If we consider the life of Marshal Marmont, then it can be divided into two periods. Following Napoleon, he ascended to such heights that he could hardly have dreamed of. When Napoleon is on the verge of falling, he betrays his benefactor, the man who made him. Serving the Bourbons, he gained neither fame nor gratitude, but only the contempt of the French. Therefore, it is not surprising that he spends the rest of his life outside of France, where he dies. The first period of his life passes under the rays of glory and greatness, the second - in loneliness, filled with contempt.

Auguste Frederic Louis Viesse de Marmont was born in Châtillon-on-Seine on July 20, 1774. As he himself recalled: "My surname Viess comes from Holland and has been known in Burgundy for three hundred years." It was an ancient and noble family. According to some reports, one of its representatives served as King Louis XII 1 .

However, by the second half of the 18th century, this family had become impoverished, so the father of the future marshal could not place his son in eminent educational institutions at that time, and therefore he himself took up the education of the young Auguste. Reading books on military history, Auguste Frederic fell in love with the war, having not yet visited it, and therefore all his dreams were only about the army.

True, the father had completely different views on the future of his child: despite the pleas of his son, he sent him to a religious college, hoping that serving God could “feed a nobleman better than serving the king” 2 .

Despite the decision of his father, the grandfather of Auguste Marmont obtained for his grandson a patent for a junior lieutenant in the Chartres battalion, which carried out exclusively garrison service. For Marmont, this was much better than studying scriptures, reading prayers and other religious paraphernalia. As Marmont later recalled, thanks to this gift from his grandfather, he could wear an officer's uniform and this flattered the pride of a 15-year-old boy. 3 .

Having brilliantly passed the entrance exams to the Chalons Artillery School, after his studies he entered the army as a career artillery officer.

As Delderfield writes: “Marmont was an extremely subtle young man, with dark kind eyes and easy pleasant manners, which allowed him to make many friends. It is true that these friends took quite a long time to appreciate the value of Marmont's friendship. In due time they will all make such an assessment, and often to their advantage. This, however, did not bother Marmont very much - neither at that time, nor later. He survived each of them, apparently proving that, in the end, it was worth playing only a survival game. 4 .

By the time the Bastille fell, of all future marshals, only one Marmont was familiar with Napoleon Bonaparte, whose name, however, was pronounced differently at that time - Buonaparte. One served in the garrison of Dijon, the other not far away - in the garrison of Auxerre (Oxerra). Bonaparte often visited the Dijon garrison, where he soon met his soul mate in artillery, Auguste Marmont. From the first meeting, Napoleon made such a favorable impression on Auguste that he “sang praises to his new friend at every opportunity and even somehow invited him home to introduce him to his parents.” True, this thin and unprepossessing officer made absolutely no impression on Marmont Sr.; the noble nobleman was especially horrified by the secular manners of Bonaparte, or rather, their absence. According to Delderfield, however, Marmont turned out to be “a very shrewd young man. Despite all the advice from the outside, he remained true to his gloomy friend. He was able to recognize the genius and thus became the first person in France to hitch the wagon of his fate to the chariot of Bonaparte. 5 .

Following his idol, Marmont takes part in the siege of Toulon, captured by the British. “From that time on, one side began to show love and trust towards the other, and the other side met these sentiments with cold prudence and paid with empty verbiage. Marmont's nature was similar to Massena's - except that the dominant for him was not money, but power and the desire to be on the side of the winner at any cost. 6 .

After the capture of Toulon, Captain Bonaparte makes a huge leap in his career - he becomes a brigadier general. In addition, he is favored by the younger brother of the all-powerful Maximilian Robespierre - Auguste Robespierre. True, after 9 Thermidor, these friendly relations almost cost the head of Bonaparte, who was arrested and imprisoned. The arrest of the hero Toulon plunged Captain Marmont into despondency, however, he tried not to show it. According to S. Nechaev, Marmont and Junot - also a close friend and adjutant of Napoleon - “were in Marseille, waiting for a decision and their fate too. From the moment Bonaparte was arrested, they did not receive a single salary and were forced to live in a shabby hotel, unable to pay for a more or less decent apartment. They were ready to drop everything and run, if necessary, with Napoleon abroad. 7 .
Speaking about the magic of Bonaparte, F. Kirhuizen writes that “already at that time, Napoleon had such an exceptional influence on his subordinates that they abandoned their fatherland, family and hopes for promotion, just to follow their general” 8 .

Fortunately for Bonaparte, his arrest did not last long and he was soon free. He was reinstated in his rank of brigadier general and even led a military expedition to his home island of Corsica to free him from the British. Marmont follows his general, having received command of the baggage train from Bonaparte. The expedition, however, ended in complete failure: on April 13-14, 1795, French ships were attacked by the English fleet. “This defeat,” writes F. Kirhuizen, “put an end to the entire expedition to Corsica. On March 12, 1795, the troops were ordered to immediately join the Italian army.

Napoleon's hope was shattered! He was left without a definite position, since his post of inspector of the coast was transferred in the meantime to his compatriot Casabianca ” 9 .

After this failure, Marmont accompanies Bonaparte to Paris, where he was summoned by the Committee of Public Safety. Their path lay through Châtillon and Marmont could not stop at home for at least a few days. Arthur Levy remarks on this: “Isn't it strange that at the beginning of Napoleon's career there is the name of an insignificant town, with which its last stage is connected? In Châtillon-on-Seine in 1814, the allied sovereigns finally decided to deprive Napoleon of the crown. 10 .

“The property of the Marmons,” writes G. Kirhuizen, “was located on the edge of the city and was called Chatelot. In the anti-Jacobin milieu of the provincial aristocracy, who, from the point of view of their reactionary concepts, looked almost with contempt on the so-called "blue officers", the pale, stingy republican general made the most unfavorable impression ... " 11 .

On May 27, Marmont left the house with Bonaparte and moved on. On the 29th they were in Paris, where Napoleon was asked to lead the republican troops stationed in the Vendée. He refused, for which he fell into disgrace. Out of work was also Marmont. As marshal's biographer Robert Christophe notes, Marmont accompanied his general unofficially and, from the point of view of the law, "was nothing more than a deserter." 12 .

Marmont himself subsequently recalled: “The three of us (he, Bonaparte and Junot - S.Z.) ended up in Paris. Bonaparte without a position, I without legal leave, and Junot as an adjutant to a general whom the government did not want to recognize. We spent time at the Palais Royal and in theaters, although we had almost no money and no chance for the future.
However, the events of 13 Vendemière, 1795, radically changed their situation. The royalist conspiracy against the Convention that broke out helped Bonaparte to reappear on the scene. General Menou, who was charged with crushing this action, was too weak for such a decisive undertaking. Therefore, the government, in the person of its main member - Barras, turned to Bonaparte for help. After some deliberation, Napoleon agreed to take on the task. When the rebels went out into the street and moved towards the Convention, Bonaparte met with volleys of cannons and defeated the rebels within a few hours. After this event, Bonaparte, as well as Marmont, could no longer worry about their fate: their lives and careers rapidly went up.

In 1796, Napoleon was appointed commander of the Italian army. Marmont, as adjutant, accompanies the new commander in chief.

After the first resounding victories of Napoleon, which shocked the Austrian court and delighted France, Marmont notes with pleasure that he did an "excellent thing" by joining and becoming close to Bonaparte. 13 .

As Delderfield notes: “Among the many military men who surrounded Napoleon during the hostilities in Italy, Marmont was the only one who could refer to friendship with a great man in his youth ... Despite the reputation that he earned later (and not one marshal had no more disgusting), there is no reason to think that he extended this courtesy to a lone young officer in the hope of a future career. He was a cautious and cold-blooded man, but in his youth he sincerely admired his brilliant and gloomy friend. In evaluating the first victories of France, he goes further in his forecasts for the future than anyone else, and, what is even more interesting, he very correctly assesses the mood prevailing in the French army at a time when it was carried by a wave of victories. “We were like a big happy family,” he writes, looking back on those triumphant days when everyone around him was young, full of zeal and a lot of promise. He was never as happy as in those days, but for that he had only himself to blame. Marmont did not belong to those people who completely devote themselves to one cause or put themselves at the service of one person. Such people are not uncommon, but only a few of them had to pay the price that Marmont paid. 14 .

After the battles at Rovereto, Bassano, Saint-Georges, Primolano and Chismonet, in which Marmont also distinguished himself, the latter was sent by Bonaparte to Paris with banners captured from the enemy.

At the end of the Italian campaign, Marmont was already a major general. In this rank, he takes part in the Egyptian expedition of Bonaparte in 1798-1799.

Participating in the capture of Malta, the soldiers, led by Marmont, repulse the sortie of the Valletta garrison. Bonaparte, in his essay on the Egyptian expedition, writes about Marmont's actions: “Between four and five o'clock, the besieged made a sortie. Adjutant Marmont drove them back, taking several prisoners. On this occasion, he was promoted to brigadier general. 15 .

After the departure of the general from Alexandria, Marmon was left in this city with a garrison and commanded troops in Lower Egypt, so he did not take any part in further hostilities.

When Napoleon left the army in Egypt and returned to France, among the narrow circle of persons whom Bonaparte took with him was Marmont. During the coup d'état of 18 Brumaire, he supported Bonaparte, which, however, was not at all surprising.

During the second Italian campaign, Marmont commanded the artillery of the Reserve Army. Before crossing the Great St. Bernard, Marmont did an excellent job with the difficult task of getting the cannons safe and sound across the Alps. Napoleon told us about what the artillery commander of the Italian army came up with. “The artillery commander, General Marmont,” he writes, “used two methods. The first was that eight-pound cannons and mortars were placed in trough-shaped hollowed-out logs. One hundred men were harnessed to each cannon, which was dragged across St. Bernard for two days. The second method was to use the sled on the skating rinks made by Brigadier Gassendi in Oxonne. The carriages were taken apart and carried in turn, with the exception of the instruments, to the eight-pounder guns, which were carried in their entirety on a stretcher by ten soldiers. The wagons were unloaded and started forward empty, and the loads were carried in boxes on the backs of people and mules ... " 16 .

In the Battle of Marengo, Marmont directs the actions of artillery and shows diligence and decisiveness in battle. At the critical moment of the battle, when it seemed that defeat could not be avoided, the division of General Desaix arrived. Napoleon immediately prepared a counterattack against the Austrians. “Marmont,” Chandler writes, “concentrated in one place the 5 remaining divisional guns, 8 Boudet guns and 5 more guns from the reserve, forming one battery, and opened the strongest twenty-minute fire on the Austrians, damaging many Austrian guns and breaking through large gaps in the flank heavily the approaching column of Tzach. And then Desaix led his soldiers forward, lined up in formal brigadier order; there was a moment of hesitation when, emerging from clouds of smoke, these troops saw in front of them a selected battalion of Austrian grenadiers, but Marmont was already nearby with 4 light cannons, quickly removed from the limbers to give four volleys of direct fire at soldiers in white uniforms » 17 .

Upon his return to France, Marmont received from the First Consul the position of Chief Inspector of Artillery. “Marmont's rise in such a short period of time,” writes Hadley, “was truly enchanting. And this he was primarily obliged to friendship and closeness to Napoleon. True, such a rapid ascent revealed one negative trait in Marmont: envy begins to take possession of him, which sometimes affected relationships with other people and views on them. 18 . It was noted quite rightly, and this feature was especially manifested in 1804, when Napoleon, having become emperor, awarded the rank of Marshal of France to 18 generals. True, Marmont was not included in this list, which was both offended and surprised. He never expected that, having been a close friend of Napoleon since their youth, he, Marmont, would be overboard. His resentment soon grew into envy and even hostility towards those commanders who were the first to receive this high rank. True, Marmont was somewhat comforted by the thought that he, perhaps, would be lucky in this world. True, envy did not decrease from this. Particularly strong was Marmont's jealousy of Bessieres, who, in his opinion, did not at all deserve the marshal's baton. On this occasion, Ronald Delderfield writes: “Another surprise was the nomination of the former barber Bessieres, who once defended the Bourbons in Paris from the rebellious mob. Apparently, there was something charming in the nature of Bessières, because, although he did not do anything particularly significant over all these years, Napoleon considered him one of his closest friends, and he paid the emperor unchanging loyalty. Marmont, who was not among the first to be promoted to marshal, was cruelly jealous of Bessières (as, indeed, of everyone else) and spoke out sharply against his candidacy. In the end, however, the preference that Napoleon made for Bessières proved to be justified. Bessières gave his life for the man who offered him his friendship, and the name Marmont became synonymous in France with the word "traitor" 19 .

Among other things, Marmont's displeasure was aggravated by the fact that during the coronation ceremony in Notre Dame Cathedral on December 2, 1804, he was given a place not next to other generals, but in the ranks of numerous representatives of the court, the highest state institutions, the diplomatic corps and delegations of the largest cities in France. as a member of the Council of State. As V. Shikanov notes on this occasion, he, Marmon, a military general, “had to stand in an official uniform among some civilian “shtafik”. Nothing worse can be imagined!” 20

In the campaign of 1805 against the Third Anti-French Coalition of European States, Marmont commanded the 2nd Army Corps of the Great Army, but for the entire period of hostilities he did not gain any significant laurels, thanks to which he could stand out among the same generals as he.

After the defeat of the 3rd coalition, Marmont was sent by Napoleon to govern Styria and Dalmatia. Here he was able to show his organizational and administrative abilities, and the emperor in 1808 marked his diligence with the title of Duke of Ragusa. However, to the great displeasure of the newly-made duke, Napoleon did not give him the coveted marshal's baton. This further aroused Marmont's envy and hatred of other marshals.

Being a great admirer of the arts and especially the theatre, the Duke of Ragusa formed a troupe that regularly put on plays and gave performances in Udine. Marmont did his best not to miss these performances, not to mention the premieres. In addition, he was well versed in the art of playing the delicate cello. 21 .

In the war against Austria in 1809, as in the campaign of 1805, the participation of the Duke of Ragusa in the fighting was not so active. Despite this, Napoleon, according to V. Shikanov, “somehow grunted with displeasure: “Marmont, you maneuvered like an oyster” (that is, with the same degree of meaningfulness and reason)” 22 .

In the battle near Znaim, which, in fact, had no special significance for the outcome of the entire campaign, Marmont takes a direct part, trying with might and main to rise to the coveted marshal rank. After Wagram, he was sent to pursue the retreating Austrians and overtook them on July 10 at Znaim. Chandler describes Marmont's actions as follows: “The serious pursuit of Charles did not begin until July 7, after Napoleon had organized new communications that led back to Vienna. The lack of combat pressure from the French gave Charles a significant advantage. In addition, Napoleon did not have exact information where the Austrians had gone, so on July 8 he sent Massena to Znaim, Davout and Marmont to Brunn, the guards and Oudinot were in the central reserve, these rearrangements were made to block Karl any way to salvation. On the 8th, there were several fierce rearguard skirmishes, indicating that Charles's troops were still capable of resistance. Only on July 9 did it become clear that the Archduke was withdrawing his troops to Znaim, across the Taya River, hoping that this line would separate him from the French. Napoleon promptly sent his central reserve in support of Massena. Meanwhile, Marmont, on his own initiative, decided to intercept Charles at the Taia River and cut him off from the crossings. Having crossed the river much east of Znaim, Marmont went down the left bank, not thinking about the possible danger that he brings upon himself by acting alone. In essence, this was a repetition of Landshut's maneuver. On July 10, he reached Znaim and learned that most of Charles's army had already crossed, but despite this, Marmont threw his soldiers into an unequal battle, hoping to delay the Austrians until the main body of the French approached from the rear. In this he was fortunate, for Masséna arrived early the next morning and the fighting began again.

This battle was not destined to last long. If Archduke Charles's army was still capable of fighting, he himself could no longer, and as soon as the shooting began, he asked for a truce. Napoleon agreed to this, convinced that his own soldiers were too exhausted to achieve a complete victory. 23 .

This time, these minor actions of Marmont were enough for Napoleon to grant him the much coveted title of Marshal of France on July 12, 1809. True, subsequent events showed that the emperor clearly overestimated the military talents of the Duke of Ragusa.

Dissatisfied with the actions of Marshal Massena in Spain, Napoleon replaced him in 1811 and instructed Marmont to lead the Portuguese army. However, this rearrangement did not bring anything new to the situation in the Iberian Peninsula and to the actions of the Portuguese army, in particular.

“He accepted his new combat assignment with enthusiasm,” writes Delderfield. - His arrival in Salamanca showed that he quickly realized how a marshal of France should behave. He brought with him a superbly organized kitchen service and a whole army of cooks and attendants, and immediately went headlong into the work of reorganizing the losing morale of the Portuguese army, which he did with the efficiency of a new broom " 24 .

Speaking of Marmont as a commander, Hadley writes: “... Marmont in this post shows amazing apathy, slowness and lack of any energy that Napoleon would like to see in him. He reigned rather than fought in Spain. To be more precise, in between dinners, balls, entertainment, he fought a little, however, he did not deserve any laurels " 25 .

In confirmation of the above words, V. Shikanov writes: “Marmon created for himself an earthly paradise in Valladolid. He lived like an Eastern satrap, earning the nickname "King Marmon". Dinners, balls, soirees followed one after another almost without interruption. In the days of such entertainment in the palace of the Duke of Ragusa, two huge tables were laid for dinner: separately for ladies and gentlemen. At the same time, none of the men had the right to enter the ladies' room. Naturally, this rule did not apply to the owner of the house.
Two hundred servants in red liveries served the residence of Marmont, not counting his personal lackeys. In addition, the retinue (but not the headquarters) of the marshal included 12 more officers and three quartermasters, including a giant hung with gold chains, specially brought from Dalmatia, who served and supplied exclusively His Excellency " 26 .

During the hostilities and marches, nothing essentially changed: just all the scenery was transferred to another place. A contemporary described one of the halts of Marshal Marmont as follows: “Mr. Marshal dismounted and the retinue followed his example. Twenty servants in livery with aiguillettes unpacked 30 horses and mules, laid out snow-white table linen decorated with woven patterns and set the table with gilded silver dishes, placing cold appetizers, game, poultry, pies, etc. All this was complemented by French wines: Bordeaux and Burgundy. This is how Mr. Marshal and his entire staff dined (very close to the army regiment, which was content with bread alone) ” 27 .
And at the same time, Monsignor Marshal constantly complained about the extreme scarcity of funds.

Before his departure for the army, which was going to war against Russia, Napoleon appointed his brother Joseph as the supreme commander of the French troops in Spain and gave him the old marshal Jourdan as a military adviser. Describing the situation after these reshuffles, Ronald Delderfield writes: “Jourdan is used to carrying heavy loads. In his younger years, he moved from fair to fair with a healthy bag of specimens on his back, but the load he was now offered to carry was far heavier than anything he had carried in his youth. In accordance with the decree of the emperor, Jourdan was subordinate to Suchet, who considered himself the most reasonable military leader in Spain (this, however, probably happened), Marmont, who thought the same about himself (this, of course, was not), Soult, who considered himself almost a king, and Joseph, who was a real king, but every night he prayed that he would stop being one. 28 .

If Marmont really was such a brilliant commander as he considered himself, he acted more successfully in Spain, but he was pursued by continuous failures. As a military leader, left to his own devices, Marmont, as it is not regrettable to admit, turned out to be completely untenable.

After several days of maneuvers, Marmont's army collided on July 22, 1812 at Arapil (near Salamanca) with the English army of Wellington. Both sides were almost equal in strength. True, the Duke of Ragusa could have waited for reinforcements from King Joseph, however, hoping to defeat the British, Marmont did not wait for them, so as not to share glory with anyone. However, the laurels of the winner again bypassed the marshal. Hesitation and indecision - this is the main reason for the defeat of Marmont. But Wellington made full use of the mistakes of the French commander, achieving a convincing victory.

Marmont himself was hit by a cannonball at the very beginning of the battle, and if not for the stamina and talent of General Clausel, the French defeat could have turned into a disaster. Clausel managed to put the defeated units in order and retreat.

Napoleon learned about the defeat of Marmont on the eve of the Battle of Borodino. In a letter to the Secretary of War, General Clark, he recommended that the marshal be removed from command of the army. In addition, the emperor asked the Minister of War to demand an explanation from the Duke of Ragusa regarding his actions; in conclusion, Napoleon asked to tell the Duke of Ragusa that he, first of all, should not think about his personal ambitions and vanity, but about the glory of his country and the benefit of the common cause.

Subsequently, Marmont tried not only to justify his course of action, but also complained and accused Joseph of the fact that he disgustingly ruled the country and constantly interfered with him in military operations.

Removed from the post of commander of the Portuguese army, Marmont went to France to improve his health in connection with the wound.

Poorly proven as an independent military leader, Marmont looked much better under the direct leadership of Napoleon. He differs under Lützen, under Bautzen and Dresden; in the Battle of Leipzig, he defends the northern approaches to the city.

Despite the defeat at Leipzig, despite the retreat and the general catastrophic situation, Marshal Marmont tries to exalt himself in the eyes of Napoleon, not even shunning an obvious lie. In his report, he claims that the successful defense of Schönefeld on October 18 is solely his merit, and not Marshal Ney, since "Prince of Moscow (Title of Marshal Ney) was there only ten minutes, "and he was" ten hours under enemy buckshot " 29 .

On the first day of the new year, 1814, the allies crossed the Rhine, and hostilities spread to French territory. In this campaign, Marmont excels in several battles. The first success awaited him at Champobert, near which he attacked and in many ways contributed to the defeat of the Russian corps of General Olsufiev. At first, the Russians tried to defend themselves, but the soldiers of Marmont acted with such determination that the Russian detachment was soon surrounded and defeated. Only a small part managed to escape from the encirclement. Olsufiev himself (This general was captured by a 19-year-old recruit who did not serve even six months) and other officers were taken prisoner.

Paying tribute to his soldiers, the marshal wrote in his memoirs: “The recruits who arrived the day before stood in line and behaved like veterans in terms of courage. Oh, how much heroism in French blood!

"As if it was within his power!" Marmont bitterly remarks in his memoirs 30 .

The Battle of Champaubert took place on 10 February. The next day there was a larger and equally decisive battle near Montmirail. The victory was complete: by dusk the enemy fled, throwing cannons, personal weapons and carts with loot. At Chateau-Thierry, the allies were again defeated and fled from the battlefield.

Napoleon, encouraged by the successes, instructed Marmont to watch the defeated Blucher, and he himself headed against Schwarzenberg with the main forces. However, news soon came that Blucher had gone on the offensive again. Seeing a numerically superior enemy in front of him, Marmont began to retreat to Ver, and did it so brilliantly that he gave Napoleon time to prepare a decisive blow against Blucher.

After this success, Napoleon again turned against Schwarzenberg, and instructed Marmont to pursue the defeated enemy. As Chandler writes: “The Duke of Ragusa (Marmont) did this with great success, and by the night of the 14th Blücher’s reckless daring had cost him 7,000 killed and wounded and 16 cannon, besides a large number of vehicles. French losses that day amounted to only 600 people. 31 .

However, in the battle at Laon, Marmon suddenly shows amazing slowness, fatigue and apathy, which leads to a major quarrel with the emperor. “The quarrel,” writes Delderfield, “which led to their break, took place under the walls of Lahn (Laona - S.Z.) . Napoleon lived after this incident for seven years, and Marmont - half of his life, but from that moment on they could never remember each other without acrimony. History condemned Marmont as a scoundrel, and Napoleon as a madman with delusions of grandeur. To some extent, both of these judgments were influenced by how these two people subsequently spoke of each other. 32 .

Undertaking an attack on Blucher's strong positions at Laon, Napoleon instructed the marshal to capture the village of Aty. While Napoleon was operating on other points, Marmont, with great difficulty, was able to capture half of the village of Ati, located on the extreme left flank of the Prussian army. When evening came, Marmont considered the success achieved more than sufficient, and calmly departed for the night to the castle of Epp, not forgetting to enjoy comfort even during the war.

Meanwhile, Blucher conducted a reconnaissance and found out that Marmont's positions were not too fortified and launched a surprise attack. The troops of the Duke of Ragusa, unable to withstand the onslaught of the enemy, fled, dragging their commander with them in complete stun. Fortunately for Marmont, he was saved by two fortunate combinations of circumstances: Colonel Favier, following the connection with Napoleon at the head of a detachment of 1000 people, heard the noise of battle; his arrival enabled Marmont to assemble his soldiers and continue his retreat already in some semblance of order; at the same time, the Duke of Ragusa was helped to some extent by the Prussian cavalry, who tried to capture the Festier defile, but were repulsed by 125 soldiers of the Old Guard who escorted the convoy. Saved by these two successes, completely undeserved by him, Marmont was able to break away from his pursuers and busied himself with reorganizing his units at Corbeny, six miles from Berry-au-Bac.

When Napoleon learned of what had happened at Marmont, he was furious beyond description. Marshal Berthier, who was present, considered the emperor’s anger quite justified, noting about the subsequent meeting between Napoleon and Marmont: “The emperor had every right to hack him to death on the spot!” 33

However, the reproaches that Napoleon poured out on the head of the marshal could no longer change the situation. He remained at Laon without taking any action to enable Marmont to put his troops in order and prevent the Prussians from pursuing him.

Marshal was able to collect only 8 thousand soldiers, placing them in Fisma. As Delderfield notes, the Duke of Ragusa was "more fortunate than he deserved" 34 .

Pouring out dissatisfaction with the actions of Marmont, Napoleon wrote to his brother Joseph on March 11: "... Probably, the enemy would have left us Laon, fearing our attack, if not for the wild stupidity of the Duke of Ragusa, who behaved like a junior lieutenant." Back in 1812, in a conversation with Caulaincourt, the emperor noted that the marshal “talks very cleverly about the war,” but “turns out to be worse than mediocrity when you need to act” 35 .

According to V. Sloon: “The audacity of Napoleon's strategic measures now made an overwhelming impression on this marshal. He became virtually incapable of desperate self-sacrifice, which alone could make him a suitable assistant to the emperor under the then critical circumstances. 36 .

Marmont himself in his memoirs describes the state of his troops as completely confused and demoralized, the soldiers lost not only the rudiments of military skills, but also clothes, shoes and hats; in the artillery, he said, were sailors who did not know how to load and aim the gun 37 .

In the battle for Reims, Marmont, trying to rehabilitate himself, this time acted courageously and decisively, being the first to break into the city and push back the Russian troops of Count Saint-Prix, who was killed during the battle.

The people of Reims enthusiastically greeted Napoleon, who heard the greeting of the people for the last time before his return from Elba a year later, and Reims became the last city he took in a chain of victories that began in 1793 in Toulon. According to V. Sloon, “the movement to Reims was, on the part of Napoleon, a formidable, convulsive blow of a dying gladiator” 38 .

Despite the successful actions of Marmont at Reims, a sharp conversation took place again in the captured city regarding the Laonian events. Marmont, who did not like any criticism addressed to him, considered the words of the emperor unfair. According to Delderfield, the words spoken by Napoleon to the Duke of Ragusa at Reims "far exceeded in their consequences the loss of position and a few cannons. Seventeen days later, the emperor paid dearly for his reproach.” 39 .

V. Sloon in his biography of Napoleon also did not bypass this topic. He writes: “The next morning, Napoleon, meeting with Marshal Marmont, showered him with bitter reproaches for his behavior near Ati. In general, he spoke to him in such a tone in which an angry father might speak to his negligent son. This fact alone is evidence that Napoleon was aware of the hopelessness of his position. Marmont had just won a victory and was, so to speak, the hero of the day. For the sake of this, it was possible to forgive the marshal for the previous guilt and thereby secure his further loyalty. If Napoleon had felt less upset, he would certainly have done so. Knowing, however, that the war could last only a few more weeks in the most favorable case for him, he involuntarily fell into a caricature, playing out the role of a self-confident monarch and commander to the end. 40 .

It is quite possible that the bitter reproaches against Marmont played a role in the subsequent betrayal of the marshal, but they were hardly decisive in the actions of the Duke of Ragusa.

After the battle at Ferchampenoise, where Pacto's soldiers demonstrated unprecedented heroism and stamina, Marmont, along with Mortier's troops, withdrew to Paris. On March 30 and 31, the troops of Marmont and Mortier defended Paris, but closer to noon, Joseph Bonaparte, in the name of the emperor, authorized the Duke of Ragusa to begin negotiations on the surrender of the city.

At four o'clock in the afternoon, the Prussians captured Montmartre and prepared to open artillery fire on Paris from there. Under such circumstances, the Duke of Ragusa considered further resistance pointless. As Delderfield put it, “…Paris was not to be compared…to Zaragoza…and its defenders were not fanatics. They were just tired and hungry soldiers…” 41 .

Negotiations for the surrender of Paris have begun...

In a letter to the Duchess d'Abrantes, the wife of his friend Junot, the marshal tries to explain his decision and behavior: “... I would recommend that you do not leave Paris, which will certainly be much calmer tomorrow than anywhere in twenty leagues around. Having done all that was in my power for the honor of France and French arms, I am forced to sign a surrender that will allow foreign troops to enter our capital tomorrow! All my efforts were in vain. I was forced to surrender to a numerically superior enemy, no matter how regretful I felt. But it was my duty to save the lives of the soldiers for whom I am responsible. I cannot do otherwise and I hope that my country will judge me fairly. My conscience is clear before this court." 42 .

Surrendering Paris, Marmont believed that it was his duty both to the country and to the Parisians, and perhaps history condemned him too harshly in this matter. In the end, everyone believed that the Empire had been defeated. Moreover, neither the Duke of Ragusa, nor Mortier, nor old Moncey had sufficient influence to inspire Paris to resist the enemy. And Marmont, who shouldered almost all the responsibility, understood this very well.

The house of the Duke of Ragusa became a rallying point for the commissioners charged with negotiating and for the few politicians who remained in the capital. During the negotiations, there were also talks, moreover, openly and not interrupted by the marshal, that the role of Napoleon had already been played and the French throne should be occupied only by the Bourbon dynasty. These days, the marshal did not hear so much flattery addressed to him, they spoke of him as the only savior of France. All this spurred the vanity of Marmont, who really began to consider himself the savior of the country.

Despite this, the conditions offered by the allies did not satisfy the marshal, and he declared that he would continue hostilities until his troops were guaranteed an exit in arms. Finally, the Russian Emperor Alexander I agreed with everything and the capitulation was signed. The conditions were as follows: 1) Mortier and Marmont pledged to withdraw their troops from Paris no later than seven o'clock the next day; 2) hostilities may be resumed not earlier than two hours after the French troops leave the city; 3) the French must hand over the arsenals and stores to the allied forces in the form in which they were at the time of the signing of the surrender; 4) The National Guard and the Gendarmerie are to remain in the city, and, at the discretion of the Heads of the Allied Powers, will either be disbanded or continue to be left for garrison and police service; 5) the wounded and stragglers found after nine o'clock in the morning are recognized as prisoners of war; 6) Paris is entrusted to the generosity of the allied monarchs 43 .

On March 31, the Allies solemnly entered Paris. As Emperor Alexander I promised, there were no riots, there were no robberies by the Allied troops anywhere.

When Napoleon learned that the allied armies were approaching Paris, he rushed to the city. However, not far from Paris, he learned that the city had been surrendered. For a few seconds, the emperor was dumbfounded. Then he began to throw thunder and lightning in the direction of Joseph, whom he called a coward, in the direction of Marmont, calling his actions stupidity, in the direction of the deputies, calling them nothing more than traitors.

Having come to his senses, the emperor settled in Fontainebleau to gather troops for a campaign against Paris. He ordered Marmont and Mortier to take up positions between Esson and the Seine. To the envoy of Napoleon - Flao, the marshal said that after Joseph and the Empress left Paris, the inhabitants completely lost heart, that the National Guard was no good for anything, and here, the Duke of Ragusa was deceitful. I wonder how Marshal Mortier, and the national guards themselves, would have reacted to the last statement!
Despite dissatisfaction with the actions of the marshal, Napoleon arrived at Marmont's headquarters on April 1, where he congratulated him on the courage shown in the defense of Paris. Having learned the latest news, he again left for Fontainebleau.

Meanwhile, events in Paris were gaining momentum. On April 1, the Provisional Government was formed. The next day, the Senate issued a decree on the removal of Napoleon from power, he was accused of all mortal sins, sometimes completely unthinkable, but then no one wanted to look at it. On the same day, the municipal council openly spoke in favor of the Bourbon dynasty and called on the marshals and generals to go over to the side of the king. In return, they were promised to keep their pensions, ranks and titles.

This news only irritated Napoleon, but did not lessen his desire to retake Paris. He gathered all the troops loyal to him around Fontainebleau. He had confidence in the soldiers and junior officers, and they still trusted Napoleon. However, the decree of the Provisional Government, releasing the army from the oath to the emperor, affected some marshals and generals.

In order to knock out support from under the emperor, having enticed the backbone of the French generals to the side of the Bourbons, Talleyrand decided first of all to influence Marmont, who was Napoleon's oldest friend. In addition, it was not worth discounting the fact that the reputation of the Duke of Ragusa at that moment was as high as ever. As Delderfield writes, "Marmont began to see himself as General Monk (Monk, George (1604-1669) - one of the main figures in the restoration of the Stuart dynasty in England after the death of Cromwell; enthroned Charles II Stuart) , in the role of a person who, having reconciled the interests of military and civilians in war-weary France, will deserve the applause of his compatriots and the gratitude of his descendants " 44 . “He mentally saw France prosperous,” writes V. Sloon, “thanks to the restoration of peace and social order, and all honor was attributed exclusively to him, and everywhere praises were given to his magnanimous patriotism. Meanwhile, this goal could be, in his opinion, achieved not only without any damage, but even with respect for personal gain. 45 .

Standing in Esson with his 14 thousand soldiers, Marmont saw no point in continuing the struggle, and when the envoy of the Provisional Government appeared with letters of appeal from Bourrienne, a friend of the marshal, Marmont's faith in Napoleon's future was shaken very much.

Talleyrand, as a clever intriguer and diplomat, chose a roundabout way to lure the Duke of Ragusa to the Bourbon camp. In addition to letters from Bourrienne and General Desole, Marmont received another, more important letter from Prince Schwarzenberg, commander of the Austrian army. In all three messages, he was offered to go over to the side of the coalition, thereby showing that not only civilians want the arrival of the Bourbons, but also the army; such a path, according to the authors of the letters, will prevent the country from slipping into civil war and will finally bring the long-awaited peace.

In his letter, Bourrienne urged the marshal to finally utter the one word that would bring happiness to France. In conclusion, he wrote: “Your friends are waiting for you, yearning for you, and I hope that soon I will be able to hug you.” 46 . General Desol's letter was analogous to the previous letter. Schwarzenberg in his message promised to let Marmont through with full military honors to Normandy; the duke of Ragusa was also promised the retention of the ducal title and the corresponding ducal fief, as well as generous rewards and honors (True, it should be noted that when concluding agreements with the allies, Marmont also took care of Napoleon. He spoke out to Napoleon for life and freedom in the location indicated by mutual agreement by the allied monarchs and the French government) . 47

For some time, the Duke of Ragusa hesitated in accepting one of the two solutions. But in the end he answered the envoy of the Provisional Government Montessui that he was ready to start negotiations on his transition to the side of the coalition.

On April 4, from Prince Schwarzenberg, the marshal received the consent of the allied monarchs to all his proposals, after which Marmont waged a propaganda campaign among the officers of his corps.

On the same day, Napoleon abdicated in favor of his young son under the regency of Empress Marie Louise. The delegation, which included Caulaincourt, Ney and Marmont, was supposed to present this document in Paris to the Russian Emperor Alexander I.

However, soon the composition of this delegation was changed: Marshal MacDonald was introduced instead of the Duke of Ragusa. According to Ronald Delderfield, this was done, "partly because Marmont was in Essonne, partly because Napoleon wanted to spare his oldest friend, "who grew up in his tent," the humiliation of carrying such a document— a bizarre desire in the light of what was happening at that moment in the headquarters of the Duke of Ragusa. However, three parliamentarians were instructed to stop by Essonne on their way to Paris and include Marmont in the delegation, if he so desired. 48 .

Marmont did not show much desire and was very embarrassed by the unexpected arrival of the emperor's envoys, since he had already won over several generals to his side, and negotiations with Schwarzenberg were coming to an end. The marshal faced a dilemma: either hurry up with his plans, or face a military tribunal. After a short hesitation, he, with an embarrassed look, confessed that an envoy from Prince Schwarzenberg had come to him with a proposal to go over to the side of the coalition. However, he lied, saying that he did not sign any papers. Napoleon's envoys believed the Duke of Ragusa, although the embarrassed appearance of the marshal still caused them some suspicion of his sincerity. Marshal was asked to write a letter to Schwarzenberg refusing further negotiations, to which Marmont replied with a categorical refusal. The proposal of Caulaincourt, who suggested that Marmont go with them and tell Schwarzenberg in person that he could not fulfill his promises, the Duke of Ragusa accepted more favorably.

With a displeased look, he went with Napoleon's envoys to Paris. Before his departure, Marmont announced the abdication of Napoleon and ordered that nothing be done without his order.

As Delderfield writes, “Macdonald, who had always been a close friend of Marmont, must have felt very uncomfortable during this trip. The Duke of Ragusa, obviously, was horrified by the situation - in an attempt to protect the dynasty, he, in fact, betrayed it " 49 .

Arriving at the headquarters of Schwarzenberg, Ney, Caulaincourt and MacDonald went to meet with the Austrian general. Marmont remained in Macdonald's carriage.

Schwarzenberg received envoys who informed him of their desire to immediately see the Russian emperor. Soon the prince went out and when he returned, Marmont was with him. The marshal's appearance was completely different - it was “not the pathetic little man who remained in the carriage: now he relaxed and smiled. It looks like he confessed everything and was released from his half-promise to surrender. However, what exactly happened to him with Schwarzenberg, neither they nor future generations found out: from that moment on, the testimony of eyewitnesses diverge. Some witnesses (including the Duke of Ragusa himself) remove the charge of a double game from the marshal. Others, and most of them, stigmatize him as a scoundrel who, for one reason or another, deliberately cut off the last thin thread that connected France with the Napoleonic dynasty. 50 .

Alexander I accepted the deputation and praised the marshals for their valiant defense of France, he especially noted the fearlessness and stamina of young soldiers in the battle of Fer-Champenoise. During the discussion, the Russian emperor basically agreed with the proposals of the deputation, but he left the final answer the next day.

While there was an audience with Alexander I, Marmont, leaving Ney, Caulaincourt and Macdonald, went to Ney's mansion on the Rue de Lille.

The next day, while they were all having breakfast, Fabrier, Marmont's aide-de-camp, appeared in a very excited state. The Duke of Ragusa got up and left. A few minutes later he entered the hall with a pale face and said: “All is lost! I'm dishonored! My corps at night, on the orders of General Suam, went over to the enemy. I would give my hand so that this would not happen ... "To these words, Ney angrily exclaimed:" Tell me better - the head, and it will not be enough! 51 Marmont ran out of the room, his face reddened with anger.

When the representatives of Napoleon again appeared before Alexander I, a completely different reception awaited them. The Russian emperor had a new argument: the army was against Napoleon, the Marmont corps went over to the side of the coalition. The allies refused to recognize the rights of the Bonaparte dynasty to the throne and demanded an unconditional renunciation.
On April 6, 1814, Napoleon abdicated for himself and his son.

The transition of the Marmont corps to the side of the coalition is a mystery. Whether Suam himself, left by the marshal to command the troops in his absence, gave the order to move, or whether all his actions were coordinated with Marmon - it is not only difficult to say, but it is also not possible with sufficient accuracy. Speaking of Suam's actions, Ronald Delderfield writes that it is possible that Suam acted on his own initiative, against the orders of his superior. Possibly, but implausible in light of the secretiveness of the Duke of Ragusa in the preceding hours. 52 .

“On the evening of April 6th,” writes Manfred, “the shares of the Bank of France, quoted a week ago at five hundred and twenty to five hundred and fifty francs, rose to nine hundred and twenty to nine hundred and eighty francs. There has not been such a huge jump in the stock market for many years. Some dodgers have made millions in one day. Among them was the Duke of Ragusa - Marshal Marmont " 53 .

Marmon remained with the enemies. "Marmont's courage saved us all!" exclaimed Bourrienne, many years later recalling the events of that day. So it was from the point of view of Bourrienne, Talleyrand and all other Frenchmen who, under Napoleon, occupied high positions only to betray the interests of the emperor at the first opportunity. 54 .

“For some time,” writes V. Sloon, “Marmont managed to play the role of a hero, but soon his vain, empty character showed his behavior in the true light. From the title of the Duke of Ragusa, which was worn by Marmon, the word "raguzada" was developed, which served as a synonym for treason" 55 .

Napoleon will never forgive the betrayal of Marmont in 1814 and will remember it with bitterness. Being on the island of Saint Helena, the exiled emperor will tell Dr. O "Mir that, "despite the occupation of Paris by the allies, he would still have achieved his goal if not for the betrayal of Marmont, and would have ousted the allies from France." And speaking, in particular, about the Duke of Ragusa, he said: "Marmont should become an object of disgust from posterity. As long as France exists, the name of Marmont will not be mentioned without a shudder. He feels this even at this moment," he added, "he is the most unfortunate person in the world. He is not will be able to forgive himself and he will end his life like Judas" 56 .

Marmont was the very first of the marshals to go over to the side of the Bourbons and was made by Louis XVIII a peer of France and captain of the bodyguard. The Bonapartists called the company of Marmont "the company of Judas."

During the trial of Marshal Ney in the House of Peers, the Duke of Ragusa voted for the execution of "the bravest of the brave", which further stained himself in the eyes of both comrades-in-arms and ordinary Frenchmen.

When Napoleon fled Elba and landed in France in March 1815, Marmont accompanied the king on his flight from Paris to Ghent.

On March 1, 1815, after landing in France, in his proclamation to the army, Napoleon wrote: “We were defeated because of two people: Augereau and Marmont. Both of them went over to the side of the enemy, betraying our laurels, their country, their overlord and benefactor. 57 .

During the second restoration of the Bourbons, the Duke of Ragusa was showered with even more favors and honors, which caused even greater hatred for him from the most diverse sections of society.

The final assessment of Marmont's life was given in 1830 - the year of the final overthrow of the Bourbon dynasty. When revolutionary uprisings of the people flared up again in Paris, King Charles X (the former Comte d'Artois), who replaced Louis XVIII in 1825, ordered Marmont, who was at that time the governor of Paris, to restore order in the city. However, the marshal constantly hesitated and could not decide what to do, constantly asking the king for new instructions. Finally, on July 28, the Duke of Ragusa ordered the troops to go into action. Street fighting takes place, blood is shed. As the historian Hadley put it, during these three terrible days, Marmont "acted either like a fool or Like a crazy" 58 .

After all his actions lead to nothing, but only cause even more bitterness of the people, Marmont begs the king to give in. Charles X does not want to listen to the marshal and removes him from command. The Duke of Angouleme, son of the king, suspecting Marmont of treason, and in anger shouts to him: “So you are cheating on us, as you cheated on him (meaning Napoleon - S.Z.) ?!" The marshal's answer was worthy of the question: "Yes, but without that betrayal you would not have reigned" 59 .

Nothing can save the power of Charles X. On August 2, under the pressure of the growing revolution, the king abdicates the throne and two weeks later left France forever, fleeing to England.

"Marmont the traitor", "Marmont the executioner" causes resentment and hatred throughout France. He sees this perfectly and understands that he cannot stay in France. He leaves Paris after the king, “consoling himself that he covered the streets of Paris with the bodies of more than five thousand compatriots, performing an unjust and tyrannical act. It doesn't make sense to talk about his duty as a soldier, adds Hadley. “It was not a lawless crowd, as they were called when they tried to suppress it, but the people of France who rose up against a lawless monarch. And he (Marmont) knew it" 60 . The indignation of the Parisians was not against the rule of law, but for just laws, and the Duke of Ragusa, who went through the revolution of 1789 and was a fierce defender of republican principles, should have been aware of this.

All references by some historians to the voluntary emigration of Marmont are not worth a hatched egg. The hatred of the people made him leave the country.

On the way to England, Marmont seems to awaken from his delusions and condemn himself. Isn't it too late?! In a letter to a friend dated August 6, he writes: “Have you ever seen anything like this? To fight against my fellow citizens... Does this business make me completely unhappy? And the future! This is an unfair opinion towards me! My only refuge is my conscience. I accompany the king to Cherbourg; when he is safe, my mission will be completed. I will leave France until I see what the future has in store for me." 61 . What is it - belated repentance or an attempt to whitewash yourself by any means? His conscience must be an exceptional thing to be a refuge in such an extraordinary case. To support the narrow-minded and despotic king, who violated the sacred rights of the people, he covers the streets of Paris with corpses, and then finds refuge in his conscience. All this does not look like sincere repentance.

The "traitor Marmont" will never return to France, to a country where everyone hates him. He travels around Europe and is increasingly immersed in memories of his youth, being in a kind of nostalgic trance. He visits London, Vienna, Rome, Venice, but nowhere does he find peace of mind. He is like an autumn leaf that has fallen from a branch and is flying at the behest of the wind.

During his stay in Vienna, a tempting offer was made to him, flattering his vanity and pride. The Vienna court convinced the marshal to "enlighten" the twenty-year-old son of Napoleon, and now the Duke of Reichstadt. The instructions received by Marmont explicitly stated that the marshal was to tell the young man that his father was an immoral, evil and bloodthirsty person. "The first meeting between Napoleon's only legitimate son and his oldest friend ended in disappointment for the Habsburgs," writes Delderfield. “He is suspicious, but he will become friendlier,” Marmont predicted optimistically. Marshal stubbornly pursued his goal, and within three months there were many meetings between them. The Duke of Ragusa described in detail all the Napoleonic campaigns, and the young man listened patiently. Perhaps he must have found it strange that he was being mentored by a man who had deprived him of any chance of becoming Emperor of France. However, over time, the charm of Marmont took up, and the Duke of Reichstadt even granted him his portrait. 62 .

Having completed his mission, the Duke of Ragusa left for Italy, where he rode through the battlefields, probably remembering the man about whom he once wrote these lines: “What prospects does he open up for all of us!”

He will also visit Russia to attend the coronation of Nicholas I. While there, he will visit the famous Borodino field ...

Having traveled all over Europe, the Duke of Ragusa never found peace anywhere. He returns again to Italy, the country where not only the glory of Bonaparte began, but also his ascent to high titles and wealth. Has he gained fame? Hardly. And if it did, it was destroyed overnight on one April day in 1814.

It was in sunny Italy that he ended his life, lonely, forgotten and despised. It happened on March 3, 1852 in Venice.

“He outlived the oldest of his colleagues by one year,” writes Ronald Delderfield. - The young man who once indulged in dreams with him, he survived by thirty-one years. For Marmont, who was dying in Venice, memories must have seemed much more tangible than life itself. 63 .

Despite the contempt felt for Marmont, his body will nevertheless be transported to France, but the marshal will find his last resting place not in the Pere Lachaise cemetery, but in the local cemetery of his native Chatillon.

On the island of Saint Helena, Napoleon will say about the Duke of Ragusa: "I was betrayed by Marmont, whom I had the right to call my son, my child, my creation ...". And then he concluded: "He will end up like Judas" 64 .

This prophecy will turn out to be absolutely true: the name of Marmont has become hated in France.

Applications

1. STAGES OF SERVICE

1790 - sub-lieutenant of the garrison battalion.
1792 - 2nd lieutenant of the 1st artillery regiment.
1793 - 1st lieutenant.
1793 - captain.
1796 - battalion commander.
1798 - brigadier general.
1799 - Member of the State Council.
1800 - commander of the artillery of the Reserve Army.
1800 - commander of the artillery of the Italian army.
1800 - divisional general.
1802 - inspector general of artillery.
1805 - Colonel-General of Horse Rangers.
1805 - commander of the 2nd Army Corps of the Great Army.
1805 - Commander of the 1st Corps of the Italian Army.
1806 - Governor-General of Dalmatia.
1808 - Duke of Ragusa.
1809 - Marshal of France.
1811 - commander of the Portuguese army.
1813 - Commander of the 6th Army Corps of the Great Army.
1814 - captain of the 6th company of the king's bodyguards and peer of France.
1815 - expelled from the number of marshals by Napoleon.
1815 - General of the Royal Guard.
1817 - Minister of State.
1821-1830 - commander of the 1st military district.
1828 - Member of the Supreme Military Council.
1830-1852 - in exile after the July Revolution of 1830.

2. AWARDS

1803 - legionnaire of the Legion of Honor.
1804 - the highest officer of the Legion of Honor.
1805 - badge of the Great Eagle of the Order of the Legion of Honor.
1806 - Commander of the Order of the Iron Crown (Italy).
1806 - Commander of the Order of the Golden Eagle (Württemberg).
1816 - Commander of the Order of St. Louis.
1817 - Commander of the Order of the Iron Crown (Austria).
1820 - Grand Cross of the Order of St. Louis.
1825 - Knight of the Order of St. Spirit.
1826 - Knight of the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called (Russia).

3. MARITAL STATUS

Wife - Hortense Perrego (1779-1855).

NOTES

1 Shikanov V.N. Constellation of Napoleon: Marshals of the First Empire. M., 1999.
2 there.
3 There.
4 Delderfield R. F. Marshals of Napoleon. M., 2001. S. 23.
5 There. S. 64.
6 there. pp. 64-65.
7 Nechaev S. Yu. General Junod. Half life. M., 2001. S. 20.
8 Kirkheisen F. Napoleon the First: his life and his time. M., 1997. S. 177.
9 There. S. 185.
10 There. pp. 29-30
11 Kirkheizen G. Women around Napoleon. M., 1991. S. 64-65.
12 Christophe R. Le maréchal Marmont. Duc de Raguse. P., 1968. P. 33.
13 Delderfield R.F. Marshals of Napoleon ... S. 74.
14 There. pp. 86-87.
15 Napoleon. Selected works. M., 1956. S. 402.
16 Chandler D. Napoleon's military campaigns. M., 1999. S. 184.
17 There. S. 194.
18 Headley J.T. Napoleon and his marshals. N.Y., 1850.
19 Delderfield R.F. Marshals of Napoleon ... S. 149.
20 Shikanov V.N Decree. Op.
21 There.
22 There.
23 Chandler D. Decree. Op. S. 448.
24 Delderfield R.F. Marshals of Napoleon ... S. 278.
25 Headley J.T. Op. cit.
26 Shikanov V.N Decree. Op.
27 There.
28 Delderfield R.F. Marshals of Napoleon ... S. 299.
29 Shikanov V.N Decree. Op.
30 Delderfield R.F. The collapse of Napoleon's empire. M., 2001. S. 275-276.
31 Chandler D. Decree. Op. S. 590.
32 Delderfield R.F. The collapse of Napoleon's empire ... S. 313.
33 There. S. 315.
34 There.
35 Chandler D. Decree. Op. S. 601.
36 Sloon V. New biography of Napoleon I. M., 1997. V.2. S. 521.
37 Delderfield R.F. The collapse of Napoleon's empire ... S. 315.
38 Sloan W. Decree. Op. T. 2. S. 523.
39 Delderfield R.F. The collapse of Napoleon's empire ... S. 317.
40 Sloan W. Decree. Op. T. 2. S. 521-522.
41 Delderfield R.F. Marshals of Napoleon ... S. 350-351.
42 Delderfield R.F. The collapse of Napoleon's empire ... S. 346.
43 Headley J.T. Op. cit.
44 Delderfield R.F. The collapse of Napoleon's empire ... S. 364.
45 Sloan W. Decree. Op. T. 2. S. 547.
46 Delderfield R.F. The collapse of Napoleon's empire ... S. 366.
47 There. S. 366.
48 There. S. 373.
49 There. S. 375.
50 There. S. 376.
51 Manfred A. Z. Napoleon Bonaparte. M., 1998. S. 546.
52 Delderfield R. F. The collapse of Napoleon's empire ... S. 379.
53 Manfred A.Z. Decree. Op. S. 547.
54 Delderfield R.F. The collapse of Napoleon's empire ... S. 381.
55 Sloan W. Decree. Op. T. 2. S. 551.
56 O "Mira B. Napoleon. Voice from St. Helena. M., 2004. S. 422-423.
57 Shikanov V.N Decree. Op.
58 Headley J.T. Op. cit.
59 Shikanov V.N Decree. Op.
60 Headley J.T. Op. cit.
61 Ibidem.
62 Delderfield R.F. Marshals of Napoleon ... S. 432.
63 There. S. 442.
64 Shikanov V.N Decree. Op.

There is an opinion in the historical literature that Napoleon's abdication in 1814 was the result of the betrayal of Marshal Marmont, who surrendered Paris to the enemy and went over to his side with his corps.

It is not difficult to guess that this opinion, which has become widespread, comes from Napoleon himself, who repeatedly accused Marmont of treason both in 1814 and in his famous address to the people of France, made on March 1, 1815 in the Bay of Juan. In this appeal, Napoleon claimed that during the campaign of 1814 in France he was successful, that the Allied armies were bled and cut off from their sources of supply, that they would certainly have found their grave in the vast French expanses, if not for “the betrayal of the Duke of Ragusa, who surrendered the capital to the enemy and disorganized the army. This betrayal, according to Napoleon, "changed the fate of the war."

This highest opinion was immediately picked up and began to be replicated by historians, while acquiring numerous details and nuances.

This opinion is expressed, in particular, by such a prominent researcher of the Napoleonic wars as David Chandler, who writes: “News came from Paris that Marmont openly went over to the side of the enemy, taking his soldiers with him. This was the last blow. Napoleon had one last card left; having come to terms with the thought of his abdication, he tried to secure the succession to the throne for his son.

But the accusation against Marmont is so serious that it requires no less serious evidence. Let's try to figure out what really happened in these few dramatic days from the end of March to the middle of April 1814.

As you know, the 1813 campaign of the year ended unsuccessfully for Napoleon, and already in January 1814, the allied armies crossed the Rhine and invaded French territory.

The condition of the French army was critical: Napoleon and his marshals had only about 47,000 soldiers ready for battle. The allies who invaded France had five times as many of them, and almost two hundred thousand more went in different ways to help them. Everyone was terribly tired of the war, but Napoleon was energetic and eager to fight.

On January 26, he drove Blucher's Prussian troops out of Saint-Dizier. On January 29, at Brienne, a new victory was won over the Prussians and the Russian corps of Osten-Sacken.

Immediately after the defeat, Blucher hurried to Bar-sur-Aube, where the main Austrian forces of Prince Schwarzenberg were concentrated. The allies had a force of 122,000 between Chaumont and Bar-sur-Aube.

Napoleon at that moment had a little more than 30,000 people, but he decided not to retreat, but to accept the battle. The battle of La Rotierre began early in the morning on February 1 and lasted until late at night. The superiority of the Allies in numbers could not but affect, and the French, having lost about 6,000 people and 50 guns, began to retreat. The Allies lost 4,600 men at La Rotierre.

After this battle, Napoleon, not pursued by anyone, crossed the river Aube and entered the city of Troyes on February 3. But the situation still remained extremely dangerous, few reinforcements came up, and they acted extremely slowly.

Oddly enough, as the dangers increased, Napoleon became more energetic. On February 10, after several quick transitions, he attacked the detachment of General Olsufiev stationed at Champobert and defeated him utterly. More than 1,300 Russians were killed, about 3,000 people, along with Olsufiev himself, were taken prisoner, the rest fled. The French lost only about two hundred men.

The next day he turned from Champobert towards Montmirail, where the Russians and Prussians were stationed. The Battle of Montmiraile, which took place in February, ended with a new brilliant victory for Napoleon. The allies lost about 4,000 people that day, and Napoleon - less than 1,000. The allies hastily retreated from the battlefield.

The battle of Château-Thierry on February 12 ended with a new victory for Napoleon. If it were not for the erroneous movement and delay of Marshal MacDonald, the matter would have ended with the complete extermination of the allied forces fighting at Château-Thierry. On February 14, Napoleon destroyed Blucher's vanguard at Voshan: here the Prussians lost about 9,000 people.

On February 18, a new battle took place at Montreux, and again the allies, having lost 3,000 people killed and wounded and 4,000 prisoners, were driven back 40 miles to the south. The French lost about 2,500 men.

But the allies, despite the defeat, did not lose heart: too much was at stake. The brilliant victories of Napoleon, one after another, made them think with anxiety about what would happen if this man, whom they unanimously and for a long time considered the first commander of world history, remains on the throne, rests, gathers with renewed strength? Who will cope with it then, in a year, in two?

By the beginning of March, Napoleon already had more than 75,000 people, of which 40,000 he set up barriers against the retreating Schwarzenberg, and with 35,000 he rushed after Blucher, who, by sheer chance, almost got captured.

But, having escaped captivity, Blucher did not leave the battle: on March 7, Napoleon overtook him at Craon and started a battle with the corps of General Vorontsov advanced towards him. The result of the day: the Russians lost 5,000 people, the French - about 8,000 people.

In the meantime, the entire army of Blucher concentrated at Laon. On March 9 and 10, Napoleon made attempts to dislodge the Allies from the Laon position, but these attempts failed. After losing about 9,000 men, Napoleon withdrew his troops to Soissons.

At the same time, Marshals Oudinot and Macdonald, who were ordered to watch Schwarzenberg, were driven back to the Provence region.

Not having time to rest and not allowing his army to rest after the inconclusive battle at Laon, Napoleon rushed to the 15,000-strong Russian-Prussian detachment that entered Reims under the command of the Russian general Comte de Saint-Prix. On March 13, Napoleon broke into Reims, utterly defeating the enemy (while de Saint-Prix himself was killed). After that, Napoleon moved south to meet with Schwarzenberg.

This meeting took place on March 20 at Arcy-sur-Aube. Napoleon had about 30,000 people, Schwarzenberg had about 90,000. The battle lasted two days, the French inflicted heavy losses on the Austrians, but there were no forces to pursue Schwarzenberg, and Napoleon was forced to withdraw back across the river Ob.

After the battle of Arcy-sur-Aube, Napoleon, with his 50,000th army, decided to go behind the lines of the allies and attack their communications with the Rhine. At the same time, Paris was left practically uncovered, and the allies decided to take a chance: take advantage of the fact that Napoleon was far to the east, and go straight to the French capital, hoping to capture it before Napoleon had time to personally come to her defense.

* * *

Only marshals Marmont and Mortier blocked the path to Paris, but they had a total of no more than 25,000 people. The battle of Fer-Champenoise on March 25 ended in their defeat, they were driven back, and on March 29, almost 150,000-strong Allied army approached the Parisian suburbs of Pantin and Romainville.

About the mood that prevailed in Paris, Marmont himself wrote the following:

The inhabitants of Paris, in particular, dreamed of the fall of Napoleon: this is evidenced by their complete indifference while we were fighting under his walls. The real battle was on the heights of Belleville and on the right bank of the canal. So, not a single company of the National Guard came to support us. Even the police posts that stood at the outposts to detain the fugitives themselves fled at the first shots of the enemy.

The fall of Paris was a foregone conclusion. On the night of March 30-31, Marshal Marmont, considering further resistance pointless, concluded a truce with the allies and withdrew the remnants of his troops south of the capital.

It is this fact that is incriminated to Marmont. Many historians claim that Marmont surrendered Paris, embarking on the path of betrayal. Very often, such words as "treason" and "surrender" are used. Albert Manfred, in particular, writes that Marmont "betrayed military duty and opened the front to the enemy."

But the question is, why is Marshal Mortier, who was always next to Marmont, not accused of the same thing? A question without an answer.

But let's now listen to Marmont himself, because the accused should have the right to defense. In his Memoirs, published in 1857, Marmont wrote:

We were under the command of Joseph, the emperor's representative. He entrusted me with the defense of Paris from the Marne to the heights of Belleville and Romainville. Mortier was entrusted with the line of defense that ran from these heights to the Seine. My troops, stationed by night at Saint-Mandet and Charenton, numbered only 2,500 infantry and 800 cavalry. For several hours I traveled around the area in which I was to fight, because when I was here before, the thought of possible military operations did not even occur to me. I then returned to Paris, but I was never able to contact Joseph Bonaparte. I managed to catch the Minister of War only at ten o'clock in the evening.

General Compan, who left Cezanne on March 25 on the day of the battle of Fer-Champenoise, was in Meaux to approach the enemy. He blew up the bridge in that city and received small reinforcements; his forces increased to five thousand men. Having retreated to Panten, on March 29 he entered under my command. Thus, I had about 7,500 infantry, belonging to the remnants of seventy different battalions, and 1,500 cavalry, and I had to confront a whole army of more than 50,000 people. I understood the importance of the position at Romainville, but General Compan, retreating, did not take it, and I did not know if the enemy had managed to settle there. During the night I sent reconnaissance there from San Mande. The officer in charge of reconnaissance did not go there, but reported to me, as if he had seen it with his own eyes, that the enemy was not there yet.

However, this mistake, this real war crime, had a positive result and was partly the reason for the duration of this memorable defense, despite the huge disproportion in the number of troops. This happened because I started the offensive, and this gave the defense a completely different character. Thanks to this false report, I left Sharenton with 1200 infantry, guns and cavalry and was already in place early in the morning, but it turned out that the enemy was already there. Immediately, a battle began in the forest surrounding the castle. The enemy, surprised by our unexpected attack, which he mistook for the approach of Napoleon's main forces, took everything with great caution and began to defend himself. In addition, we managed to take advantage of the position and well-placed artillery.

Events developed with varying success until about eleven o'clock; but then the enemy, having made an effort on his left flank, overturned my right flank, and I was forced to retreat to Belleville. There my troops concentrated and became able to defend the streets that converged at this point.

A little later, that is, about noon, I received permission from King Joseph to negotiate the surrender of Paris to foreigners. On March 30, he wrote: "If the Lord Marshal Duke of Ragusa and Marshal Duke of Trevize cannot hold out, they are authorized to enter into negotiations with Prince Schwarzenberg and the Russian Emperor, who are in front of them."

This is a very important statement. Marmont claims that Joseph Bonaparte, who was his immediate superior, gave him the right to enter into negotiations with the enemy.

This version is confirmed by Willian Sloon, who writes that "Joseph, in the name of the emperor, authorized Marmont to enter into negotiations", and also that Marmont "had positive instructions to save, by all means, Paris from plunder".

Why does no one reproach Joseph Bonaparte for betraying and leaving Paris? Another rhetorical question.

But the situation was partially restored, and I sent Colonel Favier to tell Joseph that things were not so bad yet, and I hoped to continue the defense before nightfall. But the colonel did not find the king in Montmartre. It turned out that he had already left for Saint-Cloud and Versailles, taking with him the Minister of War and his entire retinue, although he was not in any personal danger.

The enemy furiously attacked my new position. Six times we lost, but seven times we recaptured important points on our front, including the towers of the Bruyeres Park. General Compan, on the left of Belleville, repulsed all attacks directed at Pantin with the same success. Finally, the enemy, informed by the prisoners of our small numbers, realized that we had no possibility of a serious attack, and began to deploy huge forces. From the heights of Belleville, new beautiful columns could be seen moving towards all our positions and crossing the canal in the direction of Montmartre. It looks like we were going to be attacked from all sides at the same time.

It was already three and a half hours: the time had come to take advantage of the permission to capitulate given me around noon. I sent three officers as envoys. One of them was very famous - this is Charles de la Bedoyer. His horse was killed, the trumpeter was also killed, and he could not cross the front of the enemy. Only the adjutant of General Lagrange managed to do this.

In the meantime, I decided to check what was happening on the left flank in Belleville. But as soon as I took a few steps along the main street, I stumbled upon a powerful column of Russians. There was not a second to lose; any delay would be fatal for us. In such a narrow defile, it was impossible to appreciate all our weakness, and I attacked, standing at the head of a handful of soldiers, along with generals Pelport and Meynadier. The first of them was wounded in the chest, but fortunately did not die. A horse fell under me, and all my clothes were riddled with bullets. The head of the enemy column turned back.

At this moment, the adjutant, who traveled as a truce, returned back, accompanied by Count Paar, adjutant of Prince Schwarzenberg, and Colonel Orlov, adjutant of the Russian emperor. The fire was stopped. It was agreed that the troops would withdraw to their positions, and measures would be taken to evacuate the capital.

Such is the analysis of the course of this battle for Paris, which later became the object of such odious slander. This was the sixty-seventh battle of my corps, starting on January 1, that is, from the day the campaign opened; the sixty-seventh battle in ninety days, and in conditions when I myself had to attack three times with a sword in my hand at the head of my weak troops. It is clear with what constant exertion of forces, with what marches in the most terrible weather, with what unprecedented fatigue, and, finally, with what ever-increasing dangers, this struggle was associated with such an inequality of forces, which gave our name glory and greatness.

Marmont's position in Paris is commendable. The forces are catastrophically unequal, the troops are exhausted by constant battles and transitions, resistance is practically useless and only contributes to the destruction of the most beautiful of the cities bombarded by the Prussians from the Montmartre hill.

In addition, Napoleon with the main forces of the army is far away, and there is nowhere to wait for help. Is it possible, under such conditions, to offer an option more worthy than the one chosen by Marmont?

The Duke of Trevize, who had not taken part in serious fighting all morning, was suddenly driven back to the outpost of La Villette. A little later, after a slight resistance, Montmartre was recaptured from him. Like me, he was then able to assess the events, the circumstances and the state of affairs. He settled in one of the cabarets of La Villette and made an appointment for me there to discuss the terms of the surrender of Paris. M. de Nesselrode and other plenipotentiaries also arrived there. We responded to the demand to surrender our weapons with indignation and contempt. To the proposal to leave Paris towards Brittany, we replied that we would go wherever we considered necessary, while not obeying anyone. The very first and simple terms for the evacuation of Paris were agreed upon by morning, and it was also agreed that the agreement would be signed in the late afternoon.

The Duke of Trevize and his troops were the first to move and headed south towards Esson. My troops set up camp on the Champs Elysees and set off the next morning at seven o'clock. By eight o'clock the outposts had already been surrendered to the enemy.

Representatives of the magistracies came to me before handing over their powers. M. de Talleyrand asked to see me in private, and I received him in the dining room. As a pretext, he began to talk about communications, asked if there were still Cossacks on the left bank of the Seine. Then he talked for a long time about the misfortunes of the people. I agreed with him, but did not touch upon the topic of changing the situation in a word. I only wanted to loyally practice my craft and wait for time and a hundred circumstances to bring the decision prepared by Providence. The Prince de Talleyrand, having failed in his efforts, withdrew.

I also want to dwell on a fact, insignificant in itself, which, however, shows what feelings possessed everyone at that time. Lavalette, outwardly so devoted to Napoleon, this ungrateful friend, whom I will save from the scaffold some time later and who, in gratitude for this, will join my enemies, came to me on the evening of the 30th. Wanting to take with me as much artillery as possible, I asked him for permission to take all the post horses that were in the department over which he was in charge. And what! He refused me so as not to compromise himself. How many people are brave when there is no danger, and devoted when nothing needs to be done!

These stories show what a mistake Napoleon made when he crossed the Marne with his troops. Based on MacDonald's report, he was confident that the entire enemy army would follow him in his march on Saint-Dizier.

This marshal mistook Winzengerode's corps for the entire enemy army. Having learned about the true state of affairs and assessing all the danger that threatened the capital, Napoleon set in motion all his troops, but they were at a distance of several days of crossings. On the night of the 30th to the 31st, he himself arrived in Cours-de-France. There he met the troops of the Duke of Treviso, with General Belliard at their head. He reported to him about all the events of the day. He sent his adjutant Flao to me, who arrived at two in the morning, and to whom I confirmed everything that had been told to Napoleon. Flao returned to the emperor, who was staying at Fontainebleau.

Marmont points out the mistake made by Napoleon. He went east with the intention of taking the allied armies with him, but they did not follow him for the simple reason that they intercepted a courier carrying a letter from the emperor to the empress, in which the whole plan was laid out in plain text. The high command of the allies immediately gathered for a council of war and decided not to chase after Napoleon, but to go straight to Paris.

Not suspecting that his plans were revealed, Napoleon stood for several days in Saint-Dizier, where only on March 28 did he realize the irreparability of what had happened. The two armies of the allies united near Paris, and the situation became completely hopeless. Napoleon rushed to the capital, but it was too late.

On March 30, at night, he arrived at Fontainebleau, and then he was caught by the news of the truce concluded by Marmont.

The troops were drawn to the headquarters of the emperor: on April 1, he had 36,000 people, two days later they became 60,000.

But let us again give the floor to Marshal Marmont:

On the 31st, I took up positions at Essones, and on the night of March 31st to April 1st, I went to Fontainebleau to see the emperor and discuss the latest events with him. Our successful defense won his approval. He ordered me to prepare for him award lists for the most brave soldiers who, until the last moment, with such self-sacrifice, waged this monstrously unequal struggle.

The emperor understood his position: he was defeated, and he needed to enter into negotiations. It seemed that he stopped at gathering the remnants of his forces, increasing them if possible, without conducting any more operations, and, based on this, begin negotiations. On the same day he came to inspect the positions of the 6th Corps. At this time, the officers returned from Paris, who remained there to surrender the outposts to the allies. They were Denis de Damremont and Favier. They reported to the emperor about the manifestations of joy and delight that the enemy troops were met with when they entered the capital, as well as about the statement of Emperor Alexander about his unwillingness to negotiate. Such a story deeply upset the emperor and radically changed the course of his thoughts. Peace became impossible for him, and he decided to continue the war by all means. This new position of his was forced, and he, without embarrassment, presented it to me. But this decision of his, based on desperation, led him to extreme inconsistency of thoughts: giving me the order to cross the Seine and attack the enemy where we had already fought, he forgot that the Marne lay on our way, on which all the bridges were destroyed . In general, from that moment on, I was struck by the complete disorder of thoughts that seized him, taking the place of his usual clarity of mind and power of reason.

Leaving just such orders, he left me. It was the last time in my life when I saw and heard him.

Denis de Damrémont and Favier told me about all the latest events that took place in Paris, and about all the joyful delights that accompanied them. It turned out that national pride and a feeling of noble patriotism, so natural for the French, gave way to the hatred that Napoleon aroused in everyone. Everyone wanted an end to this absurd struggle that began two years ago and was accompanied by disasters that history has not yet known. Salvation was seen only in the overthrow of the man whose ambitions led to such great disasters.

News from Paris came one after another. The Provisional Government handed over to me the decree of the Senate proclaiming the removal of the Emperor from power. This document was brought to me by Charles de Montessuis, my former adjutant back in the Egyptian campaign. After remaining in the service of me for six years, this officer then left the service and devoted himself to the career of an industrialist. Among other things, he brought me many letters from different people, and I had the opportunity to appreciate the general spirit of these letters. All of them contained a thirst for a coup, which was seen as the only means of saving France.

I was connected with Napoleon for many years, and all these misfortunes that exhausted him again began to awaken in me that same old attachment, which had always outweighed all other feelings before. However, in my concern for my country and being able to influence its situation, I felt the need to save it from total destruction. It is easy for a man of honor to fulfill his duty when everything is clear and prescribed, but how difficult it is to live in times when you involuntarily ask yourself the question: what, in fact, does this duty consist of? Those were the times at the time! I saw the collapse of Napoleon, my friend, my benefactor, and this collapse was inevitable, since all means of defense were exhausted. If this collapse had been delayed for a few more days, would this not have entailed the collapse of the whole country, despite the fact that, having got rid of Napoleon and believing the declarations of the allied rulers at their word, it was possible to force them to keep this word? And if hostilities were resumed, wouldn't that free them from their promises? And all these actions of the Senate, the only body representing the will of society, were they not the only means to save the country from total collapse? And the duty of a good citizen, whatever his position, was not he to immediately join in this in order to achieve the final result? It was obvious that only force could overcome Napoleon's personal resistance. So was it necessary to continue to remain loyal to him to the detriment of France itself?

No matter how deep my personal interest in Napoleon, I could not but admit his guilt before France. He alone created this abyss that engulfed us. And how much effort now required to prevent the fall there! I had a deeply personal feeling that I had done my duty enough in this campaign, that I, more than any of my friends, had paid in these terrible circumstances. These were unprecedented efforts, and did I not pay all of Napoleon's bills with them, did I not exceed my tasks and obligations to him?

Under the circumstances, the first thing to do was to maintain a truce in order to give politicians the opportunity to settle our fate. To achieve this, it was necessary to enter into negotiations with foreigners. It was painful, but necessary. The truth was this: public opinion considered Napoleon the only obstacle to the salvation of the country. I have already said that his military forces, reduced to zero, could no longer recover, since regular recruiting became impossible.

You can understand what was going on inside me. But before making a final decision, it was necessary to listen to the opinions of my generals. All the generals under my command gathered at my place, and I gave them the latest news from Paris. The opinion was unanimous. It was decided to recognize the provisional government and join it in the name of saving France.

* * *

Napoleon at that time was in Fontainebleau. On April 4, 1814, Marshals Ney, Oudinot, Lefebvre, Macdonald and Moncey appeared to him. Berthier and Caulaincourt were already there. Napoleon began to explain to them his plan for a march on Paris, the answer to which was deathly silence. "What do you want, gentlemen?" the emperor asked. "Repudiations!" - answered on behalf of all those present Ney and Oudinot. Napoleon did not argue and quickly drafted an act of abdication in favor of his three-year-old son under the regency of Empress Marie-Louise. Obviously, he had already considered this possibility.

Marmon writes:

On April 4, Napoleon yielded to the energetic persuasions of the two military leaders, including the very harsh ones from Marshal Ney. Recognizing the impossibility of continuing the struggle, he renounced the crown in favor of his son and appointed Prince Moskvoretsky, the Duke of Tarentum and the Duke of Vicenza as plenipotentiary representatives. They told me about what happened at Fontainebleau.

All this radically changed the state of affairs. I made many sacrifices in the name of saving the motherland, but Napoleon made a much greater sacrifice than I did. Now my mission was accomplished and I could stop sacrificing myself. Duty ordered me to be with my comrades; it would be wrong to continue to act alone.

Before leaving Essonay, I explained to the generals to whom I left the command of the corps (Suam, the eldest among them, as well as Kompan and Bordessoul), the reasons for my departure. At the same time, I promised them that I would return. In the presence of the plenipotentiaries of the emperor, I gave them the order, no matter what happened, not to make any movement until my return.

Then we went to the General Staff of the Prince of Schwarzenberg (April 4) to obtain official permission to travel to Paris. In a conversation with this general, I abandoned the negotiations that had begun. And I explained the reasons to him. My actions were aimed at the salvation of my country, and when measures taken together with my comrades and in agreement with Napoleon began to achieve this goal, I could not act in isolation. He understood me perfectly.

Now we need to figure out how and why Marmont ended up in Paris?

It is known that Napoleon appointed Ney, Caulaincourt and Macdonald as his representatives in the negotiations. But, as Willian Sloon writes, “the embassy, ​​however, had to pass through Esson, and Napoleon instructed to convey to Marmont that if the Duke of Ragusa wishes to go with the embassy to Paris, then credentials will also be sent to him.” The same is stated by Ronald Delderfield, who wrote that "three parliamentarians were instructed to stop by Essons on their way to Paris and include Marmont in the delegation." Albert Manfred clarifies: “Napoleon instructed Ney, MacDonald and Caulaincourt to go to Emperor Alexander and reach an agreement with him. He also added Marshal Marmont to the three commissioners. “I can count on Marmont; this is one of my old adjutants. He has principles of honor. I have not done as much to any of the officers as to him.

Subsequently, many historians blamed Marmont for the fact that he began negotiations with General Schwarzenberg to go over to the side of the coalition. In Albert Manfred, in particular, we find the following version of events: “The Duke of Ragusa had an extremely embarrassed face. Not without difficulty, he told that on the same morning of the 4th, an envoy from Prince Schwarzenberg came to him, offering to leave Napoleon's army and go with his troops to the side of the coalition. Marmont accepted this offer. Caulaincourt and MacDonald, restraining their feelings, asked if an agreement had already been signed with Schwarzenberg. Marmon denied this. As it turned out later, he was lying; he had already committed an act of betrayal. He was in great confusion. But he promised Caulaincourt and MacDonald, at their suggestion, to notify Schwarzenberg that his intentions had changed. In the presence of Napoleon's emissaries, Caulaincourt relates, he gave orders to his generals not to move while the negotiations were going on. The treacherous act of Marmont aroused the indignation of the marshals; but he was ready to correct his act, and in critical circumstances this seemed to be the main thing.

He has already committed an act of betrayal! But, as you know, Joseph Bonaparte gave Marmont permission to start negotiations with Schwarzenberg.

And what did Marmon negotiate with Schwarzenberg about? First about the details of leaving Paris, and then about the prospects for saving the army. We know the letter that Marmont sent to Schwarzenberg on the night of April 3rd to 4th. In this letter, Marmont said that he was "ready to leave the army of Emperor Napoleon with his troops, subject to the provision of written guarantees." But guarantees of what?

Marmont demanded from Schwarzenberg guarantees for the preservation of the army with all its weapons, baggage and ammunition, as well as (isn't this strange for a traitor?) guarantees for the preservation of Napoleon's life and freedom.

Why did Marmont talk about preserving the army, because, it would seem, nothing threatened her? Everything is explained by the fact that Marmont knew that the emperor, driven by insane ambitions, was going to launch an assault on Paris on April 5, which would mean the senseless destruction of the remnants of the army and the capital itself. April 5th was only one day away.

Why did he demand written guarantees for Napoleon? Is it because he was simply a decent and still devoted person, who very soon became devoted to him?

Note that Marmont did not discuss any personal benefits for himself personally. He thought only of France, of the army, and of Napoleon. A very strange position for a traitor to his homeland, isn't it?

Marmon himself claims that he stopped the negotiations that had been started and not completed with Schwarzenberg, and it remains only to decide whether to believe him in this or not. In any case, the same Manfred does not bother to prove Marmont's lies, limiting himself to the vague wording "as it turned out later."

* * *

The decisive and highly controversial issue is the so-called transition of the 6th Corps to the side of the Allies, as well as the role that Marmont played in this matter.

Ronald Delderfield characterizes this event as follows: “The transfer of the Sixth Corps to the side of the enemy in the absence of Marmont is another mystery in the history of this turbulent week. Even assuming that it was not Marmont's fault, the person responsible for the step that destroyed the last chances for the king's consent to the regency remains General Suam, who temporarily commanded Marmont's troops in Esson. It is possible that he acted on his own initiative, against the orders of his superior. Perhaps, however, it is not very plausible.

What actually happened? Let's try to figure it out.

As we already know, Ney, MacDonald and Caulaincourt, as well as Marmont who joined them, having arrived in Paris, had a conversation with the Russian Emperor Alexander I, defending the rights of Napoleon's son and the idea of ​​​​a possible regency. The discussion was long and very lively. Alexander ended it by announcing that he could not decide such an important issue alone, and that he should consult with the allies.

The four envoys had no choice but to remain in Paris and wait for a final answer.

Albert Manfred, describing these events, states the following: “The next morning, as agreed, before going to Alexander, everyone met for breakfast at Ney's in his mansion. Marmont also came. In the middle of breakfast, the Duke of Ragusa was summoned by an officer. A few minutes later he returned with a pale, distorted face:

Everything is lost! I'm dishonored! My corps at night, on the orders of Suam, went over to the enemy. I would give my hand for this not to happen...

Tell me better - the head, and that will not be enough! Ney cut him off sternly.

Marmont took his saber and ran out of the room.

When Ney, Caulaincourt and Macdonald were later received by Alexander, a different reception awaited them. The king had a new argument: the army was against Napoleon, the Marmont corps went over to the side of the coalition. The allies refused to recognize the rights of the Bonaparte dynasty to the throne, they demanded an unconditional renunciation.

If the two historians cited above at least agree that the transfer of the corps took place in the absence of Marmont and on the orders of General Souam, who remained in command, then Willian Sloan is completely categorical. He, not tormented by doubts, claims that Marmont "began to incite the officers of his corps to treason." Sloon's version is as follows: the offer to go to Paris "stunned the active conspirator, who managed to win over five generals of his corps, namely Souam, Merlin, Dijon, Ledru and Meynadier (chief of staff of the corps). The treacherous plan was in full swing on the way to fulfillment, so that it was already impossible to stop the work begun. Meanwhile, if the Russian sovereign agrees to conclude peace with the regency, what will be the position of the instigators of the conspiracy?

Of course, in what. If the fact of treason had reached the emperor, all his instigators would have been immediately shot. Ronald Delderfield unequivocally defines that "the conspirators were faced with a choice: either hasten their plans for surrender, or face a tribunal on charges of desertion."

But, according to Willian Sloan, Marmon found a way out. He agreed to go to Paris, and there, allegedly, "found a way to inform the Austrian commander in chief about the changed circumstances."

Let us now turn to the testimony of Marmont himself:

On the morning of the 5th we gathered at Marshal Ney's to wait there for the final answer. At this time, Colonel Favier rushed from Esson and announced to me that some time after my departure, several adjutants had arrived with the aim of finding me in order to go to the emperor at Fontainebleau. And since I was not there, it was proposed to the general staff that the general who commanded instead of me appear at the general staff. Frightened by this order, the generals, deciding to protect themselves, did not find anything better than to raise troops and move towards the location of the enemy. Colonel Favier begged the generals to wait for my return or my instructions, for which, in fact, he came.

What were the generals of Marmont so afraid of? For Willian Sloon, the explanation is obvious: “An orderly arrived from Fontainebleau with an order for Souam to appear before the emperor on business. An unclean conscience drew all sorts of horrors to the imagination of this general, and when Napoleon's adjutant Gurgo then arrived and demanded a meeting with Souam, this general immediately assumed that he would certainly be arrested, and was terribly frightened. Calling together other equally compromised generals, he told them of his concerns. Immediately the troops were placed in the gun. Around midnight, they were given the order to go forward.

Ronald Delderfield adheres to a similar version. He writes: “Faced with the possibility of an imminent tribunal and even execution if Napoleon's embassy succeeded, Suam and his four fellow officers expected the outcome with understandable impatience. When several couriers arrived from Fontainebleau, one after another, demanding the immediate appearance of Marmont or his deputy in the imperial headquarters, anxiety gave way to panic. Having gathered the divisional commanders, Suam suggested that they act together and without the slightest delay. They were to march to Versailles, thereby fulfilling the first clause of Marmont's agreement with the enemy."

By the way, it would be nice to figure out what kind of person Joseph Suam was, who commanded the corps in the absence of the Duke of Ragusa.

He was born in 1760 and was 14 years older than Marmont. Possessing almost two meters in height, he joined the heavy cavalry in 1782, and in 1793 became a divisional general (at that time Marmont was still a simple lieutenant). General Souam served under the infamous generals Pichegru and then Moreau. For communication with the latter in 1804, he was removed from the army and even spent several months in prison. After that, Suam was in disgrace for a long time, and then served in Spain, participated in the battles of Lützen and Leipzig. In 1814, Suam commanded the 2nd reserve division in the 6th Corps of Marmont.

Question: could such a person, known for his royalist views and not hiding them, openly promote the return of the Bourbons in April 1814? Answer: it could. And, in any case, he had no reason to love the emperor and rejoice at the unexpected invitation to his headquarters.

Very interesting is the analysis made in 1858 by a certain Pierre-Nicolas Rapetti in a book published under the unambiguous title "Marmont's Treason in 1814".

In this book, Rapetti writes: "The departure of the Duke of Ragusa occurred suddenly and was like a flight."

A very strange statement, because Marmont went to Paris on behalf of the emperor! Maybe, in order not to worry his soldiers, he should have prepared for the departure longer or even abandoned the trip altogether?

In addition, Marmont himself claimed that before leaving Esson, he explained to the generals, to whom he left the command of the corps, the reasons for his departure. At the same time, he allegedly promised them that he would return.

Next, Rapetti analyzes the behavior of the generals of the 6th corps in the absence of Marmont. He writes: “Suddenly the generals learned about the arrival of an officer at the headquarters on instructions from the emperor. This officer began to look for the Duke of Ragusa, and when he heard that the marshal was not in place, he expressed great surprise, rage and indignation. Then he hurried away, shouting threats.

No less strange statement! What kind of entrustee is this from the emperor, who did not know that Marmont himself was sent by the emperor to negotiate in Paris, and who allowed himself to speak in raised tones and threaten the generals of the 6th corps? According to all evidence, it was the colonel of the headquarters of Gaspard Gourgaud, an extremely reasonable and polite person, Napoleon's closest assistant, who later accompanied him (already in the rank of general) to St. Helena. Gurgo simply could not behave like that in someone else's headquarters. Moreover, there is evidence that he was sent with an invitation to dinner to the emperor and, learning that Marmont was not there, immediately went to Mortier. He turned out to be on the spot and went to Fontainebleau with pleasure.

According to Rapetti, the generals of the 6th Corps were terribly frightened. Rapetti's argument is simple: “Perpetrators panic easily; the generals thought that they had been denounced, that they had been discovered, almost betrayed.

However, all these explanations look quite logical, but in no way prove the guilt of Marmont. Yes, if the generals of the 6th Corps really felt guilty, then they could well be afraid of any invitation to the emperor's headquarters. As they say, fear has big eyes (this is especially true of the disgraced General Suam, who was already “sitting” under Napoleon). Out of harm's way, they immediately raised the troops and moved them towards Versailles.

It turns out almost an anecdotal situation: with his innocent desire to dine in the campaign of one of his marshals, Napoleon provoked a terrible drama that ended with his abdication.

But jokes aside, and suppose that Marmont, while in Paris, really did not know anything about the intentions of his generals?

It is very important to resolve this issue by analyzing the future behavior of the marshal, because it is quite obvious that a person who knows everything in advance and a person who knows nothing will behave differently.

I immediately sent my first adjutant Denis de Damrémont to Essones and was about to go myself, when a foreign officer sent by Emperor Alexander reported that the 6th Corps had already arrived at Versailles at that very moment.

In 1815, I felt it my duty to answer the accusations against me, and then I explained as follows:

“The generals moved troops to Versailles on April 5 at four o'clock in the morning, fearing for their own safety, which they felt threatened after the appearance of several officers of the general staff who arrived from Fontainebleau on the 4th in the evening. The action was performed, and it became irreparable.

As evidence of his innocence, Marmont cites the following letter from General Bordessoul, written at Versailles on April 5, 1814:

Monsieur Colonel Favier should have told Your Excellency about the motives that impelled us to carry out the movement that we decided to undertake until the return of the Prince of Moskvoretsky, the Dukes of Tarentum and Vicenza.

We arrived in full force. Everyone, without exception, followed us with the consciousness of what we were doing; at the same time, we notified the troops about this before the start of the march.

Now, monsignor, in order to reassure the officers about their fate, it is necessary that the provisional government urgently address the corps with a statement about what it can count on; without this, you can be afraid that he will not disperse.

All gentlemen generals are with us with the exception of Mr. Lucotte. This dear gentleman denounced us to the emperor.

As you can see, General Bordessul announces to Marmont the arrival of the corps in Versailles, and the nature of the letter indicates that the marshal knew nothing about what was happening in the corps.

Very important in this letter is the evidence that the troops were informed about everything "before the start of the march." This is important because the same frantic accuser Sloon claims that “not knowing where they were being led, the soldiers were silent at first, but then, finding themselves between the two lines of the Austrians, they flatly refused to obey their officers.”

Mr. Rapetti devotes several pages of his book of accusations to the analysis of this letter of General Bordessoul. Taking out of context the phrase about the movement "which we decided to undertake," Rapetti by the word "we" does not mean the generals of the 6th Corps reporting to their commander, but the generals and their commander, who jointly decided to undertake the movement to Versailles. From this, the author draws a conclusion, surprising in its validity, that "the agreement between Marmont and Prince Schwarzenberg meant on April 4". Further, Rapetti accuses General Bordessoul of lying in almost every paragraph of the letter, using four "killing arguments" as arguments, which boil down to four repetitions of the same phrase - "this is not true."

About how events unfolded after the promotion of the 6th corps, Marmont writes the following:

As I said in 1815, the action was irreparable. Moreover, no agreement was concluded with the general of the enemy. On the contrary, I announced the termination of the negotiations that had begun. Thus, the troops were put at the mercy of foreigners, and not only those who left, but also those who remained with the emperor and lost their cover.

I went to Versailles to review the troops and try to explain to them the circumstances in which they found themselves, but before I could set off, I was informed of a great uprising that had broken out. The soldiers shouted that they had been betrayed. The generals fled, and the troops moved to join with Napoleon. I decided that I must restore discipline and save them. Speeding up my movement, I reached the Versailles outpost, where I found all the generals; the corps went by itself in the direction of Rambouillet. General Kompan shouted:

- Beware, Mr. Marshal, the soldiers will meet you with shots.

“Gentlemen, you are free to stay,” I replied, “if you so desire. As for me, my decision is made. In an hour, I will either die or force them to recognize my authority.

When I caught up with the column, I saw many drunken soldiers. It took some time for this to settle down. I ordered the troops to stop, and the officers to gather brigade to the left of the columns. The order was carried out, I dismounted and entered the first group of officers that stood in my way. I spoke emotionally, with warmth and enthusiasm. Then, in other groups of officers, I repeated the same thing, instructing them to convey my words to the soldiers. In the end, the corps took up arms and shouted: "Long live the marshal, long live the Duke of Ragusa!" He then moved on to the Manta area, where I ordered him to set up camp.

Marmont's last phrase is very interesting here. He ordered his corps, marching independently in Rambouillet, to move to the Manta region and set up camp there. Firstly, if the corps allegedly realized that it had been betrayed, then why did it not go back to the southeast to Esson, but in a completely different direction - to the southwest in Rambouillet? Secondly, if Marmont really was a traitor, then why did he move the corps not back to Versailles, which, according to Ronald Delderfield, allegedly was "the first point of Marmont's agreement with the enemy", but in the opposite direction - to Mantes, located in the north west of Versailles, almost 40 km from it?

Mr. Rapetti finds explanations for this as well. He claims that Colonel Ordener, who led the rebellious corps, moved him "to Rambouillet in order to get to Fontainebleau." Rapetti-style explanation: if you look at the map, you can easily see that Rambouillet is located at a distance of almost 70 km from Fontainebleau, and completely on the other side of Versailles, therefore, if such a route could be chosen, then only by a person who is completely unaware in space.

Regarding the subsequent movement of the corps to Mantes, Rapetti writes that "from there they should have gone to Normandy, away from events." This logic is also highly questionable. Why did Marmont need to lead the corps to Normandy now, if only a few days before he had refused to lead it there, despite the proposals of the enemy (remember: “To the proposal to leave Paris towards Brittany, we replied that we would go where we considered necessary, without submitting to anyone)? Maybe Marmont just wanted to give a little time to the unruly and excited corps, left without generals, in order to recover, calm down and reorganize? To do this, it was not necessary to send him to Fontainebleau, seething with passions, but there was no need to go to distant Normandy either. The nearest relatively large population centers from Rambouillet are Mantes and Chartres, but Chartres is almost twice as far from Paris.

And why did Marmont risk his life at all and rush towards the rebellious corps? Something not very similar to the behavior of a traitor, for whom it would be more logical to avoid meeting with his deceived and outraged soldiers and officers (as, by the way, General Suam and his accomplices did).

What kind of rebellion are we talking about? Why did the soldiers scream that they had been betrayed?

Willian Sloon, remaining true to his version of the general's betrayal, gives the following explanation: “They, however, were assured that by morning they would enter into battle with these same Austrians, on which the salvation of the empire should depend. Believing this false statement, the soldiers calmed down. When they finally arrived at Versailles and learned the truth, they rebelled. Then Marshal Marmont appeared, who managed to intimidate them and convince them of the need to come to terms with what can no longer be changed.

Ronald Delderfield echoes him: “At first, the rank and file thought that they were going to fight the enemy, but it soon turned out that this assumption was ridiculous, since they passed between two corps of Russian and Bavarian cavalry, which closely followed them, but did not attack. After dawn, the news spread through the ranks that the 6th Corps was about to surrender, and the columns mixed up. The rank and file and junior officers were furious. By the time the corps reached Versailles, an open rebellion broke out in it, and the generals were threatened with a noose.

Everything is completely logical, but again it does not prove the guilt of Marmont, who, according to Ronald Delderfield, “rushed headlong from Paris”, and whose speech “put out the riot”.

A very important point in refuting the version of Marmont's betrayal is the fact that none of his generals openly accused the marshal of this either immediately after the events, or later, or even during the Hundred Days, when it became simply profitable.

Even General Lucotte, who did not want to go to Versailles and was accused by General Bordessoul of denunciation (remember: “This dear gentleman denounced us to the emperor”), even he, in fact, did not warn Napoleon about the impending treason, although, it would seem, he should have to do this. He with the remnants of his division fortified in Corbeil-Esson. His words said at the same time “The brave never desert; they must die in their post” were made public only on 7 April. But even he did not reproach Marshal Marmont for anything.

* * *

Be that as it may, on April 6, early in the morning, Napoleon's plenipotentiaries returned from Paris to Fontainebleau. They reported to the emperor that the allies, in the end, refused to recognize the rights of the Bonaparte dynasty to the throne.

After listening to their story, Napoleon went to the table and signed the act of renunciation. At the same time, he laid all the blame for this on Marshal Marmont. In desperation, he said: “The unfortunate man does not know what awaits him. His name has been disgraced. Believe me, I do not think of myself, my career is over or close to the end. I think about France. Ah, if these fools had not betrayed me, I would have restored her greatness in four hours, because, believe me, the allies, maintaining their current position, having Paris in the rear and me in front of them, would have perished! If they had left Paris to avoid this danger, they would not have returned there. This unfortunate Marmont made this beautiful denouement impossible.

On April 12, Napoleon took poison, which he always carried with him since the retreat from Russia, but the poison had no effect on his body. And on April 28, he had already left for the island of Elba, given to him by the winners in lifelong possession with the preservation of the imperial title.

As we already know, all the blame for what happened was laid by Napoleon on Marmont: the emperor always needed "scapegoats", and such was, as always, instantly found. And then numerous Napoleonic historians began to produce versions similar to each other, like two drops of water, justifying the Greatest of the Greatest and stigmatizing the unfortunate Marmont. Here are just a few of them:

Willian Sloan:

For some time, Mormon managed to play the role of a hero, but soon his vain, empty character showed his behavior in the true light. From the title of the Duke of Ragusa, which was worn by Marmont, the word "raguzada" was developed, which served as a synonym for treason. The people called him Judas the traitor, and he died in exile, despised by all.

Vladimir Shikanov:

The name of Marmont is more often remembered in connection with the surrender of Paris and the actual surrender of the 6th Army Corps to the enemies. It is not for nothing that the word “Raguser”, which stems from his high-profile ducal title, became in the era of the Restoration for the Bonapartists a synonym for the word “traitor”.

It looks very similar, doesn't it?

* * *

Marmont suffered unspeakably because of all these accusations and, naturally, tried to answer them. In particular, on April 1, 1815, he wrote a response to Napoleon's Juan Address. This answer of Marmont, this cry from the soul of a slandered and hunted man who faithfully served Napoleon for more than twenty years, it makes sense to quote almost in full:

A terrible accusation has been leveled against me in the face of all Europe, and whatever the nature of the partiality and implausibility it contains, my honor compels me to answer. This is not an excuse, I do not need it: this is a true statement of facts that will allow everyone to evaluate my behavior.

I am accused of surrendering Paris to the enemies, although the defense of this city was the subject of general astonishment. With the miserable remnants of the troops, I fought against the combined forces of the allied armies; for eight hours I resisted in hastily prepared positions, where all defense was impossible, with eight thousand soldiers against forty-five thousand; and this military feat, so glorious for those who took part in it, they dare to call a betrayal!

After the battle of Reims, Emperor Napoleon with almost all his forces went to the Marne, under the illusion that this movement of his threatened the communications of the enemy. But the enemy thought differently and, having united, moved to Paris. My weak corps, consisting of 3,500 infantry and 1,500 cavalry, and the corps of the Duke of Trevize, numbering approximately 6,000-7,000 men, were left on the Aisne to confront the Silesian army, which, after linking up with Bülow's corps and receiving reinforcements, had more than 80,000 men. …

The Duke of Trevize was entrusted with the defense of Paris from the Canal to the Seine, and I from the Canal to the Marne. My troops were reduced to 2,400 infantry and 800 cavalry. This was the number of people who remained after many glorious battles. The troops of General Kompan were also placed under my command: they were soldiers of the rear and veteran units, collected more for numbers than for actual combat. Altogether, my total force was 7,400 infantry, made up of the remnants of almost seventy different battalions, and about 1,000 cavalry. In the afternoon I went to the heights of Belleville and hurried to the heights of Romainville, which were the key positions, but the enemy was already there, and the battle had to be started in the Romainville forest. The enemy was stopped and driven back, but his numbers were constantly increasing. There were many hand-to-hand fights, and many soldiers were killed near me with bayonets, when Joseph sent me a written permission to surrender, and here it is in my hands. It was ten o'clock; at eleven, Joseph was already far from Paris, and at three o'clock I was still fighting; but at this time I no longer had any more people, and I saw another twenty thousand people approaching the enemy. Only then did I send several officers to Prince Schwarzenberg with the message that I was ready for negotiations. Only one of them managed to complete the assignment, and when he returned, General Compan had already left the heights of Panten. The enemy broke into the streets of Belleville, and I had to drive him out of there, standing at the head of a handful of people, thus providing a route for the retreat of my troops. I was almost at the walls of Paris.

A truce was declared, and the troops were able to leave the outposts. The contract was signed only at midnight.

The next morning the troops left Paris, and I went to Essones, where I took up positions. Then I went to Fontainebleau to meet the Emperor Napoleon. He seemed to me able to assess his position and disposed to stop the useless struggle. He settled on the following plan: to fortify, gather the remnants of his forces, try to increase them and negotiate. This was the only reasonable decision that could be made, and I was of the same opinion. I immediately left to begin the defensive work necessary to carry out the plan.

On the same day, April 1, he came to inspect the position and learned from the officers whom I left to surrender the outposts about the rejoicing in Paris, the declaration of Emperor Alexander and the coup that had taken place. And at the same moment he decided to sacrifice the remnants of the army for revenge; now he thought of nothing but a senseless attack that had no chance of success and could only lead to new victims for the sake of his insane passions. From that time on, all orders, all instructions were made only in accordance with this plan, scheduled for April 5th.

News from Paris came one after another. They showed me the renunciation decree. The situation in Paris, and in France in general, was deplorable, and the future would have been even more deplorable if the fall of the emperor had not changed everything, establishing peace with all of Europe and quelling the hatred that he aroused in everyone.

The allies, supported by speeches in all major cities, proclaimed that they were waging war only with Napoleon. It was necessary to check this, to force them to keep their word and abandon the revenge that France could become a victim of. It was necessary that the army again become national, that is, defending the interests of the entire population, which was against Napoleon. If one could count on the unity of all commanders; if it were not likely that the personal interests of some of them would collide with the general patriotic interests; if time had not been in such a hurry, after all, it was already April 4, and this senseless action was scheduled for April 5, which could only lead to the destruction of the last soldiers and the capital, then it would be necessary to appeal to the consent of all the commanders. But in those circumstances, it was necessary to confine ourselves to ensuring the free separation of various parts from the emperor in order to neutralize his plans and combine them with other parts located far from him.

Such was the purpose of the negotiations begun with Prince Schwarzenberg. While I decided to inform my comrades about the state of affairs and about the part that I was going to play in this, the Duke of Tarentum, the Prince of Moskvoretsky, the Duke of Vicenza and the Duke of Trevise came to me in Esson. The first three told me that the Emperor had been forced to sign an undertaking of his renunciation, and that therefore they were on their way to negotiate a cessation of hostilities. I informed them about the agreements with Prince Schwarzenberg, which had not yet been completed, since I had not yet received from him the written guarantee I required. I announced to them that if they agreed with the changes proposed to save the country, then I would not leave them. The Duke of Vicenza expressed his desire that I accompany him to Paris, thinking that my alliance with them, after what had happened, would mean a great deal. I acquiesced to his wishes, leaving command of the corps to the most senior of the divisional generals, ordering him not to make any movement until my soon return. I explained the reasons for changing my plans to Prince Schwarzenberg, who, full of loyalty, found them legitimate and without objection, and I fulfilled the promise made to my comrades in a conversation that I had with Emperor Alexander.

At eight o'clock in the morning one of my adjutants arrived and announced that, contrary to my orders and his strong objections, the generals raised the corps at four o'clock in the morning and moved it to Versailles, fearing for their personal danger, the threat of which they saw in the arrival of several officers of the general staff who arrived from Fontainebleau. The demarche made was irreparable.

This is the true story of these events that have had such a profound effect on my entire life.

By blaming me, the emperor wanted to save his glory, the opinion of his talents and the honor of the soldiers. Nothing had to be done for the honor of the soldiers: she had never shown herself so brilliantly as in this campaign; but as regards him personally, he cannot deceive a single impartial person, for it is impossible to justify in any way the series of actions that marked the last years of his reign.

He accuses me of betrayal! But I want to ask, what is the price for this? I discard with contempt all the distinctions given to me which were given to the whole army. But did I have any special attachment to the Bourbon family? And how could I have them if I was born only a little before they finished ruling France? ...

What are my actions based on? On the ardent love for the motherland, which all my life absorbed my heart and all my thoughts. I wanted to save France from destruction; I wanted to save her from machinations that could lead her to ruin; machinations, which were the fruits of strange illusions and pride, which often arose in Spain, Russia and Germany, which could lead to a terrible catastrophe ...

He says that the enemies were cut off from resources, and he accuses me of saving them. It is I, their savior, I who have always fought against them with such energy and constancy, I who have already associated my name with the main successes of this campaign and have already defended Paris in the battles of Meaux and Lisey! Let us admit that the one who helped foreigners so much in their operations and rendered useless the dedication of so many good soldiers and officers is, in fact, the one who, with three hundred thousand people, decided to conquer all of Europe from the Vistula to Cattaro and the Ebro, while time, as only forty thousand soldiers, gathered in a hurry, left to defend France ...

I served the Emperor Napoleon with zeal, constancy and selflessness throughout my life, and I moved away from him only for the sake of saving France, when only one step separated her abyss, which he himself opened. I did not consider any sacrifices when it came to glory or the salvation of my country, although sometimes it was hard and excruciatingly painful! Who else ignored personal interests more than me and was driven by only one main goal? Who paid for this with great suffering, danger and hardship? Who has shown more selflessness in his life than me? My life is pure, it is the life of a good citizen, and they want to tarnish him with disgrace! No, so many uninterrupted years of honor brush aside this accusation so that those whose opinion is worth something will refuse to believe it ...

* * *

Indeed, at the suggestion of Napoleon himself, Marmont was firmly entrenched in the shameful reputation of a traitor who abandoned his emperor, went over with his corps to the side of the coalition and thereby forced him to abdicate in favor of the Bourbons without any hope of leaving the throne to his son.

Whatever Napoleon said about Marmont, putting on him all the responsibility for his defeat. However, all these words have come down to us only from memoir sources, the authors of which were also people who were not free from addictions and personal interests.

Marmont himself denies his betrayal: he was the last one who tried to defend Paris, he did not conduct any separate negotiations with the allies, and his corps moved to Versailles without him and contrary to his orders. You can believe Marmont, or you can not believe it - this is a very emotional and subjective question. In the same way, one can believe or not believe the words of other participants in the events who expressed the opposite point of view. But wouldn't it be much more constructive to try to find at least some objective preconditions for resolving this issue?

First of all, it is completely objective that Marmont and Mortier, abandoned by everyone to the mercy of fate, continued an unequal battle in the suburbs of Paris until March 31, 1814. It is also a fact that Marmont was authorized by Joseph Bonaparte to enter into negotiations with the enemy if further resistance becomes meaningless and can only lead to the ruin of the great city. What feelings Marmont had these days is evidenced by his words addressed to Laura d'Abrantes, the widow of General Junod: “Having done everything in my power for the honor of France and French weapons, I am forced to sign a surrender that will allow foreign troops enter our capital tomorrow! All my efforts are in vain. I was forced to surrender to a numerically superior enemy, no matter how regretful I felt. But it was my duty to save the lives of the soldiers for whom I am responsible. I could not do otherwise and I hope that my country will judge me fairly. My conscience is clear before this court." However, these are just the words of Laura Junot, which you can also believe, or you can not believe.

And what were the other “heroes of the great epic” doing at that time?

For some reason, Napoleon himself with his army did not want to defend Paris, preferring to hunt in the rear of the allied army, and on the decisive day of March 31, for some reason, he decided to stop 200 kilometers southeast of the capital in Fontainebleau. His brother Joseph Bonaparte and the Minister of War, General Clark, generally fled from Paris without waiting for the end of the battle. Although Marshal Moses was in Paris, not a single battalion of his national guard thought to support Marmont and Mortier. Marshals Lefebvre, Ney and Oudinot were busy persuading Napoleon to abdicate. Marshal Macdonald, who was covering the rear of the Grand Army and having been ordered by Napoleon to attack Vitry, refused to do so, saying that his men were tired. "Let your guard do it first, sire!" he declared to the Emperor.

But they were still flowers. Marshal Augereau, who commanded the army in the south of the country, abandoned all his artillery in Balance and surrendered Lyon, the second largest city in France, to the enemy without a fight. Already on April 16, he sent a declaration to the troops, glorifying the return of the Bourbons. But even greater "loyalty" to Napoleon was demonstrated by the handsome Murat! Dreaming of retaining his Neapolitan throne, he began to intrigue against the emperor, entered into negotiations with the allies, joined the anti-Napoleonic coalition and, together with the Austrians, launched an offensive against the positions defended by Eugene Beauharnais. Napoleon, who had seen a lot in his lifetime, called Murat "an unheard of traitor" for this.

But what about the rest? Marshal Suchet was in Spain with the army. Marshal Soult on April 10, 1814 was defeated by Wellington near Toulouse. Marshal Saint-Cyr, the only one of the Napoleonic marshals, in November 1813 surrendered his 30,000th army to the Austrians and surrendered himself. Marshal Davout with the corps was tightly blocked in Hamburg.

Suppose that Marmont really betrayed Napoleon and thereby contributed to the restoration of the power of the Bourbons in France. Then it would be logical to assume that the grateful Louis XVIII should have made Marmont rich for this service. After all, if there is Judas, there must be thirty pieces of silver. V. Shikanov, already quoted by us above, writes like this: “The official honors that were showered on Marshal of the Bourbons only increased hatred towards him in the most diverse strata of society.”

But let's see what kind of honors that the Bourbons "showered" Marmont?

After Napoleon's abdication in June 1814, Marmont was appointed captain of the 6th company of the king's bodyguards and became a peer of France. At the same time, he was not even awarded the Order of St. Louis, which the Bourbons in 1814 handed out to the left and right for joy. In particular, marshals Berthier, Victor, Jourdan, Lefebvre, Macdonald, Mortier, Ney, Augereau, Perignon, Soult, Suchet and Oudinot became commanders and knights of this order. Kellerman was awarded, neither more nor less, the Grand Cross of the Order of St. Louis.

By the way, in 1814, General Suam, who openly went over to the side of the Bourbons, became a Knight of the Order of St. Louis. And immediately after the Hundred Days, he was promoted to Inspector General of the Infantry. An interesting continuation of a career, isn't it?

The peerage of France in 1814 was not something out of the ordinary. Marshals Berthier, Kellermann, Lefebvre, Macdonald, Moncey, Mortier, Ney, Pérignon, Saint-Cyr, Serrier, Suchet and Oudinot became peers, that is, almost all of them.

Now - the position of captain of the royal bodyguards. Was this appointment something outstanding, distinguishing Marmont from other marshals for his special services to the Bourbons? Of course it wasn't. Exactly the same captain of the 5th company of the king's bodyguards became Marshal Berthier.

No less prestigious military appointments were received after the abdication of Napoleon and many other marshals. Victor, in particular, became the governor of the 2nd military district, Mortier - the governor of the 16th military district, Ney - the governor of the 6th military district, Augereau - the governor of the 19th military district, Suchet - the governor of the 5th military district. 60-year-old Marshal Perignon became the chairman of the commission for the certification of officers, and the very old man Kellermann became the royal commissioner in the 3rd military district. Further - more: MacDonald became a member of the Supreme Military Council and the governor of the 21st military district, Oudinot became a minister of state, commander of the royal foot grenadiers and chasseurs, and then the governor of the 3rd military district, Soult - the governor of the 13th military district, and through half a year as Minister of War, replacing the unfortunate General Dupont in this post.

From the above list of "honours of the Bourbons" it is clear that Marmont was noted for his "betrayal" not only no more than others who remained "loyal" to the emperor, but even less. In any case, the term "showered" is much more applicable to MacDonald, Oudinot or Soult.

Thus, it turns out that Marmont received from the Bourbons after the abdication of Napoleon almost less than all other marshals, and therefore the logic based on the number of pieces of silver received misfires here.

You can try a different logic, because a traitor, in fact, will remain a traitor under any circumstances. Who changed once, will not stop before betrayal and further.

Let's analyze the subsequent behavior of Marmont, maybe his "treacherous essence" will still show itself there?

During the Hundred Days after the flight of Louis XVIII from France, Marmont did not defect again to Napoleon's camp, as did many of his comrades in arms. On the contrary, faithful to the new oath, he went with the king to Belgian Ghent. On April 10, he was excluded from the list of marshals by Napoleon.

After the final fall of Napoleon, Marmont returned to France and became Minister of State (1817), Governor of the Paris Military District (1821) and member of the Supreme Military Council (1828).

In 1824, Louis XVIII died, and his brother Charles X took the throne. After the July Revolution of 1830, the abdication and departure to England of King Charles X, Marmont did not join Louis Philippe, the son of the Duke of Orleans, who overthrew him, and also emigrated from France . After that, he was in exile for 22 years until he died in Venice on March 3, 1852.

Where is the “traitorous essence” of Marmont we are looking for here? Accurate and consistent in everything, he only faithfully served those to whom he swore an oath, not abandoning his masters in difficult times. After all, this, in fact, is the duty of a real soldier.

Now let's see how some other marshals behaved.

To begin with, none of the marshals wanted to share his exile with Napoleon. Each of them tried to fit into the new value system. Everyone reconciled with the regime of the Bourbon monarchy, except for Marshal Davout, who went into voluntary exile. For some, this decision was difficult, while others joined the white banner quickly and with great zeal. Soult, who became Minister of War, wishing to show his loyalty to the new regime, even tried to enforce a decree on the expulsion from Paris of some pro-Bonapartist generals.

From a military point of view, before the beginning of the Hundred Days, all Napoleonic marshals, except for Davout, were in the service of the Bourbons, that is, they managed to take the oath to them. Marshals Jourdan, Brun, Mortier, Soult, Suchet and Ney again fled to Napoleon, violating this oath, and the latter did this, despite the fact that a few days earlier he had boasted that he would bring the criminal to Paris in an iron cage.

Marshal Murat, who first opposed Napoleon, also again went over to his side, but was defeated by the Austrians at Tolentino (May 2–3, 1815) and fled. After that, this twice traitor was arrested and shot on October 13, 1815. “He died like a jester,” said the exiled Napoleon when he learned about the death of Murat.

Someone said sick, someone hid in his estate. Only Marmont and Berthier showed integrity and followed the king to Belgium, while the latter died on June 1, 1815, falling out of the window of his castle in Bamberg under unclear circumstances.

After the final Restoration, Marmont returned with the king to Paris. And right there, “faithful to duty” Victor, Saint-Cyr and Perignon turned out to be nearby. Soon Oudinot appeared nearby, followed by others. In this case, only the speed with which these people changed their views is amazing. Truly, it is unparalleled in history!

And the awards poured in. Saint-Cyr headed the Ministry of War (1817–1819) and became a marquis. Victor showed himself perfectly in the role of a hunter for his own former friends, recognized as traitors. He too became Minister of War (1821–1823) and a member of the Supreme War Council (1828–1830). Old Perignon became Governor of Paris (1816) and Marquis (1817). At one time, having lost his marshal's baton in Spain, Jourdan headed the military tribunal that tried Marshal Ney. For this, he was granted the title of count (1816), and then he became governor of Les Invalides (1830). This tribunal also included Ney's former comrades-in-arms Marshals Massena, Mortier and Augereau. Marshal Soult, after the amnesty, again became Minister of War (1830–1834), and then Chairman of the Council of Ministers, MacDonald - General of the Royal Guard and Minister of State (1815), Mortier - member of the Supreme Military Council (1828), Ambassador to Russia (1830), military minister (1834).

What is the conclusion? And the conclusion is very sad. It turns out that everyone cheated on Napoleon: women, close relatives, courtiers, and the best military leaders. But the worst thing is that he himself, betraying his true friends and, literally and figuratively, walking over corpses, created this system of false values, in which everyone easily cheated on everyone, while revealing an amazing ability to adapt to new circumstances and find good explanations for it.

And Marshal Marmont, Duke of Ragusa, was clearly not in this not the most pleasant company the most worthy of the label of a traitor, due to very dubious and controversial circumstances, stuck to him for almost two hundred years.

Rank Part commanded Job title Battles/wars

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Awards and prizes

Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the Legion of Honor	Grand Officer of the Legion of Honor	Knight of the Order of the Legion of Honor
Order of the Iron Crown (Kingdom of Italy)	Knight of the Order of the Holy Spirit	60px
Order of the Iron Crown 2nd class	Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the Württemberg Crown

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Auguste Frederic Louis Viesse de Marmont, Duke of Ragusa(fr. Auguste Frederic Louis Viesse de Marmont, duc de Raguse , July 20 ( 17740720 ) - March 22) - Marshal of the Empire (July 12 of the year), Colonel General of the Horse Rangers (from February 1 to July 31 of the year), Duke of Ragusa, peer of France (1814).

Biography

After the triumph of the revolution, he fled with Charles X from France and since then lived in Austria, then in Italy, where he died.

Awards

• Order of the Legion of Honor, large eagle (2.02.1805)
• Order of the Legion of Honor, commander (06/14/1804)
• Order of the Legion of Honor, legionnaire (2.10.1803)
• Order of the Holy Spirit, commander (09/30/1820)
• Order of Saint Louis, grand cross (8/24/1820)
• Order of Saint Louis, Commander (05/3/1816)
• Order of Saint Louis, Chevalier (06/1/1814)
• Order of the Iron Crown, commander (Austria, 11/18/1817)
• Knightly Order of the Golden Eagle, Grand Cross (Kingdom of Württemberg, 02.1806)
• Order of the Iron Crown, Commander (Kingdom of Italy, 06/2/1805)
• Order of St. Andrew the First-Called (Russia, 09/13/1826)
• Order of St. Alexander Nevsky (Russia, 09/13/1826)

Compositions

Marmont's writings: "Esprit des institutions militaires" (The essence of military statements), translated in the publication "Military Library". - St. Petersburg, 1871. vol. 3. p. 462-584.

After his death, memoirs were published (Par., 1856-57). They drew sharp criticism in Laureut's book, "Réfutation des Mémoires du maré chal M." (P., ). Published in Russian: "Travels of Marshal Marmon, Duke of Ragusa, to Hungary, Transylvania, South Russia, across the Crimea and the shores of the Sea of ​​\u200b\u200bAzov, to Constantinople, some parts of Asia Minor, Syria, Palestine and Egypt" / Per. from French, published by X. Field in 4 volumes - M., 1840.

Successor:
Nicolas Songy

View this template commander in chief Adjutant General The ranks of the court Staff ranks Guard ranks The ranks of the army corps Ranks of the reserve cavalry

Excerpt characterizing Marmont, Auguste Frédéric Louis

I had no idea who the happy inhabitants of such a world could be, but I suddenly really wanted to know.
- Went! I said decisively and pulled Stella along with me.
A wondrous landscape opened up to us... It was very similar to the earthly one and, at the same time, differed sharply. It seemed that before us was a real emerald green "earthly" field, overgrown with juicy, very tall silky grass, but at the same time I understood that this was not the earth, but something very similar to it, but too ideal ... not real. And on this field, too beautiful, untouched by human feet, like red drops of blood, scattered throughout the valley, as far as the eye could see, unprecedented poppies were scarlet ... Their huge bright cups swayed heavily, unable to withstand the weight of , iridescent chaos of crazy colors, diamond butterflies... A strange purple sky blazed with a haze of golden clouds, from time to time illuminated by the bright rays of the blue sun... It was an amazingly beautiful, created by someone's wild imagination and blinding by millions of unfamiliar shades, a fantastic world. .. And a man was walking through this world... It was a tiny, fragile girl, from a distance something very similar to Stella. We literally froze, afraid of inadvertently frightening her away with something, but the girl, not paying any attention to us, calmly walked across the green field, almost completely hiding in the lush grass ... and a transparent purple mist twinkling with stars swirled over her fluffy head , creating a marvelous moving halo above it. Her long, shiny, purple hair “flashed” with gold, gently touched by a light breeze, which, playing, playfully kissed her tender, pale cheeks from time to time. The little one seemed very unusual, and absolutely calm ...
- Shall we talk? Stella asked softly.
At that moment, the girl almost caught up with us and, as if waking up from some distant dreams of hers, raised her strange, very large and slanting ... purple eyes at us in surprise. She was extraordinarily beautiful, with a strange, wild, unearthly beauty, and she looked very lonely...
- Hello, girl! Why are you so sad going? Do you need some help? Stella asked cautiously.
The little one shook her head negatively.
“No, you need help,” and she continued to carefully examine us with her strange slanting eyes.
- Us? Stella was surprised. What do we need her for?
The girl opened her miniature palms, and on them ... two amazingly bright purple crystals sparkled with a golden flame.
- Here! - and unexpectedly touching our foreheads with her fingertips, she laughed loudly - the crystals disappeared ...
It was very similar to how my "star" miracle friends once gave me a "green crystal". But that was them. And it was just a tiny girl... and not at all like us, people...
- Well, now it's good! - She said contentedly and, no longer paying attention to us, she went on ...
We looked after her in a dazed way and, unable to understand anything, continued to stand in a “pillar”, digesting what had happened. Stella, as always recovering herself first, shouted:
“Girl, wait, what is this? What are we to do with this?! Well, wait!!!
But the little man, without turning around, waved his frail hand at us and calmly continued on his way, very soon completely disappearing into a sea of ​​lush green, unearthly grass ... over which now only a light cloud fluttered a transparent purple fog ...
- Well, what was it? - Stella said as if asking herself.
I didn’t feel anything bad yet, and, calming down a bit after the “gift” that suddenly fell down, I said.
“Let’s not think about it for now, but we’ll see later…”
On this they decided.
The joyful green field disappeared somewhere, replaced this time by a completely deserted, cold-icy desert, in which, on a single stone, the only person there was sitting ... He was obviously very upset about something, but at the same time, looked very warm and friendly. Long gray hair fell in wavy strands over her shoulders, framing her years-worn face with a silvery halo. It seemed that he did not see where he was, did not feel what he was sitting on, and in general, did not pay any attention to the reality surrounding him ...
Hello, sad person! - approaching enough to start a conversation, Stella greeted quietly.
The man raised his eyes - they turned out to be blue and clear, like the earthly sky.
- What do you, little ones? What have you lost here?.. – the “hermit” asked in a detached tone.
- Why are you sitting here alone, and no one is with you? Stella asked sympathetically. And the place is so creepy...
It was clear that the man did not want to communicate at all, but Stella's warm voice left him no choice - he had to answer ...
“I haven’t needed anyone for many, many years. It makes no sense,” his sad, gentle voice murmured.
“Then what are you doing here alone?” - the baby did not let up, and I was afraid that we would seem too intrusive to him, and he would simply ask us to leave him alone.
But Stella had a real talent for talking to anyone, even the most silent person ... Therefore, amusingly tilting her sweet red head to her side, and obviously not intending to give up, she continued:
Why don't you need anyone? Does it happen?
“Still, as it happens, little one ...” the man sighed heavily. – It still happens... I have lived my whole life in vain – who do I need now?..
Then I slowly began to understand something ... And having gathered myself, I carefully asked:
“Everything was revealed to you when you came here, right?
The man jumped up in surprise and, fixing his now piercing gaze on me, sharply asked:
“What do you know about this, little one? .. What can you know about this? ...” He hunched even more, as if the weight that had fallen on him was unbearable. – All my life I struggled with the incomprehensible, all my life I was looking for an answer ... and I did not find it. And when I came here, everything turned out to be so simple! .. So my whole life was wasted ...
- Well, then everything is fine, if you have already learned everything! .. And now you can look for something else again - there is also a lot of incomprehensible here! - the overjoyed Stella “reassured” the stranger. "What's your name, sad man?"
Fabius, dear. Do you know the girl who gave you this crystal?

Participation in wars: Wars of Republican France. Napoleonic Wars.
Participation in battles: Egyptian company. Italian trip. Spanish company. Battle of Marengo. Battle of Ulm. Battle of Arapile. Battles of Lutzen, Bautzen, near Dresden, near Leipzig. Battles at Brienne, at Champaubert, at Montmirail, at Fer-Champenoise

(Auguste de Marmont) Napoleon's Marshal

The small-scale nobleman Marmont graduated from the Chalon artillery school in 1792, after which he was enrolled in the army as an officer. Even during the siege of Toulon, he was noticed Bonaparte. In 1796, during the Italian campaign, Marmont became aide-de-camp to the future emperor.

In 1798, Marmont accompanied Napoleon Bonaparte to Egypt. After the capture of Malta, he was appointed brigadier general. Then, following Bonaparte, he followed to Paris to participate in the coup.

In 1800 he took part in battle of Marengo commanded the artillery. For bravery in battle he was appointed a divisional general. At that moment he was only 26 years old. fought brilliantly at Ulm in 1805.

In 1806 he became governor of Dalmatia. In 1809 he received under his command the Dalmatian army, which later merged into the Italian one.

The future marshal took part in military campaigns not only in Italy, but also in Croatia. After Wagram battle Napoleon elevated Marmont to the rank of marshal and the title of duke.

The next two years, he did not take part in the battles, as he was the governor of Illyria. However, in 1811 he began to command the Portuguese army, replacing massena. In battle at Arapil 1812 was wounded, the battle itself ended in defeat.

After treatment, in 1813 he took part in the German campaign. Fought under Lützen and Bautzen, near Dresden. Also participated in battle of Leipzig.

In the French campaign of 1814, together with the emperor, he fought near Brienne, at Champaubert, at Montmirail, at Fer-Champenoise. In the last battle, the marshal capitulated. In other words, Marmont did everything to look like a traitor (many civilian casualties, an attempt to end Paris in ruins).

He became a peer under the king, but after some time he went to Europe. In Vienna, he became the guardian of Napoleon's son, the Duke of Reichstadt.

Marmont, a small estate nobleman, was released into the army as an officer from the artillery school of Chalons in 1792. Bonaparte noticed him during the siege of Toulon. Both of them, having received a similar education, sympathized with each other. In the Italian campaign of 1796, Bonaparte made Marmont one of his adjutants.

In 1798, Marmont accompanied the future emperor to Egypt, where, after the capture of Malta, he became a brigadier general. Later, Marmont, among others close to Bonaparte, followed to Paris to take part in the coup of 18 Brumaire.

At the Battle of Marengo on June 14, 1800, he commanded the artillery. For the distinction shown in this brilliantly won battle, Marmont was appointed divisional general. He was at that moment only 26 years old. However, Marmont was not included in the list of marshals in May 1804 ... This did not prevent him from fighting with fervor at Ulm ( October 20, 1805). In July of the following year, 1806, he became the governor-general of Dalmatia. Marmont greatly expanded this duchy by annexing Ragusa, captured from Russia in 1807. In 1809, Marmont commanded the Dalmatian army, which became part of the Italian army of Prince Eugene Beauharnais.

Marmon took part in military campaigns in Italy and Croatia. Its units were the first to occupy Znaim after the Wagram battle, in which the Austrian army was utterly defeated. This happened on July 10, 1809, the next day Napoleon entered the city, and on July 12 he handed Marmont a marshal's baton and bestowed the title of Duke of Ragusa. Many historians argue that Marmont received the title of Marshal not because of outstanding military merits, but out of old memory and friendship with the Emperor. I think this is very close to the truth. - Adjutant.

Marmont spent the next two years away from the battlefields - he turned out to be the governor of the provinces of Illyria. But in 1811 he replaced Massena in command of the Portuguese army. After several successes, inconsistent actions with Marshal Soult against Wellington led to defeat at the Battle of Arapil on July 22, 1812.

Marmont was seriously wounded in the arm. In 1813, having recovered, he took part in the German campaign. Commanding the VI Corps, fought at Lützen ( May 2, 1813) and Bautzen ( May 20 and 21, 1813). In the second phase of the campaign, Marmont fought near Dresden (August 26-27, 1813). In that battle, where the allied forces suffered a crushing defeat, General Moreau was mortally wounded by a cannonball. (A Frenchman, a republican, a talented commander, accused of conspiring against Napoleon and expelled from France. Great hopes were placed on Moreau, Napoleon's sworn enemy, intending to make him the supreme commander of the allied forces. Fate decreed otherwise, but could no longer influence the outcome of the campaign. - Adjutant.) Marmont, together with Murat, Victor, Saint-Cyr and General Vandamme, pursued the allies retreating to the Ore Mountains for several days. taking several thousand prisoners. The Marshal also took part on October 16-19 in the "Battle of the Nations" at Leipzig.

In the French campaign of 1814, Marmont fought with the Emperor at Brienne ( January 31), under Champobert ( February 10) at Montmirail ( February 11). On February 13, Blucher defeated and drove back Marmont's troops. But already on February 14, Napoleon, who arrived in time to help Marmont, defeated Blucher again at the Battle of Voshan ... (“I have found my boots of the Italian campaign,” exclaimed Napoleon, recalling his lightning victories in 1796. These almost daily victories inspired the Emperor so much that he rejected the offer of a truce by the Prince of Liechtenstein. Military critics find the 1814 campaign one of the most remarkable parts of the Napoleonic era from the point of view of the strategic creativity of the emperor - Tarle, "Napoleon").

Near Laon, where Napoleon drove the hastily retreating Blucher, Marmont's attempts to drive the latter out of the city ( March 9-10, 1814) failed. The emperor brought down on him a hail of reproaches, since he intended to finally deal with the Prussian army of Blucher. This was followed by several more victorious battles of Napoleon, but they could not change anything. The number of allied armies was several times higher than the French troops, in which by that time hastily trained 16-19 year old recruits were fighting. The allies, on the advice of Talleyrand, firmly decided to go straight to Paris, ignoring Napoleon, who remained in the rear.

Marmont, together with Marshal Mortier and Generals Pacto and Ame, with a total of 25,000 soldiers blocked the path to Paris. As a result of the battle of Fer-Champenoise on March 25, they were driven back to the outskirts of the city. Paris began to hastily prepare for the defense: up to 40,000 people gathered defenders. The assault on the city by the allies began on the morning of March 30. In a few hours they lost 9 thousand people, of which about 6 thousand were Russians. At 5 pm, depressed by the fear of defeat and under the influence of Talleyrand, Marmont capitulated...

Napoleon arrived at Fontainebleau at night. (Later, on the island of St. Helena, Napoleon will say: “ I never said that the Duke of Ragusa had betrayed me, but only that his surrender at Esson was simply ridiculous, but meanwhile it turned out to be disastrous for me.»). Determined to continue the fight, the Emperor decided to play for time in order to pull as many troops as possible to Fontainebleau. To this end, he sends Caulaincourt to the Emperor Alexander for negotiations. The Russian emperor asked him to induce Napoleon to abdicate. " Convince your master to submit to fate- said Alexander, saying goodbye to Caulaincourt. - Everything that can be done for honor (to Napoleon) will be done", - and he again called Napoleon " great man».

On the night of April 3-4, Marmont met with the envoy of the allies and signed the withdrawal of his troops defending the approaches to Fontainebleau. Caulaincourt came to him, and together they went to Alexander's headquarters. Having learned that a significant part of the French army was neutralized, the Russian emperor demanded the unconditional resignation of Napoleon.

Napoleon did not forgive this defect to his marshal. As he studied the papers sent from the Allies, he whispered: "Marmont gave me the final blow". Here it is worth mentioning the story of E.V. Tarle about the last days of the First Empire in the work "Napoleon", ch.15. In addition, along with the obvious recognition of the betrayal of Marmont, it is worth thinking about the inevitable thousands of victims of both the civilian population of Paris and the soldiers in the event of an assault on the city, about the unwillingness of the marshals and soldiers to turn the capital into ruins, in general to conduct a further struggle that is practically meaningless, and about more than the dubious outcome of such an operation: the forces of France, which had spent a quarter of a century in continuous wars, were exhausted. In addition, do not forget about the words of Napoleon himself, said to Caulaincourt on the night before the abdication: “0, people, people, Caulaincourt! My marshals would be ashamed to behave like Marmont, they speak of him with indignation, but they are annoyed that he was so ahead of them in the path of honors. They would like, without covering themselves, however, with disgrace, to receive the same rights to the goodwill of the Bourbons ... ".

The enthroned Louis XVIII made Marmont a Peer of France. Exiled in 1830 with Charles X, Marmont swept through Europe and ended up in Vienna, where he became the guardian of the Duke of Reichstadt, son of Napoleon. Towards the end of Marmont's life, from whose title the French soon extracted the word " raguser "meaning "despicable traitor", began compiling memoirs in which he tried to justify himself. He died in Venice in 1852, at the age of 78.

	Napoleon, island of St. Helena “He was almost the most mediocre of the generals; I supported him, defended him against everyone, because I believed in his honor. Brought up in my camp, fed in my house, showered with favors, riches, becoming one of the most prominent people in France, having such a high title, in his ambition he dreamed of even higher exaltation; he forgot under whose flag he received all his awards, under whose roof he spent his youth; he forgot that he owes all the honors to the prestige of that national cockade, which he now tramples underfoot, decorating himself with the sign of the traitors with whom he fought for twenty-five years!

	From track record 06.07.1790 Su-lieutenant of the garrison battalion 01.09.1792 2nd Lieutenant of the 1st Artillery Regiment 08.03.1793 1st lieutenant 12.11.1793 Captain 08.02.1796 Battalion commander 13.10.1796 brigade commander 10.06.1798 Brigadier General 25.12.1799 Member of the State Council 15.04.1800 Artillery Commander of the Reserve Army 06.09.1800 Commander of Artillery of the Italian Army 09.09.1800 Divisional General 16.09.1802 Inspector General of Artillery 01.02.1805 Colonel General of the Horse Rangers 30.08.1805 Commander of the 2nd Corps of the Great Army 23.12.1805 Commander of the 1st Corps of the Italian Army 07.07.1806 Governor General of Dalmatia and Commander of the Dalmatian Army 15.04.1808 Duke of Ragusa 1809 Commander of the 11th Corps 12.07.1809 Marshal of the Empire 07.05.1811 Commander of the Portuguese Army 12.03.1813 Commander of the 6th Corps of the Great Army 04.06.1814 Captain of the 6th Company of the King's Bodyguards and Peer of France 10.04.1815 Excluded from marshals 03.08.1815 General of the Royal Guard 30.11.1817 Minister of State 1821-1830 Governor of the 1st Military District 17.02. 1828 Member of the Supreme Military Council 1830 Emigrated from France after the July Revolution