MERCENES

Jordanian Khalid al-Hayad had an affair in his country. A small firm selling office equipment and a barbershop were making good profits. In addition, the contacts acquired while studying at the Kiev Polytechnic Institute helped to open a branch in Ukraine. There, in Kyiv, he met resourceful guys from Chechnya. They helped establish close commercial relations with Ruslan Gelaev's relatives. At that time, it seemed to Khalid that the Russians were oppressing a small, unfortunate people, trampling on ancient customs and destroying the Muslim faith. Without much hesitation, he accepted the offer to go to Chechnya, especially since the trip promised not only moral satisfaction for the rendered all possible assistance and spiritual support to the long-suffering Chechens, but also, according to the Jordanian, should have turned into a considerable profit - the militants were in dire need of satellite communications.

Khalid al-Khayad was among the Chechen bandits for several months. Together with them he fought, suffered from hunger and endured hardships in the mountains, left Grozny through minefields. A zealous Islamist, he was sure that every devout Muslim should fight against Russia. However, after the defeat of the Gelaev gang in the village of Komsomolskoye, Khalid decided to surrender to the Russian troops. Voluntarily. After everything he saw in Chechnya, his beliefs changed radically.

Mercenaries, of course, are different. For most, money is the main measure of life. But there are also convinced enemies of Russia, Russians, Christians. There is a political motivation here. Such, for example, are the Kosovo Albanians, who cannot forgive Russia for sympathy for the Serbs. Most of them arrived in Chechnya before the start of the war, in the summer of 1999. Khattab established contacts, and the guys from the Kosovo Liberation Army rushed to the North Caucasus - some through Azerbaijan, some through Georgia - to cut the Russians. Most Albanians have already been killed. So are the Taliban. They seem to be fighting here for their faith, that is, they are killing Christians. But how they explain to themselves the aggression against Dagestan (almost entirely Muslim) is unknown. There are haters of everything Russian from among the Balts and Ukrainians. According to some reports, in December 1999 in Grozny, under the guns of bandits, there were about 300 mercenaries from Ukraine. Some of them fought in the first Chechen war. First of all, these are representatives of the extremely nationalist organization UNA-UNSO, which actively supplies live goods to the “Chechen front”.

"Salo in the trenches" is what Russian soldiers call Ukrainian mercenaries in Chechnya. And our closest neighbors and blood brothers do not expect mercy from the “feds”. That is why they fight so hard. In captivity, as a rule, do not surrender. First, legally they are not subject to amnesty (as citizens of another country). Secondly, any mercenary, in theory, is devoid of moral principles, since he fights only for money. Romance and a thirst for adventure do not count here. Boys from Ukraine, unlike the Chechens, cannot say that they are defending their land and their families, the sovereignty of their republic and the honor of the highlanders (despite the dubiousness of these arguments). They, Christians, cannot defend Islamic values ​​before the "aggression of Orthodoxy", which is the ideological basis of the Wahhabis.

It is this betrayal of brothers in faith and blood that most irritates the Russian military. Moreover, there are many Ukrainians in the ranks of the federal army - soldiers, officers, and generals. And they serve heroically. However, even on the bandit side, Ukrainians fight to the last bullet. For example, sniper girls from Poltava and Nikolaev acted desperately: more than one Russian soldier was killed with their rifles. They were tracked down for a long time, hunted for them and eventually killed.

The Russians fighting in Chechnya against the "federals" stand apart. Basically, these are criminals hiding in the territory not controlled by the Russian authorities. By the will of fate, they were forced to take up arms and ended up in the same trench with the local "thugs". Among the Russians there are also drug addicts sitting on a Chechen needle. There are also former Russian servicemen among them who, for one reason or another, converted to Islam and fought on the side of the militants. Two of these, former servicemen of the internal troops from the Sofrinsky brigade, were recently sentenced by a military court to long terms of imprisonment.

However, the most surprising thing is that they come across among mercenaries and romance. A. Korchinsky, the former leader of the UNA-UNSO, who has now quarreled with his comrades-in-arms, wrote about them in his memoirs. At one time, the Una-Uns fought in Transnistria, in Abkhazia, in the first Chechen war, and now they are fighting in the mountains of Chechnya. Many of them, when signing a contract, were guided by a thirst for adventure rather than a desire to make money. The former leader of UNA-UNSO recalls the case when his detachment, intending to fight on the side of the Abkhazians, ended up on the Georgian side. They stayed there. They shot at the Abkhazians and their allies solely by the will of ridiculous circumstances. By and large, they didn't care which side they fought on.

Before the second Chechen war, the republic turned, in fact, into an international bandit enclave. There you could meet mercenaries from all over the world. True, in the course of the counter-terrorist operation, mercenaries from far-abroad countries have noticeably decreased. First, because of the active and successful actions of the federal forces. There are fewer people from Arab countries, Turkey, Afghanistan, Kosovo who want to go to Chechnya for slaughter. In addition, the appearance of the Arabs and the Taliban is different from the appearance of the Chechens. And if the latter have the opportunity to disguise themselves as a local civilian, then no make-up will help an Arab, Taliban or Kosovo Albanian with a characteristic “face face”, and even without knowledge of the Chechen and Russian languages. They have no exit routes. There are very few Arabs left in the ranks of the militants, mostly Russians, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Latvians.

Secondly, the material incentive - the main motive for the mercenary's actions - is clearly discredited by Basayev and Khattab and "scammers" like them. Mercenaries were often paid with counterfeit dollars printed in Urus-Martan.

In addition, most contracts specifically stipulated that the militant would receive money only if he proved the murder of a Russian soldier or officer. A separate fee for a wrecked tank or armored personnel carrier. In general, the payment system is quite rigid. Radio intercepts of the militants' conversations testify to the complete disappointment of the mercenaries.

We did not agree on this, - foreigners reproach Chechen field commanders, - you promised that there would be military equipment, but there is none, you said that aviation would not hammer, but it does not give us a break.

What did the militant commanders say? They said that the Russians themselves deceived them - they are fighting too competently. But it is not in their power to revise the contract.

In general, in addition to the natural loss of mercenaries from the blows of the “feds”, there was also an outflow of them from the trenches for financial reasons.

The mercenaries became outcasts among the local population, that is, among the Chechens themselves, because they were engaged in robberies, taking everything in a row: both clothes and food. Some flats and houses in Grozny were scammed two or three times. Even the field commanders tried to stop the theft: they were allowed to take only food, they forbade entering locked doors. The mercenaries, however, understood these orders in their own way: if they could not enter the doors, they climbed through the windows.

Among them, I repeat, there were many drug addicts. After the federal troops took Grozny into a tight ring, the potion became a big deficit, and its prices increased fabulously. Mercenaries, even under fire from aviation and artillery, were ready to carry bags of loot to the market all day long, so that by the evening, having sold all the things, they could get a syringe with a dose and relax.

No matter how the mercenaries hide in the caves of mountainous Chechnya, a terrible ending awaits them. This is not just my conclusion. This is also the opinion of the Jordanian Khalid I mentioned, who said at a press conference: “Those Muslims who are going to go to Chechnya to fight will only face death. The same fate befell the Slavic mercenaries. If such volunteers are not killed by Chechen fighters, they will inevitably fall under the fire of Russian aviation and artillery. Better to sit at home and live a normal life. Those who still hold weapons do not really want to fight anymore. I just don't recommend anyone to go here. In Chechnya, many people die in vain. The man is like a commodity. People are stolen and traded here.”

This was not said by me, a Russian general, but by a former Wahhabi, an anti-Russian Muslim, a recent ally of the Basayevs and Khattabs.

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05.10.2004 - 09:52

Where does the lad's Caucasian sadness come from? Our reference: UNA - UNSO (Ukrainian National Assembly - Ukrainian National Self-Defense). The militants of this extremist organization of Ukrainian radicals participated (or at least declared their participation) in almost all armed conflicts in the CIS. They fought in Transnistria, in the Georgian-Abkhaz war, in both Chechen companies, participated in the attack on Dagestan, were in the Gelaev detachment, defeated in the fall of 2001. in the Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia. DEBUT

The UNS started at home, in Ukraine, as an ultra-radical wing of the Ukrainian nationalists-independence. In the early 1990s, they were fairly integrated into the social life of Ukraine, working closely with the "People's Rukh". The organization's first steps were the pogroms of Orthodox churches in Western Ukraine. Even then, the militants drew attention to themselves by the cruelty with which they beat the clergy and parishioners.

The next step was actions in the Crimea, where they tried to push the Crimean Tatars to "cleanse" the peninsula from the Russian speakers. It was not possible to unleash hostilities, but working contacts with the Tatar nationalists were established. In 95g. UNSO instructors in secret military camps located in the Crimean mountains taught Tatar youth. In 1992 Unsovites went to the warring Transnistria, hoping to turn the unrecognized republic into the main base of the UNA-UNSO. But, no matter how much the full-time propagandists later extolled the numerous exploits of "self-defenders" on the banks of the Dniester, their real contribution was more than modest. Many did not even notice several dozen militants with chevrons decorated with the "Jerusalem cross" and a trident, against the backdrop of thousands of Cossacks and volunteers from Russia. In the same year, hot lads appeared in the Caucasus. One of the leaders of the organization Anatoly Lupinos, a criminal who spent 25 years in the camps, through his prison "sidekick" Jaba Ioseliani, the leader of the Georgian armed formations "Mkhedrioni", organized the dispatch of militants for the war against Abkhazia. Moreover, all the expenses for the transfer, armament and payment of mercenaries, Jaba took upon himself. The Argo detachment was formed from the Unsovites, headed by Valery Bobrovich, the head of the Ivano-Frankivsk UNSO, a former sailor of the merchant fleet, decommissioned for drunkenness and speculation, but posing as an officer, a participant in the Vietnam War. Abkhazian sources claim that the detachment decided mainly propaganda tasks, demonstrating to the Georgian army that "foreigners will help us". Nevertheless, the "Argonauts" managed to light up their participation in the massacres of the civilian population. Fourteen of the mercenaries received the Order of Vakhtang Gorgasal, Georgia's highest award. In gratitude, they received one of the Mkhedrioni bases in the Kakheti mountains.

UNSO IN CHECHNYA

The organization's first contacts with Chechen rebels date back to 1993, when Lupinos handed over to Dzhokhar Dudayev instructions developed by "scientific circles close to the UNSO" on organizing terrorist attacks against civilians. Contacts were continued when a number of UNSO leaders, led by its then head Dmitry Korchinsky, arrived in Grozny. And although it was not possible to meet with Dudayev, meetings were held with Zelimkhan Yandarbiev and Aslan Maskhadov. With the latter, Korchinsky agreed that the UNSO would recruit air defense and air force specialists in Ukraine. Ukrainian mercenaries were supposed to receive three thousand dollars a month. To start recruiting, the Chechens transferred hard currency to the account of the Unsov Center "Eurasia", which was headed by the current leader of the organization Andrei Shkil. But the outbreak of the war mixed plans: the rebel aircraft were destroyed at the airfields, and there was no need to talk about any air defense system either. It is known that at the time of the storming of Grozny by the opposition on November 24, 1994. Korchinsky was there, and subsequently took part in the interrogations of Russian tankers taken prisoner by the militants.

After the outbreak of hostilities, a detachment "Prometheus" was sent to Chechnya at the expense of "Eurasia", the backbone of which was made up of militants trained in Kakheti. According to Russian secret services, the bulk of Ukrainian mercenaries in the rebellious republic were by no means "ideological" party extremists, but outcasts, a criminal element recruited to participate in hostilities by special structures of the UNSO. But even this contingent is undergoing a process of political training.

As a rule, the combat value of these "soldiers of fortune" left much to be desired, and Chechen employers did not stand on ceremony with them too much. So during the assault on Novogroznensky by federal troops in 1996, five Ukrainian mercenaries were shot by order of Raduev. According to the testimony of the captured militants, it was possible to recreate the picture of the death of the unlucky "Landsknechts". When the federals put the rebels under pressure, the mercenaries "suddenly remembered" that their contract had expired and came to Raduev for a paycheck. He said that first you need to hand over machine guns and ammunition. When the Ukrainians were disarmed, he ordered his nukers to take them out.

Strictly speaking, two categories of Ukrainian "volunteers" in Chechnya can be distinguished. The first is the UNSO activists, such as the Prometheus fighters, they mainly solved the tasks of propaganda, showing "the solidarity of the Ukrainian people with the fighting Ichkeria."

PR people

Along with direct participation in hostilities, members of the UNSO provided powerful propaganda support to the Chechen rebels. On the basis of local organizations of the UNSO, committees "in support of Chechnya" and "Chechen-Press" information centers were created in major cities of Ukraine. Most of these structures later became the legal "roofs" of the Chechen criminal communities.

In 1998 Dmitry Korchinsky organized the "Caucasus Institute", the purpose of which was proclaimed "to create a broad anti-Russian front" in this region. There is evidence that Magomed Tagaev's notorious book "Our Struggle, or the Rebel Army of Islam" was written by specialists from this "institute". Wahhabi literature published by this organization is still also delivered to the regions of the Volga region, where a significant part of the population is Muslim, distributed among the diasporas of Moscow and St. Petersburg, delivered to Central Asia.

The "Caucasus Institute" and the "Eurasia" center closely cooperate with the "Caucasus" center of Movladi Udugov and the "Vainakh Congress" of Ruslan Akaev, which controls the activities of Chechen communities in Europe.

THEIR LINKS

To this day, the UNSO has considerable weight in the Ukrainian establishment. For example, Leonid Kuchma's adviser on the issues of social protection of military personnel, chairman of the All-Ukrainian Fatherland Association, Major General Vilen Martirosyan, was a UNA member. The organization is greatly supported by the Ukrainian self-consecrated "patriarch" Filaret, who obtained the registration of the UNA - UNSO, from which it was removed for extremism. The UNS members also had serious connections in the apparatus of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. For a long time, the Human Rights Commission of the Verkhovna Rada was headed by former UNA leader Oleg Vitovich. Unsovites are looking for contacts with extremist organizations in Russia.

The attempt to "make friends" with the RNE failed - the Barkashovites refused any "consultations" with the UNSO. On the other hand, they managed to establish interaction with a certain Alexander Ivanov-Sukharevsky, a failed film director and leader of the "People's National Party" (whose emblem is also the "Jerusalem" cross). According to media reports, a couple of years ago, on the idea of ​​Korchinsky and Udugov, Sukharevsky was going to head the "Russian Liberation Army" (ROA-!?) in Chechnya, which should be made up of Slavs fighting on the side of the rebels.

In addition, UNA-UNSO is trying to create its own cells in the Stavropol Territory, in the Kuban, in the Rostov Region. Through the underground Greek Catholic order, the UNSO interacts with the intelligence structures of the Vatican, contacts with the leader of the Italian "Red Brigades" Pietro Danutsoo, and also (according to Korchinsky) with the "P-2" Masonic lodge. Since the mid-90s, contacts have been established with Algerian fundamentalists, the IRA, American and German neo-Nazis, and the South African Iron Guard. Interviews with the leaders of these organizations, analysis of their activities, "exchange of experience" filled the pages of UNS newspapers and magazines. It is curious that almost simultaneously the UNSO established contacts with the PKK and the Turkish Gray Wolves.

Through the Turks, they reached Hekmatyar's Afghan Mujahideen, and even suggested that they create an "International of the Offended", which was supposed to include terrorist organizations from all over the world, but they did not meet with "understanding". There is evidence that through Udugov and Yandarbiev, contact was once established with the Taliban movement.

WHAT NOT TO TALK ABOUT

Thus, the Russian special services have information that the participation of UNSO militants in the riots organized by the Belarusian opposition in Minsk was paid from a special fund created by Western "sponsors" to overthrow Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. But these contacts, oddly enough, are not advertised.

Currently, the development of new combat regulations for the Russian Armed Forces is in full swing. In this regard, I would like to bring up for discussion a rather interesting document that fell into my hands during a business trip to the Chechen Republic. This is a letter from a mercenary who fought in Chechnya. He does not address anyone, but the general of the Russian Army. Of course, some of the thoughts expressed by a former member of illegal armed groups can be called into question. But in general he is right. We do not always take into account the experience of hostilities and continue to suffer losses. It's a pity. Perhaps this letter, while new combat regulations are not yet approved, will help some commanders avoid unnecessary bloodshed. The letter is published almost without editing. Only spelling errors have been corrected.
- Citizen General! I can say that I am a former militant. But above all, I am a former senior SA sergeant who was thrown onto the battlefield in the DRA a few weeks before (as I later learned) the withdrawal of our troops from Afghanistan.
So, with three broken limbs, ribs, a strong concussion, at the age of 27 I became a gray-haired Muslim. I was "sheltered" by a Khazarian who once lived in the USSR and knew a little Russian. He got me out. When I began to understand Pashto a little, I found out that the war in Afghanistan was over, the USSR was gone, and so on.
Soon I became a member of his family, but it did not last long. With the death of Najib, everything changed. At first, my father-in-law did not return from a trip to Pakistan. By that time we had moved from Kandahar to Kunduz. And when I returned with spare parts to my house at night, the neighbor boy told me in confidence that they asked and were looking for me. Two days later, the Taliban took me too. So I became a "volunteer" militant mercenary.
There was a war in Chechnya - the first. People like me, Arab Chechens, were being trained for jihad in Chechnya. Prepared in camps near Mazar-i-Sharif, then sent to Kandahar. There were Ukrainians, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, many Jordanians among us, and so on.
After preparation, the last instruction was given by NATO instructors. They transferred us to Turkey, where there are camps for the transfer, rest and treatment of "Chechens". It was said that highly qualified doctors were also from former Soviet citizens.
We were transported across the state border by rail. They drove us through all of Georgia without stopping. There we were given Russian passports. In Georgia, we were treated like heroes. We went through acclimatization, but then the first war in Chechnya ended.
We continued to prepare. Combat training began in the camp - mountain training. Then they transported weapons to Chechnya - through Azerbaijan, Dagestan, the Argun Gorge, the Pankisi Gorge and through Ingushetia.
Soon they started talking about a new war. Europe and the USA gave the go-ahead, political support was guaranteed. The Chechens should have started. The Ingush were ready to support them. The final preparations began - the study of the region, access to it, bases, warehouses (many of which we did ourselves), issued uniforms, satellite phones. The Chechen-NATO command wanted to forestall events. They were afraid that before the start of hostilities they would close the borders with Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ingushetia and Dagestan. A blow was expected along the Terek. Section of the plains. Destruction by envelopment along the outer ring and the inner stronghold - with a general seizure, a general search of buildings, farmsteads, etc. But no one did this. Then they expected that, having narrowed the outer ring along the Terek with captured crossings, dividing three directions along the ridges, the Russian Federation would move along the gorges to the already tightly closed border. But that didn't happen either. Apparently, our generals, sorry for the free-thinking, neither in the DRA nor in Chechnya have ever learned to fight in the mountains, especially not in open battle, but with gangs that know the area well, are well armed, and most importantly, are aware. Absolutely everyone conducts surveillance and reconnaissance - women, children, who are ready to die for the praise of a Wahhabi - he is a horseman!!!
Even on the way to Chechnya, I decided that at the slightest opportunity I would return home. I took almost all my savings out of Afghanistan and hoped that 11 thousand dollars would be enough for me.
Back in Georgia, I was appointed assistant field commander. With the beginning of the second war, our group was first thrown near Gudermes, then we entered Shali. Many in the gang were local. Received money for the fight and home. You are looking for, and he sits, waiting for a signal, and bargains for the money received in battle from the rear for food - dry rations, stew, and sometimes ammunition "for self-defense from bandits."
I was in battles, but I did not kill. Mostly endured the wounded and the dead. After one battle, they tried to pursue us, and then they slapped the Arab cashier, and before dawn he left through Harami to Shamilka. Then he sailed to Kazakhstan for 250 bucks, then moved to Bishkek. Called himself a refugee. Having worked a little, I got used to it and left for Alma-Ata. My colleagues lived there, and I hoped to find them. I even met Afghans, they helped me.
This is all good, but the main thing about the tactics of actions of both sides:
1. The bandits are well aware of the tactics of the Soviet army, starting with the Bendera. NATO analysts studied it, summarized it and gave us instructions back at the bases. They know and directly say that "the Russians do not study these issues and do not take them into account," which is a pity, very bad.
2. The bandits know that the RF Army is not prepared for night operations. Neither soldiers nor officers are trained to act at night, and there is no material support. In the first war, entire gangs of 200-300 people passed through the battle formations. They know that the RF Army does not have PSNR (ground reconnaissance radars), there are no night vision devices, silent shooting devices. And if so, the bandits carry out all sorties and prepare at night - the Russians are sleeping. During the day, bandits conduct sorties only well-prepared and for sure, but in this case - imprisonment, rest, collection of information is carried out, I have already said, by children and women, especially from among the "victims", that is, who have already killed their husband, brother, son and etc.
The most intensive indoctrination of these children is carried out, after which they can even go to self-sacrifice (jihad, ghazavat). And ambushes come out at dawn. At the appointed time or on a signal - from the cache of weapons and forward. They put up "beacons" - they stand on the road or on a high-rise, from where everything is visible. As our troops appeared - left - this is a signal. Almost all field commanders have satellite radio stations. Satellite data received from NATO bases in Turkey is immediately transmitted to the field workers, and they know when which column went where, what is being done in the places of deployment. They indicate the direction of exit from the battle, etc. All movements are controlled. As the instructors said, the Russians do not carry out radio monitoring and direction finding, and Yeltsin "helped" them in this, destroying the KGB.
3. Why the huge losses of our troops on the march? Because you carry living corpses in a car, that is, under an awning. Remove awnings from vehicles in combat areas. Deploy the fighters to face the enemy. Have people sit facing the board with benches in the middle. Weapons at the ready, not like firewood, randomly. The tactics of the bandits is an ambush with an arrangement in two echelons: the 1st echelon opens fire first. In
2nd are snipers. Having killed the airborne, they blocked the exit, and no one will get out from under the awning, but if they try, they finish off the 1st echelon. Under the awning, people, as if in a bag, do not see who is shooting and from where. And they can't shoot themselves. By the time we've turned around, we're ready.
Further: they shoot the first echelon through one: one shoots, the second reloads - continuous fire and the effect of "many bandits" are created, etc. As a rule, this sows fear and panic. As soon as the ammunition, 2-3 magazines, is used up, the 1st echelon withdraws, takes out the dead and wounded, and the 2nd finishes off and covers the retreat. Therefore, it seems that there were many militants, and they did not have time to come to their senses, as there were no bandits, and if there were, then at 70-100 meters, and not a single corpse on the battlefield.
In each echelon, carriers are appointed, who do not so much shoot as follow the battle and immediately pull out the wounded and the dead. Appoint strong men. And if the gang had been pursued after the battle, then there would have been corpses, and the gang would not have left. But sometimes there is no one to pursue. Everything in the body rests under the awning. That's the whole tactic.
4. Capture of hostages and prisoners. There are instructions for this too. It says to watch out for "wet chicken." That's what they call lovers of bazaars. Since the rear does not work - take a negligent, careless slob with a weapon "by the back" - and back to the market, get lost in the crowd. And they were. It was the same in Afghanistan. Here is your experience, father commanders.
5. Mistake of command - and the bandits were afraid of this. It is necessary to immediately conduct a census with the "cleansing" of the population. They came to the village - they copied in each house how many people where, and along the way, through the remains of documents in the administrations and through neighbors, it would be necessary to clarify the actual situation in each yard. Control - they came from the police or the same troops to the village and checked - there were no peasants. Here is a list of the finished gang. New ones have come - who are you, "brothers", and where will you be from? Their inspection and search in the house - where did you hide the gun?!
Any departure and arrival - through registration at the Ministry of Internal Affairs. He went to the gang - atu him! Wait - came - slapped. To do this, it was necessary to assign settlements to each unit and establish control over any movement, especially at night with night vision devices, and systematic shooting of bandits coming out to collect. No one else will come out at night, no one will come from the gang.
At this expense, half of the bandits feed at home, so there are fewer problems with food. The rest is decided by our rear, selling products on the sly. And if there was a zone of responsibility, the army commander, explosives and an employee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs would control the situation by mutual efforts, and the appearance of any new one would be his (look for Khattab, Basayev and others at their wives, they are there in winter).
And again, don't disperse the gangs. It is you who plant them like seedlings in a vegetable garden. Example: in the gang where I was, we were once told to urgently go out and destroy the convoy. But the informants gave inaccurate information (the observer had a walkie-talkie about the exit of the first cars, he reported and left, the rest apparently lingered). So the battalion hit the gang, "scattered" and "won". Yeah! Each subgroup always has the task of retreating to where the common gathering area of ​​the gang is. And if they chased us - almost "0" ammunition - they fired. You need to drag two wounded and a dead one. They would not have gone far - of course, they would have abandoned everyone and then, maybe, they would have left.
And so in Ingushetia, in a former sanatorium, the wounded were treated - and again in service. Here is the result of "scattering" - sowing - after 1 month the gang, rested, is assembled. That is why the living and elusive field commanders remain alive for so long. There would be rapid reaction teams, with dogs, by helicopter, and urgently to the area of ​​​​collision with the support of the "beaten" - that is, who was fired upon, and in pursuit. There are none.

On Tuesday, a regular session of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Chechnya on the case of citizens of Ukraine was held in Grozny Mykola Karpyuk and Stanislav Klykh. They are accused of killing two or more people during the fighting in Chechnya. The persons killed by the indicated citizens of the neighboring state were servicemen of the Russian army. Citizens of Ukraine participated in the hostilities as part of the UNA-UNSO units and were subordinate to Aslan Maskhadov and Shamil Basaeva.

Yatsenyuk in the tank

The defendants are not the only citizens of Ukraine accused in Russia of participating in Chechen gangs. Not so long ago, a long list of those accused of hostilities against federal forces in Chechnya was added to Prime Minister of Ukraine Arseniy Yatsenyuk.

It was first announced in the 1990s head of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation Alexander Bastrykin in September of this year. So, according to him, Yatsenyuk was directly involved in the events of December 1993 - February 1994 in Grozny. He is also suspected of torturing and shooting Russian servicemen. “According to our information, Yatsenyuk, among other active members of UNA-UNSO, was awarded the highest award in December 1995 Dzhokhar Dudayev“Honor of the nation” for the destruction of Russian military personnel,” said the head of the TFR.

The main evidence against the Ukrainian prime minister was the testimony of the late radical nationalist at the disposal of the Investigative Committee Alexandra Muzychko(better known as Sashko Bily), under whose command Yatsenyuk allegedly fought in Chechnya. Naturally, the politician's press service immediately denied all accusations, and a wave of jokes and demotivators appeared on the Web depicting Yatsenyuk on a tank or with a beard typical of Islamists. Other evidence, as well as evidence of Yatsenyuk's non-involvement in the events described, has not yet appeared. According to the official biography of the politician, during the war in Chechnya, he lived in Chernivtsi, where he organized a certain company that dealt with "privatization issues." Yatsenyuk has the military rank of captain of the reserve with a specialty "artillery reconnaissance."

We will leave the details of the involvement of the Ukrainian prime minister in the hostilities in Chechnya to the investigation.

Arseniy Yatsenyuk. Photo: Reuters

Strong Chechen-Ukrainian friendship

To date, there is a lot of evidence that Ukrainian nationalists really fought in Chechnya on the side of Dudayev's militants against Russian government troops. It was a troubled time, many people wanted to earn money, and the neo-Banderists did not miss the opportunity to shoot at the “Muscovites”. It is known for certain that the organization UNA-UNSO (Ukrainian National Assembly - Ukrainian People's Self-Defense) was engaged in recruiting Ukrainian fighters for the war in the Caucasus mountains. This group is recognized as extremist, and its activities are prohibited on the territory of Russia.

According to some information, the fighters were supposed to receive a monetary reward of $2-3 thousand per month. They brought them to Chechnya through Georgia. There is evidence that during the Chechen campaign, the militants underwent treatment and rehabilitation on the territory of Ukraine. Here they closely cooperated with the UNA-UNSO, created their own cells and agreed on the supply of weapons. So close friendly ties between Chechen terrorists and Ukrainian nationalists have been established for a long time. It is this that can explain the fact that in the war in the Donbass, people from Chechnya turned out to be in the ranks of the punitive battalions of neo-Banderists.

Initially led the militants general in exile Isa Munaev, who received political asylum in Denmark after the end of the Chechen campaign. And now, years later, the hour of retribution has come for him. In 2014, he already calmly held press conferences for the Ukrainian media, during which he praised the fighters of the Ukrainian battalions fighting against the Donbass militias. In February 2015, General Munaev was killed during the battles for Debaltseve.

combat experience

In fact, the experience of the Chechen war in the conflict in the Donbass was brought not only by the leaders of the Chechen gangs of the 90s. There are also Ukrainians who, having gained experience in the Caucasus mountains, took up arms again in 2014, but already on the territory of their country. Someone even went into big politics.

We are talking about such well-known members of UNA-UNSO as Dmitry Korchinsky(journalist and public figure, ex-presidential candidate of Ukraine), Andrew and Oleg Tyagniboki(deputies of the Verkhovna Rada), Dmitry Yarosh(Verkhovna Rada deputy, adviser to the head of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, leader of the "Right Sector" and the right-wing radical nationalist organization "Tryzub"), etc. All the listed citizens of Ukraine in 1994-1995 took part in hostilities in Chechnya under the command of the aforementioned Oleksandr Muzychko.

March UNA-UNSO in Kyiv. Photo: www.russianlook.com

“During the investigation of a criminal case on a clash between illegal armed groups led by Shamil Basayev and Khattab with servicemen of the 76th Pskov Airborne Division on the territory of the Chechen Republic, information was obtained about the organization of a gang of UNA-UNSO members and their participation in hostilities against federal forces on side of the Chechen separatists in the period 1994-1995,” the official statement of the TFR said.

Maybe they were slandered? Let's see. Korchinsky is actually the founder of UNA-UNSO. In the 1990s, he personally negotiated cooperation with Maskhadov. During the conflict in Donbas, he publicly called for the creation of filtration camps for the Russian-speaking residents of Lugansk and Donetsk.

Oleg Tyagnibok is a deputy of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of several convocations, a candidate for the presidency of Ukraine, known for his loud Russophobic and anti-Semitic statements.

About the now deceased Sashko Bily (who, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, shot himself during a special operation), everyone is already quite aware, he managed to “distinguish himself” in the war in the Donbass. We can only mention that he also managed to prove himself in Chechnya. Possessing a Slavic appearance, he carried out subversive work among Russian military personnel, led them into Chechen ambushes and generally showed himself to be a true follower Stepan Bandera. According to some reports, Muzychko was directly involved in organizing the hostage-taking in Budyonnovsk, conducting reconnaissance on the ground and helping the terrorists in drawing up a plan of action.

But back to our premieres. More recently, politician Yatsenyuk spoke out categorically against his involvement in Ukrainian neo-fascists, although he had attended their events for a long time, eyewitnesses testify to this. But already in 2015, it was he who became the author of the bill “On the legal status and memory of participants in the struggle for the independence of Ukraine in the 20th century”, according to which OUN members and UPA soldiers are given the status of “fighters for the independence of Ukraine”.

It's a common practice that the degree of "heroism" of Ukrainian nationalists is usually assessed by the number of Russians killed - during the Second World War, in Chechnya, now - in the Donbass. So it is not at all surprising that today the younger generation of Ukrainian nationalists takes the side of the IS militants in the Syrian conflict, diligently exposing Russian pilots and applauding the victories of terrorists, and in Lviv there is still a street named after Dzhokhar Dudayev.

* Organizations recognized as extremist and banned in Russia.

A blue-eyed bearded guy in a camouflage jacket gives an interview. The image is blurry, the record is rare, she is 20 years old. But on his hat you can see a green armband with the inscription "Ukraine". The same are worn by his brothers in arms. But on their armbands is written "Allahu Akbar".

- What are you doing here? the journalist asks him.

“We are defending the freedom of the Chechen-Ukrainian people against Moscow aggression,” the guy answers confidently.

Are there many of your people here?

- 200 guys, - the fighter switches to Russian.

How do they fight?

- As the others. Like Chechens, so Ukrainians themselves. They fight well. And when we advance on Moscow, we will fight even harder - it is not easy for him to speak pure Russian. Obviously, his native language is Ukrainian.

This person is Alexander Muzychko, aka Sashko Bily, a Rivne activist of the right-wing radical organization UNA-UNSO, who was killed by Kyiv special forces in March 2014 during his arrest. In the video, he is in his early 30s and is the commander of the Viking squad that is fighting against the Russian army during the first Chechen war.

Had he survived, he would certainly have become one of the main defendants in the “large-scale criminal case against Ukrainian militants,” which this week began to be considered in the Grozny court.

According to Russian human rights activists, it was opened back in 2001, but the investigation was not very active. The events on the Maidan, the situation in the Crimea and the war in Donbass contributed to the fact that Russian investigators shook the dust off the yellowed pages.

In the dock were a well-known UNS member, Dmitry Yarosh's colleague Nikolai Karpyuk and journalist Stanislav Klykh. Karpyuk is accused of creating a gang of mercenaries for a trip to Chechnya, killing Russian soldiers during the 1994-1995 war. Klykh is charged with participation in a gang and torture (Article 209 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation - leadership and participation in a gang, and Article 102 - the murder of two or more servicemen).

For more than a year, neither lawyers nor human rights activists could approach both prisoners. Klykh has already stated that he gave all his confessions under torture.

The associates of those arrested unanimously assure that neither Karpyuk nor Klykh were in Chechnya during the war. But the other day, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, the Tyagnibok brothers and Dmitry Yarosh, who, according to the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, also fought on the side of Chechen fighters, joined them. Their names gave the case of the "captives of the Caucasus" a political color.

In any case, Sashko Bily is far from being the only Ukrainian who has been reported in Chechnya. What were the Ukrainians looking for in that war? What will be remembered by allies and enemies? Many participants in those events hid the details of their stay in Chechnya for a long time. Being in Grozny, the Ukrainians tried not to get into the photo and video footage.

And amateur pictures were carefully kept in their photo archives. Excessive attention could cost them their freedom in Ukraine, where Article 447 “Mercenarism” appeared in the Criminal Code. In connection with a criminal case in Russia, some of them, without denying the “Chechen stage” in their lives, refuse to share their memories for fear of persecution. Those who do agree often avoid thorny questions. But still, they shared their memories with the journalists of the Reporter publication.

Road

Evgeny Dykyy, then a journalist and head of the humanitarian mission of the Ukrainian human rights committee Helsinki-90, recalls. He arrived in Grozny at the beginning of 1995. Accompanied a cargo of medicines, collected information as a journalist and human rights activist at the front and in the rear. He left Chechnya in April 1996, when the active phase of the war ended.

- The desire to go to Chechnya was spontaneous. When they learned in Ukraine that Russia would not recognize the independence of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and was going to suppress the rebellion, those who wanted to go had only one question: who would be better to agree on the transfer? The core of the “Ukrainian corps” is several dozen people with combat experience in Afghanistan, Transnistria, and Abkhazia. We got to the border of Dagestan with Chechnya. Transfer is a big word. In fact, they could drive through a mountain river at night on a tractor. This was done brazenly - there was a bridge a kilometer away, which was controlled by the Russians.

Among the Ukrainians there were those who made themselves certificates of newspaper employees, which were a good screen. They really made good reports, not letting go of the gun from their hands.

“The day before the new year 1995, we arrived in Baku, met there with Chechen acquaintances,” recalls Igor Mazur (call sign Topolya), head of the Kyiv branch of the UNA-UNSO, one of the defendants in the Russian criminal case. - At that time, tank columns were already moving towards Grozny, and one could get to Chechnya through Dagestan. We drove normally, but several of our guys were taken from Grozny by their parents. When they found out where their sons were going, they came to the leadership of UNA-UNSO and demanded that the children be returned back.

During the war, the Chechens found themselves in an information blockade. Ukrainian journalists tried to break through

motive

The main motive for the trip of Ukrainians to Chechnya, the Russian media called the money that the government of Dzhokhar Dudayev supposedly generously endowed foreign specialists. But not everything is so clear. Some Ukrainians already had military experience, first gained in Afghanistan. UNSO activists, in turn, polished it in Transnistria and Abkhazia.

“Only a small part of the people who passed through Chechnya fall under the definition of “mercenaries,” Evgeny Dikiy believes. “They were well-remunerated. But the vast majority are ordinary volunteers who fought for free. They received clothing and food allowances, like other fighters. The Chechens did not throw money around. What's the point of paying for something a local would do for free? And to get money, you had to have unique skills. For example, to be a sapper or a MANPADS operator.

There certainly were such people among Ukrainians. We are talking about the military who went through Afghanistan. Obviously, it was not only money or an idea that forced them to change one war for another. It's more like a post-war syndrome.

Tagi Jafarov, an Azerbaijani photographer who worked in Grozny during the first Chechen war, wrote about one of these Ukrainians in his memoirs:

“Victor, on the contrary, is silent. He is from Kharkov. Victor does not make noise, does not share emotional impressions of the battle. He speaks quietly, without rushing. He is a cadre, Afghan passed. At home, wife, children ... And not a crest, Russian.

“Vit, how did you get here?” Also for money?

“No, money has nothing to do with it,” pause. I'm waiting for him to speak. “You see, we put so many of them in Afghanistan. Villages were swept to the ground and burned. For what? In the name of what? Many of them are on my conscience. This is where I pray for Afghan sins. Maybe I'll get it."

UNSO activists have never denied that they went to Chechnya because of their ideological anti-imperial views. That war was seen by him through the prism of Ukrainian independence, received without bloodshed. For the same reason, passionate Balts also ended up in Chechnya.

- Then it seemed to us like this: in order not to have a front in the Crimea, we need to keep it in the Caucasus, - recalls the former head of UNA-UNSO Dmitry Korchinsky.

- Perhaps now it is difficult to understand, but emotionally, many were set up like this: “You can’t crush the people with tanks because they wanted independence!” Wild says. - Ukraine and the Baltic countries have also chosen independence. So, now they will also be pressed like that? Therefore, they went to help, fearing the return of the empire.

“Hundreds of our wounded soldiers received treatment in Ukraine,” recalls Musa Taipov, a member of the CRI (Chechen Republic of Ichkeria) government. “We were given humanitarian aid. And Ukrainian journalists broke through the information blockade, telling the world about the true events in the Russian-Chechen war. It was extremely difficult to get to us and then take out the footage.

300 Ukrainians

Data on how many Ukrainians went to Chechnya as fighters is different.

Musa Taipov, a representative of the CRI government, speaks of two dozen people, four of whom died. One was captured.

According to Yevgeny Dykyi, about 300 Ukrainians visited Chechnya during the war, 70 of whom passed through the Unsov detachment. One of the UNSO commanders Valery Bobrovich, who fought
in Abkhazia (led the Argo detachment), he names a figure of 100 people.

“They treated the wounded, provided security, sent humanitarian aid,” recalled Dmitry Yarosh, whose patriotic organization Trizub collaborated with Dzhokhar Dudayev, in an interview with Hromadsky. - I turned to Dudayev with a request to form a Ukrainian unit. But he received an answer: "Thank you, but we have fewer weapons than those who want to." So we didn't go.

Igor Mazur assures that he, like other Ukrainians, accompanied foreign journalists more than he fought.

“Journalists trusted us Slavs more than Caucasians,” Mazur recalls.

“The wounded were taken out through Georgia,” he says. - In Ukraine, in addition to ours, Chechens were also treated. Basically, they were assisted in Western Ukraine. It seemed to be done secretly, but it only seemed so. Everyone knew. The official position of Ukraine was as follows: we categorically deny Ichkeria, we have no contacts with them, we condemn the participation of Ukrainians, we can give an article to mercenaries. In practice, there were no trials, no one was extradited to Russia.

Meeting

Yevgeny Dikiy recalls that in Chechnya any person of Slavic appearance raised a lot of questions. But it was worth saying that he was Ukrainian, he immediately became a dear guest.

“Ukrainian passport was a universal pass,” Dyky says. The Chechens really appreciated the fact that the Ukrainians were practically the only volunteers from non-Muslim countries who came to fight on their side. They understood that no one owes them anything, that coming here is the highest manifestation of friendship.

The same factor caused hatred on the part of Russians.

“They couldn’t understand why the Slavs became against them, why they became traitors,” Evgeny continues. - In order not to be captured by them, ours always had the last grenade with them. They understood: if they were taken prisoner, there would be no trial.

And in order not to stand out among the Caucasians, the Ukrainians grew beards. Following the example of the Chechens, green ribbons were tied to a machine gun and a uniform.

Oleg Chelnov from Kharkiv (call sign Berkut) stood out more than others among Ukrainians.
among nationalists and participants in those events, they are considered even more iconic than Sashko Bily. Both were awarded the highest award from Dzhokhar Dudayev - the Order of Honor of the Nation.

“He was not a member of the UNSO when he arrived in Chechnya,” recalls Igor Mazur. - But before this war, he went through hot spots, was a liquidator at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. I could never sit in one place: I wanted to figure out where the truth was and where the lie was.

There were legends about his dashing character in Chechnya.

When street battles were going on and Chechens and Russians were in the neighboring front rooms, in this mess and confusion Chelnov could fly in to the Russian paratroopers and shout: “Why are you still here? Behind me!"

“He was fair-haired, blue-eyed, dressed in a trophy uniform,” Dikiy recalls. - They believed him. And he took these Russians to the Chechens, who then "packed" them. Chelnov also found out that many of the Russian military's call signs have not changed since the days of Afghanistan. He used it. He went on the air under the call sign of the commander and caused crossfire so that one battery "kneaded" the other.

Chelnov died in Grozny in 1996. Sashko Bily in an interview said that
in honor of Oleg, the government of Ichkeria named the street, and his daughter was assigned a life allowance. Naturally, after the second Chechen war, these privileges for the Ukrainian family were eliminated. The streets named after him, as well as the streets named after Muzychko, no longer exist in Grozny.

A detachment of Unsovites arrived in Grozny in the winter of 1995. According to unofficial data, about 300 Ukrainians passed through Chechnya

torture

In the Russian media, Sashko Bily appeared as the personal bodyguard of Dzhokhar Dudayev. He was portrayed as an extremely cruel man who practiced sophisticated torture on prisoners.

“You can’t call him an easy person,” Dyky recalls. - Heavy character. A commander who does not spare himself first of all, and then his fighters. He wanted to spit on laws, but did not spit on concepts. He did not torture the prisoners. Besides, it was an invaluable exchange fund. I can be a living witness of those events, I talked with the prisoners, including those who were at Bily.

- Bily was among the three dozen fighters who guarded the building of the Reskom, - says Dikiy. - But this is not Dudayev's bodyguard. Moreover, Bily did not command her.

Ukrainian journalist Viktor Minyailo, who twice visited Chechnya during the 1994-1996 war, recalls how one of the Chechen military leaders, Aslan Maskhadov, wrote a note in which he addressed all his subordinates with an order to release any Ukrainian from captivity, no matter who he was.

“It concerned the Ukrainians fighting on the side of the federals,” Minyailo says. - Those who were born in Ukraine. They were indeed released unconditionally.

“There were tortures during the second Chechen one,” Musa Taipov assures. “But it was a different war — fierce and out of the rules. As for the first war, Ukrainian volunteers did not torture Russian soldiers.

“The brutalization took place as the peaceful villages were bombed,” Dikiy recalls. - The secular Chechens, most of whom died in the first Chechen war, were replaced by "wolf cubs" - teenagers who grew up under bombs, listened to preachers instead of lessons. Their teenage cruelty
and a low cultural level eventually formed the image of a "Chechen bandit".

Return

According to the recollections of the fighters, the UNSO detachment returned home in the spring of 1995, when the war turned from open to guerrilla.

Musa Taipov says that this was the desire of the Chechen military command.

- In the second Chechen war, there were fewer Ukrainians - two or three dozen, - says Evgeniy Dikiy. - These are those who could not stand it and returned to the field commanders, under whose leadership they fought in the first Chechen war. Some of them already lived in Chechnya, having converted to Islam.

Members of the UNSO, recalling those days, say that their participation in the Chechen war, as well as their attitude
to them in Ukraine, was under the scrutiny of the SBU, which has not lost close ties with its Russian counterparts.

“Those who returned from Chechnya tried not to advertise their exploits,” recalls journalist Viktor Minyailo. - They were afraid of criminal liability.

And there really were no high-profile litigations in this regard. Although the Ukrainians who participated in the Georgian-Abkhazian war spent four months behind bars on suspicion of mercenarism.

“We were released at the request of Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze,” recalls the head of the Ukrainian Argo detachment, Valery Bobrovich. - He said that keeping us, the heroes of Georgia, awarded with state awards, in custody is disrespectful on the part of Ukraine.

The past that is with us again

The participation of Ukrainians in wars in the post-Soviet space after Afghanistan has long been an irrelevant topic in most Ukrainian media. There was neither massive support nor condemnation on television.

“It was interesting only to those who were in the know,” says political scientist Mikhail Pogrebinsky. - Not much attention was paid to this by the special services.

“Ukraine was then a “sleeping” country,” adds political analyst Vadim Karasev. - We were more concerned then with the issue of Crimea, "Meshkovshchina" - Yuri Meshkov at that time was a representative of the pro-Russian bloc "Russia", served as president of the Republic of Crimea in 1994-1995. And in our country the situation then unfolded according to a separatist scenario.

History develops in a spiral. The ideas of the UNSO radicals about the coming war, which were laughed at in Ukraine 20 years ago, have become a reality. Ukraine and Russia are not officially at war, but battles are going on on all fronts - informational, economic, for territories and for the souls of those who live on them.

The paradox is that then passionate Ukrainians supported the Chechens' right to self-determination, although television painted a different picture for the majority of the population. Today, Russia, in justification of the Crimea and Donbass, speaks of the people's right to self-determination. Historical parallels suggest themselves. The counteroffensive of Chechen fighters on Grozny during Operation Jihad ended with the retreat of Russian troops and huge losses (about 2,000 people). This defeat can be compared with the Ilovaisk tragedy. In 1996, Russia was forced to sign the Khasavyurt agreements, which actually opened the way to the independence of Ichkeria. After Ilovaisk, the battle that changed the course of the military campaign, Ukraine signed the Minsk agreements, which are comparable in meaning to the agreements in Khasavyurt.

Russia returned to Chechnya a few years later, starting the flywheel of a bloody and destructive war. When overcoming the Ukrainian crisis, one should not repeat the mistakes of the past.