Most clearly, the personality and state practice of Alexander I was revealed in his confrontation with Napoleon, a confrontation that brought the French emperor to the island of St. Helena, and Alexander was broken and devastated to such an extent that he apparently could not recover from this until the end of his days.

Russia met the beginning of the century with the settlement of its relations with the European powers. Friendly relations with England were restored, diplomatic relations with the Austrian Empire were resumed. Alexander I declared that he refuses to interfere in the internal affairs of foreign states and recognizes in them the political system that is supported by the "general consent" of the peoples of these countries. With France, the former friendly relations were maintained, but Alexander every month became more and more distrustful of the first consul of France. This distrust was based not only on politics, the ever-increasing expansion of France on the European continent, about which much has been written by our historians, but also on Alexander's attitude to the domestic political problems of France, which was not paid attention to.

Being an admirer of the ideas of the French Revolution, the republic, the constitutional system and ardently condemning the dictatorship and terror of the Jacobins, the young Russian monarch closely followed the developments in France. Already in 1801, reflecting on Napoleon's desire to raise his power in France, on his international claims, which were actively promoted by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Talleyrand, Alexander remarked: "What swindlers!" And in 1802, when Napoleon declared himself consul for life, Alexander wrote to La Harpe: “I have completely changed, just like you, my dear, my opinion about the first consul. Since the establishment of his consulate for life, the veil has been lifted: since then, things have gone from bad to worse. He began by depriving himself of the greatest glory that can befall a man. The only thing left for him was to prove that he acted without any personal benefit, only for the sake of the happiness and glory of his homeland, and to remain faithful to the Constitution, to which he himself swore to transfer his power in ten years. Instead, he chose to monkey-copy the customs of the royal courts, thereby violating the Constitution of his country. He is now one of the greatest tyrants that history has ever produced." As you can see, Alexander cares about the constitutional order of France. Moreover, it is not at all necessary to consider this demagoguery, since Alexander professed precisely these views in recent years, and the letter was of a purely personal, closed nature. In addition, Alexander quite correctly caught the sovereign claims of the "little corporal."

Since 1803, the expansion of France has been increasing. Bonaparte organizes the Boulogne camp to prepare troops for the invasion of the British Isles, occupies Hanover and the Kingdom of Naples. The Russian ambassador in Paris begins to demonstrate his opposition to Napoleon's policies, which infuriates the first consul. The execution by Napoleon of the Duke of Enghien, the offspring of the Bourbons and a relative of the St. Petersburg court, caused a shock in the Russian capital.

The Russian government protested. In particular, it said that Napoleon had violated the neutrality of another state (the duke was captured in Baden) and human rights. After the proclamation of Napoleon as emperor, Russia went on an active rapprochement with Prussia, and then with England. Business went to the European war. So, by the force of circumstances, rather by the force of his humanistic aspirations, the rejection of Napoleon's cynical violation of the laws of his own country, as well as the principles of legitimism, the system established in Europe, Alexander was forced to abandon his position of non-interference in European affairs, although the confrontation with France at this stage was not caused the interests of Russia. But already at that time, the desire to make Russia happy through the reforms that were beginning began to coexist more and more in Alexander's soul with the desire to "save" Europe from the French tyrant. And this desire should not be underestimated or replaced by the concept of “saving the reactionary regimes of Europe” and so on, since it lay in the general mainstream of Alexander I's worldview at that time.

For Russia, a military confrontation with France was objectively undesirable, since already at that time there was a natural desire of the parties through political combinations to achieve the desired results for themselves. Russia sought to develop the successes of the Russo-Turkish wars and claimed the straits and Poland, the annexation of Moldavia and Wallachia; Russia also included Finland in the sphere of interests. Napoleon sought to ensure freedom in the fight against England and wanted to extend his power to southern and central Europe. Compromises were acceptable along the way, but war was also possible. The subsequent development of events showed the regularity of both. And yet it should be said about the two main tendencies that dictated the behavior of Alexander. The first is, of course, the policy of Russia as a great European power capable of dividing Europe with Bonaparte, and the growing autocratic ambitions of the Russian emperor. The second is his liberal complexes, which spilled over from domestic politics into the international arena. It was at this time that Alexander had an idea, later expressed in the organization of the Holy Alliance, about the possibility of organizing the European world on the basis of humanism, cooperation, justice, respect for the rights of nations, and observance of human rights. The lessons of La Harpe were not in vain. So, sending Novosiltsev to England in 1804 for negotiations, he gave him instructions in which he outlined the idea of ​​​​concluding a general peace treaty between the peoples and creating a league of peoples. Here is what he wrote in this document: “Of course, here we are not talking about the realization of the dream of eternal peace, but still it would be possible to get closer to the benefits that are expected from such a world, if in the treaty, when determining the conditions for a general war, it was possible to establish on clear and precise principles of the requirements of international law. Why not include in such a treaty a positive definition of the rights of nationalities, provide the benefits of neutrality, and establish obligations never to start a war without first having exhausted all the means provided by arbitration mediation, which makes it possible to clarify mutual misunderstandings and try to eliminate them? Under such conditions, it would be possible to begin to implement this general pacification and create an alliance, the decrees of which would form, so to speak, a new code of international law. A remarkable document, although very premature for that time. Nevertheless, Alexander was perhaps the first statesman in Europe to put forward the idea of ​​legal regulation of international relations, which long anticipated real steps in this direction already in the second half of the 20th century.

And yet the reasoning of that time remained a chimera. The reality turned out to be more prosaic. England sought an alliance with Russia to crush Napoleon. There was a new anti-French coalition consisting of England, Russia, Austria, Prussia. At the same time, Russian claims to Turkey and Poland were satisfied. Russian troops moved to Europe. The goal of a great absolutist power outweighed the good fantasies of a liberal young man. But these fantasies remained in his mind, and they will arise again as soon as the right circumstances arise for this.

On December 2, 1805, the united Russian-Austrian army, contrary to the warnings of M.I. Kutuzova met with Napoleon near Austerlitz. The defeat of the allies was complete. Crashed into dust and illusions of Alexander. He led the troops, determined their disposition, was sure of victory ... When the troops fled and the catastrophe became obvious, he burst into tears. Alexander barely escaped captivity that day, having lost contact with the headquarters, with the troops. He took refuge in the hut of a Moravian peasant, then galloped for several hours among the fleeing army, was tired, dirty, did not change his sweaty linen for two days, and lost his luggage. The Cossacks got him wine, and he warmed up a little, fell asleep in a shed on straw. But he was not broken, but only realized that it was necessary to fight with such a rival as Napoleon fully armed with physical and spiritual forces and all the forces of the empire. From now on, for him, extremely proud, claiming to be the benefactor of Russia and Europe, Napoleon became a mortal enemy, and from 1805 he purposefully and stubbornly went to his destruction. But on the way to this there were still new defeats in the fields of Prussia, Tilsit, Erfurt, 1812, the fire of Moscow, the European campaign of the Russian army, new defeats from Napoleon.

Contemporaries noted that after Austerlitz, Alexander changed in many ways. L.N. Engelhardt, who closely observed the king at that time, wrote: “The battle of Austerlitz made a great influence on the character of Alexander, and it can be called an epoch in his reign. Before that, he was meek, trusting, affectionate, but then he became suspicious, strict to the point of immeasurability, unapproachable and no longer tolerated anyone telling him the truth.

From that time on, Arakcheev became a more prominent figure under him, and the activities of the Private Committee gradually faded. And although the tsar's reform efforts continue - still slowly and cautiously - but the time of former hobbies and revelations is already passing: life, the system takes its toll. In fact, the very first encounter with Napoleon taught Alexander a cruel life lesson, which he learned very thoroughly.

This manifested itself already during the negotiations in Tilsit, where the emperors talked face to face in a house on a raft in the middle of the Niemen.

The Peace of Tilsit dramatically reoriented Russian foreign policy. Russia joined the continental blockade against England, was forced to abandon the support of Prussia, which was dismembered by Napoleon, but received a free hand in relation to Moldavia, Wallachia and Finland. In essence, the monarchs made one of the next divisions of Europe. Alexander showed Napoleon all his charm and friendliness and seems to have deceived him. Napoleon, in a conversation with his adjutant Caulaincourt, considered the king a handsome, intelligent, kind person who puts "all the feelings of a kind heart in the place where reason should be ..." This was Bonaparte's big mistake and, perhaps, the beginning of his future defeat. Meanwhile, Alexander wrote to his sister Ekaterina Pavlovna that Bonaparte had one vulnerable feature - his vanity, and that he was ready to sacrifice his pride for the sake of saving Russia. Somewhat later, in a conversation with the Prussian king Friedrich Wilhelm III and his wife, the charming Queen Louise, Alexander said: “Be patient, we will return ours. He'll break his neck. Despite all my demonstrations and outward actions, in my heart I am your friend and I hope to prove it to you in practice ... At least I will buy time.

On the way to Erfurt - the second meeting with Napoleon and the next negotiations with him - Alexander I continued this line: restraint, calmness, goodwill, playing on the vanity of the French emperor and the desire to obtain certain foreign policy benefits for Russia. Trade continued over Poland, the straits, Constantinople, the Danubian principalities, Finland, the German states, etc. At the same time, Alexander sent secret letters to England, reassuring the British cabinet, expressing his firm desire to fight Bonaparte. Distrust, secrecy, duplicity - this is how Alexander appeared in his relationship with Napoleon in 1807-1808. At the same time, Caulaincourt transmitted to Paris the words of Alexander that Napoleon had conquered him in Tilsit.

The meeting in Erfurt brought Russia incomparable success: Napoleon agreed to Russia's annexation of Finland, Moldavia and Wallachia, but opposed the capture of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. But at the same time he forced Russia to take his side in the event of a war between France and Austria. The Russian emperor, saving his unlucky ally, the Prussian king, obtained from France a reduction in indemnity from Prussia. He also insisted on the withdrawal of French troops from the Grand Duchy of Warsaw.

And here Alexander continued the double game. Talleyrand wrote later in his memoirs: “Napoleon's favors, gifts and impulses were completely in vain. Before leaving Erfurt, Alexander personally wrote a letter to the Emperor of Austria in order to dispel his fears about the meeting.

The negotiations in Erfurt, despite outward cordiality, were very tense. At one point, Napoleon threw his hat on the ground, to which Alexander objected: “You are quick-tempered. I am stubborn. You won't get anything from me with anger. Let's talk, reason, otherwise I'll leave.

The true attitude of the Russian emperor towards Napoleon was also manifested in the fact that the Russian court practically refused the French emperor in claims to the hand of the tsar's sister, the charming Ekaterina Pavlovna. Reference was made to the position of Catherine Pavlovna herself and the Dowager Empress Maria Feodorovna. After some time, Napoleon's attempt to get the hand of another sister of the king, Anna Pavlovna, ended with the same result.

For the Russian ruling house, this marriage would have been an undoubted misalliance, and in Paris this was understood correctly. Napoleon was furious.

From 1807–1808, especially in connection with the dissatisfaction in Russian society with the results of the Peace of Tilsit, some evidence comes of Alexander's real attitude to the events taking place. Of course, they could be defensive in nature, but, compared with his general line regarding Napoleon, Prussia, England, and also compared with each other, they give a remarkable picture. In a letter to his mother shortly before the meeting in Erfurt, Alexander wrote: “Our recent interests have forced us to enter into a close alliance with France. We will do everything to prove to her the sincerity and nobility of our course of action.” And in the same year, after the Erfurt meeting, he noted in a letter to Ekaterina Pavlovna: “Bonaparte believes that I am only a fool, but the one who laughs last laughs better, and I place all my hopes on God, and not only on God. but also on their abilities and willpower. It is no coincidence that Caulaincourt, in one of his personal letters to Napoleon of that time, apparently having begun to see clearly, wrote: “Alexander is not accepted for who he is. He is considered weak, and they are mistaken. Undoubtedly, he can suffer annoyance and hide his displeasure ... But this lightness of character has its limits - he will not go beyond the circle outlined for himself, and this circle is made of iron and does not bend ... "

It is no coincidence that Napoleon himself, already on the island of St. Helena, recalled Alexander of that Tilsit-Erfurt era: “The king is smart, elegant, educated; he can easily charm, but this must be feared; he is insincere; this is a real Byzantine from the time of the decline of the empire ... It is quite possible that he fooled me, because he is subtle, deceitful, dexterous ... ". It seems that Napoleon received his sight too late. And this is proved, by the way, by the entire subsequent history of the relationship between the two emperors. Alexander opposed the military genius, strength, onslaught of Napoleon with the highest diplomatic art, a subtle mind, and long-range calculation.

Beginning in 1808, the tsar, preparing for a future confrontation with the French emperor, began to rebuild and reform the Russian army. Two excellent, talented assistants helped him in this matter - A.A. Arakcheev and M.B. Barclay de Tolly. By the beginning of 1811, he already had 225 thousand soldiers, but sought to increase the army by another 100 thousand people. At the same time, he established relations with the British government, with Polish high-ranking figures.

By the spring of 1812, relations between France and Russia had heated up to the limit. Under these conditions, Alexander showed great restraint, fortitude, and genuine patriotism. In response to the words of Napoleon, transmitted to him with one of the envoys: “We will create our bridgeheads not only on the Danube, but also on the Neman, Volga, Moscow River and push back the threat of raids from the north for two hundred years,” Alexander led him to the map and , pointing to the shores of the Bering Strait, replied that the French emperor would have to go to these places in order to get peace on Russian soil. In the same days, Alexander said to his friend Parrat, the rector of Dorpat University: “I do not hope to triumph over the genius and forces of my enemy. But in no case will I conclude a shameful peace and prefer to bury myself under the ruins of the empire.

Having invaded the borders of Russia, the great army of Napoleon began to move freely into the interior of the country. According to Caulaincourt's memoirs, Napoleon hoped to end the campaign quickly, defeat the Russians in a pitched battle, and sign peace. “I will sign peace in Moscow! ... And two months will not pass before the Russian nobles will force Alexander to ask me for it! ...”

Indeed, in the current situation and in the future, after the fall of Moscow, Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich, Chancellor Rumyantsev, Arakcheev, and a number of prominent dignitaries advocated peace with Napoleon. But Alexander was relentless. When, in July, Napoleon made the first attempt at peace negotiations, transmitted through General Balashov, Alexander simply did not answer him. On August 24, the French emperor wrote a new letter to the tsar from Smolensk, and again there was no answer. Having received from Kutuzov the news of the abandonment and subsequent fire of Moscow, Alexander burst into tears, but quickly pulled himself together and, according to Colonel Michaud sent to him, said: “Return to the army, tell our brave men, announce to all my loyal subjects wherever you will pass that if I have not a single soldier left, I will become the head of my dear nobility and my good peasants and sacrifice all the means of the empire ... But if it is predestined by Divine Providence that my dynasty should ever cease to reign on the throne of my ancestors, then, having exhausted all the means that are in my power, I will grow my beard and agree to eat potatoes with the last of my peasants, rather than sign the shame of my fatherland and my dear subjects, whose sacrifices I know how to appreciate. Napoleon or I, I or he, but together we cannot reign; I have learned to understand it; he won't deceive me anymore."

Firm assurances on this score were also made to Kutuzov. The military conflict with France took for Alexander I, quite obviously, the form of a personal and uncompromising conflict with Napoleon, and the Russian emperor put into it all the strength of his hatred, hurt pride, firmness of will. In this confrontation, Alexander suddenly appeared to be who he really was, or rather, became after gaining confidence on the throne, a powerful, strong, far-sighted ruler.

At the same time, the events of the beginning of the war, and especially the fire of Moscow, shocked him so much that, according to eyewitnesses, he was often sad, began to retire in his Kamennoostrovsky Palace, which remained almost without protection. Then, for the first time, he so earnestly, so passionately turned to God. “The fire of Moscow illuminated my soul,” he later confessed to the Prussian Bishop Eilert, “and filled my heart with the warmth of faith, which I have not felt until now. And then I knew God.”

All attempts by Napoleon from Moscow to enter into peace negotiations with the Russian Tsar also remained unanswered. Alexander continued to fulfill his vow.

In December 1812, the Russian army, having forced the French out of Russia, reached the state border of Russia on the Neman. The question arose about the future of the campaign. M.I. Kutuzov believed that the war could have ended there, that there was no longer any need to destroy Russian soldiers. The aged field marshal, not without reason, believed that the fall of Napoleon would only strengthen England and the group of European powers in defiance of Russia. However, Alexander had other feelings. He aspired now to become the savior of Europe, to be its arbitrator. What was more in these aspirations - the autocratic claims of the owner of the empire, the messianic claims of a believer, insulted by Napoleon, a man humiliated by him. It seems that the first, and the second, and the third. And yet, personal confrontation with Napoleon was one of the dominant behavior of the Russian Tsar.

Now the goal of Alexander was the indispensable capture of Paris, the overthrow of Napoleon. The Russian tsar motivated this goal with noble feelings of helping the oppressed peoples. In this regard, all the propaganda support of the campaign was carried out. The entry of the allied troops into France was justified by the need to save the French people from the tyranny of Bonaparte. And yet we cannot but recall this decisive phrase of Alexander: "Napoleon or I, I or he." It seems that this was his real program, not so much as a sovereign, but as a person. Moreover, when the allies showed hesitation, Alexander announced that he would go to the French capital with one Russian army.

During the foreign campaign of the Russian army, the battles between the allies and Napoleon, Alexander was constantly with the army. But this was no longer an enthusiastic newcomer to Austerlitz, but a husband wise in military experience, and a brave husband at that. In the battle near Dresden, on the Lutsen fields, he participated in the leadership of the troops and stood under fire. During the Battle of Bautzen, Alexander positioned himself in such a way that he saw the French emperor, and he saw him. In the battle of Dresden, Alexander narrowly escaped death. A cannonball exploded next to him, fatally hitting General Miro. In the battle of Leipzig, on the first day, Alexander himself commanded the troops, made a number of important decisions, including the commissioning of reserve artillery, which turned the tide of battle in favor of the allies. During the battle of the convoy of life-Cossacks and French cuirassiers, the emperor was almost fifteen paces from the fighters. Alexander showed personal courage and good military command also on the second day of the Battle of Leipzig, as well as in the battle for Paris.

After the success of the French near Bautzen, Napoleon again turned to the Russian Tsar with peace proposals and was again refused. Alexander showed firmness even further, throughout 1814, however, in conditions when the scales were already leaning in favor of the allies.

Already after the solemn entry into Paris, Alexander said to Caulaincourt, who was trying in vain to save his emperor: “We decided to continue the fight to the end, so as not to resume it under less favorable circumstances, and we will fight until we reach a lasting peace, which cannot be expected from a man who has devastated Europe from Moscow to Cadiz. The Allies declared that they would not deal with Napoleon or any of his family. On April 6, Napoleon signed the abdication, and a few days later he left for the island of Elba. These days, Alexander finally showed generosity to the defeated enemy and insisted on relatively mild conditions for his removal from power (ownership of the island of Elba, a huge pension, 50 guards for protection), contrary to Talleyrand, who offered a link to the Azores and a tougher detention regime .

However, as soon as the news of Napoleon's flight from Elba and the onset of the Hundred Days era spread throughout Europe and reached Vienna, where the leaders of the then Europe gathered for its next redistribution, Alexander again showed decisiveness and militancy, which largely determined the rallying of the allies and the final crush of Napoleon Bonaparte. Alexander did not abandon his line in relation to Napoleon even when he sent the Russian emperor an anti-Russian treaty signed by Russia's recent allies - Austria, England and Louis XVIII of Bourbon, who was placed on the parental throne. The treaty was secret and provided for the possibility of joint actions, including military ones, against Russia in connection with serious differences between the allies and Russia on territorial issues. Calling on Austrian Foreign Minister Metternich, Alexander introduced him to the document, then threw it into the fireplace and said that the further fight against Napoleon required the strengthening of allied actions.

Alexander - Napoleon, the beginning of a relationship

Since the autumn of 1801, an active and friendly correspondence has been going on between the Russian emperor and the French consul. Alexander sees in Napoleon a liberator from revolutionary terror, he gave freedom to France. Napoleon is interested in a lasting alliance with Russia in his eternal political and economic struggle with England. He even managed to agree with the obstinate and unpredictable Pavel that he would be able to get along with the “soft” Alexander, and in his favor, he has no doubt.

Over time, the relationship between the two rulers begins to deteriorate. In June 1802, at the urgent request of his mother, Maria Feodorovna, Alexander met with the couple of Prussian monarchs - Wilhelm III and the famous Queen Louise. Kochubey did his best to dissuade Alexander from this meeting, S. V. Vorontsov, the eagle of our diplomacy, was also against it, but you can’t argue with your mother. Yes, Alexander did not argue very much. The Romanovs had a genetic love for Prussia. Peter III and Paul bowed before Frederick the Great.

Alexander went to Prussia incognito, under the name of the Count of Russia. The meeting took place in Memel and was arranged very solemnly. Then anecdotes were told about the meeting in Memel in Europe, clearly alluding to the love between Alexander and the beautiful Louise that happened there. The Russian emperor charmed the queen for life, and she remained faithful to this romantic feeling until her death. You can’t say the same about Alexander, he behaved much more restrained. Napoleon was very dissatisfied with Russia's "flirting" with Prussia, his opponent.

Alexander had his own claims to Napoleon. On August 2, 1803, he was elected consul for life. What is it? Unlimited power, while for life. This means that Napoleon is a graceless tsar, that's all. In a letter to La Harpe dated July 14, 1803, the tsar writes: “I have completely changed, just like you, my dear, my opinion about the first consul. Since the establishment of his consulate for life, the veil has been lifted; Since then, things have gone from bad to worse. He began by depriving himself of the greatest glory that can befall a man. The only thing left for him was to prove that he acted without any personal benefit, only for the sake of the happiness and glory of his homeland, and to remain faithful to the Constitution, to which he himself swore to transfer his power ten years later. Instead, he chose to monkey-copy the customs of the royal courts, thereby violating the Constitution of his country. He is now one of the greatest tyrants that history has ever produced." Touching letter. Alexander argues in it just like our Decembrists.

Further more. Under the Treaty of Amiens, France and England divided territories and spheres of influence. And suddenly England, in violation of the treaty, declares that it retains Malta for another seven years. Napoleon asks Alexander to mediate in resolving this issue. He refuses, not wanting to interfere with European affairs. Then Napoleon gathers an army - the Boulogne camp, and then rapidly occupies Hanover and the Kingdom of Naples. Europe only shrugged it off, England took care of it. This did not concern us yet, but it was clear that things were heading for war.

On March 18, the Senate proclaimed Napoleon emperor. And four days later suddenly a new atrocity in France. On March 21, 1804, on the orders of Napoleon, the Duke of Enghien was captured in Ettenheim, hastily convicted and shot - the full name of Louis Antoine Henri de Bourbon Conde (1772–1804), that is, a representative of the royal family. The essence of this story is as follows. The day before, a conspiracy against Napoleon was uncovered, an English hand was guessed in it, and the performers, of course, were royalists. At the right moment, wanting to curry favor and prove his loyalty, Talleyrand, a smart and unprincipled man to the point of cynicism, informed Napoleon that the conspiracy was led by the Duke of Enghien, who lives in Baden, in the town of Ettenheim, that is, actually abroad. Napoleon ordered a detachment of gendarmes to kidnap him and bring him to France. The duke was taken to the Château de Vincennes, then a speedy military court. That very night he was shot. Needless to say, the duke had nothing to do with the conspiracy. He even wrote an explanatory letter to Napoleon, but Talleyrand prudently delayed the delivery of this message. Napoleon later read this letter and declared that if he had read it earlier, the duke would have been pardoned. He was worried, of course, that he had unfairly shot a man, but then he calmed down, for the exasperation of the royalists, this is perhaps good. Usual revolutionary logic!

But this event made a heavy impression on Europe. And the court, and justice - where? A representative of the royal house was shot in a ravine near the Château de Vincennes, as in the blackest years of terror. There were calls for war, it's time to teach the "Corsican monster" a lesson! Russia declared mourning for the Duke of Enghien, but Prussia refused to sign a protest against the execution. Strange as it may seem to write about it, there was opposition at the court in St. Petersburg. The closest circle of the emperor, this very four hot and young, was especially criticized. The Dowager Empress Maria Feodorovna was at the head of the opposition. She hated Napoleon and warned her son that it was impossible to be friends with the "Corsican", she warned more than once, and that's what happened.

This time, Alexander was in complete agreement with his mother. Russia sent a protest to France, in which Napoleon was explained in an intelligible form what he was wrong about and how his recklessness could affect the political situation in Europe. Russia's answer was composed by Talleyrand: if you want to fight, then do not look for a reason for this, act openly. The consul for life does not want war, but he will not allow anyone to interfere in the internal affairs of France. An explanation followed. I don’t have the exact text, so I’ll use a quote from E. V. Tarle: “Napoleon ordered his foreign minister to give that famous answer that was never forgotten by Alexander, because no one had ever insulted him more cruelly in his entire life. The meaning of the answer is as follows: the Duke of Enghien was arrested for participating in a conspiracy to kill Napoleon; if, for example, Emperor Alexander found out that the murderers of his late father, Emperor Paul, were even on foreign territory, but that it was possible (physically) to arrest them, and if Alexander really arrested them, then he, Napoleon, would not protest against this violation of foreign territory by Alexander. In fact, he called Alexander a parricide. From this moment on, relations between the two emperors have not only a state, but also a personal character.

On July 27, France withdrew its ambassador from St. Petersburg. Motivation - Russia boldly declared mourning for the executed duke, although it had no family ties with him. Diplomatic relations were interrupted. On December 2, 1804, Napoleon was crowned by the Pope, brought specially to Paris, and on December 6, Alexander signed an agreement with England. It was an open challenge to France.

Alexander did not want war. Wanting to prevent it, he sent Novosiltsev to London with clear instructions. Mark Aldanov, the unsurpassed author of Historical Portraits, writes wonderfully about this trip. Here is an excerpt from Alexander's instructions: "Why could not positive international law be defined in this way, ensure the advantage of neutrality, establish an obligation never to start a war except by exhausting all the means provided by the mediation of a third power, and thus clarifying mutual claims and means for settling them? These are the principles on which it will be possible to arrange a general appeasement and create a league, which should be based, so to speak, on a new code of international law, which, having been approved by the majority of European states, will naturally become an indispensable law for cabinets. Particularly because those who wish to break it run the risk of calling the forces of the new league against them. This league, probably, will be started little by little by all the powers, weary from the last wars ... "

So, the proposal to create the League of Nations, and this is at the very beginning of the 19th century. The text of the instructions to Novosiltsev was also set out by Czartorysky in his Notes, probably he himself wrote these instructions, but, of course, everything was discussed by the whole four and approved by the sovereign himself. Neither Vorontsov, our ambassador, nor William Pitt, the prime minister of England, began to talk seriously about any league. The instructions were a hundred years ahead of their time. All the more pleasant to read Aldanov. He writes about Alexander, his advisers and about Russia itself with pride: “It was in this environment that the idea of ​​the League of Nations arose. It is not necessary to be a fanatical admirer of the Geneva institution - the writer of these lines does not fear being enrolled in the list of fanatical admirers. But what culture can refuse to claim copyright, however remote, for an idea that is so sensational in the world?

The Treaty of Amiens was terminated, and England was effectively at war. Napoleon in Boulogne was gathering a huge army, near the English Channel. Pitt was well aware of the size of the threat looming over the country. Just then Novosiltsev appeared with his proposals. Czartoryski, already Minister of Foreign Affairs, actively persuaded Alexander I to an alliance with England. Alexander himself said: "Russia and England are the only powers in Europe that do not have hostile interests among themselves." If Pitt approves the idea of ​​creating a league and a new international code, brings this idea to Napoleon, and he approves it, then everything is fine. Otherwise, there is only one outcome - war.

Novosiltsev arrived in London on November 4, 1804. The conversation with Vorontsov about the creation of the league did not work out, the ambassador was generally skeptical about the activities of the Private Committee - the boys picked up new French ideas! But Pitt had already decided everything for himself - Napoleon must be put in his place, France must be "brought into its natural borders." The conversation with Novosiltsev turned to the need to create a third coalition, which would include England, Russia, Austria and Prussia. On April 11, a treaty was signed that determined how many soldiers the states should supply. England will fight at sea. She agreed to pay for the war on land. For every one hundred thousand soldiers, England was obliged to pay one million two hundred and fifty pounds sterling. London retained Malta, but agreed with the Russian claims to Poland and Turkey. There were many clauses in the treaty - seven open and thirteen secret.

The Russian and Austrian armies began to move, Prussia refused to participate in the coalition. War - the fun of emperors - has begun. What next? On October 14, 1805, the Austrian army was defeated near Elchingen, on October 20 the same story was repeated near Ulm, the 32,000-strong army surrendered to the mercy of the winner.

On November 6, 1805, Alexander I arrived in the Russian army in Moravia. He arrived in Europe much earlier. The first destination was Berlin, Alexander made an attempt to persuade Frederick William III to join the coalition. Wilhelm was afraid of both Napoleon and Alexander, in the end he nevertheless agreed to present a protest to Napoleon and eventually join the coalition. There was also an agreement on "friendship for all time", which was confirmed by an oath. A lot was written about this oath, pictures were drawn on this topic, some called the oath romantic and sentimental, others absurd, and even more stringent definitions were found. The fact is that Alexander, Queen Louise and Frederick William III took their oath at twelve o'clock at night, by the light of torches in the crypt over the ashes of Frederick the Great. Speaking lofty words about eternal friendship, Alexander and Friedrich-Wilhelm held hands and looked into each other's eyes. The absurdity of this scene lies in the fact that Frederick the Great pursued a hostile policy towards Russia, we fought with him in the Seven Years' War, and Catherine II was always afraid of tricks on his part. The Memel and Berlin meetings between Alexander I and Friedrich Wilhelm III had no serious significance in the international politics of that time (laugh at it all you want), but it determined the policy of Russia for many years. We have not been at war with Germany for many years. The "oath over the coffin" was broken only in 1914.

So, on November 6, the king arrived at Olmutz in Moravia. And on December 2, 1805, Napoleon with a 68,000th army at Austerlitz defeated the 92,000th Allied army, smashed it to smithereens. It is worth dwelling on this battle in more detail, because under Austerlitz Alexander I actually took command.

Founded in the XII century by the Templars, Austerlitz is a tiny town 120 kilometers from Vienna. The battle that took place on December 2 was called the "battle of the three emperors." Everyone was "on the field" - Franz I, Alexander I and Napoleon I. Kutuzov considered it untimely to give battle to Napoleon. The Russian army had just escaped encirclement, the soldiers were exhausted. The idea to attack first belonged to the Austrians. They were sure of victory. A persistent rumor spread throughout the army that Napoleon was avoiding battle. He has just occupied Vienna, the army is tired. But the French emperor played his card. He just needed the Russians to give battle, and end the war with that.

On the eve of the battle, the French Adjutant General Savary unexpectedly appeared in the Russian camp. He brought a letter from Napoleon - the most kind - with an offer of peace. In addition, he asked Alexander for a meeting. The Russian headquarters rejoiced. Alexander refused to meet, and in return sent his adjutant, the young and self-confident Prince Pyotr Dolgorukov, to the French camp "for negotiations". Upon his return, the prince spoke of his meeting with Napoleon in the following way: “Most of all, this man in a gray frock coat wants to be called “your majesty.” I didn't give him that opportunity." And here is Napoleon’s review of Alexander’s envoy: “I had a conversation with this impudent varmint in which he spoke to me as he could talk to a boyar sent to Siberia. This young man is endowed, among other things, with unprecedented arrogance. Did he take my extreme restraint as a sign of great fear? That's just the point, that he accepted. Napoleon is a coward! This is the conclusion Dolgorukov made and inspired this to Alexander.

He wrote superbly about Alexander and his retinue, which included the “magnificent four”, L. N. Tolstoy in War and Peace. The young people were cheerful, self-confident, handsome, on magnificent horses, and next to them was an old one-eyed commander. Kutuzov persuaded Alexander not to rush, to wait for Bennigsen to approach with the troops (the former conspirator fought superbly in these wars), but Alexander did not listen. Everyone quotes the famous conversation between the commander and the tsar (I don’t know in which diaries or notes Tolstoy found it):

Why don't you start the battle, Mikhail Illarionovich? Alexander asked.

I'm waiting, Your Majesty, - answered Kutuzov, - not all the columns have yet gathered.

We are not in the Tsaritsyn Meadow, - Alexander said with a laugh, - where they don’t start the parade until all the regiments have gathered.

That's why I'm not starting, sir, because we're not at the parade and not in the Tsaritsy's Meadow. - After the answer, there is a momentary hitch, the retinue is silent, and Kutuzov is already in a different tone: - However, if you order, Your Majesty ...

Their Majesty had the imprudence to order, which forced Kutuzov to leave an advantageous position. Alexander was a weak general. The army was commanded mainly by Austrian generals. The soldiers took to flight, the emperors hurried after them, fearing to be captured. In the meadow among the dead bodies lay, looking at the sky, Prince Bolkonsky. The defeat was terrible. The Austrians lost six thousand soldiers, the Russians died three times as many. But in general, who exactly counted there, now all encyclopedias and military reference books give different numbers. After the shameful defeat, Alexander burst into tears at night with grief. It was a pity for the soldiers, insulting, ashamed of their arrogance. Napoleon spent him like a boy! He later told Kutuzov: "I was young and stupid, and you should have been more persistent." Alexander did not like Kutuzov. He could not forgive him for his arrogance at Austerlitz.

On December 4, 1805, Napoleon signed an armistice with Austria. Conditions were set for Franz I: Russian troops must immediately leave Austria.

In St. Petersburg, after Austerlitz, Alexander I, as they say now, "received in full" (vulgarism, of course, but very accurately) - for a shameful defeat, for a wrong policy. Most of all, mother Maria Fedorovna and her entourage were indignant. “I conjure you to watch out,” she admonished her son, “so that you cannot be accused of betraying the interests and glory of Russia.”

Czartoryski, he headed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, also did not support the king. They had different tasks. Czartoryski hated Prussia, and one can understand him. Let me remind the reader of the results of the third partition of Poland: Russia received Lithuania, Courland and Western Belarus, Austria - Krakow and Ljubljana with adjacent territories, Prussia - Warsaw and most of the Polish lands. Czartoryski dreamed that Russia, having started the war with Napoleon, would first of all conquer Prussia and Poland would be returned to Warsaw and the territories that had gone to the Prussians.

But you have to pay for the unification of Poland. Aldanov writes: “... in compiled by him (Czartoryski. - Auth.) the note stated that in "in case of emergency, Prussia could offer Holland instead of renouncing the Polish lands." Austria, in gratitude for the same, should receive Bavaria and those regions in Swabia and Franconia that she herself chooses.

It is amazing how easily the map of Europe was redrawn in the 19th century. The states in it are large, rich, the weather is good. In the morning, the hard-working people got up, swept the territory, watered the tulips from the watering can, and live - rejoice, and God knows what sovereign you now obey. Russia did not fall under these tailor's scissors, it was not necessary. And who needs Taimyr or the Laptev Sea with islands. Sweep the permafrost, plant tulips. And it sounds stupid. Now everything is different.

In April 1806, Czartoryski burst into a letter (frankly, defiant), he criticized the tsar, deliberately putting pressure on the most painful points: “... accustoming the soldiers to see you constantly and without any need, you weakened the charm produced by your appearance.

Your presence during the battle of Austerlitz did not bring any benefit even in the very part where you were, the troops were immediately completely defeated, and you yourself, Your Majesty, had to hastily flee from the battlefield. In no case should you expose yourself to this ... We must do justice to the generals that even in advance, before the disaster, they, feeling how much your presence, Sovereign, complicates and complicates their actions, constantly begged Your Majesty, firstly, to retire from the army and, secondly, not to expose yourself to unnecessary danger ... ”And so on. In June of the same year, Czartoryski submitted his resignation and received it. Here is an excerpt from his letter to Alexander: “Your Majesty never completely trusts anyone, which is why, perhaps, not a single enterprise was carried out as it was desirable ...”

But Alexander swore an oath to protect Prussia and did not want to go back on his word. In July 1806, Alexander signed a declaration of alliance with William III, after which the king, a arrogant and narrow-minded man (apparently, the glory of Frederick the Great blinded his eyes), demanded that France withdraw its troops from the territory of Prussia. Ah well? Napoleon immediately gave the Prussians a couple of battles and smashed them head on, then occupied Berlin. The Prussian army ceased to exist. How indignant was the Dowager Empress Maria Feodorovna and her court! Why do we need Prussia? It was under Frederick the Great that she was considered, and King Wilhelm is weak, cunning and unsympathetic.

On November 18, 1806, Russia declared war on France. Not only Prussia Alexander cared. He kept wanting to cut off Napoleon's hands, besides, the threat of a continental blockade, which France wanted to impose on Russia, threatened to destroy our economy. The essence of the continental blockade is that the states of Europe were forbidden to trade with England. It was possible to trade only with France and with friendly states. Now this situation has become especially aggravated, because the French fleet was destroyed by Nelson in September 1805 at the Battle of Trafalgar (Nelson himself died then). England was the mistress of the seas. And what about the port of Arkhangelsk and St. Petersburg, where, as you know, "all the flags were visiting us"?

War is war, Napoleon loved to fight. It immediately began with our defeats, but after the crushing defeat near Friedland (June 14, 1807), all the hopes of Alexander I evaporated. Napoleon marched on Konigberg, the last fortress of the Prussians. Bennigsen got in his way. The Russians fought bravely, but the fatal mistake of the command decided the matter. After a devastating battle near Friedland, Napoleon stopped on the Neman River near the town of Tilsit. Along the Neman was the border with Russia. Bennigsen offered a truce, Napoleon agreed, but Alexander hesitated. So much wasted effort and all for nothing? Even after the defeat near Heilsberg, Tsarevich Konstantin expressed his opinion: “Sir, if you do not want peace, then it is better to give each Russian soldier a loaded pistol and order them all to shoot themselves. You will get the same result that a new battle will give you! ..” Konstantin was a stormy, quick-tempered, hysterical nature, and it turns out that he was right? Panic reigned in the Russian troops, and Napoleon could immediately launch an invasion of Russia, it was a stone's throw to Vilna.

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LECTURE VII

The second period of the reign of Alexander (1805–1807). – The international position of Russia at the beginning of the 19th century. - The break with Napoleon. - Czartoryski's plans and Alexander's attitude towards the Poles in 1805 - Unsuccessful outcome of the 1805 campaign - War of 1806-1807 - Defeat of Prussia. - Emergency preparations for war with Napoleon in Russia, - Winter campaign of 1807 - Depletion of Russia's military means. - Peace of Tilsit. - Alliance with Napoleon. – Acute discontent in Russia caused by the Treaty of Tilsit and its consequences. – Manifestations and nature of the opposition mood in society.

Russia and Napoleon at the beginning of the reign of Alexander I

Turning to the consideration of the second period of the reign of Alexander, marked by the first two wars with Napoleon, it should be said that those relations that led to the war of 1805 began to take shape long before that.

At the time of Paul's death, a war was coming with England, and the English fleet was already on its way to bombard Kronstadt. Immediately after the accession of Alexander, peace was concluded with England, and those controversial issues of maritime law, which for quite a long time harmed the peaceful relations of Russia and other powers with England, were also resolved. Although all the sympathies of Alexander himself in his youth were on the side of France, nevertheless he submitted, as we have seen, to the pressure that was exerted on him by those around him, in favor of an alliance with England. At the very first meetings of the secret committee, it was decided in principle not to interfere in any internal affairs of foreign states, and although a suspicious attitude was established towards France due to the ambitious plans of Bonaparte, peaceful principles prevailed in external affairs. Russia, therefore, in the first years of Alexander's reign was freed from all external confusions and wars, and this was in full accordance with Alexander's own intentions to turn all his attention to internal affairs. These peace-loving relations were not then limited to Western Europe, but also extended to the eastern outskirts, so that when Georgia, fleeing the onslaught of Persia, asked to be annexed to Russia, this issue, too, was initially resolved in the unspoken committee in the negative, and only in view of the insistence of the Indispensable Council, Alexander resolved this issue in the opposite sense, and, however, ordered that all income received from the population of Georgia annexed to Russia go to local needs and that Georgia be governed according to local customs. Unfortunately, these good intentions and instructions of the young sovereign did not prevent the unsuccessful representatives of the Russian authorities in Georgia - Knorring and Kovalensky - within a few months to excite the entire public opinion of Georgia against Russia with their outrageous abuses and violence.

Relations with Napoleon, which had developed quite favorably in the first months of Alexander's reign and were secured by a peace treaty concluded in the autumn of 1801, began to deteriorate already from the end of 1801 - partly due to the hostile attitude towards Napoleon, which was taken up by our new ambassador in Paris - the arrogant c. Morkov, partly because of the Sardinian king, whom Napoleon wanted, contrary to the treaty concluded with Russia, to be wiped off the face of the earth, and Alexander considered himself obliged to protect as an old ally of Russia. In addition, Alexander himself became more and more inclined to think that it was necessary to limit the ambitious aspirations of Bonaparte, and from 1802 he gradually became convinced that sooner or later Napoleon would have to be curbed by an armed hand. At the same time, having become more familiar with international relations and personally entering into relations with representatives of foreign powers in St. propensity for direct diplomatic negotiations. He was apparently fascinated by the very technique of diplomatic relations. One can think, however, that even then he was guided by a vague desire to subsequently liberate Europe from the growing despotism and boundless lust for power of Napoleon.

In spite of the warnings and forebodings of his co-workers, as early as the spring of 1802 Alexander decided to take an active part in the affairs of Europe and, for a start, arranged a meeting with the Prussian king in Memel. In the same year, 1802, he had to be finally convinced of the rudeness and vulgarity of Napoleon's ambition, when he, having made a new coup d'état, declared himself consul for life. “The veil has fallen,” Alexander wrote to La Harpe at the time, “he, that is, Napoleon, himself deprived himself of the best glory that a mortal can achieve and which he had to acquire, the glory of proving that he, without any personal views, worked solely for the good and the glory of his fatherland, and, being faithful to the constitution to which he himself swore, lay down in ten years the power that was in his hands. Instead, he preferred to imitate the courts, while violating the constitution of his country. From now on, this is the most famous of the tyrants that we find in history.

At the same time, the rights of the Sardinian king, whose possessions were annexed to France, were finally violated. In 1803, after the renewal of the war with England, Napoleon captured Hanover and clearly threatened to become the arbiter of the fate of Central Europe. Napoleon's personal relationship with Count Carrot so deteriorated that Napoleon demanded a change in the Russian ambassador. But Alexander did not immediately go towards this desire, and then, recalling Morkov, defiantly awarded him the highest Russian order of St. Andrew the First-Called, in which Morkov appeared to bow to Napoleon.

In Paris, the Russian emperor did not appoint an ambassador at all, but temporarily entrusted the management of the affairs of the embassy to a minor official, Ubri. The proclamation of Napoleon as emperor and the murder of the Duke of Enghien that preceded this served as the last reason for the break.

Third coalition

From all the above, it is clear that the interests of Russia in this whole story were, in essence, nothing to do with it: in this whole affair, Alexander acted not as a representative of Russian state interests proper, but as the head of one of the great European powers. Having broken with Napoleon, he actively began to draw up a coalition against him.

The management of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at this time, after the retirement of Chancellor Count A.R. Vorontsov, whom Alexander did not like, was in the hands of Prince. Adam Czartoryski. Czartoryski was very sympathetic to the idea of ​​a coalition against Napoleon, he dreamed that one of the results of the war could be the restoration of Poland. He tried to convince Alexander that one armed force against Napoleon was not enough, that it was necessary, in view of his extraordinary genius and the prestige of invincibility, to arouse special enthusiasm in the peoples of Europe in the fight against him. As an idea that could create such enthusiasm, Czartoryski put forward the principle of restoring the trampled independence of nationalities, hoping that this would also lead to the restoration of the Polish nationality. Alexander, apparently, agreed with such a formulation of the question, although in the mouth of Czartoryski, the restoration of Polish nationality meant the rejection from Russia of such primordial Russian regions as Volhynia and Podolia, for Czartoryski dreamed of restoring Poland within the borders of 1772. With such a formulation of the question, the war against Napoleon in 1805 not only was not aroused by Russian interests, but even threatened Russia later to be complicated by a new struggle for territory, a struggle that in past centuries was the reason for all her backwardness and savagery. Pretending to share all the views of Czartoryski, Alexander took advantage, however in a very peculiar way, of the hopes of the Polish patriots. He encouraged them in every possible way, although he did not bind himself with definite promises, mainly, as one can now think, in order to force the wavering Prussian king to join the coalition against Napoleon and conclude an alliance with Russia by the threat of a Polish uprising in the regions of Prussian Poland; and as soon as he managed to force Friedrich Wilhelm to conclude a convention with him (which was later not even carried out), he abandoned all encouragement for the kindled hopes of the Poles and postponed the solution of the Polish question indefinitely. By this careless and incorrect behavior, he caused great disappointment in the Poles and pushed them into the arms of Napoleon, which the latter did not fail to take advantage of soon. In 1805, the war was thus decided, and the Russian people had to put up a sufficient armed force, since on the continent of Europe only Austrian and Russian troops actually opposed Napoleon. In order to muster this force, three successive recruits were required, with up to 150,000 recruits being recruited. recruits (10 recruits for every thousand male souls, but since recruits were then taken from persons aged 20 to 35 years, the ratio of the number of recruits to the size of this population group was already 10:225). Moreover, it was necessary to allow a new significant deficit in the budget, which was again covered by a new issue of banknotes.

In this case, Alexander acted like a true autocrat, whom no one could interfere with and who was not responsible to anyone. But it should be noted that Russian public opinion was already so armed against Napoleon that Russia's participation in the war with him almost no one - with the exception of Napoleon's direct admirers, whose number was getting smaller - did not seem inappropriate, and Czartoryski's views were known to few, the people are accustomed to endure without grumbling and much greater hardships.

As you know, the war of 1805 ended unhappily for Russia and Austria, mainly due to the inept conduct of the case by the Austrian generals, and partly due to the inexperience and arrogance of Alexander himself, who forced the Russian commander in chief Kutuzov to act contrary to his convictions, in accordance with the plan of the Austrian armchair strategist, doctrinaire Weyrothera. After the surrender of the Austrian army of Mack at Ulm and the subsequent terrible defeat of the Russian troops in the battle of Austerlitz, given to Napoleon against the will and advice of Kutuzov, the Russian army had to hastily retreat to the Russian borders, and the war ended there. Austria made a humiliating peace at Pressburg; Prussia also concluded with Napoleon at the same time a defensive and offensive treaty.

Nevertheless, Alexander began to prepare for the continuation of the war: the defeat of the Russian troops created a patriotic mood in society, which Alexander kindled by direct appeals to the people. Wanting these appeals to reach the masses of the people, he set in motion a powerful means in the form of appeals from the Holy Synod, which were read in all churches. In these appeals, Napoleon was declared an enemy of the human race, plotting to declare himself the Messiah and inciting the Jews to destroy the Christian church, and unprecedented blasphemy was attributed to him. Anticipating the transfer of the war within the borders of Russia, Alexander at the same time, regardless of the recruitment, convened a militia, which, according to the initial orders, was supposed to be a mass of 612 thousand warriors. One can imagine what the national economy cost in such preparations for war, accompanied, especially in the western provinces, by exhausting underwater service, with the help of which food and ammunition were brought to the theater of war.

Fourth Coalition

Although Prussia, after the first treaty of alliance with Napoleon, concluded a second treaty, apparently even more lasting, Alexander still did not lose hope of raising her against Napoleon, who kept his troops on German territory, refused to remove them and at the same time did not give his consent to the formation by the Prussian king of the North German Union from the German states not included in the Confederation of the Rhine formed by Napoleon himself. Alexander tried to persuade Friedrich Wilhelm to oppose Napoleon in every possible way, and the break between France and Prussia really did finally occur, moreover, it happened earlier than Alexander expected. Friedrich Wilhelm, as a man of weak character, hesitated for a long time, and then suddenly delivered an ultimatum to Napoleon, suggesting that he immediately remove his troops and not interfere with Prussia to form a North German alliance, otherwise threatening to break. All this happened so unexpectedly that Alexander did not have time to draw his troops to support Prussia. Napoleon, however, did not even answer the Prussian ultimatum, but immediately began hostilities and eight days later he had already inflicted a terrible defeat on Prussia at Jena. The main Prussian army here was destroyed and then, after the loss of the second battle of Auerstet, almost the entire Prussian territory was quickly occupied by the French. In the hands of the Prussians, only two fortresses remained in the northeastern corner of the kingdom - Danzig and Konigsberg; behind which Friedrich Wilhelm had to take refuge in the small town of Memel on the Neman near the Russian border. Poland became the theater of operations, and here Napoleon, wanting to oppose the hopes of the Polish population that were placed on Alexander, with his intentions, very cleverly took advantage of the disappointment that Alexander aroused in the Poles with his changeable behavior in 1805, and began to spread rumors that it is he, Napoleon, who intends to restore Poland as a bulwark of Europe against Russia.

The commander of the Russian army was the old field marshal Kamensky, who, having arrived in the army, suddenly went crazy and almost ruined it with his ridiculous orders; but, fortunately, he left without permission, having been in the army for only a week; upon departure, they were ordered to retreat, as best they could, to the borders of Russia. However, the generals decided not to listen to him, and Bennigsen, pulling his troops to one point, gave a successful rebuff to the vanguard of the French troops near Pultusk, fifty miles from Warsaw on the other side of the Vistula. At first they thought - and Bennigsen supported this opinion - that there was a battle with Napoleon himself (in fact, the victory was won over the troops of Marshal Lannes, who were in the vanguard of the Napoleonic army). Bennigsen, bypassing his senior rank c. Bukshoevden, was appointed commander in chief. Then, in the battle of Preussish-Eylau (not far from Koenigsberg), one of the bloodiest battles, in which up to 50 thousand people fell. - including 26 thousand from our side - Bennigsen really managed to repel Napoleon himself: both troops remained in their places, and the fact that the battle with such an enemy as Napoleon was not lost greatly supported the spirit of the army. However, after 5 months of inactivity, Napoleon inflicted a decisive defeat on the Russian troops at Friedland (which cost us at least 15 thousand soldiers), after which we could no longer continue the war. There was no hope for reinforcements, except for one infantry division brought by Prince. Lobanov-Rostovsky and consisted entirely of recruits; meanwhile, we had to declare war on Turkey, and therefore part of the troops was needed to reinforce Michelson's army, which occupied Wallachia and Moldavia. As for the militia, in spite of all its enormity, it proved to be completely useless; it could offer great resistance in the event of an enemy invasion of Russia, in a guerrilla war, but untrained and poorly armed warriors were completely unsuitable for a regular war, in an active army; however, with the then impassability, they could not even be quickly mobilized.

It was especially difficult to replenish the huge loss in officers and generals; there were few good generals - the best were out of order - as for the officers, there was already a shortage in them before, which forced them to take the most extreme measures - to take, for example, students who were not prepared for military service, and even just nobles, as officers “undersized” if they agreed to undergo some training in the cadet corps in a few months. Thus, we could not fight alone. Meanwhile, it was necessary to act just one way: England participated in the war with subsidies, and they were released rather meagerly (in the amount of 2,200 thousand pounds sterling a year for all its continental allies). Thanks to all this, Alexander had no choice but to start peace negotiations, taking advantage of the fact that Napoleon himself willingly extended the hand of reconciliation, since he, too, was in great difficulty after the bloody battles at Preussisch-Eylau and Friedland.

Peace of Tilsit

A meeting took place between the two emperors on the Neman, in Tilsit. Here, for the first time, Alexander had to show his remarkable diplomatic talent in all its splendor, since Napoleon offered him to negotiate directly, without the participation of ministers, and Alexander willingly agreed to this. At the same time, he had to spend especially a lot of effort to keep Napoleon from the complete destruction of Prussia. Prussia was, however, brought to unprecedented humiliation: she lost half of her territory and from a great power turned for a time into a country dependent on Napoleon, which did not even have the right to maintain an army of more than 42 thousand people; her fortresses, even on the territory returned to her, were occupied by the French for a number of years (until payment of indemnity).

During the negotiations in Tilsit, Napoleon did not want to reckon with anyone except Alexander, with whom he intended for the time being to share dominion over the world. Alexander, realizing that now further struggle is impossible, decided to temporarily meet the wishes of his rival, who, in appearance, offered rather honorable terms of peace. But an indispensable condition for peace, a condition sina qua non, Napoleon set, in the event that England refused the conditions set for her - and she obviously could not agree to them - Alexander's declaration of war with her acceptance at the same time of the notorious continental system. This system invented by Napoleon consisted in the fact that all the states of Europe, allied with him or dependent on him, refused trade relations with England and pledged not to allow English merchant ships into their ports. Alexander pledged, in addition, to force Sweden and Denmark to break with England and take part in the continental system directed against her; moreover, it could be foreseen in advance that Sweden, completely defenseless from the attack of the British, could not agree to this, while its king, Gustav IV, showed a fanatical hatred of Napoleon. Thus, even then it was possible to foresee the inevitability of an attack by England and Sweden on Russia from the sea and land near St. Petersburg. Meanwhile, at that time, the northern coast of the Gulf of Finland belonged to Sweden. Therefore, Napoleon quite thoroughly, from a strategic point of view, pointed out to Alexander the need to conquer it. Thus, in Tilsit, the accession of Finland to Russia was prepared, for which we had to in 1808 and 1809. wage a difficult two-year war with Sweden.

As for Turkey, with which we were at that time in a war caused by the Turks thanks to the intrigues of the French ambassador in Constantinople, Sebastiani, Napoleon offered his mediation to end it on terms favorable to Russia, and at the same time, in verbal negotiations with Alexander, he even expressed readiness , in the event of Porta's persistence in ceding the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia to Russia, go hand in hand with Alexander, if he wishes, up to the partition of Turkey (its European possessions); but at the same time, he made it a precondition for the beginning of a truce and peace negotiations to withdraw our troops from both principalities, so that, however, the Turks could not occupy them with their troops. In fact, the war with the Turks did not stop, and although Napoleon later tried to seduce Alexander with the brilliant prospects of expelling the Turks from Europe and a joint campaign with him in India, Russia, however, had to wage a rather fruitless war with the Turks this time, without any assistance from him. before 1812

The intrigues and measures of Napoleon on the Polish question were very unfavorable for Russia: Napoleon did not agree in Tilsit to the return of the Polish regions occupied by the French to Prussia and formed the Duchy of Warsaw from them under the leadership of the Saxon king and under the protectorate of the emperor of the French. Thus, a military outpost of Napoleon himself was created on the Russian border. At the same time, Napoleon placed Alexander in a difficult position in relation to the Poles; Alexander had to stand in apparent contradiction with himself and prevent the restoration of an independent Poland. This circumstance caused the final disappointment of the Poles in their hopes for Alexander and forced them to transfer them entirely to Napoleon.

In Tilsit and after Tilsit, Alexander outwardly expressed admiration for the genius of Napoleon and his friendship with him. He was reproached by his contemporaries for having allowed himself to be deceived by the cunning Corsican, since much of what Napoleon had promised orally was not later included in the written contracts. However, Alexander was by no means infatuated with Napoleon; he skillfully played his part in Tilsit, and then in Erfurt, so that he even gave Napoleon reason to call him later northern Talma(the name of a then famous dramatic actor) and "Byzantine Greek".

It is difficult to say who was more deceived in this diplomatic tournament, since Napoleon was later repeatedly told by those close to him that he was deceived by Alexander. If we look at the matter from the point of view of the then international relations and if we take into account the real conditions of the moment, then it should, in any case, be recognized that the policy of Alexander in Tilsit and then a year later at a new meeting with Napoleon in Erfurt was very skillful. In these negotiations, Alexander appears for the first time as a subtle and insightful diplomat, and it seems that now we can assume that this was his real sphere, in which he was undoubtedly a great statesman, capable of competing with all the European celebrities of his time.

Russia and the continental blockade

These wars with Napoleon affected the situation of the population in Russia most sharply. We have already talked about the severity of wars for the population - the severity of recruiting, militia, food supplies, etc. The suspension of the legislative activities of the government caused by the war also had a huge negative effect. Finally, the plight of the finances, under the influence of military expenditures, greatly curtailed all the plans of the government in the field of public education, which had advanced so much just before. As a result of the wars of 1805-1807, to which was added a complete crop failure in Russia in 1806, the financial situation began to deteriorate from year to year. In 1806, revenues were 100 million rubles, while expenses were 122 million rubles; in 1807, income - 121, and expenses - 171 million rubles; in 1808 it was 111.5 million rubles. income and 140 million rubles. expenses only for the army, and the total amount of expenses in 1808 reached 240 million rubles. Huge deficits were again covered by new issues of paper money, the total amount of which already reached 319 million rubles in 1806, 382 million rubles in 1807, and 477 million rubles in 1808. Meanwhile, the turnover of foreign trade under the influence of the war, and then the continental system and the prohibition of the export of grain from the western provinces, which followed under the influence of a bad harvest in 1806, was extremely reduced, and the export of Russian raw materials abroad was especially reduced, which changed the balance of trade in an unfavorable direction, which caused, in turn, the outflow of specie, which greatly influenced the depreciation of paper money.

Thanks to all these circumstances, the exchange rate of our paper money, which held firmly from 1802 to 1805 and even increased during these years, now began to fall sharply: in 1806 the paper ruble was equal to 78 kopecks, in 1807 - 66 kopecks. and in 1808 fell to 48 kopecks. Meanwhile, taxes were paid in banknotes, and a significant part of foreign state expenditures (for the maintenance of the army and for subsidies to the completely ruined Prussian king) had to be made in specie. The situation thus became very difficult, and after the Peace of Tilsit and the accession of Russia to the continental system, it became, as we shall see, downright unbearable. The Treaty of Tilsit made a depressing impression on all sections of Russian society and on the people. Many considered this treaty more shameful than all the lost battles. After the peace with Napoleon, Alexander lost a significant part of the popularity that he enjoyed. The people, who shortly before this had heard curses against Napoleon from the church pulpit, could not understand how the Russian tsar could be so defiantly friends with the “enemy of the human race”, who was plotting to abolish the Christian faith.

When the continental system began to be implemented, which completely undermined our export trade, led to the bankruptcy of many trading houses, ruined many landlord farms that sold raw materials abroad (especially flax and hemp in various forms), and caused the high cost of many supplies, then discontent took over. universal character. According to contemporaries, Alexander, who, in the eyes of everyone, had to play such an unpleasant and difficult role in his relations with Napoleon, began to noticeably deteriorate in character, and his previously so even and kind treatment of everyone began to be replaced by an irritable, sometimes gloomy mood of the spirit, moreover, characteristic his stubbornness began to manifest itself sometimes in very unpleasant forms. It is remarkable that already in 1805, going to war, Alexander, by secret order, restored, in essence, the secret police, establishing a special temporary committee of three persons to monitor public opinion and talk among the public. This committee, after the Peace of Tilsit, was officially converted into a permanent institution, and a secret instruction was given to it, which restored, among other things, the revision of letters and those methods of police supervision, from which Alexander was so far away in the first years of his reign. Especially unpleasant at this time, Alexander was affected by the rumors in society about his friendship with Napoleon. At the head of the opposition to Alexander's foreign policy in court spheres was the Dowager Empress Maria Feodorovna herself. At the same time, Alexander's position was all the more difficult because he was forced to play his role without revealing his real intentions to anyone.

Patriotic opposition to the Peace of Tilsit

Alexander's closest friends, former members of the secret committee Kochubey, Czartorysky, Novosiltsev, retired and the last two even went abroad, and Stroganov went into military service so as not to interfere in politics. Even the Marshal Alexandra gr. N. A. Tolstoy managed to express his opposition to Alexander’s friendship with Napoleon by refusing to put on, next to the ribbon of the Legion of Honor granted to him by Napoleon, the ribbon of the highest Russian order of St. Andrew the First-Called, which Alexander wanted to put on him. The opposition in the highest circles of St. Petersburg society was especially pronounced when General Savary, sent by Napoleon as a military agent, came to St. Petersburg, personally involved in the execution of the Duke of Enghien. Petersburg salons closed their doors to him, they did not receive him anywhere (except for the Winter Palace) and did not give him visits, until, finally, Alexander himself intervened in this matter and demanded from his confidants a more polite attitude towards the representative of his ally. Savary, later Napoleon's Minister of Police, decided to show his political and, one might say, downright provocative talents here too. He diligently began to collect and combine all sorts of gossip and careless phrases that sometimes broke out at Alexander in a circle of people dissatisfied with his policies, and went so far as to fabricate a legend about a major conspiracy and a coup that was being prepared, and did not hesitate to inspire all this to Alexander, trying to quarrel him with society and inflate the mutual distrust that began to form during this period between the young sovereign and his subjects.

In wider public circles, discontent manifested itself even more strongly, expressing itself in literature and in theaters, where patriotic tragedies like Dmitry Donskoy became the favorite plays of the public. Ozerova or "Prince Pozharsky" Kryukovsky, which caused stormy applause and even sobs from the audience in the most pathetic places. Comedies enjoyed the same success. Krylova"Fashion Shop" and "A Lesson for Daughters", directed against the French language and imitation of French fashions.

This opposition manifested itself even more strongly in Moscow, where one of the most ardent patriots of that time S. N. Glinka began to publish since 1808 a new patriotic magazine "Russian Messenger", directed directly against Napoleon. In this journal, Glinka wrote in the interval between the Tilsit and Erfurt meetings - where Alexander so vividly demonstrated his friendship with Napoleon in the face of all Europe - that the Tilsit peace is only a temporary truce and that when there is a new war, then all measures will be taken in society to repel the power-hungry Napoleon. Napoleon's envoy, Caulaincourt, considered it his duty to draw Alexander's attention to this article, and Glinka, an ardent patriot and conservative of Glinka, one of the first in Alexander's reign, provoked censorship persecution against himself. Along with him, the old Pavlovian nobleman gr. Rostopchin, who lived in Moscow "out of work", published at the same time a pamphlet under the pseudonym Bogatyrev "Thoughts aloud on the Red Porch", in which he tried to spread the same views in wide circles of the common people.

At the same time, Admiral A. S. Shishkov, a Russian Old Believer, already known earlier for his attacks on Karamzin (in "Discourse on the old and new syllable of the Russian language"), now formed in St. and Karamzin and even the liberal Mordvinov.

It is remarkable that this opposition, which united fairly broad social circles and manifested itself in patriotic forms, was by no means chauvinistic in nature. It was directed entirely against Napoleon and the Treaty of Tilsit with its consequences, which were so heavily reflected in the position of Russian trade, Russian industry and the entire course of Russian public life. At that time we fought four wars, and Russian society, according to a contemporary ( Vigel, a man of quite protective views), treated with amazing indifference, sometimes even with direct hostility to the success of the goals set by the government! Two of these wars (with Persia, then weak, and with Austria, with which Alexander himself fought à contre coeur [reluctantly], as an ally of Napoleon), were given relatively easily, although they still required significant costs. But the other two cost us very dearly and required significant expenses both in money and in people. These were: the war with Turkey, which lasted from 1806 - with interruptions, but without the conclusion of peace - until the spring of 1812, and the war with Sweden, which began after the Treaty of Tilsit as a direct consequence of the treaty with Napoleon and ended after a number of vicissitudes and heroic , but heavy exploits for our troops in 1809 by annexing all of Finland to the Torneo River.

Alexander wanted to attract the hearts of new subjects with generosity, and even before the signing of the peace treaty, he gathered the Diet in Borgo, having previously confirmed the ancient rights and privileges of the Finnish population with a special letter. With accession to Russia, therefore, the legal situation of the population of Finland did not change for the worse, and the economic situation of the country even improved at the very beginning: the tax that Finland paid to cover Swedish debts was canceled, and internal customs were destroyed.

But Russian society nevertheless reacted rather disapprovingly to the Friedrichsham world - there were even regrets addressed to the Swedes.

Wishes were also expressed to end the war with Turkey. Mordvinov in 1810 submitted a note to Alexander, in which he justified in detail the uselessness of territorial acquisitions for Russia, whose borders were already stretched, and insisted on the need for a speedy end to the Turkish war.

Such was the mood of Russian society after the Peace of Tilsit.

“A fierce enemy of peace and blessed silence,” the Synod’s proclamation begins, “Napoleon Bonaparte, who autocratically appropriated the royal crown of France and by force of arms, and more cunningly extended his power to many neighboring states, devastated their cities and villages with a sword and flames, dares, in the frenzy of her malice, to threaten Russia, which is patronized from above, with an invasion of its borders, the destruction of landscaping, which she now enjoys alone in the world under the meek scepter of our God-blessed and beloved pious sovereign Alexander the First, and the shock of the Orthodox Greek-Russian Church, in all its purity and holiness in this prosperous Empire ... "

After referring to the duties of the pastors of the church, the Synod continues:

“The whole world knows his ungodly plans and deeds, with which he trampled on the law and truth.”

“Even during the time of popular indignation that raged in France during the ungodly revolution, disastrous for mankind and brought a heavenly curse on the perpetrators of it, he broke away from the Christian faith, triumphed at the gatherings of the people, the idolatrous festivals established by false-minded apostates, and in the host of his impious accomplices paid worship, befitting the only Almighty deity, idols, human creatures and harlots, who served as an idol image for them.

“In Egypt, he joined the persecutors of the Church of Christ, preached the alcoran Mohammed, declared himself the defender of the confession of the superstitious followers of this false prophet of Muslims, and solemnly showed his contempt for the pastors of the holy church of Christ.”

“Finally, to her greatest disgrace, he convened Jewish synagogues in France, commanded that the rabbis be clearly honored and established a new great Jewish sanhydrin, this most ungodly cathedral, which once dared to condemn our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ to the crucifixion - and now is thinking of uniting the Jews, scattered all over the face of the earth by the wrath of God, and direct them to overthrow the church of Christ and (oh, terrible insolence, surpassing the measure of all atrocities!) - to proclaim a false messiah in the person of Napoleon ... "

At the end of the appeal, after various formidable curses and threats borrowed from Deuteronomy, the same thing is repeated once more:

“... Rejecting the thoughts of God's justice, he (i.e. Napoleon) dreams in his rampage, with the help of haters of the Christian name and capable of his wickedness, the Jews, to steal (which every person can even think terribly!) the sacred name of the Messiah: show him that he is a creature, burned with conscience and deserving of contempt...” A similar appeal was sent by the Catholic Metropolitan of Mogilev Sestrentsevich to the Catholic priests of the Western Territory (Schilder, name cit., II, p. 354 - in appendices to the text). At the same time, the local authorities of the Western Territory received an order to watch the Jews and warn them against relations with the Parisian all-Jewish institutions formed by Napoleon, and the Jews were instilled that the Parisian assembly (Sanhedrin) was striving to change their faith (Circus, February 20, 1807, see Heb. Encicl., vol. XI, p. 516). It is remarkable that the Jews in the Western Territory in 1812, contrary to all fears, remained loyal to Russia everywhere. (Compare “Acts, documents and materials for political and everyday history of 1812”, ed. K. Voensky, in "Collection, Russian. ist. gen., volumes CXXVIII and CXXXIII. SPb., 1910 and 1911, and his own art. "Napoleon and the Borisov Jews in 1812", in Voen. collection, for 1906, No. 9.)

Ref. Bogdanovich, name op. II, p. 177. The commanders of the divisions received an order directly from the field marshal: “when retreating to the Russian borders, go by the shortest route to Vilna and report to the elder” (!). Gr. Buksgevden, to whom he handed over the command, Kamensky ordered to throw battery artillery on the road if it impedes the movement of troops, and to take care only of saving people. (Ibid.) All this before meeting the enemy.

Bogdanovich reports that due to the lack of guns only fifth part militia could have them; the rest of the warriors were supposed to be armed with peaks (Ist. Reigning them. Alexander I, vol. II, p. 165). After the battle of Pultusk, Alexander ordered the size of the militia to be reduced to 252,000 men. (Shiman."Alexander I", p. 17 Russian. translation and Bogdanovich, ibidem, vol. III, p. 1). Albert Vandal("Napoleon and Alexander I", vol. I, p. 49 of the Russian translation) quotes from Rustam's memoirs, published in Revue retrospective, nos. 8-9,. the following fact: when the Russian army fled after the Friedland defeat, having lost the ability to resist, the French, having reached the Neman near Tilsit, saw a strange sight: “a horde of barbarians with Asian faces, Kalmyks and Siberians (?) without guns, firing clouds of arrows, circled around plain and vainly frightened us. It was a reserve army, which Russia announced to the public and brought by Prince. Lobanov.

Ref. Napoleon's letter to Alexander dated February 2, 1808. Its text is given at vandal(vol. 1, p. 249, Russian translation) and Solovyov (“Imp. Alexander I”, p. 165), and both historians attach completely different significance to this letter.

Napoleon's Admirer vandal this is how he expresses this subject: "Not intending to put the victim of the triple partition in the position of a stable state, he wants to create in Europe - I will not say a Polish nation - but a Polish army, because he recognizes in the projected state only a large military force standing guard over France "(! - on the banks of the Vistula), called. cit., vol. I, p. 90 of the Russian translation.

Ref. a report to Napoleon Duroc, who managed, probably with the help of bribery, to get from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Napoleon to the Russian ambassador, Prince. Kurakin in 1809. The text of this curious document is given in extracts from Bogdanovich, vol. III, p. 85 et seq.

The prices of colonial goods, which until then had been received from England, rose so much that, for example, a pood of sugar in 1808 cost 100 rubles in St. Petersburg.

"The text of these decrees and instructions see Schilder, vol. II, pp. 362–367 – in appendices. There, by the way, there is a very curious list of the subjects of competence of these secret committees, and it is clear how this competence expanded from September 5, 1805 to January 13, 1807.

Ref. at vandal, name op. pp. 111 ff., Russian translation, a whole juicy chapter entitled "Diplomatic intelligence". It is curious that other foreign diplomats in St. Petersburg (for example, Bar. Steding) and Canning in London (as can be seen from his conversation with the Russian ambassador Alopeus) report the same disturbing (but undoubtedly unfounded) rumors about conspiracies supposedly being prepared in St. Petersburg and coups. It is very possible that these were traces of Savary's intrigues and inventions. Ref. Shiman, name op. page 18 Russian translation.

In 1807, the St. Petersburg newspaper The Genius of Times also spoke of Napoleon with great harshness. After 1808, when the government began to prohibit such reviews, in the same "Genius of the Times" N. I. Grech already wrote laudatory articles about Napoleon, which did not prevent him later (in 1812) from scolding him again without mercy in Son of the Fatherland. But the public in 1808-1811. she already treated such “official” praises and censures with contempt.

In 1809, after Erfurt, Alexander, convinced of the impossibility of keeping the Austrians from a dangerous war with Napoleon, in which he himself formally undertook to help Napoleon, in a fit of frankness, told the Austrian ambassador, Prince. Schwarzenberg: “... My position is so strange that although you and I are on opposite lines, I cannot but wish you success! ..” (Soloviev, p. 190). The Russian public in 1809 directly rejoiced at every success of our "enemies" of the Austrians and every failure of our "ally" Napoleon (Vigel, Notes).

Vigel. Notes, cf. at Schilder, vol. II, p. 242.

Foreign policy is the area in which Alexander 1 most clearly and most fully showed his personal initiative.

When trying to paint a portrait and characterize a person with such a position as the Russian Tsar or, in general, the ruler of a vast state, many special conditions have to be overcome.

We also have to overcome the deceptions of historical perspective, to moderate the brilliance of artificial halos and the temptations of those exaggerations that distort all dimensions.

Wearing round hats, pantaloons and tailcoats, which appeared almost on the second day after the death of Paul. seemed to many, and quite sincerely, the beginning of a new era and the joyful radiance of ascended freedom.

He sometimes spoke intelligently and efficiently, though, almost without putting these words into action, he was charming in personal relationships.

How much, however, did Russia gain from this? However, Alexander did not know Russia, and, perhaps, did not want to know. Like his grandmother, he was an actor, but he played mainly not for Russia, but for Europe. Vallotton A. Alexander 1. -M., 1966, p.98

What will Europe say? - this question occupied him first of all.

What will Russia say? - this question was neither so clear to him, nor so simple, nor so interesting. What is Russia?

Alexander knew the Russian nobility, mostly its upper stratum. He did not love him, and despised him.

Alexander closely saw the nobility who kowtowed before the favorites of Catherine, he saw and knew all her cringing, he saw too many examples of meanness, venality, disgusting servility, he knew how she, this nobility, robbed and plundered the unfortunate country. Finally, he knew that these noble serfs, by means of a military conspiracy, elevated his grandmother to the throne, helped her kill her grandfather and killed her father.

There was almost no third estate in Russia yet, and merchants were considered an estate of swindlers. And then there was the peasant and working serf mass, people who could be bought, sold and exchanged for dogs, yes, putting on soldier uniforms, beat them with sticks.

The crowned esthete could treat this dark mass only with truly aristocratic disgust. and at best with offensive pity, not devoid of the same feeling of disgust. It was even somehow embarrassing before Europe that he had to reign over such a mass of “half-savage slaves”. Zaichkin I. Russian history from Catherine II to Alexander II. -M., 1994, p. 36

Before Austerlitz, Alexander sends to Napoleon for negotiations his beloved Adjutant General Prince. Dolgorukov, who, according to Napoleon, spoke to him in such a tone, as if Napoleon was a boyar who was about to be exiled to Siberia. Of course, nothing came of these negotiations, the battle became inevitable, although Napoleon at that time quite sincerely did not want war with Russia. Unfortunately, Alexander did not listen to the advice of his friend Czartoryski.

The Russian generals, led by Kutuzov, saw the complete worthlessness of this paper plan and foresaw the inevitability of defeat. Moreover, the Russian troops, as usual, were hungry and unshod, were forced to eat requisitions and turned the population against them. Lubos S. The Last Romanovs. - Petrograd, 1924, p. 34

But the autocratic will of Alexander, as usual, did not want to reckon with anything and anyone, and as a result, one of the most brilliant victories of Napoleon and one of the most decisive defeats was the alliance of peaks, Austrians and Russians. Alexander himself only by chance was not captured by Napoleon.

At the same time, it is remarkable that the Austrians, for whom the Russians fought, lost six thousand people, and the Russians about 21,000 ...

After fighting for another two years in the interests of Prussia, which had already managed to abandon its alliance with Napoleon, and having suffered a brutal defeat near Friedland, Alexander finally became convinced that he could not save Prussia by military forces, and decided to put up with Napoleon.

Less than a month after the Friedland defeat, the meeting of Tilsit, humiliating for Alexander, took place, which began the all-too-famous four-year-old tragicomedy of the Franco-Russian alliance.

The two greatest deceivers of their time, the two greatest deceivers known to the history of the world, for several years in a row, under the guise of the closest friendship, tried in every possible way to deceive, bypass, betray, and seduce each other.

A third player intervened in the twelve-year struggle, which was waged continuously, with inhuman energy, first by the general of the revolutionary army, then by the first consul and, finally, by the emperor of the French against the economic predominance of England.

A brilliant adventurer, whose soul was enveloped in the fiery pathos of the revolution, its impetuosity, all the tension of its energy, a true son of the new time, met in a fair game, in the person of the Russian emperor, a wonderful partner.

One is the whole embodiment of new times, the brightest representative of the third estate, all energy, calculation, all intense will directed to the outside world, to conquer it. Zaichkin I. Russian history from Catherine II to Alexander II. -M., 1994, p. 36

He everywhere brings with him the destructive principles of the revolution, before him all the walls and dilapidated strongholds of obsolete feudalism fall down. He resembles some oil or railroad king of our day, the head and director of a world trust that sets prices, dictates its will to markets and exchanges, ruining some, enriching others along the way; he wins concessions, holds world connections in his hands, causes wars and dictates the terms of peace.

Napoleon anticipated this type of business man, embracing the whole world, entangling all countries with a network of his interests.

Napoleon wielded old means, armies and armed forces, but he managed to give these old forces a new organization, he introduced new methods of struggle, and these methods were adopted by those leaders of world capitalism, whom he was the forerunner.

Napoleon was a true offspring of the spirit of the revolution, on her flaming forge he received his steel temper, she told him this eagle scope, this pathos, which he managed to fetter with strict, precise and cold calculation and calculation of forces.

And Alexander had to meet this embodiment of a new historical epoch.

And Alexander had a will, but this will was directed inward and served only the cause of self-preservation and protection of his personality. Pavlovian heredity was reflected in Alexander's passion for feeling; in the idea, he denied it as a self-sufficient autocracy.

Most clearly, the personality and state practice of Alexander I was revealed in his confrontation with Napoleon, a confrontation that brought the French emperor to the island of St. Helena, and Alexander was broken and devastated to such an extent that he apparently could not recover from this until the end of his days. Russia met the beginning of the century with the settlement of its relations with the European powers. Friendly relations with England were restored, diplomatic relations with the Austrian Empire were resumed. Alexander I declared that he refuses to interfere in the internal affairs of foreign states and recognizes in them the political system that is supported by the "general consent" of the peoples of these countries. With France, the former friendly relations were maintained, but Alexander every month became more and more distrustful of the first consul of France. This distrust was based not only on politics, the ever-increasing expansion of France on the European continent, about which much has been written by our historians, but also on Alexander's attitude to the domestic political problems of France, which was not paid attention to. Being an admirer of the ideas of the French Revolution, the republic, the constitutional system and ardently condemning the dictatorship and terror of the Jacobins, the young Russian monarch closely followed the developments in France. Already in 1801, reflecting on Napoleon's desire to raise his power in France, on his international claims, which were actively promoted by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Talleyrand, Alexander remarked: "What swindlers!" And in 1802, when Napoleon declared himself consul for life, Alexander wrote to La Harpe: “I have completely changed, just like you, my dear, my opinion about the first consul. Since the establishment of his consulate for life, the veil has been lifted: since then, things have gone from bad to worse. He began by depriving himself of the greatest glory that can befall a man. The only thing left for him was to prove that he acted without any personal benefit, only for the sake of the happiness and glory of his homeland, and to remain faithful to the Constitution, to which he himself swore to transfer his power in ten years. Instead, he chose to copy the customs of the royal courts like monkeys, thereby violating the Constitution of his country. He is now one of the greatest tyrants that history has ever produced." As you can see, Alexander cares about the constitutional order of France. Moreover, it is not at all necessary to consider this demagoguery, since Alexander professed precisely these views in recent years, and the letter was of a purely personal, closed nature. In addition, Alexander quite correctly caught the sovereign claims of the "little corporal." Since 1803, the expansion of France has been increasing. Bonaparte organizes the Boulogne camp to prepare troops for the invasion of the British Isles, occupies Hanover and the Kingdom of Naples. The Russian ambassador in Paris begins to demonstrate his opposition to Napoleon's policies, which infuriates the first consul. The execution by Napoleon of the Duke of Enghien, the offspring of the Bourbons and a relative of the St. Petersburg court, caused a shock in the Russian capital. The Russian government protested. In particular, it said that Napoleon had violated the neutrality of another state (the duke was captured in Baden) and human rights. After the proclamation of Napoleon as emperor, Russia went on an active rapprochement with Prussia, and then with England. Business went to the European war. So, by the force of circumstances, rather by the force of his humanistic aspirations, the rejection of Napoleon's cynical violation of the laws of his own country, as well as the principles of legitimism, the system established in Europe, Alexander was forced to abandon his position of non-interference in European affairs, although the confrontation with France at this stage was not caused the interests of Russia. But already at that time, the desire to make Russia happy through the reforms that were beginning began to coexist more and more in Alexander's soul with the desire to "save" Europe from the French tyrant. And this desire should not be underestimated or replaced by the concept of “saving the reactionary regimes of Europe” and so on, since it lay in the general mainstream of Alexander I's worldview at that time. For Russia, a military confrontation with France was objectively undesirable, since already at that time there was a natural desire of the parties through political combinations to achieve the desired results for themselves. Russia sought to develop the successes of the Russo-Turkish wars and claimed the straits and Poland, the annexation of Moldavia and Wallachia; Russia also included Finland in the sphere of interests. Napoleon sought to ensure freedom in the fight against England and wanted to extend his power to southern and central Europe. Compromises were acceptable along the way, but war was also possible. The subsequent development of events showed the regularity of both. And yet it should be said about the two main tendencies that dictated the behavior of Alexander. The first is, of course, the policy of Russia as a great European power capable of dividing Europe with Bonaparte, and the growing autocratic ambitions of the Russian emperor. The second is his liberal complexes, which spilled over from domestic politics into the international arena. It was at this time that Alexander had an idea, later expressed in the organization of the Holy Alliance, about the possibility of organizing the European world on the basis of humanism, cooperation, justice, respect for the rights of nations, and observance of human rights. The lessons of La Harpe were not in vain. So, sending Novosiltsev to England in 1804 for negotiations, he gave him instructions in which he outlined the idea of ​​​​concluding a general peace treaty between the peoples and creating a league of peoples. Here is what he wrote in this document: “Of course, here we are not talking about the realization of the dream of eternal peace, but still it would be possible to get closer to the benefits that are expected from such a world, if in the treaty, when determining the conditions for a general war, it was possible to establish on clear and precise principles of the requirements of international law. Why not include in such a treaty a positive definition of the rights of nationalities, provide the benefits of neutrality, and establish obligations never to start a war without first having exhausted all the means provided by arbitration mediation, which makes it possible to clarify mutual misunderstandings and try to eliminate them? Under such conditions, it would be possible to begin to implement this general pacification and create an alliance, the decrees of which would form, so to speak, a new code of international law. A remarkable document, although very premature for that time. Nevertheless, Alexander was perhaps the first statesman in Europe to put forward the idea of ​​legal regulation of international relations, which long anticipated real steps in this direction already in the second half of the 20th century. And yet the reasoning of that time remained a chimera. The reality turned out to be more prosaic. England sought an alliance with Russia to crush Napoleon. There was a new anti-French coalition consisting of England, Russia, Austria, Prussia. At the same time, Russian claims to Turkey and Poland were satisfied. Russian troops moved to Europe. The goal of a great absolutist power outweighed the good fantasies of a liberal young man. But these fantasies remained in his mind, and they will arise again as soon as the right circumstances arise for this. On December 2, 1805, the united Russian-Austrian army, contrary to the warnings of M.I. Kutuzova met with Napoleon near Austerlitz. The defeat of the allies was complete. Crashed into dust and illusions of Alexander. He led the troops, determined their disposition, was sure of victory ... When the troops fled and the catastrophe became obvious, he burst into tears. Alexander barely escaped captivity that day, having lost contact with the headquarters, with the troops. He took refuge in the hut of a Moravian peasant, then galloped for several hours among the fleeing army, was tired, dirty, did not change his sweaty linen for two days, and lost his luggage. The Cossacks got him wine, and he warmed up a little, fell asleep in a shed on straw. But he was not broken, but only realized that it was necessary to fight with such a rival as Napoleon fully armed with physical and spiritual forces and all the forces of the empire. From now on, for him, extremely proud, claiming to be the benefactor of Russia and Europe, Napoleon became a mortal enemy, and from 1805 he purposefully and stubbornly went to his destruction. But on the way to this there were still new defeats in the fields of Prussia, Tilsit, Erfurt, 1812, the fire of Moscow, the European campaign of the Russian army, new defeats from Napoleon. Contemporaries noted that after Austerlitz, Alexander changed in many ways. L.N. Engelhardt, who closely observed the king at that time, wrote: “The battle of Austerlitz made a great influence on the character of Alexander, and it can be called an epoch in his reign. Before that, he was meek, trusting, affectionate, but then he became suspicious, strict to the point of immeasurability, unapproachable and no longer tolerated anyone telling him the truth. From that time on, Arakcheev became a more prominent figure under him, and the activities of the Private Committee gradually faded. And although the tsar's reform efforts continue - still slowly and cautiously - but the time of former hobbies and revelations is already passing: life, the system takes its toll. In fact, the very first encounter with Napoleon taught Alexander a cruel life lesson, which he learned very thoroughly. This manifested itself already during the negotiations in Tilsit, where the emperors talked face to face in a house on a raft in the middle of the Niemen. The Peace of Tilsit dramatically reoriented Russian foreign policy. Russia joined the continental blockade against England, was forced to abandon the support of Prussia, which was dismembered by Napoleon, but received a free hand in relation to Moldavia, Wallachia and Finland. In essence, the monarchs made one of the next divisions of Europe. Alexander showed Napoleon all his charm and friendliness and seems to have deceived him. Napoleon, in a conversation with his adjutant Caulaincourt, considered the king a handsome, intelligent, kind person who puts "all the feelings of a kind heart in the place where reason should be ..." This was Bonaparte's big mistake and, perhaps, the beginning of his future defeat. Meanwhile, Alexander wrote to his sister Ekaterina Pavlovna that Bonaparte had one vulnerable feature - his vanity, and that he was ready to sacrifice his pride for the sake of saving Russia. Somewhat later, in a conversation with the Prussian king Friedrich Wilhelm III and his wife, the charming Queen Louise, Alexander said: “Be patient, we will return ours. He'll break his neck. Despite all my demonstrations and outward actions, in my heart I am your friend and I hope to prove it to you in practice ... At least I will buy time. On the way to Erfurt - the second meeting with Napoleon and the next negotiations with him - Alexander I continued this line: restraint, calmness, goodwill, playing on the vanity of the French emperor and the desire to obtain certain foreign policy benefits for Russia. Trade continued over Poland, the straits, Constantinople, the Danubian principalities, Finland, the German states, etc. At the same time, Alexander sent secret letters to England, reassuring the British cabinet, expressing his firm desire to fight Bonaparte. Distrust, secrecy, duplicity - this is how Alexander appeared in his relationship with Napoleon in 1807-1808. At the same time, Caulaincourt transmitted to Paris the words of Alexander that Napoleon had conquered him in Tilsit. The meeting in Erfurt brought Russia incomparable success: Napoleon agreed to Russia's annexation of Finland, Moldavia and Wallachia, but opposed the capture of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. But at the same time he forced Russia to take his side in the event of a war between France and Austria. The Russian emperor, saving his unlucky ally, the Prussian king, obtained from France a reduction in indemnity from Prussia. He also insisted on the withdrawal of French troops from the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. And here Alexander continued the double game. Talleyrand wrote later in his memoirs: “Napoleon's favors, gifts and impulses were completely in vain. Before leaving Erfurt, Alexander personally wrote a letter to the Emperor of Austria in order to dispel his fears about the meeting. The negotiations in Erfurt, despite outward cordiality, were very tense. At one point, Napoleon threw his hat on the ground, to which Alexander objected: “You are quick-tempered. I am stubborn. You won't get anything from me with anger. Let's talk, reason, otherwise I'll leave. The true attitude of the Russian emperor towards Napoleon was also manifested in the fact that the Russian court practically refused the French emperor in claims to the hand of the tsar's sister, the charming Ekaterina Pavlovna. Reference was made to the position of Catherine Pavlovna herself and the Dowager Empress Maria Feodorovna. After some time, Napoleon's attempt to get the hand of another sister of the king, Anna Pavlovna, ended with the same result. For the Russian ruling house, this marriage would have been an undoubted misalliance, and in Paris this was understood correctly. Napoleon was furious. From 1807–1808, especially in connection with the dissatisfaction in Russian society with the results of the Peace of Tilsit, some evidence comes of Alexander's real attitude to the events taking place. Of course, they could be defensive in nature, but, compared with his general line regarding Napoleon, Prussia, England, and also compared with each other, they give a remarkable picture. In a letter to his mother shortly before the meeting in Erfurt, Alexander wrote: “Our recent interests have forced us to enter into a close alliance with France. We will do everything to prove to her the sincerity and nobility of our course of action.” And in the same year, after the Erfurt meeting, he noted in a letter to Ekaterina Pavlovna: “Bonaparte believes that I am only a fool, but the one who laughs last laughs better, and I place all my hopes on God, and not only on God. but also on their abilities and willpower. It is no coincidence that Caulaincourt, in one of his personal letters to Napoleon of that time, apparently having begun to see clearly, wrote: “Alexander is not accepted for who he is. He is considered weak and mistaken. Undoubtedly, he can suffer annoyance and hide his displeasure ... But this lightness of character has its limits - he will not go beyond the circle outlined for himself, and this circle is made of iron and does not bend ... ”It is no coincidence that Napoleon himself, already on the island of St. Helena, recalled Alexander of that Tilsit-Erfurt era: “The king is smart, elegant, educated; he can easily charm, but this must be feared; he is insincere; this is a real Byzantine from the time of the decline of the empire ... It is quite possible that he fooled me, because he is subtle, deceitful, dexterous ... ". It seems that Napoleon received his sight too late. And this is proved, by the way, by the entire subsequent history of the relationship between the two emperors. Alexander opposed the military genius, strength, onslaught of Napoleon with the highest diplomatic art, a subtle mind, and long-range calculation. Beginning in 1808, the tsar, preparing for a future confrontation with the French emperor, began to rebuild and reform the Russian army. Two excellent, talented assistants helped him in this matter - A.A. Arakcheev and M.B. BarclydeTolly. By the beginning of 1811, he already had 225 thousand soldiers, but sought to increase the army by another 100 thousand people. At the same time, he established relations with the British government, with Polish high-ranking figures. By the spring of 1812, relations between France and Russia had heated up to the limit. Under these conditions, Alexander showed great restraint, fortitude, and genuine patriotism. In response to the words of Napoleon, transmitted to him with one of the envoys: “We will create our bridgeheads not only on the Danube, but also on the Neman, Volga, Moskva River, and we will remove the threat of raids from the north for two hundred years,” Alexander led him to the map and, pointing on the shores of the Bering Strait, replied that the French emperor would have to go to these places in order to obtain peace on Russian soil. In the same days, Alexander said to his friend Parrat, the rector of Dorpat University: “I do not hope to triumph over the genius and forces of my enemy. But in no case will I conclude a shameful peace and prefer to bury myself under the ruins of the empire. Having invaded the borders of Russia, the great army of Napoleon began to move freely into the interior of the country. According to Caulaincourt's memoirs, Napoleon hoped to end the campaign quickly, defeat the Russians in a pitched battle, and sign peace. “I will sign peace in Moscow! ... And two months will not pass before the Russian nobles will force Alexander to ask me for it! ...” And indeed, in the current situation and in the future, after the fall of Moscow, Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich advocated for peace with Napoleon, chancellor Rumyantsev, Arakcheev, a number of prominent dignitaries. But Alexander was relentless. When, in July, Napoleon made the first attempt at peace negotiations, transmitted through General Balashov, Alexander simply did not answer him. On August 24, the French emperor wrote a new letter to the tsar from Smolensk, and again there was no answer. Having received from Kutuzov the news of the abandonment and subsequent fire of Moscow, Alexander burst into tears, but quickly pulled himself together and, according to Colonel Michaud sent to him, said: “Return to the army, tell our brave men, announce to all my loyal subjects wherever you will pass that if I have not a single soldier left, I will become the head of my dear nobility and my good peasants and sacrifice all the means of the empire ... But if it is predestined by Divine Providence that my dynasty should ever cease to reign on the throne of my ancestors, then, having exhausted all I will grow a beard and agree to eat potatoes with the last of my peasants, rather than sign the shame of my fatherland and my dear subjects, whose sacrifices I know how to appreciate. Napoleon or I, I or he, but together we cannot reign; I have learned to understand it; he won't deceive me anymore." Firm assurances on this score were also made to Kutuzov. The military conflict with France took for Alexander I, quite obviously, the form of a personal and uncompromising conflict with Napoleon, and the Russian emperor put into it all the strength of his hatred, hurt pride, firmness of will. In this confrontation, Alexander suddenly appeared to be who he really was, or rather, became after gaining confidence on the throne, a powerful, strong, far-sighted ruler. At the same time, the events of the beginning of the war, and especially the fire of Moscow, shocked him so much that, according to eyewitnesses, he was often sad, began to retire in his Kamennoostrovsky Palace, which remained almost without protection. Then, for the first time, he so earnestly, so passionately turned to God. “The fire of Moscow illuminated my soul,” he later confessed to the Prussian Bishop Eilert, “and filled my heart with the warmth of faith, which I have not felt until now. And then I knew God.” All attempts by Napoleon from Moscow to enter into peace negotiations with the Russian Tsar also remained unanswered. Alexander continued to fulfill his vow. In December 1812, the Russian army, having forced the French out of Russia, reached the state border of Russia on the Neman. The question arose about the future of the campaign. M.I. Kutuzov believed that the war could have ended there, that there was no longer any need to destroy Russian soldiers. The aged field marshal, not without reason, believed that the fall of Napoleon would only strengthen England and the group of European powers in defiance of Russia. However, Alexander had other feelings. He aspired now to become the savior of Europe, to be its arbitrator. What was more in these aspirations - the autocratic claims of the owner of the empire, the messianic claims of a believer, insulted by Napoleon, a man humiliated by him. It seems that the first, and the second, and the third. And yet, personal confrontation with Napoleon was one of the dominant behavior of the Russian Tsar. Now the goal of Alexander was the indispensable capture of Paris, the overthrow of Napoleon. The Russian tsar motivated this goal with noble feelings of helping the oppressed peoples. In this regard, all the propaganda support of the campaign was carried out. The entry of the allied troops into France was justified by the need to save the French people from the tyranny of Bonaparte. And yet we cannot but recall this decisive phrase of Alexander: "Napoleon or I, I or he." It seems that this was his real program, not so much as a sovereign, but as a person. Moreover, when the allies showed hesitation, Alexander announced that he would go to the French capital with one Russian army. During the foreign campaign of the Russian army, the battles between the allies and Napoleon, Alexander was constantly with the army. But this was no longer an enthusiastic newcomer to Austerlitz, but a husband wise in military experience, and a brave husband at that. In the battle near Dresden, on the Lutsen fields, he participated in the leadership of the troops and stood under fire. During the Battle of Bautzen, Alexander positioned himself in such a way that he saw the French emperor, and he saw him. In the battle of Dresden, Alexander narrowly escaped death. A cannonball exploded next to him, fatally hitting General Miro. In the battle of Leipzig, on the first day, Alexander himself commanded the troops, made a number of important decisions, including the commissioning of reserve artillery, which turned the tide of battle in favor of the allies. During the battle of the convoy of the Life Cossacks and the French cuirassiers, the emperor was almost fifteen paces away from the combatants. Alexander showed personal courage and good military command also on the second day of the Battle of Leipzig, as well as in the battle for Paris. After the success of the French near Bautzen, Napoleon again turned to the Russian Tsar with peace proposals and was again refused. Alexander showed firmness even further, throughout 1814, however, in conditions when the scales were already leaning in favor of the allies. Already after the solemn entry into Paris, Alexander said to Caulaincourt, who was trying in vain to save his emperor: “We decided to continue the fight to the end, so as not to resume it under less favorable circumstances, and we will fight until we reach a lasting peace, which cannot be expected from a man who has devastated Europe from Moscow to Cadiz. The Allies declared that they would not deal with Napoleon or any of his family. On April 6, Napoleon signed the abdication, and a few days later he left for the island of Elba. These days, Alexander finally showed generosity to the defeated enemy and insisted on relatively mild conditions for his removal from power (ownership of the island of Elba, a huge pension, 50 guards for protection), contrary to Talleyrand, who offered a link to the Azores and a harsher regime of detention. However, as soon as the news of Napoleon's flight from Elba and the onset of the Hundred Days era spread throughout Europe and reached Vienna, where the leaders of the then Europe gathered for its next redistribution, Alexander again showed decisiveness and militancy, which largely determined the rallying of the allies and the final crush of Napoleon Bonaparte. Alexander did not abandon his line in relation to Napoleon even when he sent the Russian emperor an anti-Russian treaty signed by Russia's recent allies - Austria, England and Louis XVIII of Bourbon, who was placed on the parental throne. The treaty was secret and provided for the possibility of joint actions, including military ones, against Russia in connection with serious differences between the allies and Russia on territorial issues. Calling on Austrian Foreign Minister Metternich, Alexander introduced him to the document, then threw it into the fireplace and said that the further fight against Napoleon required the strengthening of allied actions. This was followed by Waterloo and Napoleon's exile to Saint Helena.