The restoration of Russia's military power is a myth that is beneficial to the ruling elite of Russia and the West, but has nothing to do with reality. This is stated in the report of the National Strategy Institute “Results with Vladimir Putin: the crisis and the decay of the Russian army”, which was prepared with the participation of prominent military experts.
The main authors of the report - political scientist Stanislav Belkovsky, President of the Institute of National Strategy Mikhail Remizov, General Director of the INS Roman Kareev, Head of the Institute of Military and Political Analysis Alexander Khramchikhin, Head of the Center for Military Forecasting Anatoly Tsyganok - note that one of the most important tasks of the study is to show that the myth of Russia's military power has nothing to do with reality. “It is necessary to admit the truth, no matter how bitter it may be: contrary to official propaganda, the Russian Armed Forces are in the deepest crisis, which was most seriously aggravated under President Vladimir Putin. Moreover, the unfavorable trends in the development of the military sphere in the “Putin era” became largely irreversible,” the report says.
The authors of the study note that in recent years, Putin's Kremlin has done a lot to create a myth about the "revival of Russia's military power" to hardly the Soviet level. At the same time, the created legend is very popular in the West, supported and disseminated by politicians and the media of a number of G7 countries, which allows foreign military functionaries to demand from their parliaments an increase in allocations for military needs and explain to their peoples various large-scale military operations or preparations for them. This myth is actively supported by the legend that Russia is ruled by a “Chekist corporation”, which, according to experts from the Institute for National Strategy, may exacerbate negative trends.
The Kremlin does not take into account the Chinese threat and exaggerates the military power of NATO in Europe
Meanwhile, the authors of the report draw attention to the fact that no military construction in the state is possible if the political leadership of the country has not formulated views on what tasks the Armed Forces (AF) will have to solve, i.e. what type of wars and with what enemy(s) the Armed Forces should be prepared for. For Russia, this issue remains relevant until recently.Experts point out that two official documents that deal with the geopolitical position of the Russian Federation, military threats to the Russian Federation and the state of the RF Armed Forces are the “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation”, approved by presidential decree in 2000, and “Actual Tasks for the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation ” – do not differ in specificity, and some points look very controversial.
In particular, experts note that, judging by official documents, the United States (and possibly Japan) is considered the only potential adversary in the Far Eastern strategic direction, while China is not considered as such, since it allegedly has neither the opportunity nor the need (due to presence of an extended land border) to conduct amphibious assault operations against the Russian Federation. Meanwhile, according to the head of the department of the Institute of Military and Political Analysis Alexander Khramchikhin, in the east of Russia it is precisely the threat of military expansion of China, which is guided by the concept of "strategic borders and living space", that should be taken into account.
As noted in the report, the concept of "strategic borders and living space" was developed to justify and legitimize the Chinese armed forces to conduct offensive hostilities, and is based on the notion that population growth and limited resources cause natural needs to expand space to ensure the further economic activities of the state and enlargement of his "natural sphere of existence". At the same time, China's long-term program for the development of China's armed forces assumes the formation of armed forces capable of "winning a war of any scale and duration using all means and methods of warfare."
The authors of the report note that although this concept does not directly name the direction in which China's "strategic boundaries of living space" will expand, it is quite obvious that it can only be Russia, first of all, its eastern regions, which have a gigantic territory and natural resources. with a very small and rapidly declining population.
At the same time, Alexander Khramchikhin draws attention to the fact that in September 2006, China held an unprecedented ten-day exercise of the Shenyang and Beijing military districts of the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA, the official name of the Chinese Armed Forces), the two most powerful in their potential of the 7 Chinese military districts. It is these districts that are adjacent to the border with Russia, Shenyang opposes the Far East, and Beijing - the Siberian military district of the RF Armed Forces.
At the same time, during the exercises, units of the Shenyang Military District made a throw at a distance of 1000 km to the territory of the Beijing Military District, where they held a training battle with units of this district. The objectives of the exercises were to develop the skills of maneuvering army formations at a great distance from their bases and to increase the level of management of the rear support of troops. According to experts, such a scenario of exercises can only be considered as preparation for a war with Russia, and it is the offensive, not the defense, that is being worked out.
On the other hand, as noted in the report, the idea of NATO as the main potential military adversary of the Russian Federation today seems very doubtful. According to experts, official Kremlin propaganda often misleads the public about the dynamics of development of the NATO Armed Forces in the regions adjacent to the Russian Federation. According to analysts, the grouping of the North Atlantic Alliance in Europe since the end of the Cold War has undergone a radical reduction, and the reduction continues. So, at the beginning of 1990, the armed forces of 16 "old" NATO members had in Europe a total of 24,344 tanks, 33,723 armored combat vehicles, 20,706 artillery systems (artillery systems) with a caliber of more than 100 mm, 5,647 aircraft, 1,605 helicopters. At the beginning of 2007, the armed forces of 22 NATO countries (16 "old" and 6 "new", former members of the Warsaw Pact Organization, ATS) had in Europe a total of 13,514 tanks, 26,389 AFVs, 16,042 artillery systems, 4,031 aircraft, 1,305 helicopters . At the same time, the US military grouping in Europe has been significantly reduced. In this regard, according to experts, the preservation of the CFE Treaty is more expedient for the Russian Federation than its destruction, since Moscow, firstly, has sufficient growth potential within the quotas provided by the treaty, and secondly, it is interested in the fact that the existing military disparity between forces of Russia and NATO countries in Europe did not take on an overwhelming character.
Analyzing official documents, experts come to the conclusion that the military-political leadership of post-Soviet (Yeltsino-Putin) Russia in the period from 1992 to 2007 did not develop a strategically clear and historically specific answer to the question why Russia needs the armed forces and, accordingly, what they should be. to be. The authors of the report believe that on the basis of existing documents, such as the “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” (2000) and “Actual Tasks for the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation” (2003), it is impossible to conduct military construction adequate to the current international situation. The “Putin era” turned out to be no more productive in this regard than the period of his predecessor’s rule, analysts conclude.
The crisis of the military-technical equipment of the Russian army
The authors of the report also draw attention to the fact that a comparison of the current state of the main types of the RF Armed Forces with their state at the end of the 1990s indicates an unequivocal aggravation of the crisis in the military-technical equipment of the Russian army in recent years. Analysts note that the total budget expenditures on defense for 2000-2006 are only insignificantly (about 15% in dollar terms) higher than similar average expenditures in the period from 1993-1999, when the economic opportunities of the state, due to the unfavorable commodity situation, were significantly ( immeasurably) more modest than today. At the same time, the volume of weapons and military equipment received by the army at the expense of these expenses is significantly lower than in the 1990s, which is due to a dramatic increase in corruption.According to experts, the crisis state of the Strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF) causes the greatest concern. In particular, their massive reduction, the unification of their structure on the basis of suboptimal and vulnerable models of weapons, the accelerated degradation of the naval component of the strategic nuclear forces.
According to the authors of the report, during the period from 2000 to 2007, strategic nuclear forces lost 405 carriers and 2498 charges. During the reign of Vladimir Putin, only 27 missiles were produced, i.e. more than 3 times less than in the "dashing" 1990s, and 1 Tu-160, i.e. 7 times less than in the 1990s. “Thus, if in the 1990s the strategic potential inherited from the USSR, on the whole, was kept at the same level, then since 2000 its reduction has been taking place, taking on a landslide character. Moreover, the trends in the development of the situation should be recognized as unambiguously negative,” experts say.
At the same time, in the field of conventional weapons, as the report says, there is a significant (several times) decrease in the volume of purchases compared to the period of the 1990s, the disruption of state rearmament programs and the degradation of the content of these programs themselves. Among the most striking inconsistencies between official propaganda and the real state of affairs, the authors of the report cite the words of former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, who said that Russia would increase the number of its strategic bombers to 50, although 79 units are currently in service.
According to experts, the current state arms program for the period 2006-2015 raises a lot of questions. The authors of the report believe that it is not clear what justifies the number and types of weapons and military equipment being purchased, as well as the feasibility of this program, given that all previous programs were frustrated.
In particular, it is not clear whether it will be possible to purchase the 1,400 T-90 tanks planned by this program (for the implementation of the program for this class of weapons, the rate of purchases must be increased 6 times compared to the current one), why they are purchased in precisely this quantity (according to the aforementioned CFE only to west of the Urals, Russia may have 6350 tanks), how expedient is the purchase of these particular tanks, which, according to experts, cannot be considered truly modern. Experts found similar "bottlenecks" in other points of the program.
In particular, the authors of the report also find the situation with the adoption of a new attack helicopter to replace the Mi-24 extremely strange. Experts note that back in December 1987, the results of the competition were summed up, in which the Ka-50 defeated the Mi-28. In 1995, by decree of the President of the Russian Federation, the Ka-50 was put into service and released in a series of 5 units. 2 helicopters of this type in 2001 successfully participated in the hostilities in Chechnya. However, in 2004 it was officially announced that the Mi-28 in the amount of 50 units would go into service. It remains unclear why such a decision was made, what determines the number of purchased aircraft (according to the CFE Treaty, the Russian Federation can have 855 attack helicopters only to the west of the Urals). At the same time, it should be noted that so far not a single serial Mi-28 has been put into service, although the arrival of the first vehicles in the unit was reported in mid-2006.
The authors of the report also draw attention to problems in the Russian Navy. Experts state that, as in the 90s of the XX century, the most serious problem for the Navy is the lack of maintenance of ships. Because of this, there is a write-off of ships that could remain in the ranks of the Navy for another 10-20 years. As an example, experts cite the nuclear missile cruiser pr. 1144 "Admiral Nakhimov", which has a huge combat potential. It was put into repair in 2001, which, with sufficient funding, could have been completed in 3-4 years. However, the ship is still under repair, which is almost not funded. Most likely, one of the best surface ships of the Russian Navy will be decommissioned in the near future, the authors of the report believe.
Analysts note that since 2000, the supply of new ships to the fleet has dropped sharply. 3 more units were completed, laid down under the USSR: 1 submarine pr. 971 ("Cheetah"), 1 missile boat pr. 12411 and 1 minesweeper. At the same time, the submarine pr. 949A "Kursk", commissioned in 1995, was lost.
Of the ships laid down in the 1990s, 6 boats pr. 10410 and the Saint Petersburg submarine were completed, in the last 2 years another 2 submarines of this type were laid. Submarine "St. Petersburg" is currently undergoing tests, which are delayed due to serious technical problems. The submarine "Severodvinsk" has been at the shipyard for 14 years. Judging by the statements of a number of representatives of the Navy, even if this boat is completed, it will remain in a single copy. In light of this fact, the laying of 3 RPK CH pr. 955 described above is especially surprising. The construction of missile boats requires the simultaneous construction of at least the same (optimally - doubled) number of multi-purpose submarines to ensure the actions of the RPK CH. In the context of the absolute superiority of the US Navy over the Russian Navy in surface ships, the absence of multi-purpose submarines also makes the deployment of RPK SN at sea in combat conditions impossible.
At the same time, experts note that in the post-Soviet period, the Russian military-industrial complex has lost many technologies and entire generations of qualified personnel. These losses, analysts believe, are gradually becoming irreplaceable. The main factor that allowed the industry to survive (at least in part) was its reorientation to the foreign market and arms exports. This had, however, ambiguous strategic consequences, increasing the likelihood that military-industrial complex enterprises would lobby for the production of obsolete samples not only for export, but also for the RF Armed Forces. At the same time, experts draw attention to the fact that at present practically no new types of weapons have been created, and the so-called latest developments were invented back in Soviet times. At the same time, there is a danger that after the creation of large military-industrial holdings, internal competition in the military-industrial complex will disappear, which can only exacerbate the existing negative trends.
The professionalism and social security of the Russian army raises big questions
Analyzing the condition of the personnel of the RF Armed Forces, the experts state that it can be assessed as even more difficult and “inaccessible” (A.I. Solzhenitsyn) than the state of armaments and military equipment. According to the authors of the report, the main problems in this area are the demotivation of servicemen (associated, not least, with the significant restriction of the social rights of servicemen during the “blessed” period of Vladimir Putin’s rule) and their deprofessionalization.As stated in the report, at present we have to state a very low level of training of the officer and general corps (including the highest command staff). In the Air Force, where the level of combat training can be clearly quantified (the number of hours of "flight"), the situation is critical. Experts note that the infamous Major Troyanov, who crashed on the territory of Lithuania in September 2005 on a Su-27, had an annual flight time of 14 hours - he lost his course, largely due to lack of flying practice. In general, the lack of flight practice has led to a sharp increase in the accident rate of aviation. There will soon not be a single sniper pilot in aviation, there are almost no 1st class pilots. In 10 years, only pilots of the 3rd class will remain, mainly at the age of 37-38 and older.
At the same time, as the report says, military science without the generation of new ideas on the part of the military leadership has gone into a dead end. In the Combined Arms Academy (the former Frunze Academy) there are only 20 active colonels - doctors of sciences, who are still teaching. At that time, until 1991, up to 100 doctors of sciences worked here. In Moscow, almost 90% of students and teachers of military academies work day and night in order to earn additional income.
According to expert estimates, about a third of graduates of military schools will take off their shoulder straps and use diplomas outside the army. 83.3% of current lieutenants do not intend to serve beyond the age limit. Graduates of military departments of civilian universities ("two-year students") are now coming to the positions of junior officers. According to the military leadership itself, they, officers called up from the reserve, are already up to 50% in the troops, which indicates big problems in the personnel of the Armed Forces.
The report also notes that it is extremely difficult to judge the real scale and nature of combat training in the RF Armed Forces. Official statistics on the number of exercises conducted are not made public, and official statements only emphasize that it is constantly growing. If we talk about the teachings that were covered in the central media, then most of them were, first of all, advertising campaigns. That is, it combined the maximum information effect with the minimum scale of the parts involved and unconvincing legends, the authors of the report believe.
At the same time, experts note the rapidly growing outflow of professional officers (graduates of military universities) from the Armed Forces and their replacement by officers called up from the reserve. Also, the current state of the Armed Forces, according to analysts, characterizes the absence for the entire post-Soviet period of our history, including the widely publicized “Putin era”, of any systemic decisions on the transition to the professional principle of recruiting non-commissioned officers, the absence of which is one of the main reasons for the moral and legal decomposition of the grassroots army environment.
The report also draws attention to the disadvantaged position of the Armed Forces and army officers in a number of other power structures, which is manifested in the social and personnel policy of the state; the growth of property and social disproportions within the Armed Forces themselves.
According to analysts, even the most general statistics make it possible to adequately assess the state of the army's social sphere, according to which 36% of military families are below the poverty line, 52% (!!!) of Russian officers work additionally, including 29% on a permanent basis ( mainly night watchmen, security guards, employees of private security companies), 24% of officers are forced to have additional earnings to earn a living. In almost every fifth officer family, the main source of livelihood is the salary of a wife or other family member.
According to experts, the introduction of the contract principle of manning individual units, which was carried out in 2000-2007, did not lead to an increase in the quality of the personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Rather the opposite. The replacement of conscription manning by contract aggravates one of the most unfavorable tendencies in the social development of the army: the tendency towards lumpenization of the Armed Forces.
The results of military construction over the past 8 years do not cause optimism
According to the authors of the report, in general, the trends in the field of military development in the Russian Federation clearly indicate that in the foreseeable future the RF Armed Forces will lose the ability to ensure the country's security from external aggression. “Apparently, the process of degradation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, which in essence remained a grandiose fragment of the Armed Forces of the deceased USSR, has assumed an irreversible character. To change the current situation, it is necessary to create a new concept of military construction based on an assessment of real external threats to the Russian Federation. On its basis, new approaches should be formed to the formation of the command and control system and structure of the Armed Forces, military-technical policy, the principles of service by personnel, and the organization of combat training. Proceeding from this, military construction in the Russian Federation should be carried out. Unfortunately, the current political situation in the country does not give any reason to assume that such a concept will be created and implemented,” experts believe.According to analysts, the military construction of the past 8 years has de facto given priority to the development of infantry units over the development of units based on high-tech types of weapons (in particular, almost all “continuous readiness units” receiving priority funding are infantry units). There is reason to believe that in the near future the basis of the RF Armed Forces will be hired infantry, whose main task will be to fight not against external threats, but against its own people. The armed forces of the Russian Federation run the risk of acquiring exclusively police functions and becoming an integral part of the repressive apparatus.
As the report says, “military building is inseparable from state building. This is doubly true for Russian history, in which the state of the army has traditionally been and remains one of the unmistakable indicators of the state of the state. According to analysts, the best that has been done so far in the field of defense policy of post-Soviet Russia can be seen as an attempt to prevent and delay the final destruction of the USSR Armed Forces. More precisely, that part of them (far from being the best in everything), which was inherited by the Russian Federation from the perished Soviet Empire.
“Military construction in the proper sense of the word has not yet been on the Russian agenda. It is a task for the future, and for the near future, if we are to survive as a united country. Considering that the means and forms of warfare have changed markedly over the past decades, and that Russian society and the state are fundamentally different from the Soviet ones, the ideology of future military development can hardly be formulated in terms of reforming/modernizing the remnants of the Soviet military legacy. It will have to be about building new Armed Forces from scratch, adequate to the new stage in the development of Russia's statehood, as has happened more than once in Russian history, ”the authors of the report believe.
The creation of new Armed Forces, which is the only possible and historically justified alternative to the process of "controlled dying" of the USSR Armed Forces, is possible only if a qualitatively new generation of statesmen comes to power in Russia. The fate of the Russian army depends entirely on probable, but by no means guaranteed changes in the fate of the Russian government. In the fate of Russia itself.
We have no superfluous grounds for historical optimism. But we still have the right and duty to hope, the authors of the report conclude.
Many young people think that modern army- these are constant bullying by military personnel who have served a year or two more, daily forced marches in the mountains, somewhere in Chechnya or Afghanistan, a broken personal life and many other negative elements of military service. In fact, everything looks a little different than in many films devoted to this topic. Many guys end up in units guarding the perimeters of factories, outposts and other important strategic objects, and in their entire service they never see a real enemy, but simply cultivate patience in themselves so as not to break loose, not to commit some irreparable acts, but to serve calmly and return to your loved ones.
Now I would like to talk about the so-called "hazing" in the army. Guys who have just been called up for military service believe that as soon as they get into the unit, a company of servicemen of a different nationality will attack them and beat them corny, with a possible fatal outcome. I will not say that this is impossible at all, but in fact, there are only a few parts in which this can happen. So that service in the modern army not quite the way it is described.
Pleasures of modern service
And recently, such a phenomenon as "hazing" is practically obsolete, since with one year of military service it is somewhat problematic to learn everything that the army can teach, and the basis of "hazing" is to make it clear to younger comrades in arms that here , as well as in life, not everything is so simple and you need to fight for everything - somewhere with your hands, somewhere with your head. I would also like to highlight another point that the majority prefers to remain silent about - why did such a phenomenon exist in the army at all, what is the purpose of this "hazing"? Here comes to serve a guy who has just graduated from the institute, has never fought in his life, and even more so did not hold a weapon in his hands. BUT duties of a soldier in the army suggest the presence of at least primary skills in weapons and fighting. Here, answer mercy, how will he defend his homeland, his land, his relatives, and his life, in the end, if an enemy attacks him in a real battle? Yes, no way, if he has no experience.
Many of us are taught to defend our lives and honor by our fathers, but who doesn’t have them? In addition, the cruelty of "hazing" is very, very exaggerated - fights, if they happen, are not all in a crowd on one, and those who can stand up for themselves are respected and the period of "hazing" is very short for them.
The army has changed
I would also like to discuss another point. , for the most part, these are outfits, guards, daily routine, numerous works, and not running through the mountains, in search of the next enemy. Now the army in the first place is not an attack, but a defense, and before, we defended our country, and did not attack everyone and everything. And now? Someone is attacking Russia? Most countries have long realized that it is better to live in peace with Russia. It should also not be assumed that the military service in the modern army brings only negativity into a person's life. Let's remember how honorable it used to be to defend your homeland, your country? Do you think there was no “hazing” then, or they didn’t kill then? All this was, as it is now, only people did not cry afterwards at home, that, you see, they were beaten in the army.
Serving one's homeland was an honorable thing, and not a punishment and a severe duty for the male population. What if women did the same? It seems that going to the army now is somehow shameful, and if women think that it is shameful for them to give birth, we will simply die out as a nation. I would also like to remind you that, in the end, serving the Motherland is a duty for every man. And the last thing I would like to say is that it is very disappointing that young people find thousands of reasons to stay on the sidelines, “go down for health reasons” or sit out at the institute, just to stay at home, on the neck of their parents, and not to defend their country . Now think - who will protect her? Who will answer the real enemy if there is war tomorrow? No one, if not us and our sons.
Not enough money, not enough soldiers, huge discipline problems, many accidents, dead and outdated equipment. Contrary to what Putin tells you, the Russian army is not that strong.
This week, the British Daily Mail published an article titled "Is Putin plotting a war in Europe?" in which intelligence sources, drawing on large-scale military exercises in Russia, claimed that the Russian army is preparing to fight NATO. All this is happening against the backdrop of many reports of the resumption of the Cold War, of Russian reconnaissance aircraft flying near the air borders of the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom, of submarines collecting intelligence around the world and, of course, of the actions of the Russian army in Ukraine and other countries. . Add to that the weekly reports of the might of the Russian military, how scary Putin is, and that the Russian military is returning to Cold War glory.
But let's tell the truth. Intimidation is used as a magic tool to get budgets and increase sales. The Russian army is actually very different from the picture that is being painted for us. Light years separate them from the combat readiness of the US, Chinese, German and French armies. Of course, one should not go to the other extreme, this is not South Sudan or Somalia after all. The Russian army has a huge number of nuclear weapons, excellent aircraft, excellent tanks and silent submarines. But, as you will now learn, it is still not as formidable as it seems.
So what is really going on in the Russian army?
1. Many victims and bad discipline
In May, it became known that Vladimir Putin signed a presidential decree according to which data on the losses of the army during military operations in peacetime become a “state secret”. In an effort to restore Russia's superpower status, Putin sends soldiers to places like Georgia, Ukraine and beyond, and they show impressive abilities there, but they also die in large numbers. For example, Ukrainian sources report that the Russians burn the bodies of soldiers who died in Ukraine to hide their participation in the war, and also to avoid the negative impact of losses on the morale of the troops.
To this should be added the huge number of soldiers dying in the exercises. According to some reports, there are several hundred such cases a year. If this is not enough, then several hundred more soldiers die every year at the hands of their comrades in fights or as a result of alcohol abuse. The last official data on such cases was published in 2001, and then it was about 500 victims of murders in the army.
There are many reasons for this, and the low level of discipline in the Russian troops is obvious, which is reflected in their combat capability and even in the quality of the exercises. The old-timers mock the recruits, the ceremonies on the occasion of the completion of the training courses are more like the torture of the Inquisition, and this is only a small part that is known to the public. Two years ago, as part of a nationwide fight against smoking, it was decided to stop distributing free cigarettes to soldiers, but the chief of the general staff warned that a riot could result. The situation with discipline and with the value of human life is so bad that the mothers of soldiers come out to protest demonstrations.
2. There is no money in the treasury
Although the Russian military budget has been greatly increased, it is nowhere near the defense spending of the wealthy US, and the financial situation of the Russian armed forces is poor. The Russian military budget is 80-90 billion dollars, the American - 500 billion dollars, the Chinese - more than 100 billion dollars. German - 50-60 billion dollars.
The difficult economic situation makes it difficult to acquire new weapons. Most of the military equipment of the Russian army refers more to museum exhibits than to military weapons. Submarines rust in ports, planes fall apart at airfields, many projects remain on paper. Vladimir Putin has good intentions and grandiose plans, but most of them are not carried out. The Russian stealth aircraft is still being tested, while the US has already formed five squadrons of Raptors and has moved on to building the next generation aircraft.
3. Soldiers are missing
For many years now, Russia has been discussing the possibility of switching to a fully mercenary army, as in the United States. At the moment, the country has universal conscription, and the term of service is from one to two years, unless the conscript has money or connections. The army has units fully staffed by contract soldiers. In particular, one of the previous chiefs of the general staff said that two brigades, 12 special forces units and five battalions of the airborne forces and marines were formed from contract soldiers. But the problem is that, for the reasons described above, the Russian army has great difficulty in attracting contract soldiers, especially from quality sectors of the population.
4. Planes fall from the sky
In the past two years, we have seen a resurgence of actions known since the Cold War: air reconnaissance flights along the air borders of Western countries and next to their ships. However, it should be noted that the condition of the Russian Air Force is so bad that planes often just crash and crash. The last incident was last week, the plane crashed during the air parade.
In July, the Russians lost a Su-24 aircraft and a Tu-95 strategic bomber, a month earlier, two MiG-29s and a more modern Su-34. Entire air fleets were chained to the ground due to plane crashes and pilot deaths. The list could go on, but the overall picture is clear. The maintenance of the planes is poor, as there is not enough money, and the pilots cannot train properly. New planes do not arrive for the same reason - lack of money.
Although Russia has excellent aircraft, most of the aircraft are now outdated MiG-29s and Su-27s, which have not been upgraded like their parallel models F-15 and F-16.
5. The only aircraft carrier that isn't overly impressive
The US Navy currently has 11 strike aircraft carriers and eight more helicopter carriers, no less advanced. France, Italy and even India have such ships. The Russian navy has one aircraft carrier, not in the best condition, which, moreover, needs to be refueled every month or two, unlike American nuclear-powered aircraft carriers.
Due to the size of an aircraft carrier, only light aircraft, that is, with limited freedom of action in the air, can take off from it.
Vladimir Putin plans to build dozens of ships and submarines, but the depreciation of the ruble is forcing these plans to be curtailed. The target date of 2020 also looks unrealistic.
6. Tank vs Tank
One of Putin's main assets is a powerful armored force with thousands of tanks. But here, too, a careful study of the quantity and quality of tanks paints a different picture than the Russian leader does. The Russian army has at least 10,000 tanks, and 3,000 of them are in active service. About half of them are T-72s, outdated vehicles that do not meet Western standards. There is also a new tank, the T-90, but there are only 300 of them in the army, and the speed of deliveries is slow. The United States has fewer tanks, about 5 thousand, but they are all different modifications of the M-1 Abrams. If you add the Marine Corps, then this number will increase by several hundred.
7. Accidents at parades show everything
The Russian army loves to show its power to the citizens of the country and the whole world at military parades. They usually involve dozens of aircraft, hundreds of pieces of equipment and many soldiers. If we carefully examine these parades, we will see the same thing that was described above - accidents and disasters, the death of a soldier, a plane crash, a tank explosion. As we have already said, just this week a plane crashed at the parade and the pilot died. Last month, in front of the public, there was an accident when launching missiles from a ship. Fortunately, the rockets fell into the water. During the parade of the air defense forces, which are considered very strong, the rocket fired did not hit the target and fell due to a technical malfunction. During the Victory Day parade on May 9, the Russians presented their newest tank, which simply stalled and had to be towed.
In November, the son left to serve in the Russian Army. In June he graduated from the university and received a diploma. What is the problem?
The problem began about six months before the time of the call. The adult guy categorically did not want to go to Amiya, because. afraid with terrible force. What were you afraid of?
He was afraid that he would be beaten by old-timers and re-enlisted sergeants. And even more, the son was afraid that they would mock him. After all, legends circulate throughout the country about how young soldiers are beaten. How they are "smeared". How they are driven to disability and suicide. You don't have to go far for examples, right? Starting with the official recognition of M. Norbekov in one of his books. And, concluding with a recent publication on the Internet about a criminal case in Kronstadt.
And the main problem, after all, is not this.
The main problem is elsewhere. As a doctor of higher education pedagogy (I work with people over 16 years old), I assume that there are such “sons” in the whole country. As a specialist, I understand that throughout Mother Russia, able-bodied and physically healthy guys are afraid to join the Army. For the same reason. I understand that they begin to be afraid about 4-6 months before the call. And these 4-6 months, almost every Russian guy lives with a sense of fear. Of course, guys are embarrassed to admit it. But, if we talk to them ... we will see a depressing picture.
The problem is aggravated by the fact that, for another 6 months, being inside the Army itself, most of them live in a state of fear.
And the problem is not only in their personal experiences. And not only that young soldiers are really humiliated and beaten. After all, for sure, far from everyone is humiliated and beaten, right?
THE PROBLEM IN THE FATE OF THE COUNTRY AND IN THE FATE OF THE NATION. The problem is that in a state of fear of humiliation and beating lives ALMOST HALF (!!!) of the rank and file of our defenders of the Fatherland.
Question 1: What is the moral and psychological spirit and combat potential of the army, in which almost half of the soldiers live in fear???
Question 2: Can we be proud of the Army, in which almost half of the soldiers are afraid of their fellow veterans, afraid of sergeants, afraid of pain?
Question 3: Is such an army capable of defeating a real enemy whose soldiers live without fear (i.e., self-confident and have high self-esteem)??? Are we securely protected by our Army?
I don’t even ask what kind of innovative potential do the citizens of Russia have, who have been threatened with humiliation and beatings for six months? And what genetic code is passed on to their children by men who have lived in a state of fear for almost a year?
I have met two polar opinions regarding the quality and combat effectiveness of the Russian Army in modern times.
The first is that the transition to a one-year service life completely destroyed the value of privates and sergeants, that everything that had not been stolen before was plundered under Serdyukov, in general, "all the polymers were pissed away."
The second opinion is that in recent years the quality of the Russian Army has risen sharply, since its financing has significantly improved, the supply of everything necessary, including the latest weapons and equipment.
I would say that funding has indeed grown very significantly, and that Serdyukov, not being a "boot", having the opportunity to look with a fresh look, did a lot of good for the army. But something, of course, was drank at the same time. But the way he was kicked out, how it was arranged, how this scandal was staged with the exposure of the unjustified construction of a road in the Astrakhan region and the dubious sale of real estate in the Moscow Region - indicates that the Kremlin’s attitude towards the army is still somehow strange. It seems that Putin does not understand why it is needed at all and what status the Minister of Defense should have if he allowed himself to publicly set his friend Bastrykin against his friend Serdyukov.
For us, it’s wild to watch how some prosecutors (investigators, it doesn’t matter) get into the affairs of the Ministry of Defense and make a public scandal out of this, exposing the minister as a thief.
Yes, maybe a thief. Maybe something stuck to your hands. Maybe he abused his official position a little, using military builders to build a road to the dacha of his relatives. But just to report on his actions and expenses - he owes to one person. Before the Supreme Commander. And explaining to investigators, prosecutors and judges what and why is completely superfluous. Maybe he has some secret projects, and they are like Guatemalan or, there, New Guinean spies?
In the Corporation to which I have the honor to belong, it would be sheer absurdity for an outsider to stick his nose into the internal kitchen of a foreign department and start convicting someone there of misappropriation of funds.
Actually, I remember one such case. A cupcake from Kadrovoye (we have it, and counterintelligence, in fact), comes to me for a week, and from the doorway: “We learned that your wife uses your official Gulf Stream to fly to resorts.”
I freaked out, of course, but I said: “Okay, how much do I owe you for silence?”
He was embarrassed, hesitated, said: “No, it’s me, by the way. Well, I'll go, okay?"
"Not so fast! Listen, kid, you don't seem to be showing signs of drug intoxication. Therefore, now you are laying out to me, as if in spirit, who advised you to come to my office and say what you said. Is this some kind of stupid bet? Like, funny? Otherwise, I will be interested in how you became aware of the details of my wife's displacement. I can damn well think."
Of course, there was a bet. The youth are having fun. They argued for a hundred rubles that he would do it, and among themselves they made bets whether he would fly out of the window or roll down the stairs. But I was in a good mood, even amused by such awkward impudence.
Well, because in fact - everyone knows that I, of course, provide my bird to close people when I myself do not need it. But - all do not care. This is my plane, this is my department, this is my budget. How I spend it is my business. I can only be asked about the efficiency of the Department. And how I achieve it - it should not bother anyone. But everyone understands that for effective work - I need peace of mind, peace and a pleasant ruddy. And this is not helped by the idea that my dearest wife, going to the resort, is soaring in the waiting room of the airport terminal. Therefore, everyone is just happy that I take the opportunity to send her on a business jet.
And everything else is the same. At all levels. And when I demand from my subordinates to solve some problem, I indicate the price of the issue, I issue funds - but I am not at all interested in their actual expenses and I do not ask them to return the change. And then there were attempts by former civil servants: they brought checks from the hotel, and just not receipts from the cops, who were given a paw. I had to explain: “Boy, I don’t care at all how you spent this money. Either to a chic tavern, where he met with a client, or he took him to McDuck, and ordered him to check out the hos in his room. If you needed it that way for a better working mood, then you needed it that way. What matters to me is that the job gets done. And for the price we agreed on. But if you wring it, I will start entrusting others who are not grumpy.
And this is how offices really focused on efficiency work. As for the state regular armies, in the nineteenth century it was a circus with horses, now - without horses. It's always a mess, always cut. Where people who don't know what they want litter with money that doesn't belong to them. First, those who spend are sawing - and then those who have to make sure that they saw somehow “in a targeted way”. But if initially very shaky ideas about the goal itself, it is clear that from any attempts to control the mess only grows.
Therefore, it is a common story for armies that if they did not plan any specific military actions, then it always turns out that they were preparing for some kind of war that does not happen in reality. And they prepared - in a very strange way. The effectiveness of military construction in peacetime - in state armies, as a rule, is very low in any case. Well, those who constantly participate in some real troubles - naturally, higher than those who see their mission exclusively in parades and in seducing girls with aiguillettes.
As for the Russian Army specifically, it evokes mixed feelings. It seems that they really began to supply them much better, they are no longer such a disgrace as they used to be. But what about specific combat training?
Lyoshka Zimin told me recently. Got a new boy. Recently served in special forces urgent, sniper. He shoots really well (he was engaged in shooting before the army). But they came to work out at the shooting gallery. And he's like, "Wow! Cool!"
But what's so cool? The usual interactive shooting range. The projector drives the "movie" to the wall, you shoot, the sensors under the bullet catchers fix the place of impact. We have had them since the early nineties, as soon as video games began to develop. The technology is primitive by today's standards, and the software that creates the video is also very simple. This is a shooting range for beginners, because for serious classes, of course, there are more advanced ones. 3D, with an interactive suit simulating an electric discharge hitting you, that's all.
And this guy, in the GRU special forces, it turns out, and this was not the case. In any case, in his training, in his unit. And here is a reasonable question: what are they spending all this loot on? On super-duper German simulators, tank simulators with hyper-realistic butt shakers? It’s the same thing, of course, but wouldn’t it be easier to take care of the training of field infantry, at least its elite part, at a much lower cost? Here to teach them not just to shoot at targets - but to differentiate targets?
Anyway. Lyoshka starts the video, gives an introduction: “The target will appear in one of the three upper windows on the left. You will have two seconds. It is necessary to hit the target at any cost and under any circumstances.
The boy takes aim, aims. When a silhouette appears behind the curtain - Lyoshka gets injured, shoots him in the back pocket of his jeans from three meters (not dangerous, but noticeable). He turns around, blinks his eyes, saying, what are you doing? True, I realized all the same, returned to the goal - but did not have time. Well, at least he didn't ask questions. For that they took it: still smart. But here is the most elementary shelling - he did not pass. And this, I repeat, is special forces. No, I don’t argue, there are real wolves there, grated, but conscripts - it’s generally not clear what they are still doing there. It’s good if they go through at least some general physical and shooting training. But in many aspects that seem vital and, moreover, very simple and cheap to comprehend - complete seams.
Here, it would seem, is such a simple thing as practical exercises on the ground with laser tag, between opposing teams with an unknown result in advance. That is, a real competition to win, and not a performance "we are storming pacifist terrorists to the applause of high authorities and the press."
Maybe in some parts it is - but not in all, as it turns out. Although a decent set of laser tag for wholesale purchases costs twenty thousand rubles. And it’s not necessary to equip all the personnel without exception with them - these are not armor and not underpants, so that everyone has them at any time. This OK only for trainings under schedule issued. But, obviously, laser tag somehow passed the attention of the Moscow Region. Although the NATO armies have been using it almost since the eighties, and quite successfully.
I already spoke about the lack of normal, full-fledged exercises for installing and removing stretch marks (and about the lack of normal cheap dummies that could be installed and overcome by hundreds in greenery). And it is incomprehensible to the mind why the boots cannot think of such a simple thing, which would surely save many lives in practice.
But on the other hand, damn it, the programs are being filmed about how the special forces master the techniques of non-contact hand-to-hand combat, are clean, knock down the enemy with hand passes from a distance. And in the army, freaks really rub off, who sell this bullshit, or even conduct classes, and even have a fee.
In general, one can be glad for the Russian Army that they began to be better fed and clothed (until the economy fucked up ... once again), but about real combat effectiveness ... Tanks, airplanes, cannons - that's cool, of course. Although it is difficult to suspect that there may be some kind of technological superiority compared to NATO - and therefore, God forbid, we really clash. But the training of conscripts, at least, still smacks of profanity. And in general, conscripts, forcibly called up, are, of course, evil. Any business should be handled by professionals. Voluntarily and with a spark. Therefore, I can’t understand the Ukrainian leadership, which is constantly conducting conscription mobilizations, each time raising problems with unmotivated “fighters” who only dream of demobilization as soon as possible.
True, I liked the initiative of their Ministry of Defense to grant reservists the right to rifled long-barreled weapons and sell SCS from army warehouses for a hundred hryvnias.
Many are sulking, they say, who needs such junk, but in fact, the SCS is quite a good thing. I remember that at the beginning of the 2000s, the already mentioned Lyoshka Zimin feuded with scumbags in the Yaroslavl province, where he has an estate, and with him there was just an SKS from a long barrel (he likes to restore old weapons and cars) - so fifteen pieces in the forest he snapped only on the way. Moreover, they had Kalash - but that did not help. So it's a pretty good toy. In capable hands, of course.
