DON COSSACKS AT THE INITIAL STAGE OF THE WAR On the evening of July 19, 1914, Germany officially declared war on Russia. The “Great War” is how it was unequivocally and without any exaggeration called it in Russian society, because the world has not yet known a military conflict of such global magnitude.

DON COSSACKS IN THE EASTERN EUROPEAN THEATER OF BATTLE ACTIONS Very significant military and organizational changes are taking place in the composition of the Don artillery. In response to the operational-tactical challenge of the Great War about the indispensable strengthening of fire support for cavalry

APPENDIX. OUR COSSACKS IN THE FAR EAST Collection of stories of correspondents and participants in the war, placed in various periodicals Collected by I. Tonkonogov Strongly guard the fighting traditions acquired by the troops. Do not waste time so that in each company,

SIBERIAN COSSACKS There are few or even no Siberian Cossacks in Russia. In general, we are much more interested in the life of our foreigners and we know this life better than the life of our Cossacks - a life full of labor and deprivation, a life entirely devoted to the Russian people and state.

FELLOW COSSACKS In one detachment, the following incident occurred: several Cossack artillerymen went for forage; passing by one village, they saw 5 horses with a Japanese saddle standing at the fanza. Dismounting, they crept up like cats, and, unsheathing their swords, shouted

Chapter 7 Sultans and Cossacks The epigraph to the chapter can be a classic aphorism: "History is not the sidewalk of Nevsky Prospekt." Here I will have to talk about very complex and ambiguous phenomena little known to the domestic reader. Don and Zaporozhye Cossacks in the 17th-18th centuries

It is traditionally believed that the Battle of Liaoyang - the first strategically important battle of the Russo-Japanese War - is an example of a successful offensive by a small but initiative Japanese army against a superior in number, but lack of initiative Russian army. However, the historical truth testifies otherwise: the Japanese attack on Liaoyang ended in complete failure, the army of Marshal Oyama was bled white, and only the criminal order of General Kuropatkin to retreat from fortified positions saved the Japanese from inevitable defeat.

Unawakened Russia

The war with Japan, which began on January 27 (February 9), 1904, demonstrated the determination and, most importantly, the ability of the Japanese to fight. Already on the first day of the war, the Japanese torpedoed in Port Arthur the two best Russian battleships (Tsesarevich and Retvizan), as well as the armored cruiser Pallada. On the same day, the newest cruiser Varyag and the gunboat Koreets were sunk in the Korean port of Chemulpo.

Such a daring start of hostilities on the part of Japan, it seemed, should have stirred up all of Russia, especially its military department. Forty years later, a similarly sudden and effective Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor instantly rallied the American people together. The top political leadership of Russia was, logically, obliged to take emergency radical measures to mobilize the entire potential of the empire in the shortest possible time to achieve victory.

Russian infantry on the way to Manchuria

Naval officer and well-known historian V. Ya. Krestyaninov, analyzing in one of his works those possible military-political measures that the imperial government could and should have carried out, writes about the “amazing lack of initiative and lack of professionalism of the Russian government.”

It is difficult to doubt the validity of this opinion. The military department of Russia massively sent, for example, newly mobilized warriors, the so-called spares, to the active army in Manchuria, which contributed to the growth of anti-war sentiment in the country, sharply reduced the morale and practical combat effectiveness of the troops. At the same time, in the western regions of the country, a trained permanent army of 1 million people stood idle, a significant number of elite guards regiments toiled “in parades and maneuvers”. The obvious decision to immediately send to the front in Manchuria the main combat-ready military formations, up to the guard, made its way into the heads of St. Petersburg strategists only in the second year of the war - after a series of inglorious and senseless defeats.

With the outbreak of hostilities, a mass patriotic movement arose throughout the country in military districts, academies, cadet corps, and even universities - for volunteer participation in the war with Japan. With small but energetic efforts by the government, volunteer regiments could be formed in the shortest possible time, which, together with the guards, would bring to the front the necessary spirit of thirst for battle and faith in victory.

The Manchurian Russian army was in dire need of mountain guns, special artillery carts, Madsen machine guns, and telephone exchanges. This and other valuable equipment was in abundance in the western military districts, but the best materiel leaked to the front only in a thin stream, although it had to be sent east in a stormy stream.

The army command, as well as the top leadership of the country, even after the loss of five of the best ships in one day, continued to underestimate the combat potential of the enemy, with infantile indifference watched the methodical strengthening of the Japanese land army in Korea.

The main tone in this orchestra of complacency and infantilism was set, oddly enough, by Tsar Nicholas II himself. In early January 1904, even before the first volleys of the war, the tsar's governor in Vladivostok, Admiral Alekseev, turned to the tsar with a request about the methods of action of the Russian army and navy in the event of a war with Japan. Alekseev proposed from the first hours of the war to withdraw the Pacific squadron to the sea to counter the landing of the Japanese army in Korea.

After five days of painful waiting, Nicholas II replied to his governor with a telegram: “It is desirable that the Japanese, and not we, open hostilities. Therefore, if they start actions against us, then you should not prevent them from landing in South Korea or on the East Bank up to and including Genzan.

It is clear that with such a "non-resistance" position of the supreme ruler of the empire, strategic infantilism very soon made a cozy nest in the heads of the military leaders closest to the king. On April 15, 1904 (that is, two and a half months after the start of the war!) The commander of the Manchurian army, General A.N. Kuropatkin, swashbucklingly wrote to the Minister of War: “The Japanese have moved on the Yalu [a river in Korea, the first Russian defensive line. - RP]; I will gladly welcome their entry into Manchuria; you can gladly arrange a golden bridge for them, so long as not one of them returns to their homeland. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria would serve as a significant indication that they will move their main forces in this direction.

Kuropatkin's strategic mediocrity becomes obvious even when reading the last sentence: for two and a half months the Japanese have been concentrating ground forces on the border with Manchuria, and the Russian commander-in-chief is still at a loss - where do they still intend to move their troops? But what about Petersburg?!

However, General Kuropatkin turned out to be a true visionary in one thing: Russia really arranged a "golden bridge" for the Japanese march to victory. Only the direct material losses of the Russians in the war with the Japanese amounted to a colossal amount of 500 million rubles in gold. Indirect losses (external and internal borrowings, devaluation of the ruble) reached 2 billion 300 million rubles. Well, why not the "golden bridge"?

General Kuropatkin: commander or "roguish kisser"?

Social elevators in the era of the last tsar of the Romanov dynasty sometimes acted in a strange way. In an imperial, emphatically class-based state, they brought from the social ranks to the very top of the state hierarchy by no means bright people with their talent, with seething energy, but comfortable, deliberately mundane, albeit hardworking "gray mice".

Such was, for example, Admiral Rozhestvensky, who ineptly destroyed the 2nd squadron at Tsushima. Or General Ruzsky - one of the most mediocre commanders of the First World War. From the same "combat cohort" General Denikin, who criminally destroyed the White Guard - the Armed Forces of the South of Russia. A very curious, in its own way, character from a host of unborn "upstarts" who played a purely regressive, even "black" role in the history of Russia, was the small-scale Pskov landowner Alexei Nikolaevich Kuropatkin.

General Kuropatkin. Source: US Library of Congress

Major General of the General Staff Georgy Goncharenko left a believable portrait of General Kuropatkin in the revolutionary March of 1917. “The hall of the officer rally was full,” Goncharenko observantly notes the details, “familiar faces could be seen from all sides. Not far from the entrance doors, in a shabby, filthy little coat with the royal monograms prudently cut off from shoulder straps, stood Adjutant General Kuropatkin. His face of an intelligent peasant, a teahouse owner or a roguish kisser, expressed the liveliest curiosity. A sly smile glimmered in the sharp slits of his eyes.

The Romanov Empire gave everything to this man. For six years he was close to the tsar, a very influential minister of war; more than a year and a half - commander-in-chief of the Manchurian army; for eleven years he was a member of the State Council, and all these years he received from the empire not only good, but the richest salary. And he came to the officers' meeting, demonstrating the meanest adaptability to revolutionary novelties, in a tattered coat. The monogram on the shoulder straps "Nik II" - a symbol of his long-term patron and benefactor - was cut off with an unwavering hand, he was not ashamed ...

Adaptation to the situation, his psychologically deep cowardice and, at the same time, truly Russian cunning, General Kuropatkin brought to the style of his command of the troops. He could demonstrate fatherly concern for warm overcoats for soldiers, and a few hours later, with a cowardly order, drive these same soldiers out of tents in the pouring rain - force them to retreat aimlessly along muddy roads. He could loudly declare to his officers: we are holding positions to the last bullet, but suddenly an insignificant report appeared about an alleged change in the situation and, instantly, the opposite order followed: leave positions, retreat.

Kuropatkin's weathervane, his sincere, perhaps even organic, at the level of genetics, desire to correspond to the mindset of the supreme Russian "master", Tsar Nicholas II, led to the most negative consequences during the Russo-Japanese War.

Huge plans and underestimation of their strength

Japan started the war against Russia on January 27, 1904. General A. N. Kuropatkin was appointed commander-in-chief of the Manchurian army on February 7, and on February 15 of the same year he appeared before Tsar Nicholas II with a grand plan for a military campaign against the "yellow-faced Japs".

Thus, more than 15 days were spent on drawing up a strategic plan for the war, which, logically, should have been developed by the General Staff a long time ago, and literally from the first day of hostilities began to be implemented.

Sending Japanese soldiers to the front. Source: port-arthur.ucoz.ru

Kuropatkin's plan was an amazing combination of exorbitant ambitions with a clear lack of confidence in the military forces already in the Far East. It was supposed - since the tsar himself wanted it - not to interfere with the concentration of the Japanese land army on the continent. General Kuropatkin, as commander in chief, "creatively" developed this infantile idea - in his opinion, it turned out that there were catastrophically few available army forces in the Far East. For six months, gradually retreating to the Liaoyang-Haichen region, the Russian army was supposed to "accumulate strength." Then the "Russian Christ-loving army" was to go on an unrestrained offensive and, throwing the enemy into the sea, completely clear China and Korea of ​​the Japanese presence.

At the final stage of the war, the valiant Russian fleet was involved to ensure the amphibious landing in Japan. In the country of the Mikado, the Russian army (since the Japanese army will, of course, be finished by this time) had to do nothing less than "suppressing the popular uprising."

Tsar Nicholas II, according to the memoirs of an influential dignitary S. Yu. Witte, “was delighted with Kuropatkin’s plan.” Still would! An impressive amphibious expedition to Japan was expected. And the matter remained essentially small - it was only necessary to defeat the Japanese army and save the Russian fleet - the tasks, as it followed from Kuropatkin's convincing report, were not very difficult.

The combat readiness of Russian forces in the Far Eastern theater of operations

General Kuropatkin stubbornly, perhaps believing in this himself, convinced the tsar that the forces of the Russian army in Manchuria were clearly not enough to stop the Japanese at the pre-Manchurian, still Korean line of defense - the Yalu River. This statement of Kuropatkin, to put it mildly, was very much at odds with reality.

By the beginning of the war with Japan, the Russian ground forces had 118 thousand bayonets and sabers in the theater of operations, with 296 guns. These forces were quite comparable to the original strength of the Japanese Expeditionary Army. General Kuroki crossed the line of the Yalu River for the first time, with troops numbering about 45 thousand bayonets.

The objective problem that General Kuropatkin really faced as commander-in-chief was the significant dispersal of Russian forces.

By the beginning of the invasion of Japanese troops into Manchuria (April 15), the deployment of Russian troops actually remained pre-war, that is, for two and a half months the troops were not assembled into a single fist. In the Yingkou-Dashichao area, the Southern Detachment was located: 30 thousand bayonets and 88 guns. On the Yalu River along the border of Korea and China, the Eastern Detachment was located, consisting of 23 thousand bayonets and 62 guns. The main forces of the Russian Manchurian army were in the Haicheng-Lyaoyang-Mukden area: 35 thousand bayonets and sabers, 90 guns. There were about 30 thousand troops and 56 guns on the Kwantung Peninsula, approximately the same forces were concentrated near Vladivostok.

Russian artillery on the road to Liaoyang. Source: port-arthur.ucoz.ru

The vicious, deliberately defensive strategy of General Kuropatkin forced the Russian Manchurian army to turn its head to the west all the time. At Kuropatkin’s headquarters, they were more concerned not with the movements of Japanese troops, but with their own railway, in the hope of quickly seeing how many more troops were being brought along the Trans-Siberian Railway.

If the Russian commander-in-chief did not look to the west, but energetically gathered together the available forces and means, then in the two months of a pause in hostilities on the Yalu River, a powerful grouping of at least 100 thousand bayonets and 250 guns would have been assembled. This concentration of forces and means could be created without withdrawing troops from Vladivostok, and without even collecting all Russian units in Manchuria without exception.

The stormy and wide Yalu River in itself represented a convenient operational-tactical theater for maneuver defense. In addition, the Russians had pre-fortified positions on Yalu, which, two and a half months before the approach of Kuroka's 1st Army, could and should have been significantly lengthened and echeloned.

The strategic myopia and tactical winglessness of Kuropatkin led to the fact that the commander of the Russian barrier on the Yalu River,

General M.I. Zasulich eventually had to fight against a three times stronger enemy. True, it must be emphasized that Zasulich fought out of hand, ugly, losing in a defensive battle on a previously fortified position twice as many soldiers as the Japanese who were crossing the river and attacking.

Defensive redoubts of engineer Velichko

The terrain at Liaoyang was almost ideal to wear down, bleed the advancing Japanese, and then crush them with a powerful counterattack. The talented military engineer K. I. Velichko, the creator of the tactics of using the so-called engineering bridgeheads by the troops, managed to erect a genuine field citadel near Liaoyang.

Two defensive positions were rebuilt: the main one (located closer to the town of Liaoyang) and the 2nd (advanced). The forward position provided opportunities for mobile defense, and the main position was actually a field fortress, since the former, still Chinese fortified area with forts and lunettes, was supplemented by a developed system of trenches, trenches, dugouts, communication passages. In this position, with competent, proactive command, it was possible to contain an army twice as large as the one that threatened the troops of General Kuropatkin.

However, the forces and means of the Russian Manchurian army near Liaoyang were not inferior to the Japanese. By the beginning of the main phase of the battle, that is, by August 17, 1904, the number of Russian Liaoyang grouping reached 180 thousand people with 644 guns.

Thus, the overall balance of forces and means was tangible in favor of the Russians (especially when you consider that it was the Japanese who had to storm the defensive positions prepared in advance). The Russians prevailed in infantry in a ratio of 1.4: 1, in artillery - 1.3: 1. In this alignment of forces, if the Manchurian army were commanded by an enterprising, decisive commander, like Alexander Suvorov or Paul von Hindenburg, from the power of the Japanese expeditionary army by the end of the battle, only memories would remain.

Black Sun of Liaoyang

Retreating to Liaoyang, Russian troops voluntarily left their positions everywhere. After some time, the process of endless retreat became not only a means of redeploying troops, but also a way of thinking of army generals close in spirit to Kuropatkin. The fighting spirit of these leaders of the “Russian Christ-loving army” can be judged by the report to the army headquarters of General A. A. Bilderling, commander of the Eastern Group of Forces.

“I earnestly ask you to allow me to remove the weary troops from their positions,” writes the well-meaning general, who clearly confused the war with maneuvers near Petersburg, “and without a fight, in the form of an ordinary march maneuver, take them to the positions indicated to us near Liaoyang. I will lead the troops with music, with songs, cheerfully, slowly, and I hope to bring them cheerful, strong in spirit for a decisive battle.

Music, songs, cheerful march maneuvers ended for the Russians on August 11 (24), 1904, when the advanced units of Marshal Oyama began shelling Russian positions on the distant suburbs of Liaoyang, and then captured several heights with a swift throw.

The next day, Oyama decided to increase the pressure, but made a major miscalculation. The Japanese Guards Division came under a powerful flank attack from the reserve regiment of the 3rd Siberian Corps. With a bayonet strike, the Russians overturned the Mikado guards and put them to flight.

The Battle of Liao (August 11-22, 1904) is the first of the three main land battles of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. (The second is the battle on the Shahe River, the third is the battle of Mukden.)

Having failed in the first assault on Port Arthur, the army of the Japanese commander-in-chief, Marshal Oyama (130 thousand soldiers), in order to prevent possible offensive actions by the Russians, on August 11, 1904, launched a decisive attack on fortified positions near Liaoyang, where Russian forces were concentrated Kuropatkin(152 thousand). The Japanese sought to surround the Russian army with flank attacks and cut it off from communication with Russia.

Battle of Liaoyang. Artist F. Neumann

There were not enough Japanese forces for flank coverage. However, due to Kuropatkin's passivity, Oyama managed to seize the combat initiative. For several days, the Japanese persistently attacked, trying to break through the Russian positions. Kuropatkin, not knowing the exact number of the enemy, exaggerated it and gradually surrendered one line after another. On August 19, he withdrew his army to the main line of defense, unsuccessfully trying to launch a counterattack from here.

Neither side was able to achieve decisive success, but in the end the aggressive tactics of the Japanese prevailed over the numerical superiority of the Russians and the passivity of their commander. On August 20, the Japanese 1st Army Kuroki, trying to bypass the left flank of the enemy army, unexpectedly captured the Yantai mines, which was partially located in the rear of the Russians and was defended by a detachment of General Orlov. This news greatly disturbed Kuropatkin. Yantai station was located 10 kilometers from the mines. Taking her, the Japanese went to the rear of the Russian army and cut off her escape route along the railway line.

Liaoyang. newsreels

The Russian forces were enough to repulse and even defeat Kuroki's army, which was advancing separately on their left flank. However, Kuropatkin, not knowing the true state of affairs among the Japanese and having lost control over the course of the battle on a front of more than 50 km, gave the order to leave Liaoyang and retreat to Mukden. According to some reports, this order was two hours ahead of a similar retreat order, which was being prepared by the Japanese command.

The Russian army retreated in an organized manner to Mukden. Oyama tried to pursue her, but did not succeed due to the successful actions of the Russian rearguards and the fatigue of his own troops. The losses of the Russians amounted to about 16-19 thousand, the Japanese - 24 thousand. Although the Liaoyang battle did not lead to the defeat of the Russian army, it had a very negative effect on its morale. Kuropatkin's army was waiting for this battle, hoping that it would turn the tide of the war. After the failure at Liaoyang, both in the ranks of the army and in the public opinion of Russia, for the first time, the idea arose that victory was far from guaranteed (previously it was considered indubitable).

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 was inevitable, because at the end of the 19th century the geopolitical interests of the Russian Empire changed dramatically. At that time, major world states had not yet learned how to resolve serious issues of geopolitics without the use of force and, accordingly, human casualties.

Causes of the Russo-Japanese War

1. Strengthening friendly relations between Russia and China. As you know, until the 90s of the 19th century, the main focus of Russia's foreign policy was on the Balkans, but since 1894, friendship with China began to strengthen. Russia provided this state with diplomatic and military assistance in the war with Japan.
2. Russia and Japan in terms of influence in the Far East and Manchuria.

Strategic mistakes and military victories

Initially, it was clear that she was not ready for a long war. But the Russian generals believed that the Asians would negotiate with the European countries and organize a war on two fronts. This turned out to be a strategic mistake of the Russian military and diplomats. Also, the Russians, assuming the general backwardness of the forces of Japan (by the way, also a mistake), thought that much more forces would be needed on the Western Front than on the Eastern. Russia's plan was to wage an exhausting protracted war, in which, in the 7-8th month, victory at sea would be achieved and troops would land on the islands. As a result, the plan of the Japanese worked, the main idea of ​​which was an instant strike on the Pacific squadron and the seizure of dominance at sea.

The balance of power at sea

Russia and Japan, a few years before the start of the war, had already begun to strengthen their fleets. Russia already had experience in which showed the importance of success at sea. Assuming the inevitability of a war in the east with Japan, the military commanders determined the main task - to strengthen the Pacific Flotilla.

So, consider the state of the fleets of countries. The total number of ships of the Russian Empire in the east in 1904 was 64. Of these, 35 were destroyers, there were also cruisers, battleships, and large boats. The Japanese fleet outnumbered the Russian one. Only 47 destroyers were put into operation. The total number was 87 units. As we can see, the Japanese Navy outnumbered the Russian squadron by 23 ships. Perhaps the Russians were confident in their technical superiority, but that didn't work either. Japanese ships were faster, fired better and were more protected from enemy shots.

The beginning of the war

Surprise is one of the important elements of success in war. The Japanese army, namely the forces of the fleet, January 27 in two directions at once. Note that both battles ended successfully for the Japanese, although their fleet also lost some strength. The first Japanese attack was at night. The Asiatic squadron consisted of 25 ships of three types: battleships, cruisers, and destroyers. As a result of the shelling, the Russian battleships "Tsesarevich" and "Ratzivan", as well as the cruiser "Pallada" were damaged. Out of surprise, the Russian troops really could not repulse this sortie of the Japanese.

The second attack took place already in the morning of the same day, as a result of which another 5 Russian ships went out of action. It cannot be said that the damage to the fleet of the empire was fatal, but quite tangible, because the repair of ships was poorly organized.

Where was the second battle of that day? The now famous Korean Incheon was called Chemulpo at that time. At the beginning of 1904, 2 Russian ships stood in the roadstead in this port: the Varyag and the Koreets. The Japanese attacked the Russians with 14 ships. It is clear that the fate of the Russian ships was determined, but the Japanese could not defeat them quickly in any case. The commander of the "Varyag" Rudnev believed that we should try to escape from the claws of the Japanese and reach the port of Artur. A battle ensued at sea. Damage to the Varyag prevented the idea of ​​leaving Korea from being realized, but 3 Japanese ships were also neutralized. It should be noted that the Russian sailors did not die and after some time were able to get to their homeland.

Death of Makarov

The leadership of the Russian army understood that the Pacific Fleet at the time of the outbreak of the war could not stand the test of military operations. To establish military training, the well-known Vice Admiral Makarov was appointed to command the fleet. This man had significant combat experience, so he had to effectively cope with the tasks.

During the month of his activity, the Russian fleet was transformed. Makarov significantly raised the level of military training, raised the organization of the fleet. The intensity of the exercises also increased, which made it possible to increase the number and success of ships going to sea. Of course, the Japanese did not sit idly by, watching the qualitative changes in the Russian fleet. All exits from Port Arthur were constantly mined. On March 31, 1904, the cruiser Petropavlovsk, on board of which Makarov was also sailing, was blown up by a mine. All people on board were killed.

Second phase of the war

The victory of the Japanese Navy made it possible for the island state to organize the transfer of significant landing forces to the Liaodong Peninsula. By the way, this operation was thought out and organized in advance, because secretly, little by little, the Japanese penetrated into Korea since the autumn of 1903. Of course, the Japanese army did not conduct open aggression. We are talking about people from the reserve, who were merchants, artisans, etc. The main task of these forces was to prepare the conditions for the success of the landing operation, to collect intelligence.

From January 24 to March 3, more than 35,000 Japanese landed on the Korean coast. It is important for us to understand the alignment of Russian forces. The total strength of the army in Asia amounted to 123 thousand people. Of these, approximately 24 thousand were in the Primorsky Territory. There were about 30 thousand on the Kwantung Peninsula. The Russians guarded the border with Korea with 19,000 troops. Northeast China was a strategically important territory for tsarism. There were more than 50 thousand soldiers of the tsarist army here. The land army was commanded by General A. N. Kuropatkin.

The Russian grouping on the border with Korea acted passively. Sluggishness led the Japanese to attack and defeat the 7,000-strong Russian corral. As a result of the battle, the Russian army lost more than 30 guns, about 3 thousand soldiers were killed, and had to retreat 70 kilometers. The Liaoyang battle began unsuccessfully for the empire.

Jinzhou: another defeat of the tsarist army

Yes, the Russians were sure of their superiority on land, but they were wrong about that too. Another Japanese landing force landed on April 22, 1904. The number of this group was also approximately 35 thousand. The maneuver of the Japanese consisted in the fact that they did not engage in battle with the army commanded by A.N. Kuropatkin, but headed deep into the continent. Of course, the command of the Asians understood the whole risk of the operation, so on May 4, a landing force of 15 thousand landed in the Dagushan area. Task: to cover the advance on Jinzhou.

The Japanese campaign to the city lasted 19 days. Near this city is the narrowest passage on the Kwantung Peninsula. The grouping of Russians on this isthmus was about 4 thousand people. May 13 was a long battle. Although the losses of the Japanese were 3 times greater, it was they who won the battle. As a result of this victory, the Japanese army opened its way to the port of Dalniy. Northeast China fell under the general control of the Japanese forces, and the Russian troops were actually cut off from each other.

Liaoyang battle

In August 1904, the third stage of the war began. The Liaoyang battle was already planned, because for three months serious defense structures were being built near this settlement. In August 1904, the number of the Manchurian Russian army was 152 thousand, and the Japanese forces were 22 thousand less numerous. The battle of Liaoyang in 1904 went down in history as an event that completely broke the spirit of the Russian army.

Despite being outnumbered, the Japanese were the first to attack on 11 August. They wanted to surround the Russians, or at least completely isolate them from a possible path of approach for new forces. The initiative always belonged to the Japanese troops, because they, unlike the Russians, were active.

Kuropatkin's army did not have the opportunity to go on the offensive sharply, because the distance from the center was more than 7000 km. On August 19, Kuropatkin surrendered another point to the Japanese, after which there was a threat of seizing Yantai. Realizing that nothing could be achieved, the command decided to retreat to Mukden. The battle of Liaoyang, whose participants lost a total of up to 40,000 people, showed the backwardness and immobility of the Russian troops.

The results of the war

Talking about further battles, in principle, does not make much sense, because these were the successes of the Japanese and the agony of Russia.

The results of the war for Russia were very difficult. So, the Portsmouth Peace Treaty of 1905 states that:

1. South Sakhalin passes to Japan.
2. Japan leases the Liaodong Peninsula.
3. The possibility of the Japanese railroad on the Liaodong Peninsula.
4. The withdrawal of the Russian army from Manchuria.

Russia and Japan entered into a conflict, the consequences of which, in fact, are felt today, because the peace treaty between Russia and Japan following the results of the 1945 war has not yet been concluded.