BATTLE OF KURSK 1943, defensive (July 5 - 23) and offensive (July 12 - August 23) operations carried out by the Red Army in the area of ​​the Kursk ledge to disrupt the offensive and defeat the strategic grouping of German troops.

The victory of the Red Army at Stalingrad and its subsequent general offensive in the winter of 1942/43 over the vast expanse from the Baltic to the Black Sea undermined Germany's military power. In order to prevent the decline in the morale of the army and the population and the growth of centrifugal tendencies within the bloc of aggressors, Hitler and his generals decided to prepare and conduct a major offensive operation on the Soviet-German front. With its success, they linked their hopes for the return of the lost strategic initiative and a turn in the course of the war in their favor.

It was assumed that the Soviet troops would be the first to go on the offensive. However, in mid-April, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command revised the method of the planned actions. The reason for this was the data of Soviet intelligence that the German command was planning to conduct a strategic offensive on the Kursk salient. The headquarters decided to wear down the enemy with a powerful defense, then go on the counteroffensive and defeat his striking forces. The rarest case in the history of warfare occurred when the strongest side, having the strategic initiative, deliberately chose to start hostilities not on the offensive, but on the defensive. The development of events showed that this bold plan was absolutely justified.

FROM THE MEMORIES OF A. VASILEVSKY ON STRATEGIC PLANNING BY THE SOVIET COMMAND OF THE BATTLE OF KURSK, April-June 1943

(...) Soviet military intelligence managed to timely reveal the preparation of the Nazi army for a major offensive in the Kursk salient area using the latest tank technology on a massive scale, and then set the time for the enemy to go on the offensive.

Naturally, under the prevailing conditions, when the expected strike by the enemy with large forces was quite obvious, it was necessary to make the most expedient decision. The Soviet command faced a difficult dilemma: to attack or defend, and if defended, then how? (...)

Analyzing numerous intelligence data on the nature of the upcoming actions of the enemy and on his preparation for the offensive, the fronts, the General Staff and the Headquarters were more and more inclined towards the idea of ​​​​transition to deliberate defense. On this issue, in particular, there was a repeated exchange of views between me and Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief GK Zhukov in late March - early April. The most concrete conversation about planning military operations for the near future took place over the phone on April 7, when I was in Moscow, at the General Staff, and G.K. Zhukov was on the Kursk ledge, in the troops of the Voronezh Front. And already on April 8, signed by G.K. Zhukov, a report was sent to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief with an assessment of the situation and considerations on the plan of action in the area of ​​the Kursk salient, in which it was noted: it will be if we wear down the enemy on our defenses, knock out his tanks, and then, introducing fresh reserves, by going over to a general offensive, we will finally finish off the main enemy grouping.

I had to be at when he received G.K. Zhukov's report. I remember well how the Supreme Commander, without expressing his opinion, said: "We must consult with the front commanders." Having given the order to the General Staff to request the opinion of the fronts and obliging him to prepare a special meeting at Headquarters to discuss the plan for the summer campaign, in particular the actions of the fronts on the Kursk Bulge, he himself called N.F. Vatutin and K.K. Rokossovsky and asked him to submit his views by April 12 according to the actions of the fronts (...)

At the meeting held in the evening of April 12 at Headquarters, which was attended by I.V. Stalin, G.K. Zhukov, who arrived from the Voronezh Front, Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky and his deputy A.I. Antonov, a preliminary decision was made on deliberate defense (...)

After a preliminary decision was made on a deliberate defense and on the subsequent transition to a counteroffensive, comprehensive and thorough preparations were launched for the upcoming actions. At the same time, reconnaissance of enemy actions continued. The Soviet command became precisely aware of the dates for the start of the enemy offensive, which were postponed three times by Hitler. At the end of May - beginning of June 1943, when the enemy’s plan to inflict a strong tank attack on the Voronezh and Central Fronts using large groups equipped with new military equipment for this purpose, the final decision was made on a deliberate defense.

Speaking about the plan for the Battle of Kursk, I would like to emphasize two points. Firstly, that this plan is the central part of the strategic plan for the entire summer-autumn campaign of 1943 and, secondly, that the decisive role in the development of this plan was played by the highest bodies of strategic leadership, and not other command instances (...)

Vasilevsky A.M. Strategic planning of the Battle of Kursk. Battle of Kursk M.: Nauka, 1970. S.66-83.

By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Central and Voronezh Fronts had 1336 thousand people, more than 19 thousand guns and mortars, 3444 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2172 aircraft. In the rear of the Kursk ledge, the Steppe Military District (from July 9 - the Steppe Front), which was the reserve of the Headquarters, was deployed. He was supposed to prevent a deep breakthrough from both Orel and Belgorod, and when going on the counteroffensive, increase the force of the strike from the depths.

The German side introduced 50 divisions, including 16 tank and motorized divisions, into the two strike groups intended for the offensive on the northern and southern faces of the Kursk ledge, which amounted to about 70% of the Wehrmacht tank divisions on the Soviet-German front. In total - 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2700 tanks and assault guns, about 2050 aircraft. An important place in the plans of the enemy was given to the massive use of new military equipment: the Tiger and Panther tanks, the Ferdinand assault guns, as well as the new Foke-Wulf-190A and Henschel-129 aircraft.

APPEAL OF THE Führer TO THE GERMAN SOLDIERS ON THE EVE OF OPERATION "CITADEL", no later than July 4, 1943

Today you are launching a great offensive battle that may have a decisive influence on the outcome of the war as a whole.

With your victory, the conviction of the futility of any resistance to the German armed forces will be strengthened stronger than before. In addition, a new cruel defeat of the Russians will further shake the faith in the possibility of the success of Bolshevism, which has already been shaken in many formations of the Soviet Armed Forces. Just like in the last big war, their faith in victory will disappear no matter what.

The Russians achieved this or that success primarily with the help of their tanks.

My soldiers! Now you finally have better tanks than the Russians.

Their seemingly inexhaustible human masses have thinned out so much in a two-year struggle that they are forced to call on the youngest and oldest. Our infantry, as always, is superior to the Russians to the same extent as our artillery, our tank destroyers, our tankers, our sappers and, of course, our aviation.

The mighty blow that will overtake the Soviet armies this morning must shake them to their foundations.

And you should know that everything can depend on the outcome of this battle.

As a soldier, I clearly understand what I demand from you. In the end, we will achieve victory, no matter how cruel and difficult this or that individual battle may be.

German homeland - your wives, daughters and sons, selflessly rallying, meet enemy air strikes and at the same time work tirelessly for the sake of victory; they look with fervent hope at you, my soldiers.

ADOLF GITLER

This order is to be destroyed at divisional headquarters.

Klink E. Das Gesetz des Handelns: Die Operation "Zitadelle". Stuttgart, 1966.

PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE. THE EVE

From the end of March 1943, the Headquarters of the Soviet Supreme High Command worked on a plan for a strategic offensive, the task of which was to defeat the main forces of Army Group South and Center and crush the enemy defenses on the front from Smolensk to the Black Sea. However, in mid-April, on the basis of army intelligence to the leadership of the Red Army, it became clear that the command of the Wehrmacht itself plans to carry out a strike under the bases of the Kursk ledge, in order to surround our troops stationed there.

The idea of ​​an offensive operation near Kursk arose at Hitler's headquarters immediately after the end of the fighting near Kharkov in 1943. The very configuration of the front in this area pushed the Fuhrer to strike in converging directions. In the circles of the German command there were also opponents of such a decision, in particular Guderian, who, being responsible for the production of new tanks for the German army, was of the opinion that they should not be used as the main striking force in a big battle - this could lead to a waste of forces . The strategy of the Wehrmacht for the summer of 1943, according to such generals as Guderian, Manstein, and a number of others, was to be exclusively defensive, as economical as possible in terms of expenditure of forces and means.

However, the bulk of the German military leaders actively supported the offensive plans. The date of the operation, which received the code name "Citadel", was set for July 5, and the German troops received at their disposal a large number of new tanks (T-VI "Tiger", T-V "Panther"). These armored vehicles were superior in terms of firepower and armor resistance to the main Soviet T-34 tank. By the beginning of Operation Citadel, the German forces of the Army Groups Center and South had at their disposal up to 130 Tigers and more than 200 Panthers. In addition, the Germans significantly improved the fighting qualities of their old T-III and T-IV tanks, equipping them with additional armored screens and putting an 88-mm cannon on many vehicles. In total, in the Wehrmacht strike groupings in the area of ​​the Kursk ledge, by the beginning of the offensive, there were about 900 thousand people, 2.7 thousand tanks and assault guns, up to 10 thousand guns and mortars. On the southern wing of the ledge, the strike forces of Army Group South under the command of Manstein were concentrated, which included the 4th Panzer Army of General Hoth and the Kempf group. The troops of Army Group Center von Kluge operated on the northern wing; the core of the strike group here was the forces of the 9th Army of General Model. The southern German group was stronger than the northern one. Generals Goth and Kemp had about twice as many tanks as Model.

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided not to be the first to go on the offensive, but to take up a tough defense. The idea of ​​the Soviet command was to first bleed the enemy's forces, knock out his new tanks, and only then, having brought fresh reserves into action, go on the counteroffensive. Needless to say, it was a rather risky plan. Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin, his deputy Marshal Zhukov, and other representatives of the Soviet high command remembered well that not once since the beginning of the war had the Red Army been able to organize defense in such a way that a pre-prepared German offensive would fizzle out at the stage of breaking through Soviet positions (at the beginning of the war near Bialystok and Minsk, then in October 1941 near Vyazma, in the summer of 1942 in the Stalingrad direction).

However, Stalin agreed with the opinion of the generals, who advised not to hurry with the start of the offensive. A defense in depth was built near Kursk, which had several lines. It was specially created as anti-tank. In addition, in the rear of the Central and Voronezh fronts, which occupied positions, respectively, on the northern and southern sections of the Kursk salient, another one was created - the Steppe Front, designed to become a reserve formation and join the battle at the moment the Red Army went on the counteroffensive.

The military factories of the country worked uninterruptedly on the production of tanks and self-propelled guns. The troops received both traditional "thirty-fours" and powerful self-propelled guns SU-152. The latter could already with great success fight the "Tigers" and "Panthers".

The organization of the Soviet defense near Kursk was based on the idea of ​​a deep echeloning of combat formations of troops and defensive positions. 5-6 defensive lines were erected on the Central and Voronezh fronts. Along with this, a defensive line was created for the troops of the Steppe Military District, and along the left bank of the river. Don prepared the state line of defense. The total depth of the engineering equipment of the area reached 250-300 km.

In total, by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, Soviet troops significantly outnumbered the enemy both in people and in equipment. The Central and Voronezh fronts included about 1.3 million people, and the Steppe Front standing behind them had an additional 500 thousand people. All three fronts had up to 5,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, 28,000 guns and mortars at their disposal. The advantage in aviation was also on the Soviet side - 2.6 thousand for us against about 2 thousand for the Germans.

PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE. DEFENSE

The closer the launch date of Operation Citadel drew nearer, the more difficult it was to conceal its preparations. Already a few days before the start of the offensive, the Soviet command received a signal that it would begin on July 5th. From intelligence reports it became known that the enemy offensive was scheduled for 3 hours. The headquarters of the Central (commander K. Rokossovsky) and Voronezh (commander N. Vatutin) fronts decided to carry out artillery counter-preparation on the night of July 5. It started at 1 o'clock. 10 min. After the roar of the cannonade subsided, the Germans could not recover for a long time. As a result of artillery counter-preparation carried out in advance in the areas of concentration of enemy strike groups, German troops suffered losses and launched an offensive 2.5-3 hours later than planned. Only after some time, the German troops were able to start their own artillery and aviation training. The attack of German tanks and infantry formations began at about half past six in the morning.

The German command pursued the goal of ramming through the defenses of the Soviet troops and reaching Kursk. In the zone of the Central Front, the main blow of the enemy was taken by the troops of the 13th Army. On the very first day, the Germans brought up to 500 tanks into battle here. On the second day, the command of the troops of the Central Front launched a counterattack against the advancing grouping by part of the forces of the 13th and 2nd tank armies and the 19th tank corps. The German offensive here was delayed, and on July 10 it was finally thwarted. In six days of fighting, the enemy penetrated the defenses of the Central Front only 10-12 km.

The first surprise for the German command both on the southern and northern wings of the Kursk ledge was that the Soviet soldiers were not afraid of the appearance on the battlefield of new German tanks "Tiger" and "Panther". Moreover, Soviet anti-tank artillery and guns from tanks buried in the ground opened effective fire on German armored vehicles. And yet, the thick armor of the German tanks allowed them to break through the Soviet defenses in some areas and penetrate into the battle formations of the Red Army units. However, there was no quick breakthrough. Having overcome the first defensive line, the German tank units were forced to turn to sappers for help: the entire space between the positions was heavily mined, and the passages in the minefields were well covered by artillery. While the German tankers were waiting for the sappers, their combat vehicles were subjected to massive fire. Soviet aviation managed to retain air supremacy. Increasingly, Soviet attack aircraft appeared over the battlefield - the famous Il-2.

Only on the first day of fighting, the Model group operating on the northern wing of the Kursk ledge lost up to 2/3 of the 300 tanks that participated in the first strike. Soviet losses were also high: only two companies of the German "Tigers", advancing against the forces of the Central Front, destroyed 111 T-34 tanks during the period of July 5 - 6. By July 7, the Germans, having advanced several kilometers forward, approached the large settlement of Ponyri, where a powerful battle ensued between the strike units of the 20th, 2nd and 9th German tank divisions with formations of the Soviet 2nd tank and 13th armies. The result of this battle was extremely unexpected for the German command. Having lost up to 50 thousand people and about 400 tanks, the northern strike force was forced to stop. Having advanced only 10 - 15 km, Model eventually lost the striking power of his tank units and lost the opportunity to continue the offensive.

Meanwhile, on the southern flank of the Kursk salient, events developed according to a different scenario. By July 8, the strike units of the German motorized formations "Grossdeutschland", "Reich", "Dead Head", the Leibstandarte "Adolf Hitler", several tank divisions of the 4th Panzer Army of Goth and the Kempf group managed to penetrate the Soviet defenses up to 20 and over km. The offensive initially went in the direction of the Oboyan settlement, but then, due to the strong opposition of the Soviet 1st Tank Army, 6th Guards Army and other formations in this sector, the commander of Army Group South von Manstein decided to strike east - in the direction of Prokhorovka . It was at this settlement that the largest tank battle of the Second World War began, in which up to TWO TWO Hundred TANKS and self-propelled guns took part on both sides.

The Battle of Prokhorovka is a largely collective concept. The fate of the opposing sides was not decided in one day and not on the same field. The theater of operations for the Soviet and German tank formations represented an area of ​​​​more than 100 square meters. km. Nevertheless, it was this battle that largely determined the entire subsequent course not only of the Battle of Kursk, but of the entire summer campaign on the Eastern Front.

On June 9, the Soviet command decided to transfer the 5th Guards Tank Army of General P. Rotmistrov from the Steppe Front to help the troops of the Voronezh Front, who was tasked with launching a counterattack on the enemy’s wedged tank units and forcing them to retreat to their original positions. It was emphasized that it was necessary to try to engage German tanks in close combat in order to limit their advantages in armor resistance and firepower of turret guns.

Having concentrated in the Prokhorovka area, on the morning of July 10, Soviet tanks moved to the attack. In quantitative terms, they outnumbered the enemy in a ratio of approximately 3:2, but the fighting qualities of the German tanks allowed them to destroy many "thirty-four" even on the way to their positions. The fighting continued here from morning until evening. The Soviet tanks that broke through met the German ones almost armor to armor. But this is exactly what the command of the 5th Guards Army wanted. Moreover, soon the battle formations of the opponents were so mixed up that the "tigers" and "panthers" began to expose their side armor, which was not as strong as the frontal, to the fire of Soviet guns. When the battle finally began to subside towards the end of July 13, it was time to count the losses. And they were truly gigantic. The 5th Guards Tank Army has practically lost its combat power. But German losses also did not allow them to further develop the offensive in the Prokhorovka direction: the Germans had only up to 250 serviceable combat vehicles left in service.

The Soviet command hastily transferred new forces to Prokhorovka. The battles that continued in this area on July 13 and 14 did not lead to a decisive victory for one side or the other. However, the enemy began to gradually run out of steam. The Germans had the 24th Panzer Corps in reserve, but sending it into battle meant losing the last reserve. The potential of the Soviet side was immeasurably great. On July 15, the Stavka decided to deploy the forces of the Steppe Front of General I. Konev on the southern wing of the Kursk ledge - the 27th and 53rd armies, with the support of the 4th Guards Tank and 1st Mechanized Corps. Soviet tanks were hastily concentrated northeast of Prokhorovka and received an order on July 17 to go on the offensive. But the Soviet tankers no longer had to participate in a new oncoming battle. The German units began to gradually move away from Prokhorovka to their original positions. What's the matter?

As early as July 13, Hitler invited Field Marshals von Manstein and von Kluge to his headquarters for a meeting. On that day, he ordered the continuation of Operation Citadel and not to reduce the intensity of the fighting. Success near Kursk seemed to be just around the corner. However, just two days later, Hitler suffered a new disappointment. His plans were falling apart. On July 12, the troops of the Bryansk Front went on the offensive, and then, from July 15, the Central and Left Wings of the Western Fronts in the general direction of Orel (Operation ""). The German defense here could not stand it and cracked at the seams. Moreover, some territorial gains on the southern wing of the Kursk salient were nullified after the battle of Prokhorovka.

At a meeting at the Fuhrer's headquarters on July 13, Manstein tried to convince Hitler not to interrupt Operation Citadel. The Fuhrer did not object to the continuation of the attacks on the southern wing of the Kursk salient (although it was no longer possible to do this on the northern wing of the salient). But the new efforts of the Manstein group did not lead to decisive success. As a result, on July 17, 1943, the command of the German ground forces ordered the withdrawal of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps from the Army Group South. Manstein had no choice but to retreat.

PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE. OFFENSIVE

In mid-July 1943, the second phase of the gigantic battle of Kursk began. On July 12-15, the Bryansk, Central and Western fronts went on the offensive, and on August 3, after the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts pushed the enemy back to their original positions on the southern wing of the Kursk salient, they launched the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (Operation Rumyantsev "). Fighting in all areas continued to be extremely complex and fierce. The situation was further complicated by the fact that in the offensive zone of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts (in the south), as well as in the zone of the Central Front (in the north), the main blows of our troops were inflicted not on a weak, but on a strong sector of the enemy defense. This decision was made in order to shorten the time for preparing for offensive operations as much as possible, to catch the enemy by surprise, that is, precisely at the moment when he was already exhausted, but had not yet taken up a solid defense. The breakthrough was carried out by powerful strike groups in narrow sections of the front using a large number of tanks, artillery and aircraft.

The courage of Soviet soldiers, the increased skill of their commanders, the competent use of military equipment in battles could not but lead to positive results. Already on August 5, Soviet troops liberated Orel and Belgorod. On this day, for the first time since the beginning of the war, an artillery salute was fired in Moscow in honor of the valiant formations of the Red Army that won such a brilliant victory. By August 23, units of the Red Army had pushed the enemy back to the west by 140-150 km and liberated Kharkov for the second time.

The Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including 7 tank divisions; about 500 thousand soldiers killed, wounded and missing; 1.5 thousand tanks; more than 3 thousand aircraft; 3 thousand guns. Even greater were the losses of the Soviet troops: 860 thousand people; over 6 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns; 5 thousand guns and mortars, 1.5 thousand aircraft. Nevertheless, the balance of forces at the front changed in favor of the Red Army. It had at its disposal an incomparably greater number of fresh reserves than the Wehrmacht.

The offensive of the Red Army, after the introduction of new formations into battle, continued to increase its pace. On the central sector of the front, the troops of the Western and Kalinin fronts began to advance towards Smolensk. This ancient Russian city, considered since the 17th century. gate to Moscow, was released on September 25. On the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, units of the Red Army in October 1943 reached the Dnieper in the Kyiv region. Capturing several bridgeheads on the right bank of the river on the move, Soviet troops carried out an operation to liberate the capital of Soviet Ukraine. On November 6, a red flag was raised over Kyiv.

It would be wrong to say that after the victory of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk, the further offensive of the Red Army developed unhindered. Everything was much more difficult. So, after the liberation of Kyiv, the enemy managed to launch a powerful counterattack in the region of Fastov and Zhytomyr against the forward formations of the 1st Ukrainian Front and inflict considerable damage on us, stopping the offensive of the Red Army on the territory of the right-bank Ukraine. The situation in Eastern Belarus was even more tense. After the liberation of the Smolensk and Bryansk regions, by November 1943, Soviet troops reached the areas east of Vitebsk, Orsha and Mogilev. However, the subsequent attacks of the Western and Bryansk fronts against the German Army Group Center, which had taken up a tough defense, did not lead to any significant results. Time was needed to concentrate additional forces in the Minsk direction, to give rest to formations exhausted in previous battles and, most importantly, to develop a detailed plan for a new operation to liberate Belarus. All this happened in the summer of 1944.

And in 1943, the victories near Kursk and then in the battle for the Dnieper completed a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War. The offensive strategy of the Wehrmacht suffered a final collapse. By the end of 1943, 37 countries were at war with the Axis powers. The collapse of the fascist bloc began. Among the notable acts of that time was the establishment in 1943 of soldiers' and commanders' awards - the Orders of Glory I, II, and III degrees and the Order of Victory, as well as the Order of Bohdan Khmelnitsky 1, 2 and 3 degrees as a sign of the liberation of Ukraine. A long and bloody struggle still lay ahead, but a radical change had already taken place.

The Battle of Kursk was planned by the Nazi invaders led by Hitler in response to the Battle of Stalingrad. where they suffered a crushing defeat. The Germans, as usual, wanted to attack suddenly, but a fascist sapper who was accidentally captured surrendered his own. He announced that on the night of July 5, 1943, the Nazis would begin Operation Citadel. The Soviet army decides to start the battle first.

The main idea of ​​the "Citadel" was to launch a surprise attack on Russia using the most powerful equipment and self-propelled guns. Hitler did not doubt his success. But the general staff of the Soviet army developed a plan aimed at the liberation of the Russian troops and the defense of the battle.

The battle got its interesting name in the form of the battle on the Kursk Bulge due to the external similarity of the front line with a huge arc.

To change the course of the Great Patriotic War and decide the fate of Russian cities such as Orel and Belgorod was entrusted to the armies "Center", "South" and the task force "Kempf". Detachments of the Central Front were put on the defense of Orel, and the Voronezh Front - on the defense of Belgorod.

Date of the Battle of Kursk: July 1943.

July 12, 1943 was marked by the greatest tank battle on the field near the Prokhorovka station. After the battle, the Nazis had to change the attack to defense. This day cost them huge human losses (about 10 thousand) and the defeat of 400 tanks. Further, in the Orel region, the battle was continued by the Bryansk, Central and Western Fronts, switching to Operation Kutuzov. In three days, from July 16 to July 18, the Nazi group was liquidated by the Central Front. Subsequently, they indulged in air pursuit and thus were driven back 150 km. west. The Russian cities of Belgorod, Orel and Kharkov breathed freely.

The results of the Battle of Kursk (briefly).

• a sharp turn in the course of events of the Great Patriotic War;
• after the Nazis failed to pull off their operation "Citadel", at the world level it looked like a complete defeat of the German campaign in front of the Soviet Army;
• the fascists were morally suppressed, all confidence in their superiority was gone.

Significance of the Battle of Kursk.

After a powerful tank battle, the Soviet Army reversed the events of the war, took the initiative in its own hands and continued to advance to the West, while freeing Russian cities.

History is always written by the victors, exaggerating their own importance and sometimes belittling the dignity of the enemy. Much has been written and said about the significance of the Battle of Kursk for all mankind. This great epic battle was another bitter lesson that claimed the lives of many people. And it will be a great blasphemy for future generations not to draw the right conclusions from those past events.

General situation on the eve of the General battle

By the spring of 1943, the formed Kursk ledge did not just interfere with normal railway communication between the German Army Groups "Center" and "South". An ambitious plan to encircle 8 Soviet armies was associated with it. Until now, the Nazis have not carried out anything like this even in a more favorable period for them. According to some historians, the obviously unrealistic plan was, rather, an act of desperation. Allegedly, Hitler was most afraid of the landing of the allies in Italy, therefore, with such measures, his army tried to protect itself in the East, having finished with the Soviets.

This point of view does not stand up to scrutiny. The significance of the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk lies in the fact that it was in these military theaters that crushing blows were dealt to the well-coordinated military machine of the Wehrmacht. The long-awaited initiative was in the hands of the Soviet troops. After these great historical events, the wounded fascist beast was dangerous and snapped, but even he himself knew that he was dying.

Preparing for the decisive moment

One of the key aspects in the meaning of the battle is the determination with which the Soviet soldiers were ready to demonstrate to the enemy that two terrible years had not been in vain for them. This does not mean that the Red Army at one fine moment was reborn, having solved all its old problems. There were still enough of them. This was primarily due to the low qualification of military personnel. Personnel shortage was irreplaceable. To survive, we had to come up with new approaches to solving problems.

One such example is the organization of anti-tank strongholds (PTOP). Previously, anti-tank guns were lined up in one line, but experience has shown that it is more efficient to concentrate them in original, well-fortified islands. Each PTOP gun had several positions for firing in all directions. Each of these strongholds was located at a distance of 600-800 meters from each other. If enemy tanks tried to wedge in and pass between such "islands", they would inevitably fall under cross artillery fire. And on the side, tank armor is weaker.

How this would work in a real combat situation had to be clarified during the Battle of Kursk. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of artillery and aviation, to which the Soviet command paid close attention, due to the emergence of a new factor, on which Hitler placed great hopes. We are talking about the emergence of new tanks.

In the spring of 1943, Marshal of Artillery Voronov, reporting to Stalin on the state of affairs, noted that the Soviet troops did not have guns capable of effectively fighting the new enemy tanks. It was necessary to urgently take measures to eliminate the backlog in this area, and in the shortest possible time. By order of the State Defense Committee, the production of 57-mm anti-tank guns was resumed. Also carried out feverish modernization of existing armor-piercing shells.

However, all these measures were ineffective due to lack of time and necessary materials. A new PTAB bomb entered service with aviation. Weighing only 1.5 kg, she was able to hit 100 mm upper armor. Such "gifts for the Fritz" were loaded into a container of 48 pieces. The Il-2 attack aircraft could take on board 4 such containers.

Finally, 85-mm anti-aircraft guns were installed in especially important areas. They were carefully camouflaged, with orders not to fire on enemy aircraft under any circumstances.

From the measures described above, it is clear what importance the Soviet soldiers attached to the Battle of Kursk. At the most difficult moment, determination to win and natural ingenuity came to the rescue. But this was not enough, and the price, as always, was a huge loss of life.

The course of the battle

A lot of conflicting information and various myths created for propaganda purposes do not allow us to put an end to this issue. History has long brought to the judgment of posterity the results and significance of the Battle of Kursk. But all the new details that are revealed make us once again marvel at the courage of the soldiers who won in this hell.

The grouping of the "genius of defense" Model launched an offensive in the north of the Kursk salient. Natural conditions limited the room for maneuver. The only possible place for the appearance of the Germans was a section of the front 90 km wide. This advantage was competently disposed of by the Red Army under the command of Konev. The railway station "Ponyri" became a "fire bag" into which advanced units of the fascist troops fell.

Soviet gunners used the tactics of "flirting guns". When enemy tanks appeared, they began to hit with direct fire, thereby riveting the fire on themselves. The Germans at full speed rushed towards them to destroy them, and came under fire from other camouflaged Soviet anti-tank guns. The side armor of tanks is not as massive as the front. At a distance of 200-300 meters, Soviet guns could completely destroy armored vehicles. At the end of the 5th day, Model's attack in the north of the ledge bogged down.

The southern direction, under the command of one of the best commanders of the twentieth century, Heinrich von Manstein, had a better chance of success. There was no room for maneuver here. To this must be added a high level of training and professionalism. 2 out of 3 lines of Soviet troops were broken through. From the operational report for July 10, 1943, it followed that the retreating Soviet units were pursued closely by German troops. For this reason, there was no way to block the road leading from Teterevino to Ivanovsky settlement with anti-tank mines.

Battle of Prokhorovka

To cool the ardor of the presumptuous Manstein, the reserves of the Steppe Front were urgently involved. But by this time, only a miracle did not allow the Germans to break through the 3rd line of defense near Prokhorovka. They were greatly hampered by the threat from the flank. Being cautious, they waited for the SS "Dead Head" fighters to cross to the other side and destroy the gunners.

At this moment, Rotmistrov's tanks, about which the German aircraft warned in a timely manner, approached Prokhorovka, assessed the future battlefield. They were to advance in a narrow corridor between the Psel River and the railroad tracks. The task was complicated by the impassable ravine, and in order to go around it, it was necessary to line up at the back of each other's heads. This made them easy targets.

Going to certain death, they stopped the German breakthrough at the cost of incredible efforts and colossal sacrifices. Prokhorovka and its significance in the Battle of Kursk are regarded as the culmination of this general battle, after which large-scale attacks of this magnitude were not undertaken by the Germans.

Ghost of Stalingrad

The result of the operation "Kutuzov", which began with an offensive in the rear of the Model group, was the liberation of Belgorod and Orel. This joyful news was marked by the roar of guns in Moscow, saluting in honor of the winners. And already on August 22, 1943, Manstein, violating Hitler's hysterical order to keep Kharkov, left the city. Thus, he completed a series of battles for the recalcitrant Kursk salient.

If we talk briefly about the significance of the Battle of Kursk, then we can recall the words of the German commander Guderian. In his memoirs, he said that with the failure of Operation Citadel on the Eastern Front, calm days disappeared. And one cannot but agree with him on this.

The Battle of Kursk is one of the largest and most important battles of the Great Patriotic War, which took place from July 5 to August 23, 1943.
The German command gave a different name to this battle - Operation Citadel, which, according to the plans of the Wehrmacht, was supposed to counterattack the Soviet offensive.

Causes of the Battle of Kursk

After the victory at Stalingrad, the German army for the first time began to retreat during the Great Patriotic War, and the Soviet army launched a decisive offensive that could only be stopped on the Kursk Bulge and the German command understood this. The Germans had organized a strong defensive line, and in their opinion, it had to withstand any attack.

Side forces

Germany
At the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Wehrmacht troops numbered more than 900 thousand people. In addition to a huge amount of human power, the Germans had a considerable number of tanks, among which were tanks of all the latest models: more than 300 Tiger and Panther tanks, as well as a very powerful tank destroyer (anti-tank gun) Ferdinand or Elephant "including about 50 combat units.
It should be noted that among the tank troops there were three elite tank divisions that had not previously suffered a single defeat - they included real tank aces.
And in support of the land army, an air fleet was sent with a total number of more than 1,000 combat aircraft of the latest models.

USSR
To slow down and complicate the advance of the enemy, the Soviet Army planted approximately 1,500 mines for every kilometer of the front. The number of infantrymen in the Soviet Army reached more than 1 million soldiers. And the Soviet Army had 3-4 thousand tanks, which also exceeded the number of German ones. However, a large number of Soviet tanks are outdated models and are not rivals to the same Wehrmacht Tigers.
The Red Army had twice as many guns and mortars. If the Wehrmacht has 10 thousand of them, then the Soviet Army has more than twenty. There were also more planes, but historians cannot give exact numbers.

The course of the battle

During Operation Citadel, the German command decided to launch a counterattack on the northern and southern wings of the Kursk Bulge in order to encircle and destroy the Red Army. But the German army failed to accomplish this. The Soviet command hit the Germans with a powerful artillery strike in order to weaken the initial attack of the enemy.
Before the start of the offensive operation, the Wehrmacht launched powerful artillery strikes on the positions of the Red Army. Then, on the northern face of the arc, German tanks went on the offensive, but soon met with very strong resistance. The Germans repeatedly changed the direction of the strike, but did not achieve significant results; by July 10, they managed to break through only 12 km, while losing about 2 thousand tanks. As a result, they had to go on the defensive.
On July 5, the attack began on the southern face of the Kursk salient. First, a powerful artillery preparation followed. Having suffered setbacks, the German command decided to continue the offensive in the Prokhorovka area, where tank forces were already beginning to accumulate.
The famous battle of Prokhorovka, the largest tank battle in history, began on July 11, but the height of the battle in the battle fell on July 12. On a small section of the front, 700 German and about 800 Soviet tanks and guns collided. The tanks of both sides mixed up and during the day many tank crews left the fighting vehicles and fought in hand-to-hand combat. By the end of 12 July, the tank battle was on the wane. The Soviet army failed to defeat the enemy tank forces, but managed to stop their advance. Having broken through a little deeper, the Germans were forced to retreat, and the Soviet Army launched an offensive.
The losses of the Germans in the battle of Prokhorovka were insignificant: 80 tanks, but the Soviet Army lost about 70% of all tanks in this direction.
In the next few days, they were already almost completely drained of blood and lost their offensive potential, while the Soviet reserves had not yet entered the battle and were ready to launch a decisive counterattack.
On July 15, the Germans went on the defensive. As a result, the German offensive did not bring any success, and both sides suffered serious losses. The number of those killed on the German side is estimated at 70 thousand soldiers, a large number of equipment and guns. The Soviet army lost, according to various estimates, up to about 150 thousand soldiers, a large number of this figure are irretrievable losses.
The first offensive operations from the Soviet side began on July 5, their goal was to deprive the enemy of maneuvering his reserves and transferring forces from other fronts to this sector of the front.
On July 17, the Izyum-Barvenkovskaya operation began on the part of the Soviet army. The Soviet command set a goal to encircle the Donbass group of Germans. The Soviet army managed to cross the Northern Donets, seize a bridgehead on the right bank, and most importantly, pin down the German reserves on this sector of the front.
During the Mius offensive operation of the Red Army (July 17 - August 2), it was possible to stop the transfer of divisions from the Donbass to the Kursk Bulge, which significantly reduced the defensive potential of the Bulge itself.
On July 12, the offensive began in the Oryol direction. Within one day, the Soviet army managed to drive the Germans out of Orel, and they were forced to move to another defensive line. After Oryol and Belgorod, the key cities, were liberated during the Oryol and Belgorod operations, and the Germans were driven back, it was decided to arrange a festive fireworks display. So on August 5, the first salute was organized in the capital for the entire period of hostilities in the Great Patriotic War. During the operation, the Germans lost over 90 thousand soldiers and a large amount of equipment.
On the southern phage, the offensive of the Soviet army began on August 3 and was called Operation Rumyantsev. As a result of this offensive operation, the Soviet army managed to liberate a number of important strategically important cities, including the city of Kharkov (August 23). The Germans during this offensive attempted to counterattack, but they did not bring any success to the Wehrmacht.
From August 7 to October 2, the Kutuzov offensive operation was carried out - the Smolensk offensive operation, during which the left wing of the German armies of the Center group was defeated and the city of Smolensk was liberated. And during the Donbass operation (August 13 - September 22), the Donets Basin was liberated.
From August 26 to September 30, the Chernigov-Poltava offensive operation took place. It ended in complete success for the Red Army, since almost the entire Left-Bank Ukraine was liberated from the Germans.

Aftermath of the battle

The Kursk operation became a turning point in the Great Patriotic War, after which the Soviet Army continued its offensive and liberated Ukraine, Belarus, Poland and other republics from the Germans.
Losses during the Battle of Kursk were simply colossal. Most historians agree that more than a million soldiers died on the Kursk Bulge. Soviet historians say that the losses of the German army amounted to more than 400 thousand soldiers, the Germans talk about a figure of less than 200 thousand. In addition, a huge amount of equipment, aircraft and guns were lost.
After the failure of Operation Citadel, the German command lost the ability to carry out attacks and went on the defensive. In 1944 and 45, local offensives were undertaken, but they did not bring success.
The German command has repeatedly said that the defeat on the Kursk Bulge is a defeat on the Eastern Front and it will be impossible to regain the advantage.

Yesterday sapojnik posted an interview with a German war historian about the Battle of Kursk. It turns out that the Soviet heroic and victorious version of this historical event is not true. A myth constructed in Soviet times specifically to hide unpleasant facts, defeats and losses, in the traditional way of postscripts, lies and omissions.
The historical truth looks much more impartial and worse. That is, more interesting and more important.
Naturally, I became interested, and I got into historical literature. Here are the results of my searches.
For starters - the interview itself: http://www.istpravda.ru/digest/4517/ More precisely, the most interesting quotes:
"Colonel Karl-Heinz Friser: in this "great tank battle" the German army lost only three tanks!
German historians about the battle of Prokhorovka.
The military historian, retired colonel Karl-Heinz Friser, who worked for many years in the military history department of the Bundeswehr, is the best specialist on the Eastern Front, studied both German and Russian documents in detail.

Die Welt: - The most famous part of Operation Citadel was the tank battle near Prokhorovka on July 12, 1943. Did two “steel avalanches” really collide then?
Karl-Heinz Freezer- Some people claim that 850 Soviet and 800 German tanks took part in the battle. Prokhorovka, where 400 Wehrmacht tanks were allegedly destroyed, is considered the "cemetery of the German tank forces." However, in fact, 186 German and 672 Soviet tanks took part in this battle. At the same time, the Red Army lost 235 tanks, and the German troops - only three!
DW - How could this be?
Frizer - The Soviet generals did everything wrong that could be done, because Stalin, mistaken in his calculations, pressed them very hard on the timing of the operation. Thus, the “kamikaze attack” by the 29th Panzer Corps ended in an unnoticed trap set up earlier by the Soviet troops, behind which were German tanks. The Russians lost 172 out of 219 tanks. 118 of them were completely destroyed. On the evening of that day, German soldiers towed their damaged tanks for repairs, and all the damaged Russian tanks were blown up.

DW - Did the Battle of Prokhorovka end with the victory of the Soviet or German forces?
Freezer - It all depends on how you look at the situation. From a tactical point of view, the German troops won, and for the Soviet this battle turned into hell. From an operational point of view, this was a Russian success, because the German advance was stopped for a while. But actually, the Red Army initially planned to destroy two enemy tank corps. Therefore, strategically, this was also a Russian failure, since it was planned to deploy the Fifth Guards Tank Army near Prokhorovka, which was subsequently to play a major role in the summer offensive.

DW - Was the Battle of Kursk really the turning point of World War II?
Freezer - No.
DW - Why not?
Freezer - Neither Kursk nor Stalingrad became turning points. Everything was decided back in the winter of 1941 in the battle near Moscow, which ended in the collapse of the blitzkrieg. In a protracted war, the Third Reich, which experienced, in particular, a lack of fuel, had no chance against the Soviet Union, which also received support from the United States and Great Britain. Even if Germany had won the Battle of Kursk, it would not have been able to prevent its own defeat in the entire war.

DW - With your research, you have already dispelled several myths about the Battle of Kursk that dominated the former Soviet Union. Why were there so many legends about this battle?
Frizer - In Soviet historiography, the Battle of Kursk, "the greatest battle of all time", was initially assigned a surprisingly insignificant role. Because the mistakes made by the Soviet command during it were simply shameful, and the losses were horrendous. For this reason, the truth was subsequently replaced by myths.
DW - How do your Russian colleagues assess the Battle of Kursk today? Is it still dominated by legends on this subject in Russia? And has anything changed in the perception of this issue in the Putin era compared to the Yeltsin era?
Frieser - Several critical publications have appeared in recent years. The author of one of them, Valery Zamulin, confirmed the huge losses of Soviet forces near Prokhorovka. Another author, Boris Sokolov, pointed out that official casualty figures were grossly underreported. Russian President Vladimir Putin demanded, however, that Russian historians create a positive image of the Red Army. Since then, these colleagues, as sources in Moscow told me, have been forced to “divide” between “truth and honor.” Sven Felix Kellerhoff for Die Welt.

I was quite surprised by Freezer's information. But very quickly I found confirmation of them.
First, here is the book of Zamulin, who was mentioned by the German military historian.
Zamulin V.Secret Battle of Kursk. — M.: Yauza; Eksmo, 2007 http://militera.lib.ru/h/zamulin_vn2/index.html
I won't be posting the entire book. But here is the concept of the author, from the preface:
"Based on an analysis of documents from the open funds of the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of Russia (2) and captured materials of the 4th TA, the book discusses four main issues related to this topic. Firstly, the general plan of the counterattack and N.F. Vatutin's calculations the moment of its occurrence (July 9-10) and after the situation changed dramatically (on the night of July 12).Secondly, how the commanders prepared their troops, what problems and inconsistencies they had. divisions from the 40th A to the 6th Guards A on July 11, 1943, and the friction that arose in the course of this between K.S. Moskalenko and I.M. Chistyakov, which did not allow the entire auxiliary grouping of the front to launch a counterattack in a timely manner. thirdly, the course of hostilities in the 69th A zone a day before the start of the counterattack and the process of localizing the breakthrough of its line by the enemy’s 3rd TC are described in detail, and the influence of these events on the failure of the main grouping of the front (5th Guards A and 5th Guards TA) And, nako fourthly, the course of the famous battle of four tank corps of the 5th Guards is described by the clock. TA and divisions of the 2nd SS TC on July 12, 1943, on the "tank field" near Prokhorovka, the reasons that did not allow several hundred Soviet combat vehicles to crush the line of the SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler were revealed.
A significant problem in preparing for the entry into battle of the two Guards armies was the choice of the area for the deployment of their main forces. In connection with the advance of the enemy, the command of the front was forced to change the starting lines for their strike groupings twice. The book shows for the first time the role of German tactical intelligence during the breakthrough on July 10, 1943 of the front line of the third army line near Prokhorovka, traces in detail the construction of the station defense system on the night of July 11, 1943, and reveals a number of basic problems in command and control of the 5th Guards . A, which contributed to the exit of the 2nd SS TC to its outskirts and the capture of the area planned for the starting positions of two shock tank formations of the 5th Guards. TA - 18th and 29th shopping mall.
One of the important components of the enemy's success at this moment was the human factor. Miscalculations and shortcomings were made by the Soviet command at almost all levels: front-line, army, and divisional. Superimposed on a chain of objective problems and difficulties in the troops defending the station and approaching from the march, they almost led to the capture of Prokhorovka by the SS, and possibly even more tragic consequences. In an effort to convey to the reader the motives for the decisions made by the key figures of that historical drama, to more fully reveal the essence of the circumstances in which they were, I used not only the base of unique documentary sources collected in domestic and foreign archives, but also eyewitness accounts previously unknown to the general reader and direct participants in the battle on both sides.
July 12, 1943 was the most dramatic day of the entire Battle of Kursk. The counterattack, with which the Soviet command tried to finally stop the advance of the troops of the GA "South" and defeat its strongest unit, did not bring the desired result. General G. Goth outplayed the leadership of the Voronezh Front. The battle planned by him back in May 1943 in order to bleed the mobile reserves accumulated by the Soviet side during the spring operational pause brought the expected results to the enemy. And although the powerful strikes of Soviet tank formations made a significant contribution to the disruption of Operation Citadel, one cannot but admit that the enemy managed to achieve a very important result near Prokhorovka - the loss of our troops in people and armored vehicles turned out to be an order of magnitude higher than in the 2nd shopping mall SS and 3rd shopping mall. For incomplete days N.F. Vatutin lost a significant part of the trained and fully equipped reserves - the most important lever of influence on the operational situation. The consequences of the dispersal of the forces of the Guards Army of General P.A. Rotmistrov in the failed and not fully prepared front-line counterattack began to be felt the very next day after it began, and a day later they were forced to withdraw the troops of the 69th A from the Donets interfluve under the most difficult conditions.

Secondly, there was an excellent article about this battle, which analyzes and criticizes Soviet mythology in detail. "The battle for Kursk, Orel and Kharkov. Strategic intentions and results. A critical review of Soviet historiography" ((Published: Gezeitenwechsel im Zweiten Weltkrieg? Hrsg. von Roland G. Foerster. Hamburg- Berlin-Bonn; Verlag Mittler Sohn-Militargeschichtliches Forschungsamt, 1996 . Translation from the English author) http://militera.lib.ru/research/sokolov1/03.html
“In 1943, the advantage gained by the Germans from the surprise attack in 1941 practically vanished, and Soviet industry reached its maximum productivity after a decline in the first year of the war. These facts were very useful in creating a new myth - about the triumph of Soviet political system and the Soviet people in the Battle of Kursk, the third great battle of the war after Moscow and Stalingrad, in which more people, tanks and aircraft participated than in any other battle on the Eastern Front.But for such a myth it is very important not to clarify the issue of strategic intentions and results.

And thirdly, the works of the historian Boris Sokolov were discovered. Quotes from them are too extensive, so I will leave only the most suitable ones, about Frizer, the Kursk Bulge and Prokhorovka. Somehow later I’ll post separate excerpts, I really liked his criticism of traditional, mythological Soviet history. http://militera.lib.ru/research/sokolov1/index.html
Sokolov B.V. The truth about the Great Patriotic War (Collection of articles). - St. Petersburg: Aletheya, 1989.
in 1993, the Military Historical Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany invited the author to a conference in Ingoldstadt, which considered this particular battle. However, in randomness, you can see a pattern. It was the Battle of Kursk that became the largest battle not only of the Great Patriotic War, but of the entire Second World War. By that time, two whole years had already passed since the German attack on the USSR, and all the advantages that the Wehrmacht received due to the surprise of the invasion had long lost their significance. The Soviet Union fully deployed its military potential, was able to use significant Lend-Lease supplies and had an army manned and equipped with two years of combat experience, which seriously outnumbered the enemy in terms of numbers and weapons. Nevertheless, as was shown in our report, from the point of view of military art, the Red Army lost the Battle of Kursk, because, with the enormous superiority that it possessed, the relatively modest results achieved do not justify the monstrous losses in people and equipment reported by it. By the way, in terms of the degree of inconsistency with the real course of events, the Soviet mythology of this battle will give odds to the battles for Moscow and Stalingrad. The reports of the German participants in the mentioned conference leave no stone unturned on this myth. I would especially like to highlight the work of Karl-Heinz Frizer, dedicated, in particular, to the analysis of the famous tank battle near Prokhorovka.(2) The German historian was inspired to write it by watching the Soviet film "Arc of Fire" from the epic film "Liberation". He found the film's picture of the greatest tank battle to be wholly false. On the material of the German archives, Frieser proved that the Soviet claims that the Germans lost 300 or 400 tanks near Prokhorovka on July 12, 1943, are nothing more than a poetic exaggeration contained in the reports of Soviet tank commanders. In fact, the 2nd German SS Panzer Corps, which opposed the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army near Prokhorovka, irretrievably lost only 5 tanks, and another 43 tanks and 12 assault guns were damaged, while the irretrievable losses of only 3 corps of the 5th 1st Guards Tank Army, according to Soviet reports, coinciding in this case with the German ones, at least 334 tanks and self-propelled guns. And this despite the fact that the Soviet side had an almost fourfold superiority - together with two corps called up in the army of P. Rotmistrov, tank and mechanized - up to 1000 armored vehicles against no more than 273 from the Germans. There is an oral tradition from the words of eyewitnesses that after the Battle of Prokhorov in Moscow, Stalin called Rotmistrov "on the carpet" and said something like this: "What are you, an asshole, ruined the entire army in one day, but did nothing?" However, the Supreme Commander refused to bring the unlucky commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army to trial: after all, the Soviet troops won the Battle of Kursk. As a result, the legend of Soviet success near Prokhorovka was born. For this purpose, the number of German tanks was overestimated by two and a half times - up to 700, and their losses - by 5-7 times, up to 300-400 vehicles, in order to make them comparable with the Soviet ones. I had a chance to talk with one of the participants in the Prokhorov battle, L.V. Chechkov. Then he was a foreman, commander of the T-34 tank. Although the tank was burned down, Leonid Vasilyevich was lucky enough to survive. But out of 50 of his friends in the tank corps formed in Transbaikalia, only five left the battlefield alive near Prokhorovka. Most of the Soviet tankers did not have the necessary combat experience and received a baptism of fire on the Kursk Bulge. This undoubtedly affected the results of the tank battle near Prokhorovka. The true reasons for the termination of the offensive of the Army Group "South", contrary to the widespread opinion in Soviet historiography, that the Germans' refusal to continue the "Citadel" operation was caused by the failure near Prokhorovka (which in reality did not happen), lie in the fact that the Soviet attack against Orlovsky had already begun bridgehead, and therefore there was no chance of encircling the Red Army grouping near Kursk. The continuation of the attack on Kursk from the south was an unjustified risk and in the future could lead to the encirclement and death of German tank formations. The victory at Prokhorovka still could not change the overall strategic situation, unfavorable for the German side.
In general, the Soviet command clearly underestimated the ability of the Wehrmacht to restore and even increase its forces after the disaster at Stalingrad and did not pay due attention to the combat training of troops and staffs. Meanwhile, there were generals in the Red Army who assessed the situation more realistically and fully paid for their realism. Thus, the head of the Smolensk Artillery School, Major General of Artillery E.S. Petrov, had the imprudence to express the opinion at one meeting that after Stalingrad the Germans "will make up for their losses, after which they will still be strong, and we must reckon with them." He was immediately arrested and sentenced to 25 years in the camps.(2a)
The reasons for the heavy losses of the Red Army in the Battle of Kursk, as well as in subsequent battles of the final period of the war, I think, are also explained by the following reason. Due to the high casualty rate in the early years of the war, officers with military experience survived mostly at regimental level and above. In the platoon-company link and even the battalion of commanders who started the war, as well as sergeants and foremen, very few survived. Therefore, it was very difficult to transfer experience to new recruits. Hundreds of thousands and millions of poorly trained fighters continued to die before they could cause serious damage to the enemy.

Sokolov has another book, I haven't had time to read it yet, but it's certainly interesting. About Zhukov: Sokolov B.V. Unknown Zhukov: a portrait without retouching in the mirror of the era. - Minsk: Rhodiola-plus, 2000.