World War I. Armed forces of the parties before the start of the war

Land armies

To characterize the military power of the warring parties, it would be necessary to evaluate the entire set of means that each state that took an active part in the war had at the time of its outbreak in August 1914. Such a task in its entirety is hardly feasible in the limited size of this work.

The data below provides only some initial data on the strength of the ground forces of both alliances at the beginning of the war, based on the latest statistical information. In reality, the military power of any country is made up of a number of factors, among which the mere number of manpower does not give a complete picture of the power of the state. And by the beginning of the World War, not a single state foresaw the size of the coming struggle, especially its duration. As a result, the warring parties, having only peacetime ammunition, encountered a number of surprises during the war itself, which had to be overcome hastily during the struggle.

Russian army

Ten years before the outbreak of World War II, of the great powers, only Russia had combat (and unsuccessful) experience of war - with Japan. This circumstance should have had, and in fact had, an impact on the further development and life of the Russian armed forces.

Russia managed to heal its wounds and take a big step forward in terms of strengthening its military power. The mobilized Russian army in 1914 reached the enormous figure of 1816 battalions, 1110 squadrons and 7088 guns, 85% of which, given the current situation, could be moved to the Western theater of military operations. The expansion of repeated collections of reserves for training, as well as a number of verification mobilizations, improved the quality of reserves and made all mobilization calculations more reliable.

In the Russian army, under the influence of the Japanese war, training was improved, combat formations were expanded, their elasticity began to be implemented, attention was paid to the importance of fire, the role of machine guns, the connection between artillery and infantry, individual training of the individual soldier, and the training of junior command and especially officer personnel. and to educate troops in the spirit of active decisive action. But, on the other hand, the importance of heavy artillery in field battles, which was put forward by the Japanese war, was ignored, which, however, should also be attributed to the errors of all other armies except the German one. Neither the enormous consumption of ammunition nor the importance of equipment in a future war were sufficiently taken into account.

Paying great attention to the training of troops and the improvement of junior command personnel, the Russian General Staff completely ignored the selection and training of senior command personnel: the appointment of persons who had spent their entire lives after graduating from the academy in an administrative position immediately to the position of division chief and corps commander was not uncommon. The General Staff was cut off from the troops, in most cases limiting their acquaintance with them to brief qualification command. The implementation of the idea of ​​maneuver in the troops was limited only by regulations and small military formations, but in practice, large military commanders and large military formations did not practice its application. As a result, the Russian rush forward was groundless and inept; divisions and corps moved slowly in the theater of military operations, did not know how to carry out marches and maneuvers in large masses, and at a time when German corps easily walked 30 km in such conditions for many days in a row, The Russians had difficulty doing 20 km. Defense issues were neglected. Counter combat began to be studied by the entire army only with its appearance in the field regulations of 1912.

A uniform understanding of military phenomena and a uniform approach to them was not achieved either in the Russian army or in its General Staff. The latter, starting in 1905, received an autonomous position. He did very little to promote a unified view of modern military art in the army. Having managed to destroy the old foundations, he was unable to give anything coherent, and his young and most energetic representatives split, following German and French military thought. With such a discrepancy in understanding the art of war, the Russian General Staff entered the world war. In addition, the Russian army began the war without sufficiently well-trained officers and non-commissioned officers, with a small supply of personnel for new formations and for training conscripts, with a sharp, in comparison with the enemy, lack of artillery in general and heavy artillery in particular, very poorly supplied with all technical means and ammunition and with poorly trained senior command staff, having in its rear a country and its military administration that was not prepared for waging a major war and an industry that was completely unprepared for the transition to work for military needs.

In general, the Russian army went to war with good regiments, with mediocre divisions and corps, and with bad armies and fronts, understanding this assessment in the broad sense of training, but not personal qualities.

Russia was aware of the shortcomings of its armed forces and from 1913 began to implement a large military program, which by 1917 was supposed to greatly strengthen the Russian army and largely compensate for its shortcomings.

In terms of the number of aircraft, Russia, with 216 aircraft, was in 2nd place, following Germany.

French army

For more than forty years, the French army was under the impression of its defeat by the Prussian army and was preparing for an undoubted future clash with its neighbor-enemy to the death. The idea of ​​revenge and defense of its great-power existence at first, the struggle with Germany for the world market subsequently forced France to take special care in the development of its armed forces, putting them, if possible, on equal terms with its eastern neighbor. This was particularly difficult for France, owing to the difference in the size of its population compared with Germany, and the nature of the government of the country, due to which concerns about its military power waxed and waned.

The political tensions of the last years before the war forced the French to take increased care of their army. The military budget has increased significantly.

France was especially concerned about the increasing difficulties in developing its forces: in order to keep up with Germany, it was necessary to increase the annual conscription of recruits, but this measure was impracticable due to weak population growth. Shortly before the war, France decided to switch from a 2-year to a 3-year active service period, which increased the size of the standing army by 1/3 and facilitated its transition to a mobilized state. On August 7, 1913, a law was introduced on the transition to 3-year service. This measure made it possible in the fall of 1913 to call up two ages under the banner at once, which gave a contingent of recruits of 445,000 people. In 1914, the strength of the standing army, excluding colonial troops, reached 736,000. Special attention was also paid to increasing the native troops in the French colonies, which had provided such significant benefits to their mother country. The strong strength of the French regiments contributed to the speed and strength of the new formations, as well as the speed and ease of mobilization, especially the cavalry and border troops. The French army of 1914 cannot be called widely supplied with all the equipment of that time. First of all, in comparison with Germany and Austria-Hungary, the complete absence of heavy field artillery is noteworthy, and in comparison with Russia, the absence of light field howitzers; the light field artillery was very poorly supplied with communications equipment, the cavalry did not have machine guns, etc.

As for aviation, at the beginning of the war France had only 162 aircraft.

The French corps, like the Russian ones, were more poorly supplied with artillery compared to the German ones; Only recently before the war was attention drawn to the importance of heavy artillery, but by the beginning of the war nothing had yet been done. In terms of calculating the necessary availability of ammunition, France was as far from the actual need as other countries.

The command staff was up to the requirements of modern warfare, and great attention was paid to their training. There was no special General Staff staff in the French army; persons with higher military education alternated their service between the ranks and the headquarters. Special attention was paid to the training of high command officials. Troop training was at a high level at that time. French soldiers were individually developed, skilled and fully prepared for field and trench warfare. The army thoroughly prepared for a war of maneuver; Special attention was paid to the practice of marching movements of large masses.

French military thought worked independently and resulted in a certain doctrine, opposite to the views of the Germans. The French developed the 19th century method of waging operations and battles from the depths and maneuvering large forces and ready reserves at the opportune moment. They did not strive to create a continuous front, but to enable the entire mass to maneuver, leaving sufficient strategic gaps between the armies. They pursued the idea of ​​the need to first clarify the situation and then lead the main mass for a decisive counterattack, and therefore during the period of strategic preparation of operations they were located in very deep ledges. Counter combat was not only not cultivated in the French army, but it was not even in the field regulations.

The French guaranteed their method of ensuring the maneuvering of mass armies from the depths with a powerful network of rail tracks and an understanding of the need for widespread use of motor transport in the theater of war, the development of which they were the first of all European powers and in which they achieved great results.

In general, the Germans quite rightly considered the French army to be their most dangerous enemy. Its main drawback was the indecisiveness of the initial actions up to and including the Marne victory.

English army

The character of the English army was sharply different from the armies of other European powers. The English army, intended mainly for service in the colonies, was recruited by recruiting hunters with a long period of active service. The units of this army located in the metropolis constituted a field expeditionary army (6 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry division and 1 cavalry brigade), which was intended for the European war.

In addition, a territorial army was created (14 infantry divisions and 14 cavalry brigades), intended to defend their country. According to the German General Staff, the English field army was regarded as a worthy opponent with good combat practice in the colonies, with a trained command staff, but not adapted to waging a major European war, since the high command did not have the necessary experience for this. In addition, the British command failed to get rid of the bureaucracy that reigned in the headquarters of the higher formations, and this caused a lot of unnecessary friction and complications.

The unfamiliarity with other branches of the army was amazing. But long service life and the strength of tradition were created by tightly welded parts.

The training of the individual soldier and units down to the battalion was good. The individual development of the individual soldier, marching and shooting training were at a high level. The weapons and equipment were quite up to par, which made it possible to highly cultivate the art of shooting, and indeed, according to the testimony of the Germans, the machine-gun and rifle fire of the British at the beginning of the war was unusually accurate.

The shortcomings of the British army were sharply revealed in the very first clash with the German army. The British failed and suffered such losses that their subsequent actions were characterized by excessive caution and even indecisiveness.

Serbian and Belgian armies

The armies of these two states, like all their people, experienced during the war the most difficult fate of the first strike of neighboring colossi and the loss of their territory. Both of them were distinguished by high fighting qualities, but in other respects there was a noticeable difference between them.

Belgium, secured by “eternal neutrality,” did not prepare its army for a major war, and therefore it did not have characteristic, firmly established features. The long absence of combat practice left a certain mark on her, and in the first military clashes she showed natural inexperience in waging a major war.

The Serbian army, on the contrary, had extensive and successful combat experience in the Balkan War of 1912-1913. and represented, as a solid military organism, an impressive force, quite capable, as it was in reality, of diverting enemy troops superior in number.

German army

The German army, after the success of its weapons in 1866 and especially in 1870, enjoyed the reputation of the best army in Europe.

The German army served as a model for a number of other armies, most of which were under its influence and even exactly copied its structure, German regulations, and followed German military thought.

With regard to organizational issues, the German military department, through the consistent development of personnel in quantitative and qualitative terms and the maintenance of reserves in the sense of training and education, achieved the opportunity to develop its armed forces to the maximum use of the male population. At the same time, he managed to maintain almost complete uniformity of the combat qualities of the newly formed units with the personnel ones. Studying the experiences of each war, the German General Staff cultivated this experience in its army. Germany turned out to be more ready for war than its enemies. The stronghold of the German army was a united, uniform and well-trained officer and non-commissioned officer corps. It was so numerous that during the war it could partially serve the allied armies.

In army training, not only in theory, but also in practice, the principles of activity, audacity and mutual assistance and revenue were widely followed. It cannot be said that the center of gravity in the training of troops was the individual fighter: discipline, turning into drill, moving to attack in dense chains were characteristic of the German army of 1914. Involvement and dense formations, together with German punctuality, made it most capable of maneuvering and marching movements in large masses. The main type of combat was considered to be counter combat, in the principles of which the German army was mainly trained.

At the same time, it paid more attention to tactical defense than other armies.

German military thought crystallized into a very definite and clear doctrine, which ran as a main thread through the entire command staff of the army.

The last teacher of the German army before the World War, who was able to carry out his teaching with energy into the depths of the army, was the Chief of the German General Staff, Schlieffen, a great fan of flank operations with double envelopment (Cannes). Schlieffen's idea was that modern battles should come down to a struggle for the flanks, in which the winner will be the one who will have the last reserves not behind the middle of the front, but on its extreme flank. Schlieffen proceeded from the conclusion that in the coming battles the natural desire to provide for oneself, in connection with the desire to use the full power of modern weapons, will lead to an enormous lengthening of the battle fronts, which will have a completely different extent than it was before. To achieve a decisive result and defeat the enemy, it is necessary to conduct an offensive from two or three sides, i.e. from the front and from the flanks. In this case, the means necessary for a strong flank attack can be obtained by weakening, as much as possible, the front, which in any case should also participate in the offensive. All the troops that were previously detained for use at the decisive moment must now be moved into battle; the deployment of forces for battle must begin from the moment the troops are unloaded from the railways.

The German Great General Staff, promoted by the care of Field Marshal Moltke the Elder to a dominant place in the construction of the armed forces of the empire and in preparation for war, preserved the traditions of its founder. The connection of General Staff officers with the system, a detailed study of all elements of war, practical conclusions from this study, a uniform approach to understanding them and well-organized staff service equipment were its positive side.

Technically, the German army was well equipped and was distinguished to its advantage in relation to its enemies by the comparative wealth of field artillery, not only light, but also heavy artillery, the importance of which it understood better than others.

Austro-Hungarian Army

The Austro-Hungarian army occupied one of the last places among the original participants in the war. The available composition of military units was very weakened (60, later 92 people in the company); to bring the field troops to full combat strength there was not enough supply of trained people; The Landwehr did not have any artillery until 1912. Although the principles underlying the regulations were fully consistent with the times, the teaching was lame, and senior military commanders had no experience in commanding troops.

A distinctive feature of the Austro-Hungarian army was its multinational character, since it consisted of Germans, Magyars, Czechs, Poles, Rusyns, Serbs, Croats, Slovaks, Romanians, Italians and Gypsies, united only by officers. According to the German General Staff, the Austro-Hungarian army, being simultaneously busy fighting on two fronts, could not liberate the German forces gathered on the Russian border, and its numerical strength, degree of training, organization and, in part, weapons left much to be desired. In terms of speed of mobilization and concentration, the Austro-Hungarian army was superior to the Russian one, against which it had to act.

Comparison of both sides

Comparing the armed forces of the first-class powers that clashed in 1914, one can come to the following conclusion.

1. In terms of the size of the army and manpower, the Entente, thanks to Russia, was in a more advantageous position than the Central Powers. However, the slowness of the mobilization and concentration of the Russian army, as well as the lack of railways in Russia, which makes it difficult to transfer troops from one theater to another, greatly diminished, and in the first time of the war, completely destroyed this advantage.

2. The development of the armed forces during the war to a limit corresponding to the size of the population was quite achievable in Germany and France, less achievable in Austria and turned out to be beyond the capabilities of Russia, constrained by personnel, reserves, the presence of a large territory and the weakness of the rail network. This condition was especially unfavorable for the Entente, since Russia represented a large share in it.

3. The training of all armies was carried out in the same direction, but it distinguished the French and especially the German armies for the better; The Russian army, which made great improvements in this regard after the Japanese War, did not manage to reach the limit of desired perfection by 1914. The Austro-Hungarian army was inferior to the Russian in this regard.

4. The highest command staff in its entirety stood at the proper level only in the German and French armies.

5. Military thought in a crystallized form resulted in French and German military doctrines.

6. The speed of mobilization and deployment was on the side of the Central Powers.

7. In terms of supply of artillery, especially heavy artillery, the German and partly Austro-Hungarian armies stood out favorably.

8. In terms of supplying equipment, the Russian army lagged far behind everyone else; it was followed by the Austro-Hungarian one.

9. Both sides began the war with an offensive, and the idea of ​​daring actions became the guiding principle for both sides. But in the sense of preparing for the implementation of this idea, its implementation through the entire thickness of the army was achieved by constant and methodical labor only in the German army, which distinguished it in a positive direction in comparison with the Entente.

10. The German army went to war, intoxicated by the successes of the Austro-Prussian wars of 1866 and the Franco-Prussian wars of 1870-1871.

11. Both sides were preparing for the inevitable war in order to come out fully armed. If France and Germany achieved this, then the great military program to strengthen the power of the Russian army ended in 1917, and in this respect the outbreak of war in 1914 was extremely beneficial for the Central Powers. With such an approximate equality of the armed forces of the warring parties and, if necessary, to wage war until the enemy is completely destroyed, it was difficult to count on a quick end to the war unless an exceptional case of lightning-fast destruction of one of the main components of the coalition intervened. Counting on such a case, the Germans, as we will see below, built their plan, but their map was beaten.

The degree of preparation of the parties for modern warfare

But if all states prepared their armed forces with special effort for the inevitable war, then the same cannot be said about preparing them for the proper nutrition of modern war. This is explained by a general failure to take into account the nature of the coming war in the sense of: 1) its duration, since everyone relied on its brevity, believing that modern states cannot withstand a long war; 2) the enormous consumption of ammunition and 3) the enormous consumption of technical means and the need to stock up on various equipment, especially weapons and ammunition, in an unexpectedly large amount during the war itself. All states, not excluding Germany, were faced with a sad surprise in this regard and, during the war itself, were forced to correct the shortcomings of peace preparations. France and England, with their widespread development of heavy industry and relatively free transportation thanks to their dominance at sea, easily coped with this matter. Germany, surrounded by enemies on all sides and deprived of sea communications, suffered from a lack of raw materials, but coped with this matter with the help of its solid organization and maintaining communications with Asia Minor through the Balkan Peninsula. But Russia, with a poorly developed industry, with poor administration, cut off from its allies, with a huge expanse of its territory and a poorly developed rail network, began to cope with this disadvantage only towards the end of the war.

It remains to note one more feature that sharply distinguished Russia from other warring powers - poverty in the railways. If France, militarily, was fully provided with a richly developed network of railways, supplemented on a large scale by motor transport, if Germany, equally rich in rail tracks, in the last years before the war built special lines in accordance with the war plan established by it, then Russia was provided with railways. roads in an amount completely inappropriate for waging a major war.

Naval forces of the warring powers

The decade preceding the World War can be marked in the field of naval development by three facts: the growth of the German navy, the restoration of the Russian fleet after its catastrophic defeat during the Japanese war, and the development of the submarine fleet.

Naval preparations for war in Germany were carried out in the direction of building a fleet of large warships (7.5 billion marks in gold were spent on this over several years), which caused strong political excitement, especially in England.

Russia developed its fleet exclusively with active-defensive missions in the Baltic and Black Seas.

The greatest attention was paid to the submarine fleet in England and France; Germany shifted the center of gravity of the naval struggle to it already during the war itself.

Distribution of naval forces of both sides before the start of the war

In the overall balance of naval forces of the warring states, the British and German fleets had a dominant role in their power, a combat meeting of which was expected with particular alarm throughout the world from the first day of the war. Their collision could immediately have very serious consequences for one of the parties. On the eve of the declaration of war, there was a moment when, according to some assumptions, such a meeting was part of the calculations of the British Admiralty. Already starting in 1905, British naval forces, until then scattered along the most important sea routes, began to converge on the shores of England in three “home” fleets, i.e., intended for the defense of the British Isles. When mobilized, these three fleets were united into one “Big” fleet, which in July 1914 consisted of a total of 8 squadrons of battleships and 11 cruising squadrons - a total of 460 pennants together with small ships. On July 15, 1914, an experimental mobilization was announced for this fleet, which ended with maneuvers and a royal review on July 20 at the Spitgad roadstead. Due to the Austrian ultimatum, the demobilization of the fleet was suspended, and then on July 28 the fleet was ordered to sail from Portland to Scapa Flow (strait) near the Orkney Islands off the northern coast of Scotland.

At the same time, the German High Seas Fleet was cruising in Norwegian waters, from where it was returned to the shores of Germany on July 27-28. The English fleet sailed from Portland to the north of Scotland not along the usual route - west of the island, but along the eastern coast of England. Both fleets sailed in the North Sea in opposite directions.

By the beginning of the war, the English Grand Fleet was located in two groups: in the far north of Scotland and in the English Channel near Portland.

In the Mediterranean, according to the Anglo-French agreement, ensuring the maritime supremacy of the Entente was entrusted to the French fleet, which, as part of its best units, was concentrated near Toulon. His responsibility was to provide communication routes with North Africa. There was an English cruiser squadron off the island of Malta.

British cruisers also served as guards for sea routes in the Atlantic Ocean, off the coast of Australia, and, in addition, significant cruising forces were located in the western region of the Pacific Ocean.

In the English Channel, in addition to the second English fleet, a light squadron of French cruisers was concentrated near Cherbourg; it consisted of armored cruisers supported by a flotilla of mine ships and submarines. This squadron guarded the southwestern approaches to the English Channel. There were 3 light French cruisers in the Pacific Ocean near Indochina.

The Russian fleet was divided into three parts.

The Baltic Fleet, vastly inferior in strength to the enemy, was forced to take an exclusively defensive course of action, trying to delay, as far as possible, the advance of the enemy fleet and landing force into the depths of the Gulf of Finland at the Revel - Porkallaud line. In order to strengthen ourselves and equalize the chances of battle, it was planned to equip a fortified mine position in this area, which was far from completed at the time of the start of the war (or rather, just started). On the flanks of this so-called central position, on both sides of the bay, on the islands of Makilota and Nargen, batteries of long-range large-caliber guns were installed, and a minefield was placed in several lines throughout the entire position.

The Black Sea Fleet remained in the Sevastopol roadstead and was inactive, failing even to properly lay minefields at the entrance to the Bosphorus. However, one cannot fail to take into account the entire difficulty of the position of the Black Sea Fleet, not only in relation to the insufficiency of combat forces, but also in the sense of the absence of other operational bases other than Sevastopol. It was very difficult to be based in Sevastopol to monitor the Bosporus, and operations to block the enemy’s entry into the Black Sea under these conditions were completely unsecured.

Far Eastern squadron - of its 2 light cruisers (Askold and Zhemchug) tried to cruise off the south-eastern coast of Asia.

The German High Seas Fleet consisted of 3 squadrons of battleships, a cruising squadron and a flotilla of fighters. After cruising off the coast of Norway, this fleet returned to its shores, with 1 linear and cruising squadron stationed at Wilhelmshaven in the roadstead, under the cover of batteries on the island of Heligoland, and 2 other linear squadrons and a flotilla of fighters at Kiel in the Baltic Sea. By this time, the Kiel Canal had been deepened for the passage of dreadnoughts, and thus squadrons from Kiel could join the North Sea squadrons if necessary. In addition to the aforementioned High Seas Fleet, along the German coast there was a large defensive fleet, but made up of outdated ships. The German cruisers Goeben and Breslau skillfully slipped into the Black Sea past the English and French cruisers, which later caused quite a lot of trouble for the Russian Black Sea Fleet and the coast. In the Pacific Ocean, German ships were partly at their base - Qingdao, near Kiao-chao, and Admiral Spee's light squadron of 6 new cruisers cruised near the Caroline Islands.

The Austro-Hungarian fleet was concentrated on the Paul and Catarro raids in the Adriatic Sea and took cover behind the coastal batteries from the cruisers and mine ships of the Entente.

Comparing the naval forces of both coalitions, the following can be noted:

1. The forces of England alone exceeded the strength of the entire fleet of the Central Powers.

2. Most naval forces were concentrated in European seas.

3. The English and French fleets had every opportunity to act together.

4. The German fleet could gain freedom of action only after a successful battle in the North Sea, which it would have to give with the most unfavorable balance of forces, i.e., in fact, the German surface fleet found itself locked in its territorial waters, having the opportunity to undertake offensive operations only against the Russian Baltic Fleet.

5. The naval forces of the Entente were the actual masters of all water spaces, with the exception of the Baltic and Black Seas, where the Central Powers had a chance of success - in the Baltic Sea during the fight of the German fleet with the Russian and in the Black Sea during the fight of the Turkish fleet with the Russian.

The imperialist states intensively developed their armed forces as the most important means for the violent implementation of domestic and foreign policy objectives. The number of ground forces and navies grew every year. Armies and navies were re-equipped with the latest types of weapons and military equipment.

Germany and France built up their ground forces the most. The introduction of a new law on universal conscription in France in 1872 allowed it to accelerate the accumulation of trained reserves. This provided the opportunity in the event of war to increase the size of the peacetime army by more than 2.5 times. So, if by the beginning of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. France was able to field an active army of 647 thousand people, but by 1880 this army could already have a strength of more than one million people. In addition, 638 thousand made up the territorial army.

The German militarists could not allow France to strengthen, which would have threatened them with the loss of the military superiority achieved in the war of 1870-1871. Therefore, they increased their army more and more.

So, if by the beginning of the Franco-Prussian War the North German Union, led by Prussia, had a peacetime army of 315.6 thousand people (the Prussian army was 283 thousand people) (2), then according to the law of May 2, 1874, the number of German The peacetime army was determined to be 401,659 people of the lower ranks (private and non-commissioned), by the law of May 6, 1880, its number was increased to 427,274 people, and in 1890 it was increased to 510.3 thousand people (including 486,983 privates and non-commissioned officers and 23,349 generals and (4). Thus, in just 20 years, the size of the German peacetime army was increased by almost 62%. Meanwhile, the population of Germany during the same time increased by only 25% (5). Germany's rival was France by the end of the 19th century. put over 625 thousand people under arms (6), while on the eve of the war of 1870-1871. its peacetime army amounted to 434.3 thousand people.

Characterizing the situation in Europe in the early 90s of the 19th century, F. Engels in the article “Can Europe Disarm?” (1893) pointed out that “that feverish competition in armaments began between France and Germany, into which Russia, Austria, and Italy were gradually drawn in.”
The arms race took on a particularly large scale immediately before the war. On July 5, 1913, the German Reichstag approved a law to increase the peacetime army by 136 thousand people. At the same time, the amount of one-time military expenses was expressed in the amount of 898 million marks. By the beginning of the war, the size of the German land army had been increased to 808,280 people. This number included 30,459, 107,794 non-commissioned officers, 647,793 privates, 2,480 doctors, 865 veterinarians, 2,889 military officials, 16 thousand volunteers.

France found it difficult to compete in military strength with Germany due to its smaller population and significantly lower rate of population growth. In addition, the annual population growth of France was decreasing all the time, while that of Germany was increasing. As a result, the annual call for recruits could not be increased. In order not to lag behind Germany in the number of ground forces, the French government, by law of August 7, 1913, increased the length of service from two to three years and lowered the conscription age from 21 to 20 years (11). This made it possible to increase the staffing level of the lower ranks to 720 thousand (12), and increase the total number of the French standing army by 50% (13). By August 1, 1914, the French peacetime army numbered 882,907 people (including colonial troops) (14).

In increasing the size of the army, Russia did not lag behind France and Germany. The peacetime Russian regular army from 1871 to 1904 was increased from 761,602 people (15) to 1,094,061 people (16). According to the states of 1912, the army was supposed to have 1,384,905 people (17). At the end of 1913, the so-called “Great Program for Strengthening the Army” was approved in Russia, which provided for an increase in peacetime ground forces of Russia by another 480 thousand people by 1917 (18). The artillery was significantly strengthened. The implementation of the program required a one-time expenditure of 500 million rubles.

Austria-Hungary also expanded its army. At the beginning of 1911, she increased the conscription contingent by 40%, allocating an additional 100 million crowns for the needs of the army (20). On July 5, 1912, a new military law was adopted in Austria-Hungary, which provided for a further increase in recruitment (from 181,677 to 205,902 people) and additional allocations for weapons. Italy also projected an increase in contingents from 153 thousand to 173 thousand people.
Along with the great powers, small countries were also engulfed in the arms race, even such as Belgium and Switzerland, which proclaimed eternal neutrality guaranteed by the great powers. In Belgium, for example, until 1909, the size of the army needed to defend the country in wartime was set at 180 thousand people. In peacetime it was about 42 thousand people. Due to the deterioration of international relations, the Belgian government in December 1912 established the size of the wartime army at 340 thousand people, and in peacetime 54 thousand people (22). On December 15, 1913, a new military law was adopted in Belgium and compulsory military service was introduced. According to this law, the composition of the peacetime army was supposed to be increased to 150 thousand by 1918.

Army recruitment system

The recruitment of private and non-commissioned officers into armies in most European countries was carried out on the basis of universal conscription, according to which military service was formally considered compulsory for all citizens. In reality, it fell with all its weight on the shoulders of the working masses. The rank and file of the armies was recruited mainly from working people. The exploiting classes enjoyed all sorts of benefits and avoided hard military service. In the army, their representatives occupied mainly command positions. Describing universal conscription in Russia, V.I. Lenin pointed out: “In essence, we did not have and do not have universal conscription, because the privileges of noble birth and wealth create a lot of exceptions. In essence, we did not have and do not have anything resembling equal rights for citizens in military service” (24).
The recruitment system based on compulsory military service made it possible to cover the largest number of the country's male population with military training and education. By the beginning of the First World War of 1914-1918. the number of military personnel reached the following values: in Russia - 5650 thousand, in France - 5067 thousand, in England - 1203 thousand, in Germany - 4900 thousand, in Austria-Hungary - 3 million people. This made it possible to mobilize multimillion-dollar armies, which exceeded the number of peacetime armies by 4-5 times.

Persons aged 20-21 were drafted into the army. Persons liable for military service were considered to be in military service until they were 40-45 years of age. From 2 to 4 years they served in the cadres (2-3 years in the infantry, 3-4 years in the cavalry and horse artillery), after which they were enlisted in the reserve for 13-17 years (reserve in France and other countries, reserve and Landwehr in Germany) and were periodically involved in training camps. After the expiration of their period in the reserve, those liable for military service were included in the militia (territorial army in France and Japan, Landsturm in Germany). Persons who were not drafted into the army for any reason, but were able to bear arms, were also enrolled in the militia.

Spares (reservists) were drafted into the army in case of war and were intended to replenish units before wartime staff. In wartime, militias were also conscripted and carried out various rear and garrison services.
In England and the USA, unlike other states, the armies were mercenary. They were staffed by recruiting people aged 18 - 25 years in England and 21 - 30 years old in the USA. Volunteers served in the USA for 3 years, and in England for 12 years, of which from 3 to 8 years in active service, the rest of the time in reserve, with participation annually in 20-day training camps.

Recruitment of non-commissioned officers in all countries was carried out by selecting from among the recruits persons belonging to wealthy strata of society (wealthy peasants, small shopkeepers and office workers), who, after training for a certain period (1-2 years) in special training units, were appointed to non-commissioned officer positions. Since the main role in the training and education of the rank and file, especially the single soldier, and in maintaining internal order in the units belonged to non-commissioned officers (27), all armies sought to consolidate these personnel in the ranks of the army, for which they had proven themselves faithful and devoted non-commissioned service - after the expiration of the terms of active service, they were left for long-term service. At the same time, they received some benefits and privileges (official, everyday, material), up to the opportunity to become officers, especially in wartime. In the German army, non-commissioned officers were only super-conscripts (28). Non-commissioned officers who served the established periods of active and extended service were enlisted in the reserve.

Officer cadres were trained mainly through special military educational institutions (by branch of service), where young people, mainly from among the ruling classes (nobles and bourgeoisie), were accepted for training on a voluntary basis. For example, in Russia by 1911 there were 28 cadet corps and 20 military schools, in Germany - 8 preparatory cadet schools and 11 military schools, in Austria-Hungary - 18 cadet schools and 2 academies. Since there was almost always a shortage in the armies, a certain number of people from the petty bourgeoisie, clergy, bureaucrats, and intelligentsia were accepted into military schools. Officer cadres for wartime were recruited through the promotion of non-commissioned officers to the ranks of non-commissioned officers, as well as through short-term training of persons with secondary and higher education (volunteers).
To improve the qualifications of command personnel intended for senior positions, there were various short-term courses and schools (rifle, cavalry, etc.) with a training duration of about a year. Higher military education was provided by military academies.

Decisive command positions in the armies of all capitalist countries were occupied by representatives of the ruling classes. Thus, in the German army in 1913, nobles occupied 87% of staff positions in the cavalry, 48% in the infantry and 41% in the field artillery (30). In the Russian army, the class composition of the officers in 1912 was expressed in the following form (in%, on average): nobles - 69.76; honorary citizens - 10.89; clergy - 3.07; “merchant title” - 2.22; “tax-paying class” (peasants, townspeople, etc.) - 14.05. Among the generals, hereditary nobles accounted for 87.45%, among the headquarters (lieutenant colonel - colonel) - 71.46% and among the rest of the officers - 50.36%. Of the “tax-paying class,” the majority were ober- 27.99%, and among the generals, representatives of this social group occupied only 2.69%.
The armies of capitalist states were the faithful armed support of the ruling classes in domestic politics and a reliable weapon for waging a war of conquest. However, the fundamental interests of the popular masses, who constituted the main force of the army, were in conflict with the aggressive goals of the capitalist states.

Organization and weapons

The ground forces of all states on the eve of the First World War consisted of infantry, cavalry and artillery, which were considered the main branches of the military. Engineering troops (sapper, railway, pontoon, communications, telegraph and radiotelegraph), aviation and aeronautics were considered auxiliary. Infantry was the main branch of the military and its share in the system of ground forces averaged 70%, artillery - 15, cavalry - 8 and auxiliary troops - 7%.
The organizational structure of the armies of the main European states, future opponents in the impending war, had much in common. The troops were consolidated into units and formations. The highest association intended to solve strategic and operational problems during the war in all countries was the army. Only in Russia, even in peacetime, was it planned to create front-line formations (two to four armies) in case of war. The army included three to six army corps, cavalry units (formations), engineering units (in Germany also army artillery).
The army corps had an established staff and included all the necessary combat and auxiliary forces and equipment, as well as rear units sufficient for the corps to independently conduct battle even in isolation from other formations. The corps consisted of two or three infantry divisions, cavalry, corps artillery, sapper units, ferry facilities (engineer fleet), communications equipment, an aviation unit (air force, air squad), logistics institutions and transport units (the numerical strength of the corps is given in Table. 5).

Table 5. Composition of the wartime army corps in 1914*

Frame	Infantry battalions	Squadrons	Machine guns			Sapper companies	Total people
French
German

* S. N. Krasilnikov. Organization of large combined arms formations, p. 133.

(1*)2 batteries of 8 guns, 2 batteries of 4 guns.
(2*) Including 4 battalions of the reserve brigade.
(3*)Including machine guns of the reserve brigade.
(4*) All batteries are 4-gun.
(5*)24 batteries of 6 guns, 4 batteries of 4 guns.

The infantry was consolidated into divisions, which consisted of two infantry brigades (2 infantry regiments each). The division also included an artillery brigade (regiment), 2-3 cavalry squadrons and special units. The number of divisions in various armies ranged from 16 to 21 thousand people. The division was a tactical formation. Due to its composition and armament, it could carry out independent tasks on the battlefield, using fire from all types of infantry and artillery (see Table 6 for the division's numerical strength).

Table 6. Wartime composition of an infantry division in 1914*

* S. N. Krasilnikov. Organization of large combined arms formations, pp. 94-95, 133.

Infantry regiments consisted of 3-4 battalions, each of which had 4 companies. The battalion's strength was almost everywhere just over 1,000 people.
In England and the United States, there were no large military formations in peacetime. In wartime, brigades, divisions, and corps were formed from individual regiments and battalions.
The main weapon of the infantry was a repeating rifle with a bayonet caliber from 7.62 to 8 mm with a firing range of up to 3200 steps; it had good ballistic qualities. Reducing the caliber made it possible to significantly reduce the weight of cartridges and increase their carry capacity by 1.5 times. The use of magazine loading together with smokeless powder increased the practical rate of fire by almost 3 times (instead of 5 - 6 shots to 15 shots per minute). The Russian army adopted a three-line (7.62 mm) infantry rifle of the 1891 model, invented by Russian army officer S.I. Mosin (Table 7). In 1908, a new cartridge was designed for it with a pointed bullet and an initial speed of 860 m/sec. The sighting range of this rifle was 3200 steps (2400-2500 m). Before the war, the armies of almost all countries also introduced pointed bullets into their arsenal.

With a relatively small difference in ballistic properties with rifles from other armies, the Russian rifle was the best. It was distinguished by its simplicity of design, had high strength, was extremely durable, reliable and trouble-free in combat conditions.
Along with the main infantry weapon - the rifle - automatic weapons are becoming widespread. In the early 80s of the XIX century. modern machine guns appeared (the heavy machine gun of the American inventor Maxim of 1883), then automatic pistols and automatic (self-loading) rifles. At the beginning of the 20th century. light machine guns appeared. They were first used in the Russo-Japanese War (34).

Table 7. Small arms of the armies of the main European states

System	Caliber, mm	Maximum fire range, m
Russia
Model 1891 repeating rifle of the Mosin system
France
Model 1896 Lebed rifle
Hotchkiss machine gun
England
Model 1903 Lee-Enfield rifle
Maxim machine gun
Germany
Model 1898 Mauser rifle
Maxim machine gun
Austria-Hungary
Model 1895 Mannlicher rifle
Schwarzlose heavy machine gun

At first, the troops had machine guns in very small quantities. Before the war, the armies of the largest states relied on 24-28 heavy machine guns per infantry division. In the Russian army, as in most other armies, the Maxim machine gun was adopted for service. In the infantry division of the Russian army in 1914 there were 32 such machine guns (8 machine guns per regiment). Russian troops did not have light machine guns.
Cavalry in all armies was divided into military and strategic. In Russia, cavalry was divided into divisional cavalry, assigned to infantry formations, and army cavalry, which was at the disposal of the high command. In peacetime, cavalry divisions were organizationally part of the army corps, and during the war, together with two cavalry corps, they formed the army cavalry. In the infantry divisions there remained small cavalry units that made up the divisional cavalry.

The highest cavalry unit in all armies (except the English) was the cavalry corps consisting of 2-3 cavalry divisions. The cavalry division consisted of 4-6 cavalry regiments (there are 12 regiments in the English cavalry division). The division included regiments of various types of cavalry - uhlans, hussars, cuirassiers, dragoons (and in Russia, Cossacks). Each cavalry division included a horse artillery division of 2-3 batteries, machine gun and engineer units, and communications units. Machine guns and technical troops (sappers and signalmen) in some armies were also part of brigades and regiments. The cavalry division consisted of 3500-4200 people, 12 guns and from 6 to 12 machine guns (the English cavalry division - 9 thousand people and 24 machine guns). A cavalry regiment in all armies consisted of 4-6 squadrons (the English cavalry regiment had 3 squadrons). Before the war, the main weapon of cavalry was considered to be bladed (saber, lance), firearms - machine gun, carbine (short rifle), revolver.

Artillery was mainly a divisional weapon and was at the disposal of division commanders. The infantry division consisted of one or two artillery regiments (brigades) with 36 - 48 guns (in the German division - 72 guns). The artillery regiment included 2-3 artillery divisions, which consisted of batteries. The battery was the main firing unit and had from 4 to 8 guns. There was little artillery under corps subordination (one howitzer division in the Russian and German corps and a light artillery regiment in the French corps).

The use of smokeless powder, breech loading, piston locks and recoil devices led to the late 19th century. to the advent of rapid-fire guns, which significantly increased the combat power of artillery. The range and rate of fire increased by 2 or more times compared to the period of the Franco-Prussian War (range - from 3.8 to 7 km, rate of fire - from 3-5 rounds per minute to 5 - 10 rounds per minute) (35).
Along with increasing the rate of fire and range of artillery, military-technical thought also resolved the problem of indirect fire, which dramatically increased the survivability of artillery in battle. For the first time in combat conditions, indirect fire was used by Russian artillerymen during the Russo-Japanese War.

At the same time, Russian artillery midshipman S.N. Vlasyev and engineer-captain L.N. Gobyato designed a mortar, which was successfully used in the defense of Port Arthur in 1904. With the invention of the mortar, it became possible to conduct overhead fire on the enemy from short distances (mainly way along the trenches). However, only the German army at the beginning of the First World War was armed with mortars.
Divisional artillery consisted mainly of light guns of 75 - 77 mm caliber. It was intended to conduct flat fire and hit open targets with shrapnel. The firing range reached 6 - 8 km. Russian troops were armed with a 76.2-mm field gun of the 1902 model, which in terms of its ballistic properties was the best in the world.
In addition to this artillery, the armies of European states had cannons with a caliber of 100 to 150 mm, and for conducting mounted fire - howitzers (light and heavy) with a caliber of 100 to 220 mm. The main samples of artillery pieces and their tactical and technical data are given in table. 8.

Table 8. Field artillery of the armies of the main European states *

State and system of weapons	Caliber, mm	Projectile weight, kg	Grenade firing range, km
Russia
Field gun mod. 1902
Field howitzer mod. 1909
Rapid-fire cannon mod. 1910
Field howitzer mod. 1910
France
Field rapid-fire gun mod. 1897
Short Banja gun mod. 1890
Heavy howitzer Rimayo mod. 1904
Germany
Field light gun mod. 1896
Field light howitzer mod. 1909
Field heavy gun mod. 1904
Field heavy howitzer mod. 1902
Austria-Hungary
Field light gun mod. 1905
Field light howitzer mod. 1899
Field heavy gun
Field heavy howitzer mod. 1899

* E. 3. Barsukov. Artillery of the Russian Army, vol. 1, pp. 210-211, 229.

However, heavy field artillery was still very poorly developed. The German army was better equipped than others with howitzers and heavy artillery, since the German high command attached great importance to artillery. Each German infantry division included a division of 105 mm howitzers (18 guns), and the corps included a division of 150 mm howitzers (16 guns). Armies could also be assigned separate divisions of heavy artillery, which consisted of 210 mm mortars, 150 mm howitzers, 105 and 130 mm guns (36). On the eve of the war, the German army was in first place in terms of the number of artillery. The rest of the states were significantly inferior to it. The Austrian army was the weakest equipped with artillery. The field howitzers with which the Austrian army entered the war were very outdated. Mountain guns also left much to be desired (37).
In addition to heavy field artillery, there was also siege artillery of larger calibers, intended for the siege of fortresses or for operations against strong field fortifications of the enemy. A significant amount of artillery of various calibers was available in the fortresses. It was used by field troops during the war.

New technical means of struggle

On the eve of the First World War, the armies of European states were, to varying degrees, equipped with military equipment that supported the combat operations of the troops. Armored means were represented by armored (armored) trains. Such trains were used by the British during the Boer War to protect rear railway communications.

Armored vehicles were just being developed. Their technical properties did not yet meet the requirements and by the beginning of the war they were not adopted for service (39), they began to be used only with the beginning of the war and were armed with a machine gun or small-caliber gun. They moved at high speed and were intended to be used as a means of reconnaissance and for a surprise attack on enemy rear units, but did not have a significant impact on the course of hostilities.

Before the war, projects of self-propelled armored vehicles with high cross-country ability (later called tanks) appeared, and during the war the vehicles themselves (tanks) appeared. In 1911, the son of the famous Russian chemist D.I. Mendeleev, engineer V.D. Mendeleev, proposed the first tank design (40). Already during the war, the Russian inventor, military engineer A. A. Porokhovshchikov, presented his project for a light armored vehicle on tracks, armed with a machine gun, called an “all-terrain vehicle” (41). The vehicle was manufactured in Riga and assembled in May 1915. The “all-terrain vehicle,” as noted in the test report, “traversed soil and terrain impassable for ordinary cars” (42), its speed reached 25 km per hour. The tsarist government, which admired foreign models, did not dare to introduce a domestic tank into service with the army.

Aviation as a new means of armed struggle has been rapidly developing since the beginning of the 20th century. Russia is rightfully the birthplace of aviation. The world's first airplane was built by the Russian designer and inventor A.F. Mozhaisky (43). On July 20 (August 1), 1882, in the vicinity of St. Petersburg, Mozhaisky’s plane, controlled by mechanic Golubev, took off and flew over the field (44). In other countries, flight attempts have also been made since the 90s.

The year of the appearance of military aviation is considered to be 1910; from that time on, aircraft began to be used in military maneuvers. In France, 4 airships and 12 aircraft (45) took part in maneuvers in 1910. The aircraft were used in maneuvers in Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia. In Germany, for example, there were 24 aircraft, three airships and a tethered balloon (46) at the maneuvers. The aircraft were used for reconnaissance and fully justified the hopes placed on them.

Military aviation received its first combat experience in 1911-1912. during the war between Italy and Turkey. At first, nine Italian aircraft took part in this war, used for reconnaissance and also for bombing (47). In the first Balkan War of 1912-1913. A Russian volunteer aviation detachment operated as part of the Bulgarian army (48). In total, the countries of the Balkan Union had about 40 aircraft at their disposal. Airplanes were used mainly for reconnaissance, adjusting artillery fire, aerial photography, but sometimes also for bombing enemy troops, most of all cavalry. In Russia, aerial bombs of a large caliber for that time were used (about 10 kg) (51), in Italy - one-kilogram bombs.

The planes had no weapons. For example, the German Taube reconnaissance monoplane was equipped with a camera and picked up several bombs, which the pilot dropped with his hands over the side of the cockpit. The pilot was armed with a pistol or carbine for self-defense in the event of an emergency landing on enemy territory. Although work on arming the aircraft was underway, at the beginning of the war it turned out to be unfinished. The Russian officer Poplavko was the first in the world to create a machine gun installation on an airplane, but it was misjudged and was not adopted for service.

The most important event in the development of aircraft manufacturing in Russia was the construction in 1913 at the Russian-Baltic Plant in St. Petersburg of the heavy multi-engine aircraft “Russian Knight” (four engines of 100 hp each). When tested, it lasted in the air for 1 hour 54 minutes. with seven passengers (54), setting a world record. In 1914, the multi-engine aircraft “Ilya Muromets” was built, which was an improved design of the “Russian Knight”. “Ilya Muromets” had 4 engines of 150 hp each. With. (or two 220 hp engines). During testing, the device reached speeds of up to 90-100 km per hour (55). The plane could stay in the air for 4 hours. Crew - 6 people, flight load - 750-850 kg (56). In one of the flights, this plane with ten passengers reached an altitude of 2000 m (it stayed in the air much longer),
On July 5, 1914, the plane with passengers was in the air for 6 hours. 33 min. (57) “Russian Knight” and “Ilya Muromets” are the founders of modern heavy bombers. "Ilya Muromets" had special installations for suspending bombs, mechanical bomb releasers and sights (58).
In Russia, earlier than anywhere else, seaplanes designed by D. P. Grigorovich appeared in 1912-1913. In terms of their flight qualities, they were significantly superior to similar types of foreign machines that were subsequently created (59).

The aircraft had the following flight tactical data: engine power 60-80 hp. With. (for certain types of aircraft - up to 120 hp), speed rarely exceeded 100 km per hour, ceiling - 2500-3000 m, ascent time to 2000 m - 30-60 minutes, flight duration - 2-3 hours, combat load - 120-170 kg, including bomb load - 20-30 kg, crew - 2 people (pilot and observer).

There were few aircraft in military aviation. Russia had 263 aircraft, France - 156 aircraft, Germany - 232, Austria-Hungary - 65, England sent 30 aircraft (60) out of 258 aircraft to France with its expeditionary force.
Organizationally, aviation in units (detachments) was part of the army corps (in Russia there were 39 air detachments)
Before the First World War, aeronautics was already widely developed. The regulations contained instructions on the use of balloons for reconnaissance (61). Even in the Russo-Japanese War, they provided significant benefits to the troops.

They made observations even with winds up to 15 m/sec. In the war of 1904-1905. tethered kite balloons designed in Russia were used, which had great stability in the air and were convenient for observing the battlefield and for accurately adjusting artillery fire from closed positions. Balloons were also used in the war of 1914-1918.
At the end of the 19th century. in Russia, France, Germany and other countries, airship construction emerges, which, like aviation, developed especially rapidly in the last five years before the war. In 1911, in the Italo-Turkish War, the Italians used three airships (soft) for bombing and reconnaissance. However, due to their great vulnerability, airships could not be used on the battlefield, and they did not justify themselves as a means of bombing populated areas. The airship showed its suitability as a means of naval warfare - in the fight against submarines, in conducting naval reconnaissance, patrolling ship moorings and escorting them at sea. By the beginning of the First World War, Germany had 15 airships, France - 5, Russia - 14 (62).
Several years before the war, work was underway on the creation of an aviation backpack parachute. In Russia, the original design of such a parachute was developed and proposed to the military department in 1911 by G. E. Kotelnikov (63). But Kotelnikov’s parachute was used in 1914 only to equip pilots flying heavy Ilya Muromets aircraft.

Road transport began to be used for military purposes several years before the war. For example, at large imperial maneuvers in Germany in 1912, cars were used for communications, transporting troops, for various loads, as mobile workshops, and radio stations. Cars were also used in maneuvers of the Austro-Hungarian army (64). The French army had 170 vehicles of all brands, the English army had 80 trucks and several tractors, and the Russian army also had few cars (65). The replenishment of the army with cars according to the mobilization plan only provided for them to replace horse-drawn vehicles in the cumbersome corps rear. When mobilizing, the army received the following number of cars: French - about 5,500 trucks and about 4,000 cars (66); English - 1141 trucks and tractors, 213 cars and semi-trucks and 131 motorcycles; German - 4,000 vehicles (of which 3,500 are trucks) (67); Russian - 475 trucks and 3562 cars.

Before the First World War, military engineering resources in all armies were very limited. Sapper units were available only as part of the corps. In all armies, the mobilized corps had a sapper battalion, which included 3-4 sapper companies at the rate of one company per division and 1-2 companies in the corps reserve. Before the war, this norm of sapper units in the corps was recognized as quite sufficient for maneuverable operations, for which all armies were preparing. Sapper companies included specialists from almost all military engineering specialties of that time (sappers, miners, demolition workers, bridge workers). In addition, the sapper battalion included a searchlight unit to illuminate the area ahead (a searchlight company in the Russian corps and a searchlight platoon in the German corps). The corps had a bridge park as a means of transportation. In the German corps, which was most richly equipped with crossing facilities, it was possible to build a bridge 122 m long, and using divisional bridge facilities, the corps could build a light bridge of 200 m, and a heavy one, suitable for artillery passage, of 100-130 m.

The Russian corps had bridge equipment in sapper companies on only 64 m of the bridge (69). All sapper work was carried out manually, the main tools were a shovel, a pickaxe, and an ax.
Of the means of communication, the mobilized corps of all armies had telegraph units in the form of a telegraph department or company both for communication downward with the divisions and for communication upward with the army. The division did not have its own means of communication. Communication went to the division headquarters from below - from the regiments and from above - from corps headquarters.
The means of technical communication in the corps of all armies was extremely insufficient. The German corps had 12 devices, 77 km of field cable and 80 km of thin wire. The telegraph company of the Russian corps had 16 telegraph stations, 40 field telephone sets, 106 km of telegraph and 110 km of telephone wire, lighting equipment (heliograph, Mangin lamps, etc.). By the beginning of the war, the Russian corps was the most equipped with communications equipment. Radiotelegraph was considered an army tool and at the beginning there were no soldiers in the corps (70).
In general, it should be noted that the nature of the armaments of the armies of the largest European states, their structure, and technical equipment at the beginning of the war did not correspond to the capabilities that the industry of these countries had for the production of technical means of combat. The main burden of the fight fell on the infantry, armed with a rifle.

Control

In different countries, the organization of troop control in peacetime and wartime differed in detail, but the basics were approximately the same. In peacetime, the head of the armed forces was the head of state (president, monarch). Practical management of military construction, weapons and supplies, combat training, and the daily life of troops was carried out by the Ministry of War, in whose system there were special bodies (divisions, directorates, departments) for various types of activities and support of troops and general staffs, which were responsible for preparing for war(71).
In the German army, a large general staff, independent of the War Ministry, was in charge of preparing the armed forces for war, especially in terms of developing plans for mobilization, concentration, deployment and the first operational tasks. In Russia, these functions were performed by the Main Directorate of the General Staff, which was part of the War Ministry.

During war, the head of all armed forces was nominally the head of state, but almost always direct command in the theater of operations was entrusted to a specially appointed person - the commander in chief. For practical work on the management of the combat activities of the troops and their support, a field headquarters (Main Quarters, Headquarters) was created under the commander-in-chief with special departments for various types of combat activities and support. The commander-in-chief within the boundaries of the theater of military operations had supreme power (72). In the rest of the country, the usual authorities operated, and the War Ministry continued its work, which was now entirely aimed at meeting the needs and requirements of the front.

The strategic leadership of troops in all states (except Russia) was organized in such a way that each army was directly subordinate to the high command. Only in the Russian army, since 1900, has a new control system been developed. Even in peacetime in Russia, it was planned to create front-line departments that would unite 2-4 armies. It was recognized that, given the condition of fighting simultaneously against several opponents along a significant length of the western border, the commander-in-chief would not be able to direct the operations of all the armies subordinate to him alone, especially if they went on the offensive, when they acted in divergent directions. Therefore, it was decided to create an intermediate authority, namely front commanders.

It was assumed that the Russian high command would control the actions of the fronts, and the fronts would control the armies. True, the French “Manual for senior military commanders” of 1914. also provided for the unification of armies into groups. However, these associations were not permanent. Their organization was envisaged only for a certain time to conduct operations according to the plan of the commander-in-chief.
Due to the increase in the scope of military operations, the importance of headquarters has increased significantly. In matters of leadership and control of troops, headquarters played an important role.

The headquarters collects all the necessary information to organize the operation, it also develops directives and orders for the troops, receives reports from them and prepares reports to the senior commander. The headquarters must take care of establishing and maintaining communications with subordinate troops and higher headquarters.

Combat and operational training

In all armies, the system of training and education of personnel was aimed primarily at making the army an obedient instrument of the ruling classes, a reliable instrument for achieving their political goals in domestic and foreign policy.
They tried to instill in the soldiers faith in the inviolability of the existing social system, state system and social structure, and instilled in them obedience and diligence. Along with this, the troop training system provided for combat training necessary for the army to fulfill its direct purpose, that is, use in battle.

Combat training of troops was carried out according to a specific plan. To ensure uniformity of training, uniform programs were developed and special instructions were published. In Russia, for example, there was a “Plan for the distribution of annual training in the infantry”, “Regulations on the training of lower ranks”, “Manual for officer training”, “Manual for conducting training in cavalry”, etc. In other armies, instructions for organizing the training of recruits and some methodological advice was contained in the infantry drill regulations.

During their time in active military service, soldiers were trained in several stages. The development of professional skills began with single training, which included drill and physical training, training in the use of weapons (fire training, bayonet and hand-to-hand combat), training in performing the duties of a single fighter in peacetime (carrying out internal and guard duty) and in battle (service in patrol, field guard, observer, liaison, etc.). The importance of this period of training is emphasized by the infantry drill regulations of the German army of 1906: “Only thorough individual training provides a reliable basis for good combat performance of troops.”

Fire training occupied a significant place in the troop training system, since infantry fire was given great importance. It was believed that the infantry should prepare its own attack with the fire of its hand weapons, so every soldier was trained to be a good marksman. Shooting training was carried out at different distances and at different targets: single and group, stationary, appearing and moving. Targets were designated by targets of various sizes and imitated lying soldiers, artillery pieces in an open firing position, attacking infantry and cavalry, etc.

They were trained to perform fire missions in various environmental conditions, single, salvo and group fire. In Russia, shooting training was carried out on the basis of the “Manual for shooting with rifles, carbines and revolvers.” Russian soldiers were trained to shoot at all distances up to 1400 steps, and up to 600 steps soldiers were trained to hit any target with one or two shots. Since it was believed that victory in battle was achieved by a bayonet attack, soldiers were persistently trained in the use of a bayonet and other hand-to-hand combat techniques.

When training in cavalry, artillery and technical troops, the emphasis was on the specifics of the actions of the type of weapon. In the cavalry, for example, much attention was paid to horseback riding, equestrian sports, vaulting, and cutting.
After completing the training period for a single fighter, training followed in action as part of units in various conditions of combat service and in various types of combat. The training of units and units was carried out mainly in the summer during the period of camp training. To train the interaction of different types of troops and familiarize them with each other, joint exercises were held. The course of combat training ended with military maneuvers (79), which also had the goal of giving practice to senior and senior command personnel in a combat situation, independently assessing the situation, making decisions, and controlling the battle of subordinate troops.

Specialty and tactical training was also conducted with the officers of military units - on maps and plans, through field trips, on which officers trained in studying and assessing the terrain, choosing positions, assessing the situation and issuing orders and instructions. This form of advanced training was also practiced, such as reports and messages at a meeting on military history and various issues of combat training.
To test operational developments and war plans, as well as to prepare senior commanders for the performance of their duties in the positions for which they were intended in wartime, field trips of the general staff and war games of senior command personnel were conducted (82). In Russia, for example, such a game was held on the eve of the war in April 1914.

The training of troops and headquarters was based on official views set out in regulations and manuals.
Issues of organizing and conducting operations by large military formations were set out in special manuals, charters and instructions. In Germany, this was the manual “German Basic Principles of High Command of Troops” (1910)(84), in France - “Manual for Senior Military Commanders” (1914)(85).

The operational formation of armies in the armed forces system at the beginning of the war was provided for by the strategic deployment plans of the parties. Armies were usually built in one echelon and had a reserve. The necessary strike force was created by assigning some armies narrower zones of action and strengthening their combat strength. There were intervals between the armies to maintain freedom of maneuver. It was believed that each army would carry out its private operation independently. The armies had open flanks and took care of securing them themselves.

The operational formation of the troops of each army was also single-echelon - the corps were located in a line. In all formations, general reserves of up to 1/3 of the forces or more were created. Reserves were intended to fend off accidents or to strengthen parts of the first line. It was believed that reserves should be spent carefully and part of the reserve should be retained until the end of the battle.

The regulations recognized the offensive as the main type of action in the operation. Achieving success in an offensive in all armies was thought of only through a rapid enveloping maneuver on the flanks with the aim of encircling the enemy. H. Ritter, for example, noted that “the essence of German tactics and strategy was the idea of ​​​​completely encircling the enemy” (86). At the same time, the troops were required to take special care of their own flanks and take all possible measures to protect them. To do this, cavalry was placed on the flanks, special units were assigned to cover the flanks, and reserves were placed closer to the open flank. The troops tried their best to avoid encirclement. Encircled combat was not provided for by the regulations and was not developed. A frontal attack and a frontal attack with the aim of breaking through were considered impractical due to the difficulty of their implementation in conditions when the enemy armies had enormously increased their firepower. True, in Russia this form of operation was also allowed.
Great importance was attached to enemy reconnaissance. For this purpose, cavalry, tethered balloons, airplanes, ground surveillance, eavesdropping and agents were intended.

The main European states had large forces of cavalry, which was then the only mobile branch of the army. However, before the First World War there was no agreement on the role of cavalry in war. It was recognized that, due to the widespread introduction of more advanced weapons into the troops, cavalry attacks against mounted infantry could not be, as before, the main method of action.

In this regard, the idea arose that cavalry had lost its role on the battlefield. The more widespread opinion was that the importance of cavalry not only did not fall, but even increased, but that it must use different techniques in battle than before. The cavalry was intended primarily for strategic reconnaissance, which it must conduct in large formations.

During reconnaissance, it was necessary to “overwhelm”, “knock out” the enemy’s cavalry from the field, to break through the enemy’s guards to the location of his main forces. An important activity of the cavalry was also the implementation of covering its troops with a “veil”, prohibiting reconnaissance of the enemy cavalry. As for the use of cavalry for independent actions in deep raids (raids) on the enemy’s rear and communications, such actions were allowed, but were considered secondary and could only be used under exceptional circumstances and in conditions if there were enough forces not to weaken reconnaissance and cover of friendly forces. troops.

Regarding the method of action of cavalry in battle, it was recognized that in the conditions of the European theater, where the terrain is replete with obstacles in the form of ditches, hedges, buildings, it is difficult to find a sufficiently large space for an attack in a closed formation of cavalry masses. Such an attack is possible with limited forces only against enemy cavalry. Against infantry, it could only be successful if the infantry was already shocked and demoralized. Therefore, it was assumed that the cavalry should also operate on foot, using their own firepower and even a bayonet.

Tactics covered the issues of using troops directly in battle: building a battle formation, the method of action of troops, the interaction of units and elements of a battle formation, the use of military branches in battle, reconnaissance, security, etc. Tactical views were set out in manuals and regulations.
The main type of combat was considered offensive. The idea of ​​an offensive, which dominated strategic and operational views, was also reflected in tactics, as was directly indicated in the charters and instructions. Here, too, it was considered necessary to act only in an offensive spirit. In Germany, for example, all actions from the army to a separate patrol included an offensive at all costs.

German regulations, manuals and tactics textbooks emphasized that only an offensive could bring a quick and decisive victory over the enemy. Thus, in the German combat infantry manual of 1906, the need was noted for the personnel to develop the skills of a non-stop offensive under the slogan “forward against the enemy, no matter the cost” (93). Austrian tactical views largely followed German ones. The Austrian Infantry Manual of 1911, on the basis of which the Austrian army prepared for war, indicated that victory could only be achieved by attacking (94). The French infantry drill manual of 1904 noted that only one offensive is decisive and irresistible (95). Russian "Field Service Regulations 1912" on this issue he gave the following general instructions: “The best way to achieve the goal is offensive actions. Only these actions make it possible to seize the initiative into our own hands and force the enemy to do what we want” (96).

For a successful offensive, according to German views, it was recommended to pull all forces to the battlefield to the last battalion and immediately introduce them into battle (97). Such tactics, as noted in Russian military literature, were based on risk. It ensured the defeat of the enemy in case of success, but in case of failure it could lead to the defeat of one’s own army (98). In the German regulations it was believed that starting a battle with insufficient forces and then constantly strengthening them was one of the most serious mistakes. Under the cover of the vanguard, one must strive to immediately deploy the main forces and only at the moment of deployment of the infantry open artillery fire, so that the enemy does not guess the intentions of the attacker for as long as possible (99).
French regulations, in contrast, believed that insufficient intelligence information forces a small part of the forces to be introduced at the beginning of the battle, while the main forces are echeloned in depth behind the front lines until the situation is clarified (100). Therefore, French regulations attached great importance to the actions of vanguards and advanced detachments.

According to Russian military theorists, the main forces were supposed to deploy into battle formation under the cover of the vanguards and begin the offensive from a distance of actual rifle fire. The main forces were concentrated in the direction of the main attack. "Field Service Regulations 1912" obligated senior commanders to concentrate the general reserve in the selected area before the attack and direct the fire of as many guns as possible to the target of attack.

The principles of tactical actions in the offensive of the armies of various states had much in common. Troops in marching columns marched towards the enemy to the upcoming battlefield with security and reconnaissance measures. In the zone of enemy artillery fire, units were divided into smaller columns (battalion, company). In the zone of rifle fire they deployed into battle formation.

According to German regulations, during the period of approach to the battlefield, troops had to concentrate, deploy and form into battle formation (102). The French divided the course of the offensive into a “preparatory period,” during which the troops were positioned against the points of attack, and a “decisive period,” during which it was necessary to “advance the infantry firing line, constantly reinforced, until the bayonet strike.” According to French regulations, the battle consisted of its initiation, the main attack and secondary attacks. The troops moved towards the enemy in columns, trying to reach his flank and rear. The start of the battle was entrusted to the strong vanguards. Their task was to capture strongholds convenient for the deployment of the main forces and hold them (103). The deployment of the main forces took place under the cover of the vanguards.

The procedure for conducting an offensive battle was better and more fully developed in the Russian “Field Service Charter of 1912” This charter defined the following periods of offensive combat: approach, advance and pursuit. The offensive was carried out under the cover of vanguards, who captured advantageous positions that ensured the deployment of the main forces in battle formation and their further actions. Before deploying the main forces, commanders were required to assign tasks to their units and subunits. The artillery of the main forces, without waiting for the deployment of the infantry, advanced to the vanguard in order to “quickly achieve superiority in artillery fire over the enemy.”

For the offensive, the troops were deployed into a battle formation, which consisted of combat sectors and reserves. Each combat sector, in turn, was divided into smaller combat sectors with their private reserves and supports (a division's combat sector consisted of brigade combat sectors, a brigade - of regiment combat sectors, etc.). According to the views of French theorists, the battle formation consisted of forces leading the start of the battle, forces not brought into battle (reserve), and security. In the battle formation, the units had to be located either next to each other or at the back of the head, and the latter arrangement was considered convenient for maneuvering during the battle.

It was recommended to make the battle formations in the direction of the main attack denser than in the auxiliary directions. If there were gaps between adjacent combat areas, they had to be kept under crossfire by artillery and infantry.
The length of combat sectors along the front depended on the situation and terrain. The main requirement was that the rifle chain produce rifle fire of sufficient density. In the Russian army, the following length of combat sectors was adopted: for a battalion - about 0.5 km, for a regiment - 1 km, for a brigade - 2 km, for a division - 3 km, for a corps - 5 - 6 km (105). The length of the company's offensive front was assumed to be 250-300 steps (106). In the German army, a brigade was assigned a sector of 1500 m, a company - 150 m (107). Reserves, as a rule, were located behind the center of their unit or on open flanks. According to Russian regulations, the general reserve was intended to assist the troops in the combat sector delivering the main blow; private reserves - to strengthen the units of their combat sector leading the battle (108). The distance of the reserve from the battle line was established so as not to suffer unnecessary losses from enemy fire and at the same time quickly bring the reserve into action.

In general, in an offensive battle, the echelon of forces was as follows: a regiment (brigade) sent two or three battalions to the battle line, which occupied their combat sectors, the remaining 1-2 battalions formed a reserve and were located in reserve columns, hidden from enemy fire. The battalion sent 2-3 companies to the battle line, with the rest in reserve. The company deployed several of its platoons in a chain, the remaining platoons formed the support of the company chain. The platoons deployed all their squads in a chain. With such a formation of battle formation, only one third of all forces took direct part in the battle. The remaining two-thirds were in the reserves of all higher authorities and were virtually inactive. The reserves of companies (support), battalions and regiments were intended mainly to replenish the loss of the chain and strengthen it with fire. At the moment of attack, supports were poured into the chain to increase its striking force. Thus, the German regulations, without defining the exact composition of the supports, considered their main purpose to be “timely reinforcement of the firing line” (109), therefore, the supports during the offensive should have been located as close as possible to the rifle chain.

The infantry had to conduct the offensive battle in dense rifle chains with intervals between fighters of 1-3 steps. “Every offensive begins with the deployment of rifle chains,” demanded the German regulations (110). “If the terrain allows secretive advance of riflemen to the distance of actual fire,” the regulations stated, “then strong, dense rifle chains must be deployed immediately” (111). They scattered into a chain and approached the enemy within the range of actual rifle fire. The chains were followed in columns by support and reserves. The movement of the chain was carried out in steps with shooting on the move, and in the zone of actual rifle fire - in dashes. From a distance of 50 m, the chain rushed to attack. The German regulations required the offensive to be carried out at a very high pace, in dashes. The troops made stops at shooting positions. The last shooting position was planned 150 m from the enemy.

It also served as the starting point for a bayonet attack. During the offensive, the artillery was supposed to fire at the attack targets. In the Russian army, infantry on the offensive moved in dashes in platoons, squads, units and individually with short stops between rifle positions. From the very beginning of the battle, the artillery was located as close as possible to the enemy, but outside the scope of his rifle fire, occupying closed, semi-closed or open positions. The infantry rushed with bayonets, shooting the enemy from close ranges with rifle and machine-gun fire and throwing hand grenades at them. The offensive should have been completed by energetic pursuit of the enemy.

The pre-war regulations of all armies noted the need to shelter manpower from enemy fire during an offensive. The combat infantry regulations of the German army, for example, indicated that the head of a squad must be able to advance the riflemen of his squad forward as covertly as possible (112). In a number of armies it was believed that self-entrenchment should not be abused, since entrenched infantry would be difficult to raise for further movement forward (113). The regulations of the Russian army provided for the secret movement of soldiers during the offensive in order to suffer fewer losses from enemy fire.
In the offensive, all armies attached great importance to small arms fire, as one of the factors in the battle. According to the German regulations, even the very essence of the offensive was “transferring fire to the enemy, if necessary, to the nearest distance” (114). How much importance the Germans attached to fire can be seen from the words of the regulations: “To attack means to push the fire forward.” According to Russian regulations, an infantry offensive consisted of a combination of movement and fire from rifle positions.

The machine guns were supposed to assist the infantry advance with their fire. Depending on the situation, they were either assigned to battalions or remained at the disposal of the regiment commander, for example in the Russian army. According to the Austrians, machine gun fire at close ranges could replace artillery.
Still, it was believed that only a blow with the bayonet could force the enemy to leave his position. Thus, the German charter stated that “an attack with cold steel crowns the defeat of the enemy” (115). The Austrian infantry regulations of 1911 also stated that, using their fire to the fullest, the infantry finished off the enemy with a bayonet.

Pre-war regulations noted the power of artillery, but its tasks were stated very vaguely. The artillery was supposed to prepare the infantry attack with its fire (116). However, by the beginning of the war, artillery preparation was understood in a very simplified way. Until the infantry approached the enemy within the range of actual rifle fire (400-500 m), the artillery fired at the enemy batteries. With the infantry thrown into the attack, the artillery had to fire from open positions to hit enemy fire weapons that were interfering with the infantry's advance. The responsibilities of the artillery were thus very limited. The role of artillery in the offensive was actually underestimated. Issues of interaction between artillery and infantry, in particular the call for artillery fire and target designation, were not clearly worked out.

In the French combat infantry manual, it was written that the command “prepares and supports the infantry movement with artillery” (117). However, the preparation of an infantry attack by artillery could be carried out independently of the actions of the infantry. Due to the fact that the fire of the French 75-mm cannon was ineffective against shelters, it was believed that when advancing, the infantry, even sacrificing themselves, must themselves knock out the enemy from the trenches, who were then shot with shrapnel by the artillery.

The Russian “Field Service Charter” emphasized that artillery, with its fire, paves the way for the infantry and, for this purpose, hits those targets that prevent the infantry from carrying out combat missions, and when the infantry attacks, specially designated batteries move forward to the attacking troops at the distances closest to the enemy to support the attack infantry (118). Here the term “pave the way for the infantry” attracts attention. By this, the 1912 regulations aimed at close interaction between infantry and artillery, which should help the infantry, accompanying it with fire and wheels. In the Russian “Field Service Charter of 1912” The idea of ​​massing artillery in battle was expressed, although not yet clearly and consistently enough, and, which was not in any of the foreign regulations, the need to support an infantry attack before throwing it with bayonets was emphasized. According to the regulations, light field artillery was included in infantry combat areas in divisions and batteries (119). The howitzer battalions and heavy field artillery that were part of the corps were either assigned to those sectors where their assistance was most useful and thus came under the subordination of lower commanders, or remained at the disposal of the corps commander and received tasks from him.

The conduct of defensive combat before the First World War was insufficiently developed in almost all countries. Defense was so neglected that some armies avoided using the word “defense.” Thus, in the French army, according to Luke, the word “defense” was so jarring that they did not dare to use it in exercises on maps and in assignments for field exercises. Anyone who was very interested in defense issues risked ruining his professional reputation (120). Nevertheless, in the charters of various armies there were special articles and sections devoted to the conduct of defensive combat. The methods of conducting defense were considered by the German regulations, although in Germany defense as a whole was underestimated. The essence of defense was seen in “not only repelling an attack, but also winning a decisive victory,” and for this, as the charter required, defense must be combined with offensive actions (121).
Despite the negative attitude of the French command towards defensive actions, French regulations still provided for defense in certain directions to save forces, disrupt the enemy in order to enable the main forces to act offensively in the best conditions (122).
Russian regulations paid significant attention to defensive actions. A transition to defense was allowed in the case “when the set goal cannot be achieved by an offensive” (123). But even while occupying the defensive, the troops had to disrupt the enemy forces with all types of fire, in order to then go on the offensive and defeat them.
In defense, troops were deployed in a battle formation, which, as in the offensive, consisted of combat sectors and reserves. When going on the defensive, the companies deployed in a chain, leaving one platoon behind as company support. The battalions deployed three companies in a chain, and one company was located behind in the battalion reserve. The regiments were deployed according to the same scheme (three battalions in the first echelon and one in reserve). According to the views of Russian military leaders, even in defense it was necessary to make the sector that was most important the strongest.
Machine guns were usually distributed two at a time between the battalions of the first echelon, evenly strengthening them in terms of fire. The Austrian infantry regulations of 1911 recommended maintaining machine guns in defense as a fire reserve.

The width of the defensive sectors differed little from the width of the offensive sectors. The width of the division's defense sectors was 4-5 km. The depth of defense was created by placing reserves and artillery and reached 1.5 - 2 km for the division. According to German views, the width of the plots had to be determined depending on the nature of the terrain. Each precinct had a precinct reserve. Great importance was attached to the creation of a strong general reserve, the purpose of which was to counterattack the enemy. In the German army, the general reserve was located in a ledge behind the open flanks. Artillery firing positions were assigned on average at a distance of up to 600 m from the infantry.
The methods of strengthening field positions and the views on their organization that existed before the First World War in the armies of future opponents were, in general terms, the same. The main line of defense consisted of strong points (centers of resistance), which were either open trenches or local objects adapted for defense (buildings, forests, heights, etc.). The gaps between the strong points were covered with fire. To delay the enemy's advance and give time to the troops of the main position to prepare for battle, forward strong points were set up. Rear positions were created in the depths of the defense. German regulations required the creation of only one defensive position (124). Field fortifications were not to be built in a continuous line, but in groups, and the spaces between them were to be shot through. There were no plans to create any barriers on the approaches to the positions (125). The defensive position, according to the Russian field service regulations, consisted of separate strong points located in fire communication. Strong points included trenches and local objects put into a defensive state. There were also “advanced points” (combat outposts). Before the start of the battle, the infantry did not occupy the trenches, but was located near them (126).

After repelling an enemy attack, according to regulations, the defending troops must launch a counterattack and a general offensive (127).
Although the decisive role in battle in all armies was assigned to infantry (128), its actions were made directly dependent on the assistance of artillery and cavalry. Thus, the organization of interaction between the military branches acquired particular importance. Russian "Field Service Regulations 1912" clearly put forward the need for interaction in battle. The desire to achieve a common goal requires the interaction of all units and branches of the military, the charter said, the selfless fulfillment of their duty by everyone and mutual assistance” (129). The cavalry was required to contribute to the offensive and defense with energetic attacks “on the flanks and rear of the enemy” in mounted and dismounted formations.
If the enemy was overthrown, the cavalry began relentless pursuit (130). The German regulations also emphasized the need for cooperation, especially between infantry and artillery (131). However, as H. Ritter later noted, the significance of the interaction of military branches in the German army “was not fully realized” (132). In reality, the individual branches of the military did not interact, but only acted next to each other. The French regulations stated that “the assistance of various types of weapons allows the infantry to complete the task under the best conditions” (133).
Russian "Field Service Regulations 1912" correctly resolved the main issues of offensive and defensive battles. Unlike similar regulations of other armies, it set out in detail the features of battles in special conditions (at night, in the mountains, etc.). The experience of these battles was gained during the Russo-Japanese War. Thus, this Russian charter undoubtedly stood higher than the regulations of other armies of that time, and was the best charter on the eve of the First World War.
The German army was the most prepared. Its officer and non-commissioned officer corps was carefully selected in terms of class, and its training was at a high level. The army was well disciplined, able to maneuver on the battlefield and march quickly. The great advantage of the German army over other armies was that its military formations included field howitzers and heavy artillery. But in terms of training, German artillery was significantly inferior to Russian and French. German artillerymen were not accustomed to firing from closed positions. All attention was paid to the speed of fire, and not to its accuracy. The preparation of the German cavalry was good. Only training in foot combat in large formations was not given enough attention everywhere.

The French army was also well prepared, and the German generals saw it as a dangerous enemy. Two-thirds of non-commissioned officer positions were filled by trained conscripts. The officer corps of the French army stood quite high in general development, education and theoretical training, which could not be said about the senior command staff. The French soldiers were fully prepared for war; in the field they acted actively and proactively. Much attention in the French army was paid to training large military formations in marching movements. The French army had an independent, well-defined military doctrine, which differed from the German army in its excessive caution. A big disadvantage of the French army was the almost complete absence of heavy field artillery and light field howitzers in the troops.
The Russian army was not inferior in combat training to the armies of Western European countries. The soldiers were well trained, distinguished by endurance and courage. The non-commissioned officers were well trained.

The troops paid great attention to the skillful conduct of rifle, machine gun and artillery fire. Russian artillery, in terms of its training, undoubtedly stood in first place compared to all other armies.
Regular Russian cavalry was well trained in combat both on horseback and in the combination of mounted and foot combat. The cavalry conducted good reconnaissance, but little attention was paid to the actions of cavalry in large masses. Cossack regiments were inferior to regular regiments in tactical training.
The officers of the Russian army at the middle and junior ranks had fairly good training. The great advantage of the Russian army was that its command staff had recent combat experience in the Russo-Japanese War. Other armies did not have such experience (the German and French armies did not fight for 44 years, the Austro-Hungarian army for 48 years, England generally only waged colonial wars against the unarmed population of enslaved countries).
The generals of the Russian army, the senior and highest command staff, whose training in peacetime was not given due attention, did not always correspond to the positions they held.

The English troops were excellent fighting material. The training of the British soldiers and juniors was good. Soldiers and officers used personal weapons skillfully. However, in operational and tactical training, the British army lagged far behind other armies. Its senior and top commanders had no experience of a major war and showed their ignorance of modern military affairs already in the first battles.
The Austro-Hungarian army was worse prepared for war than other armies. The training of the rank and file did not meet modern requirements. The junior officers were better prepared tactically. The senior command staff of the Austro-Hungarian army was not sufficiently trained in the management of combined arms formations in the field. The level of training did not meet modern requirements. Fire control and massing of artillery fire were poorly carried out.

D. V. Verzhkhovsky

In Soviet times, it was generally accepted that the Russian Imperial Army entered the First World War completely unprepared, was “backward” and this resulted in heavy losses, a shortage of weapons and ammunition. But this is not a completely correct judgment, although the tsarist army had enough shortcomings, as in other armies.

The Russo-Japanese War was lost not for military, but for political reasons. After it, colossal work was carried out to restore the fleet, reorganize forces, and eliminate shortcomings. As a result, by the First World War, in terms of its training and level of technical equipment, the Russian army was second only to the German one. But we must take into account the fact that the German Empire was purposefully preparing for a military solution to the issue of redistributing spheres of influence, colonies, domination in Europe and the world. The Russian imperial army was the largest in the world. After mobilization, Russia fielded 5.3 million people.

At the beginning of the 20th century, the territory of the Russian Empire was divided into 12 military districts plus the region of the Don Army. At the head of each was a commander of the troops. Men aged 21 to 43 were liable for military service. In 1906, the service life was reduced to 3 years, this made it possible to have an army of 1.5 million in peacetime, moreover, consisting of two-thirds soldiers of the second and third years of service and a significant number of reservists. After three years of active service in the ground forces, a person was in the 1st category reserve for 7 years, and 2nd category for 8 years. Those who did not serve, but were healthy enough for combat service, because Not all conscripts were taken into the army (there was an overabundance of them, a little more than half of the conscripts were taken), they were enrolled in the militia. Those enrolled in the militia were divided into two categories. The first category - in case of war, they were supposed to replenish the active army. The second category - those who were removed from combat service for health reasons were enrolled there; they planned to form militia battalions (“squads”) from them during the war. In addition, one could join the army at will, as a volunteer.

It should be noted that many peoples of the empire were exempted from military service: Muslims of the Caucasus and Central Asia (they paid a special tax), Finns, and small peoples of the North. True, there were small numbers of “foreign troops.” These were irregular cavalry units, into which representatives of the Islamic peoples of the Caucasus could enroll on a voluntary basis.

Cossacks performed the service. They were a special military class, there were 10 main Cossack troops: Don, Kuban, Terek, Orenburg, Ural, Siberian, Semirechenskoe, Transbaikal, Amur, Ussuri, as well as Irkutsk and Krasnoyarsk Cossacks. Cossack troops fielded “servicemen” and “militiamen.” “Service” were divided into 3 categories: preparatory (20 - 21 years old); combatant (21 - 33 years old), combatant Cossacks carried out direct service; spare (33 - 38 years old), they were deployed in case of war to make up for losses. The main combat units of the Cossacks were regiments, hundreds and divisions (artillery). During the First World War, the Cossacks fielded 160 regiments and 176 separate hundreds, together with Cossack infantry and artillery, more than 200 thousand people.

Cossack of the Life Guards Cossack Regiment.

The main organizational unit of the Russian army was the corps; it consisted of 3 infantry divisions and 1 cavalry division. During the war, each infantry division was reinforced with a mounted Cossack regiment. The cavalry division had 4 thousand sabers and 4 regiments (dragoons, hussars, ulans, Cossacks) of 6 squadrons each, as well as a machine gun team and an artillery division of 12 guns.

Since 1891, the infantry has been armed with a repeating 7.62 mm rifle (Mosin rifle, three-line). This rifle was produced since 1892 at the Tula, Izhevsk and Sestroretsk arms factories; due to a lack of production capacity, it was also ordered abroad - in France, the USA. In 1910, a modified rifle was adopted for service. After the adoption of the “light” (“offensive”) sharp-nosed bullet in 1908, the rifle was modernized, for example, a new curved sighting bar of the Konovalov system was introduced, which compensated for the change in the bullet’s trajectory. By the time the empire entered World War I, Mosin rifles were produced in dragoon, infantry and Cossack varieties. In addition, in May 1895, by decree of the emperor, the Nagant revolver chambered for the 7.62 mm cartridge was adopted by the Russian army. By July 20, 1914, according to the report card, the Russian troops had 424,434 units of Nagant revolvers of all modifications (according to the state there were 436,210), i.e. the army was almost completely provided with revolvers.

The army also had a 7.62 mm Maxim machine gun. Initially it was purchased by the navy, so in 1897-1904 about 300 machine guns were purchased. The machine guns were classified as artillery, they were placed on a heavy carriage with large wheels and a large armor shield (the mass of the entire structure was up to 250 kg). They were going to be used for the defense of fortresses and pre-equipped, protected positions. In 1904, their production began at the Tula Arms Factory. The Russo-Japanese War showed their high efficiency on the battlefield; machine guns in the army began to be removed from heavy carriages and, in order to increase maneuverability, they were placed on lighter and more easily transportable machines. It should be noted that machine gun crews often threw away heavy armored shields, having established in practice that in defense camouflage of a position is more important than a shield, and when attacking, mobility comes first. As a result of all the upgrades, the weight was reduced to 60 kg.

Maxim machine gun on a serf (“artillery”) carriage. 1915.

It was no worse than its foreign counterparts; in terms of the number of machine guns, the Russian army was not inferior to the French and German armies. The Russian infantry regiment of 4 battalions (16 companies) was armed with a machine gun team with 8 Maxim heavy machine guns as of May 6, 1910. The Germans and French had six machine guns per regiment of 12 companies. Russia met the war with good artillery of small and medium calibers, for example, a 76-mm divisional gun mod. 1902 (the basis of the field artillery of the Russian Empire) was superior in its combat qualities to the 75-mm rapid-fire French and 77-mm German guns and was highly praised by Russian artillerymen. The Russian infantry division had 48 guns, the Germans - 72, the French - 36. But Russia lagged behind the Germans in heavy field artillery (as did the French, British, and Austrians). Russia did not appreciate the importance of mortars, although there was experience of using them in the Russo-Japanese War.

At the beginning of the 20th century, there was an active development of military equipment. In 1902, automobile troops appeared in the Russian armed forces. By World War I, the army had more than 3 thousand cars (for example, the Germans had only 83). The Germans underestimated the role of vehicles; they believed that they were necessary only for advanced reconnaissance detachments. In 1911, the Imperial Air Force was established. By the beginning of the war, Russia had the most airplanes - 263, Germany - 232, France - 156, England - 90, Austria-Hungary - 65. Russia was the world leader in the construction and use of seaplanes (airplanes of Dmitry Pavlovich Grigorovich). In 1913, the aviation department of the Russian-Baltic Carriage Works in St. Petersburg under the leadership of I.I. Sikorsky built the four-engine aircraft "Ilya Muromets" - the world's first passenger aircraft. After the start of the war, the world's first bomber formation was created from 4 Ilya Muromets aircraft.

Beginning in 1914, armored vehicles were actively introduced into the Russian army, and in 1915, the first models of tanks began to be tested. The first field radio stations, created by Popov and Troitsky, appeared in the armed forces back in 1900. They were used during the Russo-Japanese War; by 1914, “spark companies” had been created in all corps, and telephone and telegraph communications were used.

Military science developed, the works of a number of military theorists were published: N.P. Mikhnevich - “Strategy”, A.G. Elchaninov - “Conducting modern combat”, V.A. Cheremisov - “Fundamentals of modern military art”, A.A. Neznamov - “Modern War”. In 1912, the “Field Service Charter”, “Manual for Field Artillery Operations in Combat” were published, in 1914 - “Manual for Infantry Operations in Combat”, “Manual for Firing from a Rifle, Carbine and Revolver”. The main type of combat operations was considered to be offensive, but much attention was also paid to defense. The infantry attack used intervals of up to 5 steps (sparrier battle formations than in other European armies). It is allowed to crawl, move in dashes, advance by squads and individual soldiers from position to position under the cover of fire from comrades. The soldiers were required to dig in not only in defense, but also during offensive operations. We studied counter combat, operations at night, and Russian artillerymen showed a good level of training. Cavalrymen were taught to operate not only on horseback, but also on foot. The training of officers and non-commissioned officers was at a high level. The highest level of knowledge was provided by the Academy of the General Staff.

Of course, there were also shortcomings, for example, the issue of automatic weapons for infantry was not resolved, although promising developments existed (Fedorov, Tokarev and others worked on them). The mortars were not deployed. The preparation of the reserve was very poor; only the Cossacks conducted training and exercises. Those who dropped out and did not get into combat service had no training at all. Things were bad with the officer reserve. These were people who received higher education, they received the rank of ensign with a diploma, but had no idea about active service. The reserve also included officers who retired due to health, age, or misconduct.

Russia underestimated the capabilities of heavy artillery and succumbed to the influence of French theories and German disinformation (the Germans actively criticized large-caliber guns in the pre-war period). They realized it late, before the war they adopted a new program, according to which they planned to seriously strengthen the artillery: the corps was supposed to have 156 guns, of which 24 were heavy. Russia’s weak point was its focus on foreign manufacturers. Minister of War Vladimir Aleksandrovich Sukhomlinov (1909-1915) was not distinguished by high abilities. He was a smart administrator, but he was not distinguished by excessive zeal; he tried to minimize efforts - instead of developing domestic industry, he found an easier way. I chose it, ordered it, received a “thank you” from the manufacturer, and accepted the product.

Russian strategic plan on the eve of the First World War

The German Schlieffen plan was generally known in Russia. The Germans planted a fake on Russian intelligence, but the General Staff determined that it was a fake, and “by contradiction” they recreated the enemy’s true plans.

The Russian war plan provided for two war scenarios. Plan “A” - the Germans strike the first blow against France, and plan “D”, if not only Austria-Hungary fights against the Russian Empire, but the Germans also strike the first and main blow against us. In this scenario, the majority of Russian forces would move against Germany.

According to the first scenario, which was carried out, 52% of all forces (4 armies) were concentrated against Austria-Hungary. With counter strikes from Poland and Ukraine, they were supposed to destroy the enemy group in Galicia (in the Lviv-Przemysl region) and then prepare an offensive in the direction of Vienna and Budapest. Successes against Austria-Hungary were supposed to keep the Kingdom of Poland from a possible uprising. 33% of all forces (2 armies) were supposed to act against the German Empire. They were supposed to deliver converging attacks from Lithuania (from the east) and from Poland (from the south), defeat the Germans in East Prussia and create a threat to the central regions of Germany. Actions against Germany were supposed to draw back part of the forces of the German army that were acting against France. Another 15% of the forces were allocated to two separate armies. The 6th Army was supposed to defend the Baltic coast and St. Petersburg, and the 7th Army was to defend the border with Romania and the Black Sea coast.

After mobilization, the following were to be deployed against Germany: 9 corps (2 armies), they had 19 infantry divisions, 11 secondary infantry divisions, 9 and a half cavalry divisions. Against Austria-Hungary: 17 corps, they had 33.5 infantry divisions, 13 secondary infantry divisions, 18 and a half cavalry divisions. Two separate armies included 2 corps with 5 infantry divisions, 7 secondary infantry divisions, 3 cavalry divisions. Another 9 army corps remained in reserve at Headquarters, in Siberia and Turkestan.

It should be noted that Russia was the first country to create such operational formations as a front - the North-Western and South-Western Fronts. In other countries, all armies were confined to a single governing body - Headquarters.

Considering the fact that the mobilization dates of the Russian army were late compared to the German and Austro-Hungarian ones, Russia decided to remove the army deployment line from the German and Austro-Hungarian borders. So that the German and Austro-Hungarian armies would not be able to carry out a coordinated offensive on Bialystok or Brest-Litovsk and generally along the eastern bank of the Vistula in order to cut off the Russian armies from the center of the empire. Against the German forces, Russian troops concentrated on the line of Shavli, Kovno, the Neman, Bobr, Narev and Western Bug rivers. This line was almost five marches away from Germany and was a strong defensive line due to its natural properties. Against the Austro-Hungarian Empire, troops were to be concentrated on the line Ivangorod, Lublin, Kholm, Dubno, Proskurov. The Austro-Hungarian army was considered not so strong and dangerous.

The connecting factor was the fact that Russia assumed the obligation, simultaneously with France, to act against Germany. The French pledged to deploy 1.3 million people by the 10th day of mobilization and immediately begin military operations. The Russian side pledged to deploy 800 thousand people by this date (one must take into account the fact that the Russian army was scattered across the vast territory of the country, as well as mobilization reserves) and on the 15th day of mobilization to launch an offensive against Germany. In 1912, an agreement was made that if the Germans concentrated in East Prussia, then Russian troops would advance from the Narev to Allenstein. And in the event that German forces deploy in the Thorn, Poznan area, the Russians will strike directly at Berlin.

The emperor was to become the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and the actual leadership was to be carried out by the chief of staff, who became the head of the Academy of the General Staff, Nikolai Nikolaevich Yanushkevich. The post of quartermaster general, who was responsible for all operational work, was given to Yuri Nikiforovich Danilov. Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich was eventually appointed Supreme Commander-in-Chief. The headquarters was created in Baranovichi.

The main weaknesses of the plan:

The need to launch an offensive before the mobilization and concentration of forces is completed. On the 15th day of mobilization, Russia could concentrate only about a third of its forces, which led to the fact that the Russian Imperial Army had to conduct the offensive in a state of partial readiness.

The need to conduct offensive operations against two strong opponents, it was impossible to concentrate the main forces against one of them.

After the end of the unsuccessful war with Japan for Russia, a set of measures was taken that were carried out from 1905-1912. and touched upon various aspects of the Russian armed forces. In particular, with the introduction of the territorial recruitment system, the centralization of military command was strengthened; The terms of service in the army and navy were shortened, the officer corps was rejuvenated; new programs for military schools, new regulations and models of artillery pieces were adopted; heavy field artillery was created, engineering troops were strengthened and material support was improved; reconstruction of fleets in the Pacific and Baltic, which suffered heavy losses in ships.

In 1912, under the leadership of General M.A. Belyaev in Russia, a “Great Program to Strengthen the Army” was developed. In March - October 1913, the provisions of the program were approved by NicholasII, however, it was approved only on June 24, 1914, when before the startPThe First World War was just over a month away.

“Two more years of peace, and Russia, with its 180 million souls, would have such a powerful army in numbers, education and supplies that it would be able, in its own interests, to give direction to the solution of all political issues of the European continent.”

V. A. Sukhomlinov - Minister of War of Russia in 1909-1915.

On the eve of the war, Russia arrived with a peacetime army of 1 million 423 thousand people. After mobilization it amounted to about 6 million people. In total, during the First World War, almost 16 million people were mobilized into the Russian army. All of the above figures exceeded those of any of the warring countries during the war.

General Alexey Aleksevich Brusilov

In historical and journalistic literature one can find two polar points of view on the command staff of the Russian army during the First World War. The first represented the officers and generals as people endowed with outstanding qualities. According to the second point of view, the commanders of the first half of the 1910s. Quite often they were mediocrities, and even mediocrities. Of course, the bulk of the Russian command staff was neither one nor the other. These were professional military men, graduates of specialized military institutions, for whom military affairs became a profession (it is difficult to blame L.G. Kornilov, M.V. Alekseev, A.I. Denikin, A.V. Samsonov, A.A. Brusilov for unprofessionalism and etc.). It was they who would subsequently form the backbone of the command staff during the civil war for both the “whites” and the “reds”.

Huge losses among the personnel of the Russian army already in the first year of the war led to the fact that after mobilization in the army there was an increase in the proportion of the peasant population, half of whom were illiterate. This did not prevent the Russian soldier from being brave and persistent on the battlefield, but at the same time he had to confront the German soldier, who at that time was the product of one of the most technically trained nations in the world. And here such categories as endurance, patience, obedience, characteristic of the communal psychology of the Russian warrior, turned out to be insufficient in the beginning war of technology.

The main tactical unit of the Russian army was the infantry division, numbering 14.5 thousand people, which, as a rule, consisted of four infantry regiments. The main weapon of the Russian army was the three-line Mosin rifle of the 1891 model, which was distinguished by its simplicity and reliability, and its undemanding manufacturing technology. Unfortunately, especially in the first years of the war, due to various circumstances in the Russian army there was not only an understaffing, but sometimes even a catastrophic shortage of rifles among the rank and file of infantrymen. More advanced rifles by V.G. were tested in 1912. Fedorov and F.V. Tokarev were not accepted for mass production either before or during the war.

Model 1891 Mosin rifle

In addition, Japanese Arisaka rifles, captured Austro-Hungarian Mannlicher rifles, German Mauser, Winchester rifles, mainly late X modifications were used to varying degreesIXcentury, but their use was secondary to the Mosin rifle.

By July 1914, the Russian army had 4,157 machine guns in service (mainly the Maxim, Vickers, Colt-Browning, Shosha, etc. machine guns), which was clearly not enough to meet the needs of the army - this the problem would persist throughout the war, even despite the influx of captured weapons and allied supplies from France and the United States.

Perhaps one of the problematic types of troops in Russia on the eve of the First World War was artillery. The roots of these problems are in outdated pre-war ideas about the nature of war. The prevailing fascination was theories about the omnipotence of the Russian bayonet strike, the belief that not a single enemy was able to withstand it, therefore, the fate of the war would be decided by quick surprise strikes in field battle. Artillery was in the process of being formed, especially heavy artillery. In addition, the problem of a lack of shells very quickly arose. Already at the end of 1914, the need was determined at 1.5 million shells per month. It was not possible to meet this need with the help of the domestic military industry. In the future, they will try to partially compensate for the problem with the lack of shells due to increased production volumes and allied supplies of weapons, but it will not be possible to fully resolve it.

By the beginning of the twentieth century. Such a branch of troops as cavalry lost its former importance. During the First World War, although cavalry was the only mobile branch of the military, numerically it constituted no more than 10% of the armies of the warring countries. The peculiarities of military operations during the war (active use of artillery, machine guns, aviation) led to large losses of personnel and horses, which made this branch of the military ineffective. The numerous Russian cavalry (36 cavalry divisions, 200 thousand people) as a result, in fact, was sometimes forced to turn into infantrymen, fighting from the trenches. It should be noted that two-thirds of the entire Russian cavalry were Cossack cavalry. For the Cossacks, given the high percentage of equestrian units among them and the traditions of horse breeding, it was most difficult for the Cossacks to adapt to the changing nature of the war. Often the Cossacks were not psychologically ready to “get off the horse,” perceiving this as a kind of betrayal of age-old foundations.

Don Cossack Kozma (Kuzma) Firsovich Kryuchkov - the first Knight of St. George among the lower ranks of the Russian army

The First World War actually only marked the use of motor vehicles in war conditions. Only on the eve of the war was the “Regulation on Military Automobile Conscription” approved, which provided for the transfer of all privately owned vehicles to the army by the civilian population upon the announcement of mobilization, with compensation to the owners for their cost. After the start of the war, in accordance with this provision, 3.5 thousand cars and 475 trucks were confiscated from the population. In wartime conditions, vehicles equipped with guns, including anti-aircraft guns, began to be created. Ambulance squads also provided great assistance in the field army.

First World War ambulance car

One of the problems that constantly existed throughout the First World War was the organization of supplies for the Russian army. Difficulties with transport support can be explained by the enormous distances over which transportation had to be carried out in Russia - they were 3-4 times greater than in Germany. Unfortunately, corruption and mercantile factors were also widespread in supply issues. It has long been no secret that war is one of the ways to get rich (this is clearly seen in the example of the United States, which, as a result of the First World War, turned from debtors into the world's largest creditors). The condition of the tracks and locomotives did not contribute to the normal operation of railway transport (it was the main transport for transportation) (in 1914 in East Prussia, the Russian army was faced with the problem of inconsistency of the railway track in Russia and Germany, which actually reduced the efficiency of transportation several times troops and supplies on enemy territory). To this should be added the climatic features of Russia - the long duration of the winter period and lower winter temperature conditions, which means the need for greater use of fuel (coal, first of all). All this naturally increased costs, both time and financial. Repeated attempts to establish normal supplies between the rear and the front were unsuccessful.

A loyal soldier tries to stop deserters

February Revolution of 1917, abdication of NicholasII, and then his brother Mikhail from the Russian throne led to significant changes in the Russian army. Order No. 1, which actually removed soldiers from the authority of commanders, contributed to a sharp decline in discipline and combat effectiveness of the army. The army was negatively impacted by incessant propaganda from various parties, which was anti-government and anti-militaristic in nature. Since the spring of 1917, desertion increased even more (by November 1917, there were about 1.5 million registered deserters), facts of “fraternization at the front” and voluntary surrender became frequent. The Russian army was close to collapse.

Ph.D. Vladimir Gizhov,

Alexander Gizhov.

Specially for the magazine “Russian Horizon”

The armed forces in all countries consisted of ground forces and navy. The structure of the ground forces was as follows: infantry accounted for 70-75%, cavalry - 5-8%, artillery - 15-17%, engineering and auxiliary troops - 2-7%. From this it can be seen that military leaders and theorists assumed that almost all combat missions would be carried out by infantry forces with little support from other branches of the military.

The imperialist powers paid much attention to the development of naval forces. It was believed that the combat power of the fleet depended primarily on the number of heavy battleships. Along with surface ships of various classes, submarines also entered service.

At the beginning of the war, England had the strongest fleet. The fleets of the Entente countries were significantly stronger than the naval forces of the Triple Alliance, which ensured that the Entente gained supremacy at sea.

There were no other types of armed forces other than land and sea forces at that time. Aviation was just in its infancy; it was not even a branch of the military and was used only as one of the technical means of reconnaissance and communications.

The organizational structure of most European armies was built according to a binary scheme: two regiments made up a brigade, two brigades made up a division, two divisions made up a corps. Infantry divisions of 1914 had the following forces and means:

In addition to two divisions, the infantry corps had a cavalry regiment, an artillery division (regiment), an aviation detachment (six aircraft), communications, engineering and logistics units. The corps artillery divisions were armed with howitzers: the Russian division - 122 mm caliber, the German - 150 mm, the French corps had an artillery regiment (48 75 mm guns).

The infantry regiments did not have their own artillery. The infantry of all capitalist countries was armed with repeating rifles with a caliber of 7.62 to 8 mm with a firing range of up to 4 - 5 km and a small number of heavy machine guns.

Soldiers were trained to conduct offensive combat in shallow but dense combat formations (dense rifle chains) without applying to the terrain or digging in.

Thus, the armament of the armies on the eve of the First World War was not very diverse. Nevertheless, repeating rifles, machine guns and rapid-fire artillery significantly increased the firepower of the troops. But the general staffs still did not take into account the increased force of fire and intended to achieve victory by striking large masses of infantry.

Strategic plans of the parties.

The general staffs of all countries developed strategic plans for the war long before it began. The authors of strategic plans did not use the experience of the first wars of the era of imperialism. They did not notice that the conditions of warfare had changed radically. In particular, the increased role of economic and moral factors was underestimated.

The prevailing idea in all general staffs was that the war would be short, that victory could be won in one or several general battles. The survivability of modern armies, due to the presence of numerous reserves and the massive production of weapons, was not taken into account. The plans of each of the warring countries expressed its imperialist aspirations, its aggressive goals.

Germany's strategic plan was developed by Chief of the General Staff Schlieffen. The main idea of ​​the plan is to defeat the armies of France and Russia consistently and quickly and thereby avoid a protracted war on two fronts. It was initially planned to concentrate the main forces in the zone from the Dutch border to the Metz fortress, launch a surprise attack through the territory of Belgium and Luxembourg, bypass from the north and defeat the French armies, occupy Paris and force France to capitulate. During this period of the war, it was planned to defend with limited forces on the section of the Franco-German border south of Metz. Considering that Russia, with its weak development of transport, cannot quickly carry out a mobilization deployment, Schlieffen proposed to cover East Prussia with the forces of one army in the first period of the war, and after the victory over France, transfer all forces from the western front to the east and defeat the Russian armies. It was planned to defeat France and Russia in three to four months.

The German strategic plan was flawed at its very core. The enemy's capabilities and strength were underestimated, which gave the plan an adventuristic character. It was also unrealistic to expect the defeat of the armed forces of a major power (France) in one general battle.

Along with its fundamental flaws, the German plan also had strengths. He was imbued with the spirit of active, decisive action. The direction of the main attack, chosen correctly, made it possible to maneuver into the enemy’s flank. Forces significantly superior to the enemy were concentrated in the direction of the main attack. The role of surprise was taken into account.

However, the presence of a number of correct operational-strategic provisions in the German plan could not compensate for its main shortcomings and miscalculations.

French Strategic Plan ("Plan No. 17") had an indecisive and ambivalent character. The French planned to deploy: the 1st and 2nd armies in the area of ​​the fortresses of Belfort, Epinal, Nancy with the task of attacking Alsace and Lorraine; The 3rd Army is to the north, in the Verdun area, and the 5th Army is on the border with Belgian Luxembourg. In the second line, behind the adjacent flanks of the 2nd and 3rd armies, the 4th Army deployed. The actions of the 3rd, 4th and 5th armies, according to the plan, depended entirely on how the enemy would behave and where he would deliver the main blow. Thus, the strategic initiative was ceded to the enemy, and friendly troops were doomed to passive defensive actions.

In particular, the 4th Army was not intended to build up forces during an offensive, but to counter the enemy in the direction of his main attack.

Russia's strategic plan developed under the strong influence of its political and economic dependence on its Western allies.

Russia accepted the obligation to launch an attack on East Prussia 15 days after the announcement of mobilization and thereby create a threat to the central regions of Germany. To solve this problem, Russia deployed two strong armies (1st and 2nd) on the Neman and Narev rivers.

The main aspirations of the Russian landowners and bourgeoisie were aimed at Galicia and the Balkans. Therefore, according to the strategic plan, it was planned to deploy four armies (3, 4, 5 and 8) against Austria-Hungary, launch an offensive on the 19th day of mobilization, encircle and destroy the Austro-Hungarian armies.

The Russian army had to attack simultaneously in two strategic directions, which was completely inconsistent with the economic and military capabilities of the country.

Austria-Hungary planned decisive actions against Russia and Serbia simultaneously. The Austro-Hungarian plan, drawn up under German pressure, did not take into account the real balance of forces, the weakness of economic resources and the low morale of a significant part of its troops.

England planned to maintain and strengthen its dominance at sea. For operations on land, it was planned to send only one small expeditionary army to France, consisting of six infantry and one cavalry divisions. Thus, England intended to shift the main burdens of the war onto the allies and, with the help of the latter, to defeat its main rival and competitor - Germany.

The stake “on a lightning war” was also expressed in the grouping of forces outlined by all plans. All countries deployed their forces in one strategic echelon. The widespread deployment of strategic reserves was not envisaged, since each country planned to win victory in a short time, by defeating the enemy in one or several general battles.

Despite the presence of military alliances and the coalition nature of the war, none of the military coalitions created a single strategic plan and a single command.

The plans of the allied countries were very poorly coordinated. Moreover, the imperialist powers avoided fulfilling their allied duty in every possible way and feared the great successes of their allies.

The beginning of the war. The Art of War in the 1914 Campaign

The reason for the outbreak of the First World War was the murder on June 28, 1914 of the heir to the Austrian throne by Serbian nationalists in Sarajevo.

The declaration of war and the start of open hostilities were preceded by a one-month threat period, during which the countries of the German bloc and the Entente secretly carried out a number of pre-mobilization measures. These included checking the condition of mobilization bodies, replenishing fuel and food supplies at naval bases and in designated troop concentration areas, strengthening the security of borders, bridges and other important facilities, canceling vacations in the army, returning troops from camps to places of permanent deployment, deployment of covering troops and invasion into deployment areas, etc. For example, Germany during June 1914 deployed three cavalry corps and six infantry brigades along the western border and concentrated a group of troops intended to invade Belgium with the aim of seizing crossings on the river. Maas.

Only after completing the preliminary preparations did the imperialists of the German-Austrian bloc present ultimatum demands to their opponents and start a war.

July 28, 1914 Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. On the same day, Russia began general mobilization. Germany declared war on Russia on August 1, and two days later on France. On August 4, England declared war on Germany. In 1914, Japan joined the Entente, and Turkey joined the German bloc.

Initial period The First World War lasted 16 - 20 days and had a number of important features. During this period, the covering troops deployed along the borders and the invading armies fought with only limited forces. The warring states sought to mobilize and strategically deploy as quickly as possible in the border areas, under the protection of covering troops. The main forces of the warring states began to conduct active operations only 16-20 days after the start of mobilization and declaration of war. At the same time, the main forces of the Russian army went on the offensive in East Prussia and Galicia, without even completing their full deployment, with an incomplete complement and an unsettled rear.

In the initial period of the First World War, cavalry units were primarily used as cover troops. They were also intended for long-range reconnaissance. Aviation also conducted reconnaissance, but the range of aircraft at that time was up to 100 km.

Active operations of the limited invasion forces were also carried out with the aim of creating the most favorable conditions for subsequent offensive operations of the main forces.

Thus, the content of the initial period of the First World War consisted of combat operations of covering and invasion troops, deep reconnaissance, mobilization, concentration and strategic deployment of the main forces of the warring countries.

The mobilization and strategic deployment of armed forces in all belligerent countries, carried out according to pre-developed plans, did not encounter any serious interference from the enemy.

The balance and grouping of forces in the main theaters of military operations did not correspond to the decisive strategic goals outlined in the war plans.

At the Western European Theater Germany deployed 7 armies, which included 86 infantry and 10 cavalry divisions. They were opposed by five French, one English and one Belgian armies, which had 85 infantry and 12 cavalry divisions.

With a general equality of strength, the five German armies, which delivered the main blow through Belgium and Luxembourg, had one and a half superiority over the forces of the French, British and Belgians operating in these areas.

At the Eastern European Theater Germany and Austria-Hungary deployed five armies against Russia (one German and four Austro-Hungarian), which included 51 infantry and 12.5 cavalry divisions. Russia initially deployed six armies with 54 infantry and 17.5 cavalry divisions.

The Russian armies were consolidated into two fronts: Northwestern (1st and 2nd armies) and Southwestern (3rd, 4th, 5th and 8th armies). Russia was the first country to create front-line associations. In all other countries, the armies were controlled by the headquarters of the main command.

Active military operations began in the West on August 4, 1914, when German troops, having not yet completed their concentration, invaded Belgium.

Already from the first days of the war, serious miscalculations in the German strategic plan were revealed. Belgians, using r. The Meuse and the fortresses of Liege and Namur were detained by the German armies for two weeks. During this time, the French 4th and 5th armies managed to reach the Franco-Belgian border. The Germans failed to take full advantage of the surprise factor.

August 21-25 in the so-called "border battle" Five German armies defeated three French and one British armies, forcing the latter to retreat.

At this moment, Russia provided important assistance to France. The armies of the Northwestern Front, without even finishing their concentration, launched an offensive in East Prussia in mid-August and forced the 8th German Army to retreat.

The German command was forced to take two corps and one cavalry division from its strike force in France and send them to East Prussia. Another corps, intended for operations in the West, was detained in the Metz area with the aim of sending it to the Russian front. In a short period of time, the German armies lost the numerical superiority they had created at the beginning of the war in the decisive direction. The German command did not have strategic and operational reserves to build up forces.

The counterattacks of the French armies at the end of August forced the German command to abandon the original plan to bypass Paris from the west. The right-flank German armies were turned south, towards the river. Marne, east of Paris. They lost their enveloping position and were under threat of attack from the Paris area, where the new (6th) French army had deployed, along a completely unsecured right flank.

September 5-9, 1914 on the river. Marne The German armies suffered a serious defeat and were forced to retreat across the river. Aisne, where they switched to positional defense. This determined the complete failure of plans to defeat France with one blow and quickly end the war.

Military operations in the 1914 campaign acquired great scope. Eastern European Theater. The successfully launched offensive of the Russian armies in East Prussia was not completed. Incompetent management on the part of the command of the North-Western Front, the lack of interaction between the two armies of this front and the criminal behavior of the commander of the 1st Army allowed the German troops not only to avoid defeat, but also to inflict consistent defeat. both armies. By mid-September these armies were driven out of East Prussia.

More successful were the military operations of the Southwestern Front, whose armies Galician battle, which took place from August 19 to September 21, 1914, inflicted a heavy defeat on the enemy and captured the territory of Galicia. But economically backward tsarist Russia quickly used up its mobilization reserves and had absolutely no means to develop the success achieved and achieve victory over Austria-Hungary and Germany.

The attempts of the German command to defeat Russian troops in the area of ​​Warsaw and Lodz were also unsuccessful.

Not a single warring country was able to carry out its strategic plan and achieve rapid and decisive success. In the fall of 1914, in the West, both sides tried to bypass the enemy’s open flank from the north, which led to a rapid extension of the positional front. These attempts, which received the figurative name “flight to the sea” in historical literature, did not bring success to either side and ended in mid-November, when a continuous positional front was established throughout the Western European theater of military operations - from the border of neutral Switzerland to the shore of the North Sea.

Military operations also took place in 1914 in the Far East and Africa (the fight for the German colonies), in Transcaucasia, the Balkans and the Middle East (the fight against Austria-Hungary and Turkey). The Western European and Eastern European theaters of war were the main ones throughout the war.

Naval forces in 1914 they limited themselves to laying minefields, shelling ports and cities on the enemy’s coast, attacks on merchant ships on ocean and sea lanes, and individual naval battles involving a limited number of warships. There were no major naval battles. Submarines proved to be an effective means of combat at sea, which required the organization of anti-submarine defense. A significant drawback of the combat activities of the naval forces was that they were poorly coordinated with the actions of the ground forces.

The 1914 campaign revealed a complete discrepancy between the theoretical ideas and views of bourgeois military theorists and military leaders and the actual conditions of warfare, operations and battles.

The strategic plans of all countries, which planned to achieve victory with the forces of personnel armies in a short time, suffered a complete failure. It turned out that in the era of imperialism, armies have great survivability, and losses incurred in forces and means can be replenished by reserves accumulated in peacetime and by expanding the production of military products. The war turned into a comprehensive test for the countries participating in it and required the mobilization of all economic resources and human reserves.

The armies of all states were preparing for maneuver actions, planning outreaches, detours and encirclement of the main enemy forces. But none of the armies was able to carry out their plan, and soon after the start of the war, continuous positional fronts with their inherent immobility began to take shape in the most important directions.

Results of the campaign. The 1914 campaign objectively saw the development of major operations of a strategic scale (the operation on the Marne River, the Battle of Galicia, the East Prussian operation). But the command and headquarters did not yet have experience in organizing and conducting operations of this scale. Therefore, during operations, the armies had significant independence, interaction between the armies was not close enough, and the headquarters and front command poorly coordinated the efforts of the armies.

War experience has shown that for a successful offensive to great depth it is necessary to mass forces and assets in decisive directions, to create several operational echelons in order to be able to increase efforts and maintain the superiority over the enemy achieved at the beginning of the operation. The lack of second strategic and operational echelons among the warring countries led to the incompleteness and rapid attenuation of their offensive operations.

The extremely heavy losses suffered by all armies in the first months of the war are proof that the tactics of these armies did not correspond to new conditions, in particular new means of struggle.

The infantry was the main branch of the military, and it was entrusted with solving the main combat missions. However, this underestimated the increased strength and effectiveness of small arms and artillery fire. The battle formations of formations and units consisted of combat sectors and reserves. The combat unit consisted of units deployed in a very dense rifle chain, with an interval of 1-2 steps between fighters. The offensive was carried out linearly, without the use of maneuver. The battlefield was oversaturated with infantry, and artillery densities were low (20-25 guns per 1 km of front). The interaction between infantry and artillery was weak.

They were not able to use machine guns in offensive battles; they were used only to secure occupied terrain. During the offensive, the infantry was forbidden to dig in.

Artillery, machine gun and rifle fire against the advancing unsheltered infantry was very effective, and the infantry suffered heavy casualties.

Field positional defense received significant development in the 1914 campaign. Initially, such defense had a focal linear character. The defense consisted of one line of individual and group rifle trenches. Then these trenches began to be connected to each other by a continuous trench, and wire barriers were built in front. Communication passages were opened from the trenches to the rear, shelters and shelters were created for reserves.

The infantry division in defense occupied a strip 10-12 km wide. Small arms fire formed the basis of the defense, therefore, when repelling an enemy attack, they tried to place the maximum number of riflemen in the first trench.

To better protect the infantry from artillery fire and increase the stability of the defense, by the end of 1914, one or two more trenches were built behind the first trench at a distance of 100-150 m from one another. Defensive positions equipped according to such a system, covered from the front by a system of wire barriers, reliably sheltered the infantry from enemy cannon artillery fire and made it possible to repel the advance of enemy infantry. Neither side had any other means of attack at the time. A situation developed where the defense was stronger than the offense. The armies of both sides dug into the ground and went on the defensive for a long period on a stationary continuous front.

The Art of War in the 1915 Campaign

The complete failure of the strategic plans developed before the start of the war forced the military leaders of all the warring states to look for new ways to victory.

England and France decided to switch to strategic defense, using 1915 to rebuild the economy, expand military production and accumulate reserves. They planned active actions for 1916. The British and French imperialists shifted the main burdens of the fight against the Austro-German bloc onto Russia.

Germany decided in 1915 to carry out the second part of the Schlieffen plan, that is, to defeat the Russian army and force Russia to capitulate. This would save Germany from having to fight on two fronts - and would give it the opportunity to use Russian food and raw materials to continue the war in the West.

Russia, under pressure from its allies, also planned active offensive actions, although it did not have the necessary logistical means.

Thus, in the 1915 campaign the Russian front was the main one. Active hostilities took place on this front from February to October. The German command, having concentrated powerful groups of troops in East Prussia and the Carpathian region, tried to encircle and destroy the main forces of the Russian army on Polish territory by attacking in converging directions.

The offensive operations of German and Russian troops in January - March 1915 on the North-Western Front did not bring decisive success to either side. The German command was unable to carry out the planned deep encirclement of the right wing of the Russian armies, and the command of the North-Western Front did not have enough strength to carry out plans to defeat the enemy and capture East Prussia.

Intense battles also unfolded on the southern wing of the Russian-German front, where troops of the Southwestern Front unsuccessfully tried in January - April to capture the Carpathians and invade Hungarian territory.

In May, German troops, secretly concentrating a strong group in a narrow area, broke the stubborn resistance of the 3rd Russian Army in the Gorlitsa area and, building on their success, pushed the Russians back beyond the San and Dniester rivers. Their overwhelming superiority in artillery played a decisive role in ensuring the success of the German troops. In the breakthrough area at Gorlitsa, where the Russian troops had 141 light and 4 heavy guns, extremely poorly supplied with ammunition, the enemy concentrated 457 light and 159 heavy guns and a huge amount of ammunition (1200 shells for a light gun and up to 600 shells for a heavy gun).

In the summer of 1915, the German command tried to implement its plan to encircle and defeat Russian troops in Poland and launched an offensive from the regions of Galicia and East Prussia. Russian units were forced to fight difficult defensive battles and, avoiding the threat of encirclement, retreat to the east. At the beginning of October, they completely eliminated the offensive of the German armies and switched to positional defense at the line of Riga, r. Western Dvina, Smorgon, Baranovichi, Dubno, r. Stripa.

Thus, in the fall of 1915, maneuver operations ceased on the Russian-German front. From that time on, the armed struggle on all the decisive fronts of the First World War acquired a positional character. The warring parties faced the problem of organizing a breakthrough of the enemy’s prepared defense, without which it was impossible to carry out an offensive operation of even a small scale.

In the Western European theater of operations, operations were carried out with limited objectives. Both sides focused on developing and improving their defensive positions.

In the autumn of 1915, the French and British armies tried to break through the defenses of German troops in Champagne and Artois. Strong groups of troops and artillery were concentrated in selected areas of the breakthrough. However, these operations, despite the huge amount of money spent and heavy losses, were not successful. In both Champagne and Artois, the advancing infantry managed to capture only the first enemy position, which was completely destroyed by artillery during a multi-day artillery preparation. Attempts to overcome subsequent positions, densely occupied by approaching reserves, were carried out without sufficient artillery support and were repulsed by German troops.

In 1915, Italy joined the Entente, and Bulgaria joined the Austro-German bloc. An Italian front was formed, and the struggle in the Balkans intensified, where the Anglo-French expeditionary force arrived through the Greek port of Thessaloniki.

Combat operations at sea were also insufficiently decisive. The English fleet blockaded the German coast. In turn, German submarines inflicted rather heavy damage on the British merchant fleet. Nevertheless, the British Admiralty, by organizing patrols and strengthening anti-submarine defense, eliminated the threat of a complete disruption of sea communications.

Overall, the 1915 campaign was marked by the failure of the plans of the German bloc, designed to defeat Russia and withdraw it from the war. The German imperialists and their allies were forced to wage a long war on two fronts, which doomed them to inevitable defeat.

Russia lost vast territories (parts of the Baltic states, Poland and Galicia), but the Russian army retained the ability to continue the war. It pinned down enormous enemy forces. Russia's Western allies, having shifted the brunt of the armed struggle onto it, were given the opportunity to rebuild their economy on a war footing, expand the production of weapons, ammunition and equipment, and prepare numerous reserves.

The peculiarity of this campaign is: on the Russian-German front - in the conduct of extensive maneuver operations, which, however, did not produce decisive results; on the Western European front - in the failure of the first serious attempts to break through continuous positional defense.

The means and methods of armed struggle have undergone significant changes. Artillery developed rapidly; at that time it was the main fire weapon of the ground forces, capable of seriously disrupting the stability of positional defenses and ensuring the success of an infantry offensive. Along with the rapid increase in the number of artillery, qualitative changes took place in its composition: the production of howitzers and heavy systems increased, and mortars became widely used. Anti-aircraft artillery was born.

Aviation turned into a weapon of war, as aircraft received small arms and bomber weapons. The world's first heavy bombers - the Ilya Muromets aircraft - were built and successfully used at the front in the Russian army at the beginning of 1915. The Muromets lifted up to 500 kg of bombs and had three firing points for protection against fighters that had just appeared on the fronts of the First World War. Thus, along with the increasingly widespread use of reconnaissance aircraft, new types of aviation emerged - bomber and fighter.

In the same year, the use of chemical warfare agents began. The German troops were the first to use them: before the attack, with the wind blowing towards the enemy, they released asphyxiating chlorine gas from cylinders. The use of toxic substances required providing troops with gas masks and organizing chemical protection.

In a situation when the war had reached a positional deadlock, when the technical equipment of the armies was rapidly improving, an intense search was carried out for new ways of preparing and carrying out offensive operations and battles. In order to break through the prepared positional defenses, they began to concentrate a large number of infantry, artillery and aviation on the intended breakthrough area. For example, during the offensive in Champagne, infantry divisions operated in 1.5-2 km zones; The density of artillery reached 50-60 guns per 1 km of front. The artillery preparation lasted for several days, and the fire was conducted across areas to the depth of the enemy’s first position. Such a long and limited artillery preparation helped to capture the first position, but the defending side at that time managed to bring up reserves and prepare to repel the attack on the second and third positions. The attacking troops did not yet have the means to reliably suppress the entire depth of the defense.

When attacking prepared defenses, the infantry began to use deeper battle formations: the division had two regiments in the first line (combat sectors) and one or two regiments in the second (reserves). The regiments of the first line created several dense rifle chains that moved at distances of about 50 m.

The reserves were intended to make up for losses and maintain the striking force of the attacking chains. This form of formation of battle formations was called “waves of chains” (in contrast to the single rifle chain used in 1914).

Field positional defense has also received significant development. By creating second and sometimes third positions and echeloning battle formations, the depth of defense was increased. The number of machine guns increased two to three times, which correspondingly increased the density of fire. Machine guns were rarely used during the offensive then. The engineering equipment of the area was improved. The defending troops covered themselves with wire barriers, various artificial and natural obstacles, and equipped their positions with a system of trenches, communication passages, firing positions, dugouts and shelters.

Defense in 1915 became not only anti-personnel, but also anti-artillery, anti-aircraft and anti-chemical.

The Art of War in the 1916 Campaign

Based on the experience of the campaigns of 1914-1915. The military leaders of the Entente countries were convinced of the advisability of coordinating the efforts of their armies. According to the strategic plan of the Entente, adopted at allied conferences, it was planned that the joint forces of England and France would carry out a large offensive operation in the area of ​​the river. Somme. Since attempts to break through the enemy’s defenses at one point, in a narrow area, were unsuccessful, a plan was developed to break through the defenses of German troops on a continuous wide front in the offensive zone of several armies. The start of the offensive was planned for July 1, 1916.

On June 15, Russian troops were supposed to launch an offensive in the Berlin strategic direction, divert the maximum of German troops and thereby ensure the success of the British and French offensive on the river. Somme.

The German command attached great importance to maintaining the strategic initiative. Therefore, it was decided to begin active operations in February in order to forestall the impending attack by the Entente armies. All German calculations again boiled down to the fact that France would not be able to endure a long, intense struggle.

Since Germany did not have the forces to attack on a wide front, it outlined a plan for a powerful strike in a narrow area - in such an important point as the Verdun fortified area. To protect it, the French command would be forced to abandon all available forces. This area covered the path to Paris.

In strategic planning and military-political management of the events of the 1917 campaign, governments and general staffs were forced to reckon with the growing protest of the popular masses against the imperialist war.

The Entente countries intended to use their economic and military superiority in the upcoming campaign and deliver decisive blows to the German-Austrian bloc. The February Revolution in Russia partially undermined these plans, and Russia's final withdrawal from the war significantly weakened the Entente. To some extent, this loss was compensated by the entry of the United States of America into the war (April 1917). The first American divisions arrived in the Western European theater of operations in the fall of 1917.

Germany, after huge losses, did not have the forces and means to conduct offensive operations. Therefore, the German command decided to go on the defensive on all fronts and use 1917 to accumulate reserves and increase military production.

In order to undermine the military-economic potential of the Entente, to disrupt the delivery of raw materials, food and troops from the colonies and from America, it was decided to deploy merciless submarine warfare, that is, blockade the shores of Europe with submarines and destroy merchant ships of even neutral countries carrying cargo to England or France.

The French and English armies, implementing the adopted strategic plan, crossed in April on the offensive, trying to break through the enemy front in the Reims-Soissons sector. Huge forces took part in the offensive: four armies, 5,580 guns, 500 aircraft, up to 200 tanks, and over 30 million shells were concentrated in the main direction alone.

German troops knew about the impending offensive and created a strong, layered defense in advance. Even a ten-day artillery preparation carried out in the direction of the main attack of the French and British troops did not crush the German defense. The advancing infantry suffered huge losses from German machine gun fire, and the tanks were almost completely destroyed by artillery fire. The French troops failed to advance beyond the second position in any sector.

In this unsuccessful operation, the French lost over 125 thousand people, and the British - 80 thousand. Mass anti-war protests began in the French army, brutally suppressed by the government.

In the summer and autumn, the armies of the Entente countries carried out several private operations, which were characterized by the massive use of artillery, aviation, tanks and other military equipment and extremely limited territorial successes of the attacking side. Among these operations, the operation at Cambrai is of great interest from the point of view of the history of military art.

The Entente countries failed to fulfill their strategic plans and achieve final victory over the German bloc in 1917.

Given the rapid growth of anti-war and revolutionary sentiments, the warring countries tried to massively use new military equipment to compensate for the decline in the morale of the troops and achieve victory.

The German command announced February 1, 1917. unlimited submarine warfare. Merchant ships heading to English ports were destroyed. England's shipping and economy suffered serious damage. Only by organizing a wide patrol service, anti-submarine defense and a system for convoying convoys of merchant ships was it possible to significantly reduce losses and ensure the uninterrupted supply of raw materials, food and other materials.

The 1917 campaign was marked by a further increase in artillery and air density and the first experiments in the massive use of tanks. In combination with other branches of the military, tanks were able to achieve a tactical breakthrough. However, it has not yet been possible to find means and ways to develop a tactical breakthrough into an operational one.

Further improvement of the defense continued. In order to increase its depth and stability, they began to build forward, cutoff and rear positions. The battle formations of formations and units were echeloned in depth. From a rigid, linear defense, the purpose of which was to hold the first position, German troops are moving to the so-called “elastic” defense, in which the temporary loss of one or more positions is allowed, and the enemy’s offensive is eliminated by counterattacks and attacks by second echelons and supplied reserves.

Campaign of 1918. End of the First World War.

Strategic plans for 1918 were developed in the context of and taking into account the growing revolutionary crisis in most of the warring countries. The imperialists of the Entente and the German bloc, alarmed by the victory of the October Revolution, along with the continuation of the armed struggle among themselves, organized a military intervention against Soviet Russia.

The Entente countries tried to eliminate Soviet power and force Russia to continue the war. In the Western European theater, the British and French intended to conduct active operations only after the arrival of large contingents of American troops in Europe.

The German command, taking into account the possibility of a revolutionary explosion in the country, decided to achieve victory in 1918 at any cost. The German imperialists developed adventurist plans for an offensive in the East and West. They wanted to seize the rich regions of the Soviet Republic and at the same time achieve decisive success in the Western European theater, where by the beginning of 1918 Germany had concentrated 193 divisions against 181 divisions of the Entente countries. Germany's opponents had significant reserves and had great superiority in tanks and aircraft.

Pursuing their aggressive goals, the German imperialists treacherously violated the truce with the Soviet Republic.

On February 18, 1918, they launched an offensive on the Russian-German front. At the call of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, the working people of our country rose up to defend the socialist Fatherland. At the same time, the Soviet state continued to fight for peace. On March 3, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed. Despite the difficult terms of the treaty for our country, the conclusion of peace was a huge success for the young Soviet Republic, which received a vitally needed peaceful respite.

Meanwhile, in the territories occupied by the German invaders (the Baltics, Belarus, Ukraine), a nationwide guerrilla war was unfolding. It fettered the forces of Germany, which were so necessary for it during the period when active operations unfolded in the Western European theater.

In March, German troops, concentrating 62 divisions, more than 6 thousand guns, 1 thousand mortars and 1 thousand aircraft on a 70-kilometer front, attacked the junction of the British and French armies in Picardy. The idea of ​​the operation was to push back the English armies to the English Channel coast and completely defeat them, after which to concentrate all forces against the French armies.

The offensive of the German troops in Picardy began on March 21 with a short (five hours) but powerful artillery preparation, during which not only the first position was suppressed and destroyed, but also firing positions, defensive structures, control posts, bridges and other important objects in the depths of the defense. The infantry attack was supported by a double barrage of fire and air assault strikes. The battle formations of the German infantry consisted of combat groups (squads and platoons), echeloned in depth.

During the first day of the operation, the German infantry advanced 3-7 km and continued the offensive in the following days. However, it was delayed by approaching French reserves. The German command did not have reserves at its disposal to build up forces and develop success. German troops, having advanced 65 km in two weeks of intense fighting, suffered heavy losses and were forced to stop the offensive. The strategic goals outlined by the command were not achieved, and the operation brought only partial successes that did not provide sufficient compensation for the losses incurred and the lengthening of the front line.

In order to retain the strategic initiative, the German command in the spring and summer of 1918 made several more offensive attempts with decisive goals, but these operations only led to the formation of “dents” and “protrusions”, to a stretching of the front and to new heavy losses that Germany there was nothing to make up for.

Already in August 1918, the Entente troops took the initiative. In the summer, French, British and American troops carried out a series of successive operations to eliminate the ledges formed as a result of previous German offensives.

The successful outcome of these operations showed that Germany had completely exhausted its capabilities and could not withstand the onslaught of the Entente armies. In the fall, the Entente armies launched a general offensive against Germany. It was carried out through simultaneous powerful attacks by the allied armies on various sectors of the front. Unable to withstand the hardships of the war, the German coalition collapsed: Bulgaria capitulated on September 29, Turkey withdrew from the war on October 30. Defeats at the front and the outbreak of the revolution forced Austria-Hungary to capitulate on November 3. The German government, in order to avoid complete defeat, at the beginning of October turned to the Entente countries with a proposal to begin negotiations on an armistice.

Germany, having lost all its allies, in an environment of continuous retreat and collapse at the front, and the rapid rise of the revolutionary struggle within the country, could no longer continue the war and on November 11, 1918. was forced to sign the terms of surrender dictated by the Entente. The First World War, which lasted four years and three and a half months, is over.

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS

The First World War arose in the context of the emerging general crisis of capitalism. Its most important political result was the further aggravation of this crisis, which was manifested especially clearly in the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the establishment of a socialist social system on one sixth of the globe.

Great changes have occurred on the political map of the world. The “dual monarchy” - Austria-Hungary - collapsed and ceased to exist. New states were formed in Europe: Hungary, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia. Under the terms of the Versailles Peace Treaty, the victorious countries took away all the colonies, Alsace, Lorraine, Saarland and other territories from Germany. Germany was deprived of the right to maintain an army of more than 100 thousand people, military aircraft, tanks, submarines and some other types of weapons.

The First World War had the main features of wars of the era of imperialism. For the first time in the history of mankind, a war acquired such a grand scale and destructive character.

Lenin's position that wars are now waged by peoples has been fully confirmed.

The war required enormous material costs, devastated many areas, destroyed and maimed tens of millions of people. About 10 million people died on the fronts, and 20 million people were wounded.

Consequently, modern wars are distinguished by their destructive power, which continuously increases as new means of armed struggle appear.

The First World War showed that the economic factor acquired extremely great importance in the era of imperialism. In order to organize material support for multimillion-dollar armies, it was necessary to restructure the economy on a military basis and mobilize all economic opportunities. Military production reached unprecedented levels; the entire territory of the warring country turned into a strategic rear. The superiority of the Entente's economic resources served as the material basis for its victory over the German bloc.

The moral factor also had a profound influence on the course and outcome of the war.

Strategy, operational art and tactics received significant development during the First World War. The war overturned the previous strategic theories that prevailed in the 19th century about the possibility of winning victory by defeating the enemy in one or more general battles. Therefore, the outcome of the war was determined only in a long, intense struggle.

The First World War was a war between two large imperialist factions. An important task of the strategy was to coordinate the efforts of the allied armies. The bourgeois military leaders were unable to solve the problems of coalition strategy, since acute internal contradictions are inherent in imperialist coalitions, and the selfish interests of each country prevail over the interests of the entire Union.

Military operations in the First World War unexpectedly acquired a positional character for all its participants. For a certain period, a situation developed where the defense turned out to be stronger than the offensive. The art of war found itself in a “positional dead end.” A way out of the deadlock was found when large masses of heavy artillery, tanks and combat aircraft appeared on the battlefields.

The long war showed that winning victory is unthinkable without the most extensive systematic efforts to prepare, build up and properly use strategic reserves.

The enormous scale of armed struggle during the First World War required a change in the methods of strategic management. A new structure of the highest governing bodies has emerged: headquarters - front (army group) - army.

The use of technical means of communication (telephone, telegraph, radio, airplanes, etc.) made it possible to increase the degree of centralization of control; During the war years, the armies lost their former independence and acted according to the directives of the main and front-line command.

The First World War constituted an important stage in the development operational art. During the war, the operation finally took shape as a set of battles and battles conducted by an operational formation according to a single plan and under a single leadership in order to solve a specific operational or strategic task.

The maneuver operations of 1914 were distinguished by their large scope. Five German armies, trying to outflank the French troops, advanced on a front of 250 km and in one month advanced to a depth of 400 km.

In the Battle of Galicia, four Russian armies advanced in a 400 km zone, advancing in 33 days to a depth of 200 km.

Six armies of the Entente in the operation on the river. The Marne advanced in a zone of up to 300 km and in 8 days pushed back the German troops by 50 km.

The average rate of advance in maneuver operations reached 8-10 km per day.

The most characteristic of the First World War were operations to break through the positional front. Such operations took various forms: a frontal attack in a narrow area (12-15 km); strike on a relatively wide continuous section of the front (40-80 km); simultaneous attack on a number of sectors on a wide front. The last form of operation is the most advantageous, since the enemy’s counter-maneuver to eliminate the resulting breakthrough was extremely difficult.

Only towards the end of the war was it possible to solve the problem of organizing a breakthrough of positional defenses through massive attacks by infantry, artillery, tanks and aviation. A new problem arose before the art of war - the development of a tactical breakthrough into an operational one. It remained unresolved until the end of the war, because the range of action of military equipment of those years did not extend beyond the tactical zone.

Tactics received great development during the First World War. The very nature of combat changed radically, which was due to the improvement of old and the emergence of new means of combat.

At the beginning of the war, almost all tasks of offensive combat were carried out by infantry forces. The small artillery carried out a short artillery preparation, but did not support the infantry at the time of the attack and did not accompany it during the battle in depth. The battle formation of infantry units and formations had no depth; it consisted of a dense rifle chain and reserves feeding it. When attacking, a single chain had weak impact and suffered heavy losses from enemy fire. The firepower of the chain was low, since machine guns and escort guns were not used in the offensive at that time.

The experience of the battles of 1914 revealed the need to increase the depth of battle formations and increase the firepower of the infantry in offensive combat. This was achieved by echeloning battle formations and saturating them with machine guns, mortars, flamethrowers and escort guns. Hand grenades and various types of grenade launchers are widely used. A new form of infantry combat formation emerged - “waves of chains”, and the intervals between the fighters in the chain increased, and the chains advanced one after another at a distance of 75-100 m.

With the advent of light machine guns, battalion and regimental mortars and cannons, as well as tanks, the form of battle formation of infantry units and formations changed again. Instead of “waves of chains,” small groups of infantry operated (from squad to platoon), which advanced with the support of tanks, escort guns and machine guns. Such groups could maneuver on the battlefield, suppress, destroy or bypass enemy firing points and strongholds, boldly penetrate into the depths of the defense, and conduct an offensive at a higher tempo.

Defensive combat tactics received great development during the First World War. At the beginning of the war, when going on the defensive, troops created one line of group rifle trenches and repelled the enemy’s advance with rifle, machine gun and artillery fire. It was a focal defense, lacking depth. It was based on small arms fire.

By the winter of 1914, the trenches were connected by a continuous narrow trench, holding which was the main task of the troops in defense.

To accommodate the reserves, the second and third trenches were built. The distance between the trenches is 100-150 m. Consequently, the defense was linear, its depth did not exceed 250-300 m. The battle formations of formations and units in the defense were not echeloned. The infantry division defended in a zone of 10-12 km.

In order to strengthen the stability of the defense and reduce losses from artillery fire, in the 1915 campaign they began to create a second position, 2-4 km from the first position, where divisional and corps reserves were located. Wire barriers were built in front of the first position.

In the 1916 campaign, defensive formations and units continued to form battle formations in one echelon, but the depth of defense increased due to the reduction of stripes and sections and the construction of third and intermediate positions. The division defended in a zone of 8-10 km, occupying the first and intermediate positions with the main forces and reserves of the regiments and the second position with divisional reserves. The third position housed corps reserves.

The total depth of defense reached 7-8 km.

Within the positions, forces were not distributed evenly, but were concentrated in well-equipped “resistance centers” (strong points) adapted for all-round defense.

In the 1917 campaign, they began to create a forward position (“forefield”) in order to hide the true front line from the enemy and reduce losses from artillery fire.

To repel tank attacks, they used cannon artillery and tore off anti-tank ditches. Consequently, the defense also became anti-tank.

Due to the great force of the initial attacks, which fell primarily on the first position, some changes occurred in the methods of defense. Temporary loss of one or more positions was allowed, the fight was transferred to the depths in order to defeat the enemy with counterattacks and counterattacks to the flank of the advancing groups and throw them back to their original positions.

An important point in the development of defense during the First World War was the development of a fortified area system that combined elements of long-term and field fortification.