There are small moments in history, seemingly insignificant, sometimes even curious, which in the future have a significant impact on the course of further events. These include the Tarutinsky battle, rather not even a battle, but a clash that took place on October 18, 1812. near the village of Tarutino, the Russian army with the vanguard of the French army, where M.N. Kutuzov leaving Moscow. This clash was more moral than military - the vanguard of the French under the leadership of Marshal Murat was not defeated, but could.

In all sources, this episode is interpreted as the Tarutino battle, but as I said above, it is more like a collision with big blunders, where the principle “it was smooth on paper, but forgot about the ravines!” was justified.

The main strategic success of Kutuzov at Borodino was that the heavy losses of the French gave time for replenishment, supply, and reorganization of the Russian army, which the commander-in-chief then launched into a formidable counteroffensive against Napoleon.

Napoleon did not attack the Russian army during its retreat from Borodino to Moscow, not because he considered the war already won, but because he feared a second Borodino, after which he would have to ask for a shameful peace.

While in Moscow and soberly assessing the situation, Napoleon sent his representatives to Alexander 1 and M.I. Kutuzov with a proposal to make peace. But got rejected. And realizing that Moscow was a trap for him, he gave the order to retreat.

Meanwhile, in the Tarutinsky camp, the Russian army received reinforcements and increased its strength to 120 thousand people. In 1834, a monument was erected in Tarutino with the inscription: “At this place, the Russian army, led by Field Marshal Kutuzov, saved Russia and Europe».

Although the Cossacks initially misled the vanguard of the French, who followed the Russian army on their heels, Murat's corps nevertheless discovered Kutuzov's camp and stopped not far from Tarutino, watching the Russian army. The number of the French corps consisted of 26,540 people with artillery of 197 guns. Only the forest separated the Russian camp from the French positions.

It was an odd neighborhood. The enemy troops stood for two weeks without clashes. Moreover, according to General A.P. Yermolova: " Gentlemen generals and officers gathered at the front posts with expressions of courtesy, which was a reason for many to conclude that there was a truce.(Napoleon was waiting for an answer to the world - V.K.). By this time, the partisans reported that the French had no reinforcements at a distance from their position and to Moscow. This caused the plan to encircle and destroy the French corps, but ..., as I said above, the human factor is to blame for everything.

Murat, apparently, received information about the impending Russian attack, the day before the start. The French were in full combat readiness all night, but the attack did not happen due to the fact that General Yermolov was at their dinner party. The next day, Murat ordered the withdrawal of artillery and carts. But the adjutant, who delivered the order to the chief of artillery, found him sleeping and, unaware of the urgency, decided to wait until morning. As a result, the French were not ready to repel the attack.

In turn, mistakes were made on the Russian side. They were let down by the lack of interaction among the detachments of Bennigsen, Miloradovich and Orlov-Denisov, allocated to attack the French. Only the Cossacks of Orlov-Denisov, who reached their original positions at the time, attacked the camp of the French, who rushed to their heels, and the Cossacks took up the "shmon" of their camp. This allowed Murat to stop the fleeing French and organize counterattacks, thereby saving his corps.

The goal of the Tarutinsky battle was not fully achieved, but its result was extremely successful: not so many guns were captured in a single battle during that war (38).

But the significance of this battle consisted not only in the success and effectiveness of the military component, this battle contributed to the rise in the spirit of the Russian army and marked a new stage in the Patriotic War - the transition to active offensive operations, which the army and the entire Russian society had dreamed of for so long. This battle showed that the Russians could beat the French, just as the battle of Moscow in 1941 showed that the Nazi army could be crushed.

The next day after the battle, M. I. Kutuzov wrote to his wife: “ It wasn't smart to break them. But it was necessary to smash it cheaply for us ... The first time the French lost so many guns, and the first time they fled like hares ... ".

The next battle will be on October 22-23, 1812 near Maloyaroslavets, which will become Borodino -2 for the French, but already with a negative sign.

The battle near Tarutino on October 18, 1812 was the beginning of the countdown of the victory of the Russian people in the Patriotic War of 1812. On this day, October 18, 1962, in honor of the 150th anniversary of the Victory in Moscow, the Battle of Borodino Panorama Museum was opened - an eternal monument to those days.

VADIM KULINCHENKO, retired captain 1st rank, publicist

The Tarutinsky maneuver of 1812 is an example of the competent actions of a field marshal during the Patriotic War of 1812.

Prerequisites for the maneuver

After the battle of Borodino and the abandonment of Moscow, Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov decided to use a covert maneuver to get away from the French army, create a situation that was supposed to threaten the French rear and, most importantly, block the enemy’s road to areas of the country that had not yet been devastated by the war. An equally important task was to prepare the army for the continuation of the war. Kutuzov kept these plans a secret, and initially the entire army was sent along the old Ryazan road to the southeast.

A few days later, namely on September 4 (16), changes were made to the movement of the army, and, unexpectedly for everyone, it turned west. The troops crossed the Moskva River at Borovsky Perevoz (near the current village of Chulkovo, Ramensky District, Moscow Region). This maneuver was covered by the troops of General N. Raevsky. The Cossacks continued to move to Ryazan and, in fact, lured the vanguard of the French army behind them. Two more times they misled the French, and they followed them along the Kashirskaya and Tula roads.

Maneuver

The army from the Moscow side was covered by the vanguards of General M. Miloradovich and parts of N. Raevsky. It was at this time that army units were allocated to organize partisan detachments.

As a result of these actions, the Russian army for Napoleon dissolved in the Russian expanses. He sent out large detachments in search of Kutuzov. Only a few days later, the horsemen of Marshal I. Murat went on the trail of the Russian troops. Soon Kutuzov secretly (mostly at night) withdrew troops along the old Kaluga road to the Nara River.

On September 21 (October 3), a fortified camp of the Russian army was organized near the village of Tarutino. This maneuver allowed the Russian troops to strengthen their strategic positions and deal with the preparation of a counteroffensive. Kutuzov's actions kept communication with the southern regions and at the same time covered the arms factories in Tula and the Kaluga supply base. The location of the Tarutinsky camp also contributed to the fact that the Russian command had a stable connection with the armies of A. Tormasov and P. Chichagov.

Kutuzov's actions violated Napoleon's plans, and he was forced to leave Moscow and retreat along the roads already devastated by the war.

Mikhail Kutuzov managed to demonstrate his talent as a commander this time too. He deftly imposed his will on the enemy, made it so that he found himself in unfavorable conditions, and thereby achieved a turning point in the war.

Tarutinsky camp

The fortified Tarutinsky camp became the main center for the training of the Russian army. It was located on the banks of the Nara River, 80 kilometers from Moscow. A complete reorganization of the army was carried out here. She received replenishment, weapons, ammunition and food were brought in.

For the upcoming counter-offensive, the number of cavalry was increased, and combat training was strengthened in the troops. Army partisan detachments were sent from the camp to the rear of the enemy.

Battle of Tarutino

In October, not far from the Tarutino camp, the first battle with the French after the Battle of Borodino took place. Here Kutuzov himself opposed the vanguard of the enemy under the leadership of Marshal Murat. The French could not resist the blow of the Russian troops and retreated. They were pursued to Spas-Kupli. Kutuzov did not introduce the main forces into this battle.

The result of the battle was the infliction of heavy damage on the French avant-garde. The enemy lost, according to various sources, from 2500 to 4000 people killed and wounded, 2000 people captured, 38 guns and the entire convoy. Our losses were 300 killed and 904 wounded.

This battle strengthened the morale of the Russian army on the eve of the counteroffensive.

In 1834, at the entrance to the village of Tarutino, with money collected by local peasants, a monument was erected with the inscription: “At this place, the Russian army, under the leadership of Field Marshal Kutuzov, having strengthened, saved Russia and Europe.”

The Tarutino maneuver, led by Field Marshal Mikhail Kutuzov, is one of the outstanding strategies in Russian military affairs. This maneuver was carried out during the Patriotic War of 1812 in the direction from the capital of the Russian state to the village of Tarutino, which is 80 kilometers from Moscow, on the territory of the current Kaluga region, from September 5 to September 21, old style.

In contact with

Tarutino maneuver: Wikipedia

According to the electronic encyclopedia, the Tarutino maneuver is a strategy prepared by Kutuzov in order to getting more time to prepare for battle with the French army. The French army was defeated here, and the Russians achieved their first victory in the war of 1812 and managed to go on the counteroffensive.

What is the cause of the Patriotic War of 1812?

The French Revolution ended with the ascension to the imperial throne, which had a negative impact on relations between Russia and France. These relationships soured for several reasons:

1. Alexander I was afraid that a similar revolution would break out in Russia;
2. The aggressive policy of Napoleon in relation to some countries of Europe, and, in particular, to England, with which the Russian Empire was an ally.

Once two friendly powers, Russia and France, now found themselves on the battlefield as adversaries.

By the beginning of 1812, the entire European territory (except England) was conquered by Napoleon I, and only the Russian Empire continued its independence from others. foreign policy, as well as trade relations with England, although this contradicted the earlier Tilsit agreement, where the most important condition was a continental blockade against England. However, Russia and England now maintained their trade relations through other European countries, which corresponded to the conditions of this blockade, but this fact still made Napoleon very angry.

The independent policy of the Russian Empire destroyed the plans of the Emperor of France for world domination, so the war between these states was inevitable. The French emperor hoped to inflict a crushing blow on Russia already at the first battle and force Alexander I to dance to his tune.

Actions that prompted the development of the Tarutino maneuver

The battle near Borodino made it clear to the Russian army that the capital of the state with the rest of your strength it is impossible to keep. Then Kutuzov drew a plan on the map, according to which it was necessary:

• break away from the French army;
• to prevent the passage of the enemy army to the southern latitudes of the country, where large food supplies were located;
• try to destroy the communications of Napoleon's army and prepare for a counteroffensive.

The military council in Fili decided that it was necessary to leave Moscow and develop ways for the Russian army to withdraw. It was decided to retreat towards Ryazan.

Preparation and execution of the Tarutino maneuver

When the army crossed the Moskva River, Kutuzov ordered the main forces to move west, and the convoys guarded by the Cossacks set off along the Ryazan road, they took the French army behind them. Cossacks more twice "forged" retreat and led the Napoleonic army along the Tula and Kashira roads. Thus, the French had no idea where the Russian troops were actually moving.

On September 7, the main forces of the Russian army approached Podolsk, and a couple of days later they were already near the village of Krasnaya Parkha, a camp was set up here and Russian troops settled in it until September 14.

Napoleon began to suspect that the command of the Russian army wanted to make a surprise attack, so it was ordered to throw all his forces in search of the main force of the Russian army. Divisions under the command of Delson, Ney, Davout would be directed to the northern, southern and eastern directions from Moscow, and the troops of Murat, Bessieres and Poniatowski examined every corner south of the capital. And only on September 14, the French, or rather the troops of Murat, were able to detect Russian troops near Podolsk.

Such a position of the army of the Russian Empire was convenient for the battle, if suddenly the troops, under the command of the French commanders, decided to attack. However, if Napoleonic army decided to enter into hostilities, then Bonaparte could bring reinforcements to Podolsk in a short time, so Kutuzov decided to “push” the troops away to Krasnaya Parkha. Only a few combat posts of the Russian army were located near Podolsk itself.

The advanced troops of General Miloradovich, a detachment under the leadership of Raevsky, as well as partisan detachments were sent towards the capital. Retreating, these troops burned all the crossings.

The march of the Russian army was also helped by the peasants, who, together with the Cossacks, attacked the advanced reconnaissance troops of the French, thereby causing serious damage to the enemy.

After the French discovered the direction of the withdrawal of the Russian army, Kutuzov ordered the troops to move along the Nara River towards Tarutino at night.

Strengthening positions near the village of Tarutino

Near the village of Tarutino, the camp of the Russian army stood from September 21 to October 11 (these dates are indicated according to the old style). This camp is located in a very advantageous position, from which it was possible to observe all the roads leading from Moscow.

The camp was defended from the front and left flank by rivers, on the banks of which additional earthen fortifications were also built. The rear of the camp was covered by a forest, where blockages and notches were prepared.

In the Tarutino camp, the army was reorganized: additional forces, new weapons and ammunition arrived, replenished food stocks, a plan of offensive operations was developed, partisan detachments were sent towards the enemy army. The number of cavalry increased sharply, as a counterattack was planned, many soldiers received combat training.

The Napoleonic army that entered Moscow fell into a trap, since the capital was surrounded by partisan Cossack and peasant detachments, and the southern borders of Russia were defended by a newly equipped army of the Russian Empire.

The value of the march maneuver in the Patriotic War of 1812

A well-thought-out and excellently executed maneuver made it possible not only to confuse Napoleon's army and gain time for preparing defensive measures, but also to develop a counterattack plan. In addition, Kutuzov was able to save from attack the French south coast, due to which the domestic army was able to strengthen its power. In addition, the Tula arms factory and the Kaluga supply base still remained untouched by the French troops and provided their own army with supplies.

Thanks to this, Kutuzov kept in touch with the troops of Chichagov and Tormasov, who took up defensive positions near St. Petersburg. He came up with a brilliant plan for how to encircle the Napoleonic army and subsequently completely defeat it.

On October 6, Kutuzov decided to attack Murat's troops, who also set up their camp near Tarutino. The troops of this commander could not be completely defeated, since most of them decided to retreat.

Seeing the increased power of the Russian army, the French emperor decided not to attack Petersburg, liberate the capital and start a retreat along the road through Smolensk, that is, through those areas that have already been devastated by hostilities.

Outcome

Russian victory

Parties Commanders Losses

Tarutinsky fight- the battle of October 18, 1812 near the village of Tarutino, Kaluga Region, which took place between Russian troops under the command of Field Marshal Kutuzov and the French troops of Marshal Murat. The fight is also called battle under the river Chernishnia, Tarutino maneuver or battle in Vinkovo.

The victory at Tarutino was the first Russian victory in the Patriotic War of 1812 after the Battle of Borodino. Success strengthened the spirit of the Russian army, which went over to the counteroffensive.

background

"Gg. generals and officers gathered at the front posts with expressions of courtesy, which led many to conclude that there was a truce.

Both sides remained in this position for two weeks.

The remaining corps under the command of Miloradovich were to forge the right flank of the French in battle. A separate detachment of Lieutenant General Dorokhov, according to the plan, should cut Murat's escape route on the Old Kaluga Road near the village of Voronovo. Commander-in-Chief Kutuzov remained with the reserves in the camp and carried out general leadership.

The battle could have ended with an incomparably greater advantage for us, but in general there was little communication in the action of the troops. The field marshal, confident of success, remained with the guard, did not see it with his own eyes; private chiefs disposed of arbitrarily. A huge number of our cavalry close to the center and on the left wing seemed more collected for the parade, showing off harmony more than speed of movement. It was possible to prevent the enemy from joining the infantry scattered in parts, bypassing and standing in the way of his retreat, for there was a considerable space between his camp and the forest. The enemy was given time to gather troops, bring artillery from different sides, reach the forest without hindrance and retreat through the village of Voronovo along the road that runs through it. The enemy lost 22 guns, up to 2000 prisoners, the entire convoy and crews of Murat, King of Neapolitan. Rich carts were a tasty bait for our Cossacks: they took up robbery, got drunk and did not think to prevent the enemy from retreating.

The goal of the Tarutinsky battle was not fully achieved, but its result was successful, and success was even more important for raising the spirit of the Russian troops. Before in the course of the war, in no battle, either side (even at Borodino) had such a number of captured guns as in this one - 36 or 38 guns. In a letter to Tsar Alexander I, Kutuzov reports 2,500 Frenchmen killed, 1,000 prisoners, and another 500 prisoners the next day were taken by the Cossacks during the pursuit. Kutuzov estimated his losses at 300 killed and wounded. Clausewitz confirms French losses of 3-4 thousand soldiers. Two generals of Murat were killed (Deri and Fisher). The next day after the battle, a letter from Murat was sent to the Russian posts with a request to hand over the body of General Deri, the head of Murat's personal guard. The request could not be granted, as the body was not found.

The military historian Bogdanovich in his work gives a statement of the losses of the Russian army, which lists 1,200 people (74 killed, 428 wounded and 700 missing). According to the inscription on the marble slab on the wall of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior, the Russians lost 1,183 people killed and wounded.

Alexander I generously rewarded the military leaders. Kutuzov received a golden sword with diamonds and a laurel wreath, Bennigsen - diamond badges of the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called and 100 thousand rubles. Dozens of officers and generals - awards and promotions. The lower ranks, participants in the battle, received 5 rubles per person.

“We didn’t know how to take Murat alive in the morning”: Tarutinsky battle

When it became clear to Kutuzov that it was impossible to defend Moscow with cash forces, he decided to break away from the enemy and take a position that would cover the Russian supply bases in Tula and Kaluga and threaten the operational line of the Napoleonic troops in order to buy time and create conditions for going on the counteroffensive. . It was this maneuver that went down in the history of the war of 1812 as the Tarutino maneuver. So, on the evening of September 5 (17), the commander-in-chief gave the order to the retreating Russian army to turn off the Ryazan road and go to Podolsk. None of the corps commanders knew where and why the army was turning, and only by the evening of the next day the army reached the Tula road near Podolsk. Further, the Russian troops set off along the old Kaluga road south to Krasnaya Pakhra, passing which they stopped at the village of Tarutino.

The military historian and adjutant of Kutuzov A. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky described in detail the advantages that the Russian army received from these movements: “Becoming a firm foot on the Kaluga road, Prince Kutuzov had the opportunity:

1) to cover the midday provinces, which abounded in supplies;

2) to threaten the path of enemy actions from Moscow through Mozhaisk, Vyazma and Smolensk;

3) to cross in detachments the messages of the French stretched over excessive space and

4) in the event of Napoleon's retreat to Smolensk, warn him along the shortest route.

This march maneuver, which was considered brilliant by both supporters and opponents of Kutuzov, ended successfully. Indeed, he allowed the Russian troops to cover from the enemy at the same time provisions in Kaluga, and arms factories in Tula, and foundries in Bryansk. Napoleon was also cut off from the fertile Ukrainian provinces. And it was precisely this location that deprived the French of the opportunity to carry out the so-called "autumn plan" of the campaign against St. Petersburg.

French General A. Jomini admitted that in the history of wars from ancient times, “the retreat that the Russian army made in 1812 from the Neman to Moscow ... not allowing itself to be upset or partially defeated by such an enemy as Napoleon ... of course, should be placed above all others" not so much in terms of the "strategic talents" of the generals, but "in relation to the amazing confidence, stamina and firmness of the troops."

Separately, it must be pointed out that the Tarutinsky maneuver went unnoticed by the French. So, Kutuzov wrote in a report to the emperor: “The army, making a flank movement, for the secrecy of this direction, introduced the enemy into bewilderment on every march. Heading herself to a certain point, she disguised herself in the meantime by fake movements of light troops, making demonstrations either to Kolomna or to Serpukhov, after which the enemy followed in large parties.

The reaction of the French themselves was described in his memoirs by the German doctor Murat G. von Roos: “We drove off, accompanied by smoke that drove us from the side of the city. The sun shone through the smoke, turning everything visible yellow. The Cossacks were very close in front of us, but on this day we did not even exchange pistol shots ... The next day, September 16, we stretched further along the road leading to Vladimir and Kazan. We saw our opponents only in the evening, when we approached the wooden town of Bogorodsk, which stood to the right of the road. After that, the French moved for another day in the direction in which the Cossacks had disappeared. And only on the third day “in the early morning,” wrote Roos, “I paid a visit to my commander, Colonel von Milkau. He greeted me with the words: “We have lost the enemy and every trace of him; we have to stay here and wait for new orders.”

In fact, Murat, moving along the Ryazan road, missed the flank movement of the Russian troops, and when the Cossacks dispersed along with the fog on September 10 (22), he found an empty road in front of him. The mood of the French troops at that time was quite colorfully described by Marshal B. de Castellant: “Our vanguard is twelve miles away. The Neapolitan king, standing in the mud in his yellow boots, with his Gascon accent, spoke to the officer sent by the emperor in such expressions: “Tell the emperor that I honorably led the vanguard of the French army beyond Moscow, but I’m tired, tired of all this, you hear Do you? I want to go to Naples to attend to my subjects."

Kutuzov himself was very pleased with the implementation of his plan. In another report to Emperor Alexander I, he noted: “I still receive information about the success of my fake movement, because the enemy followed the Cossacks in parts (that is, the detachment left on the Ryazan road). This gives me the convenience that the army, having made a flank march of 18 versts tomorrow on the Kaluga road and sending strong parties to Mozhayskaya, should be very concerned about the enemy's rear. In this way, I hope that the enemy will seek to give me a battle, from which, at a favorable location, equal success, as at Borodino, I expect.

After some time, as Roos wrote, the French “regained the Russians, who seemed to have sunk into the abyss from the moment when ... they saw them on the top of the hill near Bogorodsk. The bloody military fun began again; all types of weapons were brought into action, daily, often from morning to evening, cannon fire took place ... "

Thus, after the withdrawal from Moscow, the Russian army by the beginning of October 1812 was located in a fortified camp near the village of Tarutino across the Nara River (southwest of Moscow). The soldiers received rest, and the army as a whole received the opportunity to replenish materiel and manpower.

In early October, the commander-in-chief sent an official report to Emperor Alexander I, in which he reported that he had brought 87,035 people to the camp with 622 guns. There is evidence that immediately after arriving in Tarutino, Kutuzov announced: "Now not a step back!"

In the Tarutinsky camp, an official renaming of the troops took place. Since that time, the 1st and 2nd Western armies merged into the Main Army, commanded by M.I. Golenishchev-Kutuzov. The first days of the army's stay in the camp were accompanied by certain difficulties: there was not enough food and ammunition, as well as organization. Radozhytsky wrote about the lack of provisions: “Approaching the devastated road, we ourselves began to suffer need, especially our horses: there was no fodder at all, and the poor animals fed only on rotten straw from the roofs. I also had a small supply of oats from the Tarutinsky camp; being a master in Figner's artillery company, I saved a lot of oats and only regaled the horses with them. Day by day it became more painful; the serviceability of artillery depended on horses, and therefore I tried to save them by covering them with blankets; the gunners sometimes fed them with breadcrumbs.

In the Tarutinsky camp, the conflict between M. Kutuzov and M. Barclay de Tolly, which had subsided for a while, escalated. In a letter to Alexander I, Kutuzov explained the surrender of Moscow by the poor condition of the troops after the loss of Smolensk, thus, in fact, shifting all the blame on Barclay de Tolly. The latter, however, perfectly understood that the army was in desolation after Borodin, and it departed from Smolensk in full battle order. Accordingly, Barclay de Tolly also remembered the fact that at the military council in Fili he advocated a retreat without a fight, while criticizing the disposition proposed by Bennigsen. It is known that in the Battle of Borodino, Barclay de Tolly demonstrated unprecedented courage and personal courage. Despite the fact that this was noted by many, he did not succeed in getting rid of the reputation of a "German traitor". As a result, on October 4, Barclay de Tolly wrote a note to Kutuzov, in which he asked "due to illness" to relieve him of his post. This request was granted, and the former commander of the 1st Western Army left the troops.

While in the Tarutinsky camp, Kutuzov took special care of the material component of the army. In the presence of problems for the transportation of surviving supplies in Riga, Pskov, Tver, Kyiv and Kaluga, he demanded active cooperation from the authorities of all nearby provinces in this matter, constantly receiving ammunition, bread, boots, sheepskin coats and even nails for horseshoes from them. The field marshal wrote the following to the governors of Kaluga and Tula about this: “I can’t find words to express how the greatest benefit can come from if the donated provisions continuously overtake the army and satisfy the needs for its non-stop food; and, on the contrary, I cannot explain without the greatest regret that the slow delivery of food to the army is able to stop the movement of the army and completely stop the pursuit of the fleeing enemy.

In addition to the official authorities, local residents also helped the Russian troops. Taken together, all the measures taken by Kutuzov led to the fact that by October 21, the Russian army already had more provisions than it needed.

At the same time, Napoleon, who occupied Moscow, found himself, as we have already said, in a very difficult situation - his troops could not fully provide themselves with what they needed in the city. In addition, the intensified guerrilla war prevented the normal supply of the army. For foraging, the French had to send significant detachments, which did not often return without loss. At the same time, to facilitate the collection of provisions and the protection of communications, Napoleon was forced to keep large military formations far beyond the borders of Moscow.

Indeed, using these circumstances, Kutuzov refrained from active hostilities and resorted to a "small war with a big advantage" - a guerrilla war. In particular, Russian troops even threatened the Moscow-Smolensk highway, through which the French received reinforcements and food.

Later, an additional advantage of Kutuzov's position near the village of Tarutino appeared. So, without waiting for peace from the Russian emperor, Napoleon, as already mentioned, considered the option of a campaign against St. Petersburg. But in addition to the reasons mentioned for abandoning such an idea (in particular, the approach of winter), it is necessary to name the actual location of Kutuzov's troops near Tarutino, that is, in fact, south of Moscow. Accordingly, in the event of the start of the French campaign against St. Petersburg, the Russian army would be in his rear.

In particular, since mid-September, Murat's vanguard has been stationed, watching the Russian army, not far from their Tarutinsky camp on the Chernishna River, 90 kilometers from Moscow. This grouping consisted of the following units: Poniatowski's 5th Corps, two infantry and two cavalry divisions, all four cavalry corps of Emperor Napoleon. Its total strength, according to army records at the end of September, totaled 26,540 people (this data was given by the captain of the horse artillery guards Chambray). At the same time, Chaumbray himself, taking into account the losses of the previous month, estimated the strength of the vanguard on the eve of the battle at 20,000 people.

It should be noted that the vanguard had strong artillery (197 guns). However, as Clausewitz pointed out, they "rather burdened the avant-garde than could be useful to it." The front and right flank of Murat's extended position were covered by the Nara and Chernishnia rivers, the left flank went out into an open area where only the forest separated the French from the Russian positions.

For some time, both the Russian army and the French avant-garde coexisted without clashes. As General A. Ermolov pointed out, “Messrs. generals and officers gathered at the front posts with expressions of courtesy, which led many to conclude that there was a truce. Both sides remained in this position for two weeks.

When the partisans reported that Murat, in case of an attack, had no reinforcements closer than in Moscow, it was decided to attack the French, using a successful disposition.

The plan of attack was developed by General of the Cavalry Bennigsen, Chief of the General Staff of Kutuzov. First of all, it was decided to use the fact that a large forest approached the left flank of the French almost very close, and this made it possible to covertly approach their location.

According to the plan, the army was to attack in two parts. The first (four infantry corps, one cavalry corps, ten regiments of Cossacks under the command of Adjutant General Count Orlov-Denisov), under the personal command of Bennigsen, was supposed to covertly bypass the left flank of the French through the forest. Another, under the command of Miloradovich, to forge the other (right) flank of the French avant-garde in battle. At the same time, a separate detachment of Lieutenant General Dorokhov received the task to cut off the escape route for Murat. The commander-in-chief Kutuzov himself had to remain with the reserves in the camp and carry out general leadership.

Realizing the riskiness of his position, Murat also had information about the upcoming attack. Most likely, the training of Russian troops did not remain a secret for him. Therefore, the day before the battle, the French stood under arms in full readiness all night. But the expected attack did not come. As it turned out, the planned attack by the Russian troops was a day late due to the absence of the chief of staff Yermolov, who was at the dinner party at the time.

In fact, this circumstance played into the hands of Kutuzov. So, the next day, Murat issued an order to withdraw artillery and carts. But his adjutant, having delivered the order to the chief of artillery, found him sleeping and, unaware of the urgency of the package, decided to wait until morning. As a result, the French were absolutely not prepared to repel the attack. The moment for the battle turned out to be successful for the Russian army.

Preparations for the attack began with Bennigsen's columns carefully crossing the Nara River near Spassky. But again, another mistake influenced the course of events. In particular, the night march and the incorrect calculation of the bypass movement led to a slowdown, so the Russian troops did not have time to approach the enemy in time. Only the Cossack regiments of Orlov-Denisov reached the village of Dmitrovsky behind the left flank of the French before dawn. Miloradovich on the right flank of the French also did not make active movements until dawn.

When dawn began (at this time the attack was planned), Bennigsen's infantry corps did not appear at the edge. In such a situation, not wanting to miss the surprise and opportunity, Orlov-Denisov decided to attack on his own. As a result, the French from the corps of General Sebastiani managed to fire a few shots in a hurry, but fled in disarray behind the Ryazanovsky ravine. After that, the Cossacks rushed to rob the camp and Orlov-Denisov could not gather them for a long time. The left flank of the French was saved from complete defeat by Murat, who, having gathered the fugitives, organized counterattacks and stopped the advance of the Cossacks.

One of the witnesses of this battle recalled: “King Murat immediately rushed to the attacked point and, with his presence of mind and courage, stopped the offensive that had begun. He rushed to all bivouacs, gathered all the riders that came across to him, and as soon as he managed to recruit such a squadron, he immediately rushed to attack with them. Our cavalry owes its salvation precisely to these successive and repeated attacks, which, having stopped the enemy, gave the troops time and opportunity to look around, gather and go to the enemy.

It was at this moment that one of Bennigsen's corps appeared at the edge of Teterinka, directly opposite the French battery. They were commanded by Lieutenant General K. Baggovut. Artillery skirmish ensued. Baggovut, who had previously taken part in the Battle of Borodino, died in it. This event did not allow his corps to act more decisively. Bennigsen, also not prone to improvisation on the battlefield, did not dare to act only with part of the forces and gave the order to withdraw before the approach of the rest of the troops, who continued to wander through the forest.

Murat successfully took advantage of this confusion of the Russian troops. Repulsing the attacks of the Orlov-Denisov Cossacks, he ordered the artillery convoys to retreat. Therefore, when the rest of Bennigsen's corps finally appeared from the forest, the moment for defeating the French was already lost.

Shell-shocked during this battle, Bennigsen was furious and wrote in a letter to his wife: “I can’t come to my senses! What could be the consequences of this beautiful, brilliant day if I received support ... Here, in front of the entire army, Kutuzov forbids sending even one person to help me, these are his words. General Miloradovich, who commanded the left wing, was eager to get closer to help me - Kutuzov forbids him ... Can you imagine how far our old man was from the battlefield! His cowardice already exceeds the dimensions allowed for cowards, he already under Borodin gave the greatest proof of this, and therefore he covered himself with contempt and became ridiculous in the eyes of the whole army ... Can you imagine my position, that I need to quarrel with him whenever it’s a matter of it's about taking one step against the enemy, and you need to listen to rudeness from this person!

Indeed, as already mentioned, Miloradovich's troops were on the other flank. But in the midst of the battle, they slowly moved along the old Kaluga road. Most likely, given the delay of the bypass columns, Kutuzov ordered Miloradovich's troops to be stopped. Assessing this decision, some researchers point out that, despite the retreat of the French, there were significant chances to cut off their individual parts.

Kutuzov himself, in turn. even during the battle, he noted that “if we didn’t know how to take Murat alive in the morning and arrive on time at the places, then the pursuit would be useless. We can't move away from the position."

Retreating with the main forces to Spas-Kupla, Murat fortified the position with batteries and opened frontal fire on the Orlov-Denisov Cossacks pursuing him. Under such conditions, the Russian regiments with songs and music returned to their camp in the evening.

Assessing the results of the Tarutino battle, it should be noted that the defeat of Murat did not work out not only because of mistakes in planning the attack, but also due to the inaccurate execution of the planned plans by the Russian troops. As the historian M. Bogdanovich pointed out, 5,000 infantry and 7,000 cavalry took part in this battle from the Russian side.

At the same time, some unwillingness of Kutuzov to get involved in another battle with the French also mattered. Most likely, the commander-in-chief of the Russian army considered military operations unnecessary, since time was already working in his favor. In addition, there was already information that Napoleon was preparing to withdraw from Moscow, so Kutuzov did not want to expose the troops to additional danger by withdrawing them from the camp. At the same time, the commander-in-chief tried to solve one of his personal problems: to disable Bennigsen, who had been intriguing against him all the time. Accordingly, by appointing this general to command the troops, he did not give him full authority, first of all, regarding the decision on the question of possible reinforcements, as well as on taking up positions at the end of the battle.

General A. Yermolov spoke rather critically about the results of the Tarutinsky battle: “The battle could have ended incomparably more beneficial for us, but in general there was little communication in the action of the troops. The field marshal, confident of success, remained with the guard, did not see it with his own eyes; private chiefs disposed of arbitrarily. A huge number of our cavalry close to the center and on the left wing seemed more collected for the parade, showing off harmony more than speed of movement. It was possible to prevent the enemy from joining the infantry scattered in parts, bypassing and standing in the way of his retreat, for there was a considerable space between his camp and the forest. The enemy was given time to gather troops, bring artillery from different sides, reach the forest without hindrance and retreat through the village of Voronovo along the road that runs through it. The enemy lost 22 guns, up to 2,000 prisoners, the entire convoy and crews of Murat, King of Naples. Rich carts were a tasty bait for our Cossacks: they took up robbery, got drunk and did not think to prevent the enemy from retreating.

Thus, the main goal of the battle was not fully achieved, but its result was still quite successful. This concerned, first of all, raising the spirit of the Russian troops. Also, before that, throughout the entire war of 1812, in no battle, either side (even at Borodino) had such a number of captured guns - 36 (according to other sources 38) guns.

As for the losses of the parties, Kutuzov, in a letter to Emperor Alexander I, reported 2,500 Frenchmen killed and 1,000 prisoners. Another 500 prisoners were taken the next day by the Cossacks during the pursuit. The commander-in-chief estimated the losses of the Russian side at 300 killed and wounded.

The military theorist Clausewitz confirmed the losses of the French in 3-4 thousand soldiers. Two generals of Murat, Deri and Fisher, were killed in the battle. The day after the battle, Russian posts received a letter from Murat asking them to hand over the body of General Deri, the head of his personal guard. This request could not be granted because the body could not be found.

It should be pointed out that the military historian Bogdanovich cited a list of losses of the Russian army, which included 1,200 people (74 killed, 428 wounded and 700 missing). According to the inscription on the marble slab on the wall of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior, the loss of killed and wounded amounted to 1,183 people.

Alexander I generously rewarded his commanders: Kutuzov received a golden sword with diamonds and a laurel wreath, Bennigsen received diamond signs of the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called and 100 thousand rubles. Dozens of other officers and generals - awards and regular promotions. As after the battle of Borodino, the lower ranks, participants in the battle, received 5 rubles per person.

The described inconsistency of actions on the field of the Tarutinsky battle caused an aggravation of the long-standing conflict between Kutuzov and Bennigsen. The latter reproached the commander-in-chief for refusing support and recalling Dokhturov's corps from the battlefield. The result of this confrontation was the removal of Bennigsen from the army. As Kutuzov wrote to his wife in a letter dated October 30, 1812: “I almost don’t let Bennigsen in and will send him soon” (which in the end was done).

Most likely, it was the battle near Tarutino that prompted Napoleon to retreat from Moscow. In his notes, Roos pointed out: “this ... camp on the Chernishna River, near the village of Teterinka, where our division stood and I, with the last remnant of our regiment, was the final point of our difficult campaign deep into Russia, and October 18 was the day when we were forced were to start retreating.

Accordingly, despite the fact that the decision to withdraw was made by Napoleon before the start of the Tarutino battle, it was after receiving news of this battle that he finally decided to withdraw from Moscow. And the very next day, the retreat of the French towards Kaluga began.

Interestingly, in commemoration of the Tarutino victory over the French, the owner of Tarutino, Count S. Rumyantsev, freed 745 peasants from serfdom in 1829, obliging them to erect a monument on the battlefield.

As already mentioned, initially Napoleon planned to spend the winter in Moscow: “There was a minute,” noted the French officer Bosse, “when the emperor thought to spend the winter in Moscow; we collected a significant amount of provisions, which were replenished daily with the discoveries that soldiers made in the cellars of burned houses ... In the cellars they found whole piles of all kinds of things, flour, pianos, hay, wall clocks, wines, dresses, mahogany furniture, vodka, weapons, woolen fabrics, superbly bound books, furs at different prices, etc. And the churches were overflowing with things. Napoleon was so determined to spend the winter in Moscow that one day at breakfast he ordered me to draw up a list of artists from the Comedi Francaise who could be called to Moscow without disturbing the performances in Paris.

As already mentioned, on October 4 (16) Napoleon sent the Marquis of Loriston to Kutuzov's camp, who was ambassador to Russia just before the war. The Soviet historian E. Tarle wrote: “Napoleon wanted, in fact, to send General Caulaincourt, Duke of Vicenza, who was also ambassador to Russia even before Lauriston, but Caulaincourt strongly advised Napoleon not to do this, pointing out that such an attempt would only indicate to the Russians the uncertainty of the French army . Napoleon was irritated, as always, when he felt the justice of the argument of the one arguing with him; Yes, and he has already lost the habit of disputants. Lauriston repeated the arguments of Caulaincourt, but the emperor cut off the conversation with a direct order: “I need peace; so long as honor is saved. Immediately go to the Russian camp ".... Kutuzov received Loriston at headquarters, refused to negotiate peace or a truce with him, and only promised to bring Napoleon's proposal to the attention of Alexander."

Interestingly, Kutuzov decided to take advantage of Loriston's visit to give him the impression of the high morale of the army. The Russian commander-in-chief ordered to light as many fires as possible, to give meat to the soldiers for dinner and to sing at the same time.

During this meeting, Lauriston categorically denied the involvement of the French in the fire in Moscow and reproached the Russian soldiers for excessive cruelty. But Kutuzov insisted that Moscow was plundered by the enemy, and the fire was also the work of marauders of the Great Army. The meeting ended with Kutuzov assuring Loriston that he personally would never go to peace talks with the French, because he would be "cursed by posterity for the very possibility of such a thing." But he promised to convey Napoleon's peace proposals to Alexander I. Although Loriston sought permission to go to St. Petersburg himself, the next morning Prince Volkonsky was sent to the Russian emperor with a report on the meeting.

Alexander I expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that Kutuzov, despite his order not to enter into any negotiations with the French, nevertheless received Lauriston. But the field marshal, most likely, went into negotiations solely with the aim of gaining additional time in order to put the army on alert. He perfectly understood that every day his army was growing stronger in the Tarutinsky camp, and the Great Army was decomposing in Moscow. As it turned out, such a calculation by Kutuzov fully justified itself: Napoleon waited in vain for a few more days for an answer from Alexander I. But, as you know, the Russian emperor once again left this proposal unanswered, which was the last one.

When the futility of concluding peace agreements with the Russian emperor and the impossibility of providing food for the troops had finally become clear, Napoleon decided to leave Moscow. This was also facilitated by the sharply deteriorated weather with early frosts. In addition, the Battle of Tarutino showed that Kutuzov had strengthened, and further clashes could be expected at the initiative of the Russian army. Baron Dedem wrote: “To spend the winter in Moscow was unthinkable. We made our way to this city, but not one of the provinces we passed through was conquered by us.

Soon Napoleon gave the order to Marshal Mortier, appointed by him as the Moscow governor-general, before leaving Moscow, to set fire to wine shops, barracks and all public buildings in the city, with the exception of the Orphanage. An order was also given to set fire to the Kremlin Palace and the Kremlin walls. It was planned that the explosion of the Kremlin was to follow the exit of the last French troops from the city.

On October 7 (19), the army moved from Moscow along the old Kaluga road. Only the corps of Marshal Mortier remained in the city. A bad feeling did not leave the French soldiers during the exit from Moscow: “There was something gloomy in this campaign. The darkness of the night, the silence of the soldiers, the smoking ruins that we trampled under our feet, and each of us anxiously foresaw all the troubles of this memorable retreat. Even the soldiers understood the difficulty of our situation; they were gifted both with intelligence and with that amazing instinct that distinguishes French soldiers and which, forcing them to weigh danger from all sides, seemed to double their courage and give them the strength to face danger in the face.

The convoy of the retreating French army made a special impression on the eyewitness. Christopher-Ludwig von Jelin recalled and was surprised: “But what a terrible picture the Great Army now presented: all the soldiers were loaded with a wide variety of things that they wanted to take from Moscow - maybe they hoped to take them to their homeland - and at that At the same time, they forgot to finally stock up on the most necessary for the duration of their long journey. The convoy looked like a horde, as if coming to us from strange, unfamiliar countries, dressed in the most diverse dresses and having the appearance of a masquerade. This wagon train was the first to break order during the retreat, since each soldier tried to send the things he had taken in Moscow in front of the army in order to consider them safe.

Immediately after the start of the retreat, Napoleon planned to attack the Russian army and, having defeated it, get into the regions of the country not devastated by the war in order to provide his soldiers with food and fodder. But, being for several days in the village of Troitskoye on the banks of the Desna River, he abandoned his original plan - to attack Kutuzov, since in this case he had to endure a battle similar to Borodino.

After that, Napoleon decided to turn right from the old Kaluga road and, bypassing the Russian army, go to the Borovskaya road. Further, he planned to move the army in places untouched by the war in the Kaluga province to the southwest, to Smolensk. He intended, having calmly reached Smolensk through Maloyaroslavets and Kaluga, to spend the winter in Smolensk or in Vilna and continue the war in the future.

In a letter to his wife dated 10 (22) October, Napoleon wrote: "I left Moscow with the order to blow up the Kremlin." This order was sent to Marshal Mortier the night before. The latter, having completed it, was to immediately join the army with his corps. But due to lack of time, Mortier did not have time to thoroughly prepare for the explosion of the Kremlin.

One of the local workers, who was forced to dig tunnels for explosives, recalled: “The French took me there, and they brought many other workers from ours and ordered us to dig tunnels under the Kremlin walls, under the cathedrals and the palace, and they dug themselves right there. And we just did not raise our hands. Let everything die, but at least not by our hands. Yes, it was not our will: no matter how bitter, but dig. The accursed ones are standing here, and as soon as they see that one of us is bad at digging, they are now beating them with rifle butts. My whole back is bruised."

When Mortier left Moscow, explosions of planted mines began behind him: “Undressed, wounded by fragments of glass, stones, iron, the unfortunate people ran out into the streets in horror. Impenetrable darkness enveloped Moscow; cold autumn rain poured down in torrents. Wild cries, squeals, groans of people crushed by falling buildings were heard from everywhere. There were calls for help, but there was no one to help. The Kremlin was illuminated by the ominous flame of a fire. One explosion followed another, the earth did not stop shaking. Everything seemed to resemble the last day of the world.

As a result, only the Vodovzvodnaya Tower was destroyed to the ground, the Nikolskaya, 1st Bezymyannaya and Petrovskaya towers, as well as the Kremlin wall and part of the arsenal, were badly damaged. The explosion burned the Faceted Chamber. Contemporaries noted that the attempt to undermine the tallest building in Moscow, the Ivan the Great Bell Tower, failed. It remained unscathed, unlike later additions: “A huge extension to Ivan the Great, torn off by an explosion, collapsed near him and at his feet, and he stood as majestic as the one just erected by Boris Godunov to feed the workers in times of famine, as if mocking over the fruitless fury of nineteenth-century barbarism.

After the withdrawal of the French troops from Moscow, the cavalry vanguard of the Russian army under the command of A. Benckendorff entered the city. On October 14, he wrote to M. Vorontsov: “We entered Moscow on the evening of the 11th. The city was given over to the plunder of the peasants, of whom there were a great many, and all drunk; the Cossacks and their foremen completed the rout. Entering the city with the hussars and Life Cossacks, I considered it my duty to immediately take over the command of the police units of the unfortunate capital: people killed each other in the streets, set fire to houses. Finally, everything calmed down, and the fire was extinguished. I had to endure some real battles."

A. Shakhovskaya also wrote about the presence in the city of crowds of peasants who fled to rob him from all over the district: to the turmoil of our entry, they arrived in wagons to seize the unlooted, but gr. Benckendorff calculated otherwise and ordered that bodies and carrion be loaded onto their cart and taken out of the city, to places convenient for burial or extermination, which saved Moscow from infection, its inhabitants from peasant robbery, and the peasants from sin.

A. Bulgakov, an official for special assignments under Count Rostopchin, described his first thoughts when he saw Moscow: “But God, what I felt at every step forward! We passed Rogozhskaya, Taganka, Solyanka, Kitay-gorod, and there was not a single house that had not been burned or destroyed. I felt cold in my heart and could not speak: every face that came across seemed to ask for tears about the fate of our unfortunate capital.

There were many destroyed houses: “From the Nikitsky to the Tver Gates, on the left side, everything was burned, and on the right, the houses of Prince. Shcherbatova, gr. Stroganova and about two more houses ... Tverskaya from the Tver Gates to the house of the commander-in-chief, on both sides, is all intact; and then, from Chertkovo down to Mokhovaya, everything burned out, on both sides ... ”At the same time, the German settlement suffered greatly,“ a vast field formed, covered with burnt pipes, and when the snow falls, they will seem like tombstones, and the whole quarter will turn into cemetery". Although Muscovites were talking about miraculously surviving houses: “The arsenal flew into the air, the wall, near the Nikolsky Gate, too, the tower itself was destroyed, and among these ruins not only the icon survived, but also the glass and the lantern in which the lamp is located. I was amazed and could not tear myself away from this spectacle. It is clear that in the city the only sense is that about these miracles.

From the data of the Moscow Chief of Police Ivashkin, you can find out about the number of human corpses taken out of the streets of Moscow - 11,959, as well as horse ones - 12,546. Most of the dead are wounded soldiers of the Russian army left in the city after the Battle of Borodino.

After returning to the city of Rostopchin, it was ordered not to organize a redistribution of property and leave the stolen goods to those in whose hands it fell. Having learned about this order, the people rushed to the market: “On the very first Sunday, mountains of stolen property blocked a huge area, and Moscow poured into an unprecedented market!”

Despite all the problems of the city described, the departure of the French troops from Moscow and the return of the Russians had a huge psychological impact on both the population and the imperial court. The maid of honor of the Empress R. Sturdza wrote in her memoirs: “How to portray what we experienced when we learned about the cleansing of Moscow! I was waiting for the Empress in her study, when the news captured my heart and head. Standing at the window, I looked at the majestic river, and it seemed to me that its waves were rushing somehow more proudly and solemnly. Suddenly, a cannon shot was heard from the fortress, the gilded bell tower of which is exactly opposite the Kamennoostrovsky Palace. From this calculated solemn firing, which marked a joyful event, all my veins trembled, and I had never experienced such a feeling of living and pure joy. I would not have been able to endure such excitement any longer if it had not been for the relief of the floods of tears. I experienced in those moments that nothing shakes the soul so much as the feeling of noble love for the fatherland, and this feeling then took possession of all of Russia. The dissatisfied fell silent; the people, who never abandoned the hope of God's help, calmed down, and the sovereign, having assured himself of the mind of the capital, began to prepare for his departure for the army.

The same M. Volkova, who met the news of Kutuzov’s decision to leave Moscow with such misunderstanding, wrote: “The French left Moscow ... Although I am convinced that only the ashes of the dear city remain, I breathe more freely at the thought that the French do not go along nicely dust and do not defile with their breath the air that we have breathed. General unanimity. Although it is said that the French left voluntarily and that the expected successes did not follow their removal, yet from that time we all cheered up, as if a heavy burden had been lifted from our shoulders. The other day, three fugitive peasant women, ruined like us, pestered me in the street and did not give me peace until I confirmed to them that there really was not a single Frenchman left in Moscow. In the churches they again pray fervently and say special prayers for our dear Moscow, whose fate worries every Russian. You cannot express the feeling we experienced today, when after Mass we began to pray for the restoration of the city, asking God to send down a blessing on the ancient capital of our unfortunate Fatherland. The merchants who fled from Moscow are going to return there along the first sledge track, to see what has become of her, and to the best of their ability to restore what they have lost. One can hope to look at dear places that I tried not to think about, believing that I had to forever give up the happiness of seeing them again. O! How dear and sacred is the native land! How deep and strong is our affection for her! How can a person sell the welfare of the Fatherland, the graves of their ancestors, the blood of brothers for a handful of gold - in a word, everything that is so dear to every creature gifted with soul and mind.

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