals of the military councils of the fronts, the General Staff developed its plan. After its comprehensive discussion at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on May 22-23, a final decision was made to conduct a strategic offensive operation. Its preliminary stage symbolically began on the third anniversary of the German attack on the USSR - June 22, 1944.

On that date, the front, with a length of over 1100 km in Belarus, passed along the line of Lake Nescherdo, east of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, Zhlobin, along the Pripyat River, forming a huge ledge. Here the troops of the Army Group Center defended themselves, which had a well-developed network of railways and highways for wide maneuvering along internal lines. The fascist German troops occupied a defense prepared in advance, in depth (250-270 km), which was based on a developed system of field fortifications and natural lines. Defensive lines passed, as a rule, along the western banks of numerous rivers, which had wide swampy floodplains.

The Belarusian offensive operation, codenamed "Bagration", began on June 23 and ended on August 29, 1944. Its idea was to break through the enemy defenses with simultaneous deep strikes in six sectors, dismember his troops and break them into parts. In the future, it was supposed to strike at Minsk in converging directions in order to encircle and destroy the main enemy forces east of the capital of Belarus. Then the offensive was planned to continue towards the borders of Poland and East Prussia.

Outstanding Soviet military leaders took part in the preparation and implementation of Operation Bagration. Her plan was developed by General of the Army A.I. Antonov. The troops of the fronts, whose forces carried out the operation, were commanded by army generals K.K. Rokossovsky, I.Kh. Bagramyan, colonel-generals I.D. Chernyakhovsky and G.F. Zakharov. The fronts were coordinated by representatives of the Stavka Marshals of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky.

The 1st Baltic, 1st, 2nd, 3rd Belorussian fronts participated in the battles - a total of 17 armies, including 1 tank and 3 air, 4 tank and 2 Caucasian corps, a horse-mechanized group, the Dnieper military flotilla , 1st Army of the Polish Army and Belarusian partisans. During the operation, the partisans cut off the enemy's retreat routes, captured and built new bridges and crossings for the Red Army, independently liberated a number of regional centers, and participated in the liquidation of encircled enemy groups.

The operation consisted of two stages. On the first (June 23 - July 4) Vitebsk-Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk, Polotsk, Minsk operations were carried out. As a result of the 1st stage of the Belarusian operation, the main forces of Army Group Center were defeated. At the second stage (July 5 - August 29), the Vilnius, Bialystok, Lublin-Brest, Siauliai, Kaunas operations were carried out.

On the first day of the strategic offensive operation "Bagration" on June 23, 1944, the Red Army troops liberated the Sirotinsky district (since 1961 - Shumilinsky). The troops of the 1st Baltic Front, together with the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, went on the offensive on June 23, by June 25 surrounded 5 enemy divisions west of Vitebsk and liquidated them by June 27, the main forces of the front captured Lepel on June 28. The troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, successfully developing the offensive, liberated Borisov on July 1. The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, after breaking through the enemy defenses along the Pronya, Basya and Dnieper rivers, liberated Mogilev on June 28. By June 27, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front surrounded 6 German divisions in the Bobruisk area and liquidated them by June 29. At the same time, the troops of the front reached the line of Svisloch, Osipovichi, Starye Dorogi.

As a result of the Minsk operation, Minsk was liberated on July 3, to the east of which formations of the 4th and 9th German armies (over 100 thousand people) were surrounded. During the Polotsk operation, the 1st Baltic Front liberated Polotsk and developed an offensive on Siauliai. In 12 days, Soviet troops advanced 225-280 km at an average daily pace of up to 20-25 km, and liberated most of Belarus. Army Group Center suffered a catastrophic defeat, its main forces were surrounded and defeated.

With the release of Soviet troops to the line of Polotsk, Lake. Naroch, Molodechno, west of Nesvizh, a gap 400 km long was formed in the strategic front of the enemy. Attempts by the fascist German command to close it with separate divisions, which were hastily transferred from other directions, could not produce any significant results. Before the Soviet troops, the opportunity arose to begin a relentless pursuit of the remnants of the defeated enemy troops. After the successful completion of the 1st stage of the operation, the Headquarters gave the fronts new directives, according to which they were to continue a decisive offensive to the west.

As a result of hostilities during the Belarusian operation, 17 enemy divisions and 3 brigades were completely destroyed, 50 divisions lost more than half of their composition. The Nazis lost about half a million people killed, wounded, captured. During Operation Bagration, Soviet troops completed the liberation of Belarus, liberated part of Lithuania and Latvia, entered Poland on July 20, and approached the borders of East Prussia on August 17. By August 29, they reached the Vistula River and organized defense at this line.

The Belarusian operation created the conditions for the further advance of the Red Army into Germany. For participation in it, more than 1,500 soldiers and commanders were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, more than 400,000 soldiers and officers were awarded orders and medals, 662 formations and units received honorary names based on the names of the cities and localities they liberated.

Northwest and southeast of the city of Vitebsk, our troops went on the offensive. Hundreds of Soviet guns of various calibers and mortars unleashed powerful fire on the enemy. Artillery and air preparation for the offensive lasted several hours. Numerous German fortifications were destroyed. Then, following the barrage of fire, the Soviet infantry went on the attack. Suppressing the surviving enemy firing points, our fighters broke through the heavily fortified defenses in both sectors of the offensive. Soviet troops advancing southeast of the city of Vitebsk cut the Vitebsk-Orsha railway and thereby deprived the Vitebsk enemy grouping of the last railway line connecting it with the rear. The enemy suffers huge losses. German trenches and battlefields are littered with the corpses of the Nazis, broken weapons and equipment. Our troops captured trophies and prisoners.

In the Mogilev direction, our troops, after heavy artillery shelling and bombardment of enemy positions from the air, went on the offensive. The Soviet infantry quickly crossed the Pronya River. The enemy built a defensive line on the western bank of this river, consisting of numerous bunkers and several full-profile trench lines. The Soviet troops broke through the enemy defenses with a powerful blow and, building on their success, moved forward up to 20 kilometers. There were many enemy corpses left in the trenches and communication passages. Only in one small area, 600 killed Nazis were counted.

***
The partisan detachment named after the Hero of the Soviet Union Zaslonov attacked the German garrison in one settlement in the Vitebsk region. In a fierce hand-to-hand fight, the partisans exterminated 40 Nazis and captured large trophies. The partisan detachment "Thunderstorm" derailed 3 German military echelons in one day. 3 steam locomotives, 16 wagons and platforms with military cargo were broken.

They liberated Belarus

Petr Filippovich Gavrilov Born October 14, 1914 in the Tomsk region in a peasant family. In the army since December 1942. A company of the 34th Guards Tank Brigade of the 6th Guards Army of the 1st Baltic Front under the command of Guards Senior Lieutenant Pyotr Gavrilov on June 23, 1944, when breaking through the defenses near the village of Sirotino, Shumilinsky District, Vitebsk Region, destroyed two bunkers, dispersed and destroyed up to a Nazi battalion. In pursuit of the Nazis, on June 24, 1944, the company entered the Western Dvina River near the village of Ulla, captured a bridgehead on its western bank and held it until our infantry and artillery approached. For the courage and courage shown during the breakthrough of the defense and the successful crossing of the Western Dvina River, Senior Lieutenant Gavrilov Petr Filippovich was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. After the war, he lived and worked in Sverdlovsk (since 1991 - Yekaterinburg). Died in 1968.
Abdulla Zhanzakov was born on February 22, 1918 in the Kazakh village of Akrab. Since 1941 in the army on the fronts of the war. The submachine gunner of the 196th Guards Rifle Regiment (67th Guards Rifle Division, 6th Guards Army, 1st Baltic Front), Guard Corporal Abdulla Zhanzakov, especially distinguished himself in the Belarusian strategic offensive operation. In the battle on June 23, 1944, he participated in the assault on the enemy stronghold near the village of Sirotinovka (Shumilinsky district). He secretly made his way to the German bunker and threw grenades at him. On June 24, he distinguished himself when crossing the Western Dvina River near the village of Buy (Beshenkovichi district). In the battle during the liberation of the city of Lepel on June 28, 1944, he was the first to break through to the high embankment of the railway track, took up an advantageous position on it and suppressed several enemy firing points with automatic fire, ensuring the success of his platoon advancement. In the battle on June 30, 1944, he died while crossing the Ushacha River near the city of Polotsk. Guard Corporal Zhanzakov Abdulla was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union posthumously.

Nikolai Efimovich Solovyov was born on May 19, 1918 in the Tver region into a peasant family. During the Great Patriotic War in the army since 1941. Particularly distinguished himself during the Vitebsk-Orsha offensive operation. In the battle on June 23, 1944, when breaking through the enemy defenses near the village of Medved in the Sirotinsky (now Shumilinsky) district, under fire, he provided communication between the division commander and the regiments. On June 24, when crossing the Western Dvina River at night near the village of Sharipino (Beshenkovichi District), he established a wire connection across the river. For courage and heroism shown during the crossing of the Western Dvina, Solovyov Nikolai Efimovich was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. After the war he lived and worked in the Tver region. Died in 1993.

Alexander Kuzmich Fedyunin Born September 15, 1911 in the Ryazan region in a peasant family. During the Great Patriotic War in the army since 1941. Particularly distinguished himself during the liberation of Belarus. On June 23, 1944, the battalion under the command of A.K. Fedyunin was the first to break into the Sirotino railway station (Vitebsk region), destroyed up to 70 enemy soldiers, captured 2 guns, 2 warehouses with ammunition and military equipment. On June 24, the fighters, led by the battalion commander, crossed the Western Dvina River near the village of Dvorishche (Beshenkovichi district, Vitebsk region), shot down the enemy’s outposts and entrenched themselves on the bridgehead, which ensured the crossing of the river by other units of the regiment. For the skillful command of the unit, courage and heroism shown during the liberation of Belarus, Fedyunin Alexander Kuzmich was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. After the end of the war, he continued to serve in the Armed Forces, lived and worked in the city of Shakhty, Rostov Region. Died in 1975.

June 23, 1944 - Soviet troops launched an operation to liberate Belarus, codenamed Bagration (more than 2.5 million people from both sides took part in it). It included two stages and ended on August 29, 1944. The operation received its name in honor of the Russian commander of the Patriotic War of 1812 P.I. Bagration, and it was developed by K. Rokossovsky together with A. Vasilevsky and G. Zhukov. Belarus was occupied by the Nazis from the very beginning of the war, and here the Germans during this time created a fairly powerful and echeloned defense. Therefore, in preparation for an offensive in this direction, the Soviet command prepared and carried out a huge amount of work to ensure the secrecy of the movement of the Red Army forces and to mislead the enemy. The units moved to their original positions at night, observing radio silence, and in parallel, a false concentration of troops was carried out in the Chisinau direction, whole echelons with models of military equipment were taken from Belarus to the rear. And this brought the desired result - the enemy did not suspect anything. In addition, a thorough reconnaissance of the forces and positions of the enemy was carried out, and before the start of the operation, Belarusian partisans rendered great help, having committed many successful sabotage on the communications of the Nazis. Operation Bagration began on June 23, 1944 with artillery preparation, after which the troops of the 1st Baltic, 3rd, 2nd and 1st Belorussian Fronts went on the offensive, which lasted two months. The actions of the troops of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts were coordinated by Marshal G. Zhukov, and the actions of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts were coordinated by the chief of the General Staff A. Vasilevsky. The Dnieper military flotilla also took part in the operation. The operation took place in two stages: the first (June 23-July 4) included the Vitebsk-Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk, Polotsk and Minsk front-line offensive operations; the second stage (July 5-August 29) - Vilnius, Siauliai, Bialystok, Lublin-Brest, Kaunas and Osovets front-line offensive operations. During the operation "Bagration" Belarus, part of the Baltic states and the eastern regions of Poland were liberated. During this time, the fascist German troops lost about 400 thousand people killed, wounded and captured. 22 German generals were captured alive, 10 more were killed. Army Group Center was practically defeated. Soviet troops lost up to 180 thousand dead, missing and captured, as well as about 600 thousand wounded and sick (although different sources give different data). But one thing is clear - the operation "Bagration" was a grand victory for the Soviet troops during the Great Patriotic War and a triumph of Soviet military art.

OPERATION "BAGRATION"

In total, by the beginning of the operation, the Soviet side had concentrated more than 160 divisions. Of this number, 138 divisions were directly in the four fronts, as well as 30,896 guns and mortars (including anti-aircraft artillery) and 4,070 tanks and self-propelled guns (1st PB - 687, 3rd BF - 1810, 2nd BF - 276 , 1st BF - 1297). The rest of the forces were subordinate to the Headquarters and were introduced into battle already at the stage of development of the offensive.

Decisive victory

In Soviet historiography, 1944 was considered the year of decisive victories in the history of the Great Patriotic War. During this year, the Red Army carried out ten strategic operations, which later received the name "Stalin's 10 strikes." The fifth and largest was the Belarusian one, carried out in the form of a strategic operation "Bagration" in the period from June 23 to August 29, 1944 by the troops of four fronts, as a result of which all of Belarus, part of the Baltic states and Poland was liberated. The Red Army finally drove the enemy out of most of the Soviet territory by crossing the State Border of the USSR.

After the defeat at Stalingrad, Kursk and Smolensk by the beginning of 1944, the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front finally switched to a tough defense. In the spring of 1944, the line of the Soviet-German confrontation had a giant bend in Belarus, forming a ledge with a total area of ​​​​more than 50 thousand square meters. kilometers, facing east with its convexity. This ledge, or, as the Soviet command called it, a balcony, was of great military and strategic importance. Army Group Center, holding the territory of Belarus, ensured the stable position of German troops in the Baltic states and Ukraine. The salient also covered Poland and East Prussia, through which passed the shortest routes to the vital centers of Germany. It also allowed the German command to maintain strategic interaction between Army Groups "North", "Center" and "Northern Ukraine". The Belorussian balcony hung over the right flank of the 1st Ukrainian Front, providing the Germans with a wide operational maneuver and the possibility of delivering air strikes on communications and industrial areas of the Soviet Union.

The command of Army Group Center did everything possible to make the territory of Belarus an impregnable fortress. The troops occupied a pre-prepared layered defense up to 270 km deep, with a developed system of field fortifications and defensive lines. The reliability of the German defense is evidenced by the fact that from October 12, 1943 to April 1, 1944, the troops of the Western Front in the Orsha and Vitebsk directions carried out 11 offensive operations that were not successful.

The composition of the Soviet troops speaks eloquently about the strategic scale of Operation Bagration. Four fronts united 15 combined arms and 2 tank armies, including 166 divisions, 12 tank and mechanized corps, 7 fortified areas, 21 rifle and separate tank mechanized brigades. The combat strength of units and subunits totaled 1 million 400 thousand people, 36,400 guns and mortars, 5.2 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns. The troops were supported by aviation from five air armies. In total, more than 5 thousand combat aircraft were involved.

As part of the operation, a number of tasks were supposed to be solved by the forces of Belarusian partisans, who by the spring of 1944 controlled more than 50% of the territory of Belarus. It was they who were supposed to ensure the paralysis of the operational rear of Army Group Center. And the people's avengers successfully completed the tasks assigned to them.

The Belarusian operation went down in history as one of the largest strategic battles in the history of wars. During the first two days, the enemy defenses were broken through in six sectors of the front. The offensive of the Red Army took place in a strip 1100 km long and was carried out to a depth of 550-600 km. The rate of advance was 25–30 km per day.

Partisan actions

The offensive of the Red Army in Belarus preceded an unprecedented partisan offensive on the enemy's communications. Massive actions in the German rear began on the night of June 20. The partisans planned to carry out 40,000 different explosions, but in fact only a quarter of what was planned was carried out. However, this was enough to cause a short-term paralysis of the rear of Army Group Center.

The head of the rear communications of the army group, Colonel G. Teske, stated: “On the night before the general offensive of the Russians in the sector of the Army Group Center, at the end of June 1944, a powerful distracting partisan raid on all important roads for several days deprived the German troops of all control. During that one night, the partisans installed about 10.5 thousand mines and charges, of which only 3.5 thousand were found and neutralized. Communication on many highways due to partisan raids could only be carried out during the day and only accompanied by an armed convoy.

Railways and bridges became the main object of application of partisan forces. In addition to them, communication lines were disabled. All these actions greatly facilitated the advance of the troops at the front.

Operation "Bagration" as a folk epic

For three years the Belarusian land languished under the fascist yoke. The Nazis, having chosen a policy of genocide and mass bloody terror, committed unheard-of atrocities here, sparing neither women nor children. Concentration camps and ghettos operated in almost every region of Belarus: in total, 260 death camps and 70 ghettos were created within the republic. Only in one of them - in Trostenets near Minsk - more than 200 thousand people were killed

The invaders and their accomplices during the war destroyed and burned 9200 settlements. Over 5295 of them were destroyed together with all the inhabitants or with part of the population. 186 villages were never able to revive, as they were destroyed with all the villagers, including mothers and babies, infirm old people and the disabled. The Nazi genocide and scorched-earth tactics killed 2,230,000 people, virtually every third inhabitant of Belarus died.

However, the Belarusians did not reconcile themselves to the "new order" that the Nazis planted in the occupied territories. From the first days of the war, underground groups were created in cities and towns, and partisan detachments in the forests. The partisan movement on the territory of Belarus had a nationwide scope. By the end of 1941, 12,000 people fought in the ranks of partisans in 230 detachments, and by the summer of 1944, the number of people's avengers exceeded 374 thousand people, who were united in 1255 detachments, 997 of which were part of 213 brigades and regiments.

Belarus was deservedly called a “partisan republic”: for three years of heroic struggle behind enemy lines, Belarusian patriots destroyed almost half a million Nazis and policemen.

The liberation of Belarus began in 1943 when in August - September, as a result of the Smolensk, Bryansk, Chernigov-Pripyat, Lepel, Gomel-Rechitsa operations, the first Belarusian cities were liberated.

On September 23, 1943, the Red Army liberated the first regional center of Belarus - Komarin. Twenty soldiers who distinguished themselves during the crossing of the Dnieper in the Komarin region were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. At the end of September, Khotimsk, Mstislavl, Klimovichi, Krichev were liberated.

November 23, 1943 The Red Army cleared the first regional center of the republic, Gomel, of the Nazis.

January-March 1944 the Kalinkovichi-Mozyr operation was carried out with the participation of the Gomel, Polessky and Minsk partisan formations, as a result of which Mozyr and Kalinkovichi were liberated.

One of the largest battles at the final stage of the Great Patriotic War was The Belarusian operation, which went down in history under the name "Bagration". The Germans along the Dnieper created a defense in depth, the so-called "Eastern Wall". The offensive of the Soviet troops here was held by the grouping of armies "Center", two army groups "North" and "Northern Ukraine", which had 63 divisions, 3 brigades, 1.2 million people, 9.5 thousand guns and mortars, 900 tanks and assault guns, 1350 aircraft. At the same time, before Operation Bagration, Nazi strategists were convinced that the Russians would advance not through the Belarusian swamps, but “in the south of the Eastern Front, in the Balkans,” so the main forces and main reserves were kept there.

From the Soviet side, the troops of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian fronts were involved in the operation (commanders - General of the Army K.K. Rokossovsky, General of the Army G.F. Zakharov and Colonel General I.D. Chernyakhovsky ), as well as the troops of the 1st Baltic Front (commander - General of the Army I.Kh. Bagramyan). The total number of Soviet troops was 2.4 million soldiers and officers, 36,400 guns and mortars, 5,200 tanks and self-propelled artillery, 5,300 aircraft.

Operation Bagration was a new form of strategic action- an operation of a group of fronts, united by a single plan and led by the Supreme High Command. According to the plan of the summer campaign of 1944, it was planned to launch an offensive first in the areas of the Karelian Isthmus by the troops of the Leningrad Front and the Baltic Fleet, and then - in the second half of June - in Belarus. The main difficulty of the forthcoming offensive of the troops, especially of the 1st Belorussian Front, was that they had to operate in a formidable wooded and heavily marshy area.

The general offensive began on June 23, and already on June 24 the defensive line of the German troops was broken through.

June 25 1944 - the enemy's Vitebsk grouping consisting of 5 divisions was surrounded and then liquidated.

June 29 Red Army troops defeated the enemy group, surrounded near Bobruisk, where the Nazis lost 50 thousand people.

July 1 troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front liberated Borisov. In the Minsk "cauldron" in the east of the capital of Belarus, a 105,000-strong enemy group was surrounded.

3 July In 1944, tankers and infantrymen of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts cleared the capital of Belarus, Minsk, from Nazi invaders.

As a result of the first stage of Operation Bagration, the enemy army grouping Center suffered a complete defeat.

During the second stage of the Belarusian operation in July 1944, Molodechno, Smorgon, Baranovichi, Novogrudok, Pinsk, Grodno were liberated. And with the liberation of Brest on July 28, the expulsion of the Nazi invaders from the territory of Belarus ended.

As German General H. Guderian recalled: “As a result of this strike, Army Group Center was destroyed ... Field Marshal Model was appointed instead of Field Marshal Bush as commander of Army Group Center, or rather, commander of“ empty space.