The Battle of the Somme is one of the largest battles of World War I, with over 1,000,000 killed and wounded, making it one of the bloodiest battles in human history. But, according to some reports, up to 100 thousand people were killed during the battle and died later from wounds. During it, every hour, about 6 thousand people died or were injured, according to the most conservative estimates.

Nazi Germany lost 841,000 soldiers in the battle. By the middle of the summer of 1942, the battles of the Great Patriotic War had reached the Volga. The German command also included Stalingrad in the plan for a large-scale offensive in the south of the USSR (Caucasus, Crimea). It included 13 divisions, where there were about 270,000 people, 3 thousand guns and about five hundred tanks.

From that day on, fascist aviation began to systematically bomb the city. On the ground, battles did not stop either. All houses were turned into fortresses. On September 12, 1942, at the height of the battles for the city, the General Staff began to develop the offensive operation "Uranus". It was planned by Marshal G.K. Zhukov. The plan was to hit the flanks of the German wedge, which was defended by the Allied troops (Italians, Romanians and Hungarians).

Having overturned Germany's allies, on November 23, Soviet troops closed the ring, surrounding 22 divisions numbering 330 thousand soldiers. Hitler rejected the retreat option and ordered the commander-in-chief of the 6th Army, Paulus, to start defensive battles in the encirclement.

4. The bloodiest one-day battle

Each side unsuccessfully tried to break through the enemy's defenses and launch a decisive offensive. 305,000 soldiers and officers from both sides lost their lives in a useless confrontation.

7. The most bloody sacking of the city

After a massive 8-hour artillery preparation, the German troops went on the offensive on the right bank of the Meuse River, but met stubborn resistance. The German infantry was advancing in tight battle formations. During the first day of the offensive, the German troops advanced 2 km and took the first position of the French. During the period from February 27 to March 6, about 190,000 soldiers and 25,000 tons of military cargo were delivered to Verdun by motor vehicles.

Only on the first day of the campaign, July 1, 1916, the English landing lost 60,000 people. German losses amounted to more than 465,000 people, of which 164,055 were killed and missing. The offensive plan on all fronts, including the Western one, was developed and approved as early as early March 1916 in Chantilly. As a result, the length of the front was reduced from 70 to 40 kilometers. Already a month after the start of the battle, the British and French lost so many soldiers that 9 additional divisions were brought into battle, while Germany transferred as many as 20 divisions to the Somme.

From October 16 to October 19, 1813, a battle took place near Leipzig between the armies of Napoleon I and the sovereigns united against him: Russian, Austrian, Prussian and Swedish. The forces of the latter were divided into three armies: the Bohemian (main), Silesian and northern, but only the first two of them participated in the battle on October 16. On October 17, both warring parties remained inactive, and only on the north side of Leipzig did a cavalry skirmish occur.

3. The most bloody creation of an empire

About one o'clock in the afternoon, the allied monarchs could already enter the city, in some parts of which fierce fighting was still in full swing. Due to a disastrous mistake for the French, the bridge on the Elster was blown up prematurely. But the new head of the Russian army also preferred to retreat: on the one hand, he wanted to wear down the enemy, on the other, Kutuzov was waiting for reinforcements to give a general battle. At 6 am, the French artillery opened fire on the entire front.

Ahead, the huntsmen also lined up in a cordon. The division of Major General Neverovsky took up positions behind the flushes. This area was attacked by the cavalry of Marshal Murat, the troops of Marshals Ney and Davout, and the corps of General Junot. The number of attackers reached 115 thousand people. The course of the Battle of Borodino after the repulsed attacks of the French at 6 and 7 o'clock continued with another attempt to take flushes on the left flank. However, subsequent attacks (at 8 and 9 in the morning) were, despite the incredible intensity of the fighting, completely unsuccessful.

At the same time, the one-day battles that took place in the 20th century were still less bloody than the Battle of Borodino.

Konovnitsin withdrew his troops to Semyonovskoye only after the holding of these fortifications ceased to be a necessity. The barrow height was attacked at the same time that the battle for the capture of flushes was in full swing on the left flank.

It can be considered that this was the first case in the history of the use of biological weapons.

Platov was able to reach the rear of the French (the Valuevo area), which suspended the offensive in the central direction. Uvarov made an equally successful maneuver in the Bezzubovo area. The battle of Borodino lasted all day and gradually began to subside only by 6 pm.

Galeas San Lorenzo, flagship of the Holy League, at the Battle of Lepanto. The Battle of Lepanto was the largest naval battle of the 16th century, involving more than 500 galleys. Photo taken from the archives of the National Maritime Museum Greenwich (London). During the Iran-Iraq war, chemical weapons were used. Over 8 years of hostilities, about 900 thousand people died, which makes this war one of the most brutal since World War II.

Perhaps the bloodiest battle took place on July 1, 1916 during the First World War. We talk about him and about six more bloody battles in history. On October 7, 1571, the bloodiest battle in the history of naval battles took place - the Battle of Lepanto between the Spanish-Venetian fleet and the fleet of the Ottoman Empire.

War is the worst thing that can happen in our life. This must not be forgotten.

Especially about those five battles. The amount of blood in which is amazing ...

1. Battle of Stalingrad, 1942-1943

Opponents: Nazi Germany vs. the USSR
Losses: Germany 841,000; Soviet Union 1,130,000
Total: 1,971,000
Outcome: Victory of the USSR

The German advance began with a devastating series of Luftwaffe raids that left much of Stalingrad in ruins. But the bombing did not completely destroy the urban landscape. As they advanced, the German army became embroiled in fierce street fighting with the Soviet forces. Although the Germans took control of more than 90% of the city, the Wehrmacht forces were unable to dislodge the remaining stubborn Soviet soldiers from it.

The cold began, and in November 1942, the Red Army launched a double attack of the 6th German Army in Stalingrad. The flanks collapsed, and the 6th Army was surrounded, both by the Red Army and by the harsh Russian winter. Hunger, cold, and sporadic Soviet attacks began to take their toll. But Hitler did not allow the 6th Army to retreat. By February 1943, after an unsuccessful German attempt to break through when food supply lines were cut, the 6th Army was defeated.

2. Battle of Leipzig, 1813

Opponents: France vs. Russia, Austria and Prussia
Losses: 30,000 French, 54,000 allies
Total: 84000
Outcome: Victory of the Coalition Forces

The Battle of Leipzig was the largest and most powerful defeat suffered by Napoleon, and the largest battle in Europe before the outbreak of the First World War. Faced with attacks from all sides, the French army performed remarkably well, keeping the attackers at bay for more than nine hours before they were outnumbered.

Realizing the imminent defeat, Napoleon began to withdraw his troops in an orderly manner across the only remaining bridge. The bridge was blown up too soon. Over 20,000 French soldiers were thrown into the water and drowned while trying to cross the river. The defeat opened the doors to France for the allied forces.

3. Battle of Borodino, 1812

Opponents: Russia vs. France
Losses: Russians - 30,000 - 58,000; French - 40,000 - 58,000
Total: 70,000
Outcome: Various interpretations of the results

Borodino is considered the bloodiest one-day battle in history. Napoleon's army invaded the Russian Empire without declaring war. The rapid advance of the powerful French army forced the Russian command to retreat inland. Commander-in-Chief M.I. Kutuzov decided to give a general battle not far from Moscow, near the village of Borodino.

During this battle, every hour on the battlefield, about 6 thousand people died or were injured, according to the most conservative estimates. During the battle, the Russian army lost about 30% of its composition, the French - about 25%. In absolute numbers, this is about 60 thousand killed on both sides. But, according to some reports, up to 100 thousand people were killed during the battle and died later from wounds. Not a single one-day battle that took place before Borodino was so bloody.

Opponents: Britain vs. Germany
Casualties: Britain 60,000, Germany 8,000
Total: 68,000
Outcome: Inconclusive

The British Army experienced the bloodiest day in its history in the opening stages of a battle that would last for several months. More than a million people were killed as a result of the hostilities, and the original military tactical situation remained largely unchanged. The plan was to crush the German defenses with artillery bombardment to the point where the attacking British and French forces could simply move in and occupy the opposite trenches. But the shelling did not bring the expected devastating consequences.

As soon as the soldiers left the trenches, the Germans opened fire from machine guns. Poorly coordinated artillery often covered their own advancing infantry with fire or was often left without shelter. By nightfall, despite the massive loss of life, only a few targets were occupied. Attacks continued in this manner until October 1916.

5. Battle of Cannae, 216 BC

Opponents: Rome vs. Carthage
Losses: 10,000 Carthaginians, 50,000 Romans
Total: 60,000
Outcome: Carthaginian victory

The Carthaginian commander Hannibal led his army through the Alps and defeated two Roman armies on Trebia and Lake Trasimene, sought to involve the Romans in the last decisive battle. The Romans concentrated their heavy infantry in the center, hoping to break through the middle of the Carthaginian army. Hannibal, in anticipation of a central Roman attack, deployed his best troops on the flanks of his army.

As the center of the Carthaginian forces collapsed, the Carthaginian parties closed in on the Roman flanks. The mass of legionnaires in the back ranks forced the front ranks to march irresistibly forward, not knowing that they were driving themselves into a trap. Eventually, the Carthaginian cavalry arrived and closed the gap, thus completely encircling the Roman army. In close combat, the legionnaires, unable to flee, were forced to fight to the death. As a result of the battle, 50 thousand Roman citizens and two consuls were killed.

In Stalingrad, the course of the world made a sharp turn

In Russian military history, the battle of Stalingrad has always been considered the most outstanding and significant event of the Great Patriotic War and the entire Second World War. The highest assessment of the victory of the Soviet Union in the Battle of Stalingrad is also given by modern world historiography. “At the turn of the century, Stalingrad was recognized as the decisive battle not only of the Second World War, but of the era as a whole,” emphasizes the British historian J. Roberts.

During the Great Patriotic War, there were other equally brilliant Soviet victories - both in terms of their strategic results and in terms of the level of military art. So why does Stalingrad stand out among them? In connection with the 70th anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad, I would like to reflect on this.

The interests of historical science and the development of cooperation between peoples demand that military history be freed from the spirit of confrontation, that scientific research be subordinated to the interests of deep, truthful and objective coverage of the history of World War II, including the Battle of Stalingrad. This is due to the fact that some people want to falsify the history of the Second World War, "re-war" the war on paper.

Much has been written about the Battle of Stalingrad. Therefore, there is no need to retell its course in detail. Historians and the military rightly wrote that its outcome was due to the increased power of the country and the Red Army by the autumn of 1942, the high level of military leadership of its command cadres, the mass heroism of Soviet soldiers, the unity and selflessness of the entire Soviet people. It was emphasized that in the course of this battle our strategy, operational art and tactics made a new major step forward in their development and were enriched with new provisions.

PLANS OF THE PARTIES FOR 1942

When discussing plans for a summer campaign at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (VGK) in March 1942, the General Staff (Boris Shaposhnikov) and Georgy Zhukov proposed that the transition to strategic defense be considered the main course of action.

Zhukov considered it possible to take private offensive actions only in the zone of the Western Front. Semyon Timoshenko proposed, in addition, to conduct an offensive operation in the Kharkov direction. To the objections of Zhukov and Shaposhnikov regarding this proposal, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Joseph Stalin stated: “We can’t sit on the defensive with our hands folded, we can’t wait until the Germans strike first! We must ourselves deliver a number of preemptive strikes on a broad front and feel the readiness of the enemy.

As a result, it was decided to undertake a number of offensive operations in the Crimea, in the Kharkov region, in the Lgovsk and Smolensk directions, in the regions of Leningrad and Demyansk.

As for the plans of the German command, at one time it was believed that it set as its main goal the capture of Moscow by a deep detour from the south. But in reality, according to the directive of the Fuhrer and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Germany, Hitler No. 41 of April 5, 1942, the main goal of the German offensive in the summer of 1942 was to seize the Donbass, Caucasian oil and, by disrupting communications in the depths of the country, deprive the USSR of the most important resources coming from these districts.

Firstly, when striking in the south, conditions were created for achieving surprise and more favorable opportunities for achieving success, because in 1942 our Supreme Command was again expecting the main attack of the enemy in the Moscow direction, and the main forces and reserves were concentrated here. Nor was the German disinformation plan "Kremlin" unraveled.

Secondly, when advancing in the Moscow direction, the German troops would have to break through the defenses prepared in advance, in depth with the prospect of protracted hostilities. If in 1941 near Moscow the German Wehrmacht failed to overcome the resistance of the retreating Red Army with heavy losses, then in 1942 it was all the more difficult for the Germans to count on the capture of Moscow. At that time, in the south, in the Kharkov region, as a result of a major defeat of the Soviet troops, the German army was confronted by our significantly weakened forces; it was here that the most vulnerable section of the Soviet front was located.

Thirdly, when the German army delivered the main blow in the Moscow direction and even, at worst, captured Moscow (which was unlikely), the retention by the Soviet troops of economically important regions in the south created the conditions for the continuation of the war and its successful completion.

All this suggests that the strategic plans of the Hitlerite command, in the main, correctly took into account the prevailing situation. But even under this condition, the troops of Germany and its satellites would not have been able to advance so far and reach the Volga, if not for the major mistakes of the Soviet command in assessing the direction of a possible enemy strike, inconsistency and indecision in choosing a method of action. On the one hand, in principle, it was supposed to switch to strategic defense, on the other hand, a number of unprepared and unsupported offensive operations were undertaken. This led to the dispersal of forces, and our army was unprepared for either defense or offensive. Oddly enough, but the Soviet troops again found themselves in the same uncertain position as in 1941.

And in 1942, despite the defeats of 1941, the ideologized cult of the offensive doctrine continued to press so hard, the underestimation of defense, its false understanding were so deeply rooted in the minds of the Soviet command that they were embarrassed as something unworthy for the Red Army and were not resolved in full apply.

In the light of the plans of the parties discussed above, an important aspect is clearly clarified: the Stalingrad strategic operation was an interconnected part of the entire system of strategic actions of the Soviet Armed Forces in 1942. In many military-historical works, the Stalingrad operation was considered in isolation from other operations carried out in the western direction. This also applies to Operation Mars in 1942, the essence of which is most perverted, especially in American historiography.

The main remark boils down to the fact that the main, decisive strategic operation in the autumn and winter of 1942–1943 was not operations in the southwest, but offensive operations carried out in the western strategic direction. The basis for this conclusion is the fact that fewer forces and means were allocated to solve problems in the south than in the western direction. But in reality this is not entirely true, because the southern strategic direction must be taken as a whole, and not only the troops near Stalingrad, including the troops in the North Caucasus and the troops of the Voronezh direction, which were practically directed to the southern direction. In addition, we must take into account the fact that the offensive actions of our troops in the west did not allow the German command to transfer forces to the south. Our main strategic reserves were located southeast of Moscow and could be transferred to the south.

DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS ON THE APPROACHES TO STALINGRAD

The second group of questions relates to the first stage of the Battle of Stalingrad (from July 17 to November 18, 1942) and arises from the need for a more objective, critical assessment of defensive battles and operations on the outskirts of Stalingrad. During this period, there were the most omissions and shortcomings in the actions of our command and troops. Military theoretical thought has yet to clarify how our army, under catastrophically difficult conditions, still managed to restore in the summer of 1942 the almost completely disrupted strategic front in the southwestern direction. It is known that only from July 17 to September 30, 1942, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command sent 50 rifle and cavalry divisions, 33 brigades, including 24 tank brigades, to reinforce the Stalingrad direction.

At the same time, the Soviet command did not plan and did not set the task for the troops to stop the advancing enemy only after retreating to the Volga. It repeatedly demanded that the enemy be stopped at a number of lines even on the distant approaches to Stalingrad. Why was it not possible, despite the large number of reserves, the courage and mass heroism of officers and soldiers, the skillful actions of a number of formations and units? There were, of course, many cases of confusion and panic, especially after the heavy defeats and heavy losses of our troops in May-June 1942. In order for a psychological turning point to occur in the troops, a serious shake-up was needed. And in this regard, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 227 played its generally positive role, giving a sharp and truthful assessment of the situation and permeated with the main requirement - "Not a step back!" It was a very harsh and extremely rigid document, but forced and necessary in the then prevailing conditions.

Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus preferred captivity to suicide.

The main reason for the failure of a number of defensive battles on the outskirts of Stalingrad was that the Soviet command repeated the mistakes of 1941 in organizing strategic defense.

After each major breakthrough of the German army, instead of a sober assessment of the situation and making a decision on defense at one or another advantageous line, where the retreating troops would retreat with battles and fresh formations from the depths would be pulled up in advance, orders were given to hold the occupied lines at any cost, even when it was impossible . Reserve formations and incoming replenishment on the move were sent into battle, as a rule, to deliver poorly prepared counterattacks and counterattacks. Therefore, the enemy had the opportunity to beat them in parts, and the Soviet troops were deprived of the opportunity to properly gain a foothold and organize defense on new lines.

The nervous reaction to each retreat further aggravated the already difficult, difficult situation and doomed the troops to new retreats.

It should also be recognized that the German troops carried out offensive operations quite skillfully, widely maneuvering and massively using tank and motorized formations in open, tank-accessible terrain. Having met resistance in one sector or another, they quickly changed the direction of their attacks, trying to reach the flank and rear of the Soviet troops, whose maneuverability was much lower.

The setting of unrealistic tasks, the appointment of dates for the start of hostilities and operations without taking into account the minimum necessary time for preparing for their conduct, also made themselves felt when many counterattacks and counterattacks were delivered during defensive operations. For example, on September 3, 1942, in connection with the difficult situation in the Stalingrad Front, Stalin sent a telegram to the representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command: “Demand from the commander of the troops, standing to the north and north-west of Stalingrad, to immediately strike at the enemy and come to the aid of the Stalingraders.”

There were many such telegrams and demands. It is not difficult for a person who understands at least a little about military affairs to understand their absurdity: how can troops, without minimal training and organization, take and “hit” and go on the offensive. The activity of the defense was of great importance for wearing down the enemy, disrupting and delaying his offensive actions. But counterattacks could be more effective with more careful preparation and material support.

During the defensive battles on the outskirts of Stalingrad, air defense was extremely weak, and therefore it was necessary to operate in conditions of significant superiority of enemy aircraft, which made it especially difficult for troops to maneuver.

If at the beginning of the war the inexperience of personnel also affected, then after heavy losses in 1941 and in the spring of 1942, the problem of personnel was even more acute, although there were many commanders who managed to harden and gain combat experience. A lot of mistakes, omissions and even cases of criminal irresponsibility were made on the part of the commanders of the fronts, armies, commanders of formations and units. Taken together, they also seriously complicated the situation, but were not as decisive as the miscalculations made by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Not to mention the fact that the too frequent change of commanders, commanders (only in July-August 1942, three commanders of the Stalingrad Front were replaced) did not allow them to get used to the situation.

The fear of encirclement adversely affected the stability of the troops. Political distrust and repressions against military personnel, who during the retreats in 1941 and in the spring of 1942, were surrounded, played a detrimental role in this respect. And after the war, officers who were surrounded were not accepted to study at military academies. It seemed to the military-political bodies and the bosses of the NKVD that such an attitude towards the "encirclement" could increase the stamina of the troops. But everything was the opposite - the fear of encirclement reduced the stubbornness of the troops in the defense. At the same time, it was not taken into account that, as a rule, the most staunchly defending troops fell into the encirclement, often as a result of the retreat of their neighbors. It was this most selfless part of the military that was persecuted. No one was held responsible for this wild and criminal incompetence.

FEATURES OF THE STALINGRAD OFFENSIVE OPERATION

From the experience of the second stage of the Battle of Stalingrad (from November 19, 1942 to February 2, 1943), when the troops of the Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad fronts carried out a counteroffensive, important conclusions and lessons follow on the preparation and conduct of offensive operations to encircle and destroy the enemy.

The strategic plan of this counter-offensive was to encircle and destroy the group of German fascists from the area south of Stalingrad in the general direction to Kalach troops and their satellites (Romanian, Italian, Hungarian troops) east of Stalingrad. Long-range aviation and the Volga flotilla also took part in the operation.

Various points of view are expressed as to who owns the initial idea of ​​a counteroffensive with encirclement and destruction of the main enemy forces. Khrushchev, Eremenko, and many others claimed this. Speaking objectively, this idea in general terms, as many participants in the war recall, was literally “in the air,” because the very configuration of the front already suggested the need to strike on the flanks of the enemy grouping under the command of Friedrich Paulus.

But the main, most difficult task was how to concretize and implement this idea, taking into account the current situation, how to gather and concentrate the necessary forces and means in time and organize their actions, where exactly to direct strikes and with what tasks. It can be considered an established fact that the main idea of ​​this plan, of course, belongs to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, and above all to Georgy Zhukov, Alexander Vasilevsky and the General Staff. Another thing is that it was born on the basis of proposals, meetings and conversations with generals and officers of the fronts.

On the whole, it must be said that the level of military skill of command personnel and headquarters, the combat skill of all personnel in the preparation and conduct of offensive operations at the second stage of the Battle of Stalingrad was significantly higher than in all previous offensive operations. Many methods of preparing and conducting combat operations, having appeared here for the first time (not always in their finished form), were then used with great success in the operations of 1943-1945.

Near Stalingrad, the massive use of forces and means in the directions chosen for the offensive was carried out with great success, although not yet to the same extent as in the operations of 1944-1945. So, on the South-Western Front, in the breakthrough section of 22 km (9% of the entire width of the strip), out of 18 rifle divisions, 9 were concentrated; on the Stalingrad front on the 40 km section (9%) out of 12 divisions - 8; in addition, 80% of all tanks and up to 85% of artillery were concentrated in these areas. However, the density of artillery was only 56 guns and mortars per 1 km of the breakthrough area, while in subsequent operations it was 200–250 or more. In general, the secrecy of preparation and the suddenness of the transition to the offensive were achieved.

In essence, for the first time during the war, not only careful planning of operations was carried out, but also painstaking work on the ground with commanders of all levels was carried out to the extent necessary to prepare for combat operations, organize interaction, combat, rear and technical support. The reconnaissance succeeded, albeit incompletely, in revealing the enemy's fire system, which made it possible to carry out a more reliable fire defeat than was the case in previous offensive operations.

For the first time, an artillery and air offensive was used in full, although not everything was sufficiently clearly worked out in the methods of artillery preparation and attack support.

For the first time, before an offensive on a broad front, reconnaissance in combat was carried out in the zones of all armies by advanced subunits in order to clarify the location of the enemy's forward edge and system of fire. But in the bands of some armies, it was carried out two to three days, and in the 21st and 57th armies - five days before the start of the offensive, which under other circumstances could reveal the beginning of the offensive, and the obtained data on the enemy’s fire system could become significantly outdated .

Near Stalingrad, for the first time, during a major offensive operation, new infantry combat formations were used in accordance with the requirements of the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 306 - with a one-echelon construction of not only subunits, units, but also formations. Such a formation reduced the losses of troops and made it possible to more fully use infantry firepower. But at the same time, the absence of second echelons made it difficult to build up efforts in a timely manner to develop the offensive in depth. This was one of the reasons why the infantry divisions of the first echelon failed to break through the enemy defenses; already at a depth of 3–4 km, tank corps had to be brought into battle, which, under the then prevailing situation, was a necessary measure. The experience of these and subsequent offensive operations showed that in regiments and divisions, when possible, it is imperative to create second echelons.

The volume of material and technical support for the troops has increased significantly. By the beginning of the counteroffensive, 8 million artillery shells and mines were concentrated on three fronts. For example: in 1914 the entire Russian army had 7 million shells.

But if we compare it with the needs of fire damage, then the November offensive operations of 1942 were relatively insufficiently provided with ammunition - an average of 1.7-3.7 ammunition; Southwestern Front - 3.4; Don - 1.7; Stalingrad - 2. For example, in the Belorussian or Vistula-Oder operations, the supply of fronts with ammunition was up to 4.5 ammunition.

Regarding the second stage of the Battle of Stalingrad, connected with the actions of the troops to destroy the encircled enemy grouping and develop an offensive on the external front, two questions arise, on which different opinions are expressed.

First, some historians and military experts believe that a serious flaw in the Soviet counter-offensive operation near Stalingrad is the fact that a large gap has formed between the encirclement of the enemy grouping and its destruction, while the classical position of military art says that the encirclement and destruction of the enemy should be one a continuous process, which was subsequently achieved in the Belarusian, Yasso-Kishinev and some other operations. But what they managed to do near Stalingrad was a great achievement for that time, especially if we remember that in the offensive near Moscow, near Demyansk and in other areas it was not even possible to surround the enemy, and near Kharkov in the spring of 1942, the Soviet troops surrounding the enemy, they themselves were surrounded and defeated.

During the counteroffensive near Stalingrad, on the one hand, all the necessary measures were not taken to dismember and destroy the enemy during his encirclement, although one must also take into account the large size of the territory on which the encircled enemy was located, and the high density of his groupings. On the other hand, the presence of large enemy forces on the outer front, seeking to release the encircled 6th Army of Paulus, did not make it possible to concentrate sufficient forces to quickly eliminate the enemy troops encircled near Stalingrad.

In Stalingrad, the battle was for every house.

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command belatedly decided to unite the control of all troops engaged in the destruction of the encircled grouping in the hands of one front. Only in mid-December 1942, a directive was received on the transfer of all troops involved near Stalingrad to the Don Front.

Secondly, how legitimate was the decision of the Supreme Command Headquarters to send the 2nd Guards Army of Rodion Malinovsky to defeat the Erich Manstein group in the Kotelnikovsky direction. As you know, the 2nd Guards Army was originally intended to operate as part of the Southwestern Front, then, with a change in the situation, it was decided to transfer it to the Don Front to participate in the destruction of the encircled enemy grouping. But with the appearance in the Kotelnikovsky direction of the enemy army group "Don" under the command of Manstein, the Supreme Command Headquarters, at the request of General Eremenko, a new decision was made - to transfer the 2nd Guards Army to the Stalingrad Front for operations in the Kotelnikovsky direction. This proposal was also supported by Vasilevsky, who was at that time at the command post of the Don Front. Rokossovsky continued to insist on the transfer of the 2nd Guards Army to the Don Front in order to accelerate the destruction of the encircled enemy grouping. Nikolai Voronov also opposed the transfer of the 2nd Guards Army to the Stalingrad Front. After the war, he called this decision a "terrible miscalculation" of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

But a careful analysis of the situation at that time, with the involvement of enemy documents that became known to us after the war, shows that the decision of the Supreme Command Headquarters to send the 2nd Guards Army to defeat Manstein was apparently more appropriate. There was no guarantee that with the inclusion of the 2nd Guards Army in the Don Front, it would be possible to quickly deal with the encircled Paulus group. Subsequent events confirmed how difficult the task was to destroy 22 enemy divisions, numbering up to 250 thousand people. There was a big, insufficiently justified risk that a breakthrough of the Manstein grouping and a strike against it by the Paulus army could lead to the release of the encircled enemy grouping and disruption of the further offensive of the troops of the Southwestern and Voronezh fronts.

ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BATTLE OF STALINGRAD FOR THE SECOND WORLD WAR

In world historiography, there is no common understanding of the significance of the Battle of Stalingrad for the course and outcome of World War II. After the end of the war, statements appeared in Western literature that not the Battle of Stalingrad, but the victory of the Allied forces at El Alamein was the most significant turning point in the course of World War II. Of course, for the sake of objectivity, it must be admitted that the Allies won a major victory near El Alamein, which made a significant contribution to the defeat of the common enemy. But still, the battle of El Alamein cannot be compared with the Battle of Stalingrad.

If we talk about the military-strategic side of things, the Battle of Stalingrad took place on a vast territory, almost 100 thousand square meters. km, and the operation near El Alamein - on a relatively narrow African coast.

More than 2.1 million people, over 26,000 guns and mortars, 2,100 tanks and over 2,500 warplanes took part in certain stages of the battle near Stalingrad on both sides. The German command for the battles near Stalingrad attracted 1 million 11 thousand people, 10,290 guns, 675 tanks and 1216 aircraft. While near El Alamein, Rommel's African corps had only 80 thousand people, 540 tanks, 1200 guns and 350 aircraft.

The battle of Stalingrad lasted 200 days and nights (from July 17, 1942 to February 2, 1943), and the battle of El Alamein lasted 11 days (from October 23 to November 4, 1942), not to mention the incomparability of tension and bitterness of the two these battles. If at El Alamein the fascist bloc lost 55 thousand people, 320 tanks and about 1 thousand guns, then at Stalingrad the losses of Germany and its satellites were 10-15 times greater. About 144 thousand people were taken prisoner. The 330,000th grouping of troops was destroyed. The losses of the Soviet troops were also very large - irretrievable losses amounted to 478,741 people. Many of the soldiers' lives could have been saved. Yet our sacrifices were not in vain.

The military-political significance of the events that took place is incomparable. The Battle of Stalingrad took place in the main European theater of operations, where the fate of the war was decided. The El Alamein operation took place in North Africa in a secondary theater of operations; her influence on the course of events could be indirect. The attention of the whole world was then riveted not to El Alamein, but to Stalingrad.

The victory at Stalingrad had a tremendous impact on the liberation movement of the peoples of the whole world. A mighty wave of the national liberation movement swept through all the countries that fell under the yoke of Nazism.

In turn, the major defeats and huge losses of the Wehrmacht near Stalingrad sharply worsened the military-political and economic situation in Germany, put it before the deepest crisis. The damage of enemy tanks and vehicles in the Battle of Stalingrad was equal, for example, to six months of their production by German factories, guns - four months, and mortars and small arms - two months. And in order to make up for such large losses, the German military industry was forced to work with extremely high voltage. The crisis of human reserves sharply worsened.

The catastrophe on the Volga left its noticeable imprint on the morale of the Wehrmacht. In the German army, the number of cases of desertion and disobedience to commanders increased, military crimes became more frequent. After Stalingrad, the number of death sentences handed down by Nazi justice to German servicemen increased significantly. German soldiers began to fight with less persistence, they began to be afraid of attacks from the flanks and encirclement. Among some politicians and representatives of senior officers, oppositional moods to Hitler appeared.

The victory of the Red Army at Stalingrad shook the fascist military bloc, had a depressing effect on the satellites of Germany, and caused panic and irresolvable contradictions in their camp. The ruling leaders of Italy, Romania, Hungary and Finland, in order to save themselves from the impending catastrophe, began to look for pretexts for withdrawing from the war, ignoring Hitler's orders to send troops to the Soviet-German front. Since 1943, not only individual soldiers and officers, but also entire units and units of the Romanian, Hungarian and Italian armies surrendered to the Red Army. Relations between the Wehrmacht and the Allied armies escalated.

The crushing defeat of the fascist hordes at Stalingrad had a sobering effect on the ruling circles of Japan and Turkey. They abandoned their intentions to go to war against the USSR.

Under the influence of the successes achieved by the Red Army at Stalingrad and in subsequent operations of the winter campaign of 1942-1943, Germany's isolation in the international arena increased and at the same time the international prestige of the USSR increased. In 1942-1943, the Soviet government established diplomatic relations with Austria, Canada, Holland, Cuba, Egypt, Colombia, Ethiopia, and resumed previously interrupted diplomatic relations with Luxembourg, Mexico and Uruguay. Relations with the London-based governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland improved. On the territory of the USSR, the formation of military units and formations of a number of countries of the anti-Hitler coalition began - the French aviation squadron "Normandie", the 1st Czechoslovak infantry brigade, the 1st Polish division named after Tadeusz Kosciuszko. All of them subsequently joined the fight against the Nazi troops on the Soviet-German front.

All this suggests that it was the battle of Stalingrad, and not the operation of El Alamein, that broke the back of the Wehrmacht and marked the beginning of a radical turning point in World War II in favor of the anti-Hitler coalition. More precisely, Stalingrad predetermined this radical change.

This article will be devoted to the topic of the decisive battles of the bloodiest war in the history of mankind - the Second World War. And here not only those battles that influenced the side of the winners will be named, because we must not forget that at the beginning of the war the Germans had the advantage and they deserved this with a series of brilliant victories.
So, let's begin. What battles can be called the most significant and most decisive during the Second World War?
1. Capture of France.
After the German troops took Poland, Hitler realized that he needed to get rid of the danger on the Western Front, this would ensure that the German army did not start a war on two fronts. And for this it was necessary to capture France.
Hitler managed to capture France in just a few weeks. It was a real blitzkrieg. Lightning tank strikes helped to break and surround the most combat-ready armies of the French, Dutch and Belgians. However, this was not the main reason for the defeat for the Allies, their overconfidence became a catastrophic mistake for them, which led to the surrender of France and the decisive victory of the Germans on the Western Front.
When attacking France, there were no huge battles, there were only local attempts at resistance in separate parts of the French army, and when Northern France fell, the German victory was not long in coming.
2. Battle for Britain.
After the French fell, it was necessary to destroy Great Britain, which was located on the islands well protected from direct attack.
Hitler was well aware that it would be possible to break the British only after their Air Force was defeated. At the initial stage, air attacks on Britain were successful, German bombers bombed the largest cities. But when the British got a radar, they were able to intercept German planes on their way to the islands.
The number of German military equipment in the air was greatly reduced, and a few months later there was a catastrophic shortage of not only aircraft, but also personnel.
But the Royal Air Force, meanwhile, was gaining its strength and completely gained air superiority over Britain. This victory allowed the British not only to secure themselves from German attacks, but also gave them time to rebuild their military potential after the defeat in the Battle of France. In addition, the victory of the British gave way to the operation called "Overlord", which will be discussed later.
3. Battle for Stalingrad.
Meanwhile, on the Eastern Front, the successful offensive of the Wehrmacht armies continued, which had already completely occupied Ukraine and are now ready to take the most important cities for the USSR, including Stalingrad. However, here they were forced to stop.
Having practically captured the city, the Germans met the determined resistance of the Red Army, which could not be broken due to the numerical superiority of the enemy, problems with supplies and weapons, as well as severe frosts.
The battle for Stalingrad began in July 1941 and successfully developed for the Germans until November of the same year. But now, with the onset of winter, the forces of the Union launched a powerful counterattack, which forced the Germans to retreat. Thus, one of the best armies of the Wehrmacht under the command of Pauls was surrounded and defeated.
In total, during the battle of Stalingrad, the Germans lost about 1 million soldiers, as well as a huge number of weapons and military equipment. The morale of the Germans was undermined so much that it was already impossible to stop the offensive of the Soviet troops. A radical change occurred not only during the Great Patriotic War, but also during the Second World War.
4. Battle of Kursk.
This battle can be safely called the last attempt by the Germans to launch a counterattack on the Eastern Front. The Germans decided to carry out a lightning attack along the Soviet defense line on the Kursk Bulge, but their plan was undermined and the offensive ended in complete failure. After that, the huge forces of the Red Army launched a counteroffensive, and thanks to their numerical superiority, they managed to break the German defenses, which meant one thing - the defeat of Germany was already a foregone conclusion. The best armies were defeated, and the number of Wehrmacht soldiers was already several times inferior to the forces of the Red Army, and this is not to mention the fact that the Allied forces began to crush on the Western Front.
During the Battle of Kursk, the largest tank battle also took place - the battle of Prokhorovka, where Soviet tanks won, albeit with huge losses.
5. Battle of Leyte Gulf.
This battle can be called the last decisive attempt by the Japanese to seize the initiative in the war in the Pacific. The Japanese fleet attacked the US fleet in the hope of breaking it and launching a counteroffensive. This battle lasted from 23 to 26 October 1944 and ended with a complete victory for the Americans. The Japanese fought so desperately that they sacrificed themselves to destroy the enemy - we are talking about the so-called "kamikaze". But this did not help them, they lost their most powerful ships and no longer made decisive attempts to stop the US fleet.
6. "Overlord".
In 1944, Germany was already on the verge of defeat, but it needed to be accelerated, for this the Western Front was opened - Operation Overlord.
In June 1944, a huge US and Allied force landed in Northern France. Two months later, Paris was liberated, and two more later, the Allied forces approached the western borders of Germany. In order to contain the offensive on the Western Front, the Germans greatly stretched their forces and further weakened their positions on the Eastern Front, which accelerated the offensive of the Red Army.
The opening of the Second Front was a decisive blow to the military strength of Germany, followed only by the occupation and fall of Berlin.
7. Battle for Berlin.
Despite the fact that Germany had already lost, Berlin continued to stand. The city was taken into the ring, and there was no way to wait for help, but the Germans stood.
The battle for Berlin, which lasted throughout the spring of 1945, was completed by May 8th. During the defense of Berlin, the Germans provided powerful pockets of resistance, because of which a huge number of Red Army soldiers died, but their fate was decided anyway.
After Hitler shot himself, the morale of the Wehrmacht was completely destroyed and Germany capitulated - the victory was won. Meanwhile, in the Pacific, the United States had almost subjugated Japan - World War II was coming to an end.
These were the decisive battles of World War II. Of course, this list could be supplemented with a dozen more important battles, but nevertheless these battles and operations were key.