When a modern Russian person hears the words "lightning war", "blitzkrieg", the first thing that comes to mind is the Great Patriotic War and Hitler's failed plans for an instant conquest of the Soviet Union. However, this tactic was not used by Germany for the first time. At the beginning of the war, the German General A. Schlieffen, who was later called the blitzkrieg theorist, developed a plan for the "lightning" crushing of enemy forces. History has shown that the plan was unsuccessful, but it is worth talking about the reasons for the failure of the blitzkrieg plan in more detail.

World War I: causes, participants, goals

Before analyzing what are the reasons for the failure of the blitzkrieg plan, one should first analyze the prerequisites for the outbreak of hostilities. The cause of the conflict was the contradiction of the geopolitical interests of two political blocs: the Entente, which included Great Britain, France and the Russian Empire, and the Triple Alliance, the participants of which were Germany, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Italy, and later (since 1915) and Turkey. There was a need to redistribute the colonies, markets and spheres of influence.

The Balkans, where many Slavic peoples lived, became a special zone of political tension in Europe, and the European great powers often took advantage of the many contradictions between them. The reason for the war was the assassination of the heir to the Emperor of Austria-Hungary Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo, in response to which Serbia received an ultimatum from Austria-Hungary, the terms of which practically deprived it of sovereignty. Despite Serbia's willingness to cooperate, on July 15 (July 28, New Style), 1914, Austria-Hungary launched a war against Serbia. Russia agreed to side with Serbia, which led to Germany's declaration of war on Russia and France. The last member of the Entente - England - entered the conflict on 4 August.

General Schlieffen's plan

The idea of ​​the plan, in essence, was to devote all forces to victory in the only decisive battle, to which the war would boil down. The enemy (French) army was planned to be surrounded from the right flank and destroyed, which would undoubtedly lead to the surrender of France. It was planned to strike the main blow in the only tactically convenient way - through the territory of Belgium. On the Eastern (Russian) front, it was supposed to leave a small barrier, counting on the slow mobilization of Russian troops.

Such a strategy seemed well thought out, albeit risky. But what are the reasons for the failure of the blitzkrieg plan?

Moltke's changes

The high command, fearing the failure of the blitzkrieg plans, considered the Schlieffen plan too risky. Under pressure from dissatisfied military leaders, some changes were made to it. The author of the modifications, Chief of the German General Staff H. I. L. von Moltke, proposed to strengthen the left wing of the army to the detriment of the attacking grouping on the right flank. In addition, additional forces were sent to the Eastern Front.

Reasons for making changes to the original plan

1. The German command was afraid to radically strengthen the right wing of the army, which was responsible for encircling the French. With a significant weakening of the forces of the left wing, combined with an active offensive by the enemy, the entire rear of the Germans was threatened.

2. Resistance of influential industrialists over the possible surrender of the Alsace-Lorraine region into the hands of the enemy.

3. The economic interests of the Prussian nobility (Junkers) made it necessary to divert a rather large group of troops to the defense of East Prussia.

4. The transport capabilities of Germany did not allow supplying the right wing of the army to the extent that Schlieffen assumed.

Campaign of 1914

In Europe, there was a war on the Western (France and Belgium) and Eastern (against Russia) fronts. Actions on the Eastern Front were called the East Prussian operation. In its course, two Russian armies coming to the aid of allied France invaded East Prussia and defeated the Germans in the Gumbinnen-Goldap battle. In order to prevent the Russians from striking Berlin, the German troops had to transfer part of the troops to East Prussia from the right wing of the Western Front, which ultimately became one of the reasons for the failure of the blitzkrieg. We note, however, that on the Eastern Front this transfer brought success to the German troops - two Russian armies were surrounded, and about 100 thousand soldiers were captured.

On the Western Front, the timely assistance of Russia, which pulled the German troops back on itself, allowed the French to put up serious resistance and prevent the German blockade of Paris. The bloody battles on the banks of the Marne (September 3-10), in which approximately 2 million people participated on both sides, showed that the First World War turned from a lightning-fast one into a protracted one.

Campaign of 1914: Summing up

By the end of the year, the advantage was on the side of the Entente. The troops of the Triple Alliance were defeated in most of the battlefields.

In November 1914, Japan occupied the German port of Jiaozhou in the Far East, as well as the Mariana, Caroline and Marshall Islands. The rest of the Pacific passed into the hands of the British. In Africa at that time, hostilities were still going on, but it was clear that these colonies were lost for Germany.

The fighting in 1914 showed that Schlieffen's plan for a quick victory did not live up to the expectations of the German command. What reasons for the failure of the blitzkrieg plan have become apparent by this point will be discussed below. A war of attrition began.

As a result of hostilities, by the end of 1914, the German military command moved the main military operations to the east - in order to withdraw Russia from the war. Thus, by the beginning of 1915, Eastern Europe became the main theater of military operations.

Reasons for the failure of the German blitzkrieg plan

So, as mentioned above, by the beginning of 1915 the war had entered a protracted stage. Finally, consider what are the reasons for the failure of the blitzkrieg plan.

To begin with, we note that the German command tritely underestimated the strength of the Russian army (and the Entente as a whole) and its readiness for mobilization. In addition, following the lead of the industrial bourgeoisie and the nobility, the German army often made decisions that were not always tactically correct. Some researchers in this regard argue that it was Schlieffen's original plan, despite its riskiness, that had a chance of success. However, as mentioned above, the reasons for the failure of the blitzkrieg plan, which were mainly the unpreparedness of the German army for a long war, as well as the dispersal of forces in connection with the demands of the Prussian junkers and industrialists, are largely due to the changes made to the plan by Moltke, or, as they often referred to as "Moltke's errors".

In the early 40s of the twentieth century, the main leadership of Germany tried to develop its own unique plan to take over the Soviet Union. The uniqueness of the idea was its time frame. It was assumed that the seizure would last no more than five months. The development of this document was approached very responsibly, not only Hitler himself worked on it, but also his inner circle. Everyone understood that if they did not quickly occupy the territory of a huge state and did not stabilize the situation in their favor, many adverse consequences could occur. Hitler clearly understood that he had already begun the Second World War and quite successfully, however, in order to achieve all the goals set, maximum resources should be attracted, including mental ones. In the event of a failure in the plan, the Union can be provided with a variety of assistance by other countries that are not interested in the victory of Nazi Germany. Fuhrer understood that the defeat of the USSR would enable Germany's ally to completely untie his hands in Asia and prevent the insidious United States of America from interfering.
The European continent was firmly in Adolf's hands, but he wanted more. Moreover, he was well aware that the USSR was not a powerful enough country (yet) and I. Stalin would not be able to openly oppose Germany, but his interests were in Europe and, in order to eliminate any inclinations, it was necessary to eliminate the opponent undesirably in the future.

Adolf Hitler planned to end the war against the Soviet Union before he could end the war against Great Britain. It was going to be the fastest company ever to conquer vast territory in such a short time. The ground forces of Germany were planned to be sent to conduct combat operations. The Air Force will have to fully provide any necessary support in order to cover and protect its military. Any actions that are planned to take place on the territory of the Soviet Union must be fully coordinated with the command and must not interfere with the established interests of capturing Great Britain.
It was said that all large-scale actions aimed at the thorough preparation of a lightning capture against the USSR should be carefully disguised so that the enemy could not find out about them and not take any countermeasures.

Hitler's Biggest Mistakes

Many historians, who have been studying the situation with the development and implementation of a plan for the instant capture of the Union for several decades, come to one single thought - regarding the adventurousness and senselessness of this idea. The commanding fascist generals also gave an assessment of the plan. They considered it the main, one might say fatal mistake - the Fuhrer's keen desire to occupy the territory of the country of the Soviets until the final end of the war with England.
Hitler wanted to start action in the fall of the fortieth year, but his military leaders were able to dissuade him from this crazy idea, citing a lot of convincing arguments. The events described suggest that Hitler had an obsessive obsession with establishing complete world domination and a crushing and intoxicating victory in Europe did not give him the opportunity to thoughtfully make some of the most important strategic decisions.
The second, most important, according to historians, mistake in the plan was that they constantly retreated from it. Hitler changed his instructions several times, because of which precious time was lost. Although he surrounded himself with excellent commanders, whose advice would help him achieve what he wanted and conquer the territory of the country of councils. However, they were opposed by the personal ambitions of the dictator, which were higher for the Fuhrer than common sense.
In addition, an important mistake of the Fuhrer is the involvement of only part of the combat-ready divisions. If all possible forces were involved, the consequences of the war could be completely different, and now history would be written completely different. At the time of the offensive, part of the combat-ready divisions were in Great Britain, as well as North Africa.

Hitler's main idea regarding the lightning speed of the work of the plan

He believed that the important point was the ability to break ground forces with the help of active tank attacks. Adolf saw the purpose of the operation solely as the division of existing Russia into two parts along the Volga and Arkhangelsk. This would allow him to keep the main industrial region of the country in operation, but have full control over it, as well as create an unprecedented shield dividing the country into European and Asian parts.
In addition, the first priority was to deprive the Baltic Fleet of its bases, which would allow the Germans to exclude Russian participation in the battles.
Complete secrecy was given regarding future actions of conquest. Only a certain circle of people were privy to this. They were charged with coordinating actions in preparation for the invasion without unnecessary dissemination of information. It got to the point that the whole country was closely involved in the preparation, and only a few knew exactly what was to happen and what tasks were assigned to the fascist army.

Outcome

The plan failed. In fact, this happened with the consent of Hitler, when he began to retreat from his intended goals. This is a huge plus for the entire Russian people, we don’t know how we would live now if the legendary plan for the instantaneous conquest of Russia, created in the fortieth year of the twentieth century, became successful and achieved all the goals set in it. One can only be glad that the commanders-in-chief of the German troops made several cardinal mistakes that did not allow him to achieve world domination and establish his ideology throughout the globe.

The meaning of the word "blitzkrieg" (Blitzkrieg - "lightning", Krieg - "war") is known to many. This is military strategy. It implies a lightning attack on the enemy using a large amount of military equipment. It is assumed that the enemy will not have time to deploy his main forces and will be successfully defeated. This is exactly the tactic used by the Germans when they attacked the Soviet Union in 1941. We will talk about this military operation in our article.

Background

The blitzkrieg theory emerged in the early 20th century. It was invented by the German commander Alfred von Schlieffen. The tactics were very smart. The world was experiencing an unprecedented technological boom, and new military means were at the disposal of the military. But during the First World War, the blitzkrieg failed. The imperfection of military equipment and weak aviation affected. The rapid advance of Germany on France bogged down. The successful application of this method of warfare was postponed until better times. And they came in 1940, when fascist Germany carried out a lightning-fast occupation, first in Poland, and then in France.

"Barborossa"

In 1941, it was the turn of the USSR. Hitler rushed to the East with a very specific goal. He needed to neutralize the Soviet Union in order to consolidate his dominance in Europe. England continued to resist, counting on the support of the Red Army. This hindrance had to be removed.

To attack the USSR, the Barbarossa plan was developed. It was based on the theory of blitzkrieg. It was a very ambitious project. The German war machine was about to unleash all its might on the Soviet Union. The main forces of the Russian troops were considered possible to destroy through the operational invasion of tank divisions. Four battle groups were created, uniting tank, motorized and infantry divisions. They had to first penetrate far behind enemy lines, and then unite with each other. The ultimate goal of the new blitzkrieg was to seize the territory of the USSR up to the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line. Before the attack, Hitler's strategists were sure that the war with the Soviet Union would take them only three to four months.

Strategy

The German troops were divided into three large groups: "North", "Center" and "South". "North" was advancing on Leningrad. "Center" rushed to Moscow. "South" was supposed to conquer Kyiv and Donbass. The main role in the attack was assigned to tank groups. There were four of them, led by Guderian, Goth, Gopner and Kleist. It was they who were supposed to carry out a fleeting blitzkrieg. It wasn't all that impossible. However, the German generals miscalculated.

Start

On June 22, 1941, the Great Patriotic War began. German bombers were the first to cross the border of the Soviet Union. They bombed Russian cities and military airfields. It was a smart move. The destruction of Soviet aviation gave the invaders a serious advantage. Particularly severe damage was inflicted in Belarus. In the very first hours of the war, 700 aircraft were destroyed.

Then the German ground divisions entered the blitzkrieg. And if the army group "North" managed to successfully cross the Neman and approach Vilnius, then the "Center" met with unexpected resistance in Brest. Of course, this did not stop the elite Nazi units. However, it made an impression on the German soldiers. For the first time they understood with whom they would have to deal. Russians died, but did not give up.

tank battles

The German Blitzkrieg in the Soviet Union failed. But Hitler had a huge chance of success. In 1941, the Germans had the most advanced military equipment in the world. Therefore, the very first tank battle between the Russians and the Nazis turned into a massacre. The fact is that Soviet combat vehicles of the 1932 model were defenseless against enemy guns. They did not meet modern requirements. More than 300 T-26 and BT-7 light tanks were destroyed in the first days of the war. However, in some places the Nazis met with serious resistance. The meeting with the brand new T-34s and KV-1s was a big shock for them. German shells flew off from the tanks, which seemed to the invaders like unprecedented monsters. But the general situation at the front was still catastrophic. The Soviet Union did not have time to deploy its main forces. The Red Army suffered huge losses.

Chronicle of events

Period from June 22, 1941 to November 18, 1942 historians call the first stage of the Great Patriotic War. At this time, the initiative entirely belonged to the invaders. In a relatively short period of time, the Nazis occupied Lithuania, Latvia, Ukraine, Estonia, Belarus and Moldova. Then the enemy divisions began the siege of Leningrad, captured Novgorod and Rostov-on-Don. However, the main goal of the Nazis was Moscow. This would have allowed the Soviet Union to strike at the very heart. However, the lightning offensive quickly got out of the approved schedule. On September 8, 1941, the military blockade of Leningrad began. Wehrmacht troops stood under it for 872 days, but were never able to conquer the city. The Kyiv cauldron is considered the largest defeat of the Red Army. More than 600,000 people died in it. The Germans seized a huge amount of military equipment, opened their way to the Sea of ​​\u200b\u200bAzov and Donbass, but ... they lost precious time. No wonder the commander of the second tank division, Guderian, left the front line, appeared at Hitler's headquarters and tried to convince him that the main task of Germany at the moment was the occupation of Moscow. Blitzkrieg is a powerful breakthrough inland, which turns into a complete defeat for the enemy. However, Hitler did not listen to anyone. He preferred to send military units of the "Center" to the South to seize territories where valuable natural resources are concentrated.

The failure of the blitzkrieg

This is a turning point in the history of Nazi Germany. Now the Nazis had no chance. It is said that General Field Marshal Keitel, when asked when he first realized that the blitzkrieg had failed, answered only one word: "Moscow." The defense of the capital turned the tide of the Second World War. On December 6, 1941, the Red Army launched a counteroffensive. After that, the "lightning" war turned into a battle of attrition. How could enemy strategists miscalculate so? Among the reasons, some historians name the total Russian off-road and severe frost. However, the invaders themselves pointed to two main reasons:

• fierce enemy resistance;
• biased assessment of the defense capability of the Red Army.

Of course, the fact that Russian soldiers defended their Motherland also played a role. And they managed to defend every inch of their native land. The failure of the blitzkrieg of fascist Germany against the USSR is a great feat that causes sincere admiration. And this feat was accomplished by the soldiers of the multinational Red Army.

The decisive military-political event of the first year of the Great Patriotic War was the defeat of the Nazi hordes near Moscow - their first major defeat in the course of the Second World War as a whole.

By the end of April 1942, the losses of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front were almost 5 times higher than all the losses suffered in Poland, Western Europe and the Balkans. The significance of this event cannot be overestimated. It meant that the Soviet Armed Forces thwarted the implementation of the Barbarossa plan, with the help of which German fascism intended to clear the way for world domination.

The strategy of blitzkrieg, or "blitzkrieg", aimed at the complete destruction of the Soviet state, failed. For the first time, a strategic initiative was wrested from fascist Germany, and she faced the prospect of a protracted war. The myth of the invincibility of the German military machine was also dispelled.

Why did the plan of a "blitzkrieg" against the USSR, which seemed to the Hitlerite military-political leadership a universal and unfailing means of achieving victory, failed: the defeat of eleven states of Europe in less than two years, reasoned in Berlin, is this not a convincing proof?

The question is far from idle. It still retains its relevance today. After all, to this day the strategy of blitzkrieg is quoted very highly in the offensive, aggressive doctrines and plans of the Western powers. The principle of blitzkrieg was at the heart of Israel's "six-day" war of conquest against the Arab countries in 1967. The same principle is now at the basis of the newest American concept of "air-ground" combat operations, which is fixed in military manuals and manuals.

It seemed to the Hitlerite leadership that a powerful, lightning strike would suffice, and success in the fight against the USSR would be assured. At the same time, Nazi Germany relied on the use of its developed military-industrial base, as well as such temporary but significant advantages as the militarization of the country, the exploitation of the military-economic resources of almost all of Western Europe, the long-term preparation of aggression, the complete mobilization of troops, the core of which had experience conduct of modern warfare, secrecy of strategic deployment and surprise attack.

A simultaneous offensive by sin groups against Moscow, Leningrad and the Donets Basin was envisaged. Together with the troops of Germany's satellites, the invading army consisted of 190 divisions, more than 4,000 tanks, and 5,000 aircraft. On the directions of the main attacks, a 5-6-fold superiority in forces was ensured.

The "victorious blitzkrieg" was given 6-8 weeks. However, in the USSR, the strategy of "blitzkrieg" was waiting for a complete collapse. During the grandiose battle near Moscow, which was fought on a front of over 1000 kilometers, Soviet troops pushed the enemy back 140-400 kilometers to the west, destroyed about 500 thousand enemy soldiers and officers, 1300 tanks, 2500 guns.

The enemy was forced to go on the defensive along the entire Soviet-German front. In the days of the battle near Moscow, US President F. Roosevelt informed I.V. Stalin about the general enthusiasm in the United States for the success of the Red Army.

In August 1941, it became obvious to the German military-political leadership that the war did not go according to the Barbarossa plan. The main tasks - the rapid defeat of the Red Army in all directions was not carried out.

Confidence in an early victory began to gradually disappear. The formations of the Red Army more and more often carried out organized attacks on the positions of the armies of the Wehrmacht. If in the first days of the war these actions were poorly thought out, then over time they began to show an ever higher level of preparation.

German blitzkrieg tactics brought tangible successes only in the first weeks of the war. And then the advance of the Wehrmacht slowed down more and more.

Kurt von Tippelskirch wrote as follows:

Much greater results were expected from tank wedges, based on the experience of the war in Europe. The Russians held out with unexpected firmness and tenacity, even when they were bypassed and surrounded.

In this way, they bought time and drew up all the new reserves for counterattacks from the depths of the country, which, moreover, were stronger than expected.

Based on this, Hitler considered that the tactics used until now require too much strength and bring little success.

The "cauldrons" that arose during the defeat of the Polar Front unexpectedly became the first "sticks" in the wheels of the blitzkrieg

"The huge boilers that were formed as a result of the rapid advance of tank formations inevitably had a very elongated shape, and the extended encirclement forces were very weak.

Prior to the approach of the army corps, mobile formations were tasked not only with holding the internal fronts of the encirclement, but also with repelling all attempts to release the encircled troops.

As a result, the fronts of the encirclement were not equally strong everywhere, and the mobile formations had to fight extremely heavy battles on two fronts for several days or even weeks, which had a detrimental effect on their combat effectiveness. The course of the fighting in the areas of Uman and Smolensk strengthened this opinion of Hitler.

Therefore, he wanted to stop large pockets from being created, and Russian forces to be destroyed in small groups in close cooperation between tank groups and field armies. "

This every day lessened the optimism of the Germans. August 26, 1941 Goebbels dictates a radio address to the German people:

“It is clear to everyone that if we manage to wipe the Soviet Union off the face of the earth before the start of winter, then the war for England is practically also lost ...

We have received word that the Württemberg local party groups are busy at the moment mainly to get flags and garlands to meet the victorious troops ... I immediately stop this nonsense.

"The mood of the troops is still good, although losses are sometimes extremely high ... One can hope that, despite the stubbornness of the Bolsheviks, such decisive successes will still be achieved in the near future that we, at least before the start of winter, will achieve the main goals of our eastern campaign.

In those August days, Goebbels decides to visit a POW camp. After his visit, doubts about the possibility of achieving an early victory intensified. On August 27, 1941, he makes an interesting entry:

"The prisoner of war camp presents a terrible picture. Part of the Bolsheviks must sleep on bare ground. The rain pours like a bucket. Most have no roof over their heads ... In short, the picture is not joyful. The types are mostly not as bad as I imagined.

Among them are fresh peasant boys with kind faces. I talked to them and came to a definite conclusion about what was not entirely clear to me about Bolshevism.

Bolshevism, of course, remade the Russian people. If it has not yet penetrated into all the pores of the nation, then in any case it is indisputable that the 25 years of education and government of the people did not pass without a trace and could not but touch these peasant boys.

True, none of these prisoners of war want to consider themselves Bolsheviks, but they, of course, say this in order to make a good impression on us.

Nobody says anything against Stalin. Everyone is convinced that Germany will win the war, but they say this for even greater favor in their favor.

Everyone considers the German people brave and more advanced than the Russian people. On the other hand, they are not so stupid and not at all animals, as one gets the impression when watching our newsreels.

Our guards are doing a hard job. To be daily in this stinking camp, to have contact with these types...

We wander through the camp in the pouring rain for two hours, we see a group of prisoners of about 30 people behind the wire. They were guilty of something, and they want to return them to common sense with a heavy punishment.

When visiting such a POW camp, one can get a strange look at human dignity in times of war.

It's not easy for us to win this war."

Goebbels, seeing the Soviet prisoners and talking with them, was convinced that the war simply could not be won

Exactly on the same day, a note from the OKW on the strategic position was sent to the commanders of military formations at the end of the summer of that year, these doubts manifested themselves even more clearly:

“No less than the battle in the Atlantic, the battles in the Mediterranean are important. The prerequisite for both is the defeat of Soviet Russia.

The defeat of Russia is the immediate and decisive goal of the war, which must be achieved by using all the forces that can be drawn from other fronts. Since this cannot be fully realized in 1941, in 1942 the continuation of the eastern campaign should be the number one task ...

Only after Russia has been defeated militarily should combat operations in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean against England be launched in full force, if possible with the help of France and Spain.

Even if a crushing blow is dealt to Russia this year, it is unlikely that before the spring of 1942 it will be possible to release ground forces and air forces for decisive operations in the Mediterranean, the Atlantic and the Iberian Peninsula.

Already in August 1941, the OKW recognized that it would not be possible to defeat the USSR in 1941

From this analysis of the situation it is clear that the original intention, as early as the autumn of 1941, to undertake operations against the British in the Middle East and withdraw troops from the Russian front turned out to be unrealistic.

At the same time, discontent began to grow among the German people - the war was not what the invaders were used to.

“The opinion is often expressed that the campaign is not developing in the way that could be expected on the basis of the reports published at the beginning of the operation ...

Now it seems that the Russians have a huge amount of weapons and equipment and that their resistance is intensifying ».

"SD reports indicate a decline in public sentiment... The black market is thriving within the country."

“Many citizens of the Reich express dissatisfaction with the fact that hostilities on the Eastern Front have dragged on too long. Increasingly, one can hear statements that the offensive in the East is developing very slowly.

"The people demand, finally, the implementation of our forecasts and promises ... we incorrectly assessed the Bolshevik strength of resistance, we had incorrect figures and based our entire information policy on them."

....................................................................

In early September, Hitler was still convinced that the successful completion of the battle of Smolensk would be a partial defeat of the Red Army.

Hitler's adjutant Nikolaus von Below recalled:

“Despite the disputes with the OKH, Hitler assessed the military situation in the summer of 1941 very positively. He held the view that Stalin would be forced to send his last reserves to the front during September.

If these formations are bled dry, stubborn resistance will cease, and our troops will only have to march forward.

This optimism was justified on certain days, but then reports of stubborn resistance and heavy fighting began to arrive again. On the whole, the Red Army was in a state of partly controlled and partly unregulated retreat.

It was still an open question whether or not to carry out an offensive against Moscow this year. Hitler was against it, but yielded to the insistence of the ground forces. On September 6, Jodl handed over Hitler's Directive No. 35 to the troops.

It spoke of a “decisive operation against Army Group Timoshenko, which is unsuccessfully conducting offensive operations in front of the front of Army Group Center. It must be decisively defeated before the onset of winter within the limited time still available.

After the bulk of the troops of the Timoshenko group have been defeated in this decisive encirclement and destruction operation, Army Group Center must begin to pursue the enemy in the Moscow direction.

Confidence was expressed that as a result of this battle, the enemy would no longer have significant forces to defend his capital. This was also reported during the discussion of the situation.

Hitler cherished the hope that the army of the Red Army near Smolensk was Stalin's last reserve

Meanwhile, during the final stage of the Battle of Smolensk, which began on August 22, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command made another attempt to organize and conduct an offensive by forces of a group of fronts in the Western direction.

The Bryansk Front (since August 25, the troops of the Central Front were included in it) was supposed to defeat the 2nd tank group of the enemy, the Western - to continue the offensive launched on August 16, and reach the Velizh, Demidov, Smolensk, Reserve line - to complete the Yelnin operation, release Yelnya and go to the Roslavl region.

On the entire front, from Andreapol to Novgorod-Seversky, fierce battles unfolded. On the right wing of the Western Front, the enemy delivered a greasy tank attack, broke through the defenses and pushed the 22nd and 29th armies back to the left bank of the Western Dvina.

Near Smolensk, the troops of the Western Front, due to a lack of forces and means, could not break the resistance of the enemy, the 24th and 43rd Armies of the Reserve Front successfully completed the Yelnin offensive

"On the front near Yelnya, the enemy is attacking from all sides. To the north of this sector, apparently, the enemy will launch a general offensive (Stalin). The enemy, under pressure from our units advancing from Toropets, retreats in front of the 6th Army Corps"

The troops of the Western Front liberated Yelnya and by September 8 liquidated the dangerous Yelnya ledge.

In the north, things were going very badly. On September 8, 1941, German troops captured Shlisselburg. This was the beginning of the blockade of Leningrad, cut off from land. Communication with the country remained only through Lake Ladoga and by air.

Uncertainty reigned in the southern direction. Although the Soviet troops in the first weeks of the war suffered heavy losses, they evaded the envelopment planned by the Germans and in an organized manner withdrew their forces beyond the Sluch River, the Western Bug in its upper reaches and the Dniester in the Mogilev region and to the south.

In early July, the troops of the Army Group "South" managed to break through the Soviet defenses. On July 7, the German 11th Panzer Division reached Berdichev, while the 3rd Motorized Corps of the 1st Panzer Group and the 6th Army reached Zhitomir.

As a result of this breakthrough, there was a threat of the capture of Kyiv and the encirclement of units of the 6th and 12th armies of the SWF southwest of Kyiv.

Then came the Uman cauldron.

The situation began to take shape against the SWF. On August 22, the German troops were ordered to destroy the Soviet forces defending in the Kyiv area. By this time, Army Group South had captured a large area between the Southern Bug and the Dnieper with the forces of the 1st Panzer Group, the 11th Army and the Romanian armies.

On August 30, the 21st Army, located north of the Bryansk Front, unexpectedly withdrew, opening the flank of the Southwestern Front. Parts of the Wehrmacht immediately rushed into the breakthrough on the outskirts of Chernigov, and only small divisions of the 15th Rifle Corps remained in their path. In addition to two regiments of the 45th Rifle Division, sent near Chernigov, the 204th Airborne Brigade of the 1st Airborne Forces was transferred there.

The paratroopers and two battalions of the 62nd SD were tasked with liquidating the bridgehead on the Desna in the Vibli area (southeast of Chernigov) captured by the 2nd German Army.
On the evening of September 7, the military council of the Southwestern Front informed the General Staff that the situation at the front had become even more complicated.

The enemy has concentrated superior forces, is developing success in the Konotop, Chernigov, Oster and Kremenchug directions, the threat of encirclement of the main grouping of the 5th Army has clearly been identified. The front made its main efforts in the Kremenchug direction in order to eliminate the enemy bridgehead here. There were no more reserves left at the front.

“There is no particular reason for serious fears at the present time, but on the other hand, one must not forget that military development is still not as desirable as it would be. What could happen if winter suddenly came now, no one can say.

In addition, there is a well-known discord between the Fuhrer and Brauchitsch. Brauchitsch is not at a sufficient height to fulfill the great tasks that face the commander in chief of the eastern campaign.

08/08/1941 Goebbels will doubt the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces V. Brauchitsch (pictured) that he is not able to solve the problem of defeating the USSR

".... the fundamental divergence in the views of Hitler and Brauchitsch on the conduct of operations after the capture of Smolensk aggravated. Hitler adhered to the provisions of his original directive. Brauchitsch and Halder, as well as the major generals of Army Group Center, saw the main goal of operations in the destruction of the Russians armed forces.

They believed that the fastest and surest way to do this was to continue advancing on Moscow.

At the same time, the stubborn resistance of the Russians will have to be overcome: Moscow is not only the capital and seat of the government, but also the largest railway junction, the loss of which would seriously affect the freedom of operational maneuver.

Hitler, on the other hand, wanted at first, as stipulated in the directive, to achieve decisive success in the north and south and at the same time capture important economic regions, which seemed to him decisive.

This is a conflict between Hitler and Brauchitsch, the growth of discontent will end with the resignation of the commander in chief.

“We must gradually prepare the people for waging a long war. We must familiarize them and accustom them to the cruelty of this war. We must put an end to the spread of unfounded illusions.

After it became clear that the eastern campaign could not be completed within the time that we, in fact, expected, the people should know what difficulties we are facing, so that it would be easier for us to induce them to overcome these difficulties with us. .”

And an early victory became an unreasonable illusion

On the same day, September 10, the encirclement of the Red Army armies near Kyiv began. On September 10, the 1st German Panzer Group, together with the 17th Army, launched an offensive. In battles that lasted more than two weeks, the German 2nd Army managed to advance to the Desna and force it. On September 10, the 3rd Panzer Division of the Model, in cooperation with the paratroopers landed in the village of Romny, cut through the positions of the 40th Army.

Using this success, the Germans quickly moved to the rear of the Soviet troops, to Grayvoron. At the same time, the 2nd Panzer Group, constantly repulsing counterattacks against its extended eastern flank, on September 14 advanced units reached the Romny area.

"The enemy, who has broken through to Romny, Lokhvitsa and Northern Podil, Khorol, has not yet been opposed to anything, except for local garrison and fighter detachments, and the advance is proceeding without resistance. The 279th and 7th divisions thrown out in this direction will be only 14.9, and then only with defensive tasks - to prevent the defense of the Piryatin and Priluki nodes from striking at the uncovered rear of the front troops.

Heavy defensive battles were waged by the Soviet 38th Army, from September 12, it began to retreat to the east.

Then, on September 13, Adolf Hitler will convene a meeting, Halder will describe what happened as follows:

Excerpt from approved by the Fuhrer. OKW memos on the strategic situation at the end of the summer of 1941:

1. At the present moment, it is not yet possible to foresee how many forces can be released from the Eastern Front with the onset of winter and how much will be needed for operations next year.

2. In the event that the campaign in the East does not lead during 1941 to the complete annihilation of the Soviet troops, which the high command has long considered possible, this will have the following military and political influence on the general situation:

a) the possibility of a Japanese attack on Russia will become doubtful, but at the same time, America can give Japan an immediate reason to attack (unbelievable!);

b) it will be impossible to prevent communication between Russia and England through Iran;

c) Turkey will consider such a development of the situation very unfavorable for us, but at the same time she will wait until she is convinced of the final defeat of Russia;

d) military measures against Turkey will be ruled out, so you need to try to win Turkey over to your side by political means.

3. In the Mediterranean area, there are no signs of a significant change in the situation. The British advance on Es Sollum and the breakthrough from Tobruk are extremely doubtful.

In the absence of a serious German threat from Syria and Iraq, British positions in the Suez Canal will be increasingly strengthened. The concentration of large enemy forces for the offensive in Libya will be carried out without hindrance (with the help of the Americans).

The position of the Italo-German troops in Libya will worsen if we fail to secure supplies through the Mediterranean or capture Tobruk before the British offensive begins. (This is not possible until October.)

4. Spain will only decide to enter the war when the Italo-German dominance in the Mediterranean is securely secured or when she herself is attacked.

5. France waits and strives, as the situation develops in favor of the Axis, to improve its own position.

6. England and America understand that Germany cannot be defeated on the continent.

Therefore, they aim to increase the difficulty of supplying our troops and, in combination with aerial bombardment, gradually weaken the internal and international position of the Axis powers.

The "danger of intrusion" can be considered eliminated for the time being. The superiority of German aviation has been proven. Our strategic position in the Mediterranean and the resulting general strategic situation can only be radically changed if our adversaries succeed in disrupting German-French cooperation:

- liquidate the German-Italian positions in North Africa;

- to master the entire North African coast;

- to establish supremacy at sea and in the air in the Mediterranean basin;

- to provide Americans with access to French Morocco (Casablanca) and French West Africa (Dakar), and through them to our theater of operations;

- all this to seriously impair the strategic capabilities of the Axis countries;

- further narrow the zone of blockade around Central Europe;

- to exert such pressure on Italy as to cause her capitulation.

Along with this, our opponents, having established ties with Russia through Iran, will support its will to resist in order to prevent the German armed forces from penetrating to the oil regions of the Caucasus. (All of the above are the likely plans of our Anglo-Saxon adversary.)

7. Our solutions. The goal remains the defeat of England and forcing her to peace. Aviation alone is not enough to solve such a problem. The main methods of achieving this goal are invasion and siege.

Invasion is the surest way to quickly end the war!

Prerequisites for an invasion: a) air supremacy;

b) the massive use against the British fleet of the most effective combat means currently available in order to prevent the British from successfully fighting our sea transport; c) mass production of high-quality self-propelled landing barges; d) the creation of large parachute and landing troops.

Halder said bluntly that England was doomed to be invaded

HER fate was in the hands of the USSR and the Soviet people

"All this can be done only if plans for the production of other types of weapons are changed. The necessary time is before the end of the summer of 1942. Further weapons and equipment should be made dependent on whether we attack England on the periphery or directly invade the islands. Means attacks will be extremely varied.

The decision should have been taken now, but this is not yet possible. The production of armaments must be organized in such a way that any of the above options can be implemented.

Blockade: Every month it is necessary to sink enemy ships with a total displacement of up to 1 million tons. The command of the Navy intends to use large reconnaissance forces and the Atlantic air squadron to combat coastal shipping and communications on the high seas.

The massive use of new aircraft mines and torpedoes is expected, as well as the continuation of systematic raids on harbors and shipyards. These plans could not be fully implemented during 1942.

The blockade of England by sufficiently large aviation forces can be started only after the Eastern campaign has been basically completed, and aviation has been restored and increased. According to the command of the Navy, in order to fulfill these plans, it is extremely necessary to improve the conditions for the successful continuation of the battle in the Atlantic by mastering new strategically advantageous naval bases.

Bizerte, Ferrol, Cadiz, Gibraltar, Casablanca, Dakar can be such advantageous bases. The capture of these bases requires the full consent of Spain or France. Spain, apparently, will succumb to our pressure. As for the French "colonial empire, there are no means to put pressure on it, because by the complete occupation of France we will only create conditions for the transition of the French fleet and French colonies to the enemy.

“Realizing that the enemy has sufficient military and political means to achieve the same goal, and that the occupation of these French naval bases can be of decisive military importance, we are obliged to use means of political influence and pressure in order to use political success for military purposes. Whether such a political influence can be exerted depends not so much on our good will as on the good will of the French government.” (Verbatim statement of the text of the memorandum.)

No less important than the battle in the Atlantic is the battle in the Mediterranean. The prerequisite for success in both areas is the defeat of Soviet Russia.

England's position will be hopeless if we manage to overcome the contradictions of France, Spain and Turkey among themselves and their contradictions with Italy to such an extent that all these three states will take part in the war against England. This is the highest goal, but, apparently, it cannot be fully achieved.

If Turkey goes with us, we will be obliged to help her with weapons and equipment. The supply of materiel to Spain will also be a heavy burden on our shoulders. By capturing the naval bases of Ferrol and Cadiz, we could achieve the liquidation of the English naval base of Gibraltar.

The political benefits of such a seizure would be very great, but only on the condition that the French colonial empire does not change its behavior in Africa. The idea of ​​armed pressure from Spain on the French colonies in Africa is difficult to implement. In this case, Spanish Morocco will be captured by the Anglo-French troops before the German troops have time to arrive there.

And if North Africa falls into the hands of the Anglo-French, the capture of Gibraltar will lose its significance.

The entry of France into the war on our side will immediately defuse the situation in North Africa for us. The use of the French fleet in our interests would be invaluable.

But then all the actions of the armed forces of France would be limited to West Africa, while further south a strong English military base would be formed. So, if France enters the war on our side, she must be able to strengthen her position in West Africa in advance, and we must be ready to give her due support. So far, our possibilities for this are still very limited.

Conclusion. Turkey's entry into the war in any case (the sooner the better) will create great military advantages for us. Turkey, even without German help, is at the present moment strong enough to tie down the Anglo-Russian armed forces on land, in the air and at sea, and, moreover, she can be of great help in gaining dominance in the Black Sea.

The situation is different with France and Spain. It is problematic whether these countries will be able to go to war without our help.

Our use of Spanish ports will make little difference. The great advantage of expanding the supply of the Italian theater of operations is connected with the danger of Dakar being captured by the British. This danger is aggravated by the fact that French aviation in the Dakar area is still insufficient.

8. General conclusions. England pursues two main political and military goals. By establishing direct contact with Soviet Russia in Iran, it wants to support Russia's will to resist and prevent the entry of German troops into the oil-bearing regions of the Caucasus, and also, sooner or later, to seize Western and North Africa as areas for deploying further struggle.

Spain and Turkey should at least remain neutral. Hence, in terms of the further conduct of the war, we must be guided by the following:

1. The defeat of Russia is the immediate and decisive goal of the war, to achieve which all forces that are not necessary on other fronts should be used. Since this goal will not be fully achieved during 1941, the continuation of the Eastern Campaign in 1942 must now be at the forefront of our planning. The capture of the territory on the southern wing of the Eastern Front will give great political and economic dividends. We must continue to strive to change Turkey's political position in our favor. This will lead to a significant improvement in our military position in the southeast.

2. Only after the exclusion of Russia as a military factor will it be possible, with the possible support of France and Spain, to begin a large-scale struggle against England in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic Ocean. However, even if Russia is largely defeated this year, we will have the appropriate ground forces and aviation for decisive operations in the Mediterranean, the Atlantic Ocean and in Spain proper only in the spring of 1942.

3. It is important not only not to break off political and military relations with France and Spain before the coming spring, but, on the contrary, to deepen them, keeping France under its influence and forcing it to strengthen its positions in West Africa in order to be able to repel any offensive by the Anglo -Americans.

Our difficulty in maintaining relations with France lies in the fact that in doing so we must take into account the interests of our ally, Italy. For military reasons, Italy is absolutely necessary for us, at least for the near future, to defeat England, and therefore her possibilities should not remain unused.

4. From the foregoing, it can be concluded that a greater number of submarines, supported by aircraft, can only be used for a successful siege of England next spring.

5. Operations in the eastern Mediterranean will be possible only when our troops enter the Transcaucasus.

6. The invasion of England can only seriously enter the agenda when, despite the defeat of Russia, all means to persuade Spain or France to participate in the war on the side of the Axis Powers will be tried, and the battle in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean will not lead to such success, so that the defeat of England becomes quite obvious.

Front situation:

The following aerial reconnaissance data deserve attention. Movement of 10–12 enemy infantry columns west of Mariupol to the northeast. The movement of trains from Kharkov to the south-west. From the interfluve of the Dnieper and Desna - movement to the east. (Apparently, these are the rear units moving.) To the east of the Valdai Lake Plateau, excavation work is carried out on a large scale at night.

Operational environment:

On the front of the 11th Army, north of the Crimea, a withdrawal to the east of large enemy forces was noted. Troops of the 17th Army are regrouping forces to continue the offensive. The 1st Panzer Group is rapidly advancing north. The 6th and 2nd armies, as well as the 1st tank group, are gradually closing up. A stage-by-stage withdrawal of divisions from the Dnieper sector of the front and their transfer to the zone of the 17th Army is being carried out.

Quiet in the center of the Eastern Front. The enemy is making small local attacks from the Ostashkov area in a westerly direction. Strong air raids on the 18th motorized division. Successes of the Schmidt Corps. Significant deepening of the wedge from the west to Leningrad. Pressure on Leeb's northern flank (from the Krasnaya Gorka area).

Rich man, Heusinger. The distribution of air reconnaissance units and anti-aircraft units of the ground forces for conducting autumn operations.

Afternoon - drafting a response to Field Marshal von Bock on the nature and scale of his troops' actions in the autumn operation.

Heusinger. Transfer of forces by Army Group North to other sectors for autumn operations.

General Paulus. The situation near Leningrad. I promised that Reinhardt's tank corps would be left to continue the offensive. The 8th Panzer Division should start "castling".

General Wagner (quartermaster general) with Altenstadt. The distribution of security units in the rear areas during the autumn operations.

General Wagner (one). Preparatory measures for the supply of troops in the autumn operations.

Atmosphere in the evening:

On the southern front. The 2nd and 1st tank groups entered the operational space. The ring around the enemy in the interfluve of the Desna and the Dnieper is practically closed. There will be battles with enemy units that will try to get out of the encirclement. The rest of the front is exceptionally calm; First of all, there is a complete inaction of aviation. Leningrad has made significant progress. The exit of our troops to the “internal bypass of the fortifications” can be considered complete .

The Red Army was the last obstacle of Hitler, his plans of conquest

The situation at the front: The landing of our troops on the island of Muhu. Aerial reconnaissance, due to bad weather, operated only on the southern sector of the Eastern Front. In front of the 11th Army, part of the enemy troops retreats to the east, the other to the south.

In the interfluve of the Desna and the Dnieper, there is a disorderly withdrawal of enemy columns in the direction of Poltava. On the rest of the front - only scattered attacks from the enemy. On the front of the 11th and 17th armies, the movement of our units is slowing down due to supply difficulties.

There is a suspicion that the enemy on the entire front will go over to the defensive. His offensive actions in the central sector were noticeably reduced. There are no signs that the enemy is withdrawing part of his forces for the transfer to the south.

Losses from June 22 to September 10, 1941: Wounded - 11,125 officers and 328,713 non-commissioned officers and privates; killed - 4396 officers and 93 625 non-commissioned officers and privates; missing - 387 officers and 21,265 non-commissioned officers and privates.

In total, 15,908 officers and 443,603 non-commissioned officers and privates were lost.

The total losses, not counting the sick, thus amount to 459,511 people, that is, 13.5% of the average number of troops on the Eastern Front (3.4 million people).

The situation with tanks in the 2nd Panzer Group:

3rd TD - combat-ready tanks - 20%, require repair and irretrievable losses - 80%.

4th TD - combat-ready tanks - 29%, require repair and irretrievable losses - 71%.

17th TD - combat-ready tanks - 21%, require repair and irretrievable losses - 79%.

18th TD - combat-ready tanks - 31%, require repair and irretrievable losses - 69%.

German tank divisions suffered huge losses, more than half of their vehicles were damaged, lost

“The situation in the evening: In the south, it’s downright classic development of the encirclement operation. On the rest of the Eastern Front, it’s exceptionally calm. The appearance of new enemy units in the Ladoga Lake area makes it necessary to bring the 8th Panzer Division into battle. Leningrad has significant success.

On September 15, the first and second tank groups of the Germans closed the ring in the Lokhvitsa area, surrounding the main forces of the Southwestern Front. The 5th, 26th, 37th armies and partly units of the 21st and 28th armies were in the ring.

"Army Group South. The advance detachment of the Leibstandarte" Adolf Hitler "reached the eastern approaches to the Crimea. The enemy retreats to Melitopol. The encirclement ring (east of Kyiv) is closed
The autumn thaw significantly delayed the advance of both German tank groups, the 17th Army, to cover the eastern flank of the advancing troops, began to advance towards Poltava with its right flank, but then turned to the northwest with large forces.

As a result of this offensive, the simultaneous strike of the 6th Army across the Dnieper on both sides of Kyiv, which was bypassed and taken on September 19, and the further advance of the 2nd Army from the north, the Russian forces located in the triangle of Kyiv, Cherkassy, ​​Lokhvitsa, were compressed from all parties. At this time, tank groups in fierce battles repulsed Russian attempts to release their troops from the east. The 4th and 2nd air fleets, acting in successive waves, continuously supported the ground forces.

September 19-21. Belov's cavalry-mechanized group (2 kk) fought successfully to capture the city of Romny.

Halder writes on the 19th:

"The situation at the front. Operations on the southern wing of the front are developing very successfully. Three pockets have been created east of Kyiv, which are blocked by our large forces. Guderian's tank group is gradually being withdrawn from the combat area and can already begin regrouping to perform a new task.

The enemy forces, brought up from the northeast and the Kharkov direction, still make little sense. They are apparently too weak to influence the course of events.

The Kamkov group occupied the Lyutenka and Belotserkovka fronts. Thus, this counterattack was delivered against the rear of the German 47th Panzer Corps, moving south, and contributed to the exit from the encirclement of the units of the 21st and 5th armies.

452,720 people were surrounded, including about 60 thousand command personnel. The enemy got a large amount of weapons and military equipment. The front commander M.P., Kirponos, together with the chief of staff V.I. Tupikov and a member of the Military Council M.A. Burmistenko, died.

In the period from September 18 to 29, more than 10 thousand people left the encirclement at our assembly points, including a group of generals I.Kh. .Skripko and many other officers.

"Army Group South. The breakthrough of the fortified positions at Perekop has begun. The 1st Panzer Group is advancing in a southeast direction; the 17th Division is slowly moving forward.

The liquidation of the encircled enemy grouping in the area east of Kyiv is nearing its end.

Guderian continues to pull his troops north. On its eastern flank (48th motorized corps) the enemy was driven back ."

When the fighting stopped on September 26, it became clear that 150,000 Soviet soldiers had been killed. 665 thousand Red Army soldiers were taken prisoner.

The losses on the German side amounted to 100 thousand people killed and wounded. Historians call the battle for Kyiv the largest single military operation in history.

Only by throwing into battle their last reserves, which were now not involved in other places, the Headquarters managed to close a huge hole in the front line and stop the advanced German tank units that had already advanced towards Rostov-on-Don.

On September 30, an order was given to the German armed forces to launch a general offensive against Moscow.