Liberation of Crimea 1944 summary. Does Russia have a future? The situation before the operation

The Crimean peninsula, due to the peculiarities of its geographical position, was an extremely important strategic position in the Black Sea basin. Possessing the Crimea, the enemy kept the Soviet troops operating in the south of Ukraine under the constant threat of a strike from the rear, making it difficult for our Black Sea Fleet to operate. The decision of the Nazi command to defend the Crimea was also determined by political considerations. The loss of the Crimea would mean for Germany a sharp drop in prestige in the countries of South-Eastern Europe and in "neutral" Turkey, which served as important sources of oil and other scarce strategic materials. In addition, the Crimea covered the Balkan strategic flank of the troops of Nazi Germany and its important sea lanes, going along the Black Sea straits to the ports of the western coast of the Black Sea.

However, the defense of the Crimea from the very beginning was a difficult problem for the enemy. While Army Group A managed to hold a bridgehead on the left bank of the Dnieper, south of Nikopol, the fascist German command still hoped to organize counter strikes by the forces of the 17th Army, blockaded in the Crimea, and the Nikopol grouping and restore land communications between them. But over time, these hopes became more and more shaky, and after the defeat of the German troops near Nikopol and Krivoy Rog, they collapsed altogether. The exit of the Red Army to the region of Odessa and the Dniester estuary put the German fascist group in the Crimea in an even more difficult situation. Its supply became more complicated, the morale of soldiers and officers fell.

The enemy troops blocked in the Crimea continued to dig in, build new and improve old defensive positions. The nature of the terrain in the northern part of the Crimean peninsula and in the Kerch region contributed to the creation of a powerful, in-depth defense. The enemy paid special attention to strengthening the defense in the northern part of the Crimea. Three strong defense lines were equipped on the Perekop Isthmus to a depth of 35 kilometers. In front of the bridgehead of our troops on the southern bank of the Sivash, the enemy, using numerous inter-lake defiles and heights, created two or three defensive lines. Equipped with a dense network of trenches and communication passages, they had a large number of bunkers, pillboxes and were covered by engineering barriers. Four defensive lines were built on the Kerch Peninsula to a depth of 70 kilometers.

Blocked in the Crimea, the 17th army of the enemy in January - March 1944 was reinforced by two divisions and by the beginning of April consisted of five German and seven Romanian divisions, as well as a large number of special units and subunits (engineering, security, construction, etc.). The main forces of the army - five divisions - were located in the northern part of the Crimea, and four divisions and an infantry regiment operated on the Kerch Peninsula. Three Romanian divisions guarded the Crimean coast. The army had a total of more than 195 thousand people, about 3600 guns and mortars, over 200 tanks and assault guns. They were supported by 150 aircraft located in the Crimea, and part of the aviation based on the airfields of Romania.

As early as the end of 1943, Soviet troops made an attempt to seize the Crimean Isthmus and break into the Crimea. But she was not successful. Taking into account the difficulties associated with conducting an operation against an enemy that had entrenched itself in advantageous positions, the Soviet Supreme High Command decided to carefully prepare this offensive. It was originally planned to start the operation in March 1944, but the unfavorable weather in the Crimean region and severe storms in the Sea of Azov did not allow active combat operations to be launched on schedule. Then it was decided to go on the offensive after the Red Army entered the Odessa region. At the same time, it was taken into account that with the withdrawal of Soviet troops to Odessa, the position of the Crimean group would worsen even more, the stability and morale of the fascist troops would sharply decrease. In addition, the clearing of the enemy of the Black Sea coast between the Crimea and Odessa gave the Soviet fleet and aviation the opportunity for wider operations on enemy communications.

To carry out the operation to liberate the Crimea, the 4th Ukrainian Front was involved as part of the 2nd Guards Army under the command of Lieutenant General G.F. Zakharov, the 51st Army, Lieutenant General Ya.G. - Lieutenant of Aviation T. T. Khryukin, Lieutenant General I. D. Vasiliev of the 19th Tank Corps; Separate Primorsky Army, commanded by General of the Army A. I. Eremenko; 4th Air Army Colonel-General of Aviation K. A. Vershinin; The Black Sea Fleet under the command of Admiral F. S. Oktyabrsky and the Azov military flotilla, commanded by Rear Admiral S. G. Gorshkov. The troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front and the Separate Primorskaya Army at the beginning of the operation consisted of 30 rifle divisions, 2 fortified areas, 2 marine brigades and a total of about 470 thousand soldiers and officers, had 5982 guns and mortars (without rocket launchers and 50 -mm mortars), 772 guns of military anti-aircraft artillery, 559 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts. They were supported by 1250 aircraft (including the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet). Thus, our troops outnumbered the enemy in men by 2.4 times, in guns and mortars by 1.7 times, in tanks and self-propelled guns by 2.6 times.

The balance of forces at sea was also in our favor. The main forces of the Black Sea Fleet were based on the ports of the Caucasian coast. The enemy fleet was based in the Crimean ports, as well as in Constanta, Sulina, Varna and Burgas.

The idea of the operation was to simultaneously strike from the north - from Perekop and Sivash - and from the east - from the Kerch region - in the general direction to Simferopol - Sevastopol, dismember the enemy troops, prevent their evacuation from the Crimea, that is, completely destroy the enemy grouping.

The 4th Ukrainian Front delivered the main blow from the bridgehead on the southern bank of the Sivash with the forces of the 51st Army and the 19th Tank Corps in the direction of Simferopol - Sevastopol, and the auxiliary blow - on the Perekop Isthmus with the forces of the 2nd Guards Army the main blow in the direction of Simferopol - Sevastopol, and part of the forces - along the southern coast of the Crimean peninsula.

The Black Sea Fleet was entrusted with the task of blocking the Crimea, striking at enemy communications, assisting ground forces on the coastal flanks and being ready for tactical landings. The forces of the fleet were distributed as follows: torpedo boats were to operate on the near approaches to Sevastopol, submarines, in cooperation with aviation, were to destroy warships, transports and other ships on communications in the northwestern and western parts of the Black Sea. The Azov military flotilla was tasked with assisting the Separate Primorsky Army in its offensive on the Kerch Peninsula and continuing to transport troops and cargo through the Kerch Strait.

The Crimean partisans were ordered to attack the rear of the enemy, destroy the nodes and lines of communication, prevent the planned withdrawal of enemy troops, destroying individual sections of the railways, arranging blockages and ambushes on mountain roads, and also preventing the Nazis from destroying cities and industrial enterprises. In addition, the task of disrupting the work of the Yalta port was assigned to the Southern Partisan Connection.

In the days of the preparation of the operation, all types of reconnaissance carefully studied the defense of the enemy and the grouping of his troops. Along with ground surveillance and searches for reconnaissance groups, enemy positions were photographed from the air. Serious importance was attached to the combat training of units and subunits, to improving their skills at a fast pace to break through heavily fortified enemy defenses.

The command and political administration of the front paid special attention to promoting the glorious traditions of the Red Army associated with the struggle for the Crimea. These traditions began with the defeat of the Wrangel troops and the liberation of the Crimea by the Red Army in 1920. The heroic defense of Sevastopol in 1941-1942, which developed these traditions, inspired Soviet soldiers to heroic deeds in battles against the fascist invaders throughout the war years. The commanders and political workers acquainted the soldiers and officers with the experience of breaking into the Crimea by the troops of the Southern Front under the command of M.V. Frunze. The Soviet soldiers listened with great attention to the stories of the participants in the legendary crossing of the Sivash and the assault on Perekop. The heroic past of the Red Army was associated with the combat missions facing the troops. Political organs and party organizations took into account the peculiarity of the upcoming battles - a breakthrough of the enemy's heavily fortified positions. In accordance with the battle formations adopted for the assault, the communists and Komsomol members were placed.

With the receipt of the combat order, the commanders and political workers, in the few hours that remained before the start of the offensive, introduced each soldier to his combat mission, gave instructions to the communists and Komsomol members. Where the situation allowed, three to five hours before the start of the offensive, party and Komsomol meetings and meetings of personnel were held.

Troops of the 2nd Guards and 51st Armies of the 4th Ukrainian Front went on the offensive on 8 April. After powerful artillery and aviation preparation, the infantry went on the attack, despite the fierce resistance of the enemy, wedged into his defenses. Already on the first day, the 2nd Guards Army captured Armenian, but its further advance was stopped by the stubbornly resisting enemy. On this day, the 51st Army, advancing from the bridgehead south of Sivash, broke through the enemy's main line of defense on its left flank. This forced the Nazi command to make a decision to withdraw its troops on the night of April 9 from the Isthmus of Perekop to the Ishun positions. The enemy, who had withdrawn from the Armyansk area, intended to gain a foothold in well-equipped Ishun positions. However, the offensive of the 51st Army created a threat of encirclement for the enemy defending here. Therefore, already on April 10, the Nazis began to retreat from the Yishun positions. On the morning of April 11, in the zone of the 51st Army, the 19th Tank Corps was introduced into the breakthrough, which began to pursue the enemy troops and on the same day liberated the important road junction, the city of Dzhankoy. To pursue the enemy in other sectors, mobile detachments from the combined arms formations were advanced.

The success achieved in the northern part of the Crimea created favorable conditions for the offensive of Soviet troops on the Kerch Peninsula. On the night of April 11, the Separate Primorsky Army went on the offensive, and already in the morning of the same day Kerch was liberated. The enemy, defending on the Kerch Peninsula, began to hastily retreat to the west.

On April 12, a relentless pursuit of the Nazi troops, retreating to Sevastopol, unfolded throughout the Crimea. On April 13, the enemy was driven out of Evpatoria and Simferopol, on April 14 - from Bakhchisaray and Sudak, and on April 15, the mobile units of the 4th Ukrainian Front reached the outer defensive bypass of Sevastopol. In the battles for Simferopol and Bakhchisaray, the troops of the J 9th Tank Corps under the command of Lieutenant General I. D. Vasiliev and the 63rd Rifle Corps under the command of Major General P. K. Koshevoy acted skillfully and selflessly. At the same time, the troops of the Separate Primorsky Army were rapidly advancing along the coastal highway, freeing the health resorts of the southern coast of Crimea. On April 16, they captured Yalta and approached Sevastopol from the east.

During the pursuit of the enemy, the aircraft of the 8th and 4th air armies operated effectively. Soviet bombers, fighters and attack aircraft inflicted massive strikes on retreating Nazi troops, enemy vehicles, highway and railway junctions, and also conducted continuous reconnaissance, which contributed to the rapid advance of the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front and the Separate Primorsky Army.

With the beginning of the operation, aviation and ships of the Black Sea Fleet intensified their operations, striking at enemy ships and transports in ports and on communications that connected Crimea with the ports of the western part of the Black Sea. On April 11, bombers and attack aircraft of the Black Sea Fleet attacked enemy transports in Feodosia and Yalta. On April 13, 80 attack aircraft, escorted by 42 fighters, attacked the concentration of enemy troops and transports in Sudak, sinking 5 self-propelled barges with troops and damaging 2 barges. No less effective were the strikes of the Black Sea pilots on enemy ships and on the high seas. Suddenly attacked the enemy and torpedo boats, the activity of which increased with the relocation to Yalta and Evpatoria.

The Crimean partisans fought courageously and bravely. Fulfilling the tasks assigned to them, partisan formations suddenly attacked the enemy, inflicted damage on him in manpower and equipment, and prevented the destruction by the Nazis of industrial and municipal structures, bridges and residential buildings.

On the roads leading from Simferopol to Alushta and Karasubazar, the Northern partisan unit operated. On April 13, the second brigade of this formation occupied the city of Karasubazar and held it until the Red Army units approached. During the liberation of Simferopol, the 17th and 19th partisan detachments, led by the commander of the 1st brigade, F.I. Fedorenko, interacted with the troops. They occupied the telephone exchange, garages, warehouses, mills and other facilities, preventing the enemy from blowing them up.

The fighting on the roads between Yalta and Sevastopol deployed the Southern Connection. The 12th detachment of this formation captured the Massandra region and prevented the destruction of the famous Massandra wine cellars. The eastern connection was active on the Simferopol - Feodosia and Feodosia - Sudak highways. On April 11, the Komsomol youth detachment of this formation ambushed and attacked a column of enemy artillery near the village of Izyumovka. Having seized the guns and captured the servants, the partisans opened fire on the city of Stary Krym and forced the Nazis to flee in panic. The underground workers of Sevastopol transmitted by radio to the command of the Black Sea Fleet information about the entry into the port and the exit from there of enemy ships, helping our aircraft and submarines to destroy them. In Yevpatoria, underground combat groups shot Nazi torchbearers who tried to set fire to buildings, and also helped the troops of the 2nd Guards Army to liquidate the enemy garrison.

Having suffered a severe defeat and having lost almost the entire Crimea, the enemy decided to keep at least the Sevastopol bridgehead, where the remnants of the Crimean group retreated. To reinforce these troops, the enemy sent about 6,000 soldiers and officers by air and sea. For defense, a powerful system of fortifications on the outskirts of the city was used, which consisted of three lanes. The strongest knot of resistance was Sapun Mountain, which had six tiers of solid trenches covered with anti-personnel and anti-tank minefields and several rows of barbed wire. The Mekenzievy Gory, Sugar Loaf, Inkerman were also powerful nodes of resistance.

Having reached the approaches to Sevastopol, our troops began to prepare for the assault on the city. It was decided to strike the main blow with the forces of the left flank of the 51st Army and the Primorsky Army in the Sapun Gora - Karan sector, break through the enemy defenses and go to the main berths of Sevastopol, which the enemy could use for evacuation. An auxiliary strike was delivered by the 2nd Guards Army from the east and northeast, and somewhat earlier, in order to divert enemy forces from the direction of the main attack. The Black Sea Fleet, by active operations of aviation and ships, was supposed to disrupt the evacuation of fascist troops.

Preparations for the assault on Sevastopol included a wide range of important and complex issues. It was necessary to carefully reconnoiter the enemy's fortifications and fire weapons, to organize well aviation and artillery preparation, and to skillfully build the combat formations of infantry and tanks. During the preparation period, assault groups were created in all parts, which were trained in fighting in the mountains and in the city. As part of the assault groups, there were strong party and Komsomol organizations. The best soldiers, communists and Komsomol members, were entrusted with the honorable task of hoisting red flags at the key heights near Sevastopol, on administrative buildings in the city itself.

Six days before the start of the assault on Sevastopol, long-range bombers and the 8th Air Army carried out preliminary aviation preparations for the offensive. They dropped over two thousand tons of bombs on the enemy fortifications.

On May 5, after artillery and aviation preparation, the 2nd Guards Army went on the offensive. In two-day battles, the troops broke through two, and in some places three lines of trenches. Believing that the main blow was being dealt here, the enemy began to transfer infantry and artillery to this sector from the right flank of his defense.

The offensive of the Soviet troops in the direction of the main attack began on May 7 after an hour and a half of artillery and aviation preparation. From the very first minutes, heavy bloody battles ensued. However, the fierce resistance of the enemy could not contain the offensive impulse of the troops of the 51st and Primorsky armies. By the end of the day, the enemy was knocked out of Sapun Mountain.

The assault on Sapun Mountain is one of the brilliant pages in the annals of the Great Patriotic War. An exciting story will be passed on from generation to generation about how heroically, with unshakable courage and perseverance, the soldiers of the 63rd Rifle Corps, commanded by Major General P.K. Koshevoy, and the 11th Guards Rifle Corps, commanded by Major General S. E. Rozhdestvensky. The standard-bearers were out of order, but the red flags, passed from hand to hand under the enemy's hurricane fire, steadily moved forward, calling for a feat of fighters who stormed enemy fortifications. Captain N. V. Shilov, senior lieutenant P. M. Kalinichenko, lieutenants V. F. Zhukov and M. Ya. Dzigunsky, junior lieutenant V. F. Gromakov, foreman A. M. Fisenko, senior sergeant distinguished themselves in the battles for Sapungora F. N. Skoryatin, corporal V. I. Drobyazko, privates S. P. Evglevsky, I. K. Yatsunenko, Dadash Babadzhanov, Ashot Markaryan and many other brave soldiers and officers of the 51st and Primorsky armies.

On the same day, the Sugar Loaf height was occupied, covering the entrance to the Inkerman Valley. The troops of the 2nd Guards Army, having captured the Mekenzievy Gory station after a four-hour battle, were advancing towards the North Bay.

On May 8, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front reached the inner perimeter of Sevastopol. The next day, they broke the enemy's resistance here, crossed the North Bay and broke into the city. With coordinated strikes from the north, east and southeast, our troops defeated the enemy and on May 9 completely liberated the city of Russian, Soviet glory - Sevastopol - from fascist invaders. The scattered remnants of the enemy troops fled to Cape Khersones, where they were soon eliminated.

The Crimean offensive operation ended on May 12 with the victory of the Red Army. The 17th German army, consisting of 12 divisions, was crushed. 100 thousand enemy soldiers and officers were killed or captured. Soviet troops captured all the enemy's military equipment. In addition, our aviation and ships of the Black Sea Fleet sank a large number of ships with troops and military cargo. If in 1941-1942. It took the Nazi troops 250 days to capture Sevastopol, which the Soviet soldiers selflessly defended, then in 1944 the Red Army hacked the powerful enemy fortifications in the Crimea in just 35 days and utterly defeated the two hundred thousandth enemy grouping.

The heroic feat of the Soviet troops was highly appreciated by the Motherland. Five times Moscow saluted the valiant soldiers of the army and navy, who liberated the Crimea from the Nazi invaders. Many formations and units were given the honorary names "Perekop", "Sivash", "Kerch", "Feodosiya", "Simferopol" and "Sevastopol". 126 Soviet soldiers received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, among them Major General E. Ya. Savitsky, Captain F. D. Dibrov, Senior Lieutenant L. I. Beda, Lieutenants M. Ya. I. Ozerin, privates I. I. Polikakhin, I. K. Yatsunenko. Squadron commander Hero of the Soviet Union V. D. Lavrinenkov was awarded the second Gold Star medal. Thousands have received government awards. Only in the 2nd Guards Army, 5229 soldiers and officers were awarded orders and medals, of which 3743 were communists and Komsomol members. All this testified to the mass heroism of the Soviet soldiers, who turned out to be worthy successors to the glorious traditions of the Red Army. Crimea - the most important strategic position on the Black Sea - was wrested from the hands of the enemy. The situation in the Black Sea basin has changed dramatically. The liberation of Sevastopol - the main naval base of the Black Sea Fleet - and Odessa allowed our fleet to take more advantageous positions to participate in subsequent operations of Soviet troops in the Balkans. After the expulsion of the fascist invaders from the Crimea, the Black Sea Fleet stepped up operations on enemy communications, using aircraft, submarines and torpedo boats for this.

The military operations of the Armed Forces of the USSR to liberate the Right-Bank Ukraine and Crimea were of great political, economic and strategic importance.

In interconnected operations carried out during January-May 1944, Soviet troops defeated the enemy's largest strategic grouping, pushed it back 250-400 kilometers to the west, and liberated Crimea. From January 1 to May 12, 22 divisions and 1 brigade of the enemy were destroyed, 8 divisions and 1 brigade were disbanded, 8 divisions lost up to 75 percent and 61 divisions lost up to 50 percent of their composition. According to K. Tippelskirch, this was the largest defeat "since the time when the German armies walked the thorny path from the Volga and the Caucasus, retreating to the Dnieper."

Such heavy losses could not pass without a trace for the enemy. They seriously weakened his forces not only on the Soviet-German front, but also in European countries. To restore the front in the southern sector, the fascist command was forced to pull up during January - April 34 divisions and 4 brigades from Romania, Hungary, France, Yugoslavia, Denmark and Germany, as well as 9 divisions from other sectors of the Soviet-German front, not counting the current replenishment of the troops operating here with people, military equipment and weapons.

As a result of the successful offensive of the Red Army, the metallurgy of the South, the ore of Krivoy Rog, Nikopol and Kerch, the fertile lands between the Dnieper and the Prut, Crimea, first-class ports on the Black Sea - Sevastopol, Odessa, Nikolaev were returned to the Motherland. Our troops liberated a significant territory of Soviet Moldavia and the western regions of Ukraine. Millions of Soviet people were rescued from fascist slavery. Carrying out the historic mission of liberating the Soviet land occupied by the enemy, the Red Army entered the southwestern border of the Soviet Union and transferred the fighting to the territory of Romania.

The defeat of the largest German fascist group, the cleansing of the Right-Bank Ukraine and Crimea from the invaders radically changed the strategic situation in the south. By reaching the Carpathians, our troops split the enemy's strategic front, as a result of which the interaction of the army groups "Northern Ukraine" and "Southern Ukraine" was very difficult. Soviet troops got the opportunity to develop strikes in the Ljubljana direction - to the flank and rear of Army Group Center, to Lvov, and also through Romania to the Balkans. The liberation of the Crimea and Odessa provided favorable conditions for the basing and operations of our fleet on the Black Sea. The troops of the Red Army found themselves on the outskirts of Germany's vital sources of Romanian oil and Balkan raw materials.

The entry of the Soviet Armed Forces into Rumania sharply aggravated the political situation in the countries of Southeast Europe allied with Germany and caused panic and confusion among the ruling classes of these countries. The Nazi puppets who were in power understood how close and inevitable the collapse of Nazi Germany was. They began to look for ways out of the Nazi bloc. At the same time, the victorious offensive of the Red Army greatly contributed to the intensification of the national liberation struggle in these states.

An important role in achieving victories was played by political bodies, party and Komsomol organizations, all of whose activities were aimed at fulfilling combat missions. Communists and Komsomol members were the true inspirers of the soldiers, the cementing force of units and subunits. In the most difficult moments of the battle, in the most crucial areas of the battles, they were always ahead, inspiring the fighters to heroic deeds by personal example. Countless examples of courage and courage shown by our soldiers in the battles for the Motherland are a vivid expression of the Soviet patriotism of soldiers, sailors, officers, generals and admirals of the Red Army and the Navy, their boundless devotion to their people, their native Communist Party and the Soviet government.

The successes gained by the Armed Forces of the USSR testified to the high level of Soviet military art. They overturned the previously existing idea of the impossibility of conducting military operations on a large scale in the conditions of spring thaw. During the liberation of the Right-Bank Ukraine, the Red Army carried out a complex of simultaneous and successive offensive operations, the largest of which were Korsun-Shevchenkovskaya, Proskurov-Chernovitskaya, Umansko-Botoshanskaya, Odessa. The operations of the Soviet troops were characterized by great scope, decisiveness and swiftness, a variety of forms of hostilities, and good support. During the offensive, such a method of action as the encirclement and destruction of enemy groups was used. A striking example of this is the Korsun-Shevchenko operation. In addition, strikes were also made on a wide front in order to crush the enemy and destroy him piece by piece. This is how the offensive of the troops of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts was organized in March 1944. The strikes of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts, inflicted at great depth, led to the dismemberment of the entire strategic front of the enemy.

For offensive operations in the Right-Bank Ukraine, the use of large forces of armored and mechanized troops is very characteristic. In the history of the Great Patriotic War, there is no other strategic operation in which six tank armies would simultaneously participate. Despite the mudslide and the relatively weak manning of the tank armies, their combat operations were distinguished by high maneuverability and a great depth of breakthroughs in the enemy defenses. Tank armies, as well as separate tank and mechanized corps

were used massively to solve the main tasks of encircling the enemy, the rapid development of success in depth, capturing important lines and objects, and repelling attacks from large enemy tank groups.

During operations, the Soviet command skillfully carried out the interaction of the fronts, as well as ground forces with aviation and navy, coordinating their efforts in time and purpose. This fettered the enemy on a wide front, deprived him of freedom of maneuver, and ensured the rapid defeat of enemy groupings. So it was in the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky and Nikopol-Krivoy Rog operations, so it was in the March offensive. A clear coordination of the efforts of the ground forces, aviation and the Black Sea Fleet made it possible to defeat the Nazi group in the Crimea. The Black Sea Fleet played an important role in solving the operational and strategic tasks facing the troops of the Red Army. Aviation, submarines and torpedo boats of the fleet, acting on enemy communications, disrupted the delivery of troops and military equipment to the Crimea, as well as the evacuation of the remnants of the defeated enemy grouping. The Azov military flotilla carried out the transfer of troops and military equipment of the Separate Primorsky Army. From January to May, she transported more than 77 thousand people, a lot of military equipment and various cargoes to the Kerch Peninsula.

The success of the offensive in the Right-Bank Ukraine and in the Crimea was largely determined by the activities of the rear, which proceeded in extremely difficult conditions. A difficult problem was the supply of troops. In order to solve this problem, the military councils and the rear services of the fronts and armies took, first of all, the most resolute measures to restore the railways as soon as possible. The personnel of the railway troops and special units of the NKPS of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts, despite the mudslide, restored about 7 thousand kilometers of railway lines during January-May. In February-April, 400 thousand wagons with troops and cargo were delivered to the Ukrainian fronts. Spring thaw extremely complicated the work of vehicles. In some sections, the average daily mileage of cars was 70-80 kilometers, and in some cases only 10-15 kilometers. Sometimes it was necessary to take cars in tow, for which all means were used, including tanks. And yet, vehicles transported a significant amount of material resources. Only the 20th automobile brigade during the Uman-Botoshansk operation delivered over 100 thousand tons of cargo to the troops. Particularly great difficulties arose when transporting goods from army warehouses. Therefore, almost all armies created horse-drawn and horse-pack columns, special teams from the local population. Ammunition, fuel and food were delivered to the troops and aviation. From March 12 to March 17 alone, the aviation of the 2nd Air Army made about 1,200 sorties to deliver cargo to the 3rd Guards and 4th Tank Armies. From April 7 to April 15, 2 million 160 thousand rounds of ammunition, more than 27 thousand shells and mines were deployed for the 1st Tank Army. over 50 tons of fuel, 24 guns of 76-mm caliber and other cargoes. On return flights, the planes took out the wounded.

During the liberation of Right-Bank Ukraine and Crimea, partisans blew up railway tracks and bridges on highways behind enemy lines, made it difficult for the transfer of fascist troops, the supply of ammunition, food, and fuel. They attacked retreating enemy troops, smashed their rears, captured river crossings, holding them until the Red Army units approached, conducted reconnaissance behind enemy lines. The data of this intelligence, transmitted across the front line, helped our command to make more appropriate decisions. Ukrainian partisans saved hundreds of thousands of Soviet people from being driven into fascist slavery, prevented the German invaders from completely taking out the stolen property and food.

The workers of the liberated cities and villages joyfully greeted the Soviet troops, provided them with active support: they restored roads, bridges, brought and brought ammunition and food, and helped care for the wounded. Residents of the liberated regions voluntarily joined the ranks of the Red Army in order to contribute with weapons in their hands to the common cause of defeating the enemy.

On April 8, 70 years ago, the Crimean strategic offensive operation began. It went down in history as one of the most important offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War. Its goal was the liberation of the Crimean peninsula, an important strategic foothold in the Black Sea theater of operations, by defeating the 17th German Army, Colonel General E. Eneke, who held the Crimea.

P.P. Sokolov-Skalya. The liberation of Sevastopol by the Soviet army. May 1944

As a result of Melitopol (September 26 - November 5, 1943) and (October 31 - November 11, 1943), Soviet troops broke through the fortifications of the Turkish Wall on the Perekop Isthmus, captured bridgeheads on the southern coast of the Sivash and on the Kerch Peninsula, but liberated Crimea immediately failed - there was not enough strength. A large grouping of German troops continued to remain on the peninsula, relying on defensive positions in depth. On the Perekop Isthmus and against the bridgehead on the Sivash, the defense consisted of three, and on the Kerch Peninsula - of four lanes.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (VGK) considered the Crimea as a strategically important area, and its liberation as the most important opportunity for the return of the main base of the Black Sea Fleet - Sevastopol, which would significantly improve the conditions for basing ships and conducting military operations at sea. In addition, the Crimea covered the Balkan strategic flank of the German troops and their important sea lanes, going through the Black Sea straits to the western coast of the Black Sea. Therefore, the German leadership also attached great military and political importance to keeping the Crimea in their hands, which, in their opinion, was one of the factors for maintaining support for Turkey and the allies in the Balkans. In this regard, the command of the 17th Army was obliged to hold the peninsula to the last. Despite this, the German command developed a detailed plan in case of their retreat, which was called Operation Adler.

At the beginning of 1944, the German army was reinforced with two divisions: at the end of January 1944, the 73rd Infantry Division was delivered to the peninsula by sea, and at the beginning of March, the 111th Infantry Division. By April, the army had 12 divisions: 5 German and 7 Romanian, 2 assault gun brigades, various reinforcement units and numbered more than 195 thousand people, about 3600 guns and mortars, 215 tanks and assault guns. She was supported by 148 aircraft.

The Soviet leadership entrusted the task of defeating the Crimean enemy grouping and liberating Crimea to the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front (commander General of the Army), which included the 2nd Guards and 51st Armies, the 19th Tank Corps, the 16th and 78th th fortified areas, aviation support was provided by the aviation of the 8th Air Army and the Air Force of the Black Sea Fleet; A separate Primorsky Army (commander General of the Army), whose operations were provided by the aviation of the 4th Air Army; the Black Sea Fleet (commander admiral), whose forces supported the offensive on the coastal flanks and disrupted the enemy's sea communications; Azov military flotilla (commander Rear Admiral), which supported the offensive of the troops of the Separate Primorsky Army.

The ratio of forces and means of the parties to the beginning
Crimean strategic offensive operation

In total, the Soviet strike force consisted of about 470 thousand people, 5982 guns and mortars, 559 tanks and self-propelled guns (ACS), 1250 aircraft, including the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet. By April 1944, the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla included a battleship, four cruisers, six destroyers, two patrol ships, eight base minesweepers, 47 torpedo and 80 patrol boats, 34 armored boats, 29 submarines, three gunboats and other auxiliary vessels. In addition, the troops were supported by the Crimean partisan detachments. Created in January 1944, the partisan forces of the Crimea, numbering almost 4 thousand people, were combined into three formations: Southern, Northern and Eastern. Thus, the forces of the USSR significantly exceeded the forces of the enemy.

The ratio of forces and means of the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front and the Separate Primorsky Army to the troops of the 17th German Army opposing them
Divisions (estimated)	2,6: 1
Total people	2,4: 1
Guns and mortars	1,7: 1
Tanks and self-propelled guns	2,6: 1
combat aircraft	4,2: 1

The actions of the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front and the Separate Primorsky Army were coordinated by representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command Marshal and Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Marshal.

Preparations for the Crimean offensive began in February 1944. On February 6, Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky and the Military Council of the 4th Ukrainian Front submitted to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command their views on the conduct of the Crimean operation, which was supposed to begin on February 18-19.

However, in the future, the start date of the operation was repeatedly postponed. So, on February 18, Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky, in accordance with the instructions of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, ordered Army General F.I. Tolbukhin to begin the Crimean operation after the entire coast of the Dnieper up to Kherson, inclusive, is liberated from the enemy. Despite this, the Headquarters, in its further instructions, demanded that the operation begin no later than March 1, regardless of the course of the operation to liberate the Right-Bank Dnieper from the enemy. A.M. Vasilevsky reported to Headquarters that, given the weather conditions, the Crimean operation could only begin between March 15 and 20. The Headquarters agreed with the scheduled date, but on March 16 the front received new instructions that the Crimean operation "begin after the troops of the left wing of the 3rd Ukrainian Front have captured the area of the city of Nikolaev and advance them to Odessa." However, due to bad meteorological conditions, the front was able to start the operation only on April 8, 1944.

The entire operation of the 4th Ukrainian Front was planned to a depth of up to 170 km for a duration of 10-12 days with an average daily advance rate of 12-15 km. The rate of advance of the 19th Panzer Corps was determined at 30-35 km per day.

The idea of the Crimean operation was to use the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front from the north - from Perekop and Sivash, and the Separate Primorskaya Army from the east - from the Kerch Peninsula, to deliver a simultaneous blow in the general direction to Simferopol and Sevastopol, to dismember and destroy the enemy grouping , preventing her evacuation from the Crimea. It was planned to strike the main blow from the bridgehead on the southern bank of the Sivash. If successful, the main grouping of the front went to the rear of the enemy's Perekop positions, and the capture of Dzhankoy opened up freedom of action towards Simferopol and the Kerch Peninsula to the rear of the enemy grouping located there. An auxiliary blow was delivered on the Perekop Isthmus. A separate Primorsky army was supposed to break through the enemy defenses north of Kerch, deliver the main blow to Simferopol, Sevastopol, and part of the forces along the southern coast of the Crimean peninsula.

On April 8, 1944, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front went on the offensive. Five days before, heavy artillery destroyed a significant part of the enemy's long-term structures. On the evening of April 7, reconnaissance in force was carried out, which confirmed the previous information about the grouping of Wehrmacht troops in the area of Perekop and Sivash. On the day the operation began at 8:00 in the zone of the 4th Ukrainian Front, artillery and aviation preparation began with a total duration of 2.5 hours. Immediately after its completion, the troops of the front went on the offensive, striking with the forces of the 51st army of the lieutenant general from the bridgehead on the southern bank of the Sivash. After two days of fierce fighting, thanks to the courage of the Soviet soldiers, the enemy's defenses were broken through. The 51st Army reached the flank of the German Perekop group, and the 2nd Guards Army of Lieutenant General liberated Armyansk. On the morning of April 11, Lieutenant General's 19th Tank Corps captured Dzhankoy on the move and successfully advanced on Simferopol. Fearing the threat of encirclement, the enemy left the fortifications on the Perekop Isthmus and began to withdraw from the Kerch Peninsula.

The troops of the Separate Primorsky Army, having launched an offensive on the night of April 11, in the morning captured the fortress city of Kerch, a fortified enemy resistance center on the eastern coast of Crimea. In all directions, the pursuit of enemy troops retreating to Sevastopol began. The 2nd Guards Army developed an offensive along the western coast towards Evpatoria. The 51st Army, using the success of the 19th Panzer Corps, rushed across the steppes to Simferopol. A separate Primorsky army advanced through Karasubazar (Belogorsk) and Feodosia to Sevastopol. As a result, Evpatoria, Simferopol and Feodosia were liberated on April 13, Bakhchisaray, Alushta, Yalta on April 14-15.

The German troops continued their retreat. Aviation of the 8th and 4th air armies delivered massive strikes against the retreating enemy troops and communication centers. The forces of the Black Sea Fleet sank its ships and transports with evacuated troops. From attacks on sea convoys and single ships, the enemy lost 8,100 soldiers and officers.

Crimean strategic offensive operation April 8 - May 12, 1944

The Crimean partisans and underground fighters fought courageously. Crimean partisan formations were given the task of destroying the rear, nodes and lines of communication of the enemy, destroying railways, setting up blockages and ambushes on mountain roads, disrupting the work of the Yalta port and thereby preventing the withdrawal of German-Romanian troops to it and other places of loading for evacuation to Romania . The partisans were also entrusted with the task of preventing the enemy from destroying cities, industrial and transport enterprises.

Women partisans who participated in the liberation of the Crimea,
Simeiz, 1944,

On April 15-16, Soviet troops reached Sevastopol and began preparations for the assault on the city. In accordance with the decision of the commander of the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front, approved by the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky, it was planned to deliver the main blow from the Balaklava region with formations and units of the left flank of the 51st and the center of the Primorskaya Army, which became part of the 4th Ukrainian Front on April 18. They were to break through the enemy defenses in the Sapun Mountain area and the heights northeast of the Karan settlement with the task of cutting it off from the bays located west of Sevastopol. In the opinion of the front command, the defeat of the enemy on Sapun Gora, with all the difficulty of its assault, should have made it possible to quickly violate the stability of the German defense. The auxiliary strike was planned in the zone of the 2nd Guards Army and, in order to divert the attention of the enemy, was planned two days earlier than the main strike. The army was to break through the enemy defenses in the area southeast of Belbek with the forces of the 13th Guards and 55th Rifle Corps and develop an offensive on the Mekenzievy mountains and the eastern shore of the Northern Bay in order to press the German group to the sea and destroy it.

On April 19 and 23, the front troops made two attempts to break through the main defensive line of the Sevastopol fortified region, but they ended in failure. A new regrouping and training of troops was required, as well as the supply of ammunition and fuel to them. On May 5, the assault on the fortifications of the city began - the 2nd Guards Army went on the offensive, which forced the enemy to transfer troops to Sevastopol from other directions.

On May 7 at 10:30, with the massive support of the entire aviation of the front, Soviet troops began a general assault on the Sevastopol fortified area. The troops of the main shock group of the front broke through the enemy defenses on a 9-kilometer sector and captured Sapun Mountain in the course of fierce battles. On May 9, front troops from the north, east and southeast broke into Sevastopol and liberated the city. The remnants of the German 17th Army, pursued by the 19th Panzer Corps, retreated to Cape Khersones, where they were finally defeated. On the cape, 21 thousand enemy soldiers and officers were taken prisoner, a large amount of equipment and weapons were captured.

Combat report of the headquarters of the 4th Ukrainian Front on the capture of the city and the sea fortress of Sevastopol

Soviet tanks on Frunze Street (now - Nakhimov Avenue)
in the days of the liberation of the city from the German invaders. May 1944

The Crimean offensive operation ended. If in 1941-1942. it took the German troops 250 days to capture the heroically defended Sevastopol, then in 1944 the Soviet troops only needed 35 days to break into the powerful fortifications in the Crimea and clear almost the entire peninsula of the enemy.

Already by May 15, 1944, reports began to arrive at the headquarters of the 4th Ukrainian Front about military parades held in military units and formations dedicated to the final defeat of the group of German troops in the Crimea.

Combat reports from the headquarters of the Primorsky Army to the headquarters of the 4th Ukrainian Front on holding military parades in military units and formations.

Fireworks in the liberated Sevastopol. May 1944. Photo by E. Khaldei

The goals of the operation were achieved. Soviet troops broke through the defense in depth on the Isthmus of Perekop, the Kerch Peninsula, in the region of Sevastopol and defeated the 17th field army of the Wehrmacht. Its losses on land alone amounted to 100 thousand people, including over 61,580 prisoners. Soviet troops and fleet forces during the Crimean operation lost 17,754 people killed and 67,065 people wounded.

Combat composition, the number of Soviet troops and casualties *
Name of associations and terms of their participation in operation	Combat squad and troop strength to the beginning of the operation		Loss of life in operation
	amount compounds	number	irrevocable	sanitary	Total	average daily
4th Ukrainian Front (all period)	sd - 18, tk - 1, otbr - 2, UR - 2	278 400	13 332	50 498	63 830	1 824
Separate seaside and 4th Air Army (all period)	sd - 12, sbr - 2, selection - 1	143 500	4 196	16 305	20 501	586
Black Sea Fleet and Azov military flotilla (all period)	-	40 500	226	262	488	14
Total:	Divisions - 30, buildings - 1, brigades - 5, UR - 2	462 400	17 754 3,8%	67 065	84 819	2 423
List of abbreviations: otbr - a separate tank brigade, sbr - rifle brigade, sd - rifle division, tk - tank corps, UR - fortified area.

The victory in the Crimea returned an important economic region to the country. In general, the territory was liberated, occupying an area of about 26 thousand square meters. km. During the years of occupation, the Nazi invaders inflicted enormous damage on the Crimea: more than 300 industrial enterprises were put out of action, the livestock was almost completely exterminated, cities and resorts were badly destroyed - Sevastopol, Kerch, Feodosia and Yevpatoria were especially affected. So, in Sevastopol, by the time of liberation, there were 3 thousand inhabitants out of the 109 thousand people available in the city on the eve of the war. Only 6% of the housing stock survived in the city.

Considering the course and evaluating the results of the Crimean operation, it is clear that its successful completion was predetermined by the skillful choice by the Soviet command of the directions of the main attacks, the good organization of the interaction of strike groups of troops, aviation and navy forces, the decisive dismemberment and defeat of the main enemy forces (the Sivash direction), mastery of key defensive positions in a short time (storming of Sevastopol). The mobile groups (forward detachments) of the armies were skillfully used to develop the offensive. They rapidly penetrated into the operational depth of the enemy's defense, preventing the withdrawing troops from gaining a foothold on intermediate lines and in defense areas, which ensured a high rate of advance.

For heroism and skillful actions, 160 formations and units were given the honorary names of Evpatoria, Kerch, Perekop, Sevastopol, Sivash, Simferopol, Feodosia and Yalta. 56 formations, units and ships were awarded orders. 238 soldiers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, thousands of participants in the battles for the Crimea were awarded orders and medals.

As a result of the Crimean operation, the last major enemy bridgehead that threatened the rear of the fronts operating in the Right-Bank Ukraine was eliminated. Within five days, the main base of the Black Sea Fleet, Sevastopol, was liberated and favorable conditions were created for a further attack on the Balkans.

________________________________________________________________

* Great Patriotic War without the stamp of secrecy. The book of losses. The latest reference edition / G.F. Krivosheev, V.M. Andronikov, P.D. Burikov, V.V. Gurkin. - M.: Veche, 2010. S. 143.

Anna Tsepkalova,
employee of the Research Institute
military history of the Military Academy of the General Staff
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,
Candidate of Historical Sciences

P.P. Sokolov-Skalya. The liberation of Sevastopol by the Soviet army. May 1944

At the beginning of 1944, the German army was reinforced with two divisions: at the end of January 1944, the 73rd Infantry Division was delivered to the peninsula by sea, and at the beginning of March, the 111th Infantry Division. By April, the army had 12 divisions: 5 German and 7 Romanian, 2 assault gun brigades, various reinforcement units and numbered more than 195 thousand people, about 3600 guns and mortars, 215 tanks and assault guns. She was supported by 148 aircraft.

The ratio of forces and means of the parties to the beginning of the Crimean strategic offensive operation

Forces and means	Troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front and the Separate Primorsky Army	Troops of the 17th German Army
Divisions (estimated)	2,6	1
Total people	2,4	1
Guns and mortars	1,7	1
Tanks and self-propelled guns	2,6	1
combat aircraft	4,2	1

Crimean strategic offensive operation April 8 - May 12, 1944

Soviet tanks on Frunze Street (now Nakhimov Avenue) during the days of the city's liberation from German invaders. May 1944

Fireworks in the liberated Sevastopol. May 1944. Photo by E. Khaldei

Combat composition, the number of Soviet troops and casualties *

Name of associations and terms of their participation in operation	Combat squad and troop strength to the beginning of the operation		Loss of life in operation
	amount compounds	number	irrevocable	sanitary	Total	average daily
4th Ukrainian Front (all period)	sd - 18, tk - 1, otbr - 2, UR - 2	278 400	13 332	50 498	63830	1 824
Separate seaside and 4th Air Army (all period)	sd - 12, sbr -2, selection - 1
Black Sea Fleet and Azov military flotilla (all period)
Total	Divisions-30, buildings-1, brigades-5, UR - 2	462 400	17 754 3,8%	67 065	84819	2 423

List of abbreviations: otbr - a separate tank brigade, sbr - rifle brigade, sd - rifle division, tk - tank corps, UR - fortified area.

________________________________________________________________

* Great Patriotic War without the stamp of secrecy. The book of losses. The latest reference edition /G.F. Krivosheev, V.M. Andronikov, P.D. Burikov, V.V. Gurkin. - M.: Veche, 2010. S. 143.

Anna Tsepkalova,
employee of the Research Institute
military history of the Military Academy of the General Staff
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,
Candidate of Historical Sciences

Liberation of Crimea and Sevastopol in 1944

The period from June 1941 to November 1942 was a period of heavy defensive battles, the heroic defense of hero cities, one of which was the Sevastopol ball. The commander of the 11th German Army, General Manstein, choosing the right moment, introducing numerous aircraft into action, broke through the defenses of the Soviet troops. I had to leave Kerch, and this seriously complicated the situation in Sevastopol, whose defenders waged a tense struggle. After 250 days of legendary defense, the city was abandoned. During the evacuation, many defenders of Sevastopol died or were captured, small groups managed to break out of the city and join the partisans. The enemy captured Sevastopol, but not for a moment was the master of the Crimean land. November 1942-1943 was a turning point in the course of the war. On the morning of November 19, 1942, the troops of the southwestern, and on November 20, the troops of the Stalingrad Front, launched a decisive offensive. After the victory at Stalingrad, a broad offensive was launched along the entire front from Leningrad to the foothills of the Caucasus. The radical turning point in the war, which took place near Stalingrad, was completed by the Battle of Kursk. The victory near Kursk in July 1943 marked the beginning of the summer - autumn offensive of the Soviet troops in 1943 and further military operations to liberate the Crimea and Sevastopol in 1944.

In 1943, the Red Army won a number of major victories. By the end of the year, favorable conditions had developed for the liberation of Crimea.

In April 1944, our troops reached the enemy's barriers in the Sevastopol area.

On May 3, 1944, the commander of the 17th Wehrmacht Army, General Almendinger, addressed his soldiers: “I received an order to defend every inch of the Sevastopol bridgehead. You understand its meaning. I demand that everyone defends in the full sense of the word, that no one retreats, that he would hold every trench, every funnel, every trench ... "

Liberation of Crimea

By the end of 1943, favorable conditions had developed for the liberation of the Crimea. In early November, the troops of the North Caucasian Front landed troops on the Kerch Peninsula, and units of the 4th Ukrainian Front broke through the enemy defenses on the Perekop Isthmus and crossed the Sivash. Thus, a large grouping of Nazi troops in the Crimea was cut off from land and blocked from the sea.

During this period, the North Caucasian Front was transformed into a Separate Primorsky Army. On the bridgeheads captured by our troops, preparations began for the liberation of the Crimea. The liberation of Crimea was entrusted to the 4th Ukrainian Front (commander - Army General F.I. Tolbukhin), the Separate Primorsky Army (commander - Army General A.I. Eremenko), the Black Sea Fleet (commander - Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky), Azov military flotilla (commander Rear Admiral S.G. Gorshkov) and long-range aviation (commander - Air Marshal A.E. Golovanov). Their actions were coordinated by representatives of the headquarters of the Supreme High Command, Marshals of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky and K.E. Voroshilov.

The idea of the operation was to simultaneously strike in the northern part of the Crimea and on the Kerch Peninsula, break through the enemy defenses and, advancing in the general direction of Sevastopol, in cooperation with the Black Sea Fleet and partisans, cut the enemy grouping, prevent its evacuation by sea.

On April 8, 1944, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front went on the offensive. They delivered the main blow south of Sivash and, breaking through the enemy’s defenses, began his pursuit. The 19th Panzer Corps was introduced into the gap, which played a significant role in the liberation of the Crimea. (commander - colonel I.A. Potseluev, chief of staff - colonel I.E. Shavrov)

On April 11, the Separate Primorsky Army went on the offensive, liberating Kerch on the same day.

On April 15, the forward units of the 4th Ukrainian Front, and the next day, units of the Separate Primorsky Army, reached the enemy's barrier zone in the Sevastopol region.

On April 18, Balaklava was liberated. On April 18, 1944, the Separate Primorskaya Army was renamed Primorskaya and became part of the 4th Ukrainian Front. Lieutenant General K.S. was appointed commander of the army. Miller.

Preparations for the liberation of Sevastopol

The Soviet troops failed to break through the enemy defenses near Sevastopol on the move. The Sevastopol bridgehead was defended by the troops of the 17th Nazi Army, numbering more than 72,000 people. They had 1500 guns and mortars, 330 anti-tank guns, 2355 machine guns, 50 tanks and 100 aircraft. The Nazi command demanded to keep Sevastopol at any cost. Soviet troops, having reached the approaches to Sevastopol, began to prepare to storm the heavily fortified positions of the enemy. In the main strike zone - in the Sapun-Gora section - the seashore was concentrated on 1 km of the front up to 250 guns and mortars.

Powerful bombing attacks on the enemy were delivered by the 8th Air Army under the command of the Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General of Aviation T.T. Khryukin. During the period of preparation for decisive battles, from April 17 to May 4, the pilots of the 8th Air Army made 10318 sorties and destroyed 392 objects, conducted 141 air battles and shot down 84 enemy aircraft. And from May 5 to May 12, during the liberation of Sevastopol, they made 10,768 sorties and shot down 66 enemy aircraft in 218 air battles.

Lieutenant P.F. Nadezhdin fought heroically in the sky of Sevastopol. In battle, his plane was shot down. P.F. Nadezhdin sent a burning car to the accumulation of manpower and equipment of the Nazis. He was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Courage and courage was shown by the crew of the PE-2 aircraft, the commander of the 134th Guards Bomber Aviation Regiment of the 6th Guards Bomber Aviation Division, Major V.M. Katkova. When approaching the enemy airfield, one aircraft engine caught fire from a shell hit, but the commander continued to lead a group of bombers to the target. After completing the mission on a burning plane, he landed on rough terrain without extending the landing gear. The cockpit canopy of the pilot and navigator jammed from hitting the ground. At the cost of huge efforts of the shooter - the radio operator of the guard, Sergeant D.I. Lone saved the commander and navigator of the regiment; as soon as the crew managed to take cover in the folds of the terrain, the gas tank of the aircraft exploded. All three were awarded the Orders of the Red Banner for this feat.

Ships and aircraft of the Black Sea Fleet actively operated on sea lanes. On April 27, a detachment of torpedo boats captain lieutenant A.I. Kudersky sank 2 transports with a total displacement of 8000 tons. In this battle, the link of senior lieutenant A.G. Kananadze. No less success in the fight against the enemy was achieved by the crews of the S-33, Shch-201, Shch-215 submarines from the brigade of Rear Admiral P.I. Boltunov. Enormous work in preparation for the upcoming liberation battles was done by engineering units, communications units and the rear of the front.

Liberation of Sevastopol

According to the plan, it was decided to deliver the main blow to the liberation of Sevastopol in the Sapun-gora-seashore sector by the forces of the Primorsky Army, the 19th Tank Corps and the left flank of the 51st Army, to cut off the retreat of the enemy grouping, to prevent its evacuation by sea. The troops of the 2nd Guards Army (commander - Guard Lieutenant General G.F. Zakharov) were tasked with liberating the North Side.

On May 5, at 12 o'clock, the 2nd Guards Army went on the offensive and by the end of the day advanced 500-700 meters forward.

Then the fascist command immediately began the transfer of part of its forces from the Sapun Mountain region to the northern side of Sevastopol.

On May 7, at 10:30, after an hour and a half of artillery and aviation preparation, the troops of the Primorsky and 51st armies went on the offensive in the main direction. Bloody battles began along the entire front. They were especially heavy in the area of Sapun Mountain, in the offensive zone of the 77th Infantry Division of Colonel A.P. Radionov and the 32nd Guards Rifle Division, Colonel N.K. Zakurinkov. The warriors of these divisions were the first to reach the crest of the Sapun Mountain.

There were many brave girls in the ranks of the liberators: Evgenia Deryugina, Lidia Polonskaya, commander of night bombers E.D. Bershanskaya and others.

Thousands of fighters and commanders showed unprecedented heroism. The enemy fiercely resisted, repeatedly launched counterattacks, but nothing could stop the power of the offensive of the Soviet troops.

On May 10, Moscow saluted the liberators of the city. On that day, the Pravda newspaper wrote: “Hello, dear Sevastopol, beloved city of the Soviet people, hero city, hero city! The whole country greets you joyfully."

On May 12, in the area of Cape Chersonese, the remnants of the Nazi group were defeated. In honor of the complete liberation of the Crimea at the Chersonesos Lighthouse, the tankers of the Guard Major N.D. Moiseev from the 6th Separate Guards Tank Brigade of the 19th Tank Corps raised the red flag.

The Crimean operation ended with a glorious victory for the Soviet troops. The enemy lost 111,587 soldiers and officers, all military equipment and weapons, killed and captured. The loss of the enemy at sea from air strikes and ships of the Black Sea Fleet amounted to about 42,000 soldiers and officers. Recognition of the merits of the city of Sevastopol to the country during the Great Patriotic War was its award in 1965 with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal. Then the Black Sea Fleet was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

Photos of the nature of Crimea

In April - May 1944, our troops inflicted Stalin's third crushing blow on the enemy in the region of Crimea and Odessa . It took the Germans 250 days to capture the Crimea, and the Soviet troops liberated it in 5 days (May 7-12, 1944).

On May 9, 1944, 70 years ago, after a general assault, Sevastopol was liberated. By May 12, the remnants of the German 17th Army, which fled to Cape Chersonese, were finally defeated. "Stalin's third blow" - the Crimean offensive operation, led to the complete liberation of the Crimean peninsula from the Nazis. Having recaptured the Crimea and Sevastopol, the Soviet Union regained control of the Black Sea.

General situation before the start of the operation. previous operations.

1943 The German military-political leadership clung to the Crimea to the last opportunity. The Crimean peninsula was of great military-strategic and political importance. Adolf Hitler demanded to keep the Crimea at any cost. Berlin needed the Crimean peninsula not only for operational reasons (a base for the air and sea fleet, an advanced outpost of the ground forces, which made it possible to stabilize the position of the southern flank of the entire front), but also for political ones. The surrender of Crimea could have influenced the position of Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey, and the general situation on the Balkan Peninsula. The loss of Crimea strengthened the capabilities of the Soviet Air Force and the Black Sea Fleet.

On August 13 - September 22, 1943, the troops of the Southwestern Front under the command of General F.I. Tolbukhin, during the Donbass offensive operation, reached the line of the Dnieper and Molochnaya rivers. Conditions appeared for the liberation of Northern Tavria and the Crimean peninsula. September 9 - October 9, 1943, the Novorossiysk-Taman operation (Liberation of Novorossiysk and the Taman Peninsula) was carried out. During this operation, Soviet troops liberated Novorossiysk, the Taman Peninsula and reached the coast of the Kerch Strait. The successful completion of the operation created favorable opportunities for attacks on the Crimean group of the Wehrmacht from the sea and through the Kerch Strait.

The position of German troops on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front continued to deteriorate further. September 26 - November 5, 1943, the Southern Front (from October 20, 1943 - the 4th Ukrainian) carried out the Melitopol offensive operation. October 24-25, 1943 19th tank corps of General I.D. Vasiliev, Guards Kuban Cossack Cavalry Corps of General N.Ya. Kirichenko and rifle units broke through the German defenses. The Red Army was rapidly advancing towards Perekop, Sivash and the lower reaches of the Dnieper.

As a result of the Melitopol operation, the Red Army defeated 8 enemy divisions and inflicted heavy damage on 12 divisions. Soviet troops advanced 50-230 km, liberating almost the entire Northern Tavria and reaching the lower reaches of the Dnieper. German troops in the Crimea were cut off from the rest of the troops. By the end of the day on October 31, the advanced units of the 19th Tank Corps and the Cavalry Corps approached the Turkish Wall and broke through it on the move. On November 1, Soviet soldiers fought in the Armyansk region. The blow of the Soviet tankers and cavalry on the Turkish Wall was so sudden that the Nazis did not have time to organize a powerful defense.

The problem of the advanced units was that they did not have enough artillery, ammunition, besides, the rifle units fell behind. The German command, realizing that the Turkish shaft was broken, organized a powerful counterattack. All day there was a stubborn battle. On the night of November 2, the Nazis again occupied the Turkish Wall with a blow from the flanks.

The advanced Soviet units were forced to fight surrounded. German attacks followed one after another. Komkor Vasiliev was wounded, but remained in the ranks and continued to lead the troops. On November 3, the units had 6-7 shells per gun and 20-25 rounds per rifle. The situation was critical. The front headquarters ordered to leave the encirclement, but if possible, to hold the bridgehead. The commander of the 19th tank corps, Ivan Vasilyev (by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of November 3, 1943, Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces Vasilyev was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union) decided to hold the bridgehead and strike from it (from the south) again break through the German positions on the shaft. At night, two small assault detachments (each with 100 fighters) made up of tankers, dismounted cavalrymen, sappers, signalmen and drivers broke through the German defenses. So, the bridgehead south of the Turkish Wall, 3.5 km wide and up to 4 km deep, was able to hold.

At the same time, parts of the 10th Rifle Corps, Major General K.P. Neverov forced the Sivash and captured another important bridgehead. The German command, realizing the danger of this breakthrough, sent reinforcements with tanks and artillery into battle. However, the Soviet troops received reinforcements. The bridgehead was retained and expanded to 18 km along the front and 14 km in depth. Thus, the operation ended with the capture of bridgeheads at Perekop and south of Sivash, which played a crucial role during the Crimean operation.

Soviet troops crossing the Sivash

The commander of the 17th Army, General Erwin Gustav Jeneke, fearing a "new Stalingrad", drew up a plan for the evacuation of German troops from the peninsula through Perekop to Ukraine ("Operation Michael"). The evacuation was scheduled for October 29, 1943. However, Hitler banned the operation at the last moment. Hitler proceeded from the strategic and military-political significance of the peninsula. He was supported by the Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces, Grand Admiral K. Doenitz. The German Navy needed Crimea to control a significant part of the Black Sea, the loss of the peninsula sharply worsened the capabilities of the German fleet. The admiral promised that in a critical situation, the fleet would evacuate 200,000 troops. 17th Army in 40 days (in bad weather - in 80). However, the naval command was mistaken in their forecasts, in assessing the capabilities of the Navy and Soviet troops. When the need arose, the 17th Army could not be quickly evacuated, which caused its destruction.

October 31 - November 11, 1943, Soviet troops carried out the Kerch-Eltigen landing operation. The Soviet command planned to liberate the Kerch Peninsula. It was not possible to liberate the peninsula, but an important bridgehead was captured and significant enemy forces were attracted to this direction. The German command was forced to transfer troops from the northern (Perekop) direction, where the Nazis planned to launch a strong counterattack on the advancing troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front. The German 17th Army became even more bogged down in the Crimea, now under the threat of attacks from two directions. The Romanian leadership, having lost confidence in the Germans, began to evacuate their troops from the Crimea.

1944 German forces and defense.

The 17th Army of Yeneke (Yeneke) was still a powerful and quite combat-ready grouping. It consisted of up to 200 thousand soldiers, 215 tanks and assault guns and about 360 thousand guns and mortars, 148 aircraft. The headquarters of the 17th Army was in Simferopol.

The army was ordered by Adolf Hitler to stay on the peninsula. In the future, the 17th Army, together with the 6th Army, located in the Nikopol region, was supposed to launch a counterattack on the Red Army and restore land communications cut by the Soviet troops with the rest of the German troops. The 17th Army was to play an important role in disrupting the Soviet offensive on the southern wing of the Eastern Front. Back in November 1943, the Litzman and Ruderboot plans were developed. They provided for the breakthrough of most of the 17th Army from the Crimea through Perekop to join the 6th Army, which was holding the Nikopol bridgehead, and the evacuation of a smaller part of the army by naval forces.

However, the actions of the Soviet troops thwarted these plans. Parts of the 10th Rifle Corps, which held the bridgehead south of Sivash, improved their tactical position and expanded the bridgehead during several local operations. The troops of the Separate Primorsky Army in the Kerch region also conducted a number of local operations, improving their position and expanding their foothold. The 17th Army found itself in an even more difficult position. As General E. Yeneke noted on January 19, 1944: "... the defense of the Crimea hangs on a" silk thread "...".

The position of the 17th Army was aggravated by the actions of the Crimean partisans. On December 20, 1943, the operational and intelligence departments of the 5th Army Corps recognized the futility of fighting partisan detachments, since:

"the complete destruction of large bands in the mountains is possible only with the involvement of very large forces."

The command of the 17th Army also recognized the hopelessness of the fight against the partisans. Partisan detachments were supported by an "air bridge" with the USSR. The Germans tried to terrorize, including exterminating the population of the foothill villages, among which the partisans were hiding, to suppress resistance. However, the punitive measures did not produce the expected results. In addition, Crimean Tatars were involved in the fight against the partisans, who massively collaborated with the invaders.

By April 1944, three partisan formations were actively operating in the Crimea, with a total number of up to 4 thousand fighters. The most powerful was the Southern connection of partisans under the command of I. A. Makedonsky. The southern detachment was located in the reserve of the southern coast of Crimea, in the region of Alushta - Bakhchisarai - Yalta. The northern unit under the command of P. R. Yampolsky was stationed in the Zuy forests. The eastern unit under the leadership of V.S. Kuznetsov was based in the Starokrymsky forests. In fact, the Soviet partisans controlled the entire mountain-forest part of the peninsula. Throughout the occupation, they strengthened their positions. Even some invaders passed to them. So, on the side of the partisans, a group of deserted Slovaks fought.

On January 22-28, the Separate Primorsky Army conducted another local operation. The offensive did not lead to success, but showed the precarious position of the 17th Army. The German command had to transfer reserves from the northern direction, which thwarted the possibility of a counterattack at Perekop. From January 30 to February 29, 1944, the troops of the 3rd and 4th Ukrainian fronts carried out the Nikopol-Krivoy Rog operation (Second Stalinist strike. Part 3. The defeat of the Nikopol-Krivoy Rog enemy grouping). The Nikopol bridgehead was liquidated, which finally deprived the Germans of the hope of restoring land communications with the 17th Army encircled in the Crimea. The 4th Ukrainian Front was able to direct all its forces to the liberation of the Crimean Peninsula.

True, in January-February, the 73rd Infantry Division from the 44th Separate Army Corps was airlifted to the Crimea from the south of Ukraine, and in March, the 111th Infantry Division from the 6th Army of Army Group A. The German high command still wanted to keep the Crimea. However, the command of the 17th Army understood that the reinforcements were not able to change the situation, they only prolong the agony. Jeneke and his staff repeatedly reported to the high command about the need for the speedy evacuation of the army.

By April, the 17th Army had 12 divisions: 5 German and 7 Romanian, 2 assault gun brigades. In the area of Perekop and against the bridgehead on Sivash, the defense was held by the 49th Mountain Rifle Corps (50th, 111th, 336th Infantry Divisions, 279th Brigade of Assault Guns) and the Romanian Cavalry Corps (9th Cavalry, 10th 19th and 19th Infantry Divisions). In total, the Northern group consisted of about 80 thousand soldiers. The headquarters of the group was located in Dzhankoy.

The German defense in the Perekop area consisted of three lanes up to 14 km long and up to 35 km deep. They were occupied by the 50th Infantry Division, reinforced by several separate battalions and units (a total of about 20 thousand bayonets, up to 50 tanks and assault guns and 325 guns and mortars). The main defensive line was up to 4-6 km deep, had three defensive positions with full-profile trenches and long-term firing points. The main center of defense was Armyansk. From the northern direction, the city was covered by a deep anti-tank ditch, minefields and anti-tank guns. The city was prepared for all-round defense, the streets were blocked with barricades, many buildings were turned into strongholds. Communication passages connected Armyansk with the nearest settlements.

The second line of defense took place in the southern part of the Perekop Isthmus between the Karkinit Bay and the Staroe and Krasnoye lakes. The depth of the second line of defense was 6-8 km. Here the Germans built two defensive positions, covered with an anti-tank ditch, minefields and other barriers. The defense was based on the Ishun positions, which closed the exit to the steppe regions of the peninsula.

The third line of defense, the construction of which was not completed by the beginning of the offensive of the Red Army, passed along the Chartylyk River. In the intervals between the defense lines there were separate nodes of resistance and strongholds, minefields. Antiamphibious defenses were prepared on the coast of the Karkinitsky Gulf. The command of the 17th Army was expecting the main attack of the Red Army in the Perekop area.

On the southern bank of the Sivash, the Germans built 2-3 defensive lines up to 15-17 km deep. They were occupied by the 336th German and 10th Romanian infantry divisions. Defensive positions passed along the shores of four lakes and had a land length of only 10 km. Due to this, a high density of defense was achieved, saturated with manpower and firing points. In addition, the defense was strengthened by numerous engineering barriers, minefields and pillboxes, bunkers. The 111th German Infantry Division, the 279th Assault Gun Brigade and part of the 9th Romanian Cavalry Division were in reserve at Dzhankoy.

The Kerch direction was defended by the 5th Army Corps: the 73rd, 98th Infantry Divisions, the 191st Brigade of Assault Guns, the Romanian 6th Cavalry Division and the 3rd Mountain Rifle Division. In total, the group consisted of about 60 thousand soldiers. Coastal defense in the area from Feodosia to Sevastopol was assigned to the Romanian 1st Mountain Rifle Corps (1st and 2nd Mountain Rifle Divisions). The same corps was engaged in the fight against partisans.

The coast from Sevastopol to Perekop was controlled by two cavalry regiments from the Romanian 9th Cavalry Division. In total, about 60 thousand soldiers were allocated for antiamphibious defense and the fight against partisans. The headquarters of the 17th Army and the Romanian 1st Mountain Rifle Corps were located in Simferopol. In addition, the 17th Army included the 9th Air Force Anti-Aircraft Division, an artillery regiment, three coastal defense artillery regiments, the Krym mountain rifle regiment, a separate Bergman regiment, and other units (security, engineer battalions, etc. .).

There were four lines of defense on the Kerch Peninsula. Their total depth reached 70 kilometers. The main line of defense was based on Kerch and the heights surrounding the city. The second line of defense ran along the Turkish Wall - from Adzhibay to Uzunlar Lake. The third lane went near the settlements of Seven Wells, Kenegez, Adyk, Obekchi and Karasan. The fourth lane covered the Ak-Monai isthmus ("Perpach-position"). In addition, the Germans equipped the rear defense lines on the Evpatoria - Saki - Sarabuz - Karasubazar - Sudak - Feodosia, Alushta - Yalta line. They covered Simferopol. Sevastopol was a powerful defensive node.

The plan of operation and the Soviet forces.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (VGK) considered the Crimean peninsula as a strategically important area. The liberation of the Crimea restored the capabilities of the Black Sea Fleet. Sevastopol was the main base of the Soviet fleet. In addition, the peninsula was an important base for the German fleet and aviation, covering the southern strategic flank of the enemy. Crimea was important in determining the future of the Balkan Peninsula and influenced Turkish policy.

The operation to liberate the Crimea began to prepare in February 1944. On February 6, Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky and the Military Council of the 4th Ukrainian Front presented the Headquarters with a plan for the Crimean operation. On February 22, 1944, Joseph Stalin approved the decision to direct the main attack from Sivash. For this, crossings were organized through the Sivash, through which manpower and equipment began to be transferred to the bridgehead. The work took place in difficult conditions. The sea, German air raids and artillery strikes destroyed crossings more than once.

The start date of the operation was postponed several times. From the beginning, this was due to the expectation of the liberation from the Nazis of the coast of the Dnieper to Kherson, then the weather conditions (because of them, the start of the operation was postponed for the period between March 15 and 20). On March 16, the start of the operation was postponed in anticipation of the liberation of Nikolaev and the exit of the Red Army to Odessa. On March 26, the Odessa offensive operation began (Stalin's Third Strike. Liberation of Odessa). However, even after the release of Nikolaev on March 28, the operation could not be started. Bad weather interfered.

The general plan of the Crimean operation was that the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front under the command of General of the Army Fyodor Ivanovich Tolbukhin from the north - from Perekop and Sivash, and the Separate Primorsky Army of General of the Army Andrey Ivanovich Eremenko from the east - from the Kerch Peninsula, dealt a simultaneous blow to general direction to Simferopol and Sevastopol. They were supposed to break through the German defenses, dismember and destroy the German 17th Army, preventing its evacuation from the Crimean Peninsula. The offensive of the ground forces was supported by the Black Sea Fleet under the command of Admiral Philip Sergeyevich Oktyabrsky and the Azov Flotilla under the command of Rear Admiral Sergey Georgievich Gorshkov.

The naval forces included a battleship, 4 cruisers, 6 destroyers, 2 patrol boats, 8 base minesweepers, 161 torpedo, patrol and armored boats, 29 submarines and other ships and vessels. From the air, the offensive of the 4th UV was supported by the 8th Air Army under the command of Colonel General of Aviation Timofey Timofeevich Khryukin and the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet. The 4th Air Army under the command of Colonel General of Aviation Konstantin Andreevich Vershinin supported the offensive of the Separate Primorsky Army. In addition, partisans were supposed to hit the Germans from the rear. Marshals of the Soviet Union K. E. Voroshilov and A. M. Vasilevsky were responsible for the coordination of the troops. In total, about 470 thousand people, about 6 thousand guns and mortars, 559 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts, 1250 aircraft took part in the operation.

Chief of Staff of the 4th Ukrainian Front Lieutenant General Sergei Semenovich Biryuzov, member of the State Defense Committee Marshal of the Soviet Union Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov, Chief of the General Staff Marshal of the Soviet Union Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky at the command post of the 4th Ukrainian Front

The 4th UV dealt the main blow. It consisted of: the 51st Army, the 2nd Guards Army and the 19th Tank Corps. The main blow from the Sivash bridgehead was delivered by the 51st Army under the command of the Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General Yakov Grigorievich Kreizer and the reinforced 19th Tank Corps under the command of the Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces Ivan Dmitrievich Vasiliev. Ivan Vasiliev will be wounded during reconnaissance, so his deputy I. A. Potseluev will lead the offensive of the corps. They received the task of advancing in the direction of Dzhankoy - Simferopol - Sevastopol. In the event of a breakthrough of the German defense and the capture of Dzhankoy, the main grouping of the 4th UV went to the rear of the German positions at Perekop. She could also develop an offensive on Simferopol and in the rear of the enemy's Kerch grouping.

The 2nd Guards Army under the command of Lieutenant General Georgy Fedorovich Zakharov delivered an auxiliary strike on the Perekop Isthmus and was supposed to advance in the direction of Evpatoria - Sevastopol. Zakharov's army was also supposed to clear the western coast of Crimea from the Nazis. A separate Primorsky army received the task of breaking through the German defenses at Kerch and advancing in the direction of Vladislavovka and Feodosia. In the future, part of the forces of the Primorsky Army was to advance in the direction of Simferopol - Sevastopol, the other part - along the coast, from Feodosia to Sudak, Alushta, Yalta and Sevastopol.

The Black Sea Fleet received the task of disrupting enemy sea communications. Submarines and torpedo boats were to attack enemy ships on the near and far approaches to Sevastopol. Aviation (more than 400 aircraft) was supposed to operate throughout the German sea lanes - from Sevastopol to Romania.

Large surface ships did not participate in the operation. The headquarters ordered them to be saved for future naval operations. The actions of the Black Sea Fleet were coordinated by the representative of the Headquarters - Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces of the USSR People's Commissar of the Navy Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov. The Azov Flotilla transported troops and cargo across the Kerch Strait and supported the offensive of the Separate Primorsky Army from the sea.

Long-range aviation under the command of Air Marshal A.E. Golovanov (more than 500 aircraft) was supposed to paralyze the work of railway junctions and ports with massive night strikes, strike at important enemy targets, and sink German ships and ships. Long-range aviation was supposed to strike at the most important Romanian ports of Galati and Constanta.

The Crimean partisans were given the task of disrupting the movement of Germans on the roads, interrupting wire communications, organizing attacks on enemy headquarters and command posts, preventing the Nazis from destroying cities and towns during their retreat, and preventing the destruction and theft of the population. They also had to destroy the Yalta port.

Offensive.

Breakthrough of the German defense.

On the evening of April 7, Soviet troops conducted reconnaissance in force, which confirmed previous information about the location of enemy positions in the area of Perekop and Sivash. Before the offensive, heavy artillery hit the enemy's long-term structures for several days. On April 8, at 8:00, a powerful artillery preparation began in the zone of the 4th Ukrainian Front, which lasted 2.5 hours. It was accompanied by air strikes on German positions. Immediately after the artillery preparation, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front went on the offensive.

The commander of the 17th German Army, having correctly determined the main direction of the strike of the 51st Army, quickly pulled up army reserves. The fighting took on a fierce character. The 1st Guards and 10th Rifle Corps (commanders - Generals I.I. Missan and K.P. Neverov) of the 51st Army in the Tarkhano-Ishunsky direction, which delivered the main blow, were able to break through only the first and partially second enemy trenches. The 63rd Rifle Corps of General P.K. Koshevoy, advancing on the auxiliary directions - Karankinsky and Toytyubinsky, acted more successfully. He broke through the defenses of the 10th Romanian Infantry Division. On April 9, the front command, in order to develop the success of the corps, introduced a division of the second echelon of the same corps into the breakthrough, reinforcing it with a guards tank brigade and a guards tank regiment. The strike was also supported by artillery and aircraft of the 8th Air Army. As a result, the auxiliary strike of Kreizer's 51st Army began to develop into the main one. On April 9, there were fierce battles. The 63rd Corps, repelling the fierce counterattacks of the 111th German Infantry Division, the 279th Assault Gun Brigade and the 10th Romanian Division, advanced 4-7 km, capturing several enemy strongholds. The front command reinforced the rifle corps with a brigade of rocket artillery and transferred to it the 77th rifle division from the army reserve.

At the same time, Zakharov's 2nd Guards Army fought heavily in the Perekop direction. On the very first day of the offensive, the guards liberated Armyansk. By the end of the day on April 9, the army had failed the German defenses at Perekop. German troops began to retreat to the Yishun positions. At the same time, the Nazis constantly counterattacked. So, on April 9, the soldiers of the 13th Guards and 54th Rifle Corps repulsed 8 enemy counterattacks. On the night of April 10, to facilitate the offensive of the 13th Guards Corps, an assault was thrown into the rear of the Germans (a reinforced battalion under the command of Captain F.D. Dibrov and Captain M.Ya. Ryabov). For successful actions, the entire staff of the battalion was awarded state awards, and Dibrov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. By the end of April 10, the 51st and 2nd Guards Armies broke through the German defenses at Sivash and Perekop.

The command of the 17th Army requested permission from the headquarters of Army Group A to withdraw forces to Sevastopol. Permission was given. The 5th Army Corps was ordered to retreat to Sevastopol. On April 10, the German command began the evacuation of rear services, transport, civil servants, collaborators and prisoners. However, the evacuation was stopped by Hitler. On April 12, he ordered to defend Sevastopol to the end and not to evacuate combat-ready units. This decision was opposed by the command of the 17th Army, the Army Group "Southern Ukraine" and the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces Kurt Zeitzler. They wanted to keep the army fighting. But Hitler insisted on his decision.

The command of the 17th Army, realizing that the Crimea could not be held, tried to carry out preparatory measures for the withdrawal of troops. Already on April 8, the development of instructions on the creation of evacuation groups began. First of all, they planned to take out units and subunits that did not directly participate in hostilities. For supply, technical support, only a small number of people were left. “Khivi” were taken to the rear - “voluntary assistants” of the Wehrmacht who served in auxiliary units, as well as former punishers, builders, counterintelligence and propaganda agencies. Sevastopol was ordered to bring as much ammunition and food as possible.

At the same time, the Germans began to destroy the infrastructure of the Crimea. The German command planned to destroy or disable communications, harbors, ports, important economic buildings, airports, communications, etc. According to the plan of the Nazis, the USSR had to restore the Crimea for a long time and not be able to use the peninsula as an operating base. Own military property was taken out or rendered unusable. The Germans did everything carefully, punctually. Roads were destroyed, villages burned, pillars were destroyed, people were killed. However, the offensive of the Soviet troops, assisted by the partisans, was so swift that most of the plan to destroy the Crimea was never implemented.

On April 10th, Tolbukhin ordered the 19th Tank Corps to be brought closer to the front line, so that on the morning of April 11th it could be thrown into battle. The tankers were supposed to release Dzhankoy, and then advance in the direction of Simferopol - Sevastopol in order to cut the enemy's Crimean grouping and prevent the enemy from making an organized withdrawal. The 19th Tank Corps with reinforcement units before the offensive included: 187 tanks, 46 self-propelled guns, 14 armored personnel carriers, 31 armored vehicles, more than 200 guns and mortars, 15 BM-13 rocket launchers. Commander Vasiliev, while inspecting the area, was seriously wounded by a fragment of a bomb dropped from an aircraft, so his deputy colonel Potseluev took command of the corps (although he was also slightly wounded). He commanded the corps until the end of the Crimean operation.

Before the 19th Panzer Corps entered the battle, the Germans were unaware of its location on the Sivash bridgehead. The command of the 17th Army read that the Soviet tank corps was in the Perekop area, where they expected the main attack of the 4th UV. Although all the equipment and weapons of the corps were transferred to the bridgehead south of Sivash in March 1944. The crossing was carried out at night or in bad weather conditions. Engineers and sappers prepared camouflaged shelters. Tracks of caterpillars were covered. Therefore, the blow of the Soviet tankers at Sivash was sudden for the enemy.

At 5 o'clock on April 11, the troops of the 63rd Rifle Corps, with the support of the 19th Tank Corps, completed the breakthrough of the German defenses in the Sivash sector. Soviet tankers were rapidly advancing towards Dzhankoy. Already at 11 o'clock on April 11, the advance detachment broke into the northern part of the city. Motorized riflemen supported the attack from the south. The German garrison, which included up to an infantry regiment, two artillery battalions, four assault guns and an armored train, stubbornly defended. The city was liberated from the Nazis by the evening of April 11th. In addition, Soviet tankers defeated the German airfield in the Veseloye area (15 km southwest of Dzhankoy), and captured an important railway bridge 8 km southwest of Dzhankoy.

On April 11, the command of the 4th UV, in order to quickly liberate the Crimean peninsula, formed a mobile front group. It included the 19th tank corps, the 279th rifle division (two regiments were planted on vehicles) and the 21st separate anti-tank artillery brigade. The mobile group was headed by the Deputy Commander of the 51st Army, Major General V. N. Razuvaev.

The troops of the Separate Primorsky Army, noticing the withdrawal of the forces of the German 5th Army Corps, also launched an offensive. At 21:30 on April 10, after strong artillery and aviation preparation, the forward units of the army went on the attack, and at 2:00 on April 11, the main forces. Formations of the 3rd Mountain Rifle Corps under the command of General A. A. Luchinsky broke through the German defenses and occupied the well-fortified German stronghold Bulganak and began to advance towards the Turkish Wall. The troops of the 11th Guards Corps of General S.E. Rozhdestvensky and the 16th Rifle Corps of General K.I. Provalov also broke through the German defenses and liberated Kerch. Many Germans and Romanians did not have time to escape and were taken prisoner.

On April 11, Supreme Commander-in-Chief Joseph Stalin expressed gratitude to the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front, who broke through the powerful enemy defenses at Perekop, Sivash and liberated Dzhankoy, as well as to the Separate Primorsky Army, which liberated Kerch. Fireworks were fired in Moscow in honor of the victorious Soviet troops.

liberation of the peninsula.

The decisive role in the pursuit of the retreating enemy was played by the cutting blow of the mobile front group. The advance of the mobile group on Simferopol cut off the northern grouping of the 17th Army of the Kerch grouping. Soviet aviation provided great support to the advancing troops of the 19th Panzer Corps, which was called with the help of radio stations that were in the head of the corps. Soviet aviation had a complete advantage in the air.

The left flank of the mobile group (202nd tank brigade, 867th self-propelled artillery regiment and 52nd separate motorcycle regiment) advanced in the direction of Dzhankoy - Seitler, Karasubazar - Zuya, towards the Separate Primorskaya Army. On April 12, Soviet troops occupied Seitler. On the same day, Soviet tankers, with the support of partisans in the Zuya area, defeated a large enemy column that was retreating towards Simferopol. So, the mobile group of the 4th UV cut off the path to Sevastopol through Simferopol for the troops of the German 5th Army Corps. At this time, the main forces of the 19th Panzer Corps continued to advance on Simferopol. Kreiser's 51st Army advanced in the same direction.

The main forces of the 19th Panzer Corps met a strong center of resistance in the Sarabuz area. Here, the defense was held by a newly created battle group under the leadership of the commander of the German 50th Infantry Division, Lieutenant General Sixt. The battle group included a grenadier battalion of the German 50th Infantry Division, a Romanian motorized regiment, a sapper battalion and a battery of anti-aircraft guns. The Soviet tankers did not get involved in a protracted battle and, bypassing the positions of the enemy, continued to move towards Simferopol.

On April 12, Zakharov's 2nd Guards Army failed the German positions on the Chartolyk River. Zakharov's army began to develop an offensive along the western coast and on Evpatoria. In all directions, mobile detachments pursued the enemy. On April 12, the advanced forces of the Separate Primorsky Army reached the Ak-Monai positions of the enemy. However, they could not break through the German defenses on the move. Only by pulling up artillery and inflicting a powerful artillery and bombing strike (aircraft made 844 sorties in a day), Eremenko's army broke through the German defenses. By the end of the day, the entire Kerch Peninsula was liberated from enemy forces.

General A. I. Eremenko decided to send a mobile group of the army to Stary Krym, Karasubazar, in order to establish contact with the troops of the 4th UV. The forward detachments and the main forces of the 11th Guards Rifle Corps and the 3rd Mountain Rifle Corps advanced in the same direction. The 16th Rifle Corps was given the task of advancing on Feodosia and further along the coast to Sudak, Yalta and Sevastopol. The troops of the German 5th Corps mostly retreated along the coast. The partisans played an important role in pursuing the enemy. So, the Crimean partisans defeated the German garrison in Stary Krym. True, the Germans brought up reinforcements and drove the partisans out of the city. In the Old Crimea, the Nazis staged a bloody massacre, killing and injuring hundreds of civilians.

On April 12, the troops of the Separate Primorsky Army were on their way to Feodosia. On this day, the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet delivered a powerful bombing and assault strike on the port of Feodosia and the ships that were there. As a result, the evacuation of German troops by sea from Feodosia was disrupted. On April 13, troops of the 16th Rifle Corps liberated Feodosia. On the same day, a large group of attack aircraft and bombers of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force, under the cover of fighters, attacked the port of Sudak. Soviet planes sank three large barges with enemy soldiers and damaged 5 barges. After this raid, the Germans no longer risked evacuating troops by sea to Sevastopol.

The soldiers, in front of whom three barges crowded with people, went under water, categorically refused to board the ships. The Germans and Romanians continued their retreat to Sevastopol along the mountain roads. Aviation of the 8th and 4th air armies, the Black Sea Fleet inflicted powerful blows on the retreating columns of the enemy and transport hubs. Stormtroopers and bombers created blockages on mountain roads. The moving parts of the advancing corps and armies, the partisans did not give the Germans a break.

The mobile group of the Separate Primorsky Army under the command of the commander of the 227th Infantry Division, Colonel N. G. Preobrazhensky (it included formations of the 227th Infantry Division in vehicles and the 227th Separate Tank Regiment) reached the Old Crimea. With the support of the partisans of the Eastern Detachment of Kuznetsov, the mobile group liberated the settlement. Then the mobile detachment, with the support of the partisans of the Northern Detachment, liberated Karasubazar. Here the enemy convoy was routed to Simferopol. On the same day, in Karasubazar, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front joined here with units of the Separate Primorsky Army.

During the offensive, Soviet soldiers showed heroism and selflessness. So, on April 13, 1944, in the area of the village of Ashaga-Jamin (the modern village of Geroiskoe) in the Saki region, nine scouts of the 3rd Guards Motor-Engineering and 91st Separate Motorcycle Battalions took an unequal battle with the enemy. Sergeant N. I. Poddubny commanded the guard unit, his deputy was guard junior sergeant M. Z. Abdulmanapov. The detachment included Red Army guards P. V. Veligin, I. T. Timoshenko, M. A. Zadorozhny and G. N. Zazarchenko, Red Army soldiers V. A. Ershov, P. A. Ivanov and A. F. Simonenko. They fought for about two hours.

Soviet soldiers repulsed three attacks by an enemy company, and then several battalion attacks. The Germans were forced to carry out artillery preparation, and then launched a new attack. The scouts fought furiously, when the ammunition ran out, they, many already wounded, entered into hand-to-hand combat with the enemy. The German command ordered to take the scouts alive. The surviving fighters were tied with barbed wire and tortured, gouged out their eyes, crushed bones, stabbed with bayonets. Nobody said a word. Then a German officer asked a young Avar guy Magomed Abdulmanapov: “Well, they are Russians, but who are you? Why are you silent? What do you have to lose? You are a stranger to them. Everyone should think about their own life. Where are you from?". The Soviet soldier replied: “We know where. We are all children of the same Motherland!” After that, he was tortured for a long time and before his death they carved a star on his chest. After brutal torture, the Nazis shot the heroes on the outskirts of the village. Only one of them, machine gunner V. A. Ershov, who received 10 gunshot and 7 bayonet wounds, miraculously survived. On May 16, 1944, all nine heroes were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

On April 13, the mobile group of the 4th UV liberated Simferopol from the enemy. The fighters of the Northern and Southern formations of the partisans also participated in the liberation of the city. On the same day, units of Zakharov's 2nd Guards Army liberated Feodosia. In Moscow, victorious salutes thundered three times in honor of the liberators of Feodosia, Evpatoria and Simferopol.

The battle for the Crimea continued with the same ferocity. The command of the 19th Panzer Corps believed that it would be expedient to send all forces from Simferopol to Sevastopol in order to break into the city on the shoulders of the Nazis. However, the commander of the mobile front group, Razuvaev, thought differently. He ordered part of the corps' forces to go to the Karasubazar area to intercept the forces of the German Kerch group. Other troops were sent to Alushta to intercept enemy forces retreating along the sea coast. And only two tank brigades pursued the German troops, who retreated through Bakhchisaray to Sevastopol. As a result, the forces of the mobile front group were scattered, and the German command was able to organize the defense of Sevastopol. The command of the 19th Panzer Corps reported the situation to the commanding front, and Razuvaev's decision was canceled. However, parts of the mobile group were already following the first order, and it was impossible to quickly change the situation. Precious time was lost.

In the early morning of April 14, Soviet troops and partisans liberated Bakhchisarai. The partisans of the Southern Union managed to destroy the arsonists and saved the city from destruction. The command of the 19th Panzer Corps regrouped its forces and decided to strike at Kacha, Mamashai, and then go to the northern outskirts of Sevastopol. The tankers took possession of the villages by evening. In the area of the villages of Kachi and Mamashai, the brigades of the 19th Tank Corps joined up with the advanced forces of the 2nd Guards Army, which bypassed the nodes of the German defense and without getting involved in protracted battles, quickly reached Sevastopol. On the night of April 14, Soviet troops attacked from the north and east (the 16th rifle corps of the Separate Primorsky Army and the motorized rifle brigade of the 19th tank corps advanced), with the support of partisans, took Alushta.

However, despite the high pace of the offensive of the Soviet troops, the main forces of the German northern group - the 49th Mountain Rifle Corps under the command of Rudolf Konrad, managed to win this race and save artillery. Konrad's 49th Corps occupied the defensive lines of Sevastopol. On April 15, the main forces of the 2nd Guards and 51st Armies reached Sevastopol. The command of the 4th Ukrainian Front decided not to wait for the troops of the Separate Primorsky Army to approach and try to take the city on the move.

Preliminary results.

During the seven days of the offensive, the Red Army liberated almost the entire Crimean Peninsula from the enemy. Having reached the "fortress of Sevastopol" (as the German command called the city), the German and Romanian units were in a deplorable state. Romanian connections, in fact, fell apart. The German divisions suffered heavy losses and turned into reinforced regiments. The losses of German and Romanian troops during this period exceeded 30 thousand people.

At the same time, the command of the 17th Army led an intensified evacuation. They evacuated the rear, engineering and construction units, supplies, civil servants, collaborators and prisoners of war. From April 12 to April 20, 67 thousand people were taken out of the peninsula.

The assault on Sevastopol and the liquidation of the 17th army of the Wehrmacht.

April. April 15, General F.I. Tolbukhin set the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front the task of capturing Sevastopol. The Soviet command was looking for weaknesses in the enemy's defense and transferred the 19th Panzer Corps from the right flank to the left. Long-range aviation was involved. On April 15-16, she delivered powerful blows to the railway station, warehouses, port facilities and enemy watercraft.

During this period, Soviet troops in the Sevastopol region did not have superiority over the German-Romanian forces either in manpower or in heavy weapons. The lines of the advancing armies were stretched out. The most powerful forces at the second stage of the pursuit of the enemy were left in the reserve of the army commanders, 50-60 km from the forward detachments. As a result, the 4th UV could not start the assault on the Sevastopol fortress with all its might.

So, the 13th Guards Rifle Corps of the 2nd Guards Army was located in the Ak-Mechet - Evpatoria - Saki area; 10th Rifle Corps of the 51st Army - in the Simferopol region. A separate Primorye army has not yet reached Sevastopol.

Tanks, artillery, aviation experienced a shortage of ammunition and fuel, due to the backlog of rear services. The 19th Panzer Corps had suffered serious losses in previous battles. In addition, Sevastopol had powerful fortifications, which consisted of three lanes. The strongest knot of resistance was Sapun Gora, where there were six tiers of continuous trenches covered with anti-tank minefields and other barriers. Powerful nodes of resistance were also Mekenzieva Gora, Sugar Loaf and Inkerman.

Therefore, it was not possible to organize powerful artillery preparation and air strike during the first assault. A short artillery attack could not disable the long-term fortifications of the enemy. Tankers had to fight against powerful German fortifications. In addition, German aviation was able to organize several attacks on the combat formations of the 19th Panzer Corps. As a result, the battles for Sevastopol took on a protracted character. The Soviet infantry, due to strong fire resistance, was also unable to advance. It was not possible to break into Sevastopol on the shoulders of the enemy.

At the end of the day on April 15, Tolbukhin was forced to give the order for more thorough preparations for the assault on Sevastopol. April 16 Marshals A.M. Vasilevsky and K.E. Voroshilov, who was also personally convinced of the stubborn resistance of the enemy troops, decided to postpone the assault on the city until April 18. At the same time, the rifle units and the 19th Tank Corps, with the support of artillery and aviation, continued the offensive, slowly biting into the German defensive formations.

A separate Primorsky army continued the offensive and on April 16, with the support of the partisans of the Southern Connection, liberated Yalta. Thanks to the help of partisans and underground fighters, many buildings and objects of the city were kept intact. By the end of the day on April 16, the advanced forces of the army captured the important Baidarsky Gate pass and, at the end of April 17, started a battle for Balaklava.

On April 18, artillery and aviation preparation was carried out, and the Soviet troops again stormed the German positions. A separate Primorye army advanced 4-7 km, captured the villages of Nizhny Chorgun, Kamary, Fedyukhin Heights, the village of Kadykovka, and the city of Balaklava. The troops of the 51st Army, advancing together with the 19th Tank Corps, also had some success. However, Sapun Mountain was not taken. The troops suffered heavy losses and retreated to their original positions.

So, the 19th tank corps, on April 18, had 71 tanks and 28 self-propelled artillery mounts on the move, and on April 19, 30 tanks and 11 self-propelled guns remained in the corps. On April 19, the 19th Tank Corps was transferred to the Separate Primorsky Army. The 2nd Guards Army in the offensive on April 18-19 was not successful. The Soviet troops met stubborn resistance from the enemy, who relied on strong fortifications and launched fierce counterattacks.

It became obvious to the Soviet command that it was necessary to prepare more carefully for the assault. It required the concentration of artillery and aviation forces, the supply of ammunition. The calculation of the Soviet leadership that the German command was actively evacuating troops and would not be able to organize a powerful defense of Sevastopol did not materialize. It was necessary to involve all the forces and means of the front in the assault. The general assault was scheduled for April 23. Fighting continued in previous days. Soviet troops actively probed the German defenses, monitored its condition and were ready to immediately go on the offensive upon detection of the withdrawal of the main enemy forces. On April 20-22, separate detachments fought local battles. The 19th Tank Corps was being replenished with armored vehicles.

On the night of April 23, Soviet long-range aviation attacked German positions. On April 23, at 11 o'clock, after an hour of artillery preparation and an air strike, the Soviet troops went on the offensive. As a result of stubborn fighting, Soviet troops achieved little success. However, it was not possible to break through the German defenses. On April 24, after an hour of artillery and aviation preparation, the Red Army went on the offensive again. All day there were stubborn battles.

The Germans counterattacked with the support of assault guns and aircraft. So, in the area north of the Mekenzievy Gory station, the enemy launched 20 counterattacks with forces from a battalion to a regiment. On April 25, Soviet troops attacked again. However, despite the fierce attacks, it was not possible to break through the enemy defenses. Soviet troops achieved only local successes. As Vasilevsky admitted: "... and this offensive of ours did not bring due success."

I had to start a new regrouping of forces and means, preparing troops for battles in the mountains, creating assault groups, working out interaction between units. We decided before the next assault to subject the enemy fortifications to a thorough artillery shelling and bombing and assault strikes. On April 29, Vasilevsky discussed this issue with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Stalin was dissatisfied with the delay in the assault on Sevastopol, but was forced to agree with Vasilevsky's arguments. It was decided on May 5 to launch an offensive by the 2nd Guards Army in an auxiliary direction in order to mislead the enemy, and on May 7 a general assault on Sevastopol.

The command of the 17th Army, realizing that Sevastopol could not be held, and wishing to preserve at least part of the combat-ready core of the army, repeatedly turned to Hitler with a request to evacuate troops. However, Hitler still demanded to keep Sevastopol. The order of April 24, 1944 said: "... not a step back." Alarmists and cowards were to be shot. The commander of the German Navy on the Black Sea, Vice Admiral Brinkman, and the head of the naval region of the Crimea, Rear Admiral Schultz, reported to Hitler that the fleet was capable of supplying the Sevastopol garrison with all the necessary sea.

The Fuhrer believed that Sevastopol must be kept for both political and military reasons. Among the political factors stood out the position of Turkey, which after the fall of Sevastopol could go over to the side of the allies, as well as the situation in the Balkans. Militarily, Sevastopol was important in that it fettered a significant Soviet grouping. The 17th Army was supposed to defend Sevastopol and inflict the greatest possible losses on the enemy. Therefore, the high command allowed only the wounded, Romanians and, collaborators, prisoners to be taken out of the Crimea.

In addition, the forcible removal of the Soviet population was practiced, the Germans covered themselves with them from Soviet air raids. So, often equipment and soldiers were loaded into the hold, and women and children were placed on the decks. The latter were warned to pick up the children and throw away the white sheets when Soviet planes appeared. After Hitler's order to hold Sevastopol, the Germans stepped up the transfer of reinforcements by sea and air for the combat units of the 17th Army. They also brought in a lot of ammunition.

General assault on Sevastopol.

The Soviet command worked hard, preparing for a general assault. It was especially difficult to ensure the transportation of ammunition and fuel, since the front-line and army warehouses were still beyond the Sivash and in the Kerch region. All the artillery of the front was drawn up to Sevastopol. Intelligence carried out additional study of the German defensive system and the disposition of enemy troops. Local operations were carried out to capture or destroy certain important points in order to improve the position of the troops before the offensive. Along the entire front, Soviet aviation and artillery continued to strike at German positions. Corps that remained in the rear were pulled up to the area of hostilities.

In the period preceding the general assault, Soviet troops constantly disturbed the Germans. Territorial successes were insignificant. But, on the other hand, the German defense was weakened and well studied. The Germans in local battles lost more people than they received replacements. They could not replenish the equipment that was out of order. And yet, the 17th Army was still a significant force: on May 5, the army had 72.7 thousand people, 1775 guns and mortars, 2355 machine guns, 50 tanks and assault guns. Given the fortified area, this made it possible to create a greater density of defensive formations and firepower. The Germans created the Sevastopol fortified area for more than one month. After the defeat of the Wehrmacht near Stalingrad, German troops began to build defensive lines near Sevastopol. The Germans restored part of the old Soviet pillboxes and bunkers, and also paid special attention to improving the system of fire from field fortifications and mining the territory. The defensive line passed through several important heights, which, due to the steepness of the slopes, were inaccessible to tanks and reinforced with engineering structures. Their entire terrain was repeatedly shot through with cross and oblique fire. Machine-gun emplacements were set up deep in the rocks, and they could only be destroyed by a direct hit. German troops were ordered to defend themselves to the last opportunity. Appointed on May 1, the new commander of the 17th Army, Karl Almendinger, addressed the troops on May 3 and demanded that ".. everyone defended in the full sense of the word, so that no one retreated, would hold every trench, every funnel, every trench."

On May 5, after 1.5 hours of artillery preparation, the 2nd Guards Army went on the offensive in the Balbek-Kamyshly region. The tactics of using small assault groups (20-30 fighters each) paid off, and the army achieved some success. The offensive of the Soviet infantry was supported by a hurricane of artillery fire and continuous air attacks. On May 6, the 2nd Guards Army resumed the offensive. However, on this day, the resistance of the German troops intensified. The Germans carried out 14 counterattacks during the day. Soviet troops advanced only a few hundred meters. However, the 2nd Guards Army completed the main task - it misled the German command about the direction of the main attack. The command of the 17th Army finally decided that the 4th UV would deliver the main blow in the Mekenzievy Gory area (repeating the German offensive of 1942).

On May 7, the general assault began. The main blow was inflicted on the Sapun Gora - Karan section. The attack was preceded by a powerful artillery preparation - from 205 to 258 artillery pieces and mortars were involved in 1 km of the front. Three out of four guards mortar brigades armed with BM-31-12 MLRS, eight out of ten guards mortar regiments and three separate guards mountain pack mortar divisions were involved here. In addition, Soviet aviation dealt powerful blows to German positions - aircraft of the 8th Air Army made 2105 sorties in a day.

A fierce battle went on for nine hours. The Germans fiercely defended the multi-tiered fortifications of Sapun Mountain, which had 63 pillboxes and bunkers. The fighters of the 63rd Rifle Corps under the command of Major General P.K. Koshevoy and the 11th Guards Rifle Corps, Major General S.E. Rozhdestvensky, fiercely attacked the German positions. There was no quick break anywhere. Every now and then the Russians and the Germans met in hand-to-hand combat. Many positions changed hands more than once. The enemy counterattacked, the Germans fought hard and skillfully. There were four German positions on Sapun Gora, and the enemy did not want to surrender each. However, the Soviet soldiers took this impregnable position - the key to Sevastopol. This assault predetermined the outcome of the entire battle for Sevastopol.

After unsuccessful night counterattacks, fearing the encirclement of their forces, the German command began a partial withdrawal of troops north of Severnaya Bay (in the offensive sector of the 2nd Guards Army). On May 8, fierce fighting continued. By the end of the day, the 2nd Guards Army reached the North Bay. The troops of the 51st Army, having finally broken through the outer contour of the German fortifications, reached the inner contour of the Sevastopol fortress. A separate Primorskaya army captured the Karan heights and created the conditions for the entry into battle of the forces of the 19th tank corps. The enemy intensively led the evacuation.

In such a critical situation, the commander of Army Group South, Ferdinand Schörner, on the evening of May 8, asked Hitler to allow the evacuation of the main forces of the 17th Army, since further defense of Sevastopol was no longer possible. On May 9, the command of the 17th Army received such permission, but it was too late. Now I had to run. Parts of the 2nd Guards and 51st armies reached the Ship side.

Parts of the Primorsky Army in the area of the settlement of Rudolfov - Otradny. On May 9, the 3rd Mountain Rifle Corps and the 16th Rifle Corps, with the support of the 19th Tank Corps, attacked the German rear line (evacuation cover line). In all areas, the Germans were still actively defending themselves, undertaking counterattacks. By the end of May 9, Sevastopol was liberated from the enemy.

At about one in the morning on May 10, the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin was transmitted on the radio, which emphasized the great importance of the liberation of Sevastopol from German troops. Gratitude was expressed to the Soviet soldiers. At the same time, Moscow saluted the soldiers-liberators with 24 salvos from 324 guns. A spontaneous salute was also held in Sevastopol.

The fighting was still going on. The Germans defended themselves with the desperation of the doomed and tried to evacuate their forces from the area of Cape Chersonese. Here lay their last line of defense. Combat groups were formed from the remnants of various formations, branches of troops and services, headed by the most experienced and decisive commanders. Almost all the remaining artillery was pulled into this area, bringing the density of barrels to 100 per 1 km. Moreover, there was an unlimited amount of ammunition and they were not spared.

However, all the efforts of the German command were in vain. On the evening of May 9, Soviet artillery began shelling a German airfield near Chersonesos. The leadership of the Air Force was forced to transfer the last fighters to Romania. Thus, the German troops lost air support. From Romania, the German Air Force could no longer solve the problem of supporting its ground forces. Reduced and the possibility of evacuation. On the night of May 11, only the command and headquarters of the 17th Army were taken out. By this time, more than 50 thousand Germans and Romanians remained on the peninsula.

Normal evacuation was disrupted. The Wehrmacht machine began to malfunction. There were not enough ships, they were late, they continued to carry ammunition that was no longer needed (they were simply thrown overboard). Many ships were not fully loaded, their captains were afraid to stand under fire for a long time. People crowded at the piers in anticipation of ships, were forced to wait under the blows of artillery and aircraft. Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz personally ordered to put into the sea more than 190 German and Romanian ships (sweepers, transports, barges, boats, etc.), which would be enough for 87 thousand people. However, a magnitude 8 storm forced some of the ships to return and others to stop. The operation was forced to be postponed to May 12. The German troops in the Crimea had to withstand the blows of the Red Army for another day. On the night of May 11, panic began. The soldiers fought for places on the ships. Many ships were forced to leave without completing their loading.

Intelligence obtained information that the German troops received an order from four o'clock on May 12 to begin a withdrawal to Cape Chersonese for evacuation. Therefore, the front command decided to launch a night assault on the last German defensive line in order to prevent the withdrawal and evacuation of enemy troops. After a short artillery raid, at 3 o'clock in the morning, the Soviet troops launched the last assault. The German defense was broken through. The evacuation was cancelled. By 12 o'clock on May 12, 1944, the Soviet troops completed the capture of the remnants of the German troops, who began to surrender en masse.

More than 21,000 enemy soldiers and officers were captured in the area of Cape Khersones, and a lot of equipment, weapons, and ammunition were captured. Among the prisoners were the commander of the enemy troops in the Kherson region, the commander of the 73rd Infantry Division, Lieutenant General Boehme, and the commander of the 111th Infantry Division, Major General E. Gruner. The commander of the 336th Infantry Division, Major General Hageman, died. A significant part of the German ships that arrived for the evacuation scheduled for May 12 were sunk by artillery and air strikes. In total, the German-Romanian troops during the period of the general assault on Sevastopol and the elimination of the remnants of the Crimean group in the Kherson region on May 7 - 12, 1944 lost more than 20 thousand people killed and more than 24 thousand people captured. The command of the ground forces blamed the fleet for the tragedy. For many months after the death of the 17th Army, the investigation continued.

The cruiser "Red Crimea" when returning to Sevastopol

The results of the operation.

The Crimean offensive operation ended with the complete victory of the Red Army. If in 1941-1942. It took the Wehrmacht 250 days to take the heroically defended Sevastopol, then in 1944 Soviet troops broke into the strong fortifications of the enemy and cleared the entire Crimean Peninsula of him in 35 days.

The goal of the Crimean operation was realized. Soviet troops broke into the enemy's defense in depth at Perekop, Sivash and on the Kerch Peninsula, stormed the powerful Sevastopol fortified area and actually destroyed the German 17th Army. The irretrievable losses of the 17th Army amounted to about 120 thousand people, of which more than 61 thousand people were captured. In addition, the Germans suffered heavy losses during the evacuation. So, the Romanian Black Sea flotilla was actually destroyed, which lost 2/3 of the available ship's composition. In particular, Soviet aircraft sank large transports "Totila", "Thea" (convoy "Patria"). It is believed that up to 8-10 thousand people died on them. Therefore, the total losses of the German-Romanian troops are estimated at 140 thousand people. In addition, almost all the equipment of the German army fell into the hands of the Red Army. The Soviet troops and fleet in this operation lost more than 17 thousand people killed and more than 67 thousand people wounded.

Strategically, the Crimean victory returned to the Soviet Union an important economic region, and to the fleet - the main base of the Black Sea Fleet. The threat was finally removed from the southern strategic flank of the Soviet-German fleet. The Red Army liquidated the last major German bridgehead that threatened the Soviet rear. The Soviet Union regained control over the Black Sea, sharply increased the operational capabilities of the fleet and aviation in the region. The political weight of the Third Reich in Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey dropped even more. Romania began to seriously think about a separate peace with the USSR.

The Crimean peninsula was seriously affected by the German occupation. Many cities and villages suffered greatly - especially Sevastopol, Kerch, Feodosia and Evpatoria. More than 300 industrial enterprises and many resorts were destroyed. Agriculture suffered greatly, almost the entire livestock was slaughtered. Many people were taken to Germany. A good picture of the destruction shows the population of Sevastopol. On the eve of the war, more than 100 thousand people lived in the city, and by the time the hero city was liberated, about 3 thousand inhabitants remained in it. Only 6% of the housing stock survived in Sevastopol.

The course and results of the Crimean operation showed the increased skill of the Soviet troops. The 4th Ukrainian Front and the Separate Primorsky Army quickly broke into the enemy's powerful defensive lines, which had been created for a long time. The Crimean operation once again showed the advantage of the offensive over the defense.

No, even the strongest defense, can withstand the onslaught of well-trained, courageous troops. When the command skillfully chooses the direction of the main attacks, organizes the interaction of troops, skillfully uses the fleet, aviation and artillery. For heroism and skillful actions, 160 formations and units of the Red Army received the honorary names of Kerch, Perekop, Sivash, Evpatoria, Simferopol, Sevastopol, Feodosia and Yalta. Dozens of units and ships were awarded orders. 238 Soviet soldiers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, thousands of participants in the Crimean operation were awarded orders and medals.

Liberation of Odessa

70 years ago the Red Army liberated Odessa. On April 10, 1944, troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front under the command of Army General Rodion Malinovsky liberated an important Soviet port from the Nazis. The liberation of the city became part of the Odessa offensive operation (March 26 - April 14, 1944), carried out by the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front with the assistance of the Black Sea Fleet. The operation became part of the so-called. "Stalin's third strike", which ended with the liberation of Odessa and the Crimea with Sevastopol. In turn, the "third strike" was a continuation of the "second strike" - a series of offensive operations to liberate the Right-Bank Ukraine (Dnieper-Carpathian strategic operation).

The situation before the operation

The Odessa operation was preceded by the Bereznegovato-Snigirevskaya operation (March 6-18, 1944). During it, the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front defeated the forces of the German 6th Army. Nine German divisions were destroyed. As the Soviet newspaper Pravda noted, the second part of the 6th Army repeated the fate of the first 6th Army, which was destroyed near Stalingrad. A significant German group was threatened with complete destruction. Therefore, on March 12, the German command was forced to withdraw all the forces of the 6th Army to the border of the Southern Bug River.

Parts of the 17th and 44th German army corps, suffering heavy losses and throwing heavy weapons, managed to break through the Southern Bug and in the direction of Nikolaev. However, part of the German group blocked in the Bereznegovatoe, Snigirevka area was liquidated. Soviet troops crossed Ingulets and liberated Kherson on March 13. On March 15, Bereznegovatoe and Snigirevka were liberated from the Nazis. By March 16, the Germans had lost more than 50 thousand people killed and captured, more than 2.2 thousand guns and mortars, 274 tanks and many other weapons and equipment. On March 20, the commander of the 6th Army, Colonel General K. Hollidt, lost his position, he was replaced by General Z. Henrici.

On March 24, the troops of the 37th Army reached the Southern Bug and, after two days of stubborn fighting, liberated the city of Voznesensk, occupying an important bridgehead. In the zone of the 46th Army, units of the 394th Infantry Division, with heroic efforts, managed to force the Southern Bug in the Troitskoye area. On March 19, Soviet troops captured an important enemy stronghold in Andreevka-Erdeleva. In fierce battles, Soviet soldiers defended and expanded the bridgehead. However, the entire front failed to force the Southern Bug on the move. The German command in the Nikolaev area concentrated a significant grouping and was able to create a stable defense.

In general, the armies of Rodion Yakovlevich Malinovsky advanced 140 km. Significant territories of the Right-Bank Ukraine between the Ingulets and Southern Bug rivers were liberated from the Germans and Romanians. The 3rd Ukrainian Front was able to take an advantageous position for a further offensive in the Odessa direction. The Soviet armies inflicted a heavy defeat on the enemy and, having liberated the interfluve of the Ingulets and the Southern Bug, seized bridgeheads on the right bank of the Southern Bug, created the conditions for a strike on the Nikolaev-Odessa Wehrmacht grouping and an offensive in the direction of the lower Dniester.

The plan of operation and the forces of the parties

Even during the Bereznegovato-Snigirevskaya operation, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command clarified the task of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. On March 11, Stalin set the task of pursuing the enemy troops, crossing the Southern Bug, liberating Nikolaev, Tiraspol and Odessa, reaching the river. Prut and the northern bank of the river. Danube on the state border of the Soviet Union with Romania.

The plan of the Odessa operation was developed by the front commander Rodion Malinovsky and the representative of the Headquarters, Marshal Alexander Vasilevsky. On March 19, 1944, they submitted their report to Stalin, in which they asked to support the front with tanks, artillery tractors and fighter aircraft, as well as to expedite the arrival of reinforcements necessary to make up for the losses suffered by the armies during the Bereznegovato-Snigirev operation. On the same day, the operation plan was approved.

Stalin promised to help with tanks and tractors, but it was more difficult with replenishments. As Vasilevsky noted, the weather conditions at the beginning of the operation were negative. The rains finally put out of action the already bad dirt roads. Ammunition, fuel and all the materials needed by the troops could only be transported with the help of tractors and all-terrain vehicles. Therefore, the offensive of the front was postponed until March 26.

The 3rd Ukrainian Front was to strike with the forces of seven combined arms armies: the 57th Army under the command of Nikolai Hagen, the 37th Army of Mikhail Sharokhin, the 46th Army of Vasily Glagolev, the 8th Guards Army of Vasily Chuikov, the 6th Army of Ivan Shlemin, the 5th shock army of Vyacheslav Tsvetaev and the 28th army of Alexei Grechkin. The front also included the 4th Guards Mechanized Corps under the command of Trofim Tanaschishin (who died on March 31, the corps was headed by Vladimir Zhdanov), the 4th Guards Kuban Cossack Cavalry Corps of Issa Pliev and the 23rd Tank Corps of Alexei Akhmanov. The 4th Guards Mechanized Corps and the 4th Guards Cossack Cavalry Corps were part of the cavalry-mechanized group under the general command of General I. A. Pliev.

In total, the grouping of Soviet troops at the beginning of the operation consisted of about 470 thousand soldiers and commanders, more than 12.6 thousand guns and mortars, 435 tanks and self-propelled guns and 436 aircraft. Soviet troops significantly (almost 4 times) outnumbered the enemy in artillery, had an advantage in tanks (2.7 times), people (1.3 times), but were inferior in aircraft (1.3 times).

The troops of the front were supported by aircraft of the 17th Air Army under the command of Vladimir Sudets, as well as naval aviation and ships of the Black Sea Fleet of Admiral Philip Oktyabrsky. Parts of the marines were involved in the liberation of coastal cities and ports. In addition, the armies of the left wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front took part in the defeat of German troops between the Southern Bug and the Dniester.

The 57th and 37th armies of Hagen and Sharokhin were to advance in the general direction towards Tiraspol. Pliev's cavalry-mechanized group, Glagolev's 46th Army, Chuikov's 8th Guards Army, and Akhmanov's 23rd Tank Corps were to advance in the general direction towards Razdelnaya station, bypassing Odessa from the northwest direction. The 6th army of Shlemin, the 5th shock army of Tsvetaev and the 28th army of Grechkin advanced on Nikolaev and Odessa.

Preparation for the operation took place in difficult conditions. Spring thaw and heavy rains completely ruined dirt roads. In order not to slow down the pace of the offensive when the main forces could not quickly move forward, special mobile forward detachments were formed in the divisions. They included up to a company of riflemen, a platoon of sappers planted on vehicles, several anti-tank guns, tanks or self-propelled guns. The mobile detachments were supposed to bypass the centers of resistance, enemy strongholds, enter the rear of the German troops, capture bridges, crossings and communication centers.

The Soviet troops were opposed by the forces of the German 6th and Romanian 3rd armies of Army Group "A" (since April 5 "Southern Ukraine"). The left wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front was also opposed by the troops of the 8th Army. The army group was commanded by Field Marshal Ewald von Kleist (since April 1, Colonel General Ferdinand Schörner). From the air, German troops were supported by the air corps of the 4th Air Fleet.

Army Group A, despite heavy losses in the previous operation, still had significant forces. The German-Romanian group had 16 German and 4 Romanian divisions, 8 brigades of assault guns and other formations. In total, the army group consisted of about 350 thousand soldiers, 3.2 thousand guns and mortars, 160 tanks and assault guns and 550 aircraft (including 150 Romanian aircraft).

The German troops had a fairly developed defense system. The main defensive line on the Southern Bug River began to be built in the summer of 1943. Local residents were involved in the construction. In the operational depth, the Germans prepared auxiliary defensive lines on the Tiligul, Bolshoy Kuyalnik, Maly Kuyalnik and Dniester rivers. The approaches to Odessa were especially well fortified. The city was considered the "fortress of the Fuhrer." In addition, Berezovka and Nikolaev were strong strongholds. The German defense relied on a significant number of serious water barriers that interfered with the advancing troops.

Offensive

Forcing the Southern Bug and liberation of Nikolaev.

On the night of March 26, the troops of the right flank and center of the 3rd Ukrainian Front began to force the Southern Bug River, trying to break through the enemy defenses on the right bank. However, due to the strong resistance of the enemy and the lack of crossing facilities, the Soviet troops did not achieve success during the day. Then the Soviet command shifted the brunt of the blow to the previously captured bridgeheads in the areas of Konstantinovka and Voznesensk. The armies of Hagen and Sharokhin, overcoming the resistance of the enemy, who created a serious defense at the bridgeheads, by the end of March 28, expanded the breakthrough to 45 km along the front and from 4 to 25 km in depth.

Malinovsky, assessing the success of the right-flank armies, decided to transfer Pliev's cavalry-mechanized group and Akhmanov's 23rd tank corps to the offensive zone of the 57th and 37th armies. These corps were originally located in the zone of the 46th Army, north of New Odessa. The cavalry-mechanized group received the task of advancing on Razdelnaya, and the 23rd Panzer Corps - on Tiraspol.

The feat of landing Olshansky. On the very first day of the advance of the front, the armies of the left flank began the assault on Nikolaev. In order to support the ground forces and divert the forces of the German garrison, the commander of the 28th Army, Lieutenant General Alexei Grechkin, set the task of landing troops in the port of Nikolaev. Marine paratroopers were supposed to land in the rear of the German troops, divert part of the forces from the front and try to cause panic, disorient the enemy. This task was assigned to the fighters of the 384th Separate Marine Battalion. The amphibious assault included 68 volunteers: 55 marines, 10 sappers (from the 57th separate engineering and sapper battalion of the 28th army), 2 signalmen and a guide (fisherman A. I. Andreev). The detachment was led by Senior Lieutenant Konstantin Fedorovich Olshansky. Lieutenant G.S. Voloshko was the chief of staff of the detachment, and Captain A.F. Golovlev was appointed deputy commander for political affairs.

Marines in the village of Oktyabrsky (the village of Bogoyavlenskoye), located on the banks of the Southern Bug, took several old boats and prepared them for the operation. Several fishermen and 12 pontoons from the 44th separate pontoon-bridge battalion sat on the oars. The paratroopers took a significant amount of ammunition, each fighter had 10 grenades. The movement of the detachment was accompanied by difficulties. There was a headwind gale that slowed the movement and damaged the boats. Along the way, one of the boats fell apart. The detachment had to land on the shore and regroup. Fishermen and pontooners were left on the shore, paratroopers sat down at the oars. As a result, they were able to cover 15 km in only more than five hours. Because of this delay, the sappers, having completed the passages, could not return before dawn and were forced to stay with the guide.

At 04:15 on March 26, 1944, the Marines landed at the commercial port and, having eliminated the guards, occupied several buildings. The detachment took up a circular defense. Signalers reported to the command about the successful start of the landing operation. In the morning, the Germans discovered the seizure of the elevator. Assuming that they were opposed by a small partisan detachment, the Germans attempted to push the enemy back with small forces. However, the Germans met serious resistance, suffered losses and withdrew.

Further, during the continuous many hours of battle, the Germans launched 18 attacks, constantly increasing the onslaught. The Germans threw into battle superior forces, artillery, six-barreled rocket launchers and armored vehicles, used smoke bombs and flamethrowers. Marine paratroopers did not give up, suffered losses, but each new attack of the enemy was beaten off with heavy fire. The second report was handed over to the command: “We have come into contact with the enemy. We are fighting a fierce battle, we are suffering losses. On the evening of March 26, radio operators reported a difficult situation. Olshansky called fire on himself.

The fierce battle continued into the night. Radio operators were killed under enemy artillery fire, the radio was destroyed. Only 15 fighters remained in the ranks. Many were injured. Olshansky, who was also wounded, ordered the foreman of the first article, Yuri Lisitsyn, who was an experienced intelligence officer, to make his way to his own and ask for air support. The scout successfully made his way through the front, but already near the location of the Soviet troops he was blown up by a mine. However, he did not die. With an injured leg, he reached his own and handed over a report.

The Marines fought like titans. Senior Lieutenant Konstantin Olshansky died a heroic death. Lieutenant Voloshko and Captain Golovlev were killed. The remnants of the detachment were led by foreman of the 2nd article K. V. Bochkovich. Sailor V. V. Khodyrev, who had already lost his arm, during the German attack, supported by tanks, volunteered to "meet them in Sevastopol." With two bundles of grenades (all anti-tank guns were already damaged), he destroyed an enemy tank. And at the cost of his life, he thwarted the German attack.

On the morning of March 28, the surviving paratroopers, supported by Il-2 attack aircraft, repulsed the last, 18th, attack of the German troops. A total of 11 fighters survived, all were injured, five in serious condition. The German command was sure to the end that the Russians had landed a significant formation. The landing detachment destroyed more than a battalion of enemy manpower, several guns and tanks.

Olshansky's landing party completed its task. His heroic actions forever entered the military annals of Russia as an example of military prowess and the skill of a military unit. The motherland highly appreciated the feat of the marines and sappers. All of them received the title of Heroes of the Soviet Union, 55 of them posthumously. The 384th Separate Marine Battalion was given the honorary name "Nikolaevsky" by Stalin's order.

On the night of March 28, formations of the 61st Guards and 24th Rifle Divisions of the Shlemin Army and the 130th Rifle Division of the Tsvetaev Shock Army crossed the Ingul River and broke into the city. At the same time, parts of Grechkin's army liberated the city from the south. On March 28, Soviet troops liberated Nikolaev. Moscow celebrated the liberation of the city with a gun salute - 224 guns fired twenty artillery volleys.

The Germans, retreating, destroyed the bridge across the Southern Bug River in the Varvarovka area. This complicated the offensive of the 6th Army and the 5th Shock Army. However, by evening, Soviet troops liberated Varvarovka. After the restoration of the bridge, the main forces of the two armies crossed.

A modern memorial to paratroopers K.F. Olshansky. Installed in Nikolaev (Ukraine) in 1974 according to the project of architects O.P. and V.P. Popov

Simultaneously with the offensive of the troops of the left flank, the formations of the right flank of the 3rd Ukrainian Front were successfully crushed by the enemy. During three days of stubborn fighting, on March 28, the 57th and 37th armies broke through the German defenses on the right bank of the Southern Bug at a front of 45 km to a depth of 25 km.

On March 29, the 28th Army was withdrawn to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Simultaneously with the liberation of Nikolaev, the troops of the left wing of the 3rd Ukrainian Front developed an offensive along the coast to Odessa. On March 30, the 5th shock army under the command of Grechkin, with the support of a landing detachment landed from the sea, crossed the Dnieper-Bug estuary and liberated the city of Ochakov. Aircraft of the 17th Air Army and the Black Sea Fleet, as far as possible and taking into account weather conditions, provided support to the ground forces. Soviet aviation inflicted powerful blows on the retreating columns of the enemy, destroyed transport hubs. Aviation also disrupted the evacuation of German troops by sea. Transport aircraft, trying to solve the problem of supplying troops in the conditions of spring thaw and impassability, delivered fuel, ammunition and other cargo by air.

The German command, in the conditions of a breakthrough of defense on the left and right flanks, as well as the offensive of the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front (which created a threat of encirclement of the Nikolaev-Odessa group), began a hasty withdrawal of the main forces of the German 6th and Romanian 3rd armies across the Dniester River. At the same time, the Germans tried to detain the enemy at the intermediate line of the Tiligul River. However, the troops of the 57th and 37th armies, the 23rd tank corps and Pliev's cavalry-mechanized group broke through the German defenses.

By the morning of March 30, the main forces of the cavalry-mechanized group and the 23rd Panzer Corps had completed the crossing of the Southern Bug in the area of Aleksandrovka and Voznesensk. On March 31, having overcome the stubborn resistance of the enemy, the Soviet troops began to pursue him in the direction of Razdelnaya. On this day, the commander of the 4th Guards Mechanized Corps, Lieutenant General of the Tank Troops Trofim Ivanovich Tanaschishin, died near the city of Voznesensk.

Already on April 4, units of Pliev's cavalry-mechanized group and Sharokhin's 37th Army cut the railway that connected Odessa and Tiraspol and occupied the important Razdelnaya railway junction. As a result, the German group was divided into two groups. Formations of the 30th and 29th Army Corps of the 6th Army (9 divisions and 2 brigades of assault guns), under the onslaught of the armies of Sharokhin, Hagen and Akhmanov's 23rd Tank Corps, rolled back to Tiraspol and across the Dniester River. The remaining troops of the 6th Army - formations of the 17th, 44th and 72nd army corps, formations of the 3rd Romanian army (a total of 10 German and 2 Romanian divisions, 2 assault gun brigades, separate tank battalions and other units) - went to Odessa. The troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front covered the German grouping from the northern and northwestern directions. They pressed them to Odessa. On April 5, a cavalry-mechanized group broke through to Strasbourg (Kuchurgan), there was a threat of encirclement of the enemy's Odessa grouping.

The command of the front, in order to finally cut off the Germans' retreat across the Dniester, turned the cavalry-mechanized group from the Razdelnaya region to the southeast. On April 7, Soviet troops occupied Belyaevka and reached the Dniester Estuary. The threat of the emergence of a large "cauldron" intensified. At the same time, units of the 8th Guards and 6th Army bypassed Odessa from the northwest, while the 5th Shock Army continued its offensive along the sea coast.

More than 6 enemy divisions turned out to be in the Odessa area. On the morning of April 6, they launched a counterattack in the Razdelnaya area, trying to break through towards Tiraspol. The blow of the German troops fell on the formations of the 82nd rifle corps of the 37th army. The Soviet troops had not yet managed to create a solid defense, their artillery and rear lagged behind. At the cost of significant losses, part of the German troops was able to break through to the crossings across the Kuchurgan River and united with their troops, who were operating northwest of Razdelnaya. The command of the 37th Army brought up additional forces and organized a counteroffensive. In the second half of April 7, the German troops, who did not have time to break through to their own, were driven back to the south and southeast of Razdelnaya. The 57th Army continued the offensive that day, but part of the German troops managed to retreat across the Dniester River.

On the evening of April 9, units of the 5th shock army under the command of Tsvetaev captured the stations of Sorting, Kyyalnik, Peresyp and began the battle for the northern quarters of Odessa. At the same time, formations of the 8th Guards and 6th Armies of Chuikov and Shlemin reached the city from the northwest. The German command tried to evacuate part of the troops, military materials and property by sea. However, it didn't work out. German ships and transports were subjected to constant attacks by aircraft of the 17th Air Army and aviation of the Black Sea Fleet, attacks by torpedo boats and submarines. In total, more than 30 enemy transports were sunk, others were damaged. Soviet bomber divisions also attacked ships in the port of Odessa. Therefore, the German troops had the only way out - to Ovidiopol with the subsequent forcing of the Dniester estuary. Logistics, transport and troops began to withdraw in this direction. Part of the German forces tried to break through Belyaevka. The retreating troops were constantly subjected to air strikes and suffered heavy losses.

On April 10, the Soviet armies, with the support of Odessa partisans and underground fighters, completely liberated the city from the Nazis. As the Germans themselves noted, Odessa, during the two years of occupation, became a real citadel of the partisan movement. Partisans and underground workers came out of the dungeons and shelters and helped clear Odessa from the enemy. In addition, they provided invaluable assistance in preventing the destruction of the port, moorings, warehouses, important buildings and facilities that the Germans had prepared for undermining. Partisans of the Kuyalnitsky detachment under the command of L.F. Gorbel on the night of April 10 struck at the rear of the enemy and destroyed the German demolition team. The Germans planned to destroy the dam of the Khadzhibeevsky estuary and flood the Peresyp, which opened the way for Soviet troops to Odessa.

In Odessa, Soviet troops captured huge trophies that the Germans did not have time to evacuate. The entire railway from the Vygoda station to the city itself was packed with wagons with military equipment, various equipment and looted property.

Night attack of Soviet T-34-85 tanks near Razdelnaya station

Capture of the left bank of the Dniester

After the liberation of Odessa, the 6th and 5th shock armies were withdrawn to the second echelon of the front. The remaining armies of the front continued the offensive and pursuit of the enemy troops. At the same time, on April 10, the 23rd Panzer Corps wedged itself into the enemy’s battle formations so much that it was surrounded in the Ploskoye area. The tankers fought in the encirclement until the units of the 57th Army approached there on April 11. On April 12, units of the Hagen army reached the Dniester, crossed the river on the move and captured small bridgeheads on the right bank.

At the same time, formations of the 37th army of Sharokhin reached Tiraspol and on the night of April 12 liberated its Nazis. Soviet troops also captured a small foothold southwest of the city up to 2 km along the front and up to 1.5 km in depth. Quite quickly, the bridgehead was increased along the front to 16 km and in depth from 6 to 10 km.

At the same time, Chuikov's 8th Guards Army and Pliev's cavalry-mechanized group, breaking enemy resistance, advanced in the Ovidiopol direction. However, part of the horse-mechanized group (10th Guards and 30th Cavalry Divisions) found itself in a difficult position. To the north of Ovidiopol, the Soviet divisions came under attack from the retreating Odessa enemy grouping and, under pressure from superior enemy forces, were forced to retreat to the north. The orders of two corps of the 8th Guards Army, stretched on a 60-kilometer front, could not reliably block the German troops' retreat to the west. Vasilevsky criticized the actions of the command of the 8th Guards Army, because of which the German troops were able to calmly leave the Dniester.

The 46th army of Glagolev, advancing to the north, by the end of April 11, reached the Dniester in the area south of Chebrucha. On April 12, the forward battalions of the army crossed the Dniester. On April 14, the 8th Guards Army reached the Dniester Estuary and cleared its coast of the enemy. On the night of April 15, units of the 74th Guards Rifle Division crossed the Dniester near Ilyichevka (near Belyaevka). The further offensive of the armies of the 3rd Ukrainian Front was stopped by the Headquarters, which on April 14 ordered to go on the defensive at the achieved lines. It was necessary to restore strength, pull up lagging behind, replenish parts with people, bring ammunition and fuel.

Results

The operation ended with the complete victory of the Red Army. The troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, supported by the left flank of the 2nd Ukrainian Front and the Black Sea Fleet, defeated the German 6th and 3rd Romanian armies. German troops lost more than 38 thousand people killed and captured. More than 950 guns, about 100 ammunition and food depots, as well as a large amount of other property and equipment were captured.

Soviet troops advanced up to 180 km and liberated the Nikolaev and Odessa regions from the German-Romanian troops. They also liberated most of Moldova. Many units and formations that distinguished themselves in the operation were awarded orders. 42 parts received honorary names ("Nikolaev", "Razdelnensky", "Odessa" and "Ochakovskaya"). At the same time, the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front failed to encircle and destroy most of the forces of the German 6th and 3rd Romanian armies, they managed to retreat to the right bank of the Dniester and organize a stable defense at this line. Therefore, the Soviet troops could not reach the state border of Romania.

The return of Nikolaev and Odessa allowed the Black Sea Fleet to restore its bases in the northwestern part of the Black Sea basin and relocate light ships and aircraft there. As a result of the blockade of the Crimean grouping of the enemy, it was seriously strengthened. Crimea was already surrounded by land. The capture of bridgeheads on the Dniester created the conditions for the further offensive of the armies of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. Next in line were the rest of Moldova, Romania and the Balkan Peninsula.

Before the Germans had time to come to their senses from the blows in the south, in June 1944, a the fourth Stalinist blow the defeat of the Finnish army near Karelia . As a result, the Red Army defeated the Finnish troops, liberated Vyborg and Petrozavodsk, and liberated part of the Karelo-Finnish Republic.

Under the influence of the successes of the Red Army, our allies were no longer in a position to delay the opening of a second front any longer. On June 6, 1944, the American-British command, two years late, began a large landing in Northern France.

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