Russian rebellion - senseless and merciless
cm. God forbid to see a Russian rebellion, senseless and merciless.
Encyclopedic Dictionary of winged words and expressions. - M.: "Lokid-Press". Vadim Serov. 2003 .
See what "Russian rebellion - senseless and merciless" is in other dictionaries:
From the story (ch. 13) "The Captain's Daughter" (1836) by A. S. Pushkin (1799 1837). Original: God forbid to see a Russian rebellion, senseless and merciless! The same thought, but more detailed, is contained in the "Missed Chapter" of the story, which was not included ... ... Dictionary of winged words and expressions
riot- - spontaneous uprising, rebellion. “The Russian rebellion is terrible, senseless and merciless” (A. S. Pushkin). Such a characterization of the Russian B., given by A. S. Pushkin, is connected not with the national characteristics of the Russian character, but with the age-old ... ... Encyclopedic Dictionary of Psychology and Pedagogy
rebellion- riot1, a, m An event, including a military one, in which military or civilian persons provide armed resistance to state authorities. God forbid to see the Russian rebellion senseless and merciless (P.). REVOLT2, a, pl riots, ov and ... ... Explanatory dictionary of Russian nouns
- - was born on May 26, 1799 in Moscow, on Nemetskaya Street in the house of Skvortsov; died January 29, 1837 in St. Petersburg. On his father's side, Pushkin belonged to an old noble family, descended, according to the genealogy, from a native "from ... ... Big biographical encyclopedia
Pushkin A. S. Pushkin. Pushkin in the history of Russian literature. Pushkin studies. Bibliography. PUSHKIN Alexander Sergeevich (1799 1837) the greatest Russian poet. R. June 6 (according to the old style, May 26) 1799. The P. family came from a gradually impoverished old ... ... Literary Encyclopedia
List of concepts containing the word "Russian" Contents 1 Classical concepts 2 Foreign concepts 3 New concepts ... Wikipedia
See also: Revolution of 1905-1907 in Russia Change of power in Russia in 1917-1918 ... Wikipedia
Change of power in Russia in 1917-1918 ... Wikipedia
Contents 1 The era of V. I. Lenin 2 The era of I. V. Stalin 3 The era of N. S. Khrushchev ... Wikipedia
This term has other meanings, see February Revolution (meanings). February Revolution Sentinels guard the arrested tsarist ministers in the Tauride d ... Wikipedia
Books
- Pitchfork, Ivanov Alexey Viktorovich. “God forbid to see a Russian rebellion - senseless and merciless,” Pushkin wrote in The Captain's Daughter ... and removed the chapter with these words from the novel. The words are beautiful, but wrong. Russian…
“I will not describe our campaign and the end of the Pugachev war. We passed through the villages devastated by Pugachev, and involuntarily took away from the poor inhabitants what was left to them by the robbers.
They didn't know who to obey. Rule was everywhere terminated. The landowners took refuge in the forests. Gangs of robbers were outrageous everywhere. The heads of separate detachments sent in pursuit of Pugachev, who was already fleeing to Astrakhan, autocratically punished the guilty and the innocent ... The state of the entire region, where the fire raged, was terrible. God forbid to see a Russian rebellion - senseless and merciless. Those who are plotting impossible revolutions among us are either young and do not know our people, or they are hard-hearted people, to whom someone else's little head is a half, and their own neck is a penny.
Pugachev fled, pursued by Iv. Iv. Michelson. We soon learned of its complete destruction. Finally, Grinev received from his general the news of the capture of the impostor, and together with the order to stop. Finally, I could go home. I was delighted; but a strange feeling clouded my joy."
A similar phrase is also used: "God forbid to see a Russian rebellion, senseless and merciless."
In the "Missed Chapter" of the story, which was not included in the final edition of "The Captain's Daughter" and was preserved only in a draft manuscript, he wrote:
« God forbid to see a Russian rebellion - senseless and merciless. Those who plot impossible revolutions among us are either young and do not know our people, or they are hard-hearted people, to whom someone else's little head is a half, and their own neck is a penny.
Another quote from Pushkin is also quoted from this passage of the work:.
Examples
(1844 - 1927)
"", Volume 2 (Publishing house "Legal Literature", Moscow, 1966):
"1) An indication of the history and spirit of the Russian people, which is essentially monarchical, understands the revolution only in the name of the autocrat (the impostors, Pugachev, Razin, with reference to the son of the tsar Alexei Mikhailovich) and is only capable of producing separate outbreaks of the Russian rebellion" senseless and ruthless". But almost no native history is taught in our classical gymnasiums; and the spirit of the people is learned from the language, literature, proverbs of the people, meanwhile, all this is in the pen and given to the ancient languages to be eaten. "
Images
More about the painting:
Notes
1) Polushka - 1/4 kopeck in pre-revolutionary Russia.
2) Mikhelson Ivan Ivanovich (1740 - 1807) - Russian military leader, cavalry general, best known for his final victory over Emelyan Pugachev.
The destruction of the traditional consciousness of the country will cause its death
PRESENTING to the attention of the readers the first issue of a fundamentally new edition of NG-religion in Russia, we consider it our duty to bring to your attention some considerations that led us to the idea of the need for such a publication.
Russia is a country of a special religious consciousness, which combines both deep "natural" mysticism and equally deep "natural" theomachism. Even Dostoevsky showed the absence of rationalism in the movements of the "Russian soul". Even the “senseless and merciless” Russian rebellion is not so much a rebellion against the circumstances of life as against the necessity of life itself imposed from outside. Recognition of the reality of the existence of this “OUTSIDE” also dictates the relationship with it - either the aforementioned hysterical rebellion (“but so that everything disappears with me!”), Or complete religious humility, the church beauty of which, in fact, will “save the world”. Such globality, perceived by the subtle European consciousness as a sign of barbarism, underlies the famous Russian “messiahism”, which still saturates the Eurasian spiritual space. Russia can be “cured” of this religiosity only by completely destroying its irrational “soil”, by throwing the country into other, pragmatic worlds - the worlds of a “comprehensively described God”, put at the service of man and society.
The era of Soviet totalitarianism, inflicting a terrible blow on the external forms of manifestation of religiosity, did not affect its "soil" basis. The reckless faith of the majority of the population of the USSR in the triumph of social ideals (from communist to Soviet-imperial) confirmed this hypothesis. Faith is necessary for Russia like air - the question is only in the forms of this faith. The Bolsheviks cleverly exploited this "question of form" by offering the people the aforementioned "rebellion" as an option. Having set before Russia the most important task of leadership in changing the world order, they dragged her into the abyss of "provoking" the Apocalypse. We dare to suggest that any other idea (parliamentarism, workers' rights, universal literacy and even social justice) would not have raised the masses of the people to a large-scale fratricidal (and in essence almost religious) war.
But the rebellion is not endless - time passed, and the "Russian soul" reached out to the light, trying to return to its original roots - to traditional religion. Traditional religious organizations in Russia were not ready for spiritual leadership. Quite calmly existing in the socio-spiritual niche allocated to them, for a long time they struggled mainly only for changing the circumstances of their existence (more churches, educational institutions, etc.). Other spheres of activity - spiritual - were hardly touched upon. However, it is difficult to blame anyone for this - any attempts to combat the ideals put forward by the authorities would be immediately brutally suppressed.
Soviet power with all its "spiritual globalisms" collapsed in five years. This collapse, at least since 1988, has been accompanied by a so-called "religious revival." Today, after some time has passed, it is clearly seen that the joyful euphoria over those events turned out to be somewhat premature - the revival turned into, basically, the restoration of property and social rights of traditional confessions, without any serious penetration into the sphere of the spiritual life of the people. Accustomed to life in the Soviet swamp, they continued to act on the principle "whoever came to us himself is ours, and we do not need others."
But a holy place is never empty - the inertia of some is compensated by the activity of others. Russian religiosity demanded and requires forms - in the space of post-Soviet chaos, "who dared - he ate it." Can it be that, for example, the Orthodox, who do not object to state punitive measures against “totalitarian sects,” do not understand that those boys and girls who flocked to follow the “pipe” of Mary-Davie-Christos into “white madness,” could replenish the Orthodox Church?! But their thirst for religiosity was quenched by other soul-catchers. What claims to whom?
Another internal conflict of modern Russia, no less serious in its consequences, is the emergence of a fairly wide, no longer Western (in the terminology of the 19th century), but Western-like, bureaucratic and intellectual stratum. "Oh, it would be better if it was cold or hot!" - the words from the Apocalypse of John, addressed to the "angel of the Laodicean church", are quite applicable to these people. The point is not their atheism (Russian atheism is entirely in a religious spirit) - the point is their indifference to everything except the circumstances of life. If before the revolution they were only guessing, lost among the general boil and struggle, in the early Soviet period they sat on the sidelines, and in the Khrushchev-Brezhnev years of the formation of a decent in the eyes of the "world
the communist establishment climbed up, now is their time. These are not the Stavrogins, not the Karamazovs, not the Verkhovenskys - they are not even the Smerdyakovs. This is the true "third force".
The devil, Dostoevsky exclaimed pathetically, fights with God, and the field of this fight is the human soul,
What if he doesn't fight? If "consensus"?
The mind of "consensus" is not cold, not hot - the positivistic rationalistic religions of the modern West are exactly according to it. "God loves you" and "how to get to heaven" - simple truths were distributed in batches at Moscow metro stations.
But we dare to say that in Russia these games are not in vain. What is so fashionable to call the "conflict of archetypes" acquires a terrible meaning in Russian realities. The positivist indifference of the modern educated strata of Russia, which caricaturely repeats the natural positivism of Western civilization, comes into sharp conflict with the blind spiritual rushings of the country's population. Dangerous fruits are ripening in the spiritual depths of Russia. Nothing is over yet - the Russian rebellion only took a breather, the "Russian soul" has not yet quenched the thirst for life and death.
Is it really not clear that the wild fascination of the population of our country with magic and sorcery has nothing to do with the calm "everyday esotericism" of the new age of the USA and Europe? That these "strange people", magicians and wizards, just get colossal power over the crowd? The power that no Hitlers dreamed of - religious power! What is "their religion", who has jurisdiction over it?
Russia cannot be non-religious - then it will simply cease to be Russia. Therefore, the question of choosing a religion for her is a matter of first priority. With this choice, it once began under Prince Vladimir. Under another Vladimir, she made a reverse choice. Under whom will another change take place?
"NG-religions" came into being at a difficult time. But otherwise, a religious question will not attract even intellectual interest.
Russia is located at the intersection of three civilizations: European (having the main cultural features of Christianity and Judaism), Western Asia (still remaining deeply and passionately religious in the context of Islam) and the Far East (with its illusory world in Buddhism and the sacralization of social life in Confucianism) - perhaps , this determines some of the so-called native Russian features. The same fact led us to the idea of the need to combine in one publication the interests of religions that determine all these three civilizations. Which, in turn, predetermined the structure of the publication.
Speak out - the department is open!
NG-Religions - 1997
These words of A.S. Pushkin is often mentioned when talking about the Russian rebellion. However, what are the reasons for this ruthlessness, and was the protest of the masses so senseless? What is hidden behind the definition of "mass movement"? It includes an unusually wide range of events. First of all, of course, it is necessary to note the struggle of the peasants and the urban lower classes against the increasingly suffocating and oppressive serfdom. In addition, this also includes the attempts of the Cossacks of the Don and Yaik to resist the “regularity” advancing on them (that is, the attempts of the state to eliminate or curtail the Cossack liberties). It probably makes sense to attribute to the mass movement the national liberation movements of some peoples who became part of Russia, but continued to defend their own social, cultural and religious values.However, the researchers also include the protest of the Old Believers, members of religious sects against the government's attempts to subordinate them to the official church, unrest on one or another specific occasion against the conditions of their service, as well as working people (workers, craftsmen) who are dissatisfied with working and living conditions. If the composition of the participants in the mass movement is so wide, and their goals are so diverse, then does this movement have any common features, what makes researchers collect these seemingly diverse phenomena under one name?
Actually, we’ll talk about the features of the Russian mass movement a little later, but for now let’s dwell on its peculiar foundation - the conditions for the existence of those sections of the empire’s population that were most often forced to express their dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs.
The first reason is that in Russia there has long been a dual serfdom - privately owned (landowner peasants, a significant part of the workers in industrial enterprises) and state (all Russian estates were, to one degree or another, silent serfs in relation to the throne). Those segments of the population who from time to time became the initiators of mass protests experienced double, and even triple (serf, national, religious) oppression, which forced them to rise up to fight.
The second common basis for the mass movement was certain traits of the Russian character, i.e. mentality. Let us make a reservation right away that we are not talking about the people's character in general, but only about those of its features that left a certain imprint on the people's protest. First of all, it is the correctness in the eyes of the protesters of only one idea, one position. Everything else was considered hostile, alien; hostility to the different, the unusual most often led to the supremacy of traditionalism, alienation from innovation, from any changes.
The organization of the life of the village and the settlement brought up communality in a person, the need to feel the elbow of a neighbor, gave rise to the idea of the superiority of the general over the individual, or, as scientists put it, "the psychology of crampedness." Therefore, the "world" (as a community and as just a collective) was always right in the eyes of a peasant or a townsman, because he was a kind of collective mind. The slave life of the “lower classes” did not contribute to the emergence of a desire to stand out, to develop a desire for enrichment through personal initiative. On the other hand, the irresponsibility of a slave was easily combined with deceit, theft, wild revenge - here even religious prohibitions were powerless.
These character traits naturally coexisted with the belief of Russians in a miracle (how many heroes of our fairy tales live not by labor, but by a miracle!). A miracle is not doing, not waiting for one's fate, but testing it, the desire to get everything at once. This is probably the origin of that national character trait, which is called the exact word "unrestrained." Unrestrained is daring, courage, breadth of nature, dangerous mischief. Finally, we note one more feature of the Russian mentality that will help us in talking about the mass movement - the exaltation of custom over law. Custom, unlike law, can be interpreted very broadly and very subjectively.
Most of the significant popular movements of the XVIII - first half of the XIX century. began at the moment when the natural course of succession to the throne was violated (Catherine II instead of her husband or son, Nicholas I instead of his elder brother Constantine). Such situations are very convenient for the appearance of impostors, and without impostors it was problematic to raise the people to fight the existing regime. According to B. Uspensky: “From the beginning of the 17th century to the middle of the 19th century. one can hardly find two or three decades that have not been marked by the appearance of a new impostor in Russia; at some periods the impostors numbered in the dozens.” Why did this phenomenon turn out to be so important for the emergence of popular protest?
Imposture appears when royal power is established (cases of self-appointed claims to the princely throne are unknown). The attitude towards the tsar in Russia was sacred, the people believed that the monarchy had divine power. In other words, the phenomenon of imposture is closely connected with the religious beliefs of Russians, which gave their socio-political protest a special stability and moral correctness. In the clash of impostors and the real monarch, the struggle between the “righteous” (correct) and “unrighteous” kings was manifested. Therefore, by supporting the impostor, the people not only hoped to find a kind, just king, but also defended a charitable order against, in their opinion, the machinations of the devil.
The desire to elevate a "righteous" tsar to the throne was combined among the peasants with the need to exterminate the "old" princes, the boyars, in general the "primary people" and foreigners who were in the Russian service. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the popular movements were anti-serfdom, but not anti-feudal. In other words, fighting against oppression by the authorities, the rebels could not imagine any other order than the monarchical one. That is why, trying to enthrone a new monarch, his entourage hoped to become "the first people in the state." This means that even in the event of the victory of the insurgents, the socio-political system in Russia would not have changed, perhaps the people would for some time feel some relief from their lot, but only for a while.
What exactly did the mass of the rebels fight for, what did they count on? They fought for things semi-abstract, or even simply unreal. First, its demand has always been the establishment of a free will. Will, unlike freedom, is not a historical phenomenon, because it cannot be won or lost. Freedom can be expressed in law (freedom of the press, assembly, conscience, etc.); the will is rather a genetic phenomenon (it either exists in a person, or it does not) and is poorly combined with the existence of the state. In addition, the desire to achieve precisely the will leads to such consequences of the Russian "unrestraint" as unbridledness, permissiveness, the right to rage, etc.
Secondly, in the aspirations of the rebels, a desire was manifested to turn history back, to return Russia to pre-Petrine times. Hence came the demands for the destruction of manufactories, the expulsion of foreigners, the return to the old (pre-Conian) faith, the weakening of serfdom. It is unlikely that the realization of such desires could lead to the progress of the country; rather, the rise of the rebels to power would plunge Russia into chaos and anarchy. However, it would be wrong to consider the protest of the masses as a purely negative phenomenon. After all, this protest kept the feudal lords within certain "frames", gave a signal to the tops and society that the serfdom and the lack of rights of the people could not continue forever. In the end, the people's protest saved this system itself, preventing it from overstepping the boundaries of the "reasonable", so far permitted by history.
In addition to those listed in the XIX century. other characteristic features of the popular movement also appeared. The nineteenth century has many definitions, but if we talk about the subject of our conversation, it can be called the "century of rumors", more precisely, peasant rumors about freedom. During this period, they became so persistent and persistent that some scholars consider them a peculiar form of peasant protest. Educated society eagerly listened to these rumors, trying to correlate their conservative, liberal or revolutionary programs with the aspirations of the peasantry. Thus, the creative principle was manifested in the mass movement. Both the leaders and society proceeded from the degree of dissatisfaction of the people, i.e. the latter became the "author" of the government's real policy and the breeding ground for the social movement.
At the same time, the Russian "unrestrained", the desire for freedom, the demand for everything at once, the unpredictability of the rebellion, alarmed, and even frightened even the leaders of the revolutionary camp. They understood that the success of a truly just coup depended not only on the victory of the revolutionaries over the government, but also on the conscious participation of the broad masses of the people in this coup. The development of this consciousness was a long and unusually difficult task. In the first half of the XIX century. the participation of the masses in public life was potentially dangerous for both revolutionaries and supporters of the existing regime. As already mentioned, the protest of the masses was anti-serfdom, but not anti-feudal; there was no talk of breaking the foundations of autocracy at all. Moreover, for the majority of the population, the monarch remained a sacred figure, sacred, the only protector and support. That is why it is customary to call a peasant a naive monarchist, which is not an entirely accurate definition of his position.
After all, loyalty to the tsar did not automatically imply the loyalty of the peasants to the entire regime. They idolized the emperor, but not the monarchy as a political system. Most of the peasants were disgusted with politics, believing that it was something hostile, and they openly hated officials and landowners. An exemplary form of hostel for the Russian lower classes was the tsar and the community, which freely coexist with each other. Could such a form be considered a state, function as such? It is very difficult to answer this question, but it is clear that one can speak more about the tsarist illusions of the peasantry than about its naive monarchism. In their views on the state system, the peasants were not so much monarchists as spontaneous anarchists.
| March 23, 2016 |
There is a saying: "Russian rebellion, senseless and merciless." And for some musical consonance of our musical Russian language, another phrase comes to mind: "Russian Kremlin, senseless and merciless." Of course, this is a conventional figure of speech. It's not about the Kremlin. It's about President Putin, about his appointees, about his entire team, about all their policies, about the state of the country - meaningless and merciless.
Well, in fact, you ask yourself the question: "What is the meaning of life in modern Russia? What are its highest values? What are its goals? What are its strategies? Where is the country going? What lies ahead?" After all, it should be written somewhere in official documents, the Address of the President should say where the country is going. We hold brainstorming sessions, I often practice, I ask ordinary people - a taxi driver, a neighbor, a casual acquaintance: "What is the goal of the development of the country, which the official authorities seem to be trying to designate even with some phrases? Where is the country going? Where is it being led?" . So there is no goal. All the chatter about democracy, about the market is already in the past, because it is already clear that instead of democracy - Churov, and instead of democratically elected representatives of the people - a new model of the CPSU nomenclature of United Russia - cynical, inept, self-serving, career people who will vote for everything , whatever, they will vote this way now, and in half an hour - just the opposite. For example, on the deployment of troops to Ukraine or on matters in Syria. No democracy.
What kind of democracy is this? The people say, even business says: "There is no money! The Central Bank of Russia is doing a diversion!" And the President of Russia says: "Sha! The Central Bank is doing everything right. The best world experts confirm that it is doing everything right." How to understand it?
Business speaks. We held a Russian business meeting. The Stolypin Club stated the same thing. At the level of 90% of solidarity opinion, business says: "The Central Bank of Russia is a saboteur. It has stung the money supply. It makes an insane discount rate. It has eliminated the credit loop of revolving and investment credit in the country. It is impossible to develop." And they answer us: "No. Everything is correct. Everything is fine." Some nonsense. Russian cash reserves are taken abroad, including state ones, at a 1% rate of return, and Russian business borrows abroad at a 4% income rate. And the Central Bank of Russia, commercial banks within the country - under 25%. What is it? It's not even nonsense. It's kind of crazy. But it says, "No. Everything is right." They - the Central Bank, Nabiullina and Putin after her - say: "We are targeting inflation." “Targeting” means we are aiming, shooting, fighting, crushing inflation. And how do they do it? Click - the devaluation of the ruble, inflation is increased three times, but at the same time they say in a blue eye: "We are targeting inflation." And they themselves increase it three times. What kind of crazy house is this?
At the same time, prices for medicines, imported clothes, imported foodstuffs, building materials (about a fifth of the gross domestic product was imported) increased two to three times. According to the people - "Boom!", and the people stop eating, reduce food consumption. And President Putin asks the King of Morocco: "What is this? Why has the supply of fruits from Morocco to Russia decreased?" Yes, it has declined, because your people, Vladimir Vladimirovich, cannot afford a penny to buy these fruits, because they are impoverished, because the incomes of the population have fallen by 10%, because effective demand has disappeared, because your Central Bank of Russia, your appointee - Nabiullina - strangled Russian finances and the economy, and you are interested in the king of Morocco, what is the reason.
The President explained to us in 2014 that there would be no decline in oil prices. And the recession rumbled and hit this comprador non-sovereign oil economy, which Putin has been growing for 15 years. Well, then go back to those words that you spoke! Explain at least with the experts! Explained recently at a meeting with the All-People's Front. It turns out that oil prices have fallen because - the global stagnation of development. The Chinese economy, it turns out, has become less in need of oil. Yes, what kind of nonsense is it in reality? The global rate of volatility and the rate of decline in oil do not correspond in any way. It is clear to a first-year student that such processes are not explained by such a process. What kind of nonsense is this?
