The issue of relations between Russians and Poles is historically difficult. So much so that almost any topic related to the two peoples can turn into a quarrel full of mutual reproaches and enumeration of sins. In this sharpness of mutual affection there is something unlike the carefully concealed alienated hostility of Germans and French, Spaniards and English, even Walloons and Flemings. In relations between Russians and Poles, perhaps, there will never be a sobering cold and averted views. Lenta.ru tried to figure out the reason for this state of affairs.

Since the Middle Ages in Poland, all the Orthodox who lived on the territory of the former Kievan Rus were called Russ, making no distinction for Ukrainians, Belarusians and Russians. Even in the 20th century, in the documents of the Ministry of the Interior, the definition of identity, as a rule, was based on religious affiliation - Catholic, Orthodox or Uniate. In those days, when Prince Kurbsky sought refuge in Lithuania, and Prince Belsky in Moscow, the mutual connection was already quite strong, the differences were obvious, but there was no mutual perception through the prism of "friend or foe". Perhaps this is a normal feature of the feudal era, when it is too early to talk about national identity.

Any self-consciousness is formed in times of crisis. For Russia in the 17th century it was the Time of Troubles, for Poland - the Swedish Flood (the invasion of the Swedes into the Commonwealth in 1655-1660). One of the most important results of the "flood" was the expulsion of Protestants from Poland and the subsequent strengthening of the influence of the Catholic Church. Catholicism has become the blessing and the curse of the Commonwealth. Following the Protestants, the Orthodox, who made up a large part of the country's population, came under attack, and a mechanism of self-destruction was launched in the state. The former Polish-Lithuanian state was distinguished by a rather high national and religious tolerance - Polish Catholics, Muslims, Karaites, Orthodox and pagans, Lithuanians who worshiped Perkunas successfully coexisted together. It is not surprising that the crisis of state power that began under the most prominent of the Polish kings, Jan III Sobiesk, led to a catastrophic contraction and then the death of the Polish state, which had lost its internal consensus. The system of state power opened up too many opportunities for conflicts, giving them legitimacy. The work of the Sejm was paralyzed by the right of liberum veto, which allowed any deputy to cancel all decisions with his own voice, and the royal power was forced to reckon with the gentry confederations. The latter were an armed association of the gentry, who had the full right, if necessary, to oppose the king.

At the same time, Russian absolutism was taking shape east of Poland. Then the Poles will talk about their historical inclination towards freedom, while the Russians will both be proud and ashamed of the autocratic nature of their statehood. Subsequent conflicts, as usual in history inevitable for neighboring peoples, acquired an almost metaphysical meaning of rivalry between two peoples very different in spirit. However, along with this myth, another one will form - about the inability of both Russians and Poles to implement their ideas without violence. A well-known Polish public figure, editor-in-chief of Gazeta Wyborcza, Adam Michnik, writes remarkably about this: “Once in a while we feel like the students of a magician, who have freed forces beyond their control from imprisonment.” Polish uprisings and the Russian revolution, in the end, the Ukrainian Maidan - a senseless and merciless instinct of self-destruction.

Russian statehood was growing stronger, but this was not, as it may seem now, the result of territorial and human superiority over its neighbors. Our country then was a huge, poorly developed and sparsely populated territory. Someone will say that these problems exist today, and they will probably be right. At the end of the 17th century, the population of the Moscow kingdom exceeded 10 million people, which is slightly more than in the neighboring Commonwealth, where 8 million lived, and in France - 19 million. In those days, the Polish neighbors did not have and could not have the complex of a small nation threatened from the East.

In the Russian case, it was all about the historical ambitions of the people and the authorities. Now it does not seem at all strange that, having completed the Northern War, Peter I took the title of Emperor of All Russia. But let's look at this decision in the context of the era - after all, the Russian tsar placed himself above all other European monarchs. The Holy Roman Empire of the German nation does not count - it was not an example or a rival and experienced its worst times. In relations with the Polish king August II the Strong, Peter I undoubtedly dominated, and in terms of the degree of development, Russia begins to outstrip its western neighbor.

Literally in a century, Poland, which saved Europe from the Turkish invasion in 1683 near Vienna, turned into a completely unviable state. Historians have already completed the debate about whether internal or external factors were fatal to Polish statehood in the 18th century. Of course, everything was decided by their combination. But as for the moral responsibility for the gradual decline of the power of Poland, then it can be said quite definitely that the initiative of the first partition belonged to Austria, the second - to Prussia, and the final third - to Russia. All equally, and this is not a childish argument about who started first.

The reaction to the crisis of statehood was, though belated, but fruitful. The Educational Commission (1773-1794) begins its work in the country, which was actually the first ministry of education in Europe. In 1788, the Four-Year Seim convened, which embodied the ideas of the Enlightenment almost simultaneously with the French revolutionaries, but much more humanely. The first in Europe and the second in the world (after the American) Constitution was adopted on May 3, 1791 in Poland.

It was a wonderful undertaking, but it lacked revolutionary force. The constitution recognized all Poles as the Polish people, regardless of class (previously only the gentry was considered such), but retained serfdom. The situation in Lithuania was noticeably improving, but no one thought of translating the Constitution itself into Lithuanian. The subsequent reaction to changes in the political system of Poland led to two partitions and the fall of statehood. Poland has become, in the words of the British historian Norman Davies, "God's toy", or, to put it more simply, an object of rivalry and agreement between neighboring and sometimes distant powers.

The Poles responded with uprisings, mainly in the territory of the Kingdom of Poland, which became part of the Russian Empire in 1815 following the Congress of Vienna. It was in the 19th century that the two peoples really got to know each other, at the same time mutual attraction was formed, sometimes hostility, and often non-recognition. Nikolai Danilevsky considered the Poles an alien part of the Slavs, and a similar approach would later appear among the Poles in relation to the Russians.

The Polish rebels and the Russian autocrats saw the future differently: some dreamed of reviving statehood by any means, others thought in terms of an imperial home in which there was a place for everyone, including the Poles. It is also impossible to underestimate the context of the era - in the first half of the 19th century, the Russians were the only Slavic people who had statehood, and great at that. Ottoman domination in the Balkans was seen as enslavement, and Russian power as deliverance from suffering (from the same Turks or Persians, Germans or Swedes, or simply from native savagery). In fact, such a view was not without reason - the imperial authorities were very loyal to the traditional beliefs and customs of the subject peoples, did not try to achieve their Russification, and in many cases the transition under the rule of the Russian Empire was a real deliverance from destruction.

Following their usual policy, the Russian autocrats willingly integrated the local elites. But if we talk about Poland and Finland, then the system failed. We can only remember Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski, who in 1804-1806 held the post of Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, but thought more about the interests of Poland.

Contradictions accumulated gradually. If in 1830 the Polish insurgents came out with the words "For our and your freedom", then in 1863, in addition to the slogan "Freedom, equality, fraternity", completely bloodthirsty calls were already heard. The methods of guerrilla warfare intensified, and even the liberal-minded public, which at first sympathized with the rebels, quickly changed their minds about them. In addition, the rebels thought not only about national liberation, but also about the restoration of statehood within the borders that the Commonwealth had before the divisions. And the slogan "For our freedom and yours" practically lost its former meaning and was now more associated with the hope that other peoples of the empire would rise, and then it would inevitably collapse. On the other hand, when evaluating such aspirations, we must not forget that the Russian Narodnaya Volya and the anarchists hatched no less destructive plans.

The dense, but somewhat squeamish neighborhood of the two peoples in the 19th century gave rise to mostly negative stereotypes. During the fires in St. Petersburg in 1862, there was even a belief among the people that “students and Poles” were to blame for everything. This was a consequence of the circumstances under which peoples met. A considerable part of the Poles with whom the Russians dealt were political exiles, often insurgents. Their fate in Russia is constant wandering, need, outcast, the need to adapt. Hence the notion of Polish thievery, cunning, flattery and painful ambition. The latter is also understandable - these people tried to preserve human dignity in difficult conditions. On the Polish side, an equally unpleasant opinion was formed about the Russians. Rudeness, cruelty, uncouthness, servility to the authorities - that's what these Russians are.

Among the rebels there were many representatives of the nobility, as a rule, well-educated. Their exile to Siberia and the Urals, willy-nilly, had a positive cultural significance for remote regions. In Perm, for example, the architect Alexander Turchevich and the founder of the first bookstore, Jozef Piotrovsky, are still remembered.

After the uprising of 1863-1864, the policy towards the Polish lands changed seriously. The authorities tried at all costs to avoid a repetition of the rebellion. However, a complete misunderstanding of the national psychology of the Poles is striking. The Russian gendarmes supported the type of behavior of the population of the Kingdom of Poland that best suited their own myth of the inflexibility of the Polish spirit. Public executions, persecution of Catholic priests only contributed to the formation of the cult of martyrs. Russification attempts, in particular, in the education system, were extremely unsuccessful.

Even before the uprising of 1863, the opinion was established in Polish society that it would still not be possible to “divorce” the eastern neighbor, and through the efforts of the Marquis of Wielopolski, a policy of consensus was pursued in exchange for reforms. This gave its results - Warsaw became the third most populated city of the Russian Empire, and reforms began in the Kingdom of Poland itself, bringing it to the forefront of the empire. In order to economically connect the Polish lands with other Russian provinces, in 1851 a decision was made to build the Petersburg-Warsaw railway. It was the fourth railway in Russia (after Tsarskoye Selo, St. Petersburg-Moscow, and Warsaw-Vienna). At the same time, the policy of the Russian authorities was aimed at eliminating autonomy and separating from the Kingdom of Poland the eastern territories that were once part of the historical Commonwealth. In 1866, ten provinces of the Kingdom of Poland were directly annexed to Russian lands, and the following year they introduced a ban on the use of the Polish language in the administrative sphere. The logical outcome of this policy was the abolition of the position of viceroy in 1874 and the introduction of the post of Warsaw governor-general. The Polish lands themselves were called the Vistula region, which the Poles still remember.

Such an approach cannot be called fully meaningful, since it actualized the rejection of everything Russian and, moreover, contributed to the migration of Polish resistance to neighboring Austria-Hungary. A little earlier, the Russian Tsar Nicholas I bitterly joked: “The most stupid of the Polish kings was Jan Sobieski, and the most stupid of the Russian emperors was me. Sobieski - because he saved Austria in 1683, and I - because I saved her in 1848. It was in Austria-Hungary at the beginning of the 20th century that Polish extremists, including the future national leader of Poland, Jozef Pilsudski, received asylum.

On the fronts of the First World War, the Poles fought on both sides in the hope that the conflict would weaken the great powers, and Poland would eventually gain independence. At the same time, conservatives in Kraków considered the option of a triune monarchy of Austria-Hungary-Poland, and pro-Russian nationalists such as Roman Dmowski saw Germanism as the greatest threat to the Polish national spirit.

The end of the First World War did not mean for the Poles, unlike other peoples of Eastern Europe, the end of the vicissitudes of state building. In 1918, the Poles suppressed the Western Ukrainian People's Republic, in 1919 they annexed Vilna (Vilnius), and in 1920 they carried out the Kyiv campaign. In Soviet textbooks, Pilsudski's soldiers were called White Poles, but this is not entirely true. During the most difficult battles between the Red Army and Denikin's army, the Polish troops not only stopped the advance to the east, but also made it clear to the Bolsheviks that they were suspending active operations, thereby allowing the Reds to complete the defeat of the Volunteer Army. For a long time, among the Russian emigration, this was perceived as a betrayal. Next - Mikhail Tukhachevsky's campaign against Warsaw and the "miracle on the Vistula", the author of which was Marshal Jozef Pilsudski himself. The defeat of the Soviet troops and the huge number of prisoners (according to the estimates of the prominent Slavist G.F. Matveev, about 157 thousand people), their inhuman suffering in Polish concentration camps - all this became a source of almost inexhaustible Russian hostility towards the Poles. In turn, the Poles have similar feelings towards the Russians after Katyn.

What cannot be taken away from our neighbors is the ability to keep the memory of their suffering. Almost every Polish city has a street named after the victims of the Katyn massacres. And no solution to problematic issues will lead to their renaming, acceptance of historical reality and amendments to textbooks. In the same way, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the Warsaw Uprising will be remembered for a long time in Poland. Few people know that the old corners of the Polish capital are actually rebuilt according to paintings and photographs. After the Warsaw Uprising was suppressed by the Nazis, the city was completely destroyed and looked approximately the same as the Soviet Stalingrad. Any rational arguments explaining the impossibility of supporting the rebels by the Soviet army will not be taken into account. This is part of a national legend, which is more important than the mere fact of the loss of about 20 percent of the population in World War II. In turn, in Russia they will think with sadness about the ingratitude of the Poles, like all other Slavs, for whom we have stood up for the last three centuries.

The reason for the mutual misunderstanding between Russia and Poland is that we have different destinies. We measure in different ways and reason in different categories. The powerful Commonwealth turned into a "toy of God", and Muscovy, which was once in the backyard, became a great empire. Even escaping from the arms of the "big brother", Poland will never find another share, how to be a satellite of other powers. And for Russia there is no other fate than to be an empire or not to be at all.

Despite the fact that Poland's borders are not as long as those of Russia, Germany and many other states, it is nevertheless a fairly large and significant state and has many neighbors. With whom Poland borders and with how many countries - let's see.

Poland's neighbors

Being located in the central part of Europe, the Republic of Poland borders on countries such as:

• Germany is in the western direction.
• Czech Republic - in the southwest.
• Ukraine is in the southeast.
• Slovakia is in the south.
• Lithuania is in the northeast.
• Belarus is in the east.
• Russia is in the northeast.

As for the north, from this side the Polish territory is washed by the Baltic Sea. Of course, international maritime law provides for the existence of maritime and commercial borders of the state. However, there are no countries bordering Poland in this direction. As for the length of the maritime border, it is 440 km. Another important parameter for any state with access to the sea, the length of the coastline, is 770 kilometers.

Good to know! The total length of the Polish state border is 3511 kilometers.

The largest border cities in adjacent areas with different countries:

• Szczecin and Frankfurt an der Oder - with Germany. The German capital, Berlin, is also relatively close.
• Ostrava, Katowice and Wroclaw - with the Czech Republic.
• Krakow - with Slovakia.
• Lublin, Rzeszow, Lviv, Kovel - in the Ukrainian direction.
• Bialystok, Grodno, Brest - from Belarus.
• Suwalki and Marijampole - with the Republic of Lithuania.
• Elbląg and Gdansk are closest to Kaliningrad and the Russian Federation

At the same time, one of the shortest sections (210 km), Poland borders on Russia, and on the shortest - on the Republic of Lithuania (only 104 kilometers). The border strip with the Czech Republic is the longest (796 km), and with neighboring Slovakia - 541 km. The Ukrainian section is 535 km, and the Belarusian one, located a little to the north, is 418 km. The total is 7 neighboring states. And finally, the German border section is 467 kilometers. Now we can see exactly which countries Poland borders on.

Russian-Polish border

The Kaliningrad region and the Warmian-Masurian Voivodeship - it is through these regions that the border between Russia and Poland passes. Also, one should not forget such a site as the Baltic Spit and the sea border passing through the Kaliningrad (Vistula) Bay. This section has several border crossings through which road and rail traffic is carried out.

The history of Poland is closely connected with the history of Russia. Peaceful periods in relations between the two countries were interspersed with frequent armed conflicts.

In the XVI-XVII centuries. Russia and Poland waged numerous wars among themselves. The Livonian War (1558-1583) was fought by Moscow Rus against the Livonian Order, the Polish-Lithuanian state, Sweden and Denmark for hegemony in the Baltic states. In addition to Livonia, the Russian Tsar Ivan IV the Terrible hoped to conquer the East Slavic lands that were part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. For Russian-Polish relations, the unification of Lithuania and Poland into a single state - the Commonwealth (Unia of Lublin in 1569) during the war, became important. The confrontation between Russia and Lithuania was replaced by the confrontation between Russia and Poland. King Stefan Batory inflicted a number of defeats on the Russian army and was stopped only under the walls of Pskov. According to the Yam Zapolsky (1582) peace treaty with Poland, Russia renounced its conquests in Lithuania and lost access to the Baltic.

During the Time of Troubles, the Poles invaded Russia three times. For the first time, under the pretext of helping the supposedly legitimate Tsar Dmitry - False Dmitry I. In 1610, the Moscow government, the so-called Seven Boyars, itself called the Polish prince Vladislav IV to the Russian throne and let the Polish troops into the city. AT 1612. Poles were expelled from Moscow by the people's militia under the command of Minin and Pozharsky. In 1617, Prince Vladislav made a campaign against Moscow. After an unsuccessful assault, he entered into negotiations and signed the Deulin truce. The Poles got Smolensk, Chernigov and Seversk lands.

In June 1632, after the Deulinsky truce, Russia tried to recapture Smolensk from Poland, but was defeated (Smolensk War, 1632 1634). The Poles failed to build on the success, the borders remained unchanged. However, for the Russian government, the most important condition was the official renunciation of the Polish king Vladislav IV from his claims to the Russian throne.

New Russo-Polish War ( 1654-1667 ) began after the adoption of the Hetmanate of Bohdan Khmelnitsky into Russia under the Pereyaslav agreements. According to the peace treaty of Andrusovo, the Smolensk and Chernihiv lands and the Left-bank Ukraine passed to Russia, and Zaporozhye was declared under a joint Russian-Polish protectorate. Kyiv was declared a temporary possession of Russia, but according to the "Eternal Peace" on May 16, 1686, it finally passed to it.

Ukrainian and Belarusian lands became a “bone of contention” for Poland and Russia until the middle of the 20th century.

The end of the Russian-Polish wars was facilitated by the threat to both states from Turkey and its vassal, the Crimean Khanate.

In the Northern War against Sweden 1700-1721 Poland was an ally of Russia.

In the 2nd half of the XVIII century. the gentry of the Commonwealth, torn apart by internal contradictions, was in a state of deep crisis and decline, which made it possible for Prussia and Russia to interfere in its affairs. Russia participated in the War of the Polish Succession 1733-1735.

Sections of the Commonwealth in 1772-1795 between Russia, Prussia and Austria took place without major wars, because the state, weakened due to internal turmoil, could no longer offer serious resistance to more powerful neighbors.

As a result of the three divisions of the Commonwealth and the redistribution at the Congress of Vienna 1814-1815 Tsarist Russia was transferred to most of the Warsaw principality (formed Kingdom of Poland). Polish national liberation uprisings of 1794 (led by Tadeusz Kosciuszko), 1830-1831, 1846, 1848, 1863-1864 were suppressed.

In 1918 The Soviet government annulled all the treaties of the tsarist government on the divisions of the country.

After the defeat of Germany in the First World War, Poland became an independent state. Its leadership made plans to restore the borders of the Commonwealth in 1772. The Soviet government, on the contrary, intended to establish control over the entire territory of the former Russian Empire, making it, as officially declared, a springboard for world revolution.

Soviet-Polish war 1920 began successfully for Russia, Tukhachevsky's troops stood near Warsaw, but then followed the rout. According to various estimates, from 80 to 165 thousand Red Army soldiers were taken prisoner. Polish researchers consider documented the death of 16,000 of them. Russian and Soviet historians put the number at 80,000. According to the Riga Peace Treaty of 1921, Western Ukraine and Western Belarus were ceded to Poland.

August 231939 The Non-Aggression Pact was signed between the USSR and Germany, better known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Attached to the treaty was a secret additional protocol defining the delimitation of Soviet and German spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. On August 28, an explanation was signed to the "secret additional protocol", which delimited the spheres of influence "in the event of a territorial and political reorganization of the regions that are part of the Polish State." The zone of influence of the USSR included the territory of Poland to the east of the line of the rivers Pissa, Narew, Bug, Vistula, San. This line roughly corresponded to the so-called "Curzon Line", along which it was supposed to establish the eastern border of Poland after the First World War.

On September 1, 1939, fascist Germany unleashed World War II by attacking Poland. Having defeated the Polish army within a few weeks, she occupied most of the country. September 17, 1939 In accordance with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Red Army crossed the eastern border of Poland.

Soviet troops captured 240,000 Polish soldiers. More than 14 thousand officers of the Polish army were interned in the fall of 1939 on the territory of the USSR. In 1943, two years after the occupation of the western regions of the USSR by German troops, there were reports that NKVD officers shot Polish officers in the Katyn forest, located 14 kilometers west of Smolensk.

In May 1945 the territory of Poland was completely liberated by units of the Red Army and the Polish Army. Over 600 thousand Soviet soldiers and officers died in the battles for the liberation of Poland.

By the decisions of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference of 1945, Poland was returned to its western lands, and the border along the Oder-Neisse was established. After the war, the construction of a socialist society was proclaimed in Poland under the leadership of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP). The Soviet Union rendered great assistance in the restoration and development of the national economy. In 1945-1993. the Soviet Northern Group of Forces was stationed in Poland; in 1955-1991 Poland was a member of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.
By the manifesto of the Polish Committee of National Liberation of July 22, 1944, Poland was proclaimed the Polish Republic. From July 22, 1952 to December 29, 1989 - the Polish People's Republic. Since December 29, 1989 - the Republic of Poland.

Diplomatic relations between the RSFSR and Poland were established in 1921, between the USSR and Poland - from January 5, 1945, the assignee is the Russian Federation.

May 22, 1992 Russia and Poland signed the Treaty of Friendly and Good Neighborly Relations.
The legal foundation of relations is formed by an array of documents concluded between the former USSR and Poland, as well as over 40 interstate and intergovernmental treaties and agreements signed over the past 18 years.

During the period 2000-2005 political ties between Russia and Poland were maintained quite intensively. President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin had 10 meetings with President of the Republic of Poland Aleksander Kwasniewski. Contacts were regularly made between the heads of government and ministers of foreign affairs, through the parliamentary line. There was a bilateral Committee on the Strategy of Russian-Polish Cooperation, meetings of the Russia-Poland Public Dialogue Forum were held regularly.

After 2005 the intensity and level of political contacts have decreased significantly. This was influenced by the confrontational line of the Polish leadership, expressed in maintaining a socio-political atmosphere unfriendly towards our country.

formed in November 2007 The new Polish government headed by Donald Tusk declares its interest in normalizing Russian-Polish ties, readiness for an open dialogue in order to find solutions to the accumulated problems in bilateral relations.

August 6, 2010 Bronisław Komorowski, the newly elected President of Poland, was inaugurated. In his solemn speech, Komorowski said that he would support the process of rapprochement with Russia that had begun: "I will contribute to the process of rapprochement and Polish-Russian reconciliation that has begun. This is an important challenge facing both Poland and Russia."

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After lengthy negotiations between Russia and Poland, the countries were able to reach an interim agreement on the implementation of mutual cargo transportation by road. As the Deputy Minister of Infrastructure and Construction of Poland, Jerzy Szmit, told reporters, the states have concluded an agreement on the introduction of a transitional period until April 15. Until then, trucks from both countries will be able to deliver goods using special permits. So far, it remains unclear how relations in the field of freight transport between countries will be built in the future.

On Friday afternoon, the conclusion of an agreement with the Poles was also confirmed by the Russian side. According to Nikolai Asaul, Deputy Minister of Transport of Russia, the signed protocol establishes the possibility of transporting goods between the two countries, transit and transporting goods to third countries.

“The parties also assumed obligations to work out the issues of improving national legislation and the 1996 agreement on international road transport. The Russian side - in terms of the number of documents that need to be used to confirm the type of transportation, and the Polish side - in terms of lifting the restriction on the amount of fuel when crossing the border. This document comes into force from the moment of signing. Accordingly, the parties will be able to resume transportation between our countries. The size of the contingent is determined for a two-month period. The forms will be valid until April 15 this year,” the official said after negotiations with the Poles that took place today.

For further discussion, the parties agreed to meet in late March - early April 2016.

Poland is looking for contracts

As Gazeta.Ru is told by participants in the road freight transportation market, both Russia and Poland are pursuing their own goals when concluding such a “temporary truce”. So, the Poles still stick to their plan and do not intend to retreat so easily.

“Poland is cunning,” Valery Alekseev, chairman of the regional council of the Association of International Road Carriers (ASMAP) in the Central Federal District, told Gazeta.Ru. - They want to give us only bilateral permissions.

That is, they still want to take over all cargo transportation in Europe. And the Poles want to leave the opportunity for Russian carriers to work only on the “short arm”, that is, to pick up goods already from the Polish border, from the Baltic states, from Belarus. Their task is to take away all import contracts from us.

During these two months they want to renew all contracts with clients. The Poles will not be able to take orders from us for cargo transportation, only if we retain the possibility of transit through their territory. Their main task is to block our way through their territory. The Poles, of course, cannot rule out the possibility that we will try to work by ferries across the Baltics, through Kaliningrad. But at the moment, when delivering cargo via ferry, you have to pay extra €650, and when transporting through Poland - only $100. Therefore, they hope that prices will be uncompetitive and we will lose all contracts. They want to determine the prices themselves, which will make working with Russian carriers unprofitable, and we will never be able to return to the European market. Hence the difficulties in the negotiations. But we have our secrets and tricks.”

Russia will take a detour

The negotiators do not want to fully disclose Russia's plan in the media in order to maintain an advantage when communicating with the Poles. Among other things, the chairman of the State Duma Committee on Transport Yevgeny Moskvichev declined to comment, saying that he did not participate in the last round of negotiations.

However, as it became known to Gazeta.Ru from a source in ASMAP, during these two months of respite, our country will in every possible way establish alternative ways to bypass Poland. This is done to demonstrate to the opponent their ability to be independent of land routes for the delivery of goods through Poland.

“Now part of the cargo is already moving through Klaipeda,” says a Gazeta.Ru source. - From February 21, ferries with trucks will also go through Kaliningrad. It will be necessary to create a stable flow of vehicles in order to reduce the cash costs for the haul, reduce the waiting time for the ferry.

Shippers will also need to be prepared for this scheme. It is not so easy to do this quickly, which is why we take a timeout for two months. During this time, we will be able to prepare, achieve competitive prices. The containers will also go to Finland and St. Petersburg. Russia has a number of proposals and options to influence the Poles, but I would not like to disclose the details in our own interests.”

Ukraine may try to negotiate with Russia

The agreement in principle between Russia and Poland will become especially important against the backdrop of problems with Ukraine: since February 14, in response to the actual blocking of roads, Russia has officially canceled the transit permit for trucks coming from there. On February 15, Ukraine introduced a similar ban on trucks from Russia. As a result, trucking from Ukraine, according to participants in the Russian market, has practically come to a standstill.

“Now all freight traffic is blocked with Poland, including transit,” Valery Alekseev explained to Gazeta.Ru. - And transit through our territory is more important for them than for us through Ukraine, because they transported their goods mainly to Russia. Now Ukraine has risen. Imagine, now we are negotiating with the Poles, and Ukrainian carriers will not be able to travel either to us or through us. Now they have to somehow get out of this situation, and I think that they can start negotiating with us in order to catch up to the Poles.”

With the opinion that in the event of an aggravation of the transport conflict between Russia and Ukraine, it is the latter that will suffer significantly greater losses, and the Minister of Infrastructure of Ukraine Andriy Pivovarsky.

“It is very important to unblock the issue of transit traffic. It should be understood that about 50,000 Ukrainians work on transit road haulage between Ukraine and Asia. This is a market worth about UAH 4 billion.

If this issue is blocked, then someone will lose business, and the transit potential of Ukraine will decrease and decrease,” Minister Pivovarsky said.

How it all started

Recall that the conflict between Russia and Poland erupted on February 1, 2016 and led to a temporary suspension of freight traffic between the countries, including transit traffic. Deputy Minister of Infrastructure and Construction of Poland Jerzy Szmit said that Russia unilaterally, through administrative decisions, radically restricts access to its market for Polish transport and goods. According to him, road transport between Russia and Poland, including transit to third countries, is regulated by an international agreement of 1996. The Polish side did not agree with the changes that Russia made in this area in December last year, limiting the possibility of transporting goods for third countries.

In the course of complex and lengthy negotiations, the countries first agreed on the possibility of returning all Polish and Russian trucks to the territory of their countries until February 15, and then a transitional period was introduced in cargo traffic until April 15.

The situation escalated when, in the western regions of Ukraine, local patriotic activists began to block Russian trucks that tried to pass to Europe bypassing Poland. The radicals, without the use of violence, turned truckers in the opposite direction, preventing them from reaching the border with Slovakia and Hungary.

In response, Russia officially closed the borders for Ukrainian truckers. The Ministry of Transport of Russia said that the actions of the Ukrainian authorities grossly violate the agreement on international freight traffic between the countries. Ukraine responded with a similar step already at the official level.

As a result, the authorities of Russia and Ukraine were able to agree on the issue of truckers of the two countries and set a 10-day period for all trucks to cross the border without hindrance and return to their homeland. It ends February 25th.

Russian-Polish political relations have a long and complicated history. Suffice it to recall the internecine wars and partitions of Poland, the Polish garrison in Moscow during the Troubles of the 17th century, and the forced membership of Poland in the Russian Empire and the Warsaw Pact. Recently, relations between the two countries have been complicated, due to various factors - from competition in the post-Soviet space to "memory wars" associated with the tragic events of the Second World War.

These problems are also complicated by the lack of "soft power" in both Russia and Poland. Russia, despite the economic successes of recent years, cannot yet compete with the West as a center of attraction attractive from political, economic and cultural points of view. It is still perceived by Western (including Polish) reference groups as a mysterious authoritarian country - the successor of the former USSR. At the same time, the “attraction” of Poland in Russia (despite the personality of the late Pope John Paul II and the novels of Henryk Sienkiewicz familiar to many Russians since childhood) is significantly inferior to the “attraction” of the largest countries of “old Europe” - France and Germany. Poland is perceived by the Russian establishment not as a significant European player, but as one of the countries of the former Soviet bloc, a European “neophyte” that is as close as possible to the United States and supports the anti-Russian tendencies that exist in the Baltic countries and in the post-Soviet space as a whole (the question of the perception of Poland by the Russian population generally discussed below).

Russians about Poland

It is well known that political decisions are made taking into account public opinion, they are influenced by stereotypes existing in society. It should be noted that the attitude of Russian society towards Poland in recent years is characterized by deterioration, but does not reach hostility. Thus, according to the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM), from October 2001 to December 2006, the number of respondents who believe that Poland is a state friendly to Russia decreased from 57% to 30%. Accordingly, the number of Russians who consider Poland an unfriendly state increased from 25 to 38%. In 2006, 29% believed that Russian-Polish relations were deteriorating, and only 6% said they were improving. Note, however, that such an assessment was given against the backdrop of the Polish government's veto on negotiations on an agreement between Russia and the European Union.

It is characteristic, however, that when answering a question from the FOM about the motives that guided the Polish authorities when deciding to veto, Russians who had an idea of ​​the essence of the problem (only 19% of the respondents said they were familiar with this topic and another 20% “something heard about it”), they chose neutral ratings more often. The most popular answer (12% of all respondents) was calmly analytical: "This is a response to Russia's ban on the import of meat from Poland." Another 3% thought that "this is due to economic reasons, Poland has its own benefits and interests." Pronounced anti-Polish formulations (“Poland treats Russia badly, wants to harm us”, “These are the ambitions of the Polish leadership, a manifestation of an inferiority complex, Poland has bad leaders”), in total, was supported by only 5% of respondents.

The attitude towards the state extends to a lesser extent to its citizens. From 2001 to 2005 (no such question was asked in 2006), according to the FOM, the number of Russians who are well disposed towards the Poles decreased only from 64 to 51%. And the number of those who dislike the Poles generally fluctuates within the limits of statistical error (13% - in 2001, 14% - in 2005). It should be noted that in 2005 the question was asked in a difficult informational situation, when the Russian media paid much attention to the hooligan beating of a group of Russian teenagers in Poland (information about the beating of several Polish citizens that followed this in Moscow was given in more dosed). But even in such an environment, the number of “polonophobes” practically did not increase. 43% of respondents felt that the majority of Poles condemned the beating of teenagers (only 4% supported the opposite position). In turn, 50% said that the majority of Russians condemn attacks on Polish citizens, and only 5% approve.

The All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) conducts polls on which countries Russians consider friendly and which are hostile. Poland occupies a rather modest place in both response hierarchies. In May 2008, she was considered an enemy by 5% of respondents. For comparison: at the same time - that is, even before the hostilities in the South Caucasus - the United States and Georgia were considered an enemy by 25% each, Ukraine - by 21% of respondents. The same survey showed that 2% of respondents consider Poland among Russia's friends. In 2005 and 2006, Levada Center asked respondents a similar question, and its data turned out to be quite close - Poland was classified as an enemy by 4% and 7% of respondents, respectively. True, in 2007 there was a jump to 20%, which can be attributed to the complication of bilateral relations under the rule of the Kaczynski brothers in Poland (in this case, we are talking about a local phenomenon, not a trend).

Thus, public opinion in Russia is not of an anti-Polish nature. However, the perception of Poland by the majority of respondents is based on the Soviet experience, often of a nostalgic nature (during this period, Soviet-Polish relations were perceived idealized in the USSR, largely based on the cultural factor). According to VTsIOM, when mentioning Poland, Russians most often remember the singers Anna German (47%) and Edita Piekha (45%). In third place by a wide margin (22%) is actress Barbara Brylska, who played one of the main roles in the "cult" Soviet film of the 1970s "Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears". Pope John Paul II was only in sixth place (16%), Lech Walesa - in seventh (14%), Andrzej Wajda - in 15th (4%).

In any case, politicians cannot find serious support in public opinion for a tough confrontation with Poland. Russian society tends towards Poland rather calmly and with restraint, without great negative emotions.

Relationship problems

Among the problems that complicate modern Russian-Polish relations, the following can be singled out.

Economic contradictions. The "meat" trade war between Russia and Poland is well known, which had a negative impact on bilateral relations, in particular, by stimulating the Polish government's veto on negotiations between Russia and the European Union. However, trade wars by themselves do not necessarily translate into political problems (this is evidenced by the many years of experience of Western states). Characteristically, Poland was not among the countries that Russia considers guilty of slowing down the process of its accession to the WTO. This responsibility lies primarily with the United States, while the Polish position is part of the EU's overall policy on this issue. In addition, it was only under the government of Yaroslav Kaczynski that economic contradictions led to serious political consequences - thus, a subjective factor of a transient nature plays a significant role in this issue (in Russia it acts less given the phenomenon of the continuity of Russian political power).

A more complex economic and political issue is the construction of the North European gas pipeline between Russia and Germany, bypassing Poland, which may lead to a decrease in the role of Poland as a transit country. However, this project is being implemented jointly by Russia and Germany and meets the interests of the largest German gas concerns. Thus, the possibilities for converting these contradictions into a large-scale conflict are significantly reduced. In addition, the construction of the gas pipeline only contributes to the diversification of gas supply routes, and not the complete elimination of the transit status of Poland. Moreover, Gazprom recently signed an agreement on becoming one of the owners of the Beltransgaz company - the more it will be unprofitable for it to completely abandon the western land route.

Poland's membership in NATO. In itself, this problem is not significant - Russia reacted quite calmly to Poland's integration into the North Atlantic bloc, which was due to several factors. But if Russia's weakness in the 1990s (when the integration process was taking place) can be attributed to a number of temporary factors, then the perception of Poland as a European country, a member of Western civilization, is permanent. It is characteristic that Samuel Huntington, who was skeptical about the integration of the Orthodox countries of Europe into NATO because of fears of a conflict with Russia, perceived at that time the inclusion of Poland in the bloc as a natural phenomenon that should not cause too much rejection in Moscow. In Russia in the 1990s, many believed that the West would act within the framework of such recommendations, which reconciled its elite with the inclusion of not only Poland, but even the Baltic states (albeit with much more reservations) in the bloc.

However, the general deterioration of relations between Russia and NATO after the hostilities in the South Caucasus can also complicate the Russian-Polish dialogue. Moreover, Russia perceives Poland (unlike Hungary or Slovakia) as a supporter of the anti-Russian line in NATO, closer to the United States than to “old Europe”, with which Russia was able to build more positive relations. However, the NATO factor itself is of secondary importance.

"Third positional area" PRO USA. More significant for Russian-Polish relations is the problem of deploying elements of the third US missile defense position area on the territory of the countries of Central Europe: Poland and the Czech Republic. Officially, this project is motivated by the need to protect the territory of Europe from a potential Iranian threat, but in Russia it is considered directed precisely against it. At the same time, we are talking about a practically consensus position shared by all four Russian parliamentary parties - only a small minority (liberal "Westerners") do not consider the American missile defense system a threat to Russia. However, this minority does not currently enjoy significant political influence.

For some time in Russia, the degree of consolidation of the Polish political elite on the issue of missile defense was downplayed, there was a tendency to exaggerate the contradictions between the positions of President Lech Kaczynski and Prime Minister Donald Tusk. This point of view was supported both by stylistic differences in the positions of the country's leaders (for example, Tusk, shortly after coming to the post of head of government, initiated consultations with Russia on missile defense issues, which Kaczynski avoided), and by different methods of negotiating with the United States on this issue. In fact, Tusk adopted the tactics of political bargaining with the United States, while Kaczynski was focused on signing agreements as soon as possible.

However, the downplaying of the degree of disagreement concerned mainly the Russian media. Politicians who seriously influence decision-making did not see in this case fundamental disagreements between various Polish politicians, recognizing the high value for the Polish elite of strategic relations with the United States. It was only about when a compromise would be reached - before or after the US presidential election. Therefore, the signing of the Polish-American agreement at the height of the conflict in the South Caucasus did not come as a surprise to Moscow. This is evidenced by the reaction of the Russian side to the signing of the agreement - the visit to Poland of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, sustained in emphatically calm tones. It was unprofitable for Russia to complicate relations with Warsaw in a situation where Russian-Western relations were in a state of the most serious crisis in the last two decades. Since the principal course was taken to preserve the maximum possible positive in the European direction (although the level of trust between Russia and Europe inevitably decreased), Russia's softer position towards Poland looked quite natural.

It seems that in Russia, of course, they will continue to have a negative attitude towards the deployment of an American missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic, but the response actions will be carefully verified. Moreover, the issue of deploying American anti-missiles in Poland is a long-term one, stretched out over several years (note the reduction by the US Congress of appropriations for the implementation of this project), which reduces the severity of the issue. Finally, there are a number of technical problems that, when discussing this issue, can come to the fore and create a basis for making compromise decisions - in particular, we are talking about the possibility of inspections of missile defense facilities by Russian officers.

Competition in the post-Soviet space. This is the most important issue in bilateral relations. Russia considers the territory of the CIS to be its sphere of influence, which is at odds with the position of Western countries, including Poland. In Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, the interests of Russia and Poland are of an opposite nature. If Poland insists on the need for democratic development of the post-Soviet states, then Russia believes that such actions are aimed at reducing its influence in the region, “eroding” the pro-Russian elites, and promoting pro-Western politicians to power. In turn, in Poland, Russia is perceived as an empire striving by any means for geopolitical revenge, the restoration of the USSR, even if in a modified form.

First, we note the close ties between the Polish political elite and the “orange” forces in Ukraine since the time preceding the 2004 revolution, while Russia was relying on the Party of Regions of Viktor Yanukovych. It should be noted that at that time the center-left Aleksander Kwasniewski was the president of Poland, so sympathies for the “orange” are of a consensual nature (the only exception that confirms the rule is the former deputy of the Seimas from the “Self-Defence” Mateusz Piskorski). In the Georgian direction, both the president and the government of Poland supported Mikheil Saakashvili during the August conflict with Russia - the differences were only in the degree of emotionality and confrontation. Poland is one of the main supporters of the early accession of Ukraine and Georgia to the NATO Integration Action Plan.

Secondly, Russia supports the regime of Alexander Lukashenko in Belarus in the form in which it took shape in the 1990s (and became part of the Union State), while Poland, along with other European countries, insists on its democratization. It is also very difficult to combine interests in this matter, although the competition in the Belarusian direction is not so tough (the pro-Russian orientation will remain the priority of the Lukashenka regime in the foreseeable future).

In the foreseeable future, the harmonization of Russian-Polish interests in the post-Soviet space is hardly possible - the differences between the parties are too great. Changes are possible only in the general context of relations between Russia and Europe on the basis of mutual interests.

"Memory Wars". This topic is painful for Poland, primarily in the context of the Katyn drama. Russia is in the process of self-affirmation and reacts painfully to allegations of its historical guilt, even in the distant past. At the same time, she does not want to give up the official point of view, placing the responsibility for the Katyn tragedy on the Soviet punitive authorities. The “Stalinist” point of view, according to which Polish officers were shot by the Germans, is marginal and is supported only by nationalist and communist circles, as well as (to varying degrees) by some media. The latter use this topic in indirect polemics with the Polish side. A more popular point of view is that the Katyn massacre was a response to the deaths of Red Army soldiers during and after the Soviet-Polish war of 1920 (it even penetrates materials for school textbooks). At the same time, the number of dead Red Army soldiers in journalism is sharply overestimated compared to the results of studies by Russian and Polish historians.

There are two more complicating moments in the Katyn theme. The first of them is the refusal of the Russian authorities to declassify all materials about this crime. As far as can be judged, it was connected with the unwillingness to publish the names of the perpetrators of this crime, some of whom may still be alive. The experience of the policy of the Baltic countries towards former Soviet officials and military men accused of committing genocide has shown that even now such people can be prosecuted. The second point is the fears of the Russian side that the descendants of the dead officers will file claims against Russia in the European Court of Human Rights. Hence the extremely restrained attitude towards the judicial rehabilitation of the dead (last week the court again rejected the request for rehabilitation), which paves the way for such a development of events (due to similar fears, the rehabilitation of the last Russian Tsar Nicholas II was delayed, which took place only on October 1, 2008 ).

The topic of “memory wars”, despite its soreness, can be softened due to the fact that the degree of its tension largely depends on political relations between countries. In the event of an increase in trust in these relations, it will be possible to consider the issue of positive changes in this matter. Time and calm discussion of difficult issues can heal many wounds.

Public Holiday. The proclamation of November 4 (the day Moscow was liberated from Polish troops in 1612) as a public holiday in Russia can hardly be regarded as a conscious anti-Polish decision. The fact is that the Russian authorities were faced with the task of selecting a replacement on November 7 (the day the Bolsheviks came to power in 1917) - this day, despite fundamental political changes, continued to be a public holiday, which was used to the maximum by the Communist Party, which was in opposition. On this day, she organized mass actions, which were attended by Russians who were nostalgic for the Soviet past. The new Russia, moreover, needed its own attributes that would fit into the tradition of the old "pre-Soviet" Russia. The day of November 4 looked very attractive in this respect - close to November 7 (so the usual day off for Russians in the first ten days of November was preserved), Orthodox-oriented (on this day, believers celebrate the feast of the Kazan Icon of the Mother of God, traditionally revered in Russia), patriotic and, of course, a non-communist holiday. In addition, this holiday was associated with the end of the Troubles, which created parallels with the activities of Vladimir Putin, during which socio-economic stabilization took place.

Problems in Russian-Polish relations should not be exaggerated or underestimated. In the current difficult state of bilateral relations, it is possible to resolve many issues on a compromise basis. First of all, we are talking about economic relations; “Memory wars” are renewed and faded depending on the political situation. Close cooperation between Poland and the United States on the issue of creating a “third missile defense position area” is a more significant problem for Russia, but at the same time it is subject to discussion during consultations that will allow reaching compromise solutions in the future.

The main problem of bilateral relations is the disagreement over the definition of the "rules of the game" in the post-Soviet space. Both Russia and Poland operate on this territory as active geopolitical players that are in competitive relations with each other. The possibility of improving the situation depends largely on the general nature of relations between Russia and Europe (in the context of which Russian-Polish relations can also be included) and the severity of existing irritants, primarily the Atlantic integration of Georgia and Ukraine.

Alexey Makarkin - Vice President of the Center for Political Technologies